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Transit in Metro Detroit: An Analysis of Problems and Solutions

Carsten Applegate

665 W. Willis Apt 201

Detroit, MI 48201

Wayne State University Master’s of Urban Planning

Originally submitted 24 May 2011

(248) 722‐6978

Transit in Metro Detroit 2

Acknowledgements

To Robin Boyle, Chair, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Wayne State

University. Many thanks for helping to refine my topic, for mentoring me during the

writing process and throughout my time at Wayne State, and for your commitment

to the development of livable cities.

To Tim Roseboom, Manager, Strategic Planning Division, Detroit Department of

Transportation. Thanks for lending your time and expertise to this project, for

giving me the opportunity to get to know DDOT from the inside, and for working

tirelessly to improve transit in Detroit.


Abstract

Mass transit has long occupied a prominent position in the debates over

revitalizing metro Detroit, and it has continually stymied any attempt at resolution.

Countless proposals and studies have been commissioned and left to gather dust,

and the region’s transportation problems have not abated. As the automobile‐

oriented road network in Southeast Michigan continues to crumble, and as rising

fuel prices and economic decline have made more and more metro Detroiters

dependent on the region’s bare‐bones mass transit network, the case for action has

never been clearer. A 2001 SEMCOG study ranked the Detroit area 21st out of 25

major metropolitan areas across the country in per capita transit spending, and it is

becoming increasingly clear that the region’s annual per capita spending of $19 is

inadequate to serve a region of this size. At the same time, the poor reliability and

inefficient operation of the existing service has made many metro‐area residents

and politicians reluctant to funnel money into a system that appears in need of

significant structural reform. This essay will analyze these issues in detail, present

possible solutions, and discuss the obstacles that must be overcome in order to

implement them. Source material will include the National Transit Database,

research on national best practices compiled by the Transit Cooperative Research

Program, archived articles from the Detroit Free Press, reports produced by DDOT

and SEMCOG, and an interview with Tim Roseboom, Manager of the Strategic

Planning and Scheduling Division at DDOT.


Local Revenue

Mass transit in the United States today is a public service, funded by some

combination of federal, state, and local tax revenue supplemented by passenger

fares. Farebox revenue is typically applied toward operating expenses, with any

remaining expenses covered by some form of local taxation. In Southeastern

Michigan, the Detroit Department of Transportation (DDOT) funds itself locally

through a subsidy from the City of Detroit’s general fund, while the Suburban

Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) raises local revenue from a

millage assessed in all member communities. In 2009, farebox revenue accounted

for 16% of DDOT’s operating budget, while the City general fund subsidy accounted

for 42% (NTD Transit Profile 2009, p. 394). Farebox revenue accounted for 12% of

SMART’s operating budget, while the local millage accounted for 45% of SMART’s

operating revenue and 1% of its capital expenditures (NTD Transit Profile 2009, p.

350).

Both methods of raising local revenue contain severe built‐in limitations that

adversely affect the ability of the systems to provide adequate transit service to the

Southeast Michigan region. DDOT’s method leaves it beholden to city government,

forced to compete with other city departments for scarce revenue. Its funding is

unstable and can be cut at any time, leading to service reductions that leave transit‐

dependent Detroiters stranded and make the system less useful and comprehensive

overall. The most recent round of cuts, implemented in 2009, saw the elimination of

the Grand Belt and Holbrook routes, as well as the end of weekend service on the


Russell and Oakland routes. At the time of this writing, DDOT is proposing even

more draconian cuts that would eliminate all 24‐hour service, increase most

evening and weekend headways to 60 minutes, and eliminate the Hayes and

Imperial Limited routes, thus severely curtailing all travel outside of peak hours.

The constant cycle of service cuts to which DDOT riders are subjected underscores

the need for a more stable source of local transit revenue.

While SMART’s millage does provide it with a dedicated stream of local

revenue not dependent on any individual city’s financial situation, the ability of

individual communities in Wayne and Oakland counties to opt in or out of the

millage every time it is up for renewal has created both revenue shortages and

logistical difficulties with providing transit service only to select communities.

