transforming violent conflict

20019cb0coverv05bjpg

Transforming Violent Conflict

This book investigates intractable conflicts and their main verbal manifestation ndash radical disagreement ndash and it explores what can be done in the communicative sphere when conflict resolution fails

Conflict resolution sees radical disagreement as a terminus to dialogue that must be overcome from the outset not learnt from The book argues that on the contrary radical disagreement ndash agonistic dialogue ndash is the key to linguistic intractability When dialogue for mutual understanding proves premature it is agonistic dialogue that needs to be acknowledged explored understood and man-aged through a strategic engagement of discourses This is illustrated through the Israeli-Palestinian conflict It begins not with exchanges between conflict parties but with inclusive strategic dialogue within them This approach challenges some of the basic assumptions in the fields of discourse analysis conflict analysis and conflict resolution and opens up new possibilities for discursive engagement It also has wider implications for cognate disciplines such as applied ethics demo-cratic theory cultural studies and the philosophy of difference

This book will be of great interest to students of conflict resolution peace and conflict studies ethnic conflict security studies and international relations as well as to practitioners and analysts

Oliver Ramsbotham is Emeritus Professor of Conflict Resolution at the University of Bradford UK Chair of the Oxford Research Group President of the Conflict Research Society and co-author of Contemporary Conflict Resolution

Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict ResolutionSeries Editors Tom Woodhouse and Oliver RamsbothamUniversity of Bradford

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Truth Recovery and Justice after Conflict Managing violent pastsMarie Breen Smyth

Peace in International RelationsOliver Richmond

Social Capital and Peace-BuildingCreating and resolving conflict with trust and social networksEdited by Michaelene Cox

Business Conflict Resolution and PeacebuildingDerek Sweetman

Creativity and Conflict ResolutionAlternative pathways to peaceTatsushi Arai

Climate Change and Armed ConflictHot and cold warsJames R Lee

Transforming Violent ConflictRadical disagreement dialogue and survivalOliver Ramsbotham

Transforming Violent ConflictRadical disagreement dialogue and survival

Oliver Ramsbotham

First published 2010by Routledge2 Park Square Milton Park Abingdon Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge270 Madison Avenue New York NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor amp Francis Group an informa business

copy 2010 Oliver Ramsbotham

All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic mechanical or other means now known or hereafter invented including photocopying and recording or in any information storage or retrieval system without permission in writing from the publishers

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataRamsbotham OliverTransforming violent conflict radical disagreement dialogue and survival Oliver Ramsbotham

p cm1 Sociolinguistics 2 Social conflict 3 Violence 4 Discourse analysis 5 Conflict (Psychology) 6 Human behavior I Title P40R36 201030644mdashdc22 2009031309

ISBN 10 0-415-55207-9 (hbk)ISBN 10 0-415-55208-7 (pbk)ISBN 10 0-203-85967-7 (ebk)

ISBN 13 978-0-415-55207-3 (hbk)ISBN 13 978-0-415-55208-0 (pbk)ISBN 13 978-0-203-85967-4 (ebk)

This edition published in the Taylor amp Francis e-Library 2010

To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor amp Francis or Routledgersquoscollection of thousands of eBooks please go to wwweBookstoretandfcouk

ISBN 0-203-85967-7 Master e-book ISBN

For Meredith Edward Ben and Zand

Contents

List of figures and boxes ixPreface xi

Prologue having the first word 1

PART I

Radical disagreement and intractable conflict 15

1 Radical disagreement and discourse analysis 17

2 Radical disagreement and conflict analysis 33

3 Radical disagreement and conflict resolution 52

PART II

Radical disagreement and the transformation of violent conflict 93

4 Methodology studying agonistic dialogue 95

5 Phenomenology exploring agonistic dialogue 109

6 Epistemology understanding agonistic dialogue 133

7 Praxis managing agonistic dialogue 165

8 Re-entry feeding back into conflict settlement and conflict transformation 205

PART III

Radical disagreement and the future theoretical and practical implications 223

9 Radical disagreement and human difference 225

10 Radical disagreement and human survival 240

Epilogue having the last word 249

Glossary 253References 255Index 267

Figures and boxes

Figures

P1 A family quarrel the disagreement 9 P2 A family quarrel the description 10 P3 A family quarrel disquotation A 11 P4 A family quarrel disquotation B 12 21 Contextual internal and relational conflict theories 35 22 The conflict triangle 43 23 Conflict in Sri Lanka a systems perspective 48 24 Understanding the Burundi conflict a systems perspective 49 31 Winndashlose losendashlose winndashwin 54 32 Prisonerrsquos dilemma pay-off matrix 55 33 Positions interestsvalues and needs 67 41 Analysis of the argument structure of the 1982 Weinberger

Open Letter 97 71 Evaluation of scenarios preferences and capabilities 175 72 The hexagon of radical disagreement 192 81 The hourglass model of conflict escalation and de-escalation 206 E1 The window 251 E2 The picture 251 E3 The mirror 252

Boxes

11 Example of conversation between caller to a radio phone-in show and its host as transcribed in conversation analysis 20

12 Truth and validity 23 21 Interpretations of the Northern Ireland conflict 35 31 The tetralemma applied to the SinhalandashTamil conflict in

Sri Lanka 85 71 Regaining the Initiative executive summary 27 August 2008 171 72 The requirement of a new discourse 182

x Figures and boxes

73 Official translation of the Arab Peace Initiative 186 74 Letter from the Israeli Ambassador to the UK 188 75 A Last Chance for a Two-State IsraelndashPalestine Agreement

executive summary 198

Preface

Human beings do not struggle in silence once conflict parties have formed In the most serious political conflicts wars of words play as significant a role as wars of weapons Wars of words are propaganda battles and contests for media control But at a deeper level they are also conflicts of belief They are clashes of perspective horizons and visual fields They are gravitational battles I call them radical disa-greements The original title of this book was Radical Disagreement Managing Agonistic Dialogue When Conflict Resolution Fails

Radical disagreement is the chief linguistic manifestation of intense and intractable political conflict Political conflict is conflict in which conflict parties recommend incompatible outcomes in the one public world ndash and act accordingly if they have the power to do so Either a bomb is dropped or it is not dropped Either a baby is aborted or it is not aborted Either a sovereign state is created or it is not created Either a form of government is instituted or it is not instituted Analysts wedded to deconstructive notions and practitioners committed to the idea that all conflicts can be transformed may not like this or want to recognize it But crude brutal and simplistic though it may be intractable political conflict obstinately persists

Intense conflict is conflict in which stakeholders mind very much indeed which outcome prevails And in the war of words conflict parties cannot lsquoagree to dis-agreersquo when given the power to do so they ride roughshod over the otherrsquos dearest interests Intractable conflict is conflict in which attempts at settlement and transformation have so far failed I say lsquoso farrsquo because it is always possible that these attempts will succeed in the future as systemic conflict transformation wants and as has happened in many other cases But lsquoso farrsquo can go on for years if not decades during which time unimaginable destruction and damage to human lives and life-hopes is ndash often unnecessarily ndash inflicted This book asks what hap-pens in the communicative sphere during this period and what if anything can be done about it

The photograph on the front cover of this book shows one result of the physical conflict between Israelis and Palestinians ndash the Israeli security barrier What is the equivalent in the war of words Verbal wars are different to physical wars They introduce another order of complexity What is the analogy to combat between armies What is the equivalent of the territory being fought over How is victory

xii Preface

distinguished from stalemate or defeat Who decides One army destroys another army What is the analogue in the war of words

Why is it worth trying to find answers to these questions Because otherwise there is no prospect of understanding the nature of linguistic intractability And without an understanding of linguistic intractability there is no prospect of learning how to manage the communicative aspects of those conflicts that are most resistant to settlement or transformation

I first became preoccupied with these questions 30 years ago at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution Since then I have writ-ten studies of radical disagreement in a number of different arenas

bull public policy as in the nuclear weapon debate and the humanitarian inter-vention debate

bull ideological confrontation as in the religionsecularism debate and the MarxismThatcherism debate

bull public issues as in the abortion debate and the environment debatebull specific political conflicts as in the Falklands war or the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict

All of these disagreements are drawn upon in what followsThe topic of this book ndash radical disagreement ndash comes relatively late in the evolu-

tion of human conflict In the long and ferocious history of oppression exclusion domination and exploitation most of the victims ndash the poor women suppressed cultures and peoples indigenous populations who have been decimated driven out or enslaved ndash have suffered in silence over long decades and centuries These are the inarticulate And the oppressors want to keep it that way That is why although this book begins late when conflict parties have formed and challengers have found a voice and although as a result this book does not make a contribution before that moment from then on its topic is not neutral in the ongoing struggle To take radical disagreement seriously in the first place ndash to attempt to study explore understand and manage it as outlined in Part II ndash is already to be opposed by internal and external hegemons

The hegemonic discourse has huge resources for controlling public discursive space But in radical disagreement minusas investigated in this book ndash the challenger does not vacate public space in response or try to resist only from the margins or attempt to transfer the struggle to a new discursive arena supposedly free from domination or even want to share the public space with the hegemonic discourse Whatever the power imbalance right up to the limit where access to public space is denied altogether the aim of the challenging discourse is to occupy the whole of discursive space in turn In asymmetric conflict the promotion of radical dis-agreement is revolutionary The fact that one army destroys another army shows the sense in which contending belief systems and discourses do not coexist either In intractable conflicts there is no room for this Such lack of discursive space is at the epicentre of linguistic intractability A radical disagreement is a singularity in the universe of discourse

Preface xiii

And the same applies to the discourse of peacemaking As developed from Chapter 6 onwards in the linguistic struggle to occupy the one discursive space the discourse of peacemaking is a further discourse struggling to replace the other claimants The language of discursive lsquotransformationrsquo may be preferred to the language of discursive elimination but the preferred direction of transformation is pre-determined or pre-approved by the peacemaker including the lsquoelicitiversquo peacemaker And the hoped-for change is one in which the transformed discourses are no longer as they were before

PrologueHaving the first word

Not all conflicts are settled or transformed The most serious political conflicts are those where settlement and transformation fail ndash or are yet to succeed These are the intractable conflicts Intractable conflicts ruin families and engulf whole nations They drag on for years destroying lives and persisting in their virulence down the generations The Israeli-Palestinian conflict for example was ignited long before the time of the declaration of the State of Israel in May 1948 and was still raging unquenched when I was writing this early in 2009

This book is about radical disagreements which are the chief linguistic mani-festation of intractable conflicts They are a key element in that intractability They cannot be reduced to other determinants Here is an example of a radical disagree-ment associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and taken from Palestinian and Israeli school textbooks (Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace 2000ndash1 selected and rearranged)

|lsquoBefore the partition of Palestine in 1947 the Palestinian population of 1364330 made up 69 and the Jewish population of 608230 made up 31 of the overall population The Palestinians owned some 95 of the land where they had lived for centuries Nearly all the Jewish people were recent immi-grants ndash in 1922 there were only 84000 (census data) Yet UN Resolution 181 called for a division in which Palestinian land would be 4288 and Jewish land 5712 The word lsquocatastrophersquo actually expresses what happened to this nation which was subjected to massacres about which only a little is known There are still facts which are so dreadful that pens cannot write them What happened to the Palestinian people is the assassination of rights murder of the land and uprooting of human beings David Ben-Gurion said ldquoWe should destroy Arab pockets in Jewish areas such as Lod Ramlah Beisan and Zirrsquoin which will constitute a danger when we invade and thus may keep our forces engagedrdquo The destruction of 418 Palestinian villages inside the pre-67 Israeli border concealing the landmarks of Palestinian life and the massacres against the Palestinian people are the best evidence for the brutality to which Palestinians were exposed They were dispersed throughout the world The Jewish State of Israel was declared in May 1948 By the time of the ceasefire in 1949 Israel held 78 of historic Palestine and the Palestinians were left

2 Prologue

with 22 Nearly 1400000 inhabited Palestine in 1948 After the catastrophe about 750000 Palestinians wandered with nowhere to go In 1967 Israel occupied the remaining 22 of the land of Palestine ndash and began building set-tlements even on that land encroachments that have expanded to this dayrsquo

lsquoThe land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people Here their spiritual religious and national identity was formed Here they achieved independence and created a culture of national and universal significance Here they wrote and gave the Bible to the world Exiled from Palestine the Jewish people remained faithful to it in all the countries of their dispersion never ceasing to pray and hope for their return and for the restoration of their national freedom On November 29 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution for the establishment of an independent Jewish State in Palestine We offered peace and unity to all the neighbouring states and their peoples But what we were then up against was as clear as daylight for us Until this very day I canrsquot understand how people donrsquot realize that we faced a continua-tion of the European Holocaust that we the Jews in the land of Israel were facing extermination That was the plan and we saw and heard it There were gangsters and murderers throughout the land ndash on roads and in settlements ndash and then came the invasions by seven Arab states The bitter understanding that if we donrsquot win we will be wiped out was one of the formative experiences of the generation Thus we foughtrsquo|

I take what appears here ndash tokens of speech acts indicated by sets of inverted com-mas ndash as an example of radical disagreement in written notation and mark it out as such between bar lines | | If the bar lines are empty there is not enough in common for there to be radical disagreement This is mutual misunderstanding If the bar lines disappear there is too much in common This is mutual convergence These are limits to radical disagreement Radical disagreements of this kind are integral to the conflicts with which they are associated and which they do so much to feed ndash the only parts of the conflict that can be reproduced and transmitted in this way

In the example given above we do not yet know who is speaking from what position in what context to what end or with what result We do not know whether the speakers are directly responding to each other Strong emotion is expressed but we do not see gestures or facial expressions or hear the intensity of tone or voice This is a translation from Arabic and Hebrew We do not know how accurate the translation is or what connotations and meanings embedded in different social systems have been lsquolost in translationrsquo

Nevertheless despite all this what is recorded is a putative example of radical disagreement It already stands in need of exploration on its own terms ndash what I call the lsquophenomenologyrsquo of radical disagreement or the study of what conflict parties say If we want to gain insight into the linguistic intractability that lies at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict we do well to take it very seriously indeed The phenomenology of radical disagreement may seem superficial from the perspective of the sociology or the psychology or the political economy or the cultural history

Prologue 3

of verbal contestation for reasons noted below But I argue that it is precisely the phenomenology of radical disagreement ndash the exploration of agonistic dialogue itself ndash that gives us our deepest insight into the nature of linguistic intractability ndash an insight not found elsewhere and not reducible to other determinants

Here is another example of radical disagreement from the same conflict I use the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a running theme throughout the book both because of its intrinsic significance and because in 2007 and 2008 it was my own main field of empirical enquiry into the nature of radical disagreement through a European Union-funded initiative (see Chapter 7) This example comes from Jay Rothmanrsquos work on Israeli-Palestinian dialogue

|lsquoFor we Israelis our past lingers We do not forget it We are ultimately the most alone and historically insecure and persecuted people in this world But we also have a positive self Not only are we here because we have been chased and murdered and hated and scapegoated we are also here in this our own land in this our own birthright to develop ourselves as individuals and as a community and to welcome our brethren who come standing upright or bent over with burdens Jerusalem is our soul For thousands of years we have prayed to return to it we say in our prayers lsquoIf I forget thee O Jerusalem let my right hand forget its cunningrsquo Without Jerusalem we are as if we were not and thus will not be Our memory of our past provides us strength now and assurance of the future Jerusalem is ourselves ndash past present and futurersquo

lsquoFor we Palestinians it is very clear our dignity has been crushed our ability to determine the fate of our future to ensure that our children grow up with a sense of purpose and direction not reactive and hostile but creative has been undermined We need to ensure that our grandchildren ndash itrsquos too late for us and our sons and daughters ndash do not grow up chased beaten and imprisoned and that they who are children of a highly educated people will grow up with a sense of national honor and communal identity Jerusalem is the core of our cause the core of ourselves We must fulfil ourselves through it and by it We must rule ourselves here And from Jerusalem the moral cultural and spiritual strength of our nation will growrsquo|

(Rothman 1992 185ndash6)

How can this conflict be settled or resolved Innumerable possible solutions to the problem of Jerusalem have been suggested and promoted some even getting close to formal agreement at certain moments (for example the idea that West Jerusalem remains Israeli and Arab East Jerusalem becomes the capital of a new Palestinian state with mutual guarantees of access to holy places) It is possible that an agreement along these lines may be reached in future But while the con-flict remains intractable it is radical disagreement of this kind that stands most in need of exploration within the communicative sphere if both the challenge and the possibilities for transformation are to be understood

Before developing this theme further I will introduce two issues that will be

4 Prologue

preoccupations throughout the book The first is a reservation about taking radical disagreements at face value given human duplicity The second is the suspicion that the phenomenon of radical disagreement itself taken as a whole is contingent on deeper gender and culture differences

The question of sincerity

Is it not well known that lsquoall men are liarsrsquo Are human beings not highly skilled at deceiving both others and themselves (Aughey 2002) There is deliberate decep-tion as practiced by political propagandists like Goebbels or Stalin (lsquoa lie always has a stronger effect than the truth the main thing is to obtain onersquos objectiversquo ndash Stalin quoted in Montefiore 2007 349) But also do people not tend to believe what they want to believe And are they not shaped in their beliefs by external and internal conditioning and manipulation Does this not leave ample textual evidence amenable to analysis and exposure by qualified experts So is it not naive to take what people say in radical disagreements at face value

The study of radical disagreement does not take what people say at face value It begins with what people say (the phenomenon or what appears between bar lines in written notation) but in most radical disagreements with which I am familiar all the points made above are found to be already at issue There is I guess an initial presumption of sincerity along the lines argued by Bernard Williams in his discus-sion of the relation between truth and truthfulness (2002 11) ndash opposed deliberate lies are not normally called disagreement But radical disagreements are full of mutual accusations of insincerity Moreover a minimal and provisional criterion of sincerity of this kind is quite compatible with unconscious external and internal manipulation ndash which is usually equally disputed As often as not even the deliber-ate lies of a Stalin may be found to conceal a deeper layer of sincerity lsquoUltimately Stalin was a devout Marxist ldquoof semi-Islamic fervourrdquo allowing no friend or family to stand between him and his missionrsquo (Montefiore 2007 230) All of this is what needs to be uncovered and tested by the phenomenological investigation

The gender question

Is the phenomenon of radical disagreement gendered Do men and women argue differently Or more critically is radical disagreement itself identified with male-gendered language To confront these questions adequately it is necessary to plunge briefly into what for some readers will be the forbidding terminology of lsquodifference feminismrsquo Here we find the most direct challenge to gender-blind universalistic claims that fail to understand their own historical contingency

Best known perhaps through Carol Gilliganrsquos critique of Laurence Kohlbergrsquos rationalist-universalist assumptions in developmental ethics and her subsequent advocacy of the idea of ethics as inclusive conversation (1982 2002) the dis-cursive assault extends to the idea of language as a symbolic (thetic) system that is already gendered through its exclusion of the pre-symbolic (semiotic) other Oppositional thought itself (including the construction of sexual identities as

Prologue 5

opposites) is therefore subverted by the lsquosemiotic transgression of the theticrsquo when the gender critique exposes this violence in its very heartland (Kristeva 1986) In Freudian terms this is the pre-oedipal challenge to the whole of phallocentric western philosophy (Irigaray 1992) It is an attempt to liberate repressed voices from outside the symbolic order itself

From this perspective it is not hard to see why the phenomenon of radical dis-agreement is set aside Radical disagreements with their superficial juxtaposition of incompatible truth claims epitomize male-gendered linguistification ndash dicho-tomous simplification adversarial rationalization competitiveness separation from the relational and the ready physiological antagonism characteristic of those who have a low arousal threshold In short radical disagreements and the conflicts interpreted through them are seen to be contingent phenomena And as such they can only be dispersed by subversion To take them seriously on their own terms would be to buy into their delusory universality and to perpetuate the intrinsic violence that they represent The emancipation of the pre-symbolic other ndash and thereby the freeing up of the whole universe of non-violent human difference ndash can only be achieved by a radical displacement of the thetic linguistic order that suppresses it And this includes a wholesale setting aside of the phenomenon of radical disagreement

The culture question

Something similar results from a radical culture critique Here the evidence is drawn primarily from anthropological fieldwork where scholars have debated the significance of the extraordinary variety of conflict understandings and conflict practices found across different societies ndash particularly pre-industrial and pre-agricultural societies (Fry and Bjorkqvist 1997) In some cases serious political conflict seems to be entirely absent given relative isolation a static social structure ritualized and hierarchical ways of handling difference and largely unchallenged belief systems This has led to a critique of most of the assumptions behind western conflict theory and conflict practice (Avruch Black and Scimecca 1991) From this perspective it is simply not true that radical disagreement is the universal lin-guistic manifestation of serious human conflict nor indeed that it has historically been the prevalent one

Even in a well-known typology of lsquoconflict management stylesrsquo that is mainly used in western business training and team-building the assertive response ndash which invites counter-assertion and thereby generates radical disagreement ndash is only one of five main responses to conflict which also include avoidance submission compromise and problem solving (Blake and Mouton 1984) The latter four ndash and others ndash are found to be more characteristic of conflict practice in non-western cul-tures particularly those that place their main emphasis on honour and lsquoface-savingrsquo (Arab) and those where concern to preserve group relations and social cohesion outweighs desire for individual satisfaction (Japan)

In some of these cases the suppression or avoidance of in-group conflict may go together with a ruthless treatment of out-groups which are not seen to belong

6 Prologue

to the same system of values (Ross 1993) Those beyond the pale are hunted killed enslaved maltreated and excluded with impunity but again there is no radical disagreement involved in all this because no rival values are seen to be at issue ndash the other is outside the scope of value This may remind us of the brutal-ities of criminality and gang warfare in ghettoized urban communities or of the kill-or-be-killed mores that prevail in lsquocultures of violencersquo generally (Nordstrom 1994) So here is another set of severe constraints on any assumption that radical disagreement may be a universal aspect of human conflict

Yet despite the force of the radical gender and culture critiques I will persist in seeing the phenomenon of radical disagreement as the chief verbal expression of intense political conflict Where this is not the case ndash where there is no intense political conflict of this kind ndash this book has nothing further to say These themes will recur in what follows and are summed up in Chapter 9 Radical disagreements encompass thick cultural divergence deep value incompatibility and uncomprom-ising political confrontation

In the rest of the prologue I will introduce the central topic of the book by initi-ating a comparison between descriptions and examples of radical disagreement Readers are invited to decide for themselves whether particular third-party descrip-tions are adequate to the radical disagreements that they purport to describe

Definition and description

The editors of a special academic journal issue on lsquodisagreement and differencersquo define disagreement ndash and by extension radical disagreement ndash as follows

First not all forms of diversity entail conflict disagreement does People may display markedly different characteristics without those being in any way rival characteristics diversity takes the form of disagreement only if people are at odds in some way Second disagreement does not encompass every form of conflict but only conflicts of a particular sort conflicts of belief Two people may have different and conflicting preferences but if these are conflicts of mere preference ndash conflicts of brute want or mere taste ndash it would be odd to describe that conflict as lsquodisagreementrsquo The normal subject matter of disag-reement is belief albeit lsquobeliefrsquo in its broadest sense

(Jones and Carey 2003 1)

A further distinction is then made in order to identify those beliefs that lsquofind their way onto the agenda of politicsrsquo

The different and conflicting beliefs that have preoccupied recent political philosophy have been value-beliefs and more particularly beliefs that relate to the question of how we should live

Disagreements are described as lsquoconflicts of beliefrsquo where the lsquoconflicting beliefsrsquo are attributed to conflict parties in much the same way as are their lsquopreferencesrsquo

Prologue 7

Others use different language but subscribe to a similar general idea Here are some descriptions of radical disagreement from the top end of the conflict spectrum taken from well-regarded accounts of the conflicts in question

In Northern Ireland the lsquouncompromising mantrasrsquo uttered by the embattled communities are expressions of lsquoconflicting perceptionsrsquo in which lsquothe only solution is utter capitulation by one side or the other as they see itrsquo

(Ryder and Kearney 2001 365)

In Kashmir lsquofundamentalist beliefsrsquo and lsquohardened attitudesrsquo lead to violence where all sides in the conflict lsquospeak their own truthrsquo and spill the blood of lsquothose of the opposite persuasionrsquo

(Schofield 1996 121)

In Kosovo the Albanians and Serbs lsquonot only live in segmented territories but in segmented realities and segmented time claiming the monopoly of victim statusrsquo

(Nicolic 2003 54)

In Jerusalem lsquoArabs and Jews inhabit different mental worlds informed by fundamentally different ideological axioms infected with profound collective suspicions of each other and infused with a mutual dread that has repeatedly exploded into hate-filled aggressionrsquo

(Wasserstrom 2001 xi)

And here is a description from critical political discourse analysis which also refers to opposed lsquoideological beliefsrsquo lsquomental representationsrsquo lsquoviews about realityrsquo lsquodiscursive representationsrsquo and lsquodiscourse worldsrsquo

This research differs in its attempt to understand this conflict situation [in Northern Ireland] by relying on the different perceptions that may be politic-ally transmitted about one single reality

(Filardo forthcoming 2010)

Conflicting perceptions embattled beliefs hardened attitudes opposed truths segmented realities contrasting mental worlds antithetic ideological axioms incompatible ideological beliefs alternative mental representations differing views about reality divergent discursive representations different discourse worlds ndash all of these can be seen to come within the same general idea that radical disagree-ments are conflicts of belief taken lsquoin its broadest sensersquo So I will provisionally call this lsquothe common descriptionrsquo

In some understandings radical disagreements are analysed in terms of opposed arguments and claims (content) In others radical disagreements are described in terms of the expression of incompatible cultural perspectives or narratives (form) In yet others radical disagreements are interpreted in terms of psychological

8 Prologue

projection or material struggle or the social construction of knowledges and truths in the service of interest and power (explanation)

Radical disagreement is not peripheral to serious political conflict but can be seen as its chief linguistic hallmark This applies at all levels Even two children squabbling over a toy for example appeal to justice and to truth

|lsquoItrsquos minersquo lsquoI had it firstrsquo|

Indeed I suggest that it is radical disagreement that most clearly distinguishes serious political conflicts from other forms of contestation such as sporting encounters economic competition or legal disputes All of these may become serious conflicts if the framework of rules is itself brought into question This is when emotionally charged radical disagreements erupt

bull A football match is merely a contest however impassioned until the ref-ereersquos action is controversial Then as players crowd round and fans become inflamed the contest becomes a conflict and radical disagreements break out

bull Economic competition however intense is deepened into full-scale conflict when accusations of unfair practice are made ndash radical disagreements over protectionism accompany trade wars

bull A legal case becomes embroiled in conflict when the legitimacy of the court is challenged ndash radical disagreement between supporters of former leaders and those seen to control the international tribunal or international criminal court before which they are tried comes to involve the whole distinction between criminality and politics

I end the prologue with another example of radical disagreement in order to test the common description ndash the idea that radical disagreements are conflicts of belief attributable to conflict parties I have chosen a simple domestic instance of radical disagreement between two individuals for the sake of clarity

A family quarrel

|lsquoGod is the creator of the universersquo

lsquoGod is a figment of the human imaginationrsquo|

This radical disagreement took place between two members of my family It was a very painful one concerning the future upbringing of children what should the children be taught from infancy The disagreement took place many years ago when my wife and I were entertaining what was meant to be a happy family gathering As host I went around taking instamatic photos (which underlines how long ago it was) I have a photograph of the disagreement taking place ndash although at first I did not see that it was a disagreement The two family members were

Prologue 9

sitting beside each other on a seat in the garden It was only when voices were raised angrily and other family members started getting upset that I realized what was happening ndash and thought that as host I should try to intervene to calm things down See Figure P1

On the right in the illustration is one member of my family who insisted that the children be brought up as Christians Early teaching would ensure that they remained good Christians for the rest of their lives This would bring deep fulfil-ment in this world and eternal salvation in the next It was the supreme duty of parenthood On the left in the illustration is another member of my family who was horrified at the thought of the children being brainwashed to believe what he called lsquooutdated and dangerous mumbo-jumborsquo Let them decide for themselves when they have grown up With luck they will by then be sensible enough to reject it

I tried to mediate the dispute by getting each to acknowledge the sincerity of the otherrsquos convictions in the hope of finding space for common ground The fact that I failed is I suppose not surprising given the intransigence of these positions ndash and the memory of my clumsy and no doubt uncalled for intrusion still causes me some embarrassment But it is the reason why I failed that shocked me then ndash and shocks me to this day This was when I first came to appreciate the significance of the phenomenon of linguistic intractability

In order to clarify the situation I took an instamatic photograph of the speak-ers and wrote lsquoGod made humansrsquo in inverted commas next to the image of one speaker and lsquoHumans made Godrsquo in inverted commas next to the image of the other The disputants ndash somewhat reluctantly ndash agreed that this did represent their disagreement

|lsquoHumans made Godrsquo

lsquoGod made humansrsquo|

Figure P1 A family quarrel the disagreement

B|lsquoHumans made Godrsquo

AlsquoGod made Humansrsquo|

10 Prologue

These were their statements and each rejected what the other was saying Incompatible courses of action were being recommended as a result I then took what I innocently thought was the next logical step in the representation of the disagreement This is the gist of what I said

In other words this whole disagreement stems from a simple difference of perception There are some people who because of their religious convictions think that God created the world On the other side are equally sincere people who are just as convinced that God is merely a human construction Each sees the otherrsquos belief as a dangerous and damaging delusion especially when it concerns the upbringing of children

I converted the two statements into two cartoon clouds the first emanating from one head and the second from the other lsquoso one of you believes this and the other believes thatrsquo See Figure P2

This time all hell broke looseThe first speaker (A) said that this was exactly what was so pernicious about

my fashionable lsquoliberalrsquo views It was also why my wifersquos and my own children had not grown up to be Christians to their great cost ndash unlike the children of my brother and his wife who had brought their children up with proper responsibil-ity I reduced everything to a matter of opinion without realizing that this is what I was doing In this way I simply reinforced the view that she utterly rejected If I wanted to use the language of belief then let me at least describe her belief accurately She believed in the true God the creator and bringer of life to whom we pray and upon whose mercy we depend for our present sustenance and future

B

God a human creation

A

God creator of the world

Figure P2 A family quarrel the description

Prologue 11

fate The transcendent reality of God could not be represented on the photograph at all ndash and certainly not in a cloud coming from her own head God exists first Then His creatures may or may not come to believe ndash in that order God causes our belief ndash if we have ears to hear See Figure P3

At this point the second speaker (B) became equally vehement All of this was precisely the first speakerrsquos belief and therefore rightly belonged inside that cloud To try to include God outside the cloud was not to describe the disagreement at all but only what the first speaker believed Nor was the second speakerrsquos own insist-ence on the need for empirical evidence when discussing this issue an lsquoequivalent belief rsquo as I was suggesting in my description This is what theists were always fatuously trying to pretend Fundamentalist theists know they are right because of what they have read in a holy book Nothing can dislodge their belief because it is usually the product of childhood indoctrination not reason The results as we can see in the world are almost entirely pernicious That is why children must not be mentally abused by having lsquofaithrsquo foisted on them before they are capable of making up their own minds By contrast what is indicated by empirical reason ndash namely the extreme improbability of there being a supernatural being of this kind that created the world ndash is based not on blind faith in a holy book but on a proper unbiased study of the evidence That is why nearly all eminent scientists are athe-ists This evidence is not just personal belief but the public basis on which the whole of science is constructed ndash always open to disproof but only as a result of better evidence or a better interpretation See Figure P4

B


The world created by God

A


Figure P3 A family quarrel disquotation A

12 Prologue

I had by now lost control entirely The first speaker (A) said that this was a complete misunderstanding of the situation and just represented what the second speaker wrongly believed it to be Old-fashioned rationalists like him always come up with vulgar caricatures of religious faith that would make a first-year theology student wince The more they detest religion the more ill-informed their criticisms of it tend to be It was this wrong belief that should be in the cloud coming out of the second speakerrsquos head ndash including his inability to understand that he did not understand Our faith in the transcendent God of Christianity springs from the example and teaching of His Son our Saviour Jesus Christ and from the inspiration and power of love that continuously pours from His Holy Spirit and illuminates the lives of those who turn to Him To cut children off from this source of truth and joy by bringing them up as miniature rationalists programmed to be unbelievers is a terrible abuse of trust

What shocked me about this experience was the fact that my own third-party description of the disagreement ndash in terms of conflicting perspectives or beliefs ndash was already integrally caught up in it through the prior involvement of the distinctions in terms of which the description was defined Was it that each mis-understood what the other was saying to the extent that they were talking about different things But neither was having any of that They understood all too well what the other was saying ndash and rejected it That was the disagreement And that was why they insisted that the children should not be abused by being brought

B


The world in which God is a human creation

A


Figure P4 A family quarrel disquotation B

Prologue 13

up wrongly In the end they both turned on me and said that I was the one who did not understand by continually supposing that I could include their positions within a third position which corresponded with neither ndash that I did not take the issue seriously that I did not realize what it was about and that I failed entirely to grasp its gravity

Part I

Radical disagreement and intractable conflict

Radical disagreement is located at the intersection of the three great realms of human difference human discourse and human conflict Preliminary comments on human difference have been made in the prologue and will be revisited in Chapter 9 Here the focus is on the other two realms Part I surveys discourse ana-lysis conflict analysis and conflict resolution in the search for an adequate account of the phenomenon of radical disagreement This will provide a foundation for the enquiry that follows in Part II

It hardly seems ten years since Sue Wright Paul Chilton and Dan Smith were able to call their book Language and Conflict A Neglected Relationship (Wright 1998) The idea that language and conflict has been a neglected relationship may seem strange in view of the fact that it has been axiomatic in discourse analysis that conflict like all other human behaviours is from the outset verbalized (Schaumlffner and Wenden (eds) 1995) In any case since then quite a lot has been written at the interface of discourse analysis conflict analysis and conflict resolution (for example Deacutedaic and Nelson (eds) 2003 Chilton 2004 Hayward and OrsquoDonnell (eds) forthcoming 2010)

1 Radical disagreement and discourse analysis

Most discourse analysis moves straight from description to explanation in rela-tion to the phenomenon of radical disagreement It does not recognize the value of investigating examples of radical disagreement on their own terms It regards this as uncritical Most of the analysis is conducted by third-party experts not conflict parties Little original ethnomethodological fieldwork is undertaken into the phenomenon of radical disagreement

In the communicative sphere it is the clash of discourses ndash radical disagreement ndash that is the chief linguistic form of intense political conflict once conflict parties have formed This can be seen in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where the Israeli security discourse the Palestinian liberation discourse and the international (UN) peacemaking and state-building discourses (among others) all struggle for suprem-acy Each tries to impose its own language Each wants to provide the lens through which the conflict is viewed Some commentators see a combined Israeli-American discourse as the prevailing one and the Palestinian discourse as the challenger (Pressman 2003) This is certainly how most Palestinians see it

An essential prerequisite for seizing the strategic initiative is to shape the nature of the discourse within which the issue of Palestinian independence is discussed A discourse is a framework of language within which verbal communication takes place It is the discourse that determines what can and cannot be said within it and how this is to be understood At the moment the Palestinian national struggle is nearly always discussed in terms of other peoplersquos discourses This is like playing all football matches on other teamsrsquo pitches It is always an away game ndash we begin one goal down Palestinians must refuse to participate on those terms We must explain and promote our own discourse and make this the primary language within which the Palestinian issue is discussed

(Palestine Strategy Group 2008 13)

The clash of discourses reverberates across the entire conflict field There is no aspect that is immune from the story of the Jewish influx in the 1920s and 1930s and Arab resistance to it through to responsibility for the collapse of two-state

18 Radical disagreement and intractable conflict

negotiations in the 1990s and the eruption of violence that followed There are also vital sub-discursive clashes within Israeli and Palestinian societies that cut across the main discourse formations Examples of this are the struggle between secular and orthodox discourses within Israeli discourse and the struggle between national-secular and Islamist discourses within Palestinian discourse Indeed Israeli orthodox and Palestinian Islamist discourses in many ways turn out to have more in common with each other than they do with their secular counterparts Nor are these sub-discourses themselves monolithic On the contrary as in chaos theory the more detailed the investigation into the nature of the radical disagree-ment in question the greater the complexity that is found to be replicated at lower levels It is true that in the furnace of intense political conflict variety is melted down into the bipolar confrontations that generate radical disagreement a pro-cess much studied in the analysis of conflict polarization and conflict escalation But enquiry into the resultant radical disagreements equally regularly uncovers a persistent generation of new and ever-varying discrepancies And these offer a starting point ndash even in the most intransigent phases of the conflict ndash for possible future reconfigurations and realignments

In addition to all this well-meaning third-party discourses together with asso-ciated actions are also found not to be immune This is a fundamental discovery that only the phenomenology of radical disagreement can uncover in detail In this extract for example an inclusive Palestinian strategy group dismisses the lsquoconflict resolutionrsquo assumptions of many external peace promoters

Two international discourses in particular are inappropriate for the Palestinian case Unfortunately these are the usual frameworks adopted by the inter-national community The first is a peacemaking discourse which assumes that the problem is one of lsquomaking peacersquo between two equal partners both of whom have symmetric interests needs values and beliefs This is the wrong discourse because there are not two equal conflict parties There is an occupying power and a suppressed and physically scattered people The second is a state-building discourse which assumes that the problem is one of lsquobuilding a statersquo along the lines attempted in Cambodia or El Salvador or Mozambique ndash or even to a certain extent in Afghanistan This is the wrong discourse because there is no Palestinian state hellip The appropriate discourse uses the language not of peacemaking or statebuilding but of national self-determination of liberation of emancipation from occupation of individual and collective rights of international law

(Palestine Strategy Group 2008 13ndash14)

A similar rejection of the third-party international lsquopeacemakingrsquo discourse is found among Israelis

Discursive battles ndash radical disagreements ndash lie at the heart of the struggle in the most serious political conflicts This is as true in Northern Ireland or Sri Lanka as it is in Palestine So it might be supposed that the phenomenon of rad-ical disagreement would be of central concern in discourse analysis where lines

Radical disagreement and discourse analysis 19

of conflict convulse the discursive field and shifting axes of radical disagreement criss-cross the terrain The discourse analytic field is large and varied and so in search of an adequate account of radical disagreement I will focus on its four most promising sub-fields in this regard conversation analysis informal reason-ing analysis socialpsychological constructionist analysis and critical political discourse analysis

Conversation analysis

The natural point of embarkation in this search is that part of structural linguistics known as conversation analysis There are different kinds but for the analysis of radical disagreement the most useful is the lsquoethnomethodologicalrsquo tradition where the emphasis is on naturally occurring conversation and on peoplersquos own know-ledge of the lsquotacit rulesrsquo and lsquocommonsense theoriesrsquo that enable them to take part successfully in conversational exchange1

Two features in particular make conversation analysis a useful launching pad for the study of radical disagreement

The first feature is the fundamental technique of recording and transcribing nat-ural conversation so that it can be reproduced and analysed in detail It would be better in many ways for the analysis of radical disagreements if the interchanges that take place face-to-face could be videoed But since that is beyond the scope of this book no more will be said about it here

The second relevant feature is that

Conversation as opposed to monologue offers the analyst an invaluable ana-lytical resource as each turn is responded to by a second we find displayed in that second an analysis of the first by its recipient Such an analysis is thus provided by participants not only for each other but for analysts too

(Levinson 1983 320ndash1)

The study of radical disagreement shares this feature but goes further It is not just that each conversational contribution is responded to by a second but that the second is then itself responded to in turn ndash and so on This characteristic affects the role of the analyst and the whole nature of what is studied

It might appear that conversation analysis would focus among other things on radical disagreement because this is very much part of lsquoordinary language verbal interchangersquo and there are plenty of lsquonaturally occurringrsquo examples of radical disagreement in day-to-day speech But to my knowledge this has not happened Conversation analysis has tended to concentrate on minute fragments of conversa-tion taken from the clinical or academic settings where the linguists work Or in the case of fieldwork pioneers like Harvey Sacks examples are taken from chance encounters that caught his eye

People often ask me why I choose the particular data I choose Is it some prob-lem that I have in mind that caused me to pick this corpus or this segment


And I am insistent that I just happened to have it it became fascinating and I spent some time on it hellip When we start out with a piece of data the question of what we are going to end up with what kind of findings it will give should not be a consideration We sit down with a piece of data make a bunch of observations and see where they will go hellip

(1984 27)

I think that the main reason for this neglect of radical disagreement is that con-versation analysis is more concerned with process and procedure than it is with conversational substance For Labov and Fanshel for example

[T]he central problem of discourse analysis is to discover the connexions between utterances hellip [and] hellip how utterances follow each other in rational rule-governed manner

(1977 299)

Common across much of the field has been a search for ways in which linguistic units (specific illocutionary acts) and combinatorial rules (mutually ordered sequential moves) are used by conversationalists to construct an lsquoarchitecture of intersubjectivityrsquo ndash a shared interactional world publicly observable to the invest-igating analyst

There is some interest shown in how speech acts are shaped to minimize lsquodis-preferred responsesrsquo and how they are lsquorepairedrsquo when this is threatened and there is also interest in lsquosaving facersquo in conversation (Pomerantz 1984) But this interest lies in the mechanics of threat and repair not in the substance of the disagreement The focus for example is on lsquoadjacency pairsrsquo of utterances and on the way lsquoturn-takingrsquo contributes to coordinated interchange In speech act theory the emphasis is on the lsquofelicity conditionsrsquo for successful interchange (Searle 1969 47) In pragmatics it is on lsquocooperative principles and maximsrsquo (Grice 1975 46 see also Sperber and Wilson 1986)

The methodological similarities and differences between conversation analysis and the exploration (phenomenology) of radical disagreement can be illustrated by means of an example See Box 11

Box 11 Example of conversation between caller to a radio phone-in show and its host as transcribed in conversation analysis

Source Hutchby and Wooffitt 1998 105

1 Caller I think we should () er reform the law on 2 Sundays here (03) w- I think people should have 3 the choice if they want to do shopping on a 4 Sunday (04) also that () i-if shops want to 5 open on a Sunday th- th-they should be given the 6 choice to do so


In this extract (Hutchby 1992) it can be seen that the main effort in conversation analysis is to record hesitation breath-taking interruption and so on (semi-colons record short pauses round brackets indicate longer pauses some with timings square brackets record interruptions equals signs record that the original speaker carried on across the interruption) In this way the analyst is able to identify a recurrent mechanism for expressing scepticism through the hostrsquos use of the argumentative device lsquoYou say X (lines 16ndash18) but what about Y (lines 18ndash21)rsquo That this is recognized by both conversation partners as a single compound turn rather than two separate turns is suggested by the way the host does not wait for a response in line 18 and by an interpretation of the recipientrsquos lsquoYesrsquo in line 19 as a lsquocontinuerrsquo The interest is in the mechanism of conversational interchange (the units and the rules) rather than its content The focus is on the backstage machinery not what is happening at the front of the stage

In marked contrast the whole interest in the exploration of radical disagreements is in the content ndash what appears between the bar lines in written notation The focus is on what is happening publicly on the front of the stage It is the content (as well as the context) that makes it a radical disagreement

Below is an example of part of the text in Box 11 transcribed as a radical disagreement

|lsquoI think we should reform the law on Sundays here I think people should have the choice if they want to do shopping on a Sunday Also that if shops want to open on a Sunday they should be given the choice to do sorsquo

lsquoYou talk about the rights of people to make a choice as to whether they shop or not on a Sunday What about the people who may not have a choice as to whether they would work on a Sundayrsquo|

Radical disagreement analysis does not need the elaborate transcription notations

7 Host Well as I understand it thee () the law as 8 theyrsquore discussing it at the moment would allow 9 shops to open h for six hours hh [er ] on a= 10 Caller [Yes] 11 Host =Sunday 12 Caller Thatrsquos righ[t 13 Host [From midday 14 Caller Y[es 15 Host [They wouldnrsquot be allowed to open before that 16 hh Erm and you talk about erm () the rights of 17 people to make a choice as to whether they 18 shop or not [on] a Sunday=what about hh the= 19 Caller [Yes] 20 Host =people who may not have a choice as to whether 21 they would work on a Sunday


of conversation analysis because its main interest is not in lsquothe connexions bet-ween utterances and how utterances follow each other in rational rule-governed mannerrsquo In this sense the study of radical disagreement is more superficial On the other hand with reference to the example above whereas the conversation analyst already has enough information to draw the conclusion given and has no need to question the speakers further the exploration of the radical disagreement has hardly begun In fact it is not yet certain that this is a radical disagreement because it is not known whether the hostrsquos position is herhis own nor what recom-mendations for practical action are being made nor how important all of this is to the conversation partners If we as analysts want to find out we will have to ask them It will not be enough just to observe and analyse their behaviour ndash even their verbal behaviour And in turn our observations must be fed back for comment to the protagonists We must listen to what they say because our observations are not separate from what is at issue If we want to learn anything significant we have to plunge into the disagreement itself

Informal reasoning analysis

I turn now to the complementary field of informal reasoning analysis ndash sometimes called lsquoinformal logicrsquo or the wider lsquocritical thinkingrsquo movement Initiated again in the 1950s and 1960s this time in reaction to the monopoly of reasoning analysis claimed by formal logic here we do find a concern with the content of what is said in conversation and with the subset of conversational exchanges that includes argumentation and dispute2