Routes such as the 450 and 420 run non‐stop through the opt‐out communities of

Bloomfield Hills and Lathrup Village in Oakland County, and the lack of opt‐in

communities on the western fringe of Wayne County has precluded any

collaboration between SMART and transit providers such as the Ann Arbor Transit

Authority in adjacent Washtenaw County. The countywide opt‐in model in Macomb

County creates another set of problems, as Macomb residents who live north of 23

Mile Road pay into the system at the same millage rate as all other county residents,

but have no access to fixed‐route transit service.

These revenue sources are somewhat unusual among large‐city transit

systems in the United States. According to a 2009 report published as part of the

Transit Cooperative Research Program, locally dedicated and directly generated tax


revenue together account for approximately 34% of local transit revenue among

transit providers in urbanized areas of 200,000 or more, while local general funds

provide less than 12% of revenue. The majority of these directly generated and

locally dedicated funds, 45.5% and 57.5% respectively, come from sales taxes;

property taxes are far less common, with 7% and 5.8% (Jenks et al., 2009, p. 11).

The report also identifies a trend toward increased reliance on directly generated

funds, which are collected by the transit provider itself through some form of taxing

authority vested in it by the state, as opposed to locally dedicated funds, which are

collected by local governments or other entities with taxing authority and then

distributed to the transit provider. The report identifies both local general funds and

property taxes as revenue sources typically employed by relatively small transit

systems, and notes that sales taxes are gaining popularity (Jenks et al., 2009, p. 12).

Sales taxes are most commonly found at independent transit authorities, which are

more easily able to assess such taxes than agencies such as DDOT that are

structured as units of municipal or county governments (Jenks et al., 2009, p. 13).

While the fact that DDOT and SMART both rely on local revenue streams typically

associated with small‐city transit systems does not in itself make these streams

inadequate, the potential benefits of adopting national best practices in this area

should not be overlooked.

In order to gain a clearer picture of these benefits, it is useful to examine the

general criteria identified by the 2009 TCRP report for evaluating local and regional

funding sources. These criteria include revenue yield, adequacy, and stability; cost

efficiency; equity; economic efficiency; political and popular acceptability; and


technical feasibility (Jenks et al., 2009, p. 42). The salient issues in this case are with

the adequacy and stability of the revenue yields of both DDOT and SMART’s local

funding mechanisms, the equity and political and popular acceptability of SMART’s

mechanism in particular, and the prospects of remedying these issues by modifying

the funding sources without creating new issues in the process. The report notes

that, in contrast to the “sometimes uneven flow of funds” associated with reliance on

a local general fund, “sales taxes provide the greatest yield and stability as well as

being among the most broadly acceptable sources of funding for public

transportation” (Jenks et al., 2009, p. 16).

Despite the benefits offered by a dedicated regional sales tax for transit,

there are many legal and political hurdles to implementing one in metro Detroit.

Since the passage of Proposal A in 1994, the sales tax throughout Michigan has been

constitutionally capped at 6%, and neither local communities nor transit authorities

have the discretion to assess their own sales taxes. Before metro Detroit can even

consider adopting a regional sales tax for transit, the state constitution will have to

be amended by the state legislature, and the amendment approved by a statewide

vote. At the time of this writing, a constitutional amendment that would allow local

communities to assess their own sales taxes is pending in the Senate Finance

Committee in Lansing, and its sponsor, Sen. Bert Johnson of Detroit, has cited

improved transit in metro Detroit as one of his primary reasons for proposing it

(Walters, 2011). Even if this amendment meets with approval in the legislature and

at the ballot box, however, a specific sales tax proposal will still have to be approved

by voters in the affected areas. This raises questions about which parts of the metro


area to include in the proposal, which could prove to be a difficult balancing act. If

the tax covers too small an area, the potential improvement to regional mobility will

be limited, and if it covers too large an area, it will encounter opposition in the form

of exurban voters who would likely see little direct benefit from improved mass

transit. Roseboom suggests that a regional tax could be implemented according to

the model used in Dallas, where the transit authority initially included the city of

Dallas and a limited number of suburban communities, but every community

adjacent to the transit authority is periodically given the opportunity to opt in

through a recurring ballot initiative. Roseboom acknowledges that a sales tax would

be “by far the best way” to fund transit in metro Detroit, but argues that less‐

effective but more politically feasible options such as a gas tax, a vehicle registration

charge, or alcohol and tobacco taxes should also be considered as potential funding

sources for regional transit (personal communication, May 19, 2011).