In his seminal The Uses of Argument (1958) for example Stephen Toulmin mounted a frontal assault on the assumption in logic that formal analytic criteria provide the benchmark for validity in general and that all inductive processes are by these deductive standards invalid This would mean that no argument can be both substantial and conclusive that all arguments produced in defence of chal-lenged assertions or claims in everyday reasoning are unsound and that we have no good reasons for any of our attendant beliefs For Toulmin this result was not only absurd from a practical perspective but also formally fallacious Formal analytic criteria were irrelevant to most lsquoactual argumentsrsquo not because they represented a loftiness unattainable in ordinary natural language arguing but on the contrary because the logicians had committed a category mistake ndash they had conflated at least five distinctions into one which they then made lsquothe absolute and essential condition of logical salvationrsquo for all arguments analytic and non-analytic forget-ting the field-dependence of all such standards

I shall argue that formal logicians have misconceived their categories and reached their conclusions only by a series of mistakes and misunder-standings

(Toulmin 1958 146ndash7)

Instead Toulmin abandoned the stipulations of formal logic and asked how actual


arguments used in our day-to-day lives can be critically assessed (lsquohow people dumb as they are actually arguersquo as Wolfgang Klein less flatteringly put it)

Suppose then that a man has made an assertion and has been challenged for his backing The question now is how does he set about producing an argu-ment in defence of the original assertion and what are the modes of criticism and assessment which are appropriate when we are considering the merits of the argument he presents

(Ibid 12)

This is clearly of great relevance to the enterprise of investigating radical disa-greements Toulmin set out the distinctions that he had found to be lsquoof practical importance in the layout and criticismrsquo of putative inductively forceful arguments He saw these as of universal applicability Toulminrsquos original determination of the lsquopatterns of an argumentrsquo ndash in terms of data claim warrant qualifier rebuttal and backing ndash is no longer applied in detail these days and most of his examples were fabricated But contemporary lsquoreal argumentrsquo analysis follows in much the same tradition

Perhaps most clearly presented today in university courses that aim to teach students not taking formal philosophy classes how to reason clearly and how to discriminate critically when confronted with the rhetorical ploys of political and commercial lsquopersuadersrsquo informal reasoning analysis focuses on inference and the construction and testing of arguments The aim is to analyse what reasons are being proposed for believing or acting in certain ways and to assess whether or not these reasons should be accepted

Three features of informal reasoning analysis are worth noting at this point because it is their cumulative effect that reduces most analystsrsquo interest in the specific phenomenon of radical disagreement The main objects of evaluation in informal reasoning analysis are single extended arguments Radical disagreements in which such arguments engage each other are not thought to pose distinct or addi-tional difficulties Indeed the idea of disagreement is already accommodated in the notion of an argument in the first place ndash an argument is a system of propositions linked by inference in order to persuade an audience on a controversial issue that a certain conclusion or set of conclusions is true (and that some others are false)

The first feature that militates against interest in radical disagreement relates to the distinction often drawn (although now sometimes controversial) between fac-tual assessment of the truth of propositions (premises or conclusions) and logical assessment of the validity or force of inductive inference See Box 12

Box 12 Truth and validity

Here are two arguments In each case are the three propositions (the two premises and the conclusion) true And is the inference from the premises to the conclusion valid In other words if the premises were true would the conclusion follow


Factual assessment and logical assessment both contribute to the evaluation of the soundness of an argument ndash the assessment of whether there are good reasons for accepting the truth of its conclusion(s) But in informal reasoning analysis it is the latter ndash logical assessment ndash that is the main concern In the factual assessment of the truth of a proposition a hearer may adopt four stances

1 acceptance (believing it) 2 rejection (not believing it) 3 abstention 4 indifference

The second stance rejection is not usually seen to introduce special complications Indeed relatively little effort is usually expended on the substance of a dispute ndash in other words on whether particular premises are true The main focus of attention is on the logical assessment of the validity or force of the inference This is seen to be less contaminated by empirical and speaker-related factors and therefore to be more amenable to clarity of analysis To this extent informal reasoning ana-lysis still bears the hallmarks of its origins in the field of formal logic And to this extent the phenomenon of radical disagreement where the substance of the dispute usually turns out to be inseparable from the validity of the reasoning spills out of its zone of interest ndash and control

Argument (1)

Premise A Mourinho managed Chelsea in 20067 Premise B Benitez managed Liverpool in 20067

Therefore

Conclusion Manchester United won the Premiership in 20067

Argument (2)

Premise A Manchester United came second in 20067 Premise B Chelsea won more points than Manchester United in

20067

Therefore

Conclusion Chelsea won the Premiership in 20067

I think that in argument (1) the three propositions are true but the inference is invalid (the conclusion does not follow from the premises ndash whatever we may think of the managers in question) whereas in argument (2) the three propositions are false but the inference is valid (the conclusion would follow from the premises were the premises true) Many other combinations are possible


The second feature to be noted is that in informal reasoning analysis the evalu-ation of good and bad arguments is usually abstracted from political context so as to preserve the purity of the analytic field This insulation is effected by drastic restriction of the scope of contextual relevance ndash for example to the supplying of undeclared assumptions or implicit premises in the reconstruction of arguments to be evaluated (perhaps in accordance with the principle of charity) or to the clarification of connotations or extended designations in cases of vagueness or ambiguity or to the accommodation of questions of rational persuasiveness for a given audience in the case of additional reasons that may be seen to defeat an otherwise sound argument But radical disagreements cannot be abstracted from the conflict context in this way because they are the chief verbal manifestation of the context Whatever third-party analysts may want in radical disagreement conflict parties import political context at every turn Recommendations exhorta-tions justifications claims refutations appeals ndash these make up the texture of the impassioned exchanges ndash and are irrevocably contextually defined and politically charged In radical disagreements conflict parties continually reach out to back-ground context when they meet an impasse ndash and the background is as regularly found to be foreground that is to say to be already integral to what is at issue

The third feature that reduces the interest of radical disagreement for informal reasoning analysis relates to the set of core distinctions that constitutes the analytic framework employed and thereby defines the field In addition to the distinction between validity and truth are distinctions such as those between

bull formal fallacies (logical mistakes) and substantive fallacies (adoption of mis-taken premises)

bull rational justification in terms of arguments and pragmatic justification in terms of desirable consequences

bull argumentative errors and rhetorical ploysbull explanations for why things are so and arguments for why we should believe

that things are as they are said to bebull non-speaker-relative and speaker-relative statements

Yet radical disagreement can almost be defined as the prior involvement of distinc-tions such as these when they are invoked by the conflict parties as here

|lsquoIsrael will prove to be good for the Palestinians and the Arab world in gen-eral because of the model of democracy and free-market economy that it provides helliprsquo

(Dershowitz 2005 31)

lsquoThe very idea of a Jewish-democratic state of Israel is a contradiction in terms helliprsquo|

(Rouhana 2006 133)

These points will be elaborated further in Part II


Social-psychological consructionist analysis

The third sub-field of discourse analysis that bears directly on the methodology for studying radical disagreement is the social-psychological constructionist approach Rooted in the highly technical fields of sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics constructionist analysis seeks to trace the ways in which language constructs social and psychological reality and relates to cognitive processes such as perception text-processing and projection The aim is

to develop a research programme in social psychology which takes full account of the dynamic properties of language use

(Potter 1996 5)

The focal point is the analysis of lsquofactual discoursersquo in relation to contestable lsquover-sions of realityrsquo This has obvious relevance for a study of radical disagreement

Our everyday lives are often disputatious in everyday conversation we regularly engage in activities such as lsquodisagreeingrsquo lsquoarguingrsquo lsquocontestingrsquo lsquoaccusingrsquo lsquodefendingrsquo lsquocriticizingrsquo and so on In short it is a perfectly normal feature of everyday life that we enter disputes with other people about some-thing that happened or didnrsquot happen when it should or the implications and consequences of events On these occasions people will be using language to warrant their perspective position or point of view

(Hutchby and Wooffitt 1998 203)

It is lsquounlikely that each side will agree with each otherrsquos interpretation of the facts even if they are able to agree on what the facts arersquo As can be seen this is a development of the tradition of conversation analysis previously discussed with a prime emphasis on uncovering the ruses and discursive resources employed by speakers to lsquowarrantrsquo the objective existence of their referents and to guard against anticipated counter-claims Apparently neutral factual utterances perform lsquodelic-ate interactional workrsquo which the analyst tries to expose as in the example below where the counsel for the defence in a court case (C) is cross-examining the chief prosecution witness the victim of alleged rape (W)

C (referring to a club where the defendant and the victim met) itrsquos where uh() uh girls and fellahs meet isnrsquot it (09)

W People go there C An during the evening (06) uh didnrsquot mistuh (name) come over tuh sit

with you (08) W Sat at our table

(Drew 1992 489 quoted Hutchby and Wooffitt 1998 207ndash8 adapted)

The rhetorical ploys by which C tries to discredit W and Wrsquos counter-ploys are


evident This is a battle to control the wording of apparently factual statements in order to sway the jury in the desired direction

Linguistic ploys and counter-ploys of this kind lsquolead us to consider the relation-ship between language and states of affairs or events in the world which are being describedrsquo The upshot of a number of recent studies is to confirm older critiques which rejected the naivety of unqualified object-talk and truth-talk in favour of the notion of the constitutive role of language in lsquosocial constructions of realityrsquo Although different analysts reach different specific conclusions these rhetorical practices are generally seen to be lsquoexternalising devicesrsquo through which we create our versions of the world and of the things in the world

We experience ourselves as if these things had a concrete existence in the world but they are all brought into being through language

(Burr 1995 58)

Developed originally from Meadrsquos work on symbolic interactionism and extended latterly within an anti-essentialist and post-structural perspective social-psycho-logical constructionism has roots in both the sociology and the psychology of knowledge exemplified in early contributions by Berger and Luckmann on the lsquosocial construction of realityrsquo (1966) and Gergen on lsquosocial-psychology as his-toryrsquo (1973) The former (roughly) offered a view of ways in which knowledge is manufactured via processes of linguistic externalization social objectification into what appear as factual existents and consequent internalization by future recipients as if these were the deliverances of an independent truth and reality The latter (roughly) developed the thought that granted the changes that continually shape human societies the role of social psychology can only be to give historically conditioned accounts of how things appear at a specific time

The general outcome has been a severe discrediting of traditional ideas of lan-guage first as sincerely or insincerely expressive of inner attitudes motivations and cognitions and second as more or less accurate or inaccurate representations of an independent external world

From the post-structural constructionist perspective of lsquothe death of the authorrsquo it looks as if to take radical disagreements seriously is to fall into the trap of inter-preting spoken or written utterances as manifestations of the lsquoinnerrsquo attitudes and intentions of speakers The constructionist emphasis is on the performative action-oriented function of language ndash concrete contextualized linguistic performances from which lsquointerpretative repertoiresrsquo can be collected and compared Discourse psychologists look for the metaphors grammatical constructions figures of speech and tropes used in the construction of accounts for specific purposes ndash to warrant particular versions of events and to pre-empt or discredit alternatives (Potter and Wetherell 1987 Edwards and Potter 1992 Potter 1996) The author of a piece of text and herhis supposed intentions are in this sense seen to be irrelevant A text is a manifestation of prevailing discourses

Similarly from the constructionist perspective of lsquothe disappearance of the external worldrsquo the project of taking radical disagreement seriously looks equally


naive and mistaken Michael Billig for example sees the very nature of discourse as inherently argumentative and lsquodilemmaticrsquo since in lsquopersuasive communica-tionrsquo some counter-alternative is always implicitly if not explicitly rejected This delivers the idea of the speaker as lsquorhetoricianrsquo and the nature of social-psychological discourse analysis as once again the deconstructing of texts in order to uncover the linguistic devices used to present justifiable and lsquoreasonablersquo accounts located within a context of public debate and argument (Billig 1991) Here it might seem that we would find an account of what is happening in radical disagreements when the other nevertheless answers back ndash as it were an analysis of linguistic battles between rhetoricians But this does not appear to be the case and once again I think that it is traceable to the constructionist view that there is lsquonothing outside the textrsquo and that talk of lsquofactrsquo lsquotruthrsquo or lsquorealityrsquo is always only reference to alternative versions of events constructed for particular purposes through language (Parker 1992) Why waste time investigating how one set of rhetorical ploys relates to another ndash together with whatever illusions of externality may go along with this

In short

The idea that there is one version of events that is true (making all others false) is hellip in direct opposition to the central idea of social constructionism ie that there exists no lsquotruthrsquo but only numerous constructions of the world and which ones receive the stamp of lsquotruthrsquo depends upon culturally and his-torically specific factors

(Burr 1995 81)

Yet it is precisely characteristic of radical disagreement that conflict parties do appeal to truth reality and justice and not just to their own lsquoconstructionsrsquo So for analysts to begin with a third-party presumption that there is no lsquotruthrsquo but only contingent constructions is to beg the main question and to preclude serious enquiry into the phenomenon being investigated

Similarly in terms of methodology the idea that linguistic practices are lsquoextern-alizingrsquo is seen to apply to all social activities that is to say to lsquoall occasions in which people employ the sense-making interpretative procedures which are embodied in the use of natural languagersquo From this premise a sweeping conclu-sion can be reached about social science research in general and especially about social science research that lsquoemploys peoplersquos accounts as investigative resourcesrsquo ndash as does the phenomenology of radical disagreement

When people are asked to provide reports of their social lives in ethnographic research projects or when people are required to furnish more formal answers to interview questions about attitudes or opinions they are not merely using language to reflect some overarching social or psychological reality which is independent of their language Rather in the very act of reporting or describ-ing they are actively building the character of the states of affairs in the world to which they are referring This raises serious questions about the status of


findings from social science research projects which trade on the assumption that language merely reflects the properties of an independent social world


The exploration of radical disagreement trades on no such assumption But nor does it trade on the opposite assumption that when people use language to describe jus-tify recommend or refer to how things are or should be in the world they merely construct the states of affairs that they refer to To make assumptions of either of these kinds is to prejudge what is being investigated Whereas to anticipate Part II it turns out more often than not that it is these very distinctions that are integ-ral to what is found to be at issue in the disagreement ndash and that this is the key to linguistic intractability

Critical political discourse analysis

Finally I turn to critical political discourse analysis and in particular to what is sometimes termed Critical Language Study Here the main focus is on the relationship between language and power Critical political linguists look back to the early Marxist readings of Volosinov (19301973) developed through the work of Peacutecheux (197582) and others influenced by Althusserrsquos writings on ideology in the 1970s and on to those who have applied mainstream European social theory (Bourdieu Foucault Habermas) to a close analysis of texts (Fowler et al 1979 Kress and Hodge 1979 Laclau and Mouffe 1985 Macdonell 1986 Fairclough 1989)

A wide spectrum of approaches is evident here converging at one end on lsquoneutralrsquo conceptions of ideology in many ways akin to the ideas looked at in the previous section But the main challenge to the project of developing a phenomeno-logy of radical disagreement as advocated in this book comes from the other end of the spectrum Here a lsquocriticalrsquo conception of ideology prevails

Critical conceptions are those which convey a negative critical or pejorat-ive sense Unlike neutral conceptions critical conceptions imply that the phenomena characterized as ideology or ideological are misleading illusory or one-sided and the very characterization of phenomena as ideology carries with it an implicit criticism or condemnation of it

(Thompson 1990 53ndash5)

From a critical perspective in Thompsonrsquos words lsquoto study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of dominationrsquo It is concerned with lsquothe ways in which symbolic forms intersect with relations of powerrsquo and ideology is seen as a phenomenon to be exposed combated and lsquoif possible eliminatedrsquo The aim is to uncover traces of the discursive play of unequal power relations in the production reception and dissemination of texts (and visual images) within the wider nexus of social and economic relations and thereby it is hoped contribute something to the empowerment and emancipation


of the dispossessed So the discursive sites chosen are those most likely to exhibit the exclusionary manipulations of power and the inequalities in communication that play to the disadvantage of the vulnerable The material analysed includes party political medical educational legal commercial bureaucratic military and other texts with increasing attention paid to the role of the media The critical analyst looks to uncover the consciously or unconsciously employed discursive manoeuvres that bolster dominant interests and to trace these through processes of production and interpretation to their material embodiment in the social and institu-tional structures that both generate them and are perpetuated by them So textual analysis is only part of this wider discursive enterprise At its heart discourse is seen to be a medium through which ideological struggles generated by wider social and economic forces play themselves out The critical discourse analyst aims to open this out and explain its workings

From this perspective it is not difficult to see why the project of exploring the phenomenon of radical disagreement with the conflict parties appears naive and uncritical For Michel Peacutecheux for example discourses evolve out of clashes with each other in which the analyst must uncover the way words lsquochange their meaningrsquo according to the lsquopositions from which they are usedrsquo (positionality) (19751982 111) They take on meanings only within such discursive processes Words are the effects of material struggle and are deployed as weapons in the wider ideological war Ideologies are shaped by each other in the crucible of class conflict where lsquowords may be weapons explosives or tranquillisers or poisonsrsquo and lsquocertain words struggle amongst themselves as enemiesrsquo As language is commandeered the fight is transmuted into an antagonism of verbal meanings where contrasting lsquovocabulary-syntaxesrsquo may lead the same words in different directions lsquodepending on the nature of the ideological interests at stakersquo There is no universal semantics or lsquomother tonguersquo only lsquoa seizure of power by a dominant tongue within a polit-ical multiplicityrsquo (Deleuze and Guattari 1976 53) Meanings are not determined by individuals so no purpose would be served by focusing in the first instance on how individuals interpret and respond to each otherrsquos utterances

Diane Macdonell sums up the decisive reason why critical political discourse analysis does not recognize the legitimacy of the phenomenology of radical dis-agreement as a research project

No other order no order which took discourses themselves as a starting-point could even begin to indicate how discourses exist materially

(1986 95)

Edward Said argues similarly with reference to the analysis of radical disagree-ments in asymmetric conflicts such as that between Israelis and Palestinians

If there is one thing that deconstructive philosophy has effected it is to have shown definitively that bipolar oppositions always regularly constitutively mystify the domination of one of the terms by the other hellip [so that] to place the Palestinian and the Israeli sides within the opposition on what appears to


be an equal opposite and symmetrical footing is also to reduce the claims of the one by elevating the claims of the other

(1986 quoted in Jabri 1996 155)

The study of radical disagreement ndash the exploration of agonistic dialogue or what is contained within bar lines in the written notation ndash has no quarrel with what Macdonell or Said say in general What they say in general is no doubt true What is mistaken though is any implication that this applies to the enterprise of the phenomenological exploration of radical disagreement The key question is does the study of radical disagreement assume that conflictants appear lsquoon an equal opposite and symmetrical footingrsquo And the answer ndash as Part II clearly shows ndash is that it decidedly does not On the contrary the argument will be that it is only the phenomenology of radical disagreement ndash the study of specific examples of radical disagreement ndash that uncovers the deeply problematic nature of linguistic intractability and in this way contributes a further emancipatory potential that the more didactic traditions of deconstructive philosophy and critical political theory do not provide

Conclusion

Within the wide field of discourse analysis language is generally taken to be a signifying system through which material objects and social formations are given meaning Human discourse is seen as a site of contestation in which competing versions of lsquorealityrsquo are constructed in the service of interest and power As a res-ult disagreement is treated purely instrumentally At neither end of the spectrum of interpretation ndash from the idea that nothing exists outside the text to the idea that texts exist in an already politicized space shaped by real material-discursive struggles ndash does the phenomenon of radical disagreement itself arouse interest as a possible object of research

The idea of taking radical disagreement seriously as a phenomenon worth studying in its own right is identified with the outmoded lsquoidealistrsquo practice of taking the beliefs and attitudes of conversation participants and their own naive self-understandings at face value For neuroscientists and psychologists this means ignoring the biological and psychological roots of belief For critical discourse theory it does not do justice to intertextuality and is tantamount to an abandon-ment of the ethical task of unmasking hegemonic exploitation as ideological in the interest of emancipation Conflict parties in radical disagreements tend to regard their language as transparent ndash another idea that is anathema to discourse analysts because of its positivist and representationalist assumptions The eitheror binaries characteristic of radical disagreement are regarded with equal suspicion and are deconstructed dismantled or dissolved by sophisticated post-structural analysts before they have time to form

As a result of all this there is to my knowledge no sustained ethnographic fieldwork on radical disagreement in conversation analysis informal reason-ing analysis social-psychological constructionist analysis or critical political


discourse analysis The sociology psychology and political economy of radical disagreement move straight from description to explanation without passing through the medium of direct exploration with the conflict parties In contrast the phenomenology of radical disagreement is not expert third-party analysis of other peoplersquos texts but a practical investigation with and by conflict parties into their own impassioned discursive engagements

Notes

1 Conversational discourse analysis emerged in the 1950s and 1960s out of the shadow of Saussurean and Chomskyan structural and generative linguistics from which it bor-rowed some of its original ideas It has embraced the experimental social psychological analysis of conversation in academic laboratories and psychotherapeutic centres and the work of linguists in language research schools It has been built on the insights of philosophers of speech act theory and pragmatics And it has reached out to adapt the distinctive ethnomethodological innovations pioneered by Harold Garfinkel and his followers at the University of Chicago (Garfinkel 1967 see also Heritage 1984)

2 Other terms used are Monroe Beardsleyrsquos original lsquopractical logicrsquo Marvin Pollnerrsquos lsquomundane reasoningrsquo as well as lsquoinformal logicrsquo lsquopractical reasoningrsquo lsquothe practical study of argumentrsquo and so on See Toulmin 1958 Scriven 1976 Blair and Johnson (eds) 1980 For more recent work see Fisher 1988 Bowell and Kemp 2002 and the journal Informal Logic

2 Radical disagreement and conflict analysis

A survey of the broad field of conflict analysis shows how and why the phenomenon of radical disagreement is generally discounted It is regarded as epiphenomenal in contextual analysis functional in internal analysis and merely subjective in rela-tional analysis It is not recorded adequately in complex systemic conflict mapping

Conflict analysis is over-determined There are too many theories of conflict It has been said that more has been written about conflict than about any other subject except love and God Different conflict theories ndash often contested ndash lie at the heart of the biological sociological anthropological political historical and psycho-logical sciences Darwin Nietzsche Marx and Freud all based their thinking on conflict theories For Machiavelli conflict is a result of the human desire for self-preservation and power (the Roman Empire was acquired as a result of successive prudent applications of the principle of lsquopre-emptive defencersquo) for Hobbes the three lsquoprincipal causes of quarrelrsquo in a state of nature are competition for gain fear of insecurity and defence of honour for Hume the underlying conditions for human conflict are relative resource scarcity and limited altruism for Rousseau the lsquostate of warrsquo is born from lsquothe social statersquo itself and so on

On the medical analogy symptoms should first be noted classified and inter-preted before doctors can move on confidently to prognosis and ndash where possible ndash cure Diagnosis comes first but in the case of intense political conflict the dia-gnosis is often already found to be affected by what stands in need of treatment In the search for an adequate account of radical disagreement the three essential prerequisites for good conflict analysis ndash data gathering data classification and data interpretation ndash are as often as not part of what is at issue in the dispute

First data sets reflect the purposes and mindsets of those collecting them The Correlates of War (COW) statistics at the University of Michigan for example measured battle-related deaths within a classical realist international relations model of conflict (Singer and Small 1972 Singer 1996) whereas the Hamburg University (AKUF) Project produces different figures by relating the onset of war to lsquothe development of capitalist societiesrsquo where conflict is lsquoa result of the new forms of production monetarization of the economy and the resulting dissolution of traditional forms of social integrationrsquo (Gantzel and Schwinghammer 2000) In contrast to both of these is the University of Uppsala Conflict Data Project which


approaches the analysis more from a conflict resolution perspective Unlike COW or AKUF which are lsquosatisfied once they have identified the actors and the actionsrsquo the Uppsala project lsquorequires that the conflict should have an issue an incompat-ibilityrsquo (Wallensteen 2002 24)

The figures produced are also often highly controversial as anyone who has followed the vicious disputes about numbers of casualties in Iraq since 2003 will know Here for example is the experience of a co-founder of the Iraq Body Count project John Sloboda communicated in an email message (2007)

Since January a whole army of people have been stirred up by lies distor-tions and outrageous personal libels against me and my colleagues and we have been bombarded with daily abusive emails basically demanding that we stop our work and lsquoconfess our crimesrsquo Journalists who should know better such as John Pilger have joined in the attacks on us Even worse than this our attackers have written to many of the newspapers and media sources that use our data telling them that our data are wrong and that they should stop using our work hellip Not only has this deeply damaging campaign actually obstructed the truth about Iraqi casualties from reaching people it has made the lives of Iraq Body Count personnel hell We have had to stop almost all of our core work and give up any possibility of social life to deal with these constant attacks and put together the defence which you now see We have no illusions that this will stop the attacks In fact it may cause them to redouble The main purpose in writing the article is to provide the information which shows conclusively (to anyone with an open mind) that the attacks on us are baseless and that our data continue to provide as reliable and comprehensive a picture of the ongoing civilian death toll as exists

Radical disagreement reaches deep into the business of conflict data collectionSecond classification is equally disputed One example can be found in the

Uppsala classification as published annually in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook which distinguishes lsquoterritory conflictsrsquo including interstate wars and ethno-national secessionist wars from lsquogovernment conflictsrsquo including ideological wars to preserve or change the form of govern-ment (socialistcapitalist secularreligious) and economic wars that seek to gain control of government in order to commandeer resources (SIPRI 2008) But in my experience those caught up in major conflicts like Kashmir or Darfur clas-sify them under all four of these categories depending upon the affiliation of the classifier

Third interpretations are themselves found to be part of the conflict John Whytersquos (1990) analysis of disputed interpretations of the Northern Ireland con-flict for example can be replicated in many other cases such as Sri Lanka and Afghanistan See Box 21

Radical disagreement and conflict analysis 35

Box 21 Interpretations of the Northern Ireland conflict

For these three reasons it might be imagined that the topic of radical disagreement would feature large in conflict analysis from the outset In order to see whether this is the case I will simplify a complicated field by pursuing the search within three broad classes of conflict theory (see Figure 21)

1 interpretations that look mainly at the conflict context 2 interpretations that focus mainly on the nature of the conflict parties 3 interpretations that mainly emphasize relations between the conflict parties

1 Britain v Ireland

lsquoThe Irish people form a single nation and the fault for keeping Ireland divided lies with Britainrsquo (Nationalist interpretation)

2 Southern Ireland v Northern Ireland

lsquoThere are two peoples in Ireland who have an equal right to self-determination and the fault for perpetuating the confl ict lies with the refusal of nationalists to recognize thisrsquo (Unionist interpretation)

3 Protestant v Catholic within Northern Ireland

lsquoThe cause of the confl ict lies in the incompatibility between divided communities in Northern Irelandrsquo (Third party interpretation)

4 Capitalist v worker

lsquoThe cause of the confl ict lies in an unresolved imperial legacy and the attempt by a governing capitalist class to keep the working class repressed and dividedrsquo (Marxist interpretation)

Contextual

Relational

Contextual

Conflict

Party A

Conflict

Party B

Internal Internal

Figure 21 Contextual internal and relational conflict theories


Most theories are hybrid Frustration-aggression theory for example combines resource scarcity (contextual) human nature (internal) and subsequent competitive behaviour (relational) (Dollard et al 1939)

Contextual conflict theories

The scene can be set by David Barashrsquos comment on the causes of war

In attempting to assess the causes of any war in general it is important to distinguish between the announced reasons for its outbreak which are often excuses concocted as public justification and the actual underlying causes which may not even be accessible to the participants

(2000 7)

If this is the case it is unlikely that much attention will be paid to what the disputants are saying or in other words to the phenomenology of radical disagreement

And so it turns out in predominantly contextual theories such as Marxist theory or realist international relations theory Here it is the context that creates or shapes the conflict (the class struggle the international anarchy) Conflict parties form within this nexus and the roles of individuals including what they think or say are consequently severely constrained

In the Marxist tradition the previous chapter showed why critical discourse analysis ignores radical disagreement The role of critical theory is to expose the class-based function of ideology thereby helping to disarm the power-holders Work on discourse of this kind

finds part of its function in its ability to unmask discourses and knowledges which from various institutions and in the face of all the inequality that divides our society (the basic inequality of class the imposed inequalities of race gender religion) claim to speak on behalf of everyone saying in effect lsquowe are all the same we all speak the same language and share the same know-ledge and have always done sorsquo

(Macdonell 1986 7)

The same happens in Marxist conflict analysis in general For Louis Althusser for example ideologies must not be seen as free-floating products of human con-sciousness Rather they exist only in those lsquoapparatusesrsquo through which the class struggle is politicized ndash not just governments but educational systems churches and the media Ideological struggle is not a meeting of distinct pre-existing entities for the same reason that classes are not mutually distinct and pre-existent to the class struggle Ideological state apparatuses provide

an objective field to contradictions which express hellip the effects of the clashes between the capitalist class struggle and the proletarian class struggle as well as their subordinate forms

(Althusser 19701 141ndash2)


Individuals and groups cannot get outside the ideologies that constitute them as those agents who act in terms of such beliefs A dominant ideology lsquointerpellatesrsquo individuals as subjects through the mechanism of recognition just as someone who turns in response to a shouted name thereby recognizes that this is who she is

This is the fundamental reason why Marxist conflict analysis does not recognize the phenomenology of radical disagreement ndash it is seen to embrace an inherently idealist epistemology In Marxist analysis on the other hand the materialist position is genuinely revolutionary because it is inseparable from the political interests of the workers lsquoPhilosophies of contradictionrsquo like Marxism need make no claim to impartiality or to lsquoultimate truthrsquo in the way that hegemonial liberal epistemologies do because they have never claimed to be disinterested in the first place That is why it is foolish from a Marxist perspective to think that anything can be learned from the phenomenology of radical disagreements without having first determined the lsquomaterial social political ideological and philosophical condi-tionsrsquo that produce lsquoalready existing knowledgersquo in the first place In a somewhat watered down version this is also the burden of Robert Coxrsquos much repeated observation that

theory is always for someone and for some purpose(1981 128)

I will argue in Part II that this is to misunderstand the phenomenology of radical disagreement Of course theory is always for someone and for some purpose but who determines who that someone is and what those purposes are In critical political economy approaches it is usually the expert analyst who provides the answers because only the analyst understands the overall context that generates domination exploitation and conflict in the first place This may well be true But naive though it no doubt appears to critical theory once conflict parties have formed and political struggle has become verbalized the phenomenology of radical disagreement is not interested in what third parties say on behalf of conflict parties however knowledgeable they may be but only in what con-flict parties themselves say however ignorant from a critical perspective Only this gives insight into linguistic intractability And as will be argued in Part II it may as a result open up an additional avenue for emancipation that crit-ical theoretic and critical political economy approaches on their own do not provide

Turning to realist international relations theory a similar disinterest in the phenomenon of radical disagreement is evident In the locus classicus for real-ist theory Thucydidesrsquo History of the Peloponnesian War it was lsquothe growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Spartarsquo that lsquomade war inevitablersquo When the Athenian generals demanded that the inhabitants of the small island of Melos join their alliance they famously dismissed the Meliansrsquo lsquofine phrasesrsquo and appeals to fairness ndash such as the argument that the Melians merited Athenian forbearance because lsquothey had never done them any harmrsquo Appeals to justice are irrelevant between unequal powers


By conquering you we shall increase not only the size but the security of our empire hellip The strong lsquodo what they have the power to dorsquo and the weak must lsquoaccept what they have to acceptrsquo

(Thucydides 1954 360ndash5)

This is usually interpreted as a realist dismissal of the relevance of radical disag-reement in the harsh world of action in international politics I will argue later that this is not the only interpretation Indeed I will suggest that the Melian dialogue can just as well be seen to be itself a radical disagreement

A similar discounting of the significance of lsquofine phrasesrsquo and the radical disa-greements that go with them appears in realist explanation more than two millennia later For Hans Morgenthau writing at the onset of the Cold War (in many ways a re-run of Thucydidesrsquo war between Athens and Sparta)

it is a characteristic aspect of all politics domestic as well as international that frequently its basic manifestations do not appear as what they actually are ndash manifestations of a struggle for power Rather the element of power as the immediate goal of the policy pursued is explained and justified in ethical legal or biological terms That is to say the true nature of the policy is concealed by ideological justifications and rationalizations

(1948 83ndash4)

The justifications and rationalizations that make up radical disagreements only hide the truth about political conflict Why do politicians nevertheless use such language Opponents of realism sometimes cite this as evidence against it

The strongest argument against Realismrsquos moral scepticism is that states employ a moral language of rights and duties in their relations with each other

(Brown 1992 see also Frost 1996 and Risse 2004)

Realists respond with two words ndash hypocrisy and self-deception

Hypocrisy is rife in wartime discourse because it is especially important at such a time to appear to be in the right It is not only that the moral stakes are high the hypocrite may not understand that more crucially his acts will be judged by other people who are not hypocrites and whose judgements will affect their policies towards him

(Walzer ndash although not himself a realist ndash 1977 20)

Politicians have an ineradicable tendency to deceive themselves about what they are doing by referring to their policies not in terms of power but in terms of ethical or legal principles hellip In other words while all politics is necessar-ily pursuit of power ideologies render involvement in the contest for power psychologically and morally acceptable to the actors and their audience

(Morgenthau 1948 83ndash4)


Beneath these psychological arguments lies a more fundamental contextual reason why neo-realism discounts radical disagreement It is expressed most clearly in structuralist theories of international politics such as that of Kenneth Waltz For Waltz high politics can only be explained at systemic level where state actors operate in an international anarchy shaped by the numbers of major players and their relative power Causal explanation is entirely abstracted from unit level lsquoreductionistrsquo analysis and elevated to this structural level State behaviour on the international scene (including the behaviour of those individuals in positions of power within it) is pre-adapted to this logic via socialization and competition (Waltz 1979 18 74) This introduces a sharp contrast between an anarchic order like the international system and a hierarchic order such as that imposed within a state if a government is strong enough to lift that polity lsquoout of naturersquos realmrsquo

Nationally the force of a government is exercised in the name of right and justice Internationally the force of a state is employed for the sake of its own protection and advantage Rebels challenge a governmentrsquos claim to author-ity they question the rightfulness of its rule Wars among states cannot settle questions of authority and right they can only determine the allocation of gains and losses among contenders and settle for a time the question of who is the stronger Nationally relations of authority are established Internationally only relations of strength result

(Waltz 1979 112)

That is why for neo-realists it would be a category-mistake to take the phenomenon of radical disagreement seriously at system (international) level

Some students of war do concern themselves with the motivation and behaviour of human agents but such concern is mainly to do with decision-making and is again usually identified with lsquoproximatersquo causes as distinguished from lsquounderlyingrsquo explanations

Whatever may be the underlying causes of international conflict even if we accept the role of atavistic militarism or of military-industrial complexes or of sociobiological drives or of domestic tensions fuelling it wars begin with con-scious and reasoned decisions based on the calculation made by both parties that they can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace

(Howard 1984 22)

Work has focused for example on perception and misperception among decision-makers (Jervis 1976) struggles to preserve cognitive consistency (Festinger 1957) and the influence of lsquogroupthinkrsquo particularly under crisis conditions (Janis 1972) In his book Perception and Misperception in International Politics for instance Robert Jervis distinguishes the lsquopsychological milieursquo (the world as the actor sees it) from the lsquooperational milieursquo (the world in which the policy will be carried out) The operational milieu includes the three lsquonon-decision-making levelsrsquo of bureau-cracy the state and the international environment These provide the contextual


parameters because they lsquoassert the importance of the objective situation or the actorrsquos rolersquo So in explaining lsquohow why and when highly intelligent and con-scientious statesmen misperceive their environments in specified ways and reach inappropriate decisionsrsquo it is in the psychological milieu that agentsrsquo errors are located Radical disagreements are not noticed as significant given the merely subjective nature of the perceptions involved

In conclusion it can be seen why contextual conflict analysis discounts radical disagreement as epiphenomenal to the underlying factors that are seen to generate major armed conflict at these levels My argument later in the book is that this is a mistake It is an error for example for international decision-makers to ignore the linguistic intractability that both accompanies and contributes so powerfully to the intransigence and ferocity of the conflicts with which they grapple This is not just peripheral It is central to success or failure in the exercise of power

Internal conflict theories

Internal interpretations in conflict analysis focus mainly on the nature of the con-flict parties What notice is taken from this perspective of the phenomenon of radical disagreement

Whereas contextual conflict theories concentrate on the conditioning environ-ment of conflict and dismiss radical disagreements as epiphenomenal internal conflict theory regards radical disagreement as merely functional for the real driv-ers of human conflict which are biological cultural social and psychological We are in the realm of explanation in terms of individual and group psychology anthropology and ideas about human nature drawn in many cases ultimately from Darwin and Freud

Comparative anthropological studies provide a rich source of material for internal conflict analysis One example is Marc Rossrsquo The Culture of Conflict which compares ethnographic data from ninety pre-industrial societies in an attempt to answer the question lsquoWhy are some societies more conflictual than othersrsquo (1993) Drawing on what are in some cases by now venerable studies he asks why among the Yanomamo of southern Venezuela a lsquomilitant ideology and the warfare associated with it are the central reality of daily existencersquo (Chagnon 1983) whereas the Mbuti pygmies of the Zaire rain forest are lsquoat peace with themselves and with their environmentrsquo (Turnbull 1978) His general answer is that

the psychocultural dispositions rooted in a societyrsquos early socialization experi-ences [eg childrearing] shape the overall level of conflict while its specific pattern of social organization [eg kinship] determines whether the targets of conflict and aggression are located within a society outside it or both

(Ross 1993 9)

Ross then generalizes this lsquoculture of conflict theoryrsquo to post-industrial societies and finds it precisely (if surprisingly) confirmed in explaining the incidence of protracted conflict in Ireland and the lsquorelatively low levels of conflict in Norwayrsquo


The main point is how the theoretical presuppositions of anthropological conflict theory of this kind can be seen to discount radical disagreement as at most merely functional for the internal drivers of conflict in different societies

The same applies to other anthropology-based internal conflict theories and for similar reasons Sometimes these have a more psychological than a sociological gloss as seen here where having looked at lsquocultural influences on conflict res-olutionrsquo and offered examples of widely varying practice from culture to culture the editorial lsquofinal wordsrsquo of Fry and Bjorkqvistrsquos Cultural Variation in Conflict Resolution are

We conclude that the source of conflict lies in the minds of people External social conflict is a reflection of intrapsychic conflict External control does not solve the roots of the problem If we wish a conflict really to disappear then a change in attitude is needed

(1997 252)

Similar results are obtained if attention shifts from the internal nature of conflict parties to human nature in general Much has been written here about the roots of human aggression (Rapoport 1989 Staub 1989) In the field of conflict analysis Konrad Lorenzrsquos lsquohydraulicrsquo theory (1966) and Robert Adreyrsquos lsquoterritorial imper-ativersquo theory of human aggression (1966) were influential in their day Latterly animal ethologist Franz de Waal offers lsquopeacemaking among primatesrsquo as an instructive model (1989) while Jane Goodallrsquos emphasis is more on the murderous propensities of our genetically nearest cousins the chimpanzees (1986) In answer to the question lsquowhy do we believe what we believersquo Andrew Neuberg and Mark Waltman reply by lsquouncovering our biological need for meaning spirituality and truthrsquo (2006)

Behind all this again lies a bitter dispute between those who argue that viol-ence is not rooted in human nature or endemic in human beings but is a learned behaviour taught by culture and eradicable through socialization and evolutionary psychologists who reject this as a lsquopolitically correctrsquo travesty and have revived the idea that human mindsets predisposed to violence lsquoevolved to deal with hostilities in the ancestral pastrsquo The idea that violence and war are learned behaviours was made famous through Margaret Meadrsquos claim that lsquowarfare is only an invention ndash not a biological necessityrsquo (1940) as amplified in the 1989 lsquoSeville Statement on Violencersquo that challenged as lsquoscientifically incorrectrsquo the idea that war is an evolutionary predisposition in human beings (Groebel et al 1989 xxiiindashxvi) Felicity de Zulueta argues similarly that lsquohumanity is essentially cooperativersquo and that the roots of destructiveness (dehumanization of the other narcissistic rage) lie in violations of childrensrsquo affiliative needs as identified in attachment theory (2006 343)

In sharp contrast Steven Pinker rejects this lsquocentral dogma of a secular faithrsquo and draws on recent studies of the mind the brain genetics and evolution to bridge the gap between culture and biology in a bid to provide secure physiolo-gical foundations for an understanding of human nature (2002) He concludes that


human bodies and human minds do show lsquodirect signs of design for aggressionrsquo pointing to

bull male body size the effects of testosterone anger and teeth baring fight-or-flight response of the autonomic nervous system aggressive acts initiated by circuits in the limbic system

bull the trans-culturally rough-and-tumble behaviour of boys lsquowhich is obviously practice for fightingrsquo

bull evidence that the lsquomost violent age is not adolescence but toddlerhoodrsquobull the lsquoshockingly high homicide rates of pre-state societies with 10 to 60 per

cent of the men dying at the hands of other menrsquo

This radical disagreement is ongoing Here is a fierce counter-critique that dis-misses Pinkerrsquos lsquoevolutionary psychologyrsquo (EP)

the claims of EP in the fields of biology psychology anthropology sociology cultural studies and philosophy are for the most part not merely mistaken but culturally pernicious hellip Like the religious fundamentalists the fundamental-ist Darwinians who wish to colonise the social sciences have political as well as cultural objectives hellip The political agenda of EP is transparently part of a right-wing libertarian attack on collectivity above all the welfare state

(Rose and Rose 2001 3 125 8)

On the question of internal conflict theory and radical disagreement I will leave the last word to Nietszche who invokes Darwin to dismiss verbal disagreement as a herd phenomenon located at the most attenuated end of language itself an attenuation of consciousness which is in turn lsquothe last and latest development of the organic and hence what is most unfinished and unstrongrsquo (1974 84ndash5) This triple downgrading of the significance of verbal justification and dispute is derived from the idea in evolutionary biology that animal and human action is impelled by unconscious physiological drives lsquoEvery drive is a type of thirst for power every one has its perspective which it wants to force on the other drives as a normrsquo

For these perspectives to masquerade as independent deliverances of reason or power-free knowledge is nothing more than a lie So to approach them in terms of their own self-articulations would be foolish in the extreme

Whatever becomes conscious becomes by the same token shallow thin rela-tively stupid general sign herd signal all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption falsification reduction to superficialities and generalization hellip Man like every living being thinks continually without knowing it the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of this ndash the most superficial and worst part ndash for only this conscious thinking takes the form of words hellip

(Nietzsche 1974 298ndash300)


So much for the project of taking radical disagreement seriously I reel under the impact of Nietzschersquos rhetoric

Nevertheless I will argue in Chapter 6 that even from the perspective of internal interpretations of conflict it is once again a mistake to disregard the phenomenon of radical disagreement How for example is the bitter radical disagreement about innate human violence referred to above accommodated within internal conflict theory The same applies to Nietzsche What of the contempt with which Zarathustra dismisses his opponents in the radical disagreements that character-ize his tempestuous passage through the world And who is more polemical than Nietzsche himself

Relational conflict theories

I turn finally to the third broad class of conflict theories ndash those that focus on relations between conflict parties This may seem the most likely site for serious exploration of the phenomenon of radial disagreement since the idea that disa-greements are conflicts of belief is built into the lsquocommon descriptionrsquo of radical disagreement as exemplified in the prologue

Relational theories of conflict loom large in my own field of conflict resolution particularly in the charting of processes of escalation and de-escalation More will be said about this in the next chapter so I will be brief here Conflict relations are generated for example by all three dimensions of Johan Galtungrsquos lsquoconflict tri-anglersquo (1996 72) See Figure 22

Here the contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation which includes the actual or perceived lsquoincompatibility of goalsrsquo between the conflict parties gen-erated by what Chris Mitchell calls a lsquomis-match between social values and social structurersquo (1981 18) In a symmetric conflict the contradiction is defined by the parties their interests and the clash of interests between them In an asymmetric conflict it is defined by the parties their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship

Figure 22 The conflict triangle

contradiction

attitude behaviour


Attitude includes the partiesrsquo perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves These can be positive or negative but in violent conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the other and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear anger bitterness and hatred Analysts who emphasize these subjective aspects are said to have an expressive view of the sources of conflict (lsquoa social conflict exists when two or more parties believe they have incompatible objectivesrsquo ndash Kriesberg 1982 17)

Behaviour is the third component of the conflict triangle It can include coop-eration or coercion gestures signifying conciliation or hostility Violent conflict behaviour is characterized by threats coercion and destructive attacks Analysts who emphasize objective aspects such as structural relationships competing mater-ial interests or behaviours are said to have an instrumental view of the sources of conflict (there is conflict lsquowhenever incompatible activities occur hellip an action that is incompatible with another action prevents obstructs interferes injures or in some way makes the latter less likely to be effectiversquo ndash Deutsch 1973 10)

Galtung argues that all three components have to be present together in a full conflict A conflict structure without conflict attitudes or behaviour is a latent (or structural) conflict Galtung sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structure attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another As the dynamic develops it becomes a manifest conflict formation as partiesrsquo inter-ests clash or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive Conflict parties then organize around this structure to pursue their interests They develop hostile atti-tudes and conflictual behaviour And so the conflict formation starts to grow and intensify As it does so it may widen (drawing in other parties) deepen and spread generating secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders who get sucked in Interests behaviours and attitudes feed off each other in escalating relations of mutual hostility threat perception polarized identities projection of enemy images and fear This often considerably complicates the task of addressing the original core conflict Eventually however resolving the conflict must involve a set of dynamic changes that involve de-escalation of conflict behaviour a change in attitudes and transforming the relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conflict structure perhaps through institutional change

I call the three sets of relations generated by the conflict triangle

1 relations of interest 2 relations of belief 3 relations of power

I will say more about these three relations and the interconnections between them later Here the main point is that relations of belief ndash which is seen to include the phenomenon of radical disagreement ndash are subsumed into the category of lsquoconflict attitudersquo in general together with emotions and desires And it is emotions and desires that predominate in determining that lsquoattitudesrsquo are interpreted as subject-ive attributes of people