State Revenue

State revenue for mass transit in Michigan is sourced primarily from the state

gasoline tax. The SEMCOG report (2001) notes that the most recent gas tax increase,

passed in 1997, was allocated entirely to roads, making further increases politically

unpalatable without improving the quality or availability of mass transit in the

Detroit area (p. 25). At that time, state funding for mass transit comprised 46% of

regional operating revenue, the fourth‐highest percentage among the 25

metropolitan areas studied by SEMCOG (p. 32). In the past decade, increasing gas

prices have led to a decline in gasoline consumption, putting pressure on Michigan’s


transit agencies from three separate corners: as ridership and fuel costs have

increased, state revenue has declined. In 2009, state revenue accounted for 31% of

DDOT’s operating revenue and 19% of its capital expenditures (NTD Transit Profile

2009, p. 394). State revenue accounted for 31% of SMART’s operating revenue and

20% of its capital expenditures (NTD Transit Profile 2009, p. 350).

Federal Revenue

Since the passage of the federal Urban Mass Transportation Act in 1964,

federal funds have been made available to publicly owned local transit agencies for

various purposes. Initially, these funds were provided for the purpose of purchasing

unprofitable privately owned transit systems and converting them to public

operation; the scope of such funding was later expanded to include both capital and

operating subsidies for publicly owned transit providers. In the early 1990s, the

federal government provided nearly 50% of operating revenue and 80% of capital

expenses to local transit providers, but by 2001 the operating subsidy had been all

but eliminated, and the capital improvement subsidy had decreased to 50%

(SEMCOG 2001, p. 26). Today, federal funds for mass transit are allocated through

the SAFETEA‐LU transportation authorization bill, which expired in 2009 and

remains temporarily in effect until Congress can craft a new bill. In 2009, federal

funds accounted for 9% of DDOT’s operating budget and 81% of its capital

expenditures (NTD Transit Profile 2009, p. 394). Federal funds accounted for 11%

of SMART’s operating revenue and 79% of its capital expenditures (NTD Transit

Profile 2009, p. 350).


Farebox Recovery

The percentage of operating revenue obtained from the farebox in the two

Detroit systems is quite low relative to comparably‐sized systems around the

country. While Austin, a clear outlier at 8%, funds a smaller proportion of its

operations through the farebox than either DDOT or SMART, cities as varied as

Minneapolis (28%), Milwaukee (27%), and Charlotte (19%) have substantially

higher recovery rates. It should be noted, however, that the results of the fare

increase implemented by SMART effective December 1, 2009 are not yet visible in

the most recent NTD data, which cover the 2009 reporting year. At public hearings

on DDOT’s proposed service reductions in 2009 and 2011, many riders expressed a

willingness to pay higher fares in order to maintain current levels of service and

improve the stability of the system.

Despite these sentiments, fare increases remain a politically difficult

proposition in metro Detroit due to the unreliability of the service and the high

levels of poverty among Detroit transit riders. In March, Detroit City Council

rejected a proposal put forth by DDOT that would increase the price of a regional

pass by 40% to $69.50, which had drawn criticism from Transportation Riders

United, a local transit advocacy organization; in a March 14th, 2011 email to TRU

members, executive director Megan Owens objected to the fact that DDOT’s plan

increased fares without improving service (CBS Detroit, 2011). However, Detroit’s

farebox recovery rates are sufficiently low and the systems’ financial situations

sufficiently dire that an overall fare increase could be considered as part of a larger


program of mass transit reforms and improvements. In the interest of simplicity and

user‐friendliness, fares should be coordinated between DDOT and SMART so that

regional passes and inter‐system transfers do not require additional payments; this

could be touted as a benefit of a revised fare structure. Continuation of the discount

programs for students, seniors, and the disabled would also mitigate the negative

impact of a fare increase. Further options for increasing farebox revenue,

specifically within DDOT, could include increased vigilance toward riders who

deliberately jam fareboxes with badly‐damaged bills and transfers, as well as more

coordinated efforts to repair malfunctioning fareboxes in a timely manner.