Conflict attitude Emotive ndash feelings Conative ndash wills desires Cognitive ndash beliefs

This is the main reason I think why the phenomenology of radical disagreement ndash the exploration of the internal economy of relations of belief ndash is not usually pursued seriously in relational conflict analysis Beliefs are seen to be little more than one aspect among others of subjective conflict attitudes in general People lsquohaversquo beliefs in much the same way as they lsquohaversquo desires or feelings And subject-ive attitudes are then as often as not themselves further subordinated under what are seen as the more measurable objective dimensions of contradiction (interest) and behaviour (power) Relations of belief are ndash wrongly in my view ndash reduced to mere reflexes of relations of interest and relations of power

Radical disagreement and the mapping of complex conflict systems

I conclude this chapter with a look at conflict mapping This too is seen to be an essential element in conflict analysis as preparation for determining the best ways to act or intervene

Conflict mapping ndash for example of conflict parties conflict issues conflict rela-tions and so on ndash has been characteristic in the field of conflict resolution from the beginning as summed up in Paul Wehrrsquos Conflict Regulation (1979) This interest has recently been revived in the form of complex or systemic conflict mapping often by aid and development workers with a view to understanding the interre-lationships between the diverse factors that make up complex conflict situations (Koumlrppen et al 2008)

The challenge of analysing systemic complexity was clearly recognized by the founding theorists of conflict resolution ndash Lewis Fry Richardson before World War II and Kenneth Boulding Quincy Wright Johan Galtung Anatol Rapoport John Burton and others from the 1950s They began from the premises that con-flict analysis must be multi-level and multi-disciplinary that the sum is greater than the parts that positive feedback loops reinforce systemic resistance to change that interventions have unpredictable outcomes and that at critical moments there can be sudden and abrupt bifurcations as the set of interlocking systems adjusts to changing environments and eco-landscapes in a process of co-adaptation ndash these are self-organizing and complex adaptive systems

For example Boulding recognized early on (1962 see also Sandole 1999) that systemic complexity is quite consonant with long-term stability since once a complex system has settled into a pattern no single stimulus or even collection of stimuli may be sufficient to overcome its constantly reinforced inertia (his model-ling was mainly in terms of fluctuating and interpenetrating fields of force drawn from economic theory) In these cases either the complex must be affected as a whole or the system must be displaced to another environment which is more benign Either way it was recognized that the process of transition would be likely


to be less stable more turbulent and perhaps potentially more dangerous than the original more familiar concatenation Indeed there was no guarantee that the new equilibrium if found would necessarily be more congenial

Richardson was an expert on mathematical computations on predictability and turbulence in weather systems Influenced by this in the first issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (1957) Boulding and Wright proposed global conflict data centres to alert the international community to the upcoming squalls and storms of international conflict Burtonrsquos thinking was greatly influenced by general systems theory particularly in the form of the distinction between first and second order learning (Burton 1968 Ramsbotham Woodhouse and Miall 2005 43ndash7)

More recently ndash over the past twenty years ndash the conflict analytic field has been enriched by a further transfer of complex system ideas from the natural to the social sciences with inputs from sociology political theory social psychology organiza-tional theory and other disciplinary areas influenced by cognate ideas (Hendrick 2009) This has not been without controversy (Rosenau and Earnest 2006) There is no one overarching approach but ndash as may be fitting given the topic ndash a hybrid coming-together of different transdisciplinary frameworks The main question for this chapter is how the phenomenon of radical disagreement is modelled in complex conflict systemic analyses of this kind The most usual way this is done is in terms of lsquomental modelsrsquo and the roles they are seen to play in perpetuating intractable conflict These are the conceptual frames or cognitive structures largely unconscious that shape our tacit knowledge and beliefs and adapt us to conform to prevailing social norms ndash what Lakoff and Johnson have called lsquothe metaphors we live byrsquo (1980)

David Stroh has said that lsquosystemic thinking is mental models made visiblersquo Norbert Ropers (2008 in Koumlrppen et al (eds) 13) building on the work of Oliver Wils et al (2006) takes thinking in mental models as one of the defining lsquocharac-teristics of ldquosystemic thinkingrdquorsquo

Thinking in (mental) models yet acknowledging perspective-dependency Accepting that all analytical models are a reduction of the complex reality (and are necessarily perspective-dependent) and are therefore only ever a tool and not lsquothe realityrsquo as such

This idea recurs albeit not in name in attempts to accommodate lsquobeliefs feel-ings and behaviorsrsquo in the dynamical-systems approach (Coleman et al 2008 6) lsquoMental modelsrsquo are included as distinct elements in systems perspective maps (Woodrow 2006) Mental models are identified with lsquowidely-held beliefs and normsrsquo in systemic conflict analysis maps within the lsquoattitudersquo dimension of the SAT model of peacebuilding (Ricigliano 2008 2) lsquoMind mapsrsquo encompassing stakeholder and evaluator perceptions and interpretations are used for testing reso-nances and exploring collective dialogue in the emergent evaluations of large-scale system action research (Burns 2006 189)

The key question is how this relates to radical disagreement For example how does the phenomenon of radical disagreement appear in the systemic mapping of


mental models in a context of intense and intractable political conflictThe following observations may suggest why the idea of conflicting mental

models as currently exemplified in systemic conflict analysis maps seems to me to be not yet adequate to capturing the role played by the phenomenon of radical disagreement in generating and sustaining linguistic intractability See Figures 23 and 24

1 In some systems perspective maps mental models are represented by lsquobelief cloudsrsquo Here the content of the cloud is a statement by a conflict party (eg lsquowe must protect what we haversquo) Occasionally a contradictory statement by another conflict party may also be included in a thought bubble elsewhere on the map But even this is not yet a radical disagreement because it misses the systemic nature of the whole which can only be represented by the appear-ance in written notation of the radical disagreement itself in this case with reference to conflict in Burundi

|lsquoWe must protect what we haversquo

lsquoWe are the majority We deserve morersquo|(Woodrow 2006 8)

This is what stands in need of phenomenological exploration with the conflict parties

2 An alternative way in which radical disagreement is indicated in systems perspective maps is through third-party description (eg lsquomutual perceptions of victimhoodrsquo or lsquocompeting narrativesrsquo) Here the assumption is that the descriptive terms lsquoperceptionsrsquo lsquonarrativesrsquo lsquobeliefsrsquo lsquoconstructionsrsquo lsquopro-jectionsrsquo lsquorationalizationsrsquo and so on are adequate to the task in hand that is they are independent of what is in question in the radical disagreements thus described But this is often to beg the question at issue as demonstrated later in this book Conflict parties in intense political conflicts do not accept that their claims recommendations and arguments are lsquomerersquo mental mod-els perceptions narratives beliefs etc This again is integral to linguistic intractability

3 Most of the elements included in the systems perspective map are presented as unproblematic that is to say as unconnected with the phenomenon of rad-ical disagreement But further phenomenological investigation usually shows that some of these too are radically contested (eg lsquohuman rights violationsrsquo or lsquovenality criminality and corruptionrsquo) or that what is referred to lies at the epicentre of the political radical disagreement itself (eg lsquothe final status of Kosovorsquo)

4 Where does emotion or motivedesire appear in systems perspective maps These again usually appear unproblematically (eg lsquofear and hatredrsquo or lsquodeter-mination to prevail at all costsrsquo) But this does not capture the way affective

R

elat

ive

depr

ivat

ion

Sec

essi

onis

tac

tion

Str

engt

h of

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tant

mov

emen

t (LT

TE

) +

mili

taris

atio

nab

solu

te c

ontr

ol

Ben

efits

and

defic

its o

f war

econ

omy

Dia

spor

a fu

ndin

g+

sup

port

Vio

lent

con

flict

inte

nsity

los

s of

lives

etc

Em

battl

edlsquom

inor

ityrsquo

(Fea

r di

stru

st r

esen

tmen

t)+

Asy

mm

etry

Mus

lim te

nsio

nw

ith L

TT

ELe

ader

ship

gove

rnan

ce +

part

y fo

rms

Den

ial o

fTa

mil

iden

tity

Lim

ited

acce

ss fo

r Tam

ils(e

duca

tion

pub

lic s

ervi

ce

deve

lopm

ent f

unds

etc

)

Mus

lim s

trug

gle

for

influ

ence

inG

OS

L

Eco

nom

icpe

rfor

man

ce(N

+ E

)

Dis

enfr

anch

isem

ent o

fot

her

min

oriti

es

Maj

orita

rian

polit

ics

+

stru

ctur

es

Sys

tem

icex

clus

ion

mar

gina

lisat

ion

+In

adeq

uate

in

equi

tabl

ede

velo

pmen

tsc

hem

es+

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tral

isat

ion

of p

ower

and

adm

inis

trat

ion

Eco

nom

icpe

rfor

man

ce(S

+ W

)

Rel

ativ

ede

priv

atio

n

ldquoGre

atra

cerdquo

imag

e

Div

ide

+ r

ule

colo

nial

pol

icie

sS

tren

gth

ofm

ilita

nt m

ovem

ents

Eco

nom

icpe

rfor

man

ce

Ben

efits

and

defic

its o

f war

econ

omy

Mili

taris

atio

n

Em

battl

ed lsquom

inor

ityrsquo

(Fea

r di

stru

st r

esen

tmen

t)

Feu

dal m

inds

et

patr

onag

e d

ynas

ticpo

litic

s d

rive

for

pow

er

App

eals

to e

thni

city

+re

ligio

n fo

r vo

tes

sup

port

(nat

iona

lism

ext

rem

ism

)

Dis

enfr

anch

ised

maj

ority

(cas

te +

cla

ssfa

ctor

s)

Ext

erna

l fac

tors

Indi

a

Inte

rnat

iona

lco

mm

unity

C

C( R)

( R)

R

R

R

RR

R

R

R

R

R

R

CC

C

= d

elay

= c

ount

erac

ting

= r

einf

orci

ng=

bull T

amils

=

min

ority

with

in

Sri

Lank

a

bull S

inha

lese

=

min

ority

in

reg

ion

RC

Fig

ure

23

Con

flic

t in

Sri

Lan

ka a

sys

tem

s pe

rspe

ctiv

e

Sou

rce

Rop

ers

2008

26ndash

7

Fig

ure

24

Und

erst

andi

ng th

e B

urun

di c

onfl

ict

a s

yste

ms

pers

pect

ive

Sou

rce

Woo

drow

200

6 8

ndash a

par

tici

pato

ry w

orks

hop

prod

uct

=

tim

e de

lay

=

men

tal m

ode

Fact

ors

in B

old

con

side

red

maj

or d

rivin

g fo

rces

Reg

ions

of B

urun

di

imba

lanc

e of

influ

ence

Inse

curit

y of

the

maj

ority

Vio

lenc

e

We

are

the

maj

ority

W

ede

serv

em

ore

Pea

ceke

epin

gP

eace

acco

rd

Inte

rnat

iona

lin

terv

entio

nD

iffic

ulty

in c

omin

gto

an

acco

rd

Pol

itica

lin

stab

ility

Ove

rall

leve

lof

res

ourc

esS

tren

gth

of th

ena

tiona

l eco

nom

y We

mus

tto

pro

tect

wha

t we

have

Bad

gov

ern

ace

Eth

nic

man

ipu

lati

on

Co

mp

etit

ion

for

po

wer

Res

ou

rces

of

the

maj

ori

ty

Po

wer

of

the

Elit

eC

lass

vs

th

e M

ajo

rity

Reg

ion

ald

ynam

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Res

ou

rces

of

the

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Imp

un

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Imp

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ity


and conative aspects are inseparable from cognitive aspects in the explosion of radical disagreement in intense conflict situations In radical disagreement for example the emotion of indignation and the will to rectify injustice infuses and is infused by what is referred to as the outrage in question This is what then comes to constitute a key element in the substance of the resultant phe-nomenon of radical disagreement when it is itself contested It is what is only revealed in the phenomenology of radical disagreement (the exploration of agonistic dialogue) as outlined in Part II below

5 And what of the dynamics of conflict This is essential to systemic analysis Yet it cannot be easily represented on two-dimensional systems perspective maps except via a static array of arrows between fixed points The phenom-enon of radical disagreement on the other hand is dramatically dynamic in every sense It emerges with sudden force at any point ndash including conflict transformation workshops (the only feature of intense political conflict to appear in this way) ndash and the speed at which spirals of linguistic contestation consequently ramify and proliferate can be breathtaking

6 The various shifting axes of radical disagreement are also difficult to map One example of this is that the axes of radical disagreement within compound conflict parties often critical both to systems analysis and to systemic con-flict transformation as noted below are to my knowledge rarely indicated on systems perspective maps

7 As for third-party interventions these usually appear unobtrusively in the corner of systems perspective maps (eg lsquoregional playersrsquo lsquothe international communityrsquo lsquothe UNrsquo) This masks crucial axes of radical disagreement among interveners (for example Russia and the US in the Middle East Quartet)

8 More importantly this also ignores axes of radical disagreement between third-party interveners and conflict parties These often transmute in sudden reversals during the course of the conflict Third parties for example who are initially welcomed may subsequently find themselves the objects of hostility of perhaps most or even all the immediate stakeholders Interveners become conflict parties

9 Then there is the involvement of the systems perspective map and the map-makers themselves Here axes of radical disagreement often again emerge between third-party mappers and conflict parties An example of this is illustrated in Chapter 6 when the lsquopeacemakingrsquo discourse implicit in the third-party map produced by international analysts is itself challenged by one or more of the protagonists This is often a key to linguistic intractability

10 Finally there is radical disagreement among third-party analysts that also does not appear on the map With reference to the enterprise of conflict transforma-tion for example systems analysis may claim to look deeper than complexity analysts into what underlies such complexity or may refute purely construct-ivist approaches Conversely critical analysts may see a failure in conflict transformation to take proper account of power imbalance and positionality in its analysis Or Foucauldian analysts may identify the peacebuilding norms of conflict transformation as covertly hegemonic despite protestations of context


sensitivity Or culture analysts may see conflict transformation as limited by assumptions implicit in the languages and associated mental frameworks in which the conflict mapping is articulated Or gender analysts may castigate conflict transformation as gender-blind

I will return to the subject of complex systemic mapping in Chapter 4 There I will acknowledge its importance in the methodology for studying radical disagreement It is a significant advance on previous conflict mapping techniques and has proved its usefulness in preparing the ground for well-inforned and more effective aid and development as well as conflict resolution interventions Nevertheless I hope that this brief critique has established why at a certain point the phenomenology of radical disagreement has to move beyond it

Conclusion

A survey of the broad and diverse conflict analysis field shows once again that the phenomenon of radical disagreement is not generally seen to be significant or worth studying in its own right It is dismissed as epiphenomenal in contextual analysis functional for deeper drivers of conflict in internal analysis and merely subjective in relational analysis It is not fully accommodated in complex systems analysis Yet this is the main verbal manifestation of intense political conflict It is the key to linguistic intractability Perhaps more is made of it in the field of conflict resolution where after all intense political conflict and intractability constitute the chief challenges This is the topic of Chapter 3

3 Radical disagreement and conflict resolution

Conflict resolution identifies radical disagreement with destructive conflict and the terminus of genuine dialogue As a result the aim of conflict resolution from the outset is to by-pass or transform radical disagreement not to learn from it

All cultures have their own ways of understanding and handling internal and external conflict These vary widely But the formal field of conflict resolution has been mainly a western venture despite the original influence of Buddhist and Hindu traditions Strenuous efforts have recently been made to weave wider cultural dimensions ndash including Islamic dimensions ndash into the fabric of conflict resolution and important centres have been set up all over the world Nevertheless the literature is still predominantly North American and European Conflict res-olution is taken here as the generic name for the enterprise which encompasses conflict settlement at one end of the spectrum and conflict transformation at the other Conflict settlement means peacemaking between conflict parties in order to avoid direct violence Conflict transformation means the deeper long-term project of overcoming underlying structural violence and cultural violence and transform-ing identities and relations1

Although this western bias is a continuing weakness in the field from the perspective of studying radical disagreement it may be an advantage Edward Hall distinguished high-context communication cultures in which most of the information is transmitted implicitly through context and comparatively little is conveyed directly through verbal messages from low-context communica-tion cultures in which most of the information is transmitted through explicit linguistic codes (1976 91) He identified the former with languages like Arabic and Chinese and the latter with languages like German English and French Perhaps synaptic pathways in the brain are programmed differently as these languages and their associated cultural mores are learned The subject-predicate grammar of English for example creates a fixed world of objects and attributes and encourages stark logical dichotomies (truefalse rightwrong) exclusive categories and adversarial relationships So the preponderance of European languages in the formal conflict resolution field should mean that the topic of radical disagreement ndash where information is explicitly exchanged through direct coded messages and where sharp antagonisms and antitheses are most abruptly

Radical disagreement and conflict resolution 53

expressed ndash becomes a focal point for linguistic analysis This chapter is an enquiry into what the conflict resolution field says about the phenomenon of radical dis-agreement For this reason what follows will be confined to the communicative sphere For a broader survey of the field see Ramsbotham Woodhouse and Miall (2005)

Conflict resolution is a multidisciplinary multilevel study of human conflict that began professionally in the 1950s and for most practitioners is both analytic and normative Accurate analysis is the foundation The normative aim is most simply expressed as the overcoming of violence Johan Galtung famously distin-guished direct violence (children are killed) structural violence (children die as a result of poverty and malnutrition) and cultural violence (whatever blinds people to direct and structural violence or makes them think that these are good things) (Galtung 1996) There are complex interconnections Structural violence (injustice exclusion inequality) and cultural violence (prejudice ignorance discrimination) lead to direct violence direct violence reinforces and perpetuates structural and cultural violence and so on The normative aim of conflict resolution is not to overcome conflict Conflict cannot be overcome ndash it is an unavoidable feature of social development And conflict should not be overcome in combating an unjust situation there may need to be more conflict before this can be achieved The aim rather is to transform actually or potentially violent conflict into non-violent forms of social struggle and social change

The early work of Morton Deutsch can serve to set the scene Drawing on the pioneering insights of Mary Parker Follett in labour relations (1940) Kurt Lewin in social psychology (1935) von Neumann and Morgenstern in game theory (1944) and others Deutsch distinguished destructive conflict from constructive conflict suggesting that the former was to be avoided but the latter was a necessary and valuable aspect of human creativity (1949 1973) The aim of constructive con-flict resolution is to transform destructive conflict into constructive conflict The main difference between destructive and constructive conflict in addition to their damaging or benign consequences lies in the contrast between competition in which partiesrsquo goals are negatively interdependent and cooperation where they are positively interdependent

Where does radical disagreement fit in Deutsch identifies constructive conflict with lsquoconstructive controversyrsquo and destructive conflict with lsquocompetitive debatersquo Radical disagreement is included in competitive debate

The major difference hellip between constructive controversy and competitive debate is that in the former people discuss their differences with the objective of clarifying them and attempting to find a solution that integrates the best thoughts that emerge during the discussion no matter who articulates them There is no winner and no loser both win if during the controversy each party comes to deeper insights and enriched views of the matter that is initially in controversy hellip By contrast in competitive contests or debates there is usually a winner and a loser The party judged to have lsquothe bestrsquo ideas skills know-ledge and so on typically wins while the other who is judged to be less good


loses Competition evaluates and ranks people based on their capacity for a particular task rather than integrating various contributions

(2000 28)

Deutschrsquos ideas can be illustrated by a well-known model that has been influential in conflict resolution almost from the beginning It represents gains and losses for two competing parties locked in a competitive conflict See Figure 31

A-C-B is the constant sum line (often misleadingly called the zero-sum line because one personrsquos gain is anotherrsquos loss) All positions along it add up to a con-stant number ndash in this case 1 At position A party X wins (1) and party Y loses (0) At position B party X loses (0) and party Y wins (1) At position C they each get half (frac12frac12) Conflict settlement or bargaining where a fixed asset or scarce resource is divided by mutual agreement appears along this line in various proportions The winndashlose line for example can be seen to reflect the proportion of the territory of historic Palestine under the sole sovereignty of the State of Israel and the proportion possibly to be included in a future Palestinian state Since 1949 the State of Israel has held 78 per cent of mandate Palestine with Israeli settlements encroaching further on the remaining 22 per cent (Gaza and the West Bank) since 1967

D-C-E is the non-constant sum line Here the conflict parties may find that they both lose (losendashlose) or both win (winndashwin) Along the D-C-E line losendashlose does not necessarily mean the worst outcome for either party just that both end up worse off than they would have been had another strategy or course of action been adopted And winndashwin does not mean an ideal solution but that both are better off than they would have been otherwise Constructive conflict resolution searches for creative outcomes along this line warning that the great majority of protracted destructive conflicts end up in disastrous losendashlose outcomes so that it is in the vital interest of all parties to find a way out of the lsquoprisonerrsquos dilemmarsquo trap In the case

Figure 31 Winndashlose losendashlose winndashwin

Par

ty X

gai

ns

Party Y gains

Position A(10) Winndashlose

Position D(00) Losendashlose

Position E(11) Winndashwin

Position B(01) Losendashwin

Position C(frac12frac12) Compromise


of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for example the argument is that although the Palestinians have so far come off much worse than the (Jewish) Israelis even the Israelis are worse off than they would have been had they reached an agreement earlier Evidently this is all part of the ongoing conflict ndash and lies at the heart of the associated radical disagreements

In prisonerrsquos dilemma two prisoners pursuing individual self-interest (to max-imize their own gain) and impeccable logic (each knows that the other is doing the same) are nevertheless driven to make choices that end in a losendashlose outcome that is not in their individual self-interest Given the rules of the game the dilemma is inescapable They can never reach the elusive winndashwin outcome in which both will be better off There is no way out in single one-off encounters See Figure 32

In prisonerrsquos dilemma it can be seen that whatever choice the other may make each player considered singly gains a higher pay-off by choosing to defect If the other cooperates defection earns 3 points rather than 2 If the other defects defec-tion earns 1 point rather than 0 So the only rational course for both of them is to defect if they want the highest pay-off But if they do this they both end up with only 1 point This is not even the highest mutual pay-off They could each have had 2 if they had both cooperated In this case winndashwin is (22) and losendashlose is (11) So self-interest and inescapable logic have led to the losendashlose outcome What if they could have communicated Even then at the point of decision how could each guarantee that the other would not defect tempted by the 3 point (winndashlose) prize and driven by the same logic They are still trapped

Prisonerrsquos dilemma has generated an enormous and often highly technical literat-ure One way out of the trap was famously demonstrated by Robert Axelrod (1984)

Figure 32 Prisonerrsquos dilemma pay-off matrix

(22)

(30)

(03)

(11)

Cooperate

Prisoner B

Prisoner A

Prisonerrsquos dilemma is a non-zero-sum game for rational self-interested players Two prisoners accused of a crime are each given two choices to cooperate with each other (remain silent) or to defect (inform on the other) The choices are made in ignorance of what the other will do ndash they are kept in separate cells The possible pay-offs are given here with prisoner Arsquos pay-off first and prisoner Brsquos pay-off second within each bracket The higher the pay-off the better 3 means release 2 means a short sentence 1 means a life sentence 0 means execution

Cooperate

Defect

Defect


when he set up a computer programme for iterated prisonerrsquos dilemma games and invited strategies prepared to compete against each other The conflict resolution theorist Anatol Rapaport submitted lsquotit-for-tatrsquo that begins by cooperating despite the risk of initial loss then copies what the other does thereafter Given certain starting conditions tit-for-tat beats more lsquoselfishrsquo strategies that persist in com-petitive (defect) moves It is initially generous (it begins cooperatively) responds toughly to aggression (it retaliates) but is forgiving (it reverts to cooperation when the other does) and is generally predictable There have been many other variations of play in some of which tit-for-tat does not do so well The lsquoshadow of the futurersquo ndash the fact of continuing future relationships ndash determines that there can be an lsquoevolution of cooperationrsquo even for competitive self-interested players as illustrated in the nuclear weapon and anti-ballistic missile treaties between the USSR and the USA

The important point is that tit-for-tat beats more competitive strategies not in an altruistic sense but because it makes the greatest gains in terms of accumulated pay-offs in its own self-interest lsquoGenerosityrsquo and lsquoforgivenessrsquo defined strategic-ally eventually win As Richard Dawkins put it in The Selfish Gene lsquonice guys come firstrsquo (1989 202ndash3)

But even tit-for-tat can be locked into mutually destructive conflict if the other persists in competitive play as happens in intractable conflicts where mutual suspicion (lack of trust) and the security dilemma (your defence is factored into my worst-case planning as offensive threat and vice-versa) as well as ideological commitment and the self-interest of intransigent parties in the continuation of the conflict perpetuate mutual retaliation Another way of springing the trap therefore is to follow the conflict resolution route and to change the playersrsquo perceptions and calculations of gain ndash and eventually relationship ndash by reframing the conflict as a shared problem All key stakeholders must be persuaded that existing strategies lead to a losendashlose impasse and that preferable alternatives are available and will be to their advantage Remaining irreconcilable spoilers must simply be defeated Perceived lsquopay-offrsquo rules can be altered in ways such as these

bull by increasing scarce resources (enlarging the cake)bull by offering bold gestures on less important issues in order to reduce tension

and build trust (logrolling and lsquograduated reciprocalrsquo strategies)bull by creating new options not included in the original demands (brainstorming)bull by looking for lsquosuperordinate goalsrsquo such as mutual economic gains that

neither party can achieve on its own ndash eg joint membership of the EU (superordination)

bull by compensating those prepared to make concessions (compensation)bull by increasing the penalties for those who are not (penalization)

Deutsch sums up the theory of constructive conflict resolution as follows

In brief the theory equates a constructive process of conflict resolution with an effective cooperative problem-solving process in which the conflict is the


mutual problem to be resolved cooperatively It also equates a destructive process of conflict resolution with a competitive process in which the con-flict parties are involved in a competition or struggle to determine who wins and who loses often the outcome of a struggle is a loss for both parties hellip At the heart of this process is reframing the conflict as a mutual problem to be resolved (or solved) through joint cooperative efforts

(Deutsch 2000 30ndash1)

Radical disagreement is identified here with destructive conflict and losendashlose outcomes ndash and ultimately with violence It is seen as a superficial feature of con-flict from which nothing further can be learned The aim of conflict resolution is to loosen the knot of misunderstanding Radical disagreement ties the knot tighter It reinforces the entrapment of conflict parties In radical disagreement substantive issues are surrounded by a penumbra of emotion that chokes off constructive com-munication and reduces verbal exchanges to a lsquoconversation of the deafrsquo Conflict parties blame each other justify themselves and endlessly repeat inherited mantras of hate Radical disagreement is seen to be an unproductive dead-end It is all too familiar It is a terminus to dialogue From the outset therefore Deutschrsquos advice is not to focus on radical disagreement because there is no point in doing so but on the contrary to look in the opposite direction

Place the disagreements in perspective by identifying common ground and common interests When there is disagreement address the issues and refrain from making personal attacks When there is disagreement seek to understand the otherrsquos views from his or her perspective try to feel what it would be like if you were on the other side hellip Reasonable people understand that their own judgment as well as the judgment of others may be fallible

(Ibid 32 35)

But what happens when reasonable people do not or cannot behave like this What happens when the radical disagreements persist This is not a rare event It is the norm in the intractable conflicts with which radical disagreement is chiefly associated such as those in Sri Lanka or Kosovo or Georgia or Tibet or the Middle East These are the conflicts that defy settlement and transformation for years if not decades lsquoCompetitive debatersquo continues to fuel intractable conflict despite the best efforts of those who seek to dispel it What happens when conflict resolution fails

Is there really no more to say about radical disagreement from a conflict resolu-tion perspective It is worth investigating further by looking at the four best-known communicative approaches negotiation and mediation interactive problem solv-ing dialogic conflict resolution and discursive conflict transformation

A good idea of the range of methodologies and approaches available can be found on Heidi and Guy Burgessrsquo website Beyond Intractability A Free Knowledge Base on More Constructive Approaches to Destructive Conflict (httpwwwbeyondintractabilityorg)


Negotiation and mediation

Since the 1970s a number of systematic analyses and comparative studies of suc-cessful and unsuccessful negotiation approaches and styles have become available The same has been true in the mediation field (Ramsbotham Woodhouse and Miall 2005 159ndash84) These studies cover negotiation of different kinds and at different levels (commercial family neighbourhood community through to international diplomacy) and mediation of various sorts (official unofficial with or without lsquomusclersquo good offices facilitation by individuals by local representatives by state officials and international organizations) Attention is paid to the nature of the conflict (actors issues evolving power relations) the nature of third-party inter-veners (status capacity roles) the process of negotiation (venue timing phases complementarity of activities) and the skill-sets required (clarity and consistency of analysis trust building active listening communication and persuasion skills) Efforts are made to evaluate and compare results in different situations in order to find out what works and what does not work

This section takes the examples of alternative dispute resolution at domestic level and interest-based negotiation at international level as the most likely venues for insight into the internal economy of radical disagreement and the nature of linguistic intractability

Alternative dispute resolution

Alternative Dispute Resolution aims to settle industrial commercial racial neigh-bour divorce and other disputes short of recourse to the courts ndash and extends to victim-offender mediation and restorative justice The purpose is to shift the focus away from dead-end adversarial argument about lsquodelusory factsrsquo (truth falsehood right wrong) ndash in other words away from radical disagreement ndash and on to product-ive exploration of how to accommodate the different interpretations perceptions and feelings that are the lsquoreal issuesrsquo I will take Andrew Floyer Aclandrsquos book Resolving Disputes Without Going to Court as exemplary here

[I]t is the tangle of material interests emotions prejudices vanities past experiences personal insecurities and immediate feelings that drive disputes and make them so hard to resolve these are the real issues People are not motivated by facts they are motivated by their perceptions of the facts their interpretations of the facts their feelings about the facts

(Floyer Acland 1995 57 original italics)

Radical disagreement is identified with the adversarial approach that alternative dispute resolution seeks to avoid

[I]f the establishment of right and wrong truth and falsehood is important then the adversarial process is a very good way to achieve it But in many other situations there is a misunderstanding a failure of communication a clash of


values a collision of equally valid interests In these the problem is not that people are right or wrong but that they are different they want different things and are headed in different directions

(Ibid 10)

In advising mediators how to handle such disputes Floyer Acland offers a nine-stage process of which the first four stages bear on the phenomenon of radical disagreement So perhaps some insight will be given here into the inner workings and nature of linguistic intractability

Stage one is preparation Here intransigent disagreements or disagreements over principle are ruled out as unsuitable because in these cases

there is no motivation for you or the other side to settle short of a trial perhaps because you want to fight or you are seeking public vindication or you are just too angry even to meet hellip a fundamental point of rights or principle is involved and it needs to be proclaimed with the full majesty of the law

(Ibid 76)

If mediation is to go ahead lsquoconceptual preparationrsquo means understanding that lsquothe adversarial assumption is ingrained and mediation involves encouraging a fresh ldquomind-setrdquo ndash new attitudes and approaches to a problemrsquo The key requirement as communicated to the disputants is

Go into your mediation thinking lsquoLet us invest time and effort in the possibility of agreement before we devote our energies and resources to disagreementrsquo See if you can get the other side to adopt a similar attitude

(Ibid 78 original italics)

Stage two is the setting up of the mediation This involves pre-negotiations choice of mediator and venue

Then comes stage three the lsquoopening movesrsquo which include the mediatorrsquos introduction

As I think your advisers will have already explained mediation is not like going to court and my job is not to tell you who is right and wrong here My task is to help you work out an agreement which suits you

(Ibid 100ndash1)

Disagreement tends to focus on the past whereas alternative dispute resolution tries from the beginning to look to the future Participants are advised that open-ing statements should confine themselves to the positive to the specifics of what is wanted and why and to what can be offered in order to attain it The disputing parties are permitted to react negatively to each otherrsquos opening statements but only if this is couched reflexively in terms of their own reactions


Describe how strongly you feel about what has been said by talking about your feelings and reactions avoid accusations Talking about your feelings and reactions is legitimate they will listen to them If you describe and judge their behaviour they will stop listening and start thinking why you are wrong


In stage four ndash lsquoputting your casersquo ndash the main focus is on communication with an emphasis on lsquocommon causes of communications failuresrsquo including the simplifications and generalizations necessary for linguistic communication when experience has become too lsquodeeprsquo or lsquocomplexrsquo or lsquoemotionally chargedrsquo to be conveyed otherwise This then becomes a cause for misunderstanding (113ndash16) In order to influence others the advice is to listen attentively welcoming new information being open to persuasion and trying to respect others lsquoeven when ndash perhaps especially when ndash you disagree with themrsquo

In summing up the lsquoway to successrsquo participants are advised that disputes are easier to resolve if you

bull start by outlining the issuesbull explain what you need to achieve and whybull ask others what they wantbull encourage appropriate allocation of responsibilitybull address the issues objectivelybull respect the other sidebull look for common ground and build on areas of agreement

In contrast the dispute will be harder to resolve if you

bull start with your solution and insist that it is the only onebull make extravagant claims and ignore the interests of othersbull tell people only what you wantbull blame the other side for everythingbull personalize the issuesbull insult the other sidebull concentrate on differences and polarize the issues

(Ibid 123)

I will not comment on the other five stages of alternative dispute mediation which move on to the generation of alternative outcomes to the drafting of proposals and to the breaking of anticipated deadlocks

It can be seen that in this account of alternative dispute resolution for entirely understandable reasons radical disagreement is presented as the antithesis of what is required As such it is proscribed from the very beginning No further attention is paid to it so there is no more to be learned about it here

But what if to borrow Floyer-Aclandrsquos language the lsquoestablishment of right and wrong truth and falsehoodrsquo is important Or there is no motivation for you or the


other side to settle because you do want to fight or are lsquoseeking public vindicationrsquo or are lsquojust too angry even to meetrsquo Or a lsquofundamental point of rights or principlersquo is involved and lsquoneeds to be proclaimedrsquo And what if as investigators this is what we want to study What if we want to explore what is said in these circumstances and to discover what role this plays in generating the intensity and intransigence of the conflicts in question

In that case we will have to look elsewhere

Interest-based negotiation

In the Harvard Negotiation Project Roger Fisher William Ury and their col-leagues have attempted to move away from traditional competitive lsquodistributional bargainingrsquo and to follow the earlier lead of Mary Parker Follett in the direction of the lsquomutual gainsrsquo seen to be offered by lsquointegrative bargainingrsquo (Fisher Ury and Patton 19811991) As originally presented this interest-based negotiation approach is encapsulated in a number of maxims for negotiators

bull Separate the people from the problem and try to build good working relationships

bull Facilitate communication and build trust by listening to each other rather than by telling each other what to do

bull Focus on underlying interests and core concerns not demands and superficial positions this includes concealed interests as well as those yet to be realized

bull Avoid zero-sum traps by brainstorming and exploring creative options with-out commitment to see if legitimate interests on both or all sides can be accommodated

bull Use objective criteria for evaluating and prioritizing options in terms of effec-tiveness and fairness

bull Anticipate possible obstaclesbull Work out how to overcome the obstacles including the drafting of clear and

attainable commitments

The aim is to define and if possible expand the zone of possible agreement and to increase its attraction in comparison with the best alternatives to a negotiated agreement as perceived by the negotiating partners individually It also means assessing the likelihood of the worst alternatives materializing if no agreement is reached A recent reworking of this process lays stress on lsquousing emotions as you negotiatersquo (Fisher and Shapiro 20057)

Perhaps the best place to see how the phenomenon of radical disagreement fits in here is Beyond Machiavelli where Roger Fisher offers a lsquotool-boxrsquo for negotiators seeking agreed settlements to a range of intractable international conflicts (Fisher et al 1994 17) Negotiators are offered help in clarifying their own goals and in understanding the perceptions and choices confronting their opposite numbers in order to learn how best to influence them in the preferred direction This is an exer-cise in positive conflict management not an attempt to lsquosolversquo individual conflicts


In the process insights into the nature of serious political disagreement are given such as how lsquopeople almost always see their own perceptions as legitimatersquo (1994 27) or how divergent mutual perceptions of the same message are easily generated ndash Fisher gives the example of the intended message of the US bombing of North Vietnam and the very different way it was received in Hanoi (1994 46) But the reason for making these points is to contrast the pitfalls of unproductive radical disagreement (personal antagonism dogmatic positional inflexibility) with the productive process of engaging with non-personal and non-positional lsquocontinuing differencesrsquo and lsquoconflicting viewsrsquo ndash the constructive controversies that it is the main aim of principled negotiation to encourage

Coping well with conflict hellip tends to strengthen a working relationship and to improve the ability of parties to deal with future differences hellip Every tool is intended to ask questions or to stimulate better questions Better questions are not about who is right and who is wrong or about one-shot solutions but about the process for dealing with conflicting views about right and wrong and for dealing with the inevitable changes that lie ahead

(Fisher et al 1994 143ndash4)

What is the upshot of this for the handling of radical disagreement Advice is given to negotiators from three perspectives their own that of the other and that of a third party

From their lsquoown perspectiversquo protagonists are advised to lsquolook forward with a purposersquo to preferred goals not backward at past resentments They are asked to set aside their own ideas about the rights and wrongs of the situation and to substitute a process in which differences are bracketed detached from the question of outcomes and subordinated to the joint search for the best ways of dealing with the conflict In particular lsquoWhat do I think is the best goalrsquo should be substituted by lsquoHow shall you and I best proceed when each of us has different ideas about what ought to happenrsquo

From the perspective of lsquothe otherrsquo the advice is to lsquostep into their shoesrsquo and explore their perceptions since

in each situation the key to the dispute is not objective truth but what is going on in the heads of the parties hellip the better we understand the way people see things the better we will be able to change them

(Ibid 20 28)

Here judgements about the world are to be translated into perceptions lsquoin the heads of the partiesrsquo and factual statements or normative recommendations into perspectives or expressions of feeling This takes precedence over what the parties are in fact saying In the case of listening to a Palestinian for example although we are advised to lsquophrase the perceptions in the voice of the person we are trying to understandrsquo we are warned that lsquothis does not mean writing a point in precisely the way they might express itrsquo For example lsquoIsraelis are Zionists and Zionists


are racistsrsquo is personal and offensive and should therefore be translated into a statement not about what Israelis are but about how Israeli actions appear to a Palestinian to be

In general it is more useful to draft statements that describe feelings and the impact of what others do than to draft statements that judge or describe others

Understanding the perception of Palestinians that Israel discriminates against Arabs will help us understand why Palestinians judge Zionists to be racists even if we do not agree with either the perception or the judgment

(Ibid 27ndash8)

From a lsquothird-partyrsquo viewpoint the critical move comes with the advice to lsquolook behind statements for underlying interestsrsquo (1994 35ndash6) Negotiators should set aside superficial position statements that simply freeze the situation (the radical disagreement) Instead the focus should be on the concealed and often unrealized lsquotrue interestsrsquo or core concerns that lie beneath these positions and lead to their adoption in the first place These are more likely to overlap and to offer wider scope for policy choice

What is the upshot of these three excellent pieces of advice for negotiators Undoubtedly they greatly increase chances of an agreed settlement if the advice is mutually followed But what happens when this fails

This can be illustrated through the advice given by Fisher to negotiators in the Sikh secessionist conflict with the Indian government in the 1980s Here is Fisherrsquos advice to negotiators and in particular to the Sikhs

One way to contrast such differing priorities is to write out in parallel columns statements of positions that identify the dispute These phrases record what each side is actually saying Then looking down first at their side and next at our own we can write out phrases that suggest underlying reasons for our different positions

(1994 39)

Positions record lsquowhat each side is actually sayingrsquo in other words the radical disagreement Consider this example

|lsquoSikhs require an independent nationrsquo

lsquoIndia must remain unifiedrsquo|

Contained in this are claims assertions and recommendations for action supported by a wealth of historical argument and appeals to principle in short the character-istic features that make up radical disagreement

But Fisher advises that all of this should be set aside as superficial and obstruct-ive Rather the focus from the beginning should be on the interests that are the lsquounderlying reasons for our different positionsrsquo


Many people become so locked into a position that they forget the very inter-ests that led them to take that position in the first place

(Ibid 36)

Interests are deeper than positions because they explain why these subjective per-ceptions have been adopted and clung to In the case of the Sikhs for example attention must shift away from the superficial position statement

lsquoSikhs require an independent nationrsquo

and must focus instead on the more profound substantive symbolic and domestic political interests that have generated it What are these interests Fisher suggests that they include

bull A substantive interest in lsquopolitical representation local control and prosperity for farmsrsquo protection from atrocities and the lsquoability to practice [the] Sikh religion in peacersquo

bull A symbolic interest in the lsquoprotection of minority Sikh rightsrsquo and a lsquoHindu apology for past violencersquo

bull A domestic political interest that lsquoSikhs regain confidence in the Indian governmentrsquo

(Fisher et al 1994 40)

What is the upshot of this translation The upshot is that the Sikh demand for national independence and a sovereign Sikh state the core of the radical disagree-ment has disappeared from view The process of interest-based negotiation has predetermined the outcome

Is this a good thing Before responding to this question let us first consider another example of radical disagreement about secession from India this time from an earlier period The year is 1947 on the eve of Indian independence The issue is Muslim separatism rather than Sikh separatism Jinnah is speaking to an ecstatic crowd of Muslim supporters Nehru is articulating a response overwhelm-ingly endorsed by the Indian Congress

|lsquoThere are two nations on this sub-continent This is the underlying fact that must shape the future creation of Pakistan Only the truly Islamic platform of the Muslim League is acceptable to the Muslim nationrsquo (Jinnah)

lsquoGeography and mountains and the sea fashioned India as she is and no human agency can change that shape or come in the way of her final destiny Once present passions subside the false doctrine of two nations will be discredited and discarded by allrsquo (Nehru)|

(quoted in Schofield 1996 291ff)

The outcomes in these two cases were opposite The Sikh bid for an independent


state ndash Khalistan ndash failed The Muslim bid ndash Pakistan ndash succeeded Was this good or bad For the huge numbers who lost their lives and livelihoods in the break-up of India in 1947 the outcome was catastrophic The consequences have reverber-ated ever since ndash not least in Kashmir But the answer to the question can be seen to be an integral part of the continuing radical disagreement Jinnah and Nehru decidedly did not lsquodraft statements that describe feelings and the impact of what others dorsquo and explicitly did lsquodraft statements that judge and describe othersrsquo Their successors still do the same That is what makes this a radical disagreement We may prefer that this did not happen We may wish that there were no radical disa-greements But when there are radical disagreements it can be seen to be integral to their linguistic intractability that the distinction between positions and interests is part of what is caught up in them

Radical disagreement and interactive problem solving

Morton Deutsch as seen above sees problem solving as central in conflict resolu-tion and identifies the heart of the process as one of reframing adversarial winndashlose competition (so often degenerating into losendashlose) into lsquoa mutual problem to be resolved hellip through joint cooperative effortsrsquo This is what Ronald Fisher (1997 163ndash4) calls lsquointeractive conflict resolutionrsquo2 Problem solving is seen to overlap with negotiation but to go beyond its focus on lsquoissuesrsquo and lsquointerestsrsquo

Proponents of [interactive conflict resolution] generally assume that conflict at all levels is a combination of objective and subjective factors Sources are to be found in both realistic differences in interests over resources that generate goal incompatibilities as well as in differing perceptions of motivations and behaviors Conflicts based in value differences or that threaten basic needs are not expressed in substantive issues amenable to negotiation but involve preferences and requirements of living that will not be compromised and must be given expression in some satisfactory fashion Escalation does not simply involve the realistic application of threats sanctions and actions of increas-ing magnitude but elicits subjective elements that come to drive the conflict more than the substantive issues Hatred between two ethnic groups coveting the same land which escalates to reciprocal massacres cannot be understood or managed by simply dealing with tangible issues In short [interactive con-flict resolution] assumes that the phenomenological side of conflict must be considered as it is expressed in the perceptions emotions interactions and social institutions of the parties

This looks very promising since we might suppose that the phenomenological side of serious human conflicts must include the inner economy of the radical disagreements that are the most prominent linguistic manifestation of those con-flicts But the sharp contrast drawn here between objective lsquorealistic differences in interestsrsquo and subjective lsquodiffering perceptionsrsquo may already suggest that this will not be followed up And indeed it eventually turns out that there can be no place


for concern with contradictory arguments and claims when the only alternatives are said to be non-cognitive lsquorealisticrsquo objectivity on the one hand and purely psychological lsquophenomenologicalrsquo subjectivity on the other So it is that the com-peting justifications that make up the substance of radical disagreement are not found among the conflicting interests and goal incompatibilities that constitute the former nor among the perceptions emotions interactions and social institutions included under the latter Ronald Fisher is himself a psychologist so perhaps this is not surprising The phenomenology of radical disagreement as understood in this book slips away between the two

John Burton and needs theory

This can be exemplified in John Burtonrsquos lsquoneeds theoryrsquo invoked by Ronald Fisher

In the 1980s a general theory emerged which could be applied to all social levels and in all cultures Its focus was the way in which social and economic structures frustrate basic human needs such as the needs for recognition and identity leading to protest and frustration responses This explanation of conflict provided the basis of policies to [prevent] violence and anti-social behaviours generally Rather than coercive compliance measures there could be analytical problem-solving processes that reveal the sources of problems in relationships leading to possible reconciliation

(Burton 1997 xv)

The failure of existing structures and institutions ndash notably the prevailing state system at both domestic and international levels ndash to satisfy basic human needs like those of identity security development and political access is seen to be the underlying cause of lsquodeep-rooted conflictsrsquo of all kinds

The conclusion to which we are coming is that seemingly different and separ-ate social problems from street violence to industrial frictions to ethnic and international conflicts are symptoms of the same cause institutional denial of needs of recognition and identity and the sense of security provided when they are satisfied despite losses though violent conflict

(Burton 1997 38)

Unlike disputes over competing interests which can be settled through bargaining and compromise conflicts rooted in denial of fundamental human needs are onto-logical (inherent in human beings as such) and non-negotiable This makes them intractable and apparently irrational from any perspective that fails to satisfy the underlying needs that generate them

The only adequate solution for Burton therefore is to use analytic problem-solv-ing techniques to uncover the deep nature of the unsatisfied needs of the conflict parties and in the light of this to devise appropriate means to satisfy them The


optimistic nature of Burtonian ideas lies in the crucial (and controversial) claim that ontological human needs are generic across cultures and are always by their very nature mutually satisfiable (non zero-sum) Unlike interests security needs and identity needs for example are not scarce resources On the contrary the security and identity needs of one party can only be finally assured to the extent that the security and identity needs of other parties are equally satisfied See Figure 33

Jay Rothmanrsquos ARIA method of conflict engagement

Here is an example of Burtonian thinking applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem from the problem-solving workshop run by Jay Rothman referred to earlier in the prologue

You do not have to convince the other side to agree with you about your needs but only persuade them that you are indeed greatly motivated in this conflict by the pursuit or defense of them

(Rothman 1992 19)

So for example it is not territorial claims still less the land itself ndash in this case Jerusalem ndash that constitute the substance of what is at issue These are only mani-festations of what lies deeper

It is by lsquolooking beneath the territory itself to the meanings that each side attaches to itrsquo that the roots of the conflict can be discerned and lsquocommon ground can be foundrsquo

(Ibid)

Figure 33 Positions interestsvalues and needs

Source Floyer Acland 1995 50

Party A Party B

Positions

Interestsvalues

Needs common basic needs

sharedinterests

values

A B


Underneath adversarial positions (mutually incompatible claims to sovereignty) overlapping but still often contested interests (competition for resources or political control) or even partially clashing values (JewishMuslim rivalry for holy lands) lie shared basic human needs (for security identity autonomy development) Once the conflicting parties have been taken to this level of insight and understanding sole ownership of lsquothe territory itselfrsquo (Jerusalem) is seen to be less significant and the conflict can be resolved

This is an inspiring programme for resolving lsquoidentity-based conflictsrsquo and has attained a considerable measure of success (Rothman 1997) Rothmanrsquos ARIA methodology aims to move participants away from negative confrontation and towards lsquoconstructive engagement and creative problem solvingrsquo His approach lsquoallows participants to surface their Antagonism find shared Resonance Invent creative options and plan Actionrsquo

Unlike most conflict resolution specialists Rothman does begin in the Antagonism phase by focusing explicitly on radical disagreement (positional dia-logue or adversarial debate)

One of the problems with previous human relations activist and problem-solving dialogue efforts between Jews and Arabs is that they have largely been held among the already lsquoconvertedrsquo hellip Setting forth mutually exclusive positions where each side vents its anger and articulates its own truth can set broad parameters of the conflict and enable participants in dialogue to articu-late the most common attitudes of their constituencies andor get their own frustrations off their chests In terms of searching for an adequate analysis and a full definition of a problem positional statements help get the process started the problem is when it also ends there

(Ibid 31)

The main idea of the adversarial stage of the conflict engagement training methodology is to encourage participants to make these lsquonormalrsquo adversarial frameworks explicit Otherwise the assumptions and tacit understandings that constitute them cannot be contrasted with anything else and further progress is impossible So trainers wait until the dead end of adversarial arguing becomes manifest

Such adversarialpositional dialogue would continue until the point at which discussions appear that they might break down altogether

(Ibid 170)

Trainers can then read the last rites on radical disagreement

You have now experienced a very familiar and I am sure you will all agree a rather unconstructive approach to dialogue Each of you stated your position each of you suggested why the other side is wrong or to blame for the conflict Few of you listened to anyone else and frankly very little if anything new


was learned This is the normal approach that all of you have experienced perhaps every time you have discussed the situation with someone who holds a very different perspective than your own I invite you now to experiment with a new way

(Ibid 170)

The ARIA method contrasts the pseudo-communication of radical disagreement (positional debating) with the genuine communication offered by the mutual and reflexive analysis of underlying attitudes and emotions the generation of creative options and the formulation and implementation of agreed outcomes

Moving from positional debating to real communication requires a lot of ana-lysis of underlying motivations hopes fears of each other especially in deeply rooted intercommunal conflicts

(Ibid 171)

If participants nevertheless subsequently fall back into adversarial mode facilita-tors are quick to step in

PARTICIPANT lsquoYou say Jerusalem is your unity but this is only helliprsquoFACILITATOR lsquoWait a minute it sounds as if you are about to score a point Thatrsquos

positional debate here we want questions for clarification for understanding for analytic empathy In a minute I will ask you to role-play the other side and express their values and core concerns as you have heard them So you should now gather information and insight to help yoursquo

(Ibid 175)

But what if despite this the radical disagreement continues What if the disputants refuse to accept the lsquosubjectivityrsquo of the facts they appeal to and persist in their lsquoobjectiversquo claims What if they will not relinquish their real territorial rights or translate them into subjective lsquomeaningsrsquo symmetrically attached to their territory and therefore detachable from it as facilitators want What if they refute these distinctions What if they accept that basic human needs may indeed underlie the conflict but insist that in the present stage of regional and world politics it is precisely and only full sovereignty that can guarantee them What if their appeal is to the bitter experience of history and to the harsh realities of contemporary power play

This is exactly what does happen in radical disagreement but in response the trainers reiterate their philosophy

You are still stuck in an illusory adversarial monologue of disbelief mistrust and animosity that condemns you to repeat the mistakes of the past and pre-vents you from reaching the underlying human hopes fears and values behind the newspaper headlines of unbridgeable positions Only when you come to


realise that at the deepest levels you are both alike in needs and motivations will a new opening for peace and therefore for true security be promoted

(Rothman 1992 adapted from the original)

So even when care is taken to note the fact of radical disagreement the phenom-enon is regarded as a negative dead end and it is assumed that nothing of value can be learned from it Radical disagreement is not seen as genuine communication or real dialogue It stands in the way of constructive engagement and needs to be overcome as soon as possible if progress is to be made

But in ongoing intractable conflicts the result of this in my experience can be that at the critical point it is the facilitators and trainers who find themselves involved in radical disagreement with the conflict parties ndash as I did in the example of the family quarrel described at the end of the prologue That is the point at which the phenomenology epistemology and praxis of radical disagreement begins

Psychodynamic workshops

Vamik Volkan set up the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI) at the University of Maryland with the following purpose

We remain constantly alert for those conscious and more importantly uncon-scious psychological factors which may render political processes unworkable and even malignant We have found that large groups are profoundly influ-enced by such factors as ethnic or national pride and by mental representations of historical grievances and triumphs which are transmitted with their accom-panying defenses and adaptations from generation to generation Underlying these factors is a need to belong to a large group and to have a cohesive group identity Such factors function as lsquounseen powersrsquo in relationships between groups CSMHIrsquos aim is to shed light on these unseen powers and to relate our findings to official decision makers so that they may deal with real world issues in a more adaptive way

(Volkan and Harris 170ndash1 quoted in Fisher 1997)

Here human needs for belonging and identity are not seen to be as benign as in Burtonian theory A psycho-social lsquoneed to have enemiesrsquo for example is recog-nized as one of the main lsquounseen powersrsquo that bedevil attempts at conflict resolution (Volkan 1988) Above all concealed and hidden meanings are regarded as more significant than overt and surface ones because they are drivers of behaviour that are not under the conscious control of actors Psychoanalytic defence mechanisms such as introjection externalization projection and identification are deployed to protect protagonists from lsquoperceived psychological dangerrsquo (Volkan 1990) Relevant psychotherapeutic concepts include

(1) the awareness that events have more than one meaning and that some-times a hidden meaning is more important than a surface one (2) that all


interactions whether they take the form of overt or concealed actions verbal or non-verbal statements formal or informal gatherings are meaningful and analyzable (3) that the initiation of a process in which problems become the lsquoshared problemsrsquo of opposing parties is more essential than the formulation of lsquologicalrsquo or lsquoquickrsquo answers and (4) that the creation of an atmosphere in which the expression of emotions is acceptable can lead to the recognition of underlying resistances to change

(Volkan and Harris 1992 24)

The phenomenon of radical disagreement is associated with what is overt con-scious and lies on the lsquosurfacersquo This is contrasted with those things that are hidden unconscious and lsquounderlyingrsquo So there is little motive for paying attention to the former when it is the latter ndash the lsquounseen powersrsquo ndash that are far more potent in driving the dynamics of violent conflict

Public decision conflict resolution

What Franklin Dukes terms lsquothe public conflict resolution fieldrsquo uses problem-solving approaches to address the foundations of democratic politics (1996) Beginning in ethnicracial dispute resolution in the United States then expanding into environmental disputes and other areas requiring public decision-making such as education health and economic development public conflict resolution is seen by Dukes not only as a means for reaching agreement over specific issues but also as a way of raising public consciousness and increasing popular participation in decisions affecting the community

Increasingly the practical need to gain agreement among divergent interests who have a stake in public decisions who share limited power and who have very different goals has led to new kinds of decision-making forums

(Dukes 1996 1)

Transformative public conflict resolution

encompasses more than a theory of resolving disputes Such thinking is con-tributing to an evolution in the understanding of what conflict means when conflict is valuable where it is destructive and how it can be transformed hellip It is becoming part of the reconception of how democratic institutions and communities may be sustained

(Ibid 7)

Dukes welcomes conflict as the lsquobasis for social changersquo in a democratic society and encourages the productive dialogue associated with it But he distinguishes this from adversarial debate (radical disagreement)

Just stimulating people to challenge and contest status quo conformities


hellip is likely to do little more than provoke disagreement and controversy increase polarization and ultimately end in winndashlose impasse compromise or chaos

(Blake and Mouton 1970 421 quoted Dukes 1996 165)

Radical disagreement is associated with lsquorancorous personal debatersquo and is identi-fied with the worst features of lsquothe Anglo-American adversary systemrsquo that is seen to distort so much of public discourse

We all know the characteristics of an all-out knock-down drag-out debate Opponents line up against one another to seek (or invent) the weaknesses in othersrsquo statements Nobody ever admits wrong or uncertainty Everyone begins with the answer and defends that answer against all attack

(Dukes 1996 69)

This system encourages speaking and penalizes listening hellip The goal of adversarial proceedings is not to develop understanding not to find construct-ive solutions and not even to discover the truth The goal of speech in these situations is to win Indeed in adversarial systems hellip speech is another species of aggression and power

(Ibid 130)

The programme of transformative public conflict resolution is creative and effect-ive But once again the phenomenon of radical disagreement is identified with what the programme seeks to overcome and is not thought to be worth investigating in its own right

Dialogic conflict resolution

Ronald Fisher explains how dialogic conflict resolution approaches differ from the problem-solving processes looked at in the previous section

Unlike the more focused forms of interactive conflict resolution such as problem-solving workshops dialogue interventions tend to involve not influ-ential informal representatives of the parties but simply ordinary members of the antagonistic groups Furthermore dialogue is primarily directed toward increased understanding and trust among the participants with some eventual positive effects on public opinion rather than the creation of alternative solu-tions to the conflict

(Fisher 1997 121)

The aim is to improve communication sensitivity critical self-awareness and mutual understanding between individuals and groups the lack of which is seen to be a key ingredient in generating the social milieu in which violent conflict breeds


An idea of the wide spectrum of dialogic techniques for handling conflict and effecting non-violent social change (which overlaps with problem solving) can be found in the Pioneers of Change Associates 2006 survey Mapping Dialogue (wwwpioneersofchangenet)3 For all the variety among the different approaches the survey finds lsquoclear common patternsrsquo

They focus on enabling open communication honest speaking and genuine listening They allow people to take responsibility for their own learning and ideas They contain a safe space or container for people to surface their assumptions to question their previous judgments and worldviews and to change the way they think They generate new ideas and solutions that are beyond what anyone had thought before They create a different level of understanding of people and problems

(Pioneers of Change Associates 2006 6)

And a clear contrast is once again drawn between true dialogue and mere debate (radical disagreement)

The most common dictionary definition of a dialogue is simply as a con-versation between two or more people In the field of dialogue practitioners however it is given a much deeper and more distinct meaning David Bohm went back to the source of the word deriving from the Greek root of lsquodiarsquo which means lsquothroughrsquo and lsquologosrsquo which is lsquothe wordrsquo or lsquomeaningrsquo and therefore saw dialogue as meaning flowing through us Elements of this deeper understanding of the word include an emphasis on questions inquiry co-creation and listening the uncovering of onersquos own assumptions and those of others a suspension of judgment and a collective search for truth Bill Isaacs calls a dialogue a conversation lsquowith a center not sidesrsquo

(Ibid 10)

In contrast lsquoa debate is a discussion usually focussed around two opposing sides and held with the object of one side winning The winner is the one with the best articulations ideas and argumentsrsquo

In view of this variety what follows will be selective and will focus on recent developments in dialogic approaches at both individual and group levels influ-enced by the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer with a particular emphasis at group level on intercultural dialogue The Gadamerian approach ultimately sees dialogue as a lsquofusion of horizonsrsquo across cultural and historical differences It is called lsquohermeneutic dialoguersquo because it draws a parallel between a conversation and the interpretation of texts For Gadamer interpreting a text is seen as a form of conversation between object and interpreter In conflict resolution it works the other way A dialogue or conversation is seen as a mutual interpretation of texts


Interpersonal dialogue

Dialogic approaches in interpersonal conflict resolution draw mainly from the com-munication psychology and active listening literatures Recent developments point beyond the original psychotherapeutic idea of lsquoprojectiversquo sympathy and empathy in which the aim was to lsquoenter the private perceptual world of the other and become thoroughly at home in itrsquo (Rogers 1980 142) Instead the focus has shifted to the concept of lsquorelationalrsquo empathy in which a more dynamic and productive process is envisaged whereby in intense interpersonal exchange that is as much affect-ive as cognitive participants together generate shared new meaning sometimes referred to as a lsquothird culturersquo (Broome 1993) This approach reflects Gadamerrsquos insistence that in the field of interpretation it is lsquoa hermeneutical necessity always to go beyond mere reconstructionrsquo in reaching understanding

This placing of ourselves is not the empathy of one individual for another nor is it the application to another person of our own criteria but it always involves the attainment of a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other

(Gadamer 1975 272)

Heavy demands are thereby made on participants who are expected to be able to recognize that they can never escape the universal reach of their own prejudice and that the attempted lsquofusion of horizonsrsquo or relational empathy will always be the creation of something that did not exist before (a third culture) and an on-going project never a completed programme They are asked to lsquodecentrersquo their own identities to the point where ndash in the words of Stewart and Thomas ndash instead of seeking lsquocertainty closure and controlrsquo they welcome the tension between lsquoirre-concilable horizonsrsquo and adopt a lsquoplayfulnessrsquo and open-mindedness appropriate to encounter with new experience or the ultimately unabsorbable lsquootherrsquo (Stewart and Thomas 2005 198)

These lsquodialogic attitudesrsquo are seen by Benjamin Broome as integral to the con-flict resolution enterprise

The third culture can only develop through interaction in which participants are willing to open themselves to new meanings to engage in genuine dia-logue and to constantly respond to the new demands emanating from the situation The emergence of this third culture is the essence of relational empathy and is essential for successful conflict resolution

(Broome 1993 104)

There are echoes here of the Rortyan idea of self-distance and irony as hallmarks of open liberal societies (1988) and of Chris Brownrsquos identification of irreverence humour recognition of onersquos own absurdity and the giving up of aspirations to ground our values in lsquosome ultimate sense of what is true or falsersquo as what most distinguishes our prevailing Western version of modernity from the unattractive


lsquofundamentalismsrsquo that challenge it (2002) Rorty admits the unavoidable lsquoeth-nocentricityrsquo involved in his attempt to combine the distance of irony with full commitment to the values thereby safeguarded Brown similarly tempers his advocacy of irony (lsquodistancing oneself and onersquos beliefsrsquo) by insisting that this must not lsquoundermine onersquos basic valuesrsquo which one must hold lsquowholeheartedlyrsquo He acknowledges that this is a lsquoterribly difficultrsquo balance to strike

It can be seen that these required lsquodialogic attitudesrsquo are far removed from those that characterize radical disagreements Indeed in some versions they are diamet-rically opposed to them The whole enterprise of fostering relational empathy of this kind is premised on the exclusion of radical disagreement

Inter-group dialogue

A similar set of ideas can be found in the field of inter-group or inter-communal dialogue An idea of the range of enterprises loosely grouped under the dialogic heading can be given by noting the activities of the Community Relations Council in Northern Ireland which has included

bull mutual understanding work (lsquoto increase dialogue and reduce ignorance suspi-cion and prejudicersquo)

bull anti-sectarian and anti-intimidation work (lsquoto transfer improved understanding into structural changesrsquo)

bull cultural traditions work (lsquoto affirm and develop cultural confidence that is not exclusiversquo)

bull political options work (lsquoto facilitate political discussion within and between communities including developing agreed principles of justice and rightsrsquo)

bull conflict resolution work (lsquoto develop skills and knowledge which will increase possibilities for greater social and political cooperationrsquo)

(Fitzduff 1989)

Here in the wake of the dramatic and unexpected events of the first decade of the new millennium the related enterprises of comparative religious ethics and inter-religious dialogue will be taken as an example The coincidence of the United Nations 2001 Year Of Dialogue Between Civilizations with the catastrophe of 11 September projected this to the top of the international agenda

In response to the events of September 2001 for example Bikhu Parekh rejected the US governmentrsquos militaristic and lsquopunitiversquo reaction which he saw as counter-productive and morally equivalent to the terrorism it purported to oppose and advocated lsquointercultural dialoguersquo between Western and non-Western (in this case particularly Muslim) societies with a view to uncovering the deeper sources of grievance and perceived injustice behind the attack

The point of the dialogue is to deepen mutual understanding to expand sym-pathy and imagination to exchange not only arguments but also sensibilities to take a critical look at oneself to build up mutual trust and to arrive at a


more just and balanced view of both the contentious issues and the world in general

(Parekh 2002 274)

In order to lsquoget to the heart of the deepest disagreementsrsquo between Western and Muslim societies Parekh offered two composite lsquoopening statementsrsquo adapted from lsquothe utterances of intellectuals and political leadersrsquo on both sides He described these as lsquopartisan extreme polemical hurtful and sometimes deeply offensiversquo We are standing on the outer perimeter of the domain to be explored in this book But Parekh himself does not want to move further into this terrain On the con-trary he immediately turns in the opposite direction The sole purpose of taking note of the disagreement for him as for others in the dialogic tradition is thereby to establish the lsquodiscursive frameworkrsquo within which the lsquobadly needed dialoguersquo can take place (2002 281)

The vision behind the proposed dialogue is of an infinitely subtle series of mutu-ally reinforcing exchanges at various levels in different locations around the world with a view to building lsquobetter intercultural understandingrsquo and lsquoa broadly agreed view of the pastrsquo in order to expedite eventual lsquomutually acceptable compromisersquo on substantive issues Continuing radical disagreement of the kind represented in the opening statements would disrupt communication and threaten this programme lsquoDeep differencesrsquo need to be lsquoadmittedrsquo but must not be allowed to lsquoget out of controlrsquo to the point where they might prevent the building of consensus towards the desired ultimate goal ndash the creation of a lsquoshared global perspectiversquo (2002 282)

Each society also needs to be critical of itself

A society unable to engage in a critical dialogue with itself and tolerate dis-agreement is unable to engage in a meaningful dialogue with others

(Parekh 2002 276)

Comparative religious ethics

In the field of comparative religious ethics it is illuminating to continue the Gadamerian theme by looking at what Sumner Twiss rather ponderously calls the lsquohermeneutical-dialogical paradigmrsquo He contrasts this with the lsquoformalist paradigmrsquo which is focused on the study of lsquoourselves (and others)rsquo and the lsquohistoricalrsquo paradigm which is focused on the study of lsquoothers (and ourselves)rsquo The lsquohermeneutic-dialogicalrsquo paradigm which Twiss favours studies lsquoothers and ourselves as equalsrsquo4 At the core of the hermeneutical-dialogical paradigm is the goal of constructing a lsquocommon moral worldrsquo between divergent traditions which involves a dialectic of mutual translation and receptivity through continual dialogue in a constructive effort to answer the shared question how should we live together (Twiss 1993) This involves lsquonormative appropriationrsquo (fusion of horizons) between insider-participants of the kind mentioned above and with similar implications


Inter-religious dialogue

It is also worth noting the related but distinct enterprise of inter-religious dialogue such as the 1993 Parliament of the Worldrsquos Religions that attempted to frame a shared lsquoglobal ethicrsquo Recent efforts have been made to bring comparative reli-gious ethics and inter-religious dialogue together (Twiss and Grelle eds 2000) The central purpose of the kind of dialogue envisaged in the 1993 parliament was not to create new shared meaning but to confirm that

there is already a consensus among the religions which can be the basis for a global ethic ndash a minimum fundamental consensus concerning binding values irrevocable standards and fundamental moral attitudes

(Kuumlng and Kuschel 1993 18)

The substance of the 1993 global ethic was seen to lie in the common demand that lsquoevery human being must be treated humanelyrsquo supported by underlying principles of universal beneficence human rights and the negative and positive versions of the Golden Rule On this admittedly somewhat lsquowesternrsquo conceptual foundation four lsquoirrevocable directivesrsquo or lsquobroad guidelines for human behaviourrsquo were seen to be generated (Kuumlng and Kuschel 1993 24ndash34)

1 lsquocommitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for lifersquo 2 lsquocommitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic orderrsquo 3 lsquocommitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulnessrsquo 4 lsquocommitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and

womenrsquo

The success of the enterprise depended once again on the lsquobracketing outrsquo of serious disagreement but this time by the simple mechanism of omission on the assumption that whatever was left could then be said to constitute the desired global religious consensus

Traces of the bracketing process are evident throughout In terms of manage-ment for example the filtering out of disagreement was controlled by Hans Kuumlng whose draft Declaration (based on prior consultations) was not subsequently altered during the week-long meeting of the Parliament except that its title was changed to Toward A Global Ethic (An Initial Declaration) Similar signs of pos-itive management appear in Kuumlngrsquos edited Yes To A Global Ethic (1996) which collected expressions of support from religious and political leaders In terms of participation certain discordant voices were self-eliminating (lsquoeven at the planning stage evangelical and fundamentalist church groups refused to collaborate with the Parliamentrsquo (Kuumlng and Kuschel 1993 95)) On matters of substance some divergent views could be accommodated by ambiguous wording (the pacifist com-mitment to lsquoa culture of non-violencersquo was glossed so that lsquothose who hold political powerrsquo need only lsquocommit themselves to the most non-violent peaceful solutions possiblersquo) others by abstract language which delivered formal unanimity but at


the cost in some eyes of allowing pernicious interpretations to lurk unchallenged Sallie King detected an lsquoisought strugglersquo in the text between what was already common religious teaching and what was not but should be (lsquosurely no one could seriously proposersquo that the commitment to equal rights for men and women lsquoaccur-ately reflectsrsquo an ethic that lsquoalready exists within the religious teachings of the worldrsquo (King 2000 132) As a final resort deeply recalcitrant issues could simply be omitted including ndash to the surprise of some ndash specific references to God

As for Kuumlng himself ndash in a way reminiscent of the different liberal dialogic tradition seen above which wants to combine irony with commitment ndash a chapter on lsquothe God of the non-Christian religionsrsquo in his book Does God Exist aims to lsquorecognize respect and appreciate the truth of other conceptions of Godrsquo but at the same time lsquowithout relativizing the Christian faith in the true Godrsquo

Does God exist We are putting all our cards on the table here The answer will be lsquoYes God existsrsquo

(Kuumlng 197880 xxiii)

What does this mean And above all what does it mean in a context of radical disagreement when real choices have to be made between incompatible com-mitments and outcomes in the shared public world An idea can be gained from Kuumlngrsquos response to the claims of the tolerant reformed Hinduism of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan This is dismissed as lsquoa specifically Hindu tolerancersquo based on the authority of the Vedanta and thus a thinly disguised exclusivity every bit as abso-lute as that of lsquothe prophetic religionsrsquo (Judaism Christianity and Islam)

Conquest as it were by embrace in so far as it seeks not to exclude but to include all other religions

(Ibid 608)

To the question lsquoWho is Godrsquo Kuumlng replies unequivocally that the true God is the Triune God of the Roman Catholic Christian faith who alone has full salvific authority and reality I think that regardless of a global ethical consensus in situa-tions of intractable interfaith doctrinal conflict it is clear whose side Kuumlng is on

Is dialogue for mutual understanding always appropriate

In light of the above and before moving on to the final section of this chapter it is worth asking whether the enterprise of expanding the scope for inclusive dialogue work along the lines suggested by Biku Parekh and others is always appropriate Its aim is to sideline or transform radical disagreement But what if radical disa-greements nevertheless persist Should we be prepared to participate in this kind of dialogue and lsquosafe spacesrsquo work if we are ourselves party to a radical disagreement And can we do so if we are not My answer in both cases is lsquonorsquo

In the first instance where we are ourselves a party to the conflict suppose that what the other says is patently absurd morally repugnant or murderous ndash a blatant


manipulation of the facts to build support for an unacceptable political programme Should we pretend to engage in lsquodeepening mutual understandingrsquo as Parekh recommends or aim to lsquotake a critical look at ourselvesrsquo and lsquoexpandrsquo our lsquosym-pathy and imaginationrsquo with a view to enriching our comprehension of the otherrsquos arguments I do not think so The question is rather should we give the other a platform for spreading such hateful ideas at all

Faced for example with an assertion such as this by David Irving

74 000 Jews died of natural causes in the work camps and the rest were hidden in reception camps after the war and later taken to Palestine where they live today under new identities

(Times Online February 22 2006)

my own response is to want to minimize its political impact and to refute it out-right ndash along the lines painstakingly undertaken by critics such as Deborah Lipstadt or Richard Evans

Clearly hellip the work of the lsquorevisionistsrsquo who deny that Auschwitz ever hap-pened at all is simply wrong hellip Auschwitz was not a discourse

(Evans 1997 quoted in Wheen 2004 97)

The fact that holocaust denial is rife in parts of Europe and across the Middle East does not alter this So far as I am concerned to lsquounderstandrsquo why some people believe such patent untruths is simply to find explanations for why the other holds such false beliefs For me to pretend otherwise in this case would be a sham

The same applies generally Here is an example where outrage is expressed at the murder of the Rev Julie Nicholsonrsquos daughter Jenny by Mohammad Siddique Khan on the Edgware train on 7 July 2005

There are few human words that can adequately express what we feel about people who indiscriminately carry out apparent acts of senseless violence against innocent civilian populations and unbelievably do so in the name of God Such delusion such evil is impossible for us to begin to comprehend

(Guardian September 4 2005)

Julie Nicholson herself eventually gave up her own ministry because she could not forgive the perpetrator

No parent should reasonably expect to outlive their children I rage that a human being could choose to take another human beingrsquos life I rage that someone should do this in the name of a God I find that utterly offensive We have heard a lot in the media about things causing certain groups of people offence and I would say that I am hugely offended that someone should take my daughter in the name of a religion or a God

(Ibid)


In a case like this where we are ourselves a party to radical disagreement the aim of dialogue with the other if it takes place at all can only be to show the other or the otherrsquos potential supporters and sympathizers why she is factually mistaken morally wrong or insincere

And what of radical disagreements in which we are not immediate conflict par-ties Here again if we take radical disagreement seriously my conclusion is that we cannot encompass it within the usual canons of dialogue and safe spaces work A common rule in dialogue work for example is that each should listen to the other with mutual respect so that differences can be tolerated if not celebrated But we can see how in radical disagreements such conceptualemotional space does not exist To insist on dialogic rules of this kind is to exclude radical disagreement However uncomfortable it may be for liberals (among whom I include myself) to accept this we simply do not respect what the other says ndash or the other as sayer of it ndash in such circumstances (The idea that we may nevertheless respect the otherrsquos right to say it will be considered later)

There is no room in the rules of dialogue for example to accommodate this radical disagreement between the governor of South Dakota Mike Rounds and his chief Democrat opponent Steve Hildebrand

|lsquoAbortion is murder God creates human life and it is blasphemous for any of Godrsquos creatures to take it away It is an unforgiveable sin The State of South Dakota is right to ban it by law absolutelyrsquo

lsquoTheyrsquove gone too far Theyrsquore essentially saying that if your daughter gets raped she has no choice but to have the criminalrsquos baby This is entirely inhu-mane and morally deeply wrong It is un-Christian It must be immediately reversedrsquo|

(USA Today 7 March 2006)

To insist that the purpose of dialogue as encapsulated in its regulatory framework is to lsquoincrease understanding and trust among participantsrsquo is to assume that more understanding will lead to more trust It omits the possibility that more interchange will deepen mistrust or that more understanding will make it even clearer to par-ticipants why they hate each other Here is Jerry Falwell on the cause of the events of 11 September 2001

The attack on the Twin Towers was Godrsquos wrath against the pagans and the abortionists and the feminists and the gays and the lesbians and the American Civil Liberties Union and People for the American Way ndash against all those who try to secularise America

(quoted in Wheen 2004 183ndash4)

In the case of radical disagreement about the de-legalization of abortion in South Dakota or attempts to reverse Wade versus Roe in the US Supreme Court the recommendations for action are starkly incompatible Either the law is imposed or


it is revoked That is what makes this a radical disagreement The rules of dialogue as defined in many conflict resolution approaches exclude radical disagreement from the outset

Radical disagreement and discursive conflict transformation

In the communicative sphere two features in particular have led to criticism of mainstream negotiation problem solving and dialogue approaches as described above and have generated new thinking These features are the complexity of conflict and the fact of asymmetric conflict Some identify these responses with a move from conflict resolution to conflict transformation John Paul Lederach and Norbert Ropers will be taken as exemplars of the first and Vivienne Jabri of the second But first a comment on the recent work of one of the founders of the field who now also adopts the transformationist language ndash Johan Galtung How is the phenomenon of radical disagreement treated in these examples

At the heart of Galtungrsquos TRANSCEND methodology (2000 2004) lies an adaptation of the winndashlose losendashlose winndashwin model looked at in Figure 31 This is interpreted as a model of conflict outcomes In constant-sum (zero-sum) conflicts one or other party prevails (eitherndashor) or there is some form of com-promise (partndashpart) In non-constant-sum conflicts neither party gets what it wants (neitherndashnor negative transcendence) or both parties get what they want (bothndashand positive transcendence) Galtungrsquos main adaptation is to identify the losendashlose outcome with negative transcendence it can sometimes be better than the winndashlose alternatives

Faced with the lsquotwo nations one territoryrsquo problem in Palestine for example Galtung notes five possible outcomes of which negative transcendence (neitherndashnor) would be better than the two winndashlose (eitherndashor) alternatives

1 one Israeli state (Palestinians out) EitherndashOr (A) 2 one Palestinian state (Israelis out) EitherndashOr (B) 3 a two-state solution (Israel and Palestine) PartndashPart 4 a third party takes over (UN protectorate) NeitherndashNor 5 two nations enter symmetrically in one state BothndashAnd

In general the eitherndashor outcomes are seen as the worst and the bothndashand positive transcendence outcome as the best ndash where available

Positive transcendence [is] the key to transformation in the TRANSCEND method

(Galtung 2004 13)

Much of this is already familiar including the identification of eitherndashor outcomes with lsquoconstraining debatersquo (radical disagreement) and the bothndashand outcome with lsquocreative dialoguersquo (constructive controversy)


A debate is a fight with verbal not physical weapons (in French battre = beat) The victory usually goes to he who can catch the other in more contradictions hellip A dialogue dia logos through the word by using words is something quite different There is no competition to win a battle of words The parties are working together to find a solution to a problem

(Ibid 38)

In Gadamerian vein the aim of dialogue is once again lsquoto get under the skin of each other in a questioning way not in the drilling way of a debatersquo and to search for a fusion of horizons

Imagine now that instead of debating trying to defeat each other with words they had used their eloquence in a dialogue with the aim of finding how their contradictions could be transcended and their perspectives combined in a higher unity

(Ibid 57)

Galtung does at times recommend identifying the lsquoaxioms of faithrsquo associated with radical disagreement but this is only in order to

start touching them tinkering with them shaking them inserting the word lsquonotrsquo negating them so that everything becomes more flexible

(Ibid 80)

No further interest is taken in the phenomenon of radical disagreement in the TRANSCEND method

John Paul Lederach and Norbert Ropers acknowledging complexity and overcoming binary logic

In his book Solving Tough Problems (2007) Adam Kahane identifies three types of complexity each of which requires a different remedy Dynamic com-plexity refers to the fact that links between cause and effect are non-linear and are individually unpredictable This requires a systemic approach Social complexity refers to the fact that there are conflicting views about the prob-lem This requires a participative approach Generative complexity refers to the fact that former solutions are no longer succeeding This requires a creative approach

John-Paul Lederach who offered trenchant criticisms of universalist cultural assumptions behind western mediation methods in the 1980s and developed innovative reconceptualizations of peacebuilding in the 1990s has now also stuck his colours firmly to the transformationist mast (2003 2005) Within the com-municative sphere Lederach is severely critical of reductive eitherndashor frames of reference (radical disagreement) and strongly in favour of acknowledging the complex webs of interactions that make up the real (lived) world and of nurturing


what he calls lsquothe moral imaginationrsquo in learning how to navigate and transform them (2005 172ndash3)

Lederach does advocate seeking lsquoconstructive engagement with those people and things we least understand and most fearrsquo in other words he encourages dia-logue that includes lsquopolitical and ideological enemiesrsquo (2005 177) So it might be thought that this points towards taking radical disagreement seriously But his all-embracing critique of eitheror and espousal of bothand thinking precludes Lederach from doing this He does not see anything worth investigating in radical disagreements In fact in the end he seems not to think that there are such things as radical disagreements at all

Develop the capacity to pose the energies of conflict as dilemmas I tend to link two ideas with the phrase lsquoand at the same timersquo This is not just a quirk in my writing it has become part of my way of thinking and formulating perspective It reflects my effort to shift my thinking from an eitheror to a bothand frame of reference This is what I would call the art and discipline of posing conflicts as dilemmas hellip The decisions we faced seemed to pose outright contradictions as framed by the people involved and even by ourselves as practitioners hellip When we changed our way of framing questions to lsquoboth andrsquo our thinking shifted We learned to recognize the legitimacy of different but not incom-patible goals and energies within the conflict setting hellip When we embrace dilemmas and paradoxes there is the possibility that in conflict we are not dealing with outright incompatibilities Rather we are faced with recognizing and responding to different but interdependent aspects of a complex situation We are not able to handle complexity well if we understand our choices in rigid eitheror or contradictory terms Complexity requires that we develop the capacity to identify the key energies in a situation and hold them up together as interdependent goals hellip The capacity to live with apparent contradictions and paradoxes lies at the heart of conflict transformation

(Lederach 2004 51ndash3)

The idea of a transformative shift to living with paradox is inspiring But there are radical disagreements They are couched in lsquorigid contradictory termsrsquo And this is how the conflict is lsquoframed by the people involvedrsquo In the unredeemed world we live in radical disagreements continue as defining features of the most intense and protracted political conflicts So what are we to make of those who nevertheless persist in posing conflicts not as dilemmas but as contradictions These are the conflict parties Is there nothing further to learn from what they say

Norbert Ropers carries the idea of dilemmatic thinking further by invoking the four-fold (plus) traditional Buddhist tetralemma in his analysis of the linguistic aspect of the SinhalandashTamil conflict in Sri Lanka (2008)

This conflict recently dramatically lsquotransformedrsquo ndash but not ended ndash by force of arms through government military victory has pitted the secessionist (mainly Hindu) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and others against the anti-seces-sionist (mainly Buddhist) Sinhala-dominated Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL)


From 1983 there was almost continuous war interrupted by the 2002 peace pro-cess until the collapse of the rebels in 2009

Ropers uses the tetralemma to map out what he calls lsquomental modelsrsquo in the Sri Lankan conflict Mental models include those interpretations and beliefs that motivate and drive agents to act as they do in the conflict not only the main con-flict parties but also involved third parties The primary discourses of both Sinhala and Tamil mainstream parties are seen to be made up of potent religious-historical national narratives fired by claims to original settlement inherited grievance and shared destiny

All parties have developed their own narratives or lsquomental modelsrsquo of the con-flict as well as options and possibilities of conflict resolution These narratives and models have had tremendous impact on the way parties communicate and interact with each other They often develop a life of their own and are deeply ingrained in the attitudes and behaviour of the respective collectives

(Ropers 2008 17)

Whereas a dilemma confronts two apparently incompatible alternatives a tetrale-mma envisages four alternative stances on any controversial issue

Position A Position B

Neither position A nor position B Both position A and position B

The third century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna pointed to a further transcend-ent stance outside these four alternatives expressed by the lsquodouble negationrsquo

Not any of these but also not that

This is reminiscent of Judaeo-Christian negative theology and later Sufi Islamic mysticism It is in the apophatic tradition where the ineffability of God cannot be put into words

Ropers uses the tetralemma to map out the interpretations and beliefs that make up the mental models driving the Sri Lankan conflict See Box 31

It is evident that the phenomenon of radical disagreement is not represented on the conceptual map at all because radical disagreement is not a position but a relation It is polylogical not monological Radical disagreement appears when the two rejected positions (A and B) are not treated separately or transcended but are presented together in all their raw mutual antagonism as here

|lsquoThis blessed land will forever cherish protect and value the fruits of the brave and courageous operation conducted by the Sri Lankan Security Forces to bring liberation to the people of the East who for more than two decades were held hostage by the forces of vicious and violent terrorismrsquo

(M Rajapaska President of Sri Lanka 19 July 2007)


lsquoWe are at a crossroads in our freedom struggle Our journey has been long and arduous and crowded with difficult phases We are facing challenges and unexpected turns that no other freedom movement had to face The Sri Lankan government has split the Tamil homeland set up military camps bound it with barbed wire and has converted it into a site of collective torturersquo|

(V Pirapaharan prominent Tamil Tiger Leader 27 November 2006)

Ropers hopes to use the tetralemma to transcend binary thinking

The tetralemma lsquois a tool that has the potential of overcoming the binary logic of these two sets of attitudes and fearsrsquo

(Ropers 2008 17)

This is a noble venture and it may well succeed It is certainly greatly needed in the aftermath of the Sri Lankan governmentrsquos military victory if peace is to be consolidated and the passions that may fuel renewed revolt assuaged But rad-ical disagreement such as the example given above is not taken note of in the tetralemma The argument in Part II of this book is that it would be a good idea to supplement the tetralemma with serious exploration of the radical disagreements


Unitary state or moderate High level autonomy ordevolution only separate state

Neither A nor B Both A and B

Power sharing is not the key issue Compromise ndash genuine more important are genuine democracy power sharing federalism etc development good local governance etc

Position A is that of the government and majority of Sinhala mainstream parties Position B is that of Tamil nationalist parties particularly the LTTE Neither A nor B represents the position of a number of civil society groups who argue that the lsquoreal problemsrsquo are not to do with the question of power-sharing among the various political elites but with other unsatisfi ed needs Both A and B represents the position of international peacemakers (eg Norway the UN) ndash for example a lsquofederal structure within a united Sri Lankarsquo (the formula agreed between the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka in the December 2002 negotiations in Oslo)

Ropers also suggests possibilities for a further stance outside the frame corresponding to Nagarjunarsquos lsquonone of these but not thatrsquo ndash lsquoavoid any of the solutions emphasise other dimensions of mutual engagement or go to warrsquo

Box 31 The tetralemma applied to the SinhalandashTamil conflict in Sri Lanka

Source Ropers 2008 29


that constitute the core of the linguistic intractability when conflict parties refuse to give up their embattled positions Quite simply there is no other recourse in the communicative sphere in times of maximum conflict intractability

Vivienne Jabri establishing the critical foundations for a discourse of peace

The second main basis for a transformationist critique is the fact of asymmetric conflict Asymmetric conflicts are those in which conflict parties are unequal in power either quantitatively (eg strong vs weak states) or qualitatively (eg state vs non-state actors) or both In these circumstances the conflict resolution aim of converting winndashlose competition into an exercise in cooperative problem solving is seen to reinforce the position of the powerful ndash a normalization and pacification that plays into the hands of those who want to preserve the status quo Negotiation problem solving and dialogue without a wider transformational agenda for addressing the structural institutional and discursive nature of the asymmetry are seen as uncritical and counter-productive (a similar critique comes from proponents of non-violent direct action (Dudouet 2006))

Here is Edward Saidrsquos criticism of attempts at cooperative negotiation problem solving and dialogue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

There is still a military occupation people are still being killed imprisoned and denied their rights on a daily basis The main prerogatives for us Arabs and Palestinians are therefore clear One we must struggle to end the occu-pation Two we must struggle even harder to develop our own independent institutions and organizations until we are on a relatively equal footing with the Israelis Then we can begin to talk seriously about cooperation In the meantime cooperation can all too easily shade into collaboration with Israeli policy

(Said 1995 37)

Problem-solving workshops operate with lsquoreasonable people with reasonable goals such as peaceful coexistencersquo rather than with those fighting for existential justice Nadim Rouhana and S Koumlrper argue that problem-solving workshops cover over the ways in which differential advantages and disadvantages for lsquohigher power groupsrsquo and lsquolower power groupsrsquo contradict facilitatorsrsquo basic assumptions about communicative symmetry (1996) Deiniol Jones mounts a sustained critique of the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords along similar lines given the asymmetry between the two sides it perpetuated rather than transformed the conflict (1999)

For these reasons many have turned to critical theory in general and to Juumlrgen Habermasrsquo discourse ethics in particular for a transformative communicative approach that will address asymmetry

Jay Rothman for example appeals to Habermas in the integrative stage of the ARIA method because Habermasrsquo critical epistemology lsquoseeks to transform real-ity such as the international system by approaching it with a normative view as to what it ought to becomersquo


Critical theory both critiques and attempts to transform the status quo hellip [It] is concerned with distinguishing those social meanings that are ideologically based or socially conditioned and therefore in principle open to transforma-tion from those that are based on invariant laws that must be discovered and can at best be reordered These laws which Habermas (1979) calls transcend-ental criteria of truth may be discovered in an lsquoideal speechrsquo situation in which conditions of perfect freedom and lack of coercion exist such that agents in discussion may converge on lsquocommon opinionsrsquo

(Rothman 1992 72)

I will say more about Habermasrsquo ideas in Chapter 6 But three moves make this an attractive option for systemic conflict transformation

1 the uncovering of existing power-saturated discourses and exposure of the ruses that make them seem lsquonaturalrsquo (along the lines described in Chapter 1 of this book)

2 disengagement from this terrain and a shift to second-order critical analysis 3 reconstruction of a new discourse free from power on a different basis ndash the

ideal speech situation where lsquoagents in discussion may converge on common opinionsrsquo

This is exemplified in Vivienne Jabrirsquos Discourses on Violence (1996)Jabri begins by rejecting lsquouncritical approaches to conflict resolutionrsquo that ignore

asymmetry and fail to appreciate the discursive and institutional origins of exclu-sion and war that perpetuate violence

The facilitation process is represented as being conducted by outsiders unin-volved observers whose interpretations of the conflict are excluded from the communicative process Interpretation is however centrally involved in the process of facilitation in its assumption of what constitutes the core set of grievances the identity of the lsquopartiesrsquo in conflict and the premise that facil-itation as a process may be extracted from the wider structural asymmetries of the conflict

(Jabri 1996 155)

In her response Jabri looks to Habermasrsquo discourse ethics for the foundation of a lsquodiscourse on peacersquo to replace the lsquodiscourses on violencersquo Her argument roughly follows the three moves indicated above

First she identifies just war and the language of exclusive identity as dominant discourses that legitimize the continuity of war through repertoires of meaning linked to the state system and drawn upon by strategically situated agents

[s]trategic and normative (just war) discourses on war share a number of assumptions and indeed constitute together the structuring language of war

(Jabri 1996 106ndash7)


Jabri recognizes language as the site for the interplay of power and contestation

Language is a central component in the production and reproduction of soci-eties Language is also a mechanism of control in highly administered social systems It constitutes the public domain of political discourse and is the medium through which identity is constructed Moreover it is the medium through which contestations become manifest

(Ibid 133)

Since language is both a mechanism of control and the medium through which contestations become manifest it might be supposed that Jabri would express inter-est in radical disagreement ndash about whether for example particular wars are just or unjust or about whether just war criteria are applicable in general (pacifist and realist critiques) But she does not do this for two main reasons First actors within the system lsquomay rationalise their conduct and be able to articulate discursively the reasons for their choice of violence in time of conflictrsquo but this does not mean that they are lsquoaware of the implications of their conductrsquo (1996 91) Actorsrsquo utterances are therefore already largely conditioned by unarticulated structures that determine their discourse so there is no point taking what they say seriously at face value Second to enter the just war debate ourselves even as critics is already to play by the rules that need to be challenged and therefore to become complicit in the continuities that they thereby perpetuate Readers will be familiar with this reason for not taking radical disagreement seriously from Chapter 2

Jabrirsquos second move is to vacate the existing power-saturated public arena entirely This is done by invoking second-order critical thinking that can analyse and expose it from the outside and point to alternatives

In recognising the constructive element of language discourse analysis goes some way towards contributing to an understanding of conflict as exclusionist discourse reifying a singular way of knowing

(Jabri 1996 140)

Otherwise the lsquoexisting self-interpretation of groupsrsquo would be allowed

a kind of normative inviolability an ontological defence mechanism against the interrogation of the truth of fundamental beliefs and the justice of operat-ive norms and values