Schedule Adherence and Service Disruption

In addition to the relatively low level of transit service provided by DDOT

and SMART, the systems are plagued by reliability issues that deter choice riders

and erode public support for mass transit in metro Detroit. Roseboom

acknowledges that DDOT’s on‐street management is “not as tight as it needs to be,”

citing late pullouts, missed trips, and the tendency of some drivers to start a trip late

and speed down the line to catch up with the schedule. Roseboom points to several

factors that contribute to DDOT’s service issues. Dispatchers and road supervisors,

who approach their jobs very differently but whose duties overlap, engage in a sort

of “territorialism” regarding real‐time service monitoring and correction. Drivers,

for their part, often mistrust both groups; Roseboom notes that many drivers are

reluctant to call dispatchers for help when they get off schedule, and that they fear

disciplinary action on the basis of the Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) data used by


the dispatchers. Despite policy memos stating that such data cannot be used for that

purpose, this fear has proved difficult to dispel. Additionally, drivers rarely peer‐

pressure one another to adhere to the schedule, due in part to a mentality that

Roseboom calls “Fordism”—like workers on an assembly line, rank‐and‐file DDOT

employees tend to perform their specific jobs in isolation rather than focusing on

the larger picture of transit service, schedule adherence, and effectively moving

passengers from one point to another. This can result in a degree of contempt for

the passengers on the part of the drivers, many of whom think nothing of stopping a

bus mid‐route with passengers on board to purchase food or otherwise conduct

personal business (T. Roseboom, personal communication, May 19, 2011).

Vehicle Maintenance Procedures

DDOT has long suffered from maintenance‐related inefficiencies. In the case

of a breakdown in the field, for example, the bus driver is required to pull the

malfunctioning coach to the side of the road, call the bus terminal, and wait for a

mechanic to arrive in a maintenance truck. Once the mechanic arrives, he or she

must first attempt to repair the coach in the field; a replacement coach can only be

made available for the remainder of the trip if the mechanic fails to correct the

problem and determines that the coach must be repaired at the garage. This entire

process is so time‐consuming that, in nearly every instance of such a breakdown, it

is far more efficient for passengers to board the next scheduled coach on the line

when it passes the disabled coach than to wait for the disabled coach to be put back

into service or replaced. The disruption in service caused by such incidents is


therefore quite large; even in the case of a relatively minor defect that can be easily

repaired in the field, such as a malfunctioning windshield wiper that makes

operation in heavy rain treacherous, the coach is very commonly passed by its

follower while waiting for the maintenance truck. In addition to causing delays for

passengers who would have boarded the missed trip, such incidents dramatically

increase the passenger load on the following coach, causing further delays due to

the extra time required for these passengers to board and alight.

In order to eliminate or mitigate such inefficiencies, DDOT should adopt a

multifaceted approach that seeks to improve the efficiency of the maintenance

procedures themselves while pursuing strategies that mitigate the resulting service

disruptions as much as possible. In the case of the routine vehicle maintenance that

occurs at the garage, DDOT should seek to eliminate occurrences of vehicles leaving

the garage with developing problems that could lead to a field call. According to

DDOT’s service standards, 5% of maximum buses in service is the acceptable

threshold for service calls; DDOT should aggressively work to ensure that this

standard is consistently met. Many transit systems across the country have made

significant gains in vehicle maintenance productivity using a variety of strategies,

including time‐based standards for individual maintenance procedures,

standardization of maintenance processes aided by electronic diagnostics and

prepared parts kits, and cash incentives paid out to employees when reliability

targets are met. When implemented as a collaborative effort that closely involves

employee unions, these practices can greatly increase maintenance productivity and

cost‐effectiveness without adversely impacting employee morale or working


conditions (Venezia et al., 2004). Such strategies can help DDOT to utilize its limited

maintenance budget as efficiently as possible, while improving reliability by

ensuring that an adequate number of road‐ready buses is available at all times.

Increasing the availability of roadworthy coaches could allow spare coaches

to be immediately dispatched when maintenance issues arise, eliminating the need

for drivers and passengers to wait for time‐consuming field repairs. However, the

time required for a coach to reach far‐flung corners of the system from the two

currently operational terminal facilities is still relatively long, and may well exceed

the headway on higher‐service routes. One possible solution to this problem could

involve parking roadworthy spare coaches close to the areas of the city least‐

accessible from the terminals, or in high‐volume problem spots where breakdowns

frequently occur, and making them available for short‐notice replacement services.

DDOT’s “loop” properties in Dearborn, Delray, Grosse Pointe Park, and Rouge Park

could be utilized for this purpose, as could the Fairgrounds Transit Center property

and the Grandview Street turnaround off Grand River and Seven Mile. Efforts should

also be made to encourage maintenance truck operators to arrive at their

destinations more quickly after receiving field calls, reducing the need for spare

coaches by allowing minor maintenance to be performed quickly in the field, and

allowing broken‐down coaches to be more quickly returned to the terminal and

brought back into service. This could take the form of time standards for field calls

similar to those for repair procedures at the garage, speed bonuses paid to

maintenance staff who meet or exceed those standards, and closer monitoring by

dispatchers or supervisors.


Route Evaluations and Restructuring of Service

A route evaluation study conducted by TranSystems on behalf of DDOT in

2005 made a number of recommendations, including short route extensions to

connect to more employment centers and transfer points on the periphery of the

service area, short‐turning some routes to concentrate service on the highest‐

ridership portions of the routes without increasing costs, coordinating headways

between routes at key transfer points, and adding more express service, including

reverse‐commute service. While all of these ideas have some potential to improve

transit service in Detroit, Mayor Bing’s Detroit Works Project presents an entirely

different paradigm for the provision of city services than existed in 2005, and with it

comes the prospect that DDOT service will need to be significantly reshaped in

accordance with the forthcoming master plan for the city. DDOT’s route map has

been tweaked over the years, with routes being combined, separated, or eliminated,

but the basic layout has remained relatively constant since the streetcar era. Routes

such as the Clairmount, Oakland, and Caniff, partially designed around industrial job

centers that no longer exist, have evolved into neighborhood routes with relatively

low ridership and ever‐decreasing levels of service. Meanwhile, routes such as

Woodward, Dexter, and Gratiot, which continue to serve the commuting needs of

large numbers of Detroiters, routinely carry standing loads during peak periods and

have maintained service at near‐walkup levels. Rather than cutting service across

the board within the existing route structure, DDOT may be better served going

forward by rethinking that structure entirely and exploring more creative ways to

compensate for the system’s declining operations budget. Roseboom says that


DDOT is currently working on an updated service plan that will take the Detroit

Works plan into account, but at the time of this writing it is still several months from

completion (personal communication, May 19, 2011).

Although it is not yet evident what the final results of the Detroit Works

Project will be, the general proposition of concentrating population, investment, and

resources in the most viable parts of the city suggests that it will have significant

implications for transit service in Detroit. DDOT’s dense grid of feeder routes tying

mainlines together may prove impractical and inefficient in some parts of a post‐

Detroit Works city of noncontiguous population centers; even today, routes such as

the Clairmount and Caniff traverse large swaths of defunct industrial land that

generate few, if any, trips. If the Detroit Works plan ultimately results in large

sections of existing feeder routes being routed through greenbelt areas, some of

these routes may need to be reimagined as a series of shorter, less linear

neighborhood circulator routes that would exist primarily to connect mainlines to

nearby residential areas. Mainline routes would serve the densest parts of the city,

and the feeder routes would branch outward beyond walking distance. This could

allow transfers to be more easily coordinated between routes, as each feeder route

would only interact with one or two mainlines. Another potential model could

involve the designation of transit nodes throughout the city, perhaps using existing

neighborhood retail districts for the purpose, and running short spokelike feeder

routes away from the mainline in several directions. Different models would likely

emerge in different parts of the city, depending on factors such as the geographic

size of the Detroit Works clusters in those areas, the size of the transit‐riding


population, the number of mainlines in close proximity, and the physical layout of

each neighborhood.