(Ibid 163)

And counter-discourses would be given no space to mount a critique

The symbolic orders and interpretative schemes upon which identity is based constitute lsquopublicrsquo or political space The transformative capacity of counter-discourses must also be located in the public space It is the domination of this space which generates hegemonic discourses based on exclusionist


ideologies which are used to legitimate the onset of war and the manipulation of information in time of war Structures of domination point to the exist-ence of asymmetrical access to public space such that the counter-discourses generated by social movements opposed to war are marginalised or rendered invisible Public space is therefore a place of contestation and conflict ndash it is a space which must be understood if we are to uncover the processes which lead to its control and manipulation as well as those involved in the emergence of dissident voices and counter-discourses

(Ibid 158ndash9)

But once again Jabri shows no interest in radical disagreements associated with contestations and conflicts that manifest the emergence of dissent from within the arena of prevailing discourse The appeal is entirely away from first-order analysis seen to be confined to agentsrsquo articulations of their own conduct and in the direction of second-order analyses conducted by third-party social scientists who

study aspects of the constitution of social life which cannot be grasped through concepts and tacit forms of mutual knowledge to which agents have access in their day-to-day lives hellip Second order analyses therefore involve a language or discourse that is situated within the domain of the social sciences

(Ibid 177)

Finally having vacated the existing power-saturated discourse of war and invoked the independent stance of critical theory Jabri is able to make the third move by constructing lsquoemancipatory critical approaches to conflict resolution which rec-ognise difference and diversityrsquo along Habermasian lines

In seeking to situate peace in discourse the suggestion being put forward is that the condition of peace incorporates a process of unhindered communicative action which involves participation and difference hellip For Habermas eman-cipation is achieved through uncovering the forces which generate distorted communication and through a discursive process which incorporates critical self-reflection and understanding

(Ibid 161ndash3)

But what does Jabri say about radical disagreements first within discourse ethics as competing validity claims are challenged and contested and second from out-side discourse ethics when the whole basis on which it is set up is rejected

On the first eventuality the field of discourse ethics is by its nature argument-ative as claim meets counter-claim in the pure atmosphere of the lsquoideal speech situationrsquo to be adjudicated by lsquoforce of argumentrsquo alone in inter-subjective com-munication free from distortion by coercion or power asymmetry So what happens when conflict parties nevertheless fail to reach agreement


Individuals and groups involved in social relations do not always reach rational consensus Where disagreement occurs a variety of options are available Groups and individuals may adopt strategic behaviour where actors may seek to influence communicative interaction through for example the direct manipulation of information on their intentions or the shared external world Groups may also break off communication and resort to violence hellip A pro-cess situated in discursive ethics however rejects these options and enters a dialogic relationship of free objection and justification

(Jabri 1996 165)

It can be seen that Jabri envisages only three alternatives when lsquodisagreement occursrsquo Two of these strategic manipulation and resort to violence do not con-cern conversational interchange while the third is a return to the pure depoliticized space of Habermasian communicative action None of these alternatives relate to ongoing radical disagreement

On the second eventuality ndash an external challenge to the presuppositions of dis-course ethics itself ndash Jabri acknowledges that

Discourse ethics as process is a locale of emancipation from the constraints of tradition prejudice and myth However some of the most pervasive con-flicts of late modernity concern issues of religious belief which preclude a questioning of norms where the text and image considered sacred are not allowed into an intersubjective space of equal interpretation and contestation This defines a situation where it is not merely inter-subjective consent as an outcome of discourse that is the problem This is in fact a condition which does not allow the occurrence of discourse and precludes any possibility of an emergent dialogic relationship

(Ibid 166ndash7)

This has indeed been characteristic of lsquosome of the most pervasive conflicts of late modernityrsquo How does Jabri respond She follows Seyla Benhabib (1992) in expanding Habermasrsquo framework to include lsquomoral substancersquo as well as lsquoprocessrsquo in the discursive ethical realm

To incorporate concrete issues of lived experience into the framework of communicative ethics renders it more responsive to the challenges of con-textualised social relations While the process contains universal constitutive rules framing communicative action it concedes that it must take place within conditions of value differentiation and heterogeneity A peace located in dis-course ethics must therefore recognise difference as a formative component of subjectivity

(Ibid 167)

Portentous issues of religious belief are defined as mere concrete issues of lived experience and are thereby reincorporated into the universal constitutive rules that


they reject So it is that the radical disagreement ndash if it is taken seriously at all ndash can already be seen to involve the procedural framework that purports to accommod-ate it This is why the conflict is intractable But in the end I think Jabri does not recognize agonistic dialogue as a genuine form of dialogue at all The language of inclusion is extended to distinguish between

discourse that lsquoincorporates a process of unhindered communicative action which involves participation and differencersquo and lsquopseudodialoguesrsquo that lsquoincorporate dogma rhetoric and ideologyrsquo and the wish to impose lsquoan unshift-able opinionrsquo rather than participate in lsquoa common searchrsquo

(Jabri 1996 161 quoting Chanteur 1992 232)

Jabri absorbs the protests that fuel intractable conflict back into lsquoa discursive ethics which not only incorporates difference but celebrates such agencyrsquo (1996 185) The anarchic voice of radical disagreement is silenced in the uniformity of celebra-tion The discursive conflict transformation programme is innovatory and potent But it does not recognize the challenge of radical disagreement or offer remedies when the clash of discourses threatens to burst its framework asunder

Conclusion

In conclusion I find that for all its different guises the conflict resolution and con-flict transformation tradition remains to this day broadly true to Morton Deutschrsquos original distinction between destructive and constructive conflict Although there are exceptions that will be particularly helpful when it comes to the question of methodology in Chapter 4 (for example lsquoconstructive controversyrsquo lsquoconstructive confrontationrsquo lsquodeep democracyrsquo lsquoconstructive management of disagreementrsquo) in general I think that radical disagreements are still identified with destructive con-flict and are seen as the terminus of genuine dialogue The aim from the outset is to overcome or transform radical disagreements not to study or learn from them

Can this be all that there is to be said about radical disagreement the chief lin-guistic manifestation of intractable human conflict I do not think so But in the light of what has been seen in Part I the task in Part II is to bracket objections from discourse analysis conflict analysis and conflict resolution so as to be able to focus clearly and steadily on the phenomenon of radical disagreement itself in order to find out

Notes

1 Some time ago John Burton caricatured conflict settlement in order to contrast it with the deeper process of conflict resolution Now it is fashionable to caricature conflict resolution in contrast to conflict transformation There are three reasons for keeping conflict resolution as the generic term for what remains a single field first that it was the original term second that it is still the most widely used term among analysts and practitioners and third because it is the term that is most familiar in the media and among the general public


2 Other terms include John Burtonrsquos lsquocontrolled communicationrsquo and lsquoanalytic problem solvingrsquo approaches Leonard Doobrsquos lsquohuman relations workshopsrsquo Herbert Kelmanrsquos lsquointeractive problem solvingrsquo Edward Azarrsquos lsquoproblem solving forarsquo and Fisherrsquos own lsquothird party consultationrsquo (see also Mitchell and Banks 1996)

3 The survey covers approaches such as Appreciative Inquiry Change Lab Deep Democracy Future Search Open Space Scenario Planning Sustained Dialogue World Cafeacute Bohmian Dialogue Learning Journeys etc

4 The formalist paradigm is rooted in the confidence of positivist universalism The historical paradigm recalls the lsquomethodological hermeneuticsrsquo of Schleiermacher and Dilthey and is reminiscent of the approaches from projective psychology noted above There is also a fourth paradigm the lsquocomparative methods and theory paradigmrsquo which studies lsquohow we ought to study others and ourselvesrsquo

Part II

Radical disagreement and the transformation of violent conflict

How the acknowledgement exploration understanding and management of rad-ical disagreement can help to transform intractable conflicts even when attempts at conflict resolution fail

In Part I the search for an adequate account of radical disagreement in discourse analysis and conflict analysis proved disappointing One reason for this is the way the topic is characterized in the social political and historical sciences in the first place Analysis moves directly from description to explanation and therefore does not linger over what has already not only been explained but explained away Nor do most conflict resolution specialists treat the phenomenon of radical disagree-ment with any greater respect The central distinction between constructive and destructive conflict identifies radical disagreement with the latter and consigns it from the outset to what must be overcome not learnt from

Nevertheless despite such discouragement these objections are bracketed in Part II and a full-scale enquiry is launched into what is after all the chief verbal expression of the most serious and intractable political conflicts It is an enquiry into the war of words itself not in the sense of conscious verbal propaganda and manipulation but in the deeper sense of the impassioned conflict of belief and truth for sole possession of the one discursive field

At the heart of the linguistic intractability lies agonistic dialogue ndash dialogue between enemies ndash that part of radical disagreement in which adversaries respond directly to each otherrsquos utterances whether or not in the first instance through intermediaries1 Agonistic dialogue is an admittedly unruly borderland of human dialogue a lsquowild westrsquo where many of the lsquofederal rulesrsquo that govern polite con-versation and orderly verbal exchange do not run But it is still a form of dialogue and has its own procedures which can be studied and explored

Beyond radical disagreement lies Max Weberrsquos polytheism of inarticulately struggling lsquogods and demonsrsquo or Matthew Arnoldrsquos dark chaotic plain lsquowhere ignorant armies clash by nightrsquo or the non-speaking attempts at mutual annihila-tion in HGWellsrsquo War of the Worlds Beyond this again lies the lsquosilence of the oppressedrsquo the vast epochs of the inarticulate victims of subjugation and exclusion Acknowledgement has already been made in the Preface that this is the pre-history of radical disagreement These are not radical disagreements because they are

94 Radical disagreement and the transformation of violent conflict

speechless It is only on the far side of radical disagreement that the final boundary of human dialogue is reached

Note

1 This is not quite the same as Chantal Mouffersquos idea of agonism In Mouffersquos conception of agonistic pluralism the raw antagonism and violence characteristic of human society in general (the lsquopoliticalrsquo) is domesticated and tamed within the democratic agon so that lsquoenemiesrsquo become lsquoadversariesrsquo who thereby gain a respect for each other as well as for the democratic lsquorules of the gamersquo that define the space of democratic lsquopoliticsrsquo (1999 755) Whereas what I call agonistic dialogue is precisely verbal exchange between enemies it still includes the antagonistic Agonistic dialogue is the dialogue of intense political struggle in general without trying to distinguish yet between domesticated and undomesticated varieties

4 MethodologyStudying agonistic dialogue

Methodologies from discourse analysis conflict resolution and systemic conflict analysis are learnt from but then developed beyond the limit where they are usu-ally broken off A methodology for studying radical disagreement results which can guide the phenomenology epistemology and praxis of radical disagreement that follows

Methodologies associated with the fields of study looked at in Part I provide the starting points for exploring understanding and managing agonistic dialogue But in each case a boundary is reached where discourse and conflict analysts turn back and those who want to take the phenomenon of radical disagreement seriously must press on over a terrain that is much less clearly mapped The first part of this chapter identifies where those boundaries are The second part outlines a meth-odology for carrying the enquiry forward into the less familiar territory that lies beyond

Lessons and limits from discourse analysis conflict resolution and systemic conflict analysis

Identifying the methodological boundaries of discourse analysis

From conversation analysis (CA) comes a methodology for recording and analys-ing conversational exchanges described in Chapter 1 But the study of agonistic dialogue goes beyond this The emphasis in the study of agonistic dialogue is not just on process but also on content And because of the nature of this content there is no need to lsquodisruptrsquo daily conversational practice in order to expose its mechanisms as was characteristic in early CA ethnomethodology The disruption is already inherent Agonistic dialogue is a fierce but often experienced discon-tinuity in day-to-day conversational practice

The role of third-party facilitators is also different Whereas in conversation analysis the commentator draws independent conclusions from what are usually fragments of conversation in the study of agonistic dialogue it is the conversation parties who do the analysis Any third-party contributions are fed into the contested field ndash and are as often as not found to be already part of what is at issue


There are two empirical problems with this extension of CA methodology and one substantial challenge

The first problem is that direct communication between conflict parties breaks down in intense political confrontation Conversation is reduced to an exchange of insults where neither is prepared to listen to what the other is saying This is the lsquodialogue of the deaf rsquo Here there is indeed a role for third parties in helping to surmount this block and eliciting continuing interchange But in my experience it is much easier to overcome this hiatus than might be supposed Most conflict parties confronted with the otherrsquos utterances react spontaneously in their readi-ness to explain why what the other says is factually mistaken morally wrong or personally insincere The response is immediate and emphatic

The second problem is that particularly in face-to-face exchanges the dialogue develops at lightning speed and with startling and unpredictable shifts of direction There are repeated expressions of exasperation or disgust and explosions of emo-tion How can all this be analysed William Harvey practiced vivisection in order to slow down the motions of the heart so that he could follow them ndash and in the process killed the object of study The methodology for studying radical disagree-ment is not quite so drastic But it too sometimes has to slow down the subject of analysis without destroying it Fortunately as will be seen there are ways in which this can be done As for expressions of emotion these are the hallmarks of radical disagreement They must be expected As is elaborated in Chapter 5 it is the fusion of the emotive the conative (desire will) and the cognitive that lies at the heart of linguistic intractability

The substantial challenge is what to do when it is not in the perceived interest of conflict parties ndash particularly powerful conflict parties ndash to develop and explore radical disagreement This applies to both internal and external hegemons Here we reach a key issue that will become a major preoccupation in Chapters 7 and 8 Again there are many ways in which this can be managed

From informal reasoning analysis comes a methodology for analysing and evaluating lsquoreal argumentsrsquo Here the content of what is said is indeed taken seriously And the methodology for aligning arguments and for distinguishing different functions of speech acts and different truth claims of propositions (ref-erential directive expressive etc) is evidently highly relevant in the analysis of agonistic dialogue More will be said about this in Chapter 5 where such distinc-tions are found to be themselves involved

But where does the boundary lie beyond which informal reasoning analysis will not take us

To pinpoint this here is an example of an argument and the way it is analysed and evaluated in the lsquocritical thinking movementrsquo

Alec Fisher subjects US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinbergerrsquos 1982 Open Letter to NATO Allies in defence of US nuclear deterrent policy to critical ana-lysis and evaluation His aim in doing this is pedagogic ndash to teach students how to handle lsquoreal argumentsrsquo better (198848ndash69) Here are some brief extracts from Weinbergerrsquos letter (Fisher analyses the whole letter)

Methodology 97

I am increasingly concerned with news accounts that portray this Administration as planning to wage protracted nuclear war or seeking to acquire a nuclear lsquowar-fightingrsquo capability This is completely inaccurate and these stories misrepresent the Administrationrsquos policies to the American public and to our Allies and adversaries abroad hellip It is the first and foremost goal of this Administration to take every step to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again for we do not believe there could be any lsquowinnersrsquo in a nuclear war hellip The policy of deterrence is difficult for some to grasp because it is based on a paradox But this is quite simple to make the cost of a nuclear war much higher than any possible lsquobenefitrsquo to the country starting it If the Soviets know in advance that a nuclear attack on the United States could and would bring swift nuclear retaliation they would never attack in the first place They would be lsquodeterredrsquo from ever beginning a nuclear war hellip That is exactly why we must have a capability for a survivable and endurable response hellip The purpose of US policy remains to prevent aggression through an effect-ive policy of deterrence the very goal which prompted the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance an alliance which is as vital today as it was the day it was formed

Fisher analyses Weinbergerrsquos argument by identifying and numbering its proposi-tions and working out the logic of their interconnections See Figure 41 for the abstract argument structure that emerges linking the numbered premises (not given here) and interim conclusions to the main conclusion (C)

Fisher takes Weinbergerrsquos main conclusion (C) to be the statement

lsquowe must have a capability for a survivable and endurable responsersquo

Figure 41 Analysis of the argument structure of the 1982 Weinberger Open Letter

10 + 11

1 +

C (main conclusion)

2

12 + 13 + 14

8 + 9 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7

15


and says that this lsquoappears to flatly contradictrsquo Weinbergerrsquos initial lsquoinsistencersquo that lsquowe are not seeking to acquire a nuclear ldquowar-fightingrdquo capabilityrsquo (198865) (Fisherrsquos italics)

Because real-life arguments are often vague ambiguous and incomplete in making such an analysis Fisher supplies the deficiencies by use of what he calls the lsquoassertibility questionrsquo He puts himself into the shoes of the arguer and asks

What arguments or evidence would justify me in asserting the conclusion (What would I have to know or believe in to be justified in accepting it)

He makes the argument as strong as it can be (the principle of charity)He also uses the assertibility question when it comes to the question of evalu-

ation because lsquoobviously the kind of answer given is different in different contextsrsquo (Toulminrsquos lsquofield-dependence of standardsrsquo)

Two points identify the boundary where the methodology of informal reasoning analysis and evaluation stops and the methodology of radical disagreement analysis and exploration begins

First there is the status of the assertibility question itself Fisher insists that it does not refer to truth conditionality (lsquowhat would have to be true or false for the conclusion to be true or falsersquo) but only to justified assertion (lsquowhat arguments or evidence would justify me in asserting the conclusionrsquo) He then ndash as can be seen ndash identifies justified assertion (lsquowhat arguments or evidence would justify me in asserting the conclusionrsquo) with subject-dependent belief (lsquowhat would I have to know or believe in to be justified in accepting itrsquo) But this is exactly the point where the exploration of agonistic dialogue parts company with informal reasoning analysis In agonistic dialogue conflict parties do talk about truth conditions and do not translate everything that is said into the language of subject-dependent belief That is what makes these exchanges radical disagreements So for a third-party analyst to dismiss truth conditionality at the outset in the testing of sound arguing is to beg what is in question in radical disagreement Watertight distinctions such as that between truth and validity break down in agonistic dialogue and are found to be part of what is disputed (see Chapter 5)

Second it can be seen that Fisher is analysing arguments not radical disagree-ments In the methodology for analysing and exploring agonistic dialogue it is not the third party who conducts the analysis but the conflict parties In this case a fitting object of enquiry might be what happens when Weinbergerrsquos argument is rejected by antinuclear protesters and he answers back In fact although Fisherrsquos purpose is pedagogic rather than political there is already an embryonic radical disagreement between Weinberger and Fisher that can be written as follows (word omissions are not indicated)

|lsquoI am increasingly concerned with news accounts that portray this Administration as seeking to acquire a nuclear lsquowar-fightingrsquo capability This is completely inaccurate If the Soviets know in advance that a nuclear attack on the United States could and would bring swift nuclear retaliation

Methodology 99

they would never attack in the first place That is exactly why we must have a capability for a survivable and endurable responsersquo

lsquoIn this argument Weinbergerrsquos main conclusion ndash ldquowe must have a capabil-ity for a survivable and endurable responserdquo ndash appears to flatly contradict his initial lsquoinsistencersquo that ldquowe are not seeking to acquire a nuclear war-fighting capabilityrdquorsquo|

Because the speakers are not directly responding to each otherrsquos arguments because there is a long time-lag and because the contemporary political context is missing we cannot yet say that this is a radical disagreement ndash the exchange would have to be developed in order to find out Above all Weinberger would have to reply in turn to Fisherrsquos critique So far in quoting Weinberger Fisher omits the original inverted commas around the term lsquowar-fightingrsquo and puts the word lsquocap-abilityrsquo into italics for the sake of his own argument He says that Weinbergerrsquos main conclusion lsquoappearsrsquo to contradict his initial proposition The radical disag-reement is embryonic But it already marks out clearly the territory that must be entered if informal reasoning analysis is to develop into an exploration of agonistic dialogue It is this radical disagreement ndash the radical disagreement between the communicative actor with political power explaining why he is right to act as he does and the communicative actor who draws on the whole of informal reasoning analysis in refuting him ndash that will be the object of exploration in Chapter 5 It is already evident why in this case informal reasoning analysis is part of what is at issue

From critical political discourse analysis come methodologies for detecting the play of power and contestation across texts and across the wider discourses that contain them ndash particularly those through which the powerful protect their privil-ege and the marginalized and oppressed are excluded (Howarth 1998 Howarth Norval and Stavrakakis (eds) 2000) This is highly relevant to the analysis of rad-ical disagreement in asymmetric conflicts But again I will try to specify the point at which the analysis of agonistic dialogue having learnt from critical language study has to break away I will use the example of a BBC Radio 3 interview given by Margaret Thatcher on 13 December 1985 and of a critical discourse analysis of it by Norman Fairclough (1989)

Here is an extract from the interview

I believe that government should be very strong to do those things which only government can do [on defence on law and order on upholding the value of the currency by sound finance on creating the framework for a good education system and social security] And at that point you have to say lsquoover to peoplersquo People are inventive and creative so you expect PEOPLE to create thriving industries thriving services Yes you expect people each and every one from whatever their background to have a chance to rise to whatever level their own abilities can take them Yes you expect people of all sorts of backgrounds and almost whatever their income level to be able to have a chance of owning


some property ndash tremendously important the ownership of property of a house where you can bring up your children gives you some independence a stake in the future hellip I wouldnrsquot call this populist I would say that many of the things which Irsquove said strike a chord in the hearts of ordinary people Why Because theyrsquore British because their character IS independent because they DONrsquoT like to be shoved around because they ARE prepared to take responsibility because they DO expect to be loyal to their friends and loyal allies ndash thatrsquos why you call it populist I say it strikes a chord in the hearts of people I know because it struck a chord in my heart many many years ago

(Thatcher 1985 in Fairclough 1989 174ndash5 repunctuated)

For Fairclough the task of critical discourse analysis is to determine

the relationship between texts processes and their social conditions both the immediate conditions of the situational context and the more remote condi-tions of institutional and social structures

(Fairclough 1989 26)

This methodology is made up of three interrelated stages Textual analysis is a description of the formal properties of the text (semantics) Process analysis is an interpretation of the production and reception of the text (pragmatics) Context analysis is an explanation of the social conditions that generate it and which it reinforces (socio-political nexus) The critical analyst is engaged in description interpretation and explanation

The play of discursive power operates across and between these different levels and generates lsquoideological power the power to project onersquos practices as universal and ldquocommon senserdquorsquo (Fairclough 1989 33) The lsquodiscourse worldsrsquo of political actors are legitimized via linguistic tropes (metonyms metaphors modality indi-cators) produced by and reproducing ideological formations (Chilton 2004 154) Texts do not just contain verbal elements but also lsquovisualsrsquo ndash facial expression movement gesture tone of voice All of these need to be analysed They are embedded in discursive practices and orders of discourse that determine how they are constituted or produced who can articulate them and what the constraints are which dictate how they are received These are in turn structured by wider con-textual social and institutional orders

[Critical language study] ought to conceptualise language as a form of social practice what I have called discourse and that correspondingly it ought to stress both the determination of discourse by social structures and the effects of discourse upon society through its reproduction of social structures hellip People are not generally aware of determinations and effects at these levels and [critical language study] is therefore a matter of helping people to become conscious of opaque causes and consequences of their own discourse

(Fairclough 1989 41ndash2)

Methodology 101

Applying this to Margaret Thatcherrsquos 1985 BBC3 interview Fairclough sees the granting of the interview as an attempt by the forces of revived conservatism to lsquonaturalisersquo its continuing economic and political dominance through a shift from the traditional remote authoritarianism of the past to a new ideological posture that identifies it with the robust lsquocommonsensersquo values and interests of ordinary British people

At the first (descriptive) stage the analyst applies critical linguistic techniques to disclose the intervieweersquos manipulation of her text via choice of words (lsquowersquo lsquothe British peoplersquo) grammar (simple lsquono-nonsensersquo phrasing) and so on

At the second (interpretative) stage the analystrsquos task is to lsquoreconstruct Margaret Thatcherrsquos production processrsquo Faircloughrsquos aim is to lsquoreconstruct the interpret-ative processes of members of the audiencersquo in order to see how her discursive moves are received He concludes that the lsquounacknowledged strategic purposersquo of the interviewee is not to lsquobe herselfrsquo at all but to use the opportunity to get her message across and make a politically favourable impact on the public In short her aim is

to construct an image of herself of her audience and of their relationship which accords with her strategic purpose

(Fairclough 1989 190 original italics)

At the third (explanation) stage the analyst accounts for the nature production and interpretation of the text by outlining the wider social-institutional setting from which these are derived and to which they in turn contribute

In accordance with the concerns of the stage of explanation hellip we now need to look at [Margaret Thatcherrsquos] discourse as an element in social processes at the institutional and societal levels and to show how it is ideologically determined by and ideologically determinative of power relations and power struggle at these levels

(Ibid 192)

Fairclough relates the text and its productioninterpretation to the underlying class struggle (lsquothe class struggle between the capitalist class or the dominant bloc it constitutes and the working class and its alliesrsquo) that can be seen to play across it The social theory appealed to is then made explicit

The view of Thatcherism I shall present owes most to the political analysis associated with the Communist Party journal Marxism Today

(Ibid 176)

This is the boundary where the methodology for analysing and exploring agon-istic dialogue breaks away from the methodology employed in critical language analysis This is not because in this case Fairclough is partisan in his critique of the discourse of Thatcherism There is no requirement that participants in the


exploration of agonistic dialogue should be ndash or could be ndash in some way non-partisan As Fairclough says

I should stress that the interpretation of British society which I give is not a neutral one ndash there are none ndash but one which reflects my own experience values and political commitments


Nor a fortiori is it because there is anything inadequate in Faircloughrsquos analysis as such

The reason why the methodology for a phenomenology of radical disagree-ment has to break away at this point is because critical language study of this kind does not study radical disagreement at all It has no interest in it and regards it as superficial and naive ndash even when it sees political language itself as a site for con-tinuous contestation Its focus is entirely on analysing ways in which discourses within wider social settings produce maintain and change relations of power that perpetuate dominance and disadvantage through inequalities of communication Its self-confessedly didactic purpose is to lsquohelp people to become consciousrsquo of lsquowhat they are not generally aware ofrsquo Its topic is to expose the hidden workings of ideology in the manufacture of consent The struggles for power located in lan-guage that it recognizes have nothing to do with the form of radical disagreement but are defined in advance through prior critical third-party understanding of the social and institutional class relations that generate them This is the reason why a phenomenology of radical disagreement will get no further guidance from critical linguistics

The topic for the phenomenology of radical disagreement is what happens (what is said) in the radical disagreement itself ndash in this case the (embryonic) radical disagreement between Margaret Thatcher and Norman Fairclough This will be explored further in Chapter 5

Identifying the methodological boundaries of conflict resolution

Chapter 3 offered an analysis of the mainstream conflict resolution field in an attempt to clarify how and why the phenomenon of radical disagreement has aroused such relatively little interest Most of the negotiation mediation problem solving dialogic and discursive approaches that were looked at in Chapter 3 pro-vide rich methodological resources for launching such an investigation So we do well to follow in the footsteps of those such as Bikhu Parekh who juxtaposes opposed Islamic and Western perspectives before developing his theme of posit-ive lsquodialogue between civilisationsrsquo or Gavriel Saloman and others who launch their enterprise of lsquoco-existence educationrsquo in the Middle East with an analysis of conflicting Israeli and Arab histories or David Holloway and Brian Lennonrsquos Community Dialogue Belfast which is prepared to risk confrontation in its encouragement of lsquorehumanisingrsquo cross-cultural exchange or Franklin Dukes in his willingness to encourage the articulation and analysis of lsquovaluablersquo conceptual

Methodology 103

conflict and lsquoproductive dialoguersquo within the enterprise of lsquopublic conflict resolu-tionrsquo or problem solving workshop methodologies including those pioneered by Herb Kelman that include an initial presentation of opposed views within the wider problem solving process or more generally the preparatory mutual listening and mutual respect phases that are common across a range of family neighbourhood and community mediation methodologies

But as Chapter 3 also suggests most of these approaches turn away at exactly the point where a study of agonistic dialogue most needs to press on although there are some conflict resolution specialists who do take the topic of verbal controversy seriously in their attempts to expedite cooperative decision-making in the public arena or to mitigate the destructive consequences of intractable conflict

The aim of David and Roger Johnsonrsquos constructive controversy for example is to elicit intellectual conflict on the Jeffersonian principle that lsquodifference of opinion leads to enquiry and enquiry to truthrsquo But it turns out in the end that there is no room for radical disagreement within the process of constructive controversy

In well-structured controversies participants make an initial judgment pre-sent their conclusions to other group members are challenged with opposing views grow uncertain about the correctness of their views actively search for new information and understanding incorporate othersrsquo perspectives and reasoning into their thinking and reach a new set of conclusions This process significantly increases the quality of decision making and problem solving the quality of relationships and improvements in psychological health

(Johnson and Johnson 2000 84)

Radical disagreement does not behave like this It is not lsquowell-structuredrsquo Something similar applies to other variants on this theme with which I am famil-iar In Barbara Bradfordrsquos imaginative lsquomanaging disagreement constructivelyrsquo programme for example there is no room for taking the phenomenon of radical disagreement seriously in any of her nine alternatives (Bradford 2004)

The aim of Myrna Lewisrsquo Deep Democracy (httpwwwdeep-democracynet) deliberately encourages dissent in order to allow minorities to express and spread the lsquonorsquo and to challenge majority democracy Facilitators lsquoturn up the volumersquo and amplify disagreement and the group may as a result decide to lsquogo into conflictrsquo Participants lsquoown their own sidersquo rather than trying to begin by understanding the other This is helpful although the emphasis is on the growth and deepening of relationships not the winning of battles and the whole process is strongly moni-tored and controlled by the facilitators

Perhaps the nearest conflict resolution approach to the phenomenology epi-stemology and praxis of radical disagreement is provided by Guy and Heidi Burgessrsquo Constructive Confrontation (1996 1997) Constructive confrontation does not aim immediately to resolve intractable conflicts Rather it takes full note of power relations and encourages intra-coalition consensus building lsquoConstructive confrontation advisersrsquo are seen as advocates as well as facilitators All of this is highly relevant But as will be noted further in Chapter 8 when it


can be compared with the approach exemplified in Chapter 7 the incremental pro-cedural approach at the centre of constructive confrontation is often found to be itself at issue in the kinds of intractable conflict looked at in this book

Identifying the methodological boundaries of systemic conflict analysis

Chapter 2 indicated how the phenomenon of radical disagreement does not show up on complex systems theory maps of conflict The idea of lsquomental modelsrsquo as applied there does not capture what is most characteristic in radical disagreement

The same happens in other attempts at cognitive mapping For example useful methodologies are developed in the lsquoconceptual mappingrsquo approach Here the map-ping of belief structures looks for lsquonodesrsquo where key concepts cluster and lsquoarcsrsquo which link concepts in order to produce a visual representation of conceptual patterns that lie behind particular arguments and belief systems This illuminates Quine and Ullianrsquos lsquoweb of beliefrsquo ndash the observation that belief-systems are like spider webs with some beliefs central to our conceptions of the world and some more peripheral so that we are more ready to give up or adapt the latter than the former (1970) Radical disagreement is unsurprisingly found to radiate out from incompatibilities between core beliefs But having reached this point the phenom-enology of radical disagreement has to move on because its topic is what happens when those incompatibilities confront each other and struggle to control the whole of conceptual space As in a gravitational battle the entire framework of cognitive mapping is then found to be affected ndash the familiar landmarks slide

An applied methodology for studying agonistic dialogue

Having been carried as far as is possible by the methodologies looked at up to this point it is time to attempt to move beyond them and to enter the relatively uncharted landscape that lies ahead

Mapping the axes of radical disagreement in complex conflicts

The journey begins by mapping the axes of radical disagreement ndash embedded in the wider conflict system ndash that were neglected in the lsquosystems perspectiversquo maps looked at in Chapter 2 This may look daunting but having gained a rough initial view of the conflict system as a whole in terms of interlocking conflict complexes the focus of the enquiry is then narrowed down to particular conflict formations and then down again to the exploration of specific examples

Mapping axes of radical disagreement across different conflict complexes

The total conflict system is made up of different overlapping conflict complexes (for example the AfghanistanndashPakistan conflict complex or the Middle East conflict complex) Conflict complexes are in turn constituted by nested conflict

Methodology 105

formations The Middle East conflict for example is a nested complex of ever-wider conflict formations a Jewish Israeli-Arab Israeli conflict formation an Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation an Arab-Israeli conflict formation (which includes unresolved IsraelndashLebanon and IsraelndashSyria conflicts) the wider Middle East conflict formation including Turkey and Iran ndash and so on up to the level of the international community that involves the Quartet (EU Russia UN US) Readers can easily think of other axes of radical disagreement that criss-cross this set of nested conflict formations such as those that traverse the Palestinian and Jewish diaspora or the EgyptndashIran and SaudindashIran conflict confrontations

The different conflict formations prima facie define conflict parties and third parties In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation for example the 22 Arab States are third parties In the Arab-Israeli conflict formation on the other hand they are conflict parties and so on In the associated radical disagreements as noted in Chapter 6 these distinctions are found to break down

Evidently the totality of shifting axes of radical disagreement within and across conflict formations and conflict complexes within the whole conflict system is too much for any one analyst to manage But it is nevertheless important to keep the existence of such a background in mind even though this book given its size does not develop or exemplify it

Mapping axes of radical disagreement in particular conflict formations

having chosen a particular conflict formation ndash for example the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation ndash the methodology suggests the following structure for the investigation

bull mapping axes of radical disagreement within the conflict partiesbull mapping axes of radical disagreement between the conflict partiesbull mapping axes of radical disagreement between third parties and conflict parties

(there are also axes of radical disagreement within and among third parties)

A full example of this level of enquiry is given in Chapter 7 in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation This example will also show that it is not difficult to conduct the enquiry across different levels of conflict formation simultaneously (eg Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli)

Within this framework the investigation can then focus down to a phenomenolo-gical exploration of the specific examples of radical disagreement thus identified

Phenomenological exploration of specific examples of radical disagreement

In each case the phenomenology of radical disagreement comprises five aspects

1 acknowledging that there is radical disagreement 2 clearing up immediate misunderstanding


3 aligning arguments in order to promote discursive engagement 4 uncovering the moments of radical disagreeing (eg recommendation justi-

fication refutation explanation description revision exploration action) 5 exploring the resulting radical disagreement

The first three of these aspects might be called lsquoprerequisitesrsquo and will be com-mented on here The fourth and fifth aspects constitute the phenomenology itself and will be presented with examples in Chapter 5

Acknowledging that there is radical disagreement

This is often the key to the whole enterprise Acknowledgement of radical dis-agreement is culturally conditioned and varies from group to group and person to person But it is evident when manifestations of radical disagreement erupt mainly because of the super-charged emotional intensity that not only accompanies intractability but also as Chapter 5 shows actively constitutes it Here are three examples from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ndash two at intra-party level and one at inter-party level

In the context described in Chapter 7 an inclusive Jewish Israeli group exploring internal radical disagreement seemed to be proceeding quietly However during the Shabbat when the main business was suspended a radical disagreement unex-pectedly ignited over the authority to interpret the religious text that had just been read Engagement was instantaneous and passionate This was the conflict that had apparently been discussed earlier Now it was real Everything else was at once eclipsed and the meeting was finally able to move on to the heart of the issue

An inclusive Palestinian group meeting in Jordan in the search for a national strategy to end occupation was allotting different contextual factors to three cat-egories ndash positive for the Palestinian cause negative for the Palestinian cause neither positive nor negative for the Palestinian cause Someone mentioned lsquoIslamizationrsquo The discussion froze The shock-wave was palpable A short silence of very high tension followed Reassuring voices made suggestions The topic was put in a special category on the bottom left-hand part of the board The meeting would come back to it later

An attempt by third-party facilitators to test three conflict resolution meth-odologies with a small number of Israelis and Palestinians in a safe university environment in Europe was progressing gently Facilitators were asking par-ticipants what they would like the situation to be in five yearsrsquo time The idea was to follow this up by analysis of what was blocking these outcomes so that discussion could focus on how to remove the blockages or circumvent the barri-ers Participants wrote down their future aspirations and these were pinned on the board After some minutes an Israeli hand went up

Some of these may be other peoplesrsquo hopes but they are not mine They are my worst nightmares

Methodology 107

The atmosphere was at once electric High emotion was expressed Facilitators were dismayed and tried to continue ndash they said that they had anticipated this and were coming on to discuss it tomorrow But they had not anticipated it The meet-ing was thrown into disarray This was the sudden detonation of the conflict itself in the middle of the workshop

To acknowledge that there is radical disagreement is a significant step in being able to explore and understand it

Clearing up immediate misunderstanding

Acknowledgement on its own is not enough For discourses to engage substan-tially there is a need for unnecessary misunderstandings to be cleared up Some have suggested as John Locke famously does here that once misunderstandings are sorted out the disagreement will disappear

I was once in a Meeting of very learned and ingenious Physicians where by chance there arose a Question whether any Liquor passed through the Filaments of the Nerves The Debate having been managed a good while by a variety of Arguments on both sides I (who had been used to suspect that the greatest part of Disputes were more about the signification of Words than a real difference in the Conceptions of Things) desired that before they went any further in this Dispute they would first examine and establish amongst them what the word Liquor signified

When they did this they found

the signification of that Word was not so settled and certain as they had all imagined but that each of them made it a sign of a different complex Idea

(Locke 16901975 IIIix16)

Perhaps the best known example of verbal misunderstanding of this kind was Krushchevrsquos outburst in the UN Security Council lsquoWe will bury yoursquo This was widely interpreted in the West as a threat of nuclear annihilation but (I gather) is better translated from the Russian as lsquoWe will outlast yoursquo ndash a less dramatic repetition of the usual Marxist prediction that capitalism would founder due to its own internal contradictions The problem of communication across languages and cultures in conflict situations is much studied (Augsburger 1992 Cohen 1991 Gulliver 1979) It extends to deep differences between the cultures in which the languages are embedded

But in the case of intractable political conflict and radical disagreement the situation often turns out to be the opposite of that described by John Locke The phenomenology of radical disagreement shows again and again that it is only when initial misunderstandings have been cleared up ndash including linguistic and cultural differences ndash that the deeper levels of misunderstanding are revealed It is when conflict parties speak the same language that the deepest differences that generate


linguistic intractability appear And as Chapter 5 again shows this includes the question whether there has been misunderstanding in the first place It is the dis-tinction between Lockersquos lsquosignification of Wordsrsquo and lsquoa real difference in the Conceptions of Thingsrsquo that is found to be part of what is in dispute

Aligning arguments in order to promote discursive engagement

A third essential element in the methodology for studying agonistic dialogue is the alignment of arguments To begin with as often as not conflict parties miss each other entirely and are appealing to different things This may be as far as the agonistic dialogue goes It is the job of argument alignment to ensure ndash so far as is possible ndash that there is discursive engagement across the full spectrum of the dispute This is commented upon further in Chapter 5

In my book Choices Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Defence Options (Ramsbotham 1987) for example the purpose was to align arguments and promote full discurs-ive engagement across the spectrum of issues involved in the nuclear weapon debate at a time when public exchanges had become sloganized and discourses largely failed to meet In the book I tested levels of polarization by analysing the debate into forty main sub-issues and twenty recommendations for nuclear and non-nuclear defence options and interviewed nineteen prominent spokespersons to elicit detailed responses across the whole gamut of questions1 One of them was US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger whose Open Letter to NATO has been considered above I will comment further on this work in Chapter 5

Note

1 Interviewees were Peter Carrington Michael Carver Leonard Cheshire Denzil Davies John Finnis Lawrence Freedman Richard Harries Michael Howard Rebecca Johnson Anthony Kenny Bruce Kent Yuri Lebedev Robert McNamara James OlsquoConnell David Owen James Schlesinger Edward Thompson Caspar Weinberger George Younger

5 PhenomenologyExploring agonistic dialogue

In exploring the phenomenon of radical disagreement with conflict parties the investigation begins by uncovering the moments of radical disagreeing ndash what conflict parties say in the very process of engaging in agonistic dialogue Through this the enquiry is able to move on to an exploration of the resulting radical disagreement itself and thereby to gain new insight into the nature of linguistic intractability

The argument in this book has reached the point where the phenomenology of rad-ical disagreement ndash the exploration of the agonistic dialogue that lies at the core of linguistic intractability ndash can be directly undertaken The contention is that it is in this way that the lacunae in the complex systemic mapping of conflicting mental models identified at the end of Chapter 2 can best be filled All ten of the analytic deficiencies noted there can be addressed in this way beginning with a tracing of the patterns of competing discourses embedded in the dynamic conflict system as a whole As described in Chapter 4 and exemplified in Chapter 7 each of the evolving axes of radical disagreement within the chosen conflict formation can then be identified and explored including those that emerge within conflict parties between conflict parties and between third parties and conflict parties These need to be mapped investigated and understood if properly informed interventions are to be undertaken Given the critical role that the phenomenon of radical disagree-ment plays in conflict intractability this is vital information for all those who seek positive systemic transformation This will be carried further in Chapter 7

Chapter 4 showed how in the case of individual examples of radical disag-reement pin-pointed in this way the methodology moves on to investigate five overlapping aspects

1 acknowledging that there is radical disagreement 2 clearing up immediate misunderstanding 3 aligning arguments in order to promote engagement 4 uncovering the moments of radical disagreeing (eg recommendation justi-



The first three aspects are lsquoprerequisitesrsquo and have already been commented upon in the previous chapter The fourth and fifth aspects are the subject of this chapter and constitute the phenomenology of radical disagreement itself

Uncovering the moments of radical disagreeing is an investigation into what conflict parties say in the process of radical disagreement The arbiters are the individual conflict parties as the process of agonistic dialogue unfolds

This thereby introduces the phenomenological exploration of the resulting rad-ical disagreement itself It is now no longer up to conflict parties individually ndash or third parties ndash to pronounce It is the agonistic dialogue as it were that speaks for itself This yields the main phenomenological insights into the heart of linguistic intractability

Uncovering the moments of radical disagreeing

The methodology used in uncovering the moments of radical disagreeing is both simple and effective It is to ask conflict parties themselves to explain what they are saying in the process of agonistic dialogue This seems superficial and unpro-ductive from a critical perspective but is exactly the topic that most requires investigation It is the gateway into the territory that a phenomenological enquiry wants to explore

To illustrate this I will use my own investigations carried out over the past 20 years with hundreds of participants from all over the world These are simulations of radical disagreements which as a result lsquoslow downrsquo the lightning speed of raw political agonistic dialogue and enable what would otherwise move too quickly to be examined The scenarios vary but in this case I use a simulation of radical disagreement over whether atom bombs should have been dropped on Japan in August 1945 The fiction is that participators ndash usually 20 to 50 ndash are in the plane carrying the bomb Whether it is dropped will depend on the decision that they make Although this is indeed a fiction what happened historically from take-off to arrival over the city is recounted in detail interspersed with the evolving stages of the radical disagreement Above all the participants argue genuinely from their own convictions This generates remarkable tension and the results can be dramatic It certainly gives participants insight into the nature of radical disagreement

In what follows I give brief samples of the evolving radical disagreement together with comments based on what participants have said Each case is dif-ferent There is no claim that the nature and order of the specific lsquomoments of radical disagreeingrsquo given here always or even usually recur But I think that what follows is representative Readers can carry out similar experiments for themselves to test these results This is an empirical experiment that anyone can do The only requirements are that the participantsrsquo arguments must be their own that the simulation must be an accurate historical re-enactment up to the point of decision that those who participate must recommend mutually incom-patible actions that a point of decision must eventually be reached and that the participants must mind what the outcome is A full simulation is complex subtle and unpredictable Here I will keep the examples as simple as possible

Phenomenology 111

and the comments as brief as possible without forfeiting the main pointsIn this case the simulation was based on the flight of the three planes that left

Tinian island on the 2500 mile round trip to drop the second atom bomb on Japan on the early morning of 9 August 1945

THE MOMENT OF RECOMMENDATION

|lsquoDrop the bombrsquo

lsquoDo not drop the bombrsquo|

The flight crews assembled at 0200 on 9 August 1945 USAF Chaplain Charles Downey said prayers on the tarmac for the success of the flight

Under the moment of recommendation participants said what should be done Those who had not abstained agreed that their recommendations were incom-patible They agreed that if they had the power to do so they would act accordingly no matter what the other said ndash recommendation would lead directly to action The recommendations had the form of commands ndash lsquodo thisrsquo ndash and immediately elided into the language of ethical injunction ndash lsquothis should be donersquo From the outset agonistic dialogue is ethical through and through

THE MOMENT OF JUSTIFICATION

|lsquoDropping the bomb will end the war and save millions of livesrsquo

lsquoDropping the bomb will destroy hundreds of thousands of innocent livesrsquo|

The crew of Bockrsquos Car the plane carrying the bomb found that an auxiliary fuel pump was not working If there were no visibility over the target they would not have enough fuel to bring the bomb back They had been told only to drop it when they had visual sighting of the target

Under the moment of justification the conflict parties justified their recommen-dations In the course of agonistic dialogue many justifications are given In the world of real decision-making recommendations are justified to multiple audiences and for multiple purposes ndash to overcome external opposition reinforce self-belief mobilize internal support persuade third parties In the simulation participants were asked to give only one justification to begin with ndash the main thing that they would appeal to if asked why they urge such action

Participants agreed that in giving their main justification they were appealing directly to how things are in the world Their appeal was spontaneous They had not yet reached words like lsquofactrsquo lsquotruersquo lsquoknowrsquo lsquorealityrsquo and the lsquooughtrsquo of the moment of recommendation (lsquoyou should do this helliprsquo) was already instantane-ously fused with the lsquoisrsquo of justification (lsquohellip because helliprsquo) lsquoOughtrsquo and lsquoisrsquo were combined in a single act of pointing The conflict parties were in the unmediated presence of the purely ostensive lsquojust lookrsquo