One important consideration in any such service modification is ensuring

that it adheres to Title VI regulations. A provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

Title VI prevents transit agencies from making service changes that

disproportionately impact low‐income or minority populations. This presents a

challenge for any service plan based on the Detroit Works Project in the near term,

as the few remaining residents in the emptiest parts of the city are largely low‐

income people without the resources to move into more stable areas. Roseboom

notes that residents of these neighborhoods are more likely to be transit‐dependent,

and that even relatively empty areas of the city continue to generate significant

numbers of trips for DDOT (personal communication, May 19, 2011). Any

comprehensive Detroit Works‐based redesigns may therefore have to wait until the

plan has been fully implemented, so that its effects on commuting patterns in

Detroit can be studied in detail.

Efficiency gains could also be realized by rethinking DDOT’s late‐night

service. Currently, nine routes operate on a 24‐hour schedule, with hourly service

between 2 and 5am. DDOT’s proposed cutbacks for June 2011 include eliminating

this service entirely, which would leave transit‐dependent riders completely

stranded during those hours, unable to take jobs requiring them to travel to work at

night. The service evaluation (2005), prepared by TranSystems on behalf of DDOT,

notes that “employees of health service, fast food, and manufacturing employers are


most likely to need transportation during these hours,” and calls late‐night service a

“safety net” for transit‐dependent Detroiters (p. 4‐26). Rather than eliminating this

crucial service, which would have significant long‐term ramifications in terms of

accessibility in the city, DDOT should seek to redesign it to make it as effective and

efficient as possible.

This redesign should begin with an acknowledgement that night buses need

not necessarily follow the same routes as daytime service. Cities such as Munich in

Germany have entirely different daytime and nighttime transit maps, allowing them

to create a far more comprehensive nighttime system with far fewer operational

routes than would be possible using DDOT’s method of selecting a limited number

of daytime routes to operate on a 24‐hour basis. A separate nighttime route map

could allow routes with a common endpoint to be combined into a single route,

taking advantage of the shorter runtimes needed to complete lightly travelled late‐

night trips. Similarly, buses could detour from their regular routes to facilitate

transfers or provide transit access to neighborhoods otherwise cut off from

nighttime service, and buses on different routes could wait for several minutes at

key transfer points to ensure that no riders are stranded in either direction. DDOT

should seek to determine through data collection whether nighttime commuting

patterns differ in terms of origin and destination from daytime ones, and should

seek to base the routes on customer demand rather than compatibility with the

daytime layout. Nighttime operations could be concentrated at a single terminal

while the other is idled overnight, as these routes would exist outside the current

division of routes between terminals. The challenge with such a model, however, is


that late‐night route maps must be made readily available to riders in order to

minimize the confusion inherent in having separate daytime and nighttime systems,

and the changeover itself would necessarily incorporate an extensive and well‐

publicized rider education process to ensure that riders are able to readily adapt to

the new system.

Potential cost savings could also be realized through the use of smaller

vehicles on circulator and late‐night routes, perhaps similar in size to those

currently used for demand‐response paratransit service. This would minimize fuel

costs and wear and tear on the full‐size coaches, and would free up more of the main

fleet to be kept in reserve or placed into regular mainline service. As the operating

hours of the late‐night and circulator routes would complement one another, these

smaller vehicles could be kept in continuous service in various parts of the city

throughout the day and night. While the purchase of such vehicles would not reduce

the need for operators, increasingly volatile fuel prices and maintenance issues with

DDOT’s regular fleet could make this an attractive long‐term investment. As a capital

expenditure, however, such a purchase would most likely be made with federal

dollars and would therefore require federal approval.

Governance and Regional Integration

One oft‐discussed means of improving transit in metro Detroit is the creation

of a regional transit authority (RTA) that would assume responsibility for all transit

operations within the metropolitan region. Such an authority could take a variety of

different forms, ranging from a basic umbrella organization that would coordinate


service and distribute state and federal funding to an entirely new transit agency

that would replace DDOT and SMART and assume responsibility for operating all

existing and future transit service in the metropolitan area. In addition to the fixed‐

route and paratransit services provided by DDOT and SMART, an authority could

preside over the Detroit Transportation Corporation’s downtown Detroit People

Mover system, SEMCOG’s planned commuter service from Detroit to Ann Arbor, and

the public‐private Woodward Light Rail partnership, and could help facilitate

pending efforts to extend the light rail line into Oakland County. Despite repeated

efforts spanning several decades to create such an authority, however, success has

proven elusive.