THE MOMENT OF ALIGNMENT

|(lsquoDropping the bomb will end the war and save millions of livesrsquo)

lsquoThe war would have ended anywayrsquo|

|(lsquoDropping the bomb will destroy hundreds of thousands of innocent livesrsquo)

lsquoConventional fire-bombing killed many more peoplersquo|

At 0700 hours the three planes were scattered in a squall and failed to make their planned rendezvous When Leonard Cheshire in one of the observer planes saw the coast of Japan he said that he felt a pang of conscience because it reminded him of Cornwall in the UK

Under the moment of alignment the participants began to respond to each otherrsquos arguments Under the initial moment of justification the arguments missed each other Participants were appealing to different things Now they started the process of lsquoidentifying and filling in the blanksrsquo so that arguments would engage each other across the spectrum as indicated in Chapter 4 Here the methodology of informal reasoning analysis is useful but not essential since it is more important that participants apply their own understanding

The moment of alignment continually recurs in the development of agonistic dialogue to the point where participants discover that what is at issue includes the question of whether arguments have been met At this point the agonistic dialogue is carried to another level as developed further below This is where it moves beyond the territory usually marked out by the conventions of informal reasoning analysis as the distinction lsquosamedifferentrsquo is also found to be involved

THE MOMENT OF REFUTATION

|lsquoIt is not true that the war would have ended anyway without greater loss of life Japanese as well as American You refuse to face up to the facts at the timersquo

lsquoThe destruction caused by conventional bombing is irrelevant Two wrongs do not make a right Besides there were the radiation effectsrsquo|

At 0800 hours the weaponeer on Bockrsquos Car found that the light went on at the top of the warning lsquoblack boxrsquo There was an electrical fault The bomb had already been armed and the electronic controls were elaborate because the bomb had to be detonated in the air directly over the target at 2000 feet for maximum effect

Under the moment of refutation the simulation participants said that they thereby distinguished between what was refuted (what the other mistakenly said) and what could be seen to refute it (how things are what is so) What was refuted was seen as a whole and more besides It was seen against a background and it

Phenomenology 113

was the background that was decisive The background ndash what is so ndash was the same background appealed to under the moment of justification and the same background within which under the moment of recommendation the action was or was not to be carried out This according to most of the participants was what they were saying under the moment of refutation

And now the whole language of lsquofactrsquo lsquotruersquo lsquoknowrsquo and their opposites also sprang up ndash significantly late in the day ndash and was as immediately plunged into the vortex

THE MOMENT OF EXPLANATION

|lsquoYou are arguing emotionally This is a war Millions have died To refuse to act as responsibly as all the allied military and political leaders did at the time is to be more concerned with your own moral purity than with the effects of your actionsrsquo

lsquoYou are like those who were brutalised by war Your moral imagination is so weak that you are incapable of conceiving what it means to destroy a city If you realised what you were doing you would see that it is a monstrous war crimersquo|

Leonard Cheshire flying in an observer plane said that it seemed unfair to be flying out of range of Japanese air defences or fighters In Europe where he had been a bomber pilot and won the Victoria Cross for bravery the attrition rate was 20 per cent ndash you could expect to be shot down after five flights

Under the moment of explanation participants accounted for the fact that the other continued to argue the unarguable Depending on the nature of the otherrsquos error the other was thereby classified as uninformed morally blind logically confused ndash or any combination of these If the other was sincere then it was the sincerity described by Jonathan Swift as that state of perfected self-assurance that comes from being blissfully self-deceived The passage from ad rem to ad hom-inem judgement happened spontaneously in a single movement The other ndash as determined under the moment of refutation ndash already thereby stood within the realm of explanation

This was the moment when psychological political and socio-cultural explana-tion made its first phenomenological appearance Significantly its first and characteristic appearance is asymmetrical This is easily tested and has been as regularly confirmed In response to the question lsquowhy do you say thisrsquo participants invoked reasons under the moment of justification In response to the question lsquowhy does the other say thisrsquo participants invoked explanations The moment of explanation perpetually hovers over radical disagreement and threatens to bring the interchange to an end in mutual recrimination What is the point of continuing to dispute with someone who is already conditioned to be blind to evidence and impervious to reason We recognize the beginning of the slide that can eventually lead to mutual dehumanization


THE MOMENT OF DESCRIPTION

|lsquoI know that this is my perspective on things and you have yours but helliprsquo

lsquoI hear what you say and I acknowledge that if I was coming from where you are I might think differently but helliprsquo|

At 0900 hours the planes arrived at their target Bockrsquos Car made two passes over the city but visibility was not good enough for a direct sighting

Under the moment of description the conflict parties for various reasons included themselves in third-party description of the radical disagreement lsquoI know that this is my perspective on things and you have yours but helliprsquo This was the reflexive moment when participants stepped back and reflected on the radical disagreement as a whole

This is a key moment for conflict resolution specialists who as seen in Chapter 3 want to begin under the moment of description and to collapse the radical dis-agreement immediately into lsquoconstructive dialoguersquo without pausing at the other staging posts along the way Assertions about what is so and judgements about the other are to be immediately translated into descriptions of our own perceptions These can then be equated with the perceptions of the other and space is opened up for mutual recognition of the validity of the different narratives for all conflict parties

This is also the moment when social scientific explanation fully enters the scene In its first entry under the moment of explanation above critical explana-tion only applied to the other Now under the moment of description conceptual space has expanded so that explanation applies generally I think that this late appearance of social scientific explanation in the phenomenology of radical disag-reement is linked to the fact that what has gone before is not picked up on its radar screen

But in the drastic economy of the phenomenology of radical disagreement the moment of description does not play the role that either conflict resolution or social science has written for it Repeated experience indicates as in this case that in ongoing agonistic dialogue the moment of description has a very different ndash indeed almost an opposite ndash function lsquoI know that this is my perspective on things and you have yours but helliprsquo ndash and it is what follows the lsquobutrsquo that signifies here The symmetric and neutral language adopted by conflict parties under the moment of description is indeed indistinguishable from third-party description in general ndash such as the various forms of the lsquocommon descriptionrsquo given in the pro-logue But equally characteristic is the way this does not affect the nature of what follows lsquobutrsquo when radical disagreement is resumed

Empirical evidence suggests that the key function of the moment of description in continuing radical disagreement is to preserve asymmetry Only meta-level sym-metry of this kind is seen to guarantee the substantial asymmetry integral to the moments of justification and refutation It does this by incorporating into its reflex-ivity whatever expressions of contingency and irony may arise thus neutralizing

Phenomenology 115

them and opening the way for a resumption of untrammelled ostensivity The world the conflict parties refer to under the moment of description contains both their perspective and that of their opponent So disputants establish thereby that in the continuing radical disagreement they are not merely referring to their own references They are referring to the world that also contains their references ndash but only as a part of it With lsquobutrsquo they once again look out on the world through clear glass ndash and act accordingly

But this can be an uncertain and fluctuating process Here is an example where the speaker struggles to accommodate this function

Is the US closer to truth and human dignity than the Taliban or Saddam Hussein Hell yes Understanding and dialogue with the cultures of the Middle East does not require us to abdicate our moral arguments for democracy liberty and human rights or our critique of nations that oppose those values in word and deed I recognise the subjectivity of my own values I happily acknowledge that many other value-systems can be just as lsquotruersquo as my own (I put lsquotruersquo in quotes because Irsquom not really comfortable calling any value system lsquotruersquo or lsquofalsersquo) That said my subjective values tell me in no uncertain terms that the values of the United States flawed though they may be are bet-ter than the values of reactionary Islamic extremists Every public execution in Iran every mass grave unearthed in Iraq and every story of oppression in the Talibanrsquos Afghanistan reinforces these values I unapologetically believe that democracy is a better form of values than fascism

(Roth-Cline 2004)

THE MOMENT OF REVISION

|lsquoIt may be true that Russiarsquos declaration of war on Japan on 8 August 1945 could have hastened a Japanese surrender but helliprsquo

lsquoI accept that the figures for exactly how many died as a direct result of the dropping of the bomb on Nagasaki are contested but helliprsquo|

At 0900 hours the planes were not over Nagasaki The prime target of the 9 August 1945 attack was Kokura Nagasaki had only been added to the list of targets in July 1945 when Kyoto was removed It had already been attacked by conventional bombing which was not usually the case with target cities in order to preserve them to maximize effect And it was mountainous which would again restrict impact Only when there was no visibility over Kokura did the planes ndash the angels of death invisible to the citizens below going about their daily business at 0900 hours ndash fly on to the secondary target

Under the moment of revision participants adjusted their arguments under the impact of agonistic dialogue In many cases they produced arguments they had not thought about before

The moment of revision is the second moment that conflict resolution aims


for In conflict resolution the encouragement of a translation of aggressive statements about the world into reflexive descriptions of our own perceptions under the moment of description (looked at above) prepares the way for mutual accommodation and transformation under the moment of revision In many cases this does indeed happen But in the case of intractable conflicts and ongoing radical disagreement it does not In agonistic dialogue the moment of revision is found to play a different role and one that is akin to the moment of description

At one end of the spectrum as in this case is reluctant admission of minor quali-fication accompanied by vigorous reassertion of the original case Confidence emotional intensity and intransigence may wax and wane while core positions remain unchanged Here the function of the moment of revision was when under pressure to readjust the periphery of the lsquoweb of beliefrsquo that surrounds these posi-tions Discredited arguments were dropped and others were taken up The purpose was not to reconsider and change the core but to protect and sustain it

At the other end of the spectrum ndash as it were leapfrogging the part of the spec-trum that conflict resolution wants to occupy ndash lies radical conversion On the road to Damascus scales fall from our eyes We see with blazing clarity that the other is right after all And now we argue in reverse but with intensified zeal The blindness of our erstwhile companions is all the more plain to us because we too used to be like that

THE MOMENT OF EXPLORATION

|lsquoDeontologyrsquos refusal to recognise negative responsibility amounts to an abdication of ethical responsibilityrsquo

lsquoConsequentialismrsquos failure to safeguard moral absolutes opens the floodgates to every kind of barbarismrsquo|

The three planes arrived over Nagasaki at 1100 hours There was only enough fuel for one run over the target Visibility was still bad

Under the moment of exploration conflict parties searched for the deep con-ceptual roots of the radical disagreement In this case participants were familiar with the distinction between consequentialist and deontological ethical approaches because of earlier discussion The first speakers recognized that their position was consequentialist ndash the reason to drop the bomb was because the alternative would lead to many more Japanese and American deaths The second speakers recognized that their position was deontological ndash the bomb must not be dropped because the deliberate killing of tens of thousands of innocent people is morally prohibited

But under the moment of exploration in ongoing radical disagreement uncov-ering the ethical and theoretical roots of the verbal contestation is not the end of the road but only the beginning What lies in turn behind the consequentialist and deontological positions ndash if anything What is happening in this confrontation

Phenomenology 117

This is the gateway through which the investigation can move on into the pheno-menological territory that the enquiry most wants to reach and that lies beyond This is the topic of the next section

THE MOMENT OF ACTION

But always lowering over agonistic dialogue there is the moment of action What is to be done to change the intolerable existing situation that conflict parties strive to eliminate Or to preserve the justly achieved outcome that is defended to the death Or to determine the as yet undecided result that combatants struggle to achieve or to prevent

It is 1101 on 9 August 1945 and the planes are over Nagasaki The moment of decision has arrived

Under the moment of action the time for deliberation is over There is no room for third-party avoidance One way or another either through action or through inaction the decision is made Under the eitherndashor pressure of decision in intense political conflict indeterminate alternatives collapse into the crude yes-no of radical disagreement Under the moment of action ndash often to our horror ndash the full enormity of what the other says is shown in what the other does And we too dis-cover what we think by what we find that we do or have done

Should the bomb be dropped or not In the simulation described here at this point attention was unexpectedly switched to those who had abstained and had so far not fully participated They would decide In the real world if those who could do something to change things do not then what would have happened happens anyway In this case if the lsquodonrsquot knowsrsquo did not intervene the bomb would be dropped The countdown began lsquoten nine eight seven helliprsquo The tension became unbearable On the count of lsquofourrsquo two of the abstainers stopped the action In the most intense and intractable political conflict there is no room for abstention In the ferocious intensity of the moment of action the abstainers discovered what they really thought

But that is not what happened historically on 9 August 1945In my book Choices (Ramsbotham 1987) interviewees were all asked whether

it had been right to drop the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki The polarization of the nuclear deterrence debate at the time was such that in nearly every case those who argued for continued deterrence said that the bombs should have been dropped while those who argued against deterrence said that they should not

Here is a radical disagreement between Leonard Cheshire the witness of the events of 9 August 1945 who continually supported both nuclear deterrence and the dropping of the bombs (Cheshire 1985) and John Finnis author of what is in my view the best book making the moral case against nuclear deterrence (Finnis et al1987)

|lsquoI hold that it was not wrong to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki And the reason why I say this is that the only foreseeable alternative was the all-out invasion of Japan Given the Japanese military mind at the time that would


have involved a fight to the last man total war across the whole of Japan in which not hundreds of thousands but millions would have diedrsquo (Leonard Cheshire)

lsquoAs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki the dropping of the two atomic bombs on those two cities was indeed morally wrong In fact as one can plainly see from the records of those who made the decision neither the motive nor the intention was to attack military targets The intention was simply to cause maximum damage in largely civilian areas ndash which it did Even if Leonard Cheshire is right and this was the only way in which the war could have been ended short of a much more costly invasion of Japan it was clearly morally wrong and should certainly not have been donersquo (John Finnis)|

(Ramsbotham 1987 197 232)

Exploration of the moments of radical disagreeing sharply illuminates the enormity of what this radical disagreement shows The defining link is between argument and action Power dictates what happens In this case historically it was Leonard Cheshire who had been able to participate in bringing about the outcome he wanted

At 1101 on 9 August 1945 bombardier Beahan shouted lsquoI rsquove got it I see the city Irsquoll take it nowrsquo He released the bomb

All the historical consequences immediately began to unfold William Laurence of the New York Times flying as an official observer described the event (1946) He later won the Pulitzer Prize

We watched a giant pillar of purple fire 10000 feet high shoot up like a meteor coming from the earth instead of outer space It was no longer smoke or dust or even a cloud of fire It was a living thing a new species of being born before our incredulous eyes Even as we watched a ground mushroom came shooting out of the top to 45000 feet a mushroom top that was even more alive than the pillar seething and boiling in a white fury of creamy foam a thousand geysers rolled into one It kept struggling in elemental fury like a creature in the act of breaking the bonds that held it down When we last saw it it had changed into a flower-like form its giant petals curving downwards creamy-white outside rose-coloured inside The boiling pillar had become a giant mountain of jumbled rainbows Much living substance had gone into those rainbows

At noon on 15 August 1945 the Japanese Emperor broadcast to a Japanese nation who had never heard his voice before

The enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable taking the toll of many innocent lives Should We continue to fight it would result not only in the ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation but also it would lead to the

Phenomenology 119

total extinction of human civilisation Such being the case how are We to save the millions of our subjects or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors This is why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers

The rest was history Power was allied to recommendation The action was doneBut that was not the end of agonistic dialogue Radical disagreement continues

to this day about what was done and what should have been done on 9 August 1945 It still passionately informs current decision-making Radical disagreement engulfs the lsquolessons of historyrsquo sweeps up distinctions between past present and future and obliterates the efforts of those who want to close the chapter once and for all

Exploring the resulting radical disagreeement

What is the radical disagreement about How far does it reach How deep does it go With these questions the heart of the radical disagreement is opened up and with it the nature of the linguistic intractability that lies at the communicative centre of the conflict It is no longer up to conflict parties individually or third-party analysts to answer these questions because the radical disagreement is polylogi-cal That is also why this section of the book is the hardest to write In the end as a monological account it can only point at examples of radical disagreement and hope that readers will see for themselves what these examples say

What is the radical disagreement about

This question proves much harder to answer than might be supposed because any answer given is found to be already part of what is at issue What is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict about What is its object

lsquoIn the Israeli-Palestinian conflict two nations claim the same territoryrsquo

This is a third-party description and is fine as far as it goes But what are lsquothe two nationsrsquo What is lsquothe same territoryrsquo The description is innocuous It misses the fact that in the radical disagreement it is lsquotwo nationsrsquo and lsquothe same territoryrsquo that is from the outset part of what is contested

Which are the two nations And already we are in the middle of the conflict The name of Israel was introduced on 14 May 1948 when David Ben-Gurion per-formatively announced the creation of the new state The naming of Palestinians and Palestine as their future state was accomplished through the birth of the PLO The identity of lsquotwo nationsrsquo has from the beginning been at the epicentre of what was fought over Who are the people who in 1948 set up their state What should they be called Are they lsquothe Jews of Palestinersquo Are they lsquothe Zionist colonisersrsquo Who are the non-Jewish inhabitants of Israel today ndash 20 per cent of the current population What should they be called Are they lsquoArab Israelisrsquo Are they the


lsquoindigenous Palestiniansrsquo Who is to name them The very naming of more than a million people is integral to the struggle

Something similar applies to lsquothe same territoryrsquo Readers are invited to reread the example of radical disagreement about Jerusalem on page 3 What was this rad-ical disagreement about Was it about Yerushalayim Was it about Al-Quds And let us not make the mistake ndash the almost irresistible mistake for third parties ndash of thinking that somehow the city itself with its streets and houses and sounds and smells and inhabitants is somehow distinct from subjective beliefs or narratives or perspectives or truths projected onto it by the conflict parties As if it were the latter that constitutes the radical disagreement whereas it is almost precisely the opposite that is the case The war of weapons is a battle to conquer the city The war of words is not a juxtaposition of subjectivities It is a battle to name the city for what it is

Or consider the radical disagreement between Jinnah and Nehru discussed earl-ier in Chapter 3

|lsquoThere are two nations on this sub-continent This is the underlying fact that must shape the future creation of Pakistan Only the truly Islamic platform of the Muslim League is acceptable to the Muslim nationrsquo

lsquoGeography and mountains and the sea fashioned India as she is and no human agency can change that shape or come in the way of her final destiny Once present passions subside the false doctrine of two nations will be discredited and discarded by allrsquo|

Is this radical disagreement about lsquotwo nationsrsquo Once again the very concept lsquotwo nationsrsquo is already equivocated and torn apart in the conflict Jinnah refers to lsquotwo nationsrsquo and the identification is made not as a subjective connotation that might be separated from a bare concept but as part of what is concretely denoted The identification is instantaneous It is a pointing The Muslim nation is named by Jinnah and there is a rapturous response ndash lsquoPakistanrsquo The father of the nation had spoken

lsquoTwo nationsrsquo ndash Nehru in magisterial style thereby gestures with anger at a pernicious false doctrine He does not refer to a bare concept but to a terrible and threatening delusion He foresees the catastrophic ripping apart of the ancient unity of India to feed ephemeral political ambitions

Already in lsquotwo nationsrsquo the whole of the disagreement is contained It is as always tempting to revert to harmless third-party description and say lsquofor Jinnahrsquo two nations was a fact whereas lsquofor Nehrursquo two nations was a false doctrine But this trivializes the struggle as if the radical disagreement were once again a mere coexistence of subjectivities rather than a life-and-death struggle for the one object Benedict Anderson famously describes nations as lsquoimagined communitiesrsquo (1991) This is an informative third-party description But how does it relate to the conflict Was the contest between Jinnah and Nehru a conflict of imagined commu-nities Neither of them is saying anything like that On the contrary it was a fight

Phenomenology 121

to the death to determine and dismiss what was a mere imagined community ndash and to act accordingly Prior even to any attempt to frame the conflict the primordial struggle is to name the object Whoever successfully names the object wins The radical disagreement is about what it is about And that is what gives insight into the nature of linguistic intractability

This turns out to be the case across the board Third-party description in gen-eral is true but banal when applied to radical disagreement It breaks down For example

lsquoOne manrsquos terrorist is another manrsquos freedom fighterrsquo

employs two possessives to present a juxtaposition of subjectivities So what is the radical disagreement about The object drops out of the description But it is the object that is fought over

Compare the innocuousness of the third-party description with the terrifying battle to name the object ndash in this case the terrorist ndash in the radical disagreement

|lsquoIsraelrsquos armed forces will root out and destroy the Hezbollah terrorists who deliberately target our civilians The IDF [Israel Defence Forces] as always will do all it can to minimise civilian casualties in Lebanon although this is not easy when the terrorists go out of their way to hide among the wider population with the specific purpose of endangering them They act entirely indiscriminately and have no concern for human life We do not act indis-criminately but in a measured and proportionate manner We did not seek this war But we will win itrsquo

lsquoThe criminal Israeli army once again shows its contempt for the Lebanese civilians They employ the modern weapons supplied to them by the United States and its terrorist lackeys without pity or any concern for the people whose lives and livelihoods they destroy They deliberately target civilian infrastruc-ture and always kill and wound many times more civilians than any Israelis harmed They are war criminals The resistance forces of the Party of God will drive them from our land with their tails between their legs God is greatrsquo|

(Lebanon 2006 composite but verbatim quotations)

What was the lsquofamily quarrelrsquo referred to in the prologue about Was it about whether God is the creator of the world or a human creation Let us not think that we can easily dispel this by some ingenious theory of descriptions or equi-valent third-party analysis In my experience conflict parties who persist in the phenomenological exploration usually conclude that their radical disagreement is about |God| where |God| is what is common between lsquoGodrsquo in lsquoGod created the worldrsquo and lsquoGodrsquo in lsquoGod is a human creationrsquo What is |God| And that is where the greatest phenomenological discoveries are made

A radical disagreement is a primordial struggle to name the object A radical disagreement is about what it is about


How far does the radical disagreement reach

In radical disagreements under repeated applications of the moment of alignment conflict parties continually reach out for the decisive argument In this way more and more of what had been background is brought into the foreground ndash and is found to be already involved A radical disagreement about the upbringing of children becomes a radical disagreement about God A radical disagreement about dropping the bomb becomes a radical disagreement about the foundations of eth-ics A radical disagreement about wages becomes a radical disagreement about capitalism A radical disagreement about a piece of territory becomes a radical disagreement about history and religion It is as if when someone has fallen through the ice ladders are brought to rescue the person struggling in the water ndash and the ladders fall in too

But what is the background It is often said that in our social and intellectual relationships we cannot get outside our own culture or language or lsquolifeworldrsquo

Communicative actors are always moving within the horizon of their life-world they cannot step outside of it

(Habermas 1981 Vol II 126)

We are told that there is no external lsquoskyhookrsquo or lsquoview from nowherersquo or escape from our habitus (Rorty Nagel Bourdieu) though some are still prepared to use the language of lsquobeyond the limits of thoughtrsquo (Priest 2002)

But this is not what concerns the phenomenology of radical disagreement (unless this is itself the issue as for example in a radical disagreement about lsquowhat cannot be saidrsquo Wittgenstein 1961 654 Priest 2002 191) The exploration of agonistic dialogue does not take up an extramundane position nor can it because it is not a philosophy Yet the phenomenological exploration that constitutes agonistic dia-logue stretches as it were from the lsquoinsidersquo as far as the appeals of those involved in it reach In this sense there is no limit And whatever is referred to in this way is found to be already involved Radical disagreement is the prior involvement of background

Consider the radical disagreement between Thatcherite discourse and Marxist discourse introduced in Chapter 4

Margaret Thatcherrsquos interview is given on pages 99ndash100 She was famously forthright in her rejection of Marxism as a failed ideology It was lsquoideologi-cally politically and morally bankruptrsquo(Conservative Party Conference 1980) Conversely she vigorously rejected any idea that there was such a thing as a Thatcherite ideology She was not being lsquopopulistrsquo She simply called a spade a spade And the British people responded to her blunt language because they shared her values Her appeal to the background was straightforward and complete ndash it was to how things are the whole of discursive space This was integral to her con-viction and emotional determination

But in the radical disagreement Norman Fairclough drawing on the panoply of Marxist critical weaponry of which he is an acknowledged master finds no

Phenomenology 123

difficulty in exposing the Thatcher interview as a transparently thin linguistic lsquoveilrsquo behind which continued political domination is being normalized It is indeed an ideology and the task of critical language study is to uncover it so that those who were previously unaware of it lsquobecome conscious of the opaque causes and consequences of their own discoursersquo Conversely the background to which Fairclough appeals is not an ideology It is discoursesociety relations in general that he points to in accounting for the emergence function and effectiveness of Thatcherite discourse in the first place

In our capitalist society the dominant bloc exercises economic and political domination over the working class and other intermediate strata of the popu-lation hellip Consequently the relationship of power-holders in public life to the mass of the population is a controlling and authoritative one In politics as in other domains those who aspire to power ndash the parties which seek govern-mental power ndash have sought to ameliorate to varying degrees the condition of the working class but not to challenge class domination The authority element in political leadership as in leadership in other domains is thus determined by class relations Why then have political leaders affected solidarity with lsquothe peoplersquo hellip This form of lsquosolidarityrsquo functions as a strategy of containment it represents a concession to the strength of the working class and its allies on the one hand but constitutes a veil of equality beneath which the real inequal-ities of capitalist society can carry on on the other hellip This is the relationship which I shall suggest exists right across Thatcherite discourse


And now it can be seen why my own introductory third-party description of this radical disagreement as one lsquobetween Thatcherite discourse and Marxist discoursersquo breaks down The whole language of conflicting lsquoideologiesrsquo or lsquopsychological projectionsrsquo or lsquosocial constructionsrsquo or lsquodiscourse worldsrsquo is inappropriate because these are plural terms As such they already contain ideas of coexistence and equivalence that in their radical disagreement the embattled parties deny This is not a coexistence of rival discourses but a fight to the death to impose the one discourse

Religious leaders often do not want to acknowledge this The Archbishop of Canterbury for example seeks to prevent conflict with other faiths ndash and scandal in his own church ndash by denying that there is radical disagreement

Faced with the disbeliefs of another discourse each of the three participants in the Abrahamic conversation [Judaism Christianity Islam] should be prompted to ask whether the God of the otherrsquos disbelief is or is not the God they themselves believe in If the answer were a simple yes dialogue might be a great deal more difficult than it is the reality of dialogue suggests that we do not in fact have to do with a simple lsquoatheismrsquo in respect of the otherrsquos models of God

(Williams 2004)


This is somewhat like John Lockersquos idea that disagreement is usually verbal mis-understanding The Archbishop may be right in many cases But what when the Abrahamic conversation does take the form of radical disagreement Unfortunately it is not up to any single party to determine what lsquothe reality of dialoguersquo is in these cases Here Taha Jabir alrsquoAlwani in his influential The Ethics of Disagreement in Islam having argued that there can be no radical disagreement within Islam ndash lsquodog-matism discord and violent disagreement (ikhtilaaf) within the Muslim Ummah has no place in the authentic teachings of Islamrsquo ndash makes it plain that this does not extend to radical disagreement between Islam and non-Islamic beliefs

No one should jump to the conclusion however that our keenness to pre-serve the brotherhood and solidarity of Muslims implies any negligence of the fundamental Islamic beliefs which are not open to any speculation or com-promise The determination to confront the enemies of the Ummah will prevent us from joining hands with those who do not have any affinity with Islam

(1997 17)

So what when there is ndash as there undoubtedly is ndash serious doctrinal dispute bet-ween some Christians and some Muslims Can this be adequately described as a clash of belief systems I do not think so Consider what such Christian believers say when they recite the creed and what such Muslim believers say when they recite the Qurrsquoan

Those who recite the Nicene Creed are not thereby referring to a mere subjective belief in the divinity of Christ ndash still less to a mistaken belief as their opponents assert lsquoCredo I believe helliprsquo ndash and with these great words the whole awe and maj-esty of the divine creation is invoked and Godrsquos salvific grace in sending His only Son as our unique advocate and atoner for our sins Through faith comes salvation This is a solemn act of affirmation at the very core of Christian faith an outpour-ing of gratitude and joy and love to the Second Person of the Triune Deity ndash our Saviour Jesus Christ

lsquoO believersrsquo ndash and there is no question in the repeated Qurrsquoanic address to the faithful that this has anything to do with a possibly fallible (or as their opponents claim an actually deluded) human conviction The believers are the Muslims who hear the Prophetrsquos recital of the very words of the Almighty and obey His injunctions The unbelievers are those who do not hear and do not obey God is all-merciful and summons all humanity to His service But the Qurrsquoan is also a warning Divine judgement is certain unavoidable and very real both for believ-ers and ndash to their great cost ndash for unbelievers The unbelievers will learn that their fate is not a subjectivity On the contrary After the briefest of lives that will seem to them like a dream they will wake to the shock of the eternal present and the never-ending reality of their punishment lsquoWhy did we not listenrsquo But now it is forever too late

The very idea that this is merely a clash of belief systems with its in-built assumption of coexistence and ontological equivalence is anathema to the con-flict parties How far do radical disagreements reach They reach to the distant

Phenomenology 125

horizon ndash as far as the eye can see Radical disagreement is the prior involvement of background invoked It is not a gravitational war between worlds within a neutral third space It is a war for and within the one world in which space itself is warped and familiar landmarks slide A radical disagreement is a singularity in the universe of discourse

How deep does the radical disagreement go

In The Theory of Communicative Action Juumlrgen Habermas distinguishes different ways of redeeming validity claims in order to settle disagreements and arrive at agreements This is structured through the world-relations that communicative actors establish with their utterances or speech acts According to Habermas speak-ers raise claims that their utterances fit the world in three main ways ndash objectively socially and subjectively In addition there is the question of the lsquowell-formedness of the symbolic expressions employedrsquo These three world concepts (the one objective world the shared social world and the individual subjective worlds) lsquoconstitute a reference system for that about which mutual understanding is poss-iblersquo The associated validity claims are that the given statement is true of the objective world that the speech act is normatively right in the context of the social world and that the speaker is sincere in references to the subjective world to which the speaker has privileged access (Habermas 19811991 Vol I 99ndash100)

What happens to these distinctions in the fiercely contested field of radical disagreement In Chapter 6 I will say a bit more about Habermasrsquo own account of radical disagreement Here I will just use the idea of factual truth normative rightness subjective sincerity and add logical consistency (roughly corresponding to lsquowell-formedness of symbolic expressionsrsquo) and see what happens to them in the fiery furnace of radical disagreement

It can be seen that these distinctions mirror those that were found to be invoked in phenomenological investigation into the moments of radical disagreeing looked at above This is not surprising since distinctions of this kind emerge naturally from the validity claims made by conflict parties (communicative actors) in the course of agonistic dialogue ndash at the extreme boundary of the sphere of language oriented to reaching understanding analysed by Habermas So I will look at what happens to the invoked distinctions between lsquofactrsquo and lsquovaluersquo lsquorealityrsquo and lsquoperspectiversquo lsquoformrsquo and lsquocontentrsquo lsquosubjectrsquo and lsquoobjectrsquo

The distinction between fact and value

The distinction between fact (reference to the one objective world) and value (ref-erence to norms in the shared social world) is regularly invoked But the moments of radical disagreeing have shown that in the intense heat of radical disagreement they are fused together from the beginning Under the moment of recommenda-tion value appears from the outset in the elision of the imperative (do this hellip) into the ethical (this should be done hellip) and this is in turn instantaneously welded into the factual under the moment of justification (hellip because this is how things


are) This already-achieved complex exists prior to any explicit challenge and is carried as an amalgam into the ensuing radical disagreement It is what is pointed at So it is that when the challenge comes ndash and is reciprocally rejected ndash it is the factvalue complex as a whole that is found to be already involved To challenge (or defend) a fact is to challenge (or defend) what does notdoes have that value To challenge (or defend) a value is to challenge (or defend) what does notdoes have that legitimacy Contradictory appeals to the lsquosamersquo principle ndash for example the principle of justice ndash are found to involve the distinction between the principle itself (the very concept) and what doesdoes not come under it

This is not just a grammatical point about how assertoric form and illocution-ary force can be substituted for each other It is linked to the central way in which emotion appears in the phenomenology of radical disagreement Emotion is often interpreted purely subjectively or psychologically as for example an expressive penumbra that accompanies conflict and needs to be dispersed before conflict parties can get down to managing the substance of the contradiction that lies at its core But the phenomenology of radical disagreement shows again and again that emotion is not separate from the factvalue fusion It is the fact of the outrage that immediately elicits indignation and the steely will never to rest until the wrong is righted The indignation felt by Palestinians is not separable from the fact of what happened in the Naqba and the fundamental norms of natural justice that were thereby violated and must now be restored This fused complex is what may lie dormant can be handed on down the generations and at any moment can suddenly erupt with violent force Emotion moves much quicker than reason Emotion is woven through the factvalue complex at the core of radical disagreement It is not a separable add-on that can be stripped away and treated psychologically That is why in the praxis of radical disagreement (as considered in Chapter 7) tackling the fact of what is at issue and its normative importance is not distinct from handling the emotion that is already built in

The distinction between reality and perspective

The distinction between reality and perspective is central in radical disagreement It is invoked under the moment of refutation when what the other says is relegated from its spurious claim to refer to the external world (objectivesocial) and is thereby assigned to the subjective world of the otherrsquos lsquomerersquo or lsquomistakenrsquo beliefs (the other may of course also make a validity claim about herhis subjective world) But in the radical disagreement the other answers back And now a battle royal is generated as what was referred to as the world in which the otherrsquos refer-ence was a lsquomerersquo or lsquomistakenrsquo subjective belief is in turn itself denied validity and attributed to the original speakerrsquos lsquomerersquo subjective world together with the subjective desires and subjective emotions that mainly define it as such What is happening now to the framework of world concepts invoked This will be explored in Chapter 6 in relation to Habermasrsquo putative model of radical disagreement so I will not pursue this line of enquiry further here

Instead two key points can be made

Phenomenology 127

First readers may recognize how light is now cast on the conflict resolution tradition that distinguishes the contradiction that lies at the heart of the conflict in question from the behaviour that together with the contradiction makes up the instrumental aspect of the conflict and the attitude that supplies the expressive aspect The phenomenon of radical disagreement interpreted as a conflict of sub-jective perspectives or beliefs is here assigned in toto to the category attitude and is thereby assimilated to emotions and desires That is why the phenomenon of radical disagreement ndash which is constituted precisely by the struggle to determine what is mere attitude and to contrast this with what is the case independent of any attitude ndash is not recognized in the mainstream conflict resolution tradition

Second returning to the topic of the distinction between reality and perspect-ive itself it can also be seen how in the radical disagreement it is the very world concepts themselves invoked in the process of radical disagreeing ndash the one object-ive world the intersubjectively shared social world the subjective worlds of the communicative actors ndash that are thereby found to be already materially contested The lsquoreference system for that about which mutual understanding is possiblersquo is itself involved

That is why in a context of radical disagreement I do not write lsquorealityrsquo or real-ity or realities or Reality (or lsquotruthrsquo truth truths Truth) or use any other lsquoscarersquo marks but I am quite happy to refer to reality and truth No notational twisting and turning will insulate itself from embroilment in whatever distinctions are invoked in the phenomenon being investigated ndash and are thereby found to be part of what is at issue Radical disagreement is the prior involvement of such distinctions The battle to determine what does and does not come under the categories lsquoexternal worldrsquo and (mere) lsquosubjective worldrsquo is found already to involve a battle to deter-mine what those worlds are

The distinction between form and content

Here conflict parties in radical disagreements accuse each other of logical errors They invoke the central distinction between validity and truth in order to focus on the former Whatever the truth of the propositions that make up an argument may be the accusation is that it is the inference itself that is faulty

Consider the (undeveloped) radical disagreement between Caspar Weinberger and Alec Fisher introduced in Chapter 4 Weinberger with the full resources of the US Department of Defense was making the strongest case possible in justification of US nuclear deterrent strategy in order to rally wavering allies during a critical phase of the cold war Fisher deploying the full resources of informal reasoning analysis exposed a simple logical fallacy at the core of Weinbergerrsquos argument

|lsquoI am increasingly concerned with news accounts that portray this Admin-istration as seeking to acquire a nuclear lsquowar-fightingrsquo capability This is completely inaccurate If the Soviets know in advance that a nuclear attack on the United States could and would bring swift nuclear retaliation they would never attack in the first place That is exactly why we must have a capability


for a survivable and endurable responsersquo


What is happening In order to test this we would need to know how Weinberger would respond Although for obvious reasons we do not have Weinbergerrsquos response he was an interviewee in my book Choices and I have a good idea of his thinking on this topic Here is an extract from that book

The policy of the Western nations is to jointly preserve their freedoms and cultural values while preventing aggression and war ndash all war The security provided by a strong defense provides the environment in which education business religion and freedom can flourish hellip It would be a cruel lsquoeconomyrsquo to jeopardise our national values by weakening our deterrence of the Soviet Union In that our policy seeks to prevent war and to ensure the continued existence of the Western political tradition which fosters and protects indi-viduals and human rights democratic government and religious freedom and toleration it is clearly and manifestly a most moral policy

(Ramsbotham 1987 449)

Weinbergerrsquos central argument is that the aim of US nuclear deterrent policy is not lsquowar-fightingrsquo On the contrary it lsquoseeks to prevent warrsquo This can only be done by convincing Soviet leaders that they will never win a war conventional or nuclear because of the manifest lsquocapability for a survivable and endurable responsersquo of the US Without an evidently inviolable second-strike force the Soviet Union would not be deterred and war would not be prevented

Fisher sees a lsquocapability for a survivable and endurable responsersquo as entailing the acquisition of a lsquowar-fighting capabilityrsquo because it cannot be a bluff US nuclear forces prepare in all earnestness for nuclear war-fighting in case deterrence fails

The key point illustrated in this example is that in radical disagreement form is not separate from content The logical fallacy that Fisher detects in Weinbergerrsquos argument (form) is found to be already enmeshed in radical disagreement about what Weinberger has said (content) That is to say the question of the validity of an argument is found not to be separate from the question of the nature and truth of the propositions that make it up when arguments clash A basic distinction from informal reasoning analysis breaks down when applied in the drastically constrained space of agonistic dialogue Nor can this be lsquocleared uprsquo by further logical analysis of the kind appealed to by Fisher that is the sets of distinctions that constitute the theoretical framework for informal reasoning analysis Fisher has already invoked this in his original analysis of Weinbergerrsquos argument See Figure 41

Phenomenological investigation repeatedly shows that however many such

Phenomenology 129

appeals are made in ongoing radical disagreement it is the framework for logical analysis appealed to that is involved too It is not just a question of application when the dispute is repeatedly found to involve the very distinction between what is applied and what it applies to

This introduces an even more basic point At the heart of radical disagreement itself in written notation is a contradiction a logical scandal

p not-p

But in the normal lsquothird-partyrsquo convention this is written

lsquoprsquo lsquonot-prsquo

And now the notation of inverted commas ndash the usual notation for conversation in general ndash reduces the scandal to a banality Form (that this is what people say ndash indicated by two sets of inverted commas) predominates entirely over content (what they say ndash what is contained within the two sets of inverted commas) This is the notation used generally in third-party description of radical disagreement which is why it is so innocuous

But the notation for radical disagreement used in this book ndash the bar line nota-tion ndash is used precisely to mark the fact that in radical disagreement form does not predominate over content On the contrary what shows an exchange to be a radical disagreement rather than any other kind of verbal interchange is the content

|lsquoprsquo lsquonot-prsquo|

It is what is contained within the two sets of inverted commas that makes the dif-ference and defines this as radical disagreement And now it is the fact that form cannot entirely contain content ndash that content as it were breaks out of the third-party descriptive straitjacket of form ndash that defines this as radical disagreement and constitutes its linguistic intractability

At this point it is helpful to refer back to the four illustrations given in the Prologue (Figures P1ndashP4)

P1 contains the radical disagreement recorded between the bar lines But here the root of the inadequate third-party description is already firmly planted The content of what is said is imprisoned in the form of the inverted comma notation and the coexistence of the bodies of the two speakers on the seat in the illustration reinforces this in the visual field through suggesting that what is said is formally subordinated to the fact that it is said This leads straight ndash and almost impercept-ibly ndash to the third-party description indicated in P2 The radical disagreement has already been attributed as a juxtaposition of equivalents to the two subject-ive worlds of the conflictants From this flows the world of social-scientific and other monological third-party explanations The demand for prior explanation short-circuits investigation and the whole phenomenon of radical disagreement is already explained away This is yet further reinforced by what the conflict


parties themselves say under the moment of description ndash and the circle seems to be complete

In contrast P3 and P4 indicate what happens if the study of the phenomenon of radical disagreement (the phenomenology of radical disagreement) gets as far as uncovering the moments of radical disagreeing It immediately becomes plain that plausible ndash even inevitable ndash though it may at first appear the third-party account assumed in P2 is explicitly rejected by both conflict parties That is what makes it a radical disagreement And that is what lies at the heart of the linguistic intractability

But there is a notable absentee from this set of pictures Where is the picture that depicts the resulting radical disagreement itself Where is the fifth picture As Chapter 6 will underline my own answer to this question having spent a long time trying to find such a picture is that it does not exist There is no adequate third-party monological depiction And now in the light of the phenomenological exploration it can be seen why this has already been said ndash in the original example of radical disagreement recorded in written notation between the bar lines in P1 ndash if it is taken seriously in the first place

A further point to be noted is that in radical disagreement the distinction bet-ween logical constants (not-) and propositional variables (p) is also compromised What defines the radical disagreement as such is not the appearance of lsquonot-rsquo on one side or the other (this can always be reversed) but the fact that there is mutual contradiction between the statements and the reappearance of p within both sets of inverted commas For there to be radical disagreement it has to be the same proposition that is here affirmed and there denied That is why the involvement of the distinction between form and content plays such a critical role Again and again under the moment of alignment conflict parties find that the question whether they are each arguing about the same thing becomes what is at issue

|lsquoYou have misunderstood mersquo

lsquoI have understood you perfectly ndash you are wrongrsquo|

And now the distinction lsquosamedifferentrsquo is also found to be involvedAs a concluding note in this regard perhaps it is apt that in mathematics the

modulus sign |4| marks out what lsquo+4rsquo has in common with lsquondash4rsquo

The distinction between subject and object

Finally and from a somewhat different angle what about the appearance of reflexive terms (I you here now) in radical disagreement Nothing could seem more distinct in Habermasrsquo world-relations than on the one hand terms explicitly referring to the private worlds of communicative actors and on the other terms explicitly referring to the external world (the one objective world and the shared social-normative world) But this distinction too turns out to be already involved ndash to break down ndash in the crucible of linguistic intractability

Phenomenology 131

How does the fact that this is my opinion (Oliver Ramsbothamrsquos opinion) for example appear phenomenologically in a radical disagreement in which I am a conflict party

In this case I do not think that it is the appearance of reflexive terms in general that shows this because reflexive terms can appear not only in what I say but also in what my opponent says

|lsquoI am right you are wrongrsquo lsquoI am right you are wrongrsquo|

Which is whichSo could my appearance in the trammels of radical disagreement be conveyed

phenomenologically by a feat of imaginative empathy In one of Sartrersquos books (I cannot remember which) for example there is an account of someone who looks through a keyhole in a hotel corridor at what is going on in one of the rooms This is just as it should be He is able to describe and make judgements about the world spread out before him But all at once there is a sound behind him He springs back from the keyhole and looks down the corridor Thank heavens No one has seen him He can relax again and is just about to return to his point of vision when he suddenly notices a door on the opposite side of the corridor ndash and is seized by an unaccountable dread What has he instinctively apprehended Why does he feel a shiver of self-conscious horror run down his spine And then he sees a keyhole in this door And through the keyhole ndash an eye

This is a brilliant evocation of the experience of someone caught in a war of visual fields Only a writer with Sartrersquos novelistrsquos skill could portray the sense of uncanniness But this still does not nail down what makes this my opinion rather than my opponentrsquos

So what does mark this out as my opinionI can only reach one conclusion Within the nexus of a radical disagreement in

which I am a conflict party what makes this my opinion is ndash precisely and only ndash the fact that it is a true opinion A true opinion is my opinion And that is what is carried as a single complex into the radical disagreement ndash to be torn apart

The wheel has come full circle What looked like the most divergent of all distinctions invoked ndash not only the distinction between the private worlds of com-municative actors in general and the external world but my private world ndash turns out under the severe attrition of radical disagreement to transmute instantaneously into its opposite And that is what constitutes linguistic intractability in this regard I will return to the reflexive theme in the epilogue

Conclusion

In the phenomenology of radical disagreement the uncovering of the moments of radical disagreeing opens the way for an exploration by conflict parties of the resulting agonistic dialogue This offers insights into the nature of linguistic intract-ability that are not available elsewhere Radical disagreements are about what they are about ndash a life-and-death struggle to name the topic Radical disagreements are


the prior involvement of background appealed to ndash a fight to pin the label lsquomere backgroundrsquo on what the other says They reach as far as the eye can see Radical disagreements are the involvement of distinctions invoked ndash the distinction bet-ween fact and value the distinction between reality and perspective the distinction between form and content the distinction between subject and object

In short the phenomenology of radical disagreement shows that conflict parties are not nearer but much further apart than was supposed Radical disagreements are not all-too familiar but on the contrary perhaps the least familiar features of intense political conflict

How does this contribute to the project of systemic transformation in intract-able conflicts at the point where attempts at settlement or resolution have (so far) failed That is the topic for the rest of the book But perhaps it can already be seen first that through agonistic dialogue verbal exchange between conflict parties is continued in the only way that it can be during periods of intractability Second agonistic dialogue engages a greater number of those who make up the conflicting parties than would otherwise be the case ndash not just those predisposed to lsquodialogue for mutual understandingrsquo Third the evolving patterns of radical disagreement embedded in the complex conflict system are identified in a way they would not otherwise be ndash this provides essential information for conflict transformation Fourth the specific discoveries made in the phenomenology of radical disagree-ment illuminate the nature of the lsquowar of wordsrsquo itself that constitutes linguistic intractability Finally ndash although it is always possible that phenomenological exploration will make things worse rather than better ndash it is at least also possible that the phenomenology of radical disagreement by showing conflict parties that they are much further apart than had been thought and making them strange to each other might even itself begin to be transformative

6 EpistemologyUnderstanding agonistic dialogue

Third parties whether as analysts or as agents find that their analyses and actions are already implicated in the conflict arenas that they seek to understand or trans-form At a theoretical level there is no adequate third-party account of agonistic dialogue There is no theory or philosophy of radical disagreement These largely negative results offer insight into the nature of linguistic intractability and have significant theoretical and practical implications

This chapter turns from a consideration of conflict parties to a consideration of third parties What happens to third-party accounts of radical disagreement in the context of the agonistic dialogues that they purport to analyse In the world of action it is a common experience that well meaning third-party interventions even if ini-tially welcomed by the combatants all too often become embroiled in the ongoing intractable conflict The epistemology of radical disagreement investigates the linguistic corollary What happens when third-party description and explanation of the verbal exchanges between conflict parties generates third-party prescription for action in what nevertheless remain intractable conflicts

In the first part of the chapter I look at two of the best attempts to interpret embattled conflict narratives with a view to prescribing transformative action that I have come across ndash an attempt to read and respond to lsquonarratives of conflictrsquo in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a study of the way lsquomyths and truths started a warrsquo in Kosovo

In the second half of the chapter I look in particular at Habermasrsquo The Theory of Communicative Action and Gadamerrsquos Truth and Method the two most influ-ential philosophies behind contemporary discursive and dialogic conflict resolution approaches respectively as Chapter 3 showed

Understanding narratives of conflict in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict description explanation prescription

Pioneering work in this field has been done in many contexts notably Northern Ireland where for example the 1992ndash3 Opsahl Commission gathered a mass of testimony from all sides with a view to promoting mutual acceptance of the validity of discrepant traditions in the hope thereby of fostering lsquoparity of esteemrsquo Here the focus is on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict


Third-party description explanation prescription

I use as an example the excellent analysis description and prescription given in Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict (2006) edited by Robert Rotberg The task in the epistemology of radical disagreement is to test the adequacy of putative third-party accounts by applying them to specific examples of radical disagree-ment How should the phenomenon of radical agreement be understood

Here are extracts from the editorrsquos introduction (selected)

lsquoThe Israeli-Palestinian conflict for primacy power and control encompasses two bitterly contested competing narratives Both need to be understood reckoned with and analysed side by side in order to help abate violence and possibly propel both protagonists toward peace This is an immensely tall order But the first step is to know the narratives the second to reconcile them to the extent that they can be reconciled or bridged and the third to help each side to accept and conceivably to respect the validity of the competing narrative helliprsquo

Juxtaposing the lsquotwo justifyingrationalizing narrativesrsquo helps us to lsquounder-stand the roots of the conflict and the differentially distorted prisms that fuel itrsquo At the core of such narratives lie lsquosymbolic constructions of shared iden-tityrsquo or lsquocollective memoriesrsquo which do not usually so much lsquoreflect truthrsquo as lsquoportray a truth that is functional for a grouprsquos ongoing existencersquo Each is lsquotruersquo in terms of the requirements of collective memoryrsquo Narratives are lsquomotivational toolsrsquo

What is required is a lsquogreater appreciation of the separate truths that drive Palestinians and Israelisrsquo because this could lsquoplausibly contribute to conflict reductionrsquo The aim is lsquoto narrow not eliminate the chasm that separates one strongly affirmed reality from another The lessons of this book are that the gulf between the narratives remains vast that no simplified efforts at soften-ing the edges of each narrative will work and that the fundamental task of the present is to expose each side to the narratives of the other in order gradually to foster an understanding if not an acceptance of their deeply felt import-ance to each sidersquo

(Rotberg (ed) 2006 1ndash17)

The radical disagreement between Israelis and Palestinians is described here in terms of lsquocompeting narrativesrsquo or lsquoseparate truthsrsquo and explained as lsquosymbolic constructions of shared identityrsquo which serve as lsquomotivational toolsrsquo that are lsquofunctional for a grouprsquos ongoing existencersquo This leads to the transformational recommendation to lsquoexpose each side to the narratives of the other in order gradu-ally to foster an understanding if not an acceptance of their deeply felt importance to each sidersquo The methodology appealed to is that of promoting dialogue for mutual understanding

Epistemology 135

In the body of the text four main strategies emerge for doing this

1 Ilan Pappe advocates lsquobridging the narrative conceptrsquo along the lines already initiated by the new lsquopost-Zionistrsquo revisionist Israeli historians among whom he is a prominent figure in order to narrow differences and if possible produce shared historiographical reconstructions

2 Daniel Bar-Tal and Gavriel Salomon do not think that it is possible to over-come the way rival narratives oppose each otherrsquos fundamental truths and as psychologists hope to promote reconciliation by lsquobuilding legitimacy through narrativersquo ndash fostering mutual acknowledgement of sincerity and there-fore validity by recognizing lsquothat there are two (legitimate) narratives of the conflictrsquo

3 Mordechai Bar-On recommends acceptance of the fact that the Zionist and Palestinian narratives lsquonegate the very existence of the foe as a collectivityrsquo and suggests that the focus should rather be on a critical re-examination of the historical record by each side separately He sees this as a particular task for the Palestinians

4 Finally Dan Bar-On and Sami Adwan aim to promote lsquobetter dialogue bet-ween two separate but interdependent narrativesrsquo that lsquoare intertwined like a double helixrsquo through their work on the production of parallel texts on the Balfour Declaration the 1948 war and the 1987 Intifada including the idea of getting Israeli and Palestinian schoolchildren to fill in intermediate commentaries

An example of radical disagreeing for comparison

How does the editorial description and explanation of the radical disagreement and the policy prescriptions and recommendations that flow from this relate to examples of what is being described explained and responded to In this case we do not have to look far I will take one of the authors of the book as a spokesperson for the Palestinian narrative This is Nadim Rouhana a highly regarded Palestinian conflict transformation specialist and professor at a leading US conflict resolu-tion centre (the George Mason University Institute for Conflict Management and Resolution) I think that what he says in his chapter would be accepted as objective and reasonable ndash indeed self-evident ndash by nearly all Palestinians We would have to ask them

How does Rouhanarsquos lsquonarrativersquo relate to the editorial prescription and the four transformation approaches listed above To make this clear I will use the same numbering sequence And I will relate these extracts from Rouhanarsquos text to the moments of radical disagreeing discussed in Chapter 5

1 For Rouhana lsquobridging the narrative conceptrsquo cannot mean lsquomeeting the other half-wayrsquo when what is required is for Israelis to acknowledge the violence and injustice inherent in the Zionist project itself (as in fact Pappe does)


From the moment Zionism was conceived force has been a central com-ponent of its relationship with Palestinians The seeds of protracted conflict are based in the relationship between colonizer and colonized and thus are inherent to the dynamics of the encounter between the Zionist movement and Palestinians It has always been naiumlve or self-serving to think that a Jewish state could be established in a homeland inhabited by another people except through the use of force

(Rouhana 2006 118)

Under the moment of justification the reference in radical disagreeing is not to lsquoone strongly affirmed realityrsquo among others but to what actually happened Third-party analysts should not try to deconstruct this prematurely if they want to reach the radical disagreement itself

2 In Rouhanarsquos chapter promoting reconciliation by lsquobuilding legitimacy through narrativersquo does not mean recognizing lsquothat there are two (legitimate) narratives of the conflictrsquo because one of the narratives is fundamentally illegitimate

The encounter has been one between an indigenous people in a homeland defined by the political unit known as Palestine ever since the British mandate was established and another group of people the Zionists who came from outside of Palestine mainly from Europe and developed a modern ideology based on three key principles The Jews are a nation and should establish their own state hellip A Jewish state should be established in Palestine hellip Palestine [should] become the exclusive homeland of the Jewish people and not the land of both the Jewish people and the people of Palestine Mainstream Zionists hellip did not seek partnership with the people who lived in Palestine to build a common homeland but rather [aimed] to transform the country into an exclu-sively Jewish homeland

(Ibid 116)

This is an example of invocation of the distinction between how things are and (false) ideology in radical disagreeing under the moment of alignment and the moment of refutation

On the issue of reconciliation mentioned under 2 above Rouhana emphasizes that this means explicit Israeli recognition of the suppression of manifest facts in their national narrative ndash the denial that the Palestinians even existed and the refusal to acknowledge that they have been either expelled from their land or sub-jugated as second-class citizens ndash and a resolve to remedy the ongoing injustice in future by ensuring full equal rights for all those living in Palestine regardless of race religion or other differences Reconciliation can only be based on truth and justice

Genuine reconciliation requires facing historic truths taking responsibility for past injustices and framing future relations in terms of justice rather than

Epistemology 137

power Reconciliation would also require a major political restructuring to enable full equality between individuals and national groups in Palestine a change that would be incompatible with a Zionist framework or with Zionism

(Ibid 127)

Radical disagreement is driven by recommendation for action and given power by action itself In this case under the moment of recommendation and the moment of action a loser in the resulting power play does not separate the question of the legitimacy of the oppressorrsquos narrative from the question of the substantial recti-fication of the associated injustice

3 For Rouhana the idea that lsquoscholarly confrontations between conflicting nar-ratives can be fruitful only if each side concentrates on self-criticism not on condemning the otherrsquo (Bar-On 2006 153) and particularly the idea that this is a task mainly for the Palestinians because Israel already has its revisionist lsquonew historiansrsquo and lsquopost-Zionistsrsquo does not cut ice The lsquoPalestinian narrativersquo is an attempt to rescue a record of suppressed reality whereas even lsquoleft-leaningrsquo liberal Israelis who promote the idea that lsquoboth sides have equally legitimate narrativesrsquo are thereby covertly supporting the hegemonic Zionist cause and reinforcing the status quo

Left-leaning Israelis and Zionist groups seek official and unofficial diplo-matic means to achieve the same result while often paralleling the history of Zionism and the Palestinian national movement arguing that both sides have equally legitimate narratives as well as a history of violence the need for recognition and so on This alternative approach seeks to achieve recognition of Zionism in return for a Palestinian state in the occupied territories

(Rouhana 2006 128)

This is a clear example of how the very idea of equivalent lsquonarratives of conflictrsquo central to the third-party understanding of the situation is already lost in relation to the agonistic dialogue that constitutes linguistic intractability This also illumi-nates the way that in intractable conflicts the moment of revision plays a different role to that sketched out for it in conflict resolution and conflict transformation reinforcing rather than weakening intransigence

4 Finally for Rouhana it is not a question of lsquopromoting better dialogue between two separate but interdependent narrativesrsquo by producing parallel texts in both Hebrew and Arabic and inviting intermediate commentary so that lsquohateful single narrativesrsquo are transformed into lsquotwo mutually sensitive onesrsquo Instead two other requirements are at issue

First the dominant narrative which supports and lsquonaturalisesrsquo the unjust power asymmetry stands in need of deconstruction in order to expose its subconscious repressed roots in guilt and fear


For obvious reasons it is not easy [for Israelis] to face this fear as it would mean challenging the national narrative and national and personal identityrsquo

(Ibid 127)

This can be seen to come under the moment of explanationSecond the marginalized narrative which represents legitimate resistance to the

injustice and a refusal to be suppressed or co-opted as lsquoone truth among manyrsquo needs to be reaffirmed

For Palestinians resisting the takeover of their homeland was a natural human reaction to injustice hellip One of the most effective and least evident forms of resistance was the preservation of memories and the national narrative at the core of which was a clinging to a right to the homeland ndash expressed now in the form of insisting on the principle of the right of return Israel must be held responsible for the Palestinian exile and the Jewish state in the Palestinian homeland must be denied legitimacy This narrative is shared by all segments of Palestinian society including Palestinians in Israel

(Ibid 125)

For Rouhana this is what the juxtaposition of two parallel texts in Hebrew and Arabic ndash or any other language ndash will demonstrate to any impartial reader The appeal is ostensive ndash look and see

An example of radical disagreement

But it is only when the other answers back in agonistic dialogue that the full dimen-sions of the radical disagreement itself are seen

In Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict the editor notes how some other authors lsquotake exceptionrsquo to Rouhanarsquos lsquocontributionrsquo What happens in these cases

One of those to take exception is Mordechai Bar-On an eminent self-styled lsquovet-eran peace activistrsquo and research scholar at the Yad Ben-Zvi Institute in Jerusalem Bar-On has great experience of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and a sophisticated capacity to lsquoread-offrsquo for his own partisanship under what in Chapter 5 is called the moment of description

Israeli historians should be able to explain the rational and moral indigna-tion that motivated the Palestinians to provoke violence [in 1948] just as Palestinian historians should be able to explain why young Israelis could not but fight back at that stage

(Bar-On 2006 154)

Bar-On is happy to recognize that lsquoopposing narratives are conceived not only as untrue but also as insulting and morally corruptrsquo by the other so that lsquoin the context

Epistemology 139

of this volume ldquotruthrdquo can be contestedrsquo He goes further and recognizes the con-tingency of his own strong emotional response to Rouhanarsquos utterances

I have no doubt that my arguments have little chance of influencing Rouhana as his oral arguments (at our meetings at Harvard University) not only failed to convince me but also made me angry

(Ibid 148)

In Chapter 5 I noted that no matter how sensitive the invocation of equivalence under the moment of description may be what signifies in ongoing radical dis-agreement is what follows the lsquobut helliprsquo In this case the word is lsquoyetrsquo And in what follows lsquoyetrsquo Bar-On does not use the language of mutual subjectivity appropriate to the moment of description but the more direct language of objective lsquofaultsrsquo in the way the other tells the story lsquoproblemsrsquo with the otherrsquos thesis and the dire consequences of the otherrsquos intransigence for prospects for peace ndash in short the language appropriate to the moments of radical disagreeing

Rouhana is the first speaker Bar-On is the second

|lsquoIsrael will have to face at least part of the truth that the country that they settled belonged to another people that their project was the direct cause of the displacement and dismantling of Palestinian society and that it could not have been achieved without this displacement Israel will also have to con-front the realities of the occupation and the atrocities it is committing and will have to accept that Palestinian citizens in Israel are indigenous to the land and entitled to seek the democratic transformation of the state so that they have equal access to power resources and decision making and are entitled to rectification of past and present injusticesrsquo

(Rouhana 2006 133)

lsquoThere are many historiographical faults in the way Rouhana tells the story hellip The main problem with Rouhanarsquos thesis hellip lies in his sweeping conclu-sion that ldquofrom the moment Zionism was conceived force has been a central component of its relationship with the Palestiniansrdquo hellip Is it not possible for a Palestinian such as Rouhana to understand that in 1948 the Jews of Palestine to their chagrin could not but use force to defend themselves and impose a solution that was legitimated by a majority of nations hellip [T]here is no chance that I shall ever consider that my father and mother who immigrated to Palestine as Zionists in 1924 were criminals Nor do I consider my actions illegitimate when I gave the order ldquoFirerdquo and perhaps killed or wounded assailants in response to an ambush on the troop that I commanded on the way to Tel Aviv in December 1947 hellip There is hardly any question that in December 1947 the fire that later spread throughout the country was ignited at that time by the Palestinians hellip The joy with which Arab intellectuals embraced the new [Israeli] narratives betrays a misguided assumption that at long last Israelis see the ldquotruthrdquo and are ready to adopt the Arab narratives of


the conflict hellip The lesson Palestinians should learn from Israelrsquos revisionist historiography is not how correct they are in their own narratives but rather how self-critical they too must becomersquo|

(Bar-On 2006 147ndash8 167ndash8)

Bar-On asks lsquoCan even the most moderate and understanding Israeli agree to deny the legitimacy of the Israeli state Can such an Israeli really be expected to embrace the original sin or original crime that Zionism inflicted upon the Palestiniansrsquo

Rouhana asks whether even the most moderate and understanding Palestinian (including lsquoPalestinians in Israelrsquo) could agree to deny the legitimacy of Palestinian demands for equal rights in their own homeland or be expected to accept responsibility for initiating violence in attempting legitimate resistance to disenfranchisement

This example of radical disagreement is undeveloped Very little direct agonistic dialogue is recorded Yet already ndash in this brief exchange between two eminently moderate members of their respective communities and colleagues in the produc-tion of the book ndash the entire lineaments of the linguistic intractability associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be glimpsed To bring it into sharper focus as outlined in Chapter 5 and developed in Chapter 7 what would be needed would be the promotion of the agonistic dialogue The radical disagreement needs to be acknowledged surface misunderstandings need to be cleared up arguments need to be aligned (here they can be seen to miss each other) the moments of radical disagreeing need to be made explicit (as indicated above in relation to Rouhanarsquos chapter) and the resulting fully engaged radical disagreement then needs to be properly explored

The editor himself realizes something of this when he comments

A next stage too late for this book would be for Jawad Porat Bar-On and others [he does not name Rouhana] to spend necessary hours together attempt-ing to reconcile the discordant narratives or at least delineating the precise contours of disagreement

(Rotberg (ed) 2006 8)

This is indeed what needs to be done It is what surprisingly is very rarely done so far as I can discover even in critical political discourse analysis and coexist-ence studies What would happen if it were done Evidently it would be up to the conflict parties undertaking phenomenological exploration of their agonistic dialogue to find out But Chapter 5 suggests that in general terms they might dis-cover that they do not agree about the object in question in the first place ndash lsquothe indigenous Palestinian citizens of Israelrsquo lsquothe Jews of Palestinersquo lsquothe displacement of Palestinian societyrsquo lsquothe solution legitimated by a majority of nationsrsquo The radical disagreement is a primordial struggle to name the object They might find that the background appealed to is in each case itself found to be already part of the conflict lsquothe truth that the country that they settled belonged to another peoplersquo lsquothe many historiographical faults in the way Rouhana tells the storyrsquo The radical

Epistemology 141

disagreement reaches to the horizon And they might find that emotions ndash Bar-Onrsquos anger Rouhanarsquos indignation ndash are not subjective adjuncts to the conflict but are inseparable from what causes the anger and what arouses the indignation In short they might find that they are not nearer but rather much further apart than Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict suggests

In this way I think that great insight would be gained into the main linguistic reason why prescriptions for transformative action of the kind advocated in Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict ndash based as they are on prior third-party description and explanation ndash so often fail in the intensity of intractable conflict In the drastic contraction of conceptual space constituted by linguistic intractability there is not yet enough room for dialogue for mutual understanding

In summary what needs to be investigated in this respect is not narratives of conflict but narratives in conflict

Radical disagreement and the involvement of third-party impartiality

Before moving on to the next example of the prior involvement of third-party description explanation and prescription in the conflict under investigation it is worth extending the Israeli-Palestinian case to embrace the question of impartiality

Dennis Ross was President Clintonrsquos chief negotiator at the 2000 Camp David talks In his 2004 book The Missing Peace The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace he describes the radical disagreement between Israelis Arabs and Palestinians as the subjective lsquohistorical narratives of each sidersquo which can only be understood once we learn lsquowhy Israelis Arabs and Palestinians see the world as they dorsquo (Chapter 1) He regards himself as impartial between the conflict parties with an interest only in securing a just peace

Contrast what Ross says here about the radical disagreement between Israelis and Palestinians with what he says in the radical disagreement that he has himself been caught up in as a result such as this response to the 2000 Camp David talks from Noam Chomsky

Bill Clinton and Israeli prime minister Barak did propose an improvement consolidation to three cantons under Israeli control virtually separated from one another and from the fourth enclave a small area of East Jerusalem the center of Palestinian communications The fifth canton was Gaza It is understandable that maps are not to be found in the US mainstream Nor is the prototype the Bantustan lsquohomelandsrsquo of apartheid South Africa ever mentioned

(Chomsky 11 May 2002 The Guardian)

Ross does offer maps in his 2004 book contrasting a map of what lsquoofficial Palestiniansrsquo and critics like Chomsky lsquoinaccuratelyrsquo cite as the lsquofinal offer they turned down at Camp Davidrsquo with a map outlining the lsquoactual proposal at Camp Davidrsquo In addition he offers a third map reflecting lsquoClinton ideasrsquo in December 2000


To this day Arafat has never honestly admitted what was offered to the Palestinians hellip [W]ith 97 percent of the territory in Palestinian hands there would have been no cantons Palestinian areas would not have been isolated and surrounded There would have been territorial integrity and contiguity in both the West Bank and Gaza and there would have been independent borders with Egypt and Jordan

Had Nelson Mandela been the Palestinian leader and not Yasir Arafat I would be writing now how notwithstanding the limitations of the Oslo pro-cess Israelis and Palestinians had succeeded in reaching an lsquoend of conflictrsquo agreement hellip Arafat either let the Intifada begin or as some argue actually gave orders for it hellip Arafat was not up to peacemaking

(Ross 2004 767 756ndash7)

The key point here is that Ross does not apply his subjectivist reading of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to his own radical disagreement with Chomsky Arafat and most Palestinians Instead he invokes the language of agonistic dialogue as examined in Chapter 5 That is what makes it a radical disagreement ndash and one that is integral to the ongoing conflict because many participants have quoted or criticized Ross in support of their claims Rossrsquos own appeal is not to lsquosubjective historical narrativesrsquo but to his objective knowledge of what really happened at Camp David He was an insider He refers to this as demonstrating the inaccuracy and dishonesty of the false assertions made by his opponents

Jeremy Pressman is another third-party intervener ndash this time not a political activist but an academic analyst He also sees himself as an impartial well-wisher of the peace process Having looked through the available documentation and supplemented this with extensive interviews with participants from all sides he concludes in diametric opposition to Ross that

neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian version of the events at Camp David and subsequent talks is wholly accurate The Palestinian version however is much closer to the evidentiary record of articles interviews and documents produced by participants in the negotiations journalists and other analysts

(Pressman 2003 5)

Pressman notes how closely aligned the view of lsquosome US officialsrsquo and lsquomajor US newspapersrsquo have been to the Israeli perspective and consequently calls this the lsquodominant versionrsquo Others have said that the proposals put forward by the US at Camp David were coordinated in advance with the Israelis

But the important point here is again the contrast between Pressmanrsquos lan-guage in his understanding of the radical disagreement between the Israelis and Palestinians and his language in refuting false claims about the 2000ndash1 negotia-tions He describes the former in familiar vein as divergent lsquoversions of eventsrsquo lsquovisions in collisionrsquo lsquonarrativesrsquo lsquostoriesrsquo lsquoviewsrsquo lsquoperspectivesrsquo and lsquocon-flicting beliefsrsquo In his own argumentation however his appeal is directly and unequivocally to the historical evidence itself

Epistemology 143

The Israeli conclusion hellip is based on five contentions that do not hold up when assessed in light of the evidence from 2000ndash1

(Ibid 23)

In the radical disagreements that third parties find themselves involved in both with the original conflict parties and with each other whether as active interven-ers like Ross or analysts like Pressman the subjectivist third-party language of equivalence used to describe the original quarrel breaks down Instead the authentic language of agonistic dialogue emerges This ndash when taken seriously and developed ndash gives third parties a chance to gain clear insight into the nature of linguistic intractability They are not neutral or impartial because there is no room for that They are trying to impose their own discourse on the continuing struggle It is as well for them to realize this from the outset

How myths and truths started a war in Kosovo

Julie Mertusrsquo book Kosovo How Myths and Truths Started a War is a rare study from a scholar who views what she calls the lsquomicro-analysisrsquo of competing versions of the truth as a serious component in the dynamic of violent conflict every bit as important as the more usual lsquomacro-analysisrsquo

The kind of analysis that is most desperately missing is an analysis of history as told by the people of the Balkans themselves hellip

(Mertus 1999 5)

She took the trouble to gather material in Albanian and Serbo-Croat from local newspapers and personal interviews She speaks the languages In her book she charts stages in the escalation of the conflict marked by inflammatory incidents beginning with the 1981 student demonstrations and ending with the alleged poisoning of Albanian schoolchildren in 1990 In each case she summarizes the opposed views

lsquothe Truth for most Serbs was helliprsquo lsquothe Truth for most Kosovo Albanians was helliprsquo

And she offers verbatim interview statements from both sides This is remarkable raw material for a study of the explosive significance of radical disagreement in intense political conflict No one was better placed to explore specific examples of the radical disagreements themselves than Julie Mertus

Yet Mertus herself does not undertake such a study She sees no purpose in recording exchanges between the conflicting parties She leaves the statements just as they are ndash juxtaposed but not mutually criticized or commented upon

Why does a scholar who has undertaken the great labour of gathering such a significant corpus of ethnomethodological data ndash a very rare achievement ndash in the event not think it worthwhile to journey on to the exploration of the radical disa-greements that she has so brilliantly exposed


Once again I think that the reason is related to Mertusrsquo own understanding of the situation in the first place

At the core of Mertusrsquo reading is the sharp contrast that she draws between lsquofactsrsquo (factual truths) such that there had been years of lsquogross human rights abuses against Albaniansrsquo by Serbian officials (lsquoI was right about the abusersquo) and lsquoTruthsrsquo (non-factual truths) such as the conflicting accounts that she has documented

To understand how wars start we need to do more than examine factual truth we need to unravel the lsquomore or less truthsrsquo

(Mertus 1999 2)

In other words

for those who are interested in understanding and predicting behavior what matters is not what is factually true but what people believe to be lsquoTruthrsquo

(Ibid 9ndash10)

We are familiar with this idea and its consequences from Chapter 3 (although the notational slippage lsquoTruthrsquo indicates the difficulty of maintaining the distinction)

Based on her sharp contrast between factual truth and non-factual Truth Mertus sees the causes of the war operating at two levels

At the top level the leaders lsquounderstood each other quite wellrsquo and knew that each wanted lsquopower and resourcesrsquo in a lsquozero-sum gamersquo There was conscious manipulation on both sides In order to achieve their political purposes leaders deliberately promoted fear and anxiety among their peoples by conducting a lsquosteady and intense propaganda campaign against the ldquootherrdquorsquo At leadership level therefore the radical disagreement is entirely subsumed into the propaganda battle There was no incentive to investigate further

It was at the second level among the lsquogeneral populationrsquo that sincerely believed conflicting Truths perpetuated by institutionalized injustice and tied to competing but manipulated national identities proved to be so potent This is where mutual misunderstanding abounded because within local private commu-nities on both sides

feelings are played out in hidden transcripts of anger aggression and disguised discourses of dignity the modes whereby groups can act out the feelings they ordinarily must conceal such as through gossip rumour and creation of autonomous private spaces for assertion of dignity Serbians and Kosovo Albanians are not privy to each othersrsquo hidden transcripts nor could they understand each othersrsquo transcripts if they could gain access

(Ibid 10)

Within this context of mutual misapprehension in which lsquoeach society has its regime of truthrsquo the opposite of a Truth

Epistemology 145

is not necessarily a lie rather it is a competing Truth linked to an alternative self-image

(Ibid 10)

For Mertus these are not disputes about factual truth only a coexistence of rival non-factual Truths They are myths believed in as a result of material circumstance and induced fear They are productions of power and are linked to action (beha-viour) through manipulated need (psychology) They themselves are all too easy to understand It is what has generated them and the role that they have played in the conflict that need to be analysed The radical disagreement has been reduced to a coexistence of manipulated subjectivities or beliefs Once again there is no incentive to enquire further

In Mertusrsquo analysis therefore the radical disagreement itself drops out of con-sideration It disappears between the limits of mutual convergence at leadership level and mutual misunderstanding at general population level That is why I think despite having wonderful material for a rich exploration of the radical disagreements at the core of the Kosovo conflict Mertus has no inducement to investigate further

When Mertus set out on her research however her original aim was not to study competing Kosovo Albanian and Serb Truths but the factual truth about alleged Serb atrocities She was then side-tracked into the former when the wide disparity between those accounts became apparent to her But she did not forget her first intention

On Serb atrocities she is clear that there had indeed been lsquoyears of gross human rights abuses against Albanians by Serbian officialsrsquo This was a factual truth

I was right about the abuse(Ibid 9)

But this is nevertheless hotly disputed by many Serbs So here is a radical disagree-ment between Mertus and those Serbs

|lsquoI was right about the abusersquo

lsquoNo you were not You were hoodwinked by the Albanian provocateurs The entire WesternNATO strategy was based on manipulated lies ndash just as in Afghanistan and Iraqrsquo|

In this (imagined) radical disagreement Mertus is not saying that the gross human rights abuses by Serbian officials were only lsquoTruth for Julie Mertusrsquo Nor that the opposite was not an untruth but lsquoTruth for those Serbsrsquo Nor that all that can be said is that lsquoeach party has its own regime of truthrsquo No doubt each party does have its own regime of truth But this does not touch what is at issue in the rad-ical disagreement or the consequences in the world of action that flow from it ndash in this case because Western leaders agreed with Mertus and had the power to act


accordingly the NATO assault the ending of Serb rule in Kosovo and the fall of Milosevich

Consequent upon Mertusrsquo descriptions and explanations are her prescriptions for preventative action in the communicative sphere She is one of the few who recognize the limits to dialogue for mutual understanding in times of maximum intractability

Allowing competing Truths to float through the air in the same space unjudged and unquestioned can be a revolutionary act The Truths may always exist But the very telling can provoke self-reflection and dismantle the link between Truths and the degrading of an oppositional lsquootherrsquo The telling may narrow the gap between Truths creating a common bridge toward something else Yet sometimes the divisions between people are too great the fear too intense the desire of some to maintain or gain power too overwhelming The mere telling is not enough to stem conflict Thus we cannot stop after the story-telling We must have the will to think of bold even drastic interventions to change the status quo into a more peaceful something else

(Mertus 1999 4)

But because Mertus does not explore the phenomenon of radical disagreement and interprets what is said in terms of subjective Truths there is no further linguistic recourse after the limits of lsquostory-tellingrsquo are reached The rest is non-verbal inter-vention or linguistic therapy ndash or just lsquosomething elsersquo

Philosophies of radical disagreement Foucault Barthes Habermas Gadamer

In the search for a philosophy of radical disagreement I look first briefly at two philosophies underlying Mertusrsquo interpretation ndash those of Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes Then at somewhat greater length I turn to the two most influ-ential philosophies in critical conflict transformation and hermeneutic dialogue respectively ndash those of Juumlrgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer What do these philosophies say about the phenomenon of radical disagreement Do they give an adequate account

Michel Foucault

Mertusrsquo concept of competing Truths is derived from Foucault

Knowledge of truth is not the product of reason operating independently of social and political relationships Rather truth can be understood as the prod-uct of complex power relations whereby Truth is produced through power and power is exercised in the production of Truth

(Mertus 1999 2 with reference to Foucault 1980 131ndash2)

Epistemology 147

But does Foucault offer an account of competing truths or radical disagreement at all

I do not find that in the structural nature of Foucaultrsquos early lsquoarchaeologicalrsquo approach there was any room for a concern with what he regarded as a throwback to phenomenological intentionality

Nor in his lsquogenealogicalrsquo homage to Nietzsche did Foucault see any more signi-ficance in the phenomenon of human disagreement than did Nietzsche himself and for loosely related reasons to those mentioned in Chapter 2 For Foucault it would be superficial and entirely misleading to take truth claims seriously as phenomena worth studying in their own right since truth is a child of multiple forms of con-straint and lsquoeffects of truthrsquo are produced by historical processes within discourses that are in themselves lsquoneither true nor falsersquo

Nor in Foucaultrsquos later re-interpretation of his work in terms of lsquoproblematiza-tionrsquo is disagreement any more prominent Indeed he specifically discounts the dialectical nature of negation and contradiction associated with verbal disagree-ment as both constraining and superficial He saw his historical writings as attempts to liberate the future by showing the complex and contested ways in which the pre-sent has emerged from the past He hoped that his patient and detailed tracing of the subtle modes by which intricate and swirling eddies of power and knowledge have been precipitated into current forms of reification subjection and exclusion would thereby help to open up new spaces of possibility for an emancipated subjectivity Things that may otherwise appear ineluctable happen to have evolved like this and can therefore evolve differently in future The task is one of breaking down over-rigid categories even those associated with resistance such as the concept of ideology with its inherent and problematic references to subject infrastructure and the non-ideological This includes the crude dialectic of disagreement which by negation reproduces what it opposes in reciprocal oversimplification and violence For Foucault the solvent for the intolerable dominations associated with agonistic politics is micro-analysis and hyper-dispersal not confrontation

The freeing of difference requires thought without contradiction without dia-lectics without negation thought that accepts divergence affirmative thought whose instrument is disjunction thought of the multiple ndash of the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity that is not limited or confined by the constraints of simil-arity hellip What is the answer to the question The problem How is the problem resolved By displacing the question hellip We must think problematically rather than question and answer dialectically

(Bouchard ed 1977 185ndash6 quoted Flynn 1994 42)

Nothing could be further from the crude mutual refutation and the brutal eitheror of radical disagreement Foucault offers subtle and searching analyses of the nature and products of agonism but is averse to including serious study of the polemical as part of this He does not offer a philosophy of radical disagreement


Roland Barthes

Turning to Barthes I focus on his Mythologies and in particular on the final essay in the collection lsquoMyth Todayrsquo Barthesrsquo aim writing as he was in the 1950s was to unmask the lsquonaturalnessrsquo with which mythology was used by lsquonewspapers art and common sensersquo to lsquodress up a reality which even though it is the one we live in is undoubtedly determined by historyrsquo (19571993 11) In this way he sought to denounce lsquothe essential enemyrsquo which was lsquothe bourgeois normrsquo because he thought that whereas left-wing myths were peripheral and merely tactical (the truly revolutionary speech of the authentic economic producer was the opposite of myth) right-wing myths (lsquomyths of orderrsquo) were fundamental to the continuing predominance of those who produced them

The oppressed makes the world he has only an active transitive (political) language the oppressor conserves it his language is plenary intransitive ges-tural theatrical it is Myth The language of the former aims at transforming of the latter at eternalising

(Barthes19571993 149)

How does myth work according to Barthes It is a second-order semiological system in which the meaning (sign) of an original language-object is emptied of content to become pure form and the signifier of a second metalanguage As signi-fier it is then filled with a new content by being absorbed into the concept that it is the purpose of the myth-maker to propagate (it becomes the signified in the new metalanguage) This appropriation creates the final signification (sign) of the meta-language which is read as entirely natural and inevitable by the myth-consumer The transfer of meaning thus operates instantaneously and below the threshold where the myth-consumer can recognize its contingency and duplicity Only the myth-producer in his cynicism and the myth-deciphererexposer (the mytholo-gist) in his sarcasm or anger sees through the subterfuge It is the naturalization of the concept that is the essential function of myth If the political comprises lsquothe whole of human relationsrsquo in the reality of its social structure and power of making the world then myth is lsquodepoliticised speechrsquo

In passing from history to nature myth acts economically it abolishes the complexity of human acts it gives them the simplicity of essences it does away with all dialectics with any going back beyond what is immediately vis-ible it organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth a world wide open and wallowing in the evident it establishes a blissful clarity things appear to mean something by themselves

(Barthes 19571993 143)

How does this famous account relate to radical disagreement What does it mean to suggest with Julie Mertus that under this conception conflicting myths can help to start a war

Epistemology 149

I do not think that Barthesrsquo idea of myth does as it stands relate to radical dis-agreement at all which is why Barthes had no interest in it Barthesrsquo interpretation separates three linguistic levels the level of the language-object the level of the metalanguage where myth is constructed and the level of the mythologist who deconstructs it The mythologist operating at level three is thereby able to demys-tify and expose unchallenged the enemy subterfuge at level two and in this way to release the level one non-mythical speech that it is his whole purpose to liberate

This may work well within a context of Marxist theory But it cannot easily be extended to describe what happens when myths are seen to be invoked equally on both sides in an intense political conflict such as Kosovo In Mertusrsquo adaptation mythologists on each side compete to expose the myths of the other Here both invoke the three-level methodology but in precise contradiction to the otherrsquos usage What is at issue is found to be the levels themselves ndash or rather the dis-tinction between these distinctions and what they distinguish as identified in Chapter 4 What is at issue is what does and does not count as mere myth

Juumlrgen Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action

As seen in Chapter 3 Juumlrgen Habermasrsquo discourse ethics is widely invoked in the conflict resolution field by those who are critical of lsquodialogicrsquo and lsquoproblem-solvingrsquo approaches that ignore power asymmetries So what does his seminal text The Theory of Communicative Action say about radical disagreement

At first sight disagreement is central to Habermasrsquo thinking The whole of this part of his social theory is grounded in a theory of argumentation where disagree-ment appears both as a threat to linguistically coordinated social action that calls forth the role of argumentation and as integral to the process of argumentation that is seen as the remedy

Thus the rationality proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the practice of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it poss-ible to continue communicative action with other means when disagreements can no longer be repaired with everyday routines and yet are not to be settled by the direct or strategic use of force For this reason I believe that the concept of communicative rationality hellip can be adequately explicated only in terms of a theory of argumentation

(Habermas 1981a 17ndash18)

The theory of argumentation thereby takes on a special significance to it falls the task of reconstructing the formal-pragmatic presuppositions and conditions of an explicitly rational behavior

(Ibid 2)

To participate properly in argument is therefore to agree or disagree with reasons offered for or against validity claims thereby defining the sphere of lsquorational agree-mentrsquo and lsquorational disagreementrsquo Agreement and disagreement are inbuilt on an


equal footing in this way into the very structure of the theory of argumentation together with the criticizability (challenge and redemption) of validity claims on which it rests

Agreement rests on common convictions The speech act of one person suc-ceeds only if the other accepts the offer contained in it by taking (however implicitly) a lsquoyesrsquo or lsquonorsquo position on a validity claim that is in principle criticisable Both ego who raises a validity claim with his utterance and alter who recognizes or rejects it base their decisions on potential grounds or reasons (original italics)

(Ibid 128)

Indeed disagreement has a special constitutive role

The binding effect of illocutionary forces comes about ironically through the fact that participants can say lsquonorsquo to speech-act offers The critical character of this saying lsquonorsquo distinguishes taking a position in this way from a reaction based solely on caprice A hearer can be lsquoboundrsquo by speech-act offers because he is not permitted arbitrarily to refuse them but only to say lsquonorsquo to them that is to reject them for reasons

(Ibid 73ndash4)

The fact that Habermas describes this as lsquoironicrsquo may indicate an awareness of a moment of slippage when the conditional tense of criticizability (being able to say lsquonorsquo) shifts into the indicative tense of criticism (actually saying lsquonorsquo) The former is integral to the emphasis that Habermas places on the fact that his theory is intersubjective in its focus on communicative action in contrast to the mono-logical theories of for example Adorno But the question is whether Habermasrsquo theory is polylogical Does it accommodate not only the potential of criticizability that is inherently intersubjective but also the fact of actual criticism and counter-criticism (radical disagreement) that is inherently polylogical Do Habermasian communicative actors answer back

Since this is Habermasrsquo account let us allow him to define the rules of debate which he does quite stringently He demands that the disagreement must take place without distortions of power and as if free from the political pressures of everyday life The participants must aim to convince a lsquouniversal audiencersquo to lsquothematizersquo a contested validity claim in a purely lsquohypothetical attitudersquo and to let arguments speak for themselves (Habermas 1981a 25) By shifting from political to hypo-thetical mode in this way Habermas excludes the crucial link to partisan identities and imminent political action that defines radical disagreement Nevertheless we will follow Habermas in doing the same What happens when people actually do answer back choose the lsquonorsquo response and reject the otherrsquos validity claim on purely rational grounds ndash as defined by Habermas

Habermasrsquo framework of analysis is based on a theory of communicative acts (CA1 CA2 etc) In Habermasrsquo words (1981b 126ndash7) communicative actors

Epistemology 151

(A1 A2) moving in the medium of a natural language and drawing upon culturally transmitted interpretations attempt to come to an understanding as speakers and hearers from out of the context of their pre-interpreted lifeworld about something in the one objective world something in the common social world and something in each of their own subjective worlds with a view to negotiate common definitions of the situation and to coordinate action accordingly The lifeworld is constitutive for mutual understanding as such whereas the three formal world-concepts consti-tute a reference system for that about which mutual understanding is possible

At the centre of this model lies the idea of a speaker who lsquoaims to come to an understanding with a hearer about something and thereby to make himself under-standablersquo So three world-relations are invoked by the raising of validity claims

In their interpretive accomplishments the members of a communication community demarcate the one objective world and their intersubjectively shared social world from the subjective worlds of individuals and (other) collectives

(Habermas 1981a 70)

In particular each participant in practical discourse lsquounderstands a linguistic expression in the same wayrsquo as the other by lsquoknowing the conditions under which it can be acceptedrsquo

Now what happens to this account in the special case of disagreement when the other in the event rejects a validity claim Habermas is clear The fact of disagree-ment is already incorporated in the model The rejection of a validity claim (a lsquonorsquo response) maps one-to-one onto his account of the redemption of a validity claim (a lsquoyesrsquo response) Both count as lsquosuccessrsquo for a speech act in formal-pragmatic terms

Someone who rejects a comprehensible speech act is taking issue with at least one of these validity claims In rejecting a speech act as (normatively) wrong or untrue or insincere he is expressing with his lsquonorsquo the fact that the utterance has not fulfilled its function of securing an interpersonal relation-ship of representing states of affairs or of manifesting experiences It is not in agreement with our world of legitimately ordered interpersonal relations or with the world of existing states of affairs or with the speakerrsquos own world of subjective experiences

(Ibid 308)

In short according to Habermas radical disagreement ndash |CA1 CA2| ndash can be substituted for communicative acts in general ndash CA1 CA2 ndash without thereby affecting the rest of the model and in particular the framework of world-relations that communicative actors establish with their utterances

Is this trueIf someone responds to a validity claim with a lsquoyesrsquo reaction this not only helps

to coordinate action in the public world it also confirms the structure of world rela-tions (the distinctions between the one public world the shared social world and


the two or more subjective worlds of the speakers) and feeds the stock of language culture and the lifeworld that make such communication possible

The lifeworld lsquomaintains itselfrsquo through lsquothe processes of reaching under-standing

(Habermas 1981b 124)

But as seen above in contrast to Gadamer it is essential for Habermas that assent is not the only permissible response

To understand a symbolic expression means to know under what conditions its validity claim would have to be accepted but it does not mean assenting to its validity claim without regard to context (original italics)

(Ibid 135ndash6)

If someone responds to a validity claim with an abstention this may be seen as somewhat akin to the lsquonot provenrsquo verdict in Scottish law because it is not the result of carelessness or indifference but rather of proper scrutiny of the proffered reasons and arguments Habermas toys with the idea of generalizing lsquoI do not knowrsquo into a principle of communicative reason itself This takes the form of a capacity for self-criticism that can also apply lsquothe attitude of the otherrsquo (the otherrsquos subjectivity) to ourselves We are familiar with this idea from Chapter 5 where we looked at it under the moment of description

By internalising the role of a participant in argumentation ego becomes capable of self-criticism It is the relation-to-self established by this model of self-criticism that we shall call lsquoreflectiversquo Knowing that one does not know has since the time of Socrates rightly been regarded as the basis of self-knowledge

(Ibid 74ndash5)

But although a capacity for lsquolooking at things from the perspective of the otherrsquo is a hallmark of accomplished as against naive communicative actors Habermas is aware of the danger of generalizing lsquoI do not knowrsquo to the point where the very possibility of framing redeemable validity claims in the first place evaporates

The concept of a subjective world permits us to contrast not only our own internal world but also the subjective worlds of others with the external world Ego can consider how certain facts (what he regards as existing states of affairs in the objective world) or certain normative expectations (what he regards as legitimate elements of the common social world) look from the perspective of the other that is as elements of alterrsquos subjective world He can further consider that alter is for his part considering how what he regards as existing states of affairs and valid norms look from egorsquos perspective that is as a component of egorsquos subjective world The subjective worlds of the

Epistemology 153

participants could serve as mirror surfaces in which the objective the norm-ative and the subjective-for-another are reflected any number of times

(Ibid 69)

As it turns out however abstention does not threaten to do this because it is not itself a validity claim The framework of world-concepts invoked by the first speaker remains intact Absence of mutual agreement does not affect the mutual understanding of what the situation would be for there to be such agreement

The function of the formal world-concepts however is to prevent the stock of what is common from dissolving in the stream of subjectivities repeatedly reflected in one another

(Habermas 1981a 69)

So now what happens when the response is a lsquonorsquo reaction Can a hearer seriously reject a speech-act offer while complying with the strict process procedure and product presuppositions of the lsquoideal speech situationrsquo noted above Certainly according to Habermas The hearer who says lsquonorsquo is rejecting the otherrsquos claim on grounds of reason In doing so like the speaker the original hearer is not trying to exert influence beyond the force of the better argument Rather the hearer is appealing as if to a universal audience has thematized what is in dispute and is prepared to enter hypothetical discussion while the pressure for immediate action is held in abeyance and not only aims lsquoto produce cogent arguments that are convin-cing in virtue of their intrinsic propertiesrsquo but claims actually to have done so

It is on these grounds that the hearer rejects the speakerrsquos claim The speakerrsquos utterance does not accord with the world of existing states of affairs (it is untrue) or with the world of legitimately ordered interpersonal relations (it is normatively wrong) or perhaps with the speakerrsquos own subjective world (it is insincere) In short the hearerrsquos act of rejection is a counter-claim

And now what happens to the framework of world concepts thereby appealed to I will focus on the distinction between the external world (objective and social) and the internal (subjective) worlds of speakershearers Here Habermas sees an integration of non-expressive and expressive components of speech acts For every proposition (p) there is an lsquointention with the same meaningrsquo (propositional attitude)

with the assertion lsquoprsquo a speaker normally gives expression to the fact that he believes p hellip