The first such attempt was the seven‐county Southeastern Michigan

Transportation Authority (SEMTA), created by an act of the state legislature in 1967.

By the mid‐1970s, SEMTA had taken over the patchwork of struggling private bus

companies that serviced various Detroit suburbs, incorporating them into a new

publicly funded regional transit system. SEMTA also collected and administered

federal and state funds on behalf of the Detroit Department of Street Railways (DSR),

the publicly owned transit agency that had serviced the City of Detroit since 1922.

Like the private suburban systems, the DSR was struggling financially, as farebox

revenues were increasingly insufficient to cover the system’s costs. When the DSR

was reorganized into DDOT in 1974, a general fund subsidy was put into place as a

short‐term solution to keep the system solvent until it could be fully absorbed into

SEMTA. Growing animosity between the City of Detroit and SEMTA during the

1970s and 1980s prevented this from occurring, however, and in 1989, SEMTA was


reorganized into the Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation

(SMART), a tri‐county suburban bus system that excluded the City of Detroit. As

SMART did not inherit SEMTA’s designation as the regional transit provider for the

Detroit area, DDOT was no longer obligated to coordinate with the new agency to

apply for federal or state funding. DDOT’s stopgap general fund subsidy has

remained its only source of local revenue ever since (Craig, 2011). Roseboom

considers SEMTA an example of the limitations of a regional authority with no

dedicated local funding source, noting that the City of Detroit continued to subsidize

SEMTA from its general fund until SMART’s present millage was put into place in

1994 (personal communication, May 19, 2011).

More recently, enabling legislation to create a Detroit Area Regional

Transportation Authority (DARTA) passed both houses of the Michigan Legislature

in 2002. This legislation, introduced in November 2001 by then‐Rep. Kwame

Kilpatrick, would have resulted in a seven‐county authority with board members

selected from Detroit and each member county. Among other responsibilities, the

authority would have been tasked with creating a master plan for regional transit

and determining how the system should be funded (Michigan Legislature, 2001).

Ultimately, the bill was vetoed by Governor Engler on his last day in office; as

reported in the Detroit Free Press, Engler’s veto was motivated by the defeat of

another bill in the legislature that would have created 15 new charter schools in

Detroit. The DARTA legislation was reintroduced in 2003 with the support of

Governor Granholm, but lost support after it was weakened by amendments

allowing communities to easily opt out of the new authority (Gray, 2003).


Once these bills stalled in the legislature, the so‐called Big Four—the

executives of Wayne and Oakland counties, the mayor of Detroit, and the

chairperson of the Macomb County Board of Commissioners—attempted, with the

governor’s blessing, to bypass the legislature by transferring the powers of the

Regional Transit Coordinating Council to a newly‐created regional transit authority.

This prompted a lawsuit from two AFSCME union locals representing DDOT’s

maintenance and clerical employees, alleging that the authority was created illegally

and should be dissolved. The case worked its way from the Wayne County Circuit

Court through the Michigan Court of Appeals to the state Supreme Court, where the

AFSCME lawsuit was upheld. The fledgling RTA, then in the process of hiring a CEO,

was forced to dissolve, leaving $850,000 in federal funds on the table (Detroit Free

Press Editorial, 2006). Another enabling bill was introduced in the state House in

2009, but was never brought to a vote; the City of Detroit expressed opposition to

the bill, due largely to concerns that implementation of an RTA at that time could

interfere with the approval process for federal funding for the Woodward Light Rail

project (Detroit Free Press Editorial, 2010).

Each of these proposals received broad‐based support from transit advocates

in the metropolitan area, and each had the potential to improve coordination

between the systems, to create a master plan and make recommendations for

transit improvements, and to apply for state and federal grants based on these

recommendations. In the interest of improving their viability in the state legislature,

however, all of these proposals shied away from giving DARTA the ability to fund

itself at the local level through direct taxation within its service area, leaving the


funding issue to be decided at a later date. Roseboom regards this as a fundamental

omission, contending that reform of the governing structure of transit in metro

Detroit is less important than securing adequate funding for the system and

increasing the level of service. Roseboom believes that the DARTA proposals have

provided cover for transit skeptics such as Oakland County Executive L. Brooks

Patterson to present themselves as transit supporters by touting their endorsement

of these unfunded proposals while continuing to oppose new taxes for transit (T.

Roseboom, personal communication, May 19, 2011).

How, then, should a successful regional transit authority be structured?

Roseboom contends that the most successful model would be a taxing authority that

assessed a regional tax and distributed it to the various transit agencies according to

an agreed‐upon formula. A similar model currently exists in Chicago, where

agencies such as CTA and Metra exist independently of one another and provide

different types of service to the Chicago area, but are funded through a single

regional authority that collects and distributes revenue. At the same time,

Roseboom believes that DDOT should be transformed from a city department into

an independent authority. Citing the models of the Detroit Transportation

Corporation and SMART, Roseboom contends that both agencies benefit from their

ability to negotiate their own labor and purchasing contracts and to hire employees

directly into the system. Whereas SMART, for example, posts job openings on its

Web site, DDOT’s employees are hired through the city’s civil service system, which

requires any job openings to be offered to current city employees in other

departments before they can be posted publicly. If DDOT were spun off from the city


government, says Roseboom, “we wouldn't be relying on Labor Relations with 45

other departments, and a lot of case law and precedent that's very, very unfavorable

towards management." Given greater flexibility to manage their own workforce,

Roseboom argues that DDOT administrators would be able to address the system’s

issues far more easily and effectively. Having studied the possibility of splitting

DDOT from the city in his capacity as a DDOT transit planner, Roseboom says that

such a split would be technically feasible, particularly if enabling provisions were

incorporated into a revised city charter, but that such a plan would likely encounter

strong opposition from the affected AFSCME and ATU locals (T. Roseboom, personal

communication, May 19, 2011).

Although amalgamating DDOT and SMART into a single transit agency would

presumably accomplish the goal of separating DDOT from the City of Detroit,

Roseboom does not believe it would confer the same benefits as having two

separate systems under a single taxing authority. Citing state law regarding such

mergers that requires existing workers from both systems to be held harmless,

Roseboom contends that the merged system would inherit DDOT’s less‐flexible

work rules and higher structural costs along with SMART’s higher hourly wage rates,

making the new system both less flexible and less efficient than either of the existing

systems. Roseboom also notes that any increased efficiency resulting from merged

operations and administrative staff would be relatively minimal, as there is

currently little duplication of service between DDOT and SMART, and

administration does not make up a significant proportion of the operating costs of

either system (T. Roseboom, personal communication, May 19, 2011).


The specific issues facing mass transit in Detroit have developed over a

period of many decades due to a complex combination of factors, and they will take

time and effort to resolve. The larger issue, however, is that transit simply has not

been a priority of either politicians or voters, and this has transformed problems

that should be relatively manageable into festering sores that continue to impede

progress in the region. In city after city across the United States, city dwellers,

suburbanites, politicians, and business leaders have put aside their differences and

recognized that quality transit is a key part of a successful region. It is long past time

for metro Detroiters to do the same. Given a sufficiently large, vocal constituency

willing to transcend ideology and work toward common goals, any of the issues

raised in this essay can be solved. If metro Detroit is to transform itself into a

thriving metropolis with a 21st‐century economy, mass transit must be prioritized.


References

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for Public Transportation. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board.

Lowe, S. & Thiel, C. (2002). Bill Analysis: House Bill 5467 and House Bill 5468. Retrieved from http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2001‐2002/billanalysis/Senate/htm/2001‐SFA‐5467‐F.htm

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(2010). Federal Transit Administration, US Department of Transportation. Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (2001). Improving Transit in Southeast

Michigan: A Framework for Action. TranSystems Corporation (2005). Final Report: DDOT Route Evaluation Study. Venezia, F. W., et al. (2004). TCRP Synthesis 54: Maintenance Productivity Practice.

Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board. Walters, M. (2011, April 8). Let local governments charge sales tax, lawmaker says.

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