In this way a certain assimilation of convictions hellip to the structure of emo-tional experiences take[s] place It is only this assimilation that makes it possible to draw clear boundaries between the internal and external worlds such that the beliefs of someone who asserts facts can be distinguished from the facts themselves hellip

(Habermas 1981b 67)


Beliefs are seen here to lsquobelongrsquo mainly to the speakerrsquos subjective world but not in the same sense as the object of reference when a speaker makes an explicit public claim about his subjective experience in communicative argumentation In the latter case the belief referred to can be regarded as lsquosomething analogous to the existence of states of affairs without assimilating one to the otherrsquo inasmuch as like a state of affairs it is what is at issue As such the speakerrsquos claim about it can be accepted or rejected It can for example be criticized on grounds of sin-cerity In the former case however the speaker does not claim that he has certain subjective beliefs but in the process of making a validity claim about the external world shows by his utterance that this is his belief (lsquogives expression to a belief or convictionrsquo) For Habermas this only becomes manifest when a speakerrsquos belief (or opinion or interpretation) turns out to be mistaken because now the false belief is definitively assimilated to the speakerrsquos experiential subjective world ndash chiefly defined in terms of desires and feelings

Desires and feelings have a paradigmatic status in this connection Of course cognitions [such as] beliefs hellip also belong to the subjective world but they stand in internal relation to the objective world Beliefs hellip come to conscious-ness as subjective only when there is in the objective world no corresponding state of affairs that exists hellip It becomes a question of lsquomerersquo that is lsquomistakenrsquo belief as soon as the corresponding statement turns out to be untrue


Elsewhere Habermas makes it clear that this is not the case in general or the ground for making truth claims about the external world would be removed We would be back to the closed system of subjective mirroring

If we ignore [the truth-claim that the actor connects with his opinion] we treat opinions as something subjective that is as something that when brought forth by the actor as his opinion [and] disclosed before a public has to be ascribed to his subjective world In this case we neutralize the claims to truth by treating opinions as expressive utterances and these can be objectively judged only from the standpoint of their sincerity

(Ibid 117)

Within this model therefore a hearer rejecting a speakerrsquos truth claim is rejecting a lsquomistakenrsquo belief on the grounds that lsquothere is in the objective world no cor-responding state of affairs that existsrsquo What the hearer rejects is in Habermasrsquo terms what thereby lsquobelongsrsquo to the speakerrsquos subjective world together with the speakerrsquos desires feelings and so on ndash it is a lsquomerersquo (mistaken) belief That is to say the hearer lsquoneutralizesrsquo the speakerrsquos claims to truth by treating them as expressive utterances According to the model this is what the rejection of a speech-act offer entails it is what saying lsquonorsquo says

But also according to the model this cannot be the end of the story So far we have only followed the logic inherent in the hearerrsquos counter-claim Habermasrsquo

Epistemology 155

analysis has been intersubjective but not yet polylogical In the communicative interchange that makes up the disagreement the hearerrsquos counter-claim is defined in terms of the speakerrsquos original claim and it is part of the definition of commun-icative action that neither has the last word

A definition of the situation by another party that prima facie diverges from ones own presents a problem of a peculiar sort for in cooperative processes of interpretation no participant has a monopoly on correct interpretation

(Ibid 100)

That is to say if the original speaker nevertheless persists in the assertion as is the case in this model of disagreement then the original speaker as hearer in turn thereby rejects the original hearerrsquos counterclaim The original hearerrsquos counterclaim is thereby rejected as a mistaken belief that belongs to the original hearerrsquos subjective world because no such corresponding state of affairs exists in the objective world

The framework of world-relations appealed to can now be seen to be com-prehensively involved (compromised) in the radical disagreement between communicative actors

In fact according to Habermasrsquo account this is what radical disagreement is Habermasrsquo account has arrived at the threshold of the territory of the phenomeno-logy of radical disagreement Yet this is exactly the point at which he breaks off Despite the formal equality that the lsquoyesrsquo and lsquonorsquo reactions appear to have in constituting criticizeability when it comes to actual criticism Habermas privileges the lsquoyesrsquo response

Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech hellip [T]he use of language with an orientation to reaching understanding is the original mode of language use upon which indirect understanding hellip and the instrumental use of language hellip are parasitic

(Ibid 288)

Verstaumlndigung (reaching understanding) is elided with the idea of Einverstaumlndnis (reaching agreement)

Coming to an understanding (Verstaumlndigung) means that participants in communication reach an agreement (Einigung) concerning the validity of an utterance agreement (Einverstaumlndnis) is the intersubjective recognition of the validity claim the speaker raises for it

Habermas for example distinguishes lsquocollective like-mindednessrsquo (Gleichstim-menheit) and lsquode facto accordrsquo (Ubereinstimmung) from genuine agreement (Einverstaumlndnis) and rationally motivated assent (Zustimmung) (1981a 287) and so on but nothing comparable is thought to be necessary in the case of the phenom-enon of radical disagreement


So it is that instead of exploring what actually happens to the framework of world relations when communicative actors disagree with each other by asking the con-flict parties Habermas responds to the challenge of a lsquodefinition of the situation by another party that prima facie diverges from onersquos ownrsquo by transposing his own third-party description

For both parties the interpretive task consists in incorporating the otherrsquos interpretation of the situation into onersquos own in such a way that in the revised version lsquohisrsquo external world and lsquomyrsquo external world can ndash against the back-ground of lsquoourrsquo lifeworld ndash be relativised in relation to lsquothersquo world and the divergent situation definitions can be brought to coincide sufficiently

(Habermas 1981a 110)

The forest of inverted commas lsquosubjectifiesrsquo the third-party description without altering its nature Habermas still does not follow through on what happens ndash in his new notation ndash when the radical disagreement is about lsquothersquo world

For the same reason Habermas preserves his watertight distinction between the background conditioning lifeworld (together with culture and language) that is lsquoconstitutive for mutual understanding as suchrsquo and provides the horizon that communicative actors lsquocannot step outsidersquo and the three formal world-concepts that lsquoconstitute a reference system for that about which mutual understanding is possiblersquo (1981b 126) Here he does recognize that culture and language may themselves become problematic in lsquorare momentsrsquo but sees this as merely in need of tinkering repairs from third-party specialists

It is only in those rare moments when culture and language fail as resources that they develop the peculiar resistance we experience in situations of dis-turbed mutual understanding Then we need the repair work of translators interpreters therapists


Habermas does not explore what happens when in radical disagreement appeal is made precisely to the distant horizon ndash but this too is then found to be part of what is at issue In short radical disagreement itself is not acknowledged in Habermasrsquo account His is an intersubjective but not a polylogical analysis In the end I do not think that Habermas offers a philosophy of radical disagreement at all

Hans-Georg Gadamer Truth and Method

As noted in Chapter 3 Gadamerrsquos insights have been widely influential in conflict resolution They are seen to offer a way of transcending cultural and political dif-ferences and managing conflict at the beginning of the twenty-first century In her book on Gadamer for example Georgia Warnke says

To the extent that individuals and cultures integrate this understanding of others

Epistemology 157

and of the differences between them within their own self- understanding to the extent in other words that they learn from others and take a wider more differentiated view they can acquire sensitivity subtlety and a capacity for discrimination

(Warnke 1987 174)

So what does Gadamerrsquos text say about the radical disagreements that are character-istic of the conflicts that Gadamerians are hoping thereby to overcome Does Truth and Method offer an adequate or satisfactory account of radical disagreement

Does Truth and Method offer a philosophy of radical disagreement

The key move that has made Gadamerian hermeneutics influential in conflict res-olution is his appeal to conversation as equivalent to the interpretation of a text The core of the hermeneutic process is viewed as a form of conversation or dialogue and genuine conversation or dialogue is regarded as an exercise in hermeneutics

In hermeneutics the application of the analogy enabled Gadamer to reinterpret tradition as a lsquopartner in conversationrsquo thereby transcending the one-sided limits of the lsquoromanticrsquo methodological hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey while incorporating insights from Husserl and Heidegger But what has been the effect in the other direction that is in the application of Gadamerian ideas drawn essentially from the hermeneutic tradition of textual interpretation to conversa-tional dialogue between political opponents in intense conflict situations

At first sight the signs seem good The entire hermeneutic world only springs into existence at the point where tradition becomes lsquoquestionablersquo and where pre-conception meets lsquoresistancersquo

Understanding becomes a special task only when this natural life in which each means and understands the same thing is disturbed

(Gadamer 1975 158ndash9)

The hermeneutic enterprise begins when we are pulled up short by a text or encounter a lsquoThoursquo that stands over against us and asserts its own rights against our proto-assumptions and interests This is the lsquoprimary hermeneutical conditionrsquo (Gadamer 1975 266)

Let us consider what this idea of distinguishing involves It is always recip-rocal Whatever is being distinguished must be distinguished from something which in turn must be distinguished from it Thus all distinguishing also makes visible that from which something is distinguished We have described this above as the operation of prejudices We started by saying that a herme-neutical situation is determined by the prejudices that we bring with us They constitute then the horizon of a particular present for they represent that beyond which it is impossible to see

(Ibid 272)


Fore-understandings and prejudices constitute our horizon but we only become aware of this when we are confronted by what does not fit in or challenges them

A person who does not accept that he is dominated by prejudices will fail to see what is shown by their light

(Ibid 324)

What Gadamer calls lsquotruersquo or lsquoproductiversquo prejudices are an integral part of the lsquohermeneutic consciousnessrsquo and as interpreters of human experience we should actively seek out what is most likely to make us aware of them These are the prejudices that lsquomake understanding possiblersquo Gadamer contrasts these with the lsquounproductive prejudicesrsquo that lsquohinder understanding and lead to misunderstand-ingrsquo (Ibid 263)

In view of all this Gadamer might be expected to have made a strenuous effort to come to terms with the fact of mutual contradiction and disagreement as the most characteristic manifestation of lsquoresistancersquo in conversational mode and the decisive linguistic feature in the critical encounter with the lsquoThoursquo that generates the whole hermeneutic experience

Yet this turns out not to be the case Far from developing the theme of lin-guistic confrontation as an important part of the hermeneutic challenge Gadamer says almost nothing more about it and where he does comment he is invariably dismissive He regards agonistic argument pro and contra as a purely formal and derivative aspect of the realm of dialectic whose serious purpose is on the contrary always a search for shared meaning and truth within the realm of lived experience He associates disagreement with a generalization of those lsquounproductive preju-dicesrsquo that lsquohinder understanding and lead to misunderstandingrsquo

This implies a severe downgrading of the status of the judgment or statement in Gadamerian hermeneutics

[The] concept of the statement the dialectical accentuation of it to the point of contradiction is hellip in extreme contrast to the nature of the hermeneutical experience and the linguistic nature of human experience of the world

(Gadamer 1975 425)

Instead Gadamerrsquos whole concern is with the opposite ndash the suspension of judg-ment and the transmutation of the statement into what he calls lsquothe questionrsquo It is to an analysis of the logical structure of the question that he devotes his best energies and most of the subsequent space available and it is only the lsquotruersquo question that ushers in productive dialogue and conversation and constitutes the dialectical link to the whole world of universal hermeneutics itself

All suspension of judgments and hence a fortiori of prejudices has logically the structure of a question

(Ibid 266)

Epistemology 159

The art of questioning is called lsquodialecticrsquo because it is the lsquoart of conducting a real conversationrsquo (Ibid 330) It is identified with the lsquoart of thinkingrsquo itself

That is why when Gadamer is looking for a conversational equivalent in Part III for the hermeneutical insight in Part II that it is lsquoin situations in which understand-ing is disrupted or made difficultrsquo that lsquothe conditions of all understanding emerge with the greatest clarityrsquo(Ibid 346) instead of finding it in radical disagreement he turns instead to the safer analogy of translation between languages It is lsquothe linguistic process by means of which a conversation in two different languages is made possible through translationrsquo that Gadamer selects as being lsquoespecially informativersquo here

One language no more answers back another language than a text answers back an interpreter Gadamer is aware of this He acknowledges that lsquothe hermeneutic situation in regard to textsrsquo is not lsquoexactly the same as that between two people in conversationrsquo (Ibid 349) The word lsquoexactlyrsquo suggests that he does not consider this to be a very significant difference Unlike passages of conversation texts are lsquopermanently fixed expressions of lifersquo which means that

one partner in the hermeneutical conversation the text is expressed only through the other partner the interpreter

(Ibid 354)

In fact Gadamer sees this difference as a gain for hermeneutic insight

precisely because it entirely detaches the sense of what is said from the person saying it the written word makes the reader in his understanding of it arbiter of its claim to truth

(Gadamer 1975 356)

This is a decisive difference between textual hermeneutics and conversational dia-logue and it rules out the relevance of serious political disagreement at a stroke Texts do not answer back as conversational partners do So the hermeneutic-dialogic tradition must ignore the latter The result is predictable What Gadamer calls lsquothe really critical question of hermeneuticsrsquo ndash that of lsquodistinguishing the true prejudices by which we understand from the false ones by which we misunder-standrsquo (1975 266) ndash has to be left to the interpreter to answer as best she can acting as lsquoarbiterrsquo in herhis own lsquoconversationrsquo with the text

Several other features of Gadamerrsquos hermeneutics in Truth and Method rule it out as offering an adequate account of radical disagreement

One example is that for Gadamer the lsquotrue home of hermeneuticsrsquo is in the intermediate area lsquobetween strangeness and familiarityrsquo (Ibid 262ndash3) In her-meneutics these are not two different moments of apprehension Instead they are seen to constitute a single authentic hermeneutic experience (albeit constantly repeated and renewed) in which it is only through the awareness of conceptual limits that they are thereby transcended lsquoin the process of understanding there takes place a real fusing of horizons which means that as the historical horizon is


projected it is simultaneously removedrsquo (1975 273) In other words the process of hermeneutic fusing of horizons is instantaneous and ongoing and is nothing other than the unfolding of understanding itself Transferring this to the realm of conversation there is no gap in Gadamerian dialogue between the lsquostrangenessrsquo of lsquotalking at cross-purposesrsquo (mutual misunderstanding) and lsquoagreeing about the objectrsquo (mutual agreement) (Gadamer 1975 331) But these are precisely the limits to radical disagreement So radical disagreement is not recognized in Gadamerian hermeneutics at all

Gadamer offers the important insight shared with the phenomenology of radical disagreement that lsquoseeing each otherrsquos pointrsquo means acknowledging the otherrsquos point of view not merely as a point-of-view This would be to ignore the otherrsquos lsquoclaim to truthrsquo But Gadamer has no interest in what happens when there is a clash between claims to truth His conclusion is that to see the otherrsquos point of view is to be moving towards agreement about the shared object of enquiry In this sense to understand is to agree about the object and the alternative to agreement is once again not radical disagreement but misunderstanding The hermeneuticist prevails over the analyst of conversation

We have already seen in the analysis of romantic hermeneutics that understand-ing is not based on lsquogetting insidersquo another person on the immediate fusing of one person in another To understand what a person says is as we saw to agree about the object not to get inside another person and relive his experiences

(Gadamer 1975 345)

But as seen in Chapter 5 agonistic dialogue is disagreement about the objectSo it is that Gadamerrsquos lsquogenuinersquo conversation is between interlocutors who

are hermeneutically trained in the interpretation of texts (in this case each otherrsquos utterances) The emphasis in overcoming prejudice is placed throughout on the interpretative capacities of hearers No account is taken of the possibility that a speaker may answer back independently of the interpreter and refuse to play the interpreterrsquos hermeneutic game ndash for example by rejecting the interpretation or even the whole hermeneutic enterprise or by refusing to lsquosuspend the validityrsquo of his own original lsquoprejudicersquo or belief

This does not mean that Gadamerrsquos hermeneutics does not offer valuable insights into the nature of radical disagreement It does so at those points of slippage where it comes up against the shadow of radical disagreement without explicitly confronting it These are the creative equivocations that accompany Gadamerrsquos wrestlings with the concept of lsquoagreement about the objectrsquo the nature of lsquonaiumlve assimilation of horizonsrsquo or lsquopremature fusion of horizonsrsquo (how can we know when we are covering up the tension that would otherwise reveal our own horizon to us ndash would we not by definition be unaware that this was so) and his magni-ficent concluding soliloquy in Part III of his book on the relationship between language and the world

But Truth and Method is not nor did it purport to be a philosophy of radical disagreement

Epistemology 161

Attempts to apply Gadamerrsquos hermeneutics to the transformation of radical disagreement

Gadamer did not offer a theory of radical disagreement but other philosophers have related his work more specifically to the task of transcending cultural and political differences and managing conflict at the beginning of the twenty-first century In a collection of essays presented on the occasion of Gadamerrsquos hundredth birthday in 2002 (Malpas et al eds) for example Ulrich Arnswald draws a parallel with the thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein while John McDowell and Charles Taylor invoke the philosophy of Donald Davidson in presenting Gadamerian approaches to the management of contemporary conflict Arnswald is representative in argu-ing that

[Gadamerrsquos] single most important insight may turn out to be a conceptual scheme that allows us to overcome cultural conflicts as well as clashes of different forms of life

(Arnswald 2002 35)

McDowell equates Gadamerrsquos hermeneutics with Davidsonrsquos work on radical trans-lation and Gadmerrsquos fusion of horizons with Davidsonrsquos lsquoprinciple of charityrsquo

What we are faced with before a fusion of horizons is the world together with a candidate for being understood as another way of conceiving it and we have a guarantee ndash if what confronts us is really another thinking subject ndash that it will be possible to understand the otherrsquos engagements with the world as expressive of another view of the world we had in view all along

(McDowell 2002 180 see also 19946)

Davidsonrsquos rejection of the schemeworld dualism and refutation of the idea of total unintelligibility (untranslatability) between human cultures thereby opens the door to the possibility of radical disagreement (he removes one of the limits) Davidson also notes that lsquogiving up the dualism of scheme and worldrsquo does not mean giving up unmediated contact with the world of lsquofamiliar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or falsersquo (1984 198) This echoes Gadamerrsquos rather more subjectivist wording lsquoevery worldview has the world in view as everything that is the case not as everything that it takes to be the casersquo (1975 note 32 192) ndash and is familiar from what is shown in the uncovering of the moments of radical disagreeing in Chapter 5

At this highly abstract level the phenomenon of radical disagreement can be said to exist between the limit of absolute misunderstanding ruled out by Davidson and the limit of a fusion of horizons delineated by Gadamer But what happens phenomenologically if when we lsquoface the world together with a candidate for being understood as another way of conceiving itrsquo we find that this is a radical disagree-ment and that the other expressly rejects the idea that what she is saying is merely lsquoexpressive of another view of the world we had in view all alongrsquo


To investigate this it is illuminating to include Taylorrsquos version of the Davidson Gadamer approach (Taylor 2002) Taylor does not claim to be dealing with radical disagreement but with cross-cultural understanding Nevertheless his insight is instructive He imagines a conversation between representatives from radically different cultures who

strive to come to an understanding to overcome the obstacles to mutual com-prehension to find a language in which both can agree to talk undistortively of each

So what happens when originally distinct horizons (the different lsquoway that each has of understanding the human condition in their non-identityrsquo) meet

For instance we become aware that there are different ways of believing things one of which is holding them as a lsquopersonal opinionrsquo This was all that we allowed for before but now we have space for other ways and can therefore accommodate the beliefs of a quite different culture Our horizon is extended to take in this possibility which was beyond its limit before

But this is better seen as a fusion rather than just an extension of horizons because at the same time we are introducing a language to talk about their beliefs that represents an extension in relation to their language Presumably they had no idea of what we speak of a[s] lsquopersonal opinionsrsquo at least in such areas as religion for instance They would have had to see these as rejection rebellion and heresy So the new language used here which places lsquoopinionsrsquo alongside other modes of believing as possible alternative ways of holding things true opens a broader horizon extending beyond both the original ones and in a sense combining them

(Taylor 2002 287)

Now let us apply this to an example Taylorrsquos central idea is that lsquothe horizon is extended so as to make room for the object that before did not fit within itrsquo How does this relate to radical disagreement between those who want to estab-lish western-style democracy in say Afghanistan or Iraq and those who want to reject it

Democracy means sovereignty for man And as a Muslim we believe sover-eignty for the Sharia

In the American form of democracy any issue is allowed to be put to a vote of the people and the majority decision prevails upon all Can we Muslims put an issue that has already been decided for us by Allah up for a vote and accept the will of the majority if they vote against the will of Allah Of course we cannot so therefore we can never accept democracy as defined practised and promoted by America

(Abu Musab 2003)

Epistemology 163

In Taylorrsquos version of Gadamerrsquos fusion of horizons let us begin by identifying ourselves with those who want to establish western democracy We are confronted by an initially alien culture in which there is no place for the idea that lsquopersonal opinionrsquo should decide forms of government by majority vote What we see as legitimate personal opinion the other sees as rejection of the word of Allah rebel-lion against His wishes and heresy that must be stamped out before it spreads its corruption So we expand our horizon to accommodate the realization that there are evidently other ways of believing things than our own Beliefs are not just personal opinions after all They are also the revealed word of Allah given to the people of the world as their religion so that the true believers are those who obey His will as set out in His Holy Qurrsquoan the Sunnah of His prophet Muhammad and His laws (Sharia)

But in the political context of intractable conflict and radical disagreement ndash for example in Aghanistan ndash what does it mean to say that we are expanding our horizon to take in what was before outside it If we are the only ones making the adjustment what difference will this make to our actions Will we submit to what the other wants and acquiesce in the establishment of Sharia If not is the other not likely to reject our self-proclaimed expanded understanding as yet another hypo-critical ruse for getting our way Is this in fact not what Islamists do say

And what of the reciprocal move outlined by Taylor For there to be a fusion of horizons must those wanting to impose Sharia learn to speak a lsquonew languagersquo that lsquoplaces ldquoopinionsrdquo alongside other modes of believing as possible alternat-ive ways of holding things truersquo Does this include non-Muslim opinions What does lsquoalongsidersquo mean in the context of the struggle between western democracy and Sharia Is there room for this Would not those who want to impose Sharia reject the whole idea that this lsquoopens a broader horizon extending beyond both the original ones and in a sense combining themrsquo Would they not see this too as yet another way of insidiously indoctrinating Muslims and of undermining Islam from within Is this not what many Muslims (and not only Muslims) do say about ecumenicism and the interfaith movement for example

Conclusion

I have yet to find an adequate third-party account of the phenomenon of radical dis-agreement During the course of the search I have reached the conclusion that there is no adequate theory or philosophy of radical disagreement And that the reason for this is because monological models cannot chart what is polylogical However subtle these models are they cannot encompass a different order of complexity that as a result appears only in the form of extreme simplicity

But the fact that putative models of radical disagreement break down does not mean that they are uninformative It is why they break down that signifies The best models are those that in their breakdown shed most light From Gadamer comes the idea of radical disagreement as a clash of horizons From Habermas comes the idea of radical disagreement as a war between incompatible validity claims From Foucault comes the idea of radical disagreement as a fight between historians to


determine what are mere regimes of truth From Barthes comes the idea of radical disagreement as a battle between (de)mythologists From Davidson comes the idea of radical disagreement as the obstinate invocation of the schemeworld dualism by the conflict parties From Derrida comes the idea of radical disagreement as the eruption of binaries that refuse to be pre-deconstructed From Nietzsche comes the idea of radical disagreement as the sudden appearance of the counter-prophet and the exchange of hammer blow for hammer blow

This chapter has shown why third party description and explanation breaks down in relation to specific examples of radical disagreement in intractable conflicts And it has clarified how as a result dialogue for mutual understanding based on such description and explanation often proves premature in these cases What are the practical implications of this Are there alternative approaches that might gain more purchase These questions are addressed in the next chapter

7 PraxisManaging agonistic dialogue

Lessons learnt from the exploration and understanding of agonistic dialogue assist the management of radical disagreement when conflict resolution fails In these circumstances lsquodialogue for mutual understandingrsquo is premature What is needed is the promotion of lsquodialogue for strategic engagementrsquo not less radical disagree-ment but more It is the strategic engagement of discourses (SED) ndash the logic of the war of words itself ndash that keeps open the possibility of future transformation when linguistic intractability closes down other forms of verbal communication It clarifies what is at issue in the struggle between the challenging discourse the hegemonic discourse and the third-party (peacemaking) discourse and what each of the competing discourses has to do in order to prevail The distinction between extremism of ends and extremism of means is often a key to breaking the deadlock between undefeated conflict parties

This chapter tests the implications of Chapters 5 and 6 for the management of linguistic intractability in the most difficult of all conflict arenas at the time of writing ndash the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Chapter 5 showed how in agonistic dialogue (dialogue among enemies) the rad-ical disagreement is a struggle to define what it is about reaching as far as the eye can see and involving the very distinctions invoked in the process of disagreeing This is not a coexistence of rival discourses but a fight to the death to impose the one discourse

Chapter 6 showed how as a result of this third parties whether as analysts or as interveners are not discursively impartial There is no adequate third-party description or philosophy of radical disagreement Third-party peacemakers find that they too are part of the struggle seeking to transform the agonistic dialogue by substituting a third discourse of their own

Serious political conflicts end in many ways in victory for one of the conflict parties in some form of agreed standoff or accommodation in contextual change that transforms the parameters that defined them (who now remembers the never-resolved conflict between Guelphs and Ghibellines ndash supporters of the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor ndash that convulsed Europe in the Middle Ages) I return to these scenarios in Chapter 8 Here the concern is with what happens in the communicative sphere while intense unresolved political conflicts persist How


can continuing linguistic intractability between undefeated conflict parties be managed

In these cases conflict parties do not respond to conflict resolution efforts such as those outlined in Chapter 3 Conflict parties refuse to distinguish positions from interests and needs resist reframing competition into shared problem solving will not convert adversarial debate into constructive controversy do not change statements into questions or fuse horizons fail to recognize the systemic nature of the conflict or that they only have a partial view of it do not acknowledge the legitimacy of the otherrsquos narrative do not recognise overlapping consensus are not prepared to transform the language and practice of power into a non-politicized lsquoideal speech situationrsquo and in general directly challenge the very bases on which third-party discourse analysis and third-party peace intervention are constructed

What can be done in these casesIn these circumstances the practical implication of what has been shown in

Chapters 5 and 6 is to abandon attempts at promoting dialogue for mutual under-standing altogether There is no point in persisting There is no conceptual or emotional space for it yet The effort is premature Instead the main effort shifts to the promotion of dialogue for strategic engagement not less radical disagree-ment but more What is required is the strategic engagement of discourses (SED) That is what is most lacking in the communicative sphere during times of greatest linguistic intractability

How does this apply to the Israeli-Palestinian caseAs made clear in Chapter 4 a conflict system is made up of related and over-

lapping conflict complexes such as the Middle East conflict complex or the AfghanistanndashPakistan conflict complex Each conflict complex encompasses nested conflict formations The Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation for example is set within the wider Arab-Israeli conflict formation which includes unresolved conflicts both between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon The Arab-Israeli conflict formation is itself located within the still wider Middle East conflict arena that includes Iran and Turkey This reaches out to affect global conflict dynamics that involve the aspirations of radical Islamic and Judeo-Christian fundamentalisms and the geo-political interests of the United States

As analysis moves up and down between and among conflict formations con-flict parties become third parties and vice versa ndash although as already shown this distinction is itself found to be involved in the associated radical disagreements

Axes of radical disagreement criss-cross the conflict arena and constitute the linguistic intractability that reinforces the complex as a whole Important axes of radical disagreement cut cross the various conflict formations In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation for example internal discursive struggles within Israel and among Palestinians are often more bitter than those between the conflict parties themselves and reach out to convulse the Jewish and Palestinian diasporas which are larger than the number of those living in the disputed territ-ories And the outcome of the conflict at the level of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation may mainly be a function of wider confrontations at a higher level such as Egyptian and Saudi fears of Iran Israelis see Hamas as an instrument of its exiled

Praxis 167

leadership in Syria controlled and supplied from Iran whose regional ambitions ndash and the interests of its regime ndash include a need to demonize Israel Nevertheless without forgetting this the emphasis in the rest of this chapter will be on the axes of radical disagreement that run within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation

At the time of writing (April 2009) many say that the next few months will be the most critical in a generation as the determination of the new Obama US administration to end the conflict meets the equally determined resistance of the new Netanyahu Israeli government against ceding a viable Palestinian state to make this possible ndash nothing less than the lsquolast chance for a two-state IsraelndashPalestine agreementrsquo (USMiddle East Project 2008)

By the time this book is published we will see whose predictions are nearest the mark But the main purpose of this chapter is not to make predictions nor even to offer yet another third-party political analysis and list of recommendations Predictions are by definition highly unreliable in complex conflict systems The aim is to exemplify what the promotion of a strategic engagement of discourses (SED) implies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation in its darkest hour when all other communicative options seem to have run into the sand The main evidence for the possibility of keeping strategic exploration open in this way even during times of maximum intractability is taken from an attempt to test this out in 2007 and 2008 as part of a European Union-funded project run by the Oxford Research Group together with Israeli and Palestinian partners1

Preparations for this enterprise confirmed that few Israelis or Palestinians at the time were interested in dialogue for mutual understanding Palestinians identified dialogue for mutual understanding with the normalization of oppression and the interminable peace process with perpetual occupation Israelis regarded dialogue for mutual understanding as pointless in view of past Palestinian unreliability were not particularly interested in the Palestinian question now that security had been restored in the West Bank ndash continuing rockets from Gaza merely confirming the dangers of Israeli military withdrawal ndash and were much more concerned by the nuclear threat from Iran Arab peace overtures were interpreted as a trap to des-troy a Jewish State of Israel Persistent failure in the Oslo peace process since the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 had led to mutual disillusionment

Deep internal divisions on both sides together with weak leaderships had blocked progress on the 2003 Road Map and the November 2007 Annapolis initiative even among those who genuinely desired it Israelis were deeply wor-ried about national disunity as a result of immigration and demographic trends socio-economic and cultural-geographic diversity and above all religioussecular divisions which were exacerbated by the passing away of the first heroic genera-tion of Israeli leaders Palestinians were in despair about their internal religioussecular and generational divides geographical separation and above all the dis-astrous HamasFatah struggle to fill the power vacuum after the death of Yasser Arafat These divisions were seen to play into the hands of Palestinian enemies intent on lsquodivide and rulersquo

These were the features that framed linguistic intractability and rendered


dialogue for mutual understanding impossible There was no discursive space for it And this was the environment in which only dialogue for strategic engagement and the resulting strategic engagement of discourses (SED) could keep channels of communication open between the conflict parties shed light on the internal economy of the radical disagreement that constituted linguistic intractability and therefore illuminate what would need to be done in the linguistic sphere if violence was ever to be transmuted into non-violent struggle It was also the only way in which third parties would be able to understand their own involvement and deter-mine what was required if their own discourse was to prevail

In these circumstances the natural programme was to acknowledge the force of the existing conflict dynamic and to work with it rather than against it The programme was driven by the logic inherent in the very fact of linguistic intract-ability As seen in Chapter 4 within a given conflict configuration the strategic engagement of discourses operates at three interlocking levels

bull Level 1 Intra-Party Strategic Engagement of Discourses (SED 1) The strategic engagement of discourses begins not with dialogue between

conflict parties but with inclusive strategic thinking within each conflict party considered separately ndash as and when the desire to overcome the internal divi-sions seen to threaten the national project becomes strong enough to counteract the influence of would-be internal hegemons wanting to impose their own exclusive discourses The motive for pursuing intra-party strategic discurs-ive engagement of this kind is not to promote mutual understanding with the enemy On the contrary it is the fear that internal weakness will jeopardize the external national struggle

bull Level 2 Inter-Party Strategic Engagement of Discourses (SED 2) Only in the light of sustained inclusive strategic thinking within each conflict

party and as a natural extension of the logic of strategic thinking itself can the process evolve into the strategic engagement of discourses between conflict parties that is made possible as a result In general in asymmetric conflicts it is the challenging discourse (the discourse of the weaker party ndash the challenger) that has a greater incentive to promote strategic engagement while the hege-monic discourse (the discourse of the more powerful party ndash the possessor) has a greater interest in ignoring or suppressing it Either way where there is strategic engagement each partyrsquos main aim is once again not to understand the other but to win

bull Level 3 Third Party Strategic Engagement of Discourses (SED 3) Finally and as a further natural extension of the logic of strategic engagement

comes the involvement of third parties ndash for example third parties appealed to by the conflict parties in the course of their strategic linguistic struggle Of particular interest here is the engagement of the discourses of those third parties who see themselves as or claim to be disinterested peacemakers These are now recognized as yet further discourses struggling to occupy the

Praxis 169

whole of the discursive space and to dictate the course of unfolding events To the extent that they acknowledge their lack of discursive impartiality and the radical disagreements between themselves and the conflict parties (as also among and within themselves) would-be third-party peacemakers may be able to anticipate the consequences of their own involvement more clearly And to the extent that they understand the detailed dynamics of the strategic engagement of discourses both within and between the conflict parties they may be able to maximize their effectiveness

This in a nutshell is the natural dynamic for managing agonistic dialogue and lin-guistic intractability when conflict settlement and conflict transformation avenues are blocked It is a dynamic which is dictated by the very nature of the web of radical disagreements that constitutes linguistic intractability It can certainly keep channels of communication open when other approaches fail Whether it can even-tually form a bridge for the reintroduction of these other approaches depends on all the other factors ndash including the non-linguistic ones ndash that drive the conflict

In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the Obama peace initiative which was imminent at the time of writing (April 2009) may bear fruit Most experts are sceptical or highly pessimistic as are the conflict parties On the other hand in highly complex conflict systems experience suggests that it is when the outlook seems bleakest that possibilities for change can unexpectedly open up and lsquohard-linersrsquo can sometimes deliver change more easily than lsquomoderatesrsquo Either way this chapter concerns the period before this became possible which is the period of maximum intractability between the collapse of the Camp DavidTaba talks in 2000ndash1 and the election of a right-wing Israeli government in April 2009 This period includes the second Palestinian intifada and the suicide bombing campaign the Sharon governmentrsquos response to them the building of the lsquoseparation barrierrsquo and support for continuing Israeli settler encroachment in the West Bank together with roadblocks lsquobypass roadsrsquo and military outposts the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007 and the rocket attacks on Israel the Israeli retaliation in 2008ndash9

The question to be addressed in this chapter is in these circumstances of max-imum polarization and linguistic intractability how can the promotion of a strategic engagement of discourses ndash the exploration of agonistic dialogue itself ndash offer the best way of managing the radical disagreements that lie at its core

In what follows I will quote as much as possible and comment as sparingly as possible because in the internal economy of radical disagreement it is what con-flict parties and involved third parties say that speaks louder than any third-party commentator

The strategic engagement of discourses level one PalestinianndashPalestinian ndash the challenging discourse

In asymmetric conflicts the challenging discourse is the discourse of the materially weaker party In this case it is the Palestinian discourse because in relation to the Israelis the Palestinians are both qualitatively at a disadvantage (they do not have


a state) and quantitatively much less powerful ndash in terms of control of territory military capacity and economic resources I turn in the next section to the fact that within the wider Arab and Islamic world Jewish Israelis are a tiny minority and it is the Israeli discourse that is drowned out This is in turn counter-balanced by the fact that within the Judeo-Christian world it is the Israeli discourse that once again predominates and in the United States has virtually become a joint Israeli-US discourse

The prime initial consideration then is whether despite their own severe internal radical disagreements Palestinians have a strong incentive to engage in inclusive strategic thinking aimed at maximizing Palestinian national coherence and effectiveness in relation to the outside world The answer in this case has been unequivocal Palestinians from across the spectrum of difference (HamasFatah Islamistsecular gender profession class age location including the countries of the diaspora) say that they have a very strong incentive to speak if not with one voice then at least in such a way that optimizes internal Palestinian cohesion and consequently projects it outwards with maximum force This is the main driver of the first part of the SED process It is not a wish by Palestinians to promote mutual understanding with the enemy but rather a fierce determination to enhance their own strength

The result of this logic was the setting up of an inclusive Palestine Strategy Group (PSG) in 2006ndash7 In his piece Palestinians Calculating Next Move Coexistence With Occupation Not an Option Sam Bahour a participant wrote

Palestinians have been historically outmanoeuvred politically neutralised and made totally dependent on international handouts Or have they A newly released Palestinian strategy document which outlines strategic polit-ical options gives witness to a renewed breath of fresh air in the Palestiniansrsquo struggle for freedom and independence After 60 years of dispossession and 40 years of brutal Israeli military occupation many of the worldrsquos power brokers are convinced that the Palestinians are successfully being forced into submission and acceptance of the colossal injustices that have been carried out against them

What the international community fails to mention is that the dynamic on the ground is explosive The Israeli military occupation is alive and well and causing structural possibly irrevocable damage to Palestinian lands and persons The Jewish-only Israeli settlement enterprise is off the leash and building more and more illegal settlements as if there were no tomorrow The failing (or failed) health care system and education system in Palestine is producing a generation of Palestinians with much less to lose and little hope for the future

Over the past several months I participated together with a group of 45 Palestinians from all walks of life men and women on the political right and left secular and religious politicians academics civil society business actors from occupied Palestine inside Israel and in the Diaspora We were a group that is a microcosm that reflects the dynamics of Palestinian society

Praxis 171

We could not all meet in one room anywhere in the world because of the travel restrictions that Israel has created Nevertheless we continue to plan and to act Our mission is to open a discussion on where we go from here What are the Palestiniansrsquo strategic options if any

After several workshops in Palestine and abroad and a continuous online debate we have produced the first iteration of Regaining The Initiative Palestinian Strategic Options to End Israeli Occupation published in Arabic and English The document is posted at wwwpalestinestrategygroupps and reflects an alternative to an official but impotent Palestinian discourse that will very shortly in the judgement of most Palestinians run head-on into a brick (cement) wall

(Sam Bahour 30 August 2008)

Box 71 gives the Executive Summary of Regaining the Initiative 27 August 2008

Box 71 Regaining the Initiative executive summary 27 August 2008

Source Palestine Strategy Group 2008 2ndash6

bull The current negotiations in the lsquoAnnapolisrsquo peace initiative have reached a critical point On the sixtieth anniversary of the Naqba after twenty years of fruitless negotiation for a Palestinian state on the basis of the historic recognition by the PLO in 1988 of the existence of the State of Israel it is time for Palestinians to reconsider this entire strategic path to their national objectives Although already greatly infl ated beyond the original 57 allotted in UN General Assembly Resolution 181 in 1947 Israel shows no sign of accepting even the 78 of historic Palestine that lies within the 1967 borders but continues to encroach beyond them in order to create new lsquofacts on the groundrsquo that will progressively render an independent Palestinian state on the remaining 22 inoperable A weak Israeli government is confronted by strong internal resistance to any compromises whatsoever while a divided Israeli public is not ready to take the necessary risks Indeed Israel refuses formally and consistently even to accept the fact that it is an occupying power with concomitant duties in international law Instead Israel calculates that a negotiated two state outcome on the 1988 basis is permanently available and supposes that it can perpetually hold out for better alternatives to a negotiated agreement The Israeli position rests on the assumption that procrastination will continue to tilt the strategic balance increasingly in Israelrsquos favour In short Israel is not a serious negotiating partner

bull The central proposal in this Report is that Israelrsquos strategic calculations are wrong Israeli strategic planners overestimate their own strength and underestimate the strategic opportunities open to Palestinians There are four main perceived alternatives to a negotiated agreement that are attractive to Israel and therefore prevent Israel from reaching a fi nal settlement on the terms offered It is a key strategic aim of Palestinians to make clear to Israel why these four alternatives are simply not available

First the default option of prolonging negotiations indefi nitely by pretending that lsquoprogress has been madersquo and that suspensions are temporary as during


the past twenty years with ongoing encroachments and military incursions few burdens and considerable fi nancial and other benefi ts from continuing occupation

Second a pseudo provisional lsquotwo state agreementrsquo with a strengthened but severely constrained Palestinian Authority masquerading as a Palestinian government while Israel disaggregates and picks off the lsquohistoric issuesrsquo and retains permanent control

Third a unilateral separation dictated by Israel as in the withdrawal from and siege of Gaza and the building of the illegal separation wall

Fourth a control of the occupied territories by Egypt and Jordan

bull But these four alternatives are unacceptable to Palestinians They do not take Palestinian national aspirations seriously Indeed they aim to undermine Palestiniansrsquo national identity and rights altogether So if Israel refuses to negotiate seriously for a genuine two-state outcome Palestinians can and will block all four of them by switching to an alternative strategy made up of a combination of four linked reorientations to be undertaken singly or together

First the defi nitive closing down of the 1988 negotiation option so long abused by Israel This blocks the fi rst two preferred Israeli alternatives to a genuine negotiated agreement

Second the reconstitution of the Palestinian Authority so that it will not serve future Israeli interests by legitimising indefi nite occupation and protecting Israel from bearing its full burden of the costs of occupation (it may become a Palestinian Resistance Authority) This also blocks the fi rst two preferred Israeli alternatives and also helps to block the third

Third the elevation of lsquosmartrsquo resistance over negotiation as the main means of implementation for Palestinians together with a reassertion of national unity through reform of the PLO the empowerment of Palestinians and the orchestrated eliciting of regional and international third party support The central aim will be to maximise the cost of continuing occupation for Israel and to make the whole prospect of unilateral separation unworkable

Fourth the shift from a two state outcome to a (bi-national or unitary democratic) single state outcome as Palestiniansrsquo preferred strategic goal This reopens a challenge to the existence of the State of Israel in its present form but in an entirely new and more effective way than was the case before 1988

Is this what Israel wants Israel cannot prevent Palestinians from a strategic reorientation along these lines Does Israel really want to force Palestinians to take these steps

bull The result of a reorientation of Palestinian strategy will clearly be much worse for Israel than the negotiation of a genuine two state outcome on the basis of the existing 1988 offer Although many Palestinians may still prefer a genuine negotiated two state solution a failure of the present Annapolis initiative will greatly strengthen those who argue against this Most Palestinians are then likely

Praxis 173

to be convinced that a negotiated agreement is no longer possible What is undoubtedly the case is that a reversal of the 1988 offer and the adoption of an alternative strategy is much preferable for Palestinians to any of the four preferred Israeli alternatives to a negotiated agreement So if current negotiations fail Palestinians will be driven to replace the 1988 offer by a new strategy not just rhetorically but in reality The negotiated two state outcome will then be defi nitively cancelled Palestinians will ensure that Israel is seen to be responsible for the closure of their 20 year offer Israel will have lost a historic and non-recurrent opportunity to end the confl ict and to secure its own future survival on the best terms available for Israel

bull In short Palestinians are able to block all four of Israelrsquos best alternatives to a genuine negotiated outcome via a fundamental reorientation of strategy Israel is not able to block this reorientation The result of such a reorientation would be far worse for Israel than that of a genuine negotiated outcome The result of such a reorientation would be far better for Palestinians than any of Israelrsquos best alternatives to a genuine negotiated outcome Therefore when Palestinians calculate that a genuine negotiated outcome is no longer available they undoubtedly will reorientate their strategy not only rhetorically but in reality and will fi nally close down their twenty year 1988 offer

bull Palestinians therefore have three main immediate parallel strategic tasks which it is the central purpose of this Report to outline

bull The fi rst strategic task is the detailed working out of a fundamental reorientation of Palestinian strategy along the lines outlined above including the new preferred strategic path and the full range of means of implementation All of this is commented upon in the main body of the Report This task must be undertaken in all seriousness and on the assumption that present negotiations will fail Even if only used as a strategic threat in order to force Israel to negotiate seriously the intention must still be to implement the new strategy should negotiations fail An empty threat is strategically no threat A mere bluff does not work So it is now an urgent priority for Palestinians to agree and work out in detail their alternative to a negotiated agreement and to communicate this as soon as possible and as forcefully as possible to Israel This must be the immediate focus of unifi ed national strategic planning that includes all Palestinians from different backgrounds generations genders and political affi liations both those living in the occupied territories and those living elsewhere

bull The second strategic task is to make sure that Israel understands the terms on which the 1988 offer is still held open by Palestinians and is clear about what Palestinians can and will do should these terms not be met Has a national movement ever made a concession on a similar scale to that made by Palestinians in 1988 In November 1988 the Palestine Liberation Organisation recognised by Palestinians as their sole representative made the extraordinary sacrifi ce of accepting the existence of the State of Israel and determining to establish an independent Palestinian state on the remaining 22 of historic Palestine in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (PNC Political Communique Algiers 15 November 1988) In negotiations Israelis repeatedly say lsquowe do all the giving and the Palestinians do all the takingrsquo This is the opposite of the truth Palestinians continue to demand no more than 22 of their historic land It is Israel that has done all the taking through continuous


The main body of Regaining the Initiative includes

bull prerequisitesbull strategic objectivesbull possible future scenarios with evaluations of their relative desirability or

undesirability for Palestiniansbull evaluation of capacity to implement or block attractive or unattractive scen-

arios (feasibility)bull strategic options and the preferred strategic path (the preferred scenario

reserve scenarios rejected scenarios)bull means of implementationbull revision points and assessment of alternative strategiesbull review of alternatives to a negotiated outcome for Palestinians and Israelisbull action plan

government-backed settler encroachment on this remaining 22 The second strategic task for Palestinians therefore is to spell out the minimum terms acceptable for negotiating a fully independent Palestinian state on 1967 borders and to explain clearly why this is by far the best offer that Israel will ever get including guarantees for Israelrsquos future security from neighbouring Arab states Palestinians will set out a clear timetable for judging whether this has been attained or is attainable It is Palestinians who will judge lsquosuccessrsquo and it is Palestinians who will decide how long to persist in negotiations and when the moment has come to change strategy entirely

bull The third strategic task is to ensure that it is the Palestinian discourse that frames international discussion of the Palestinian future This is elucidated in the Report The aim is to make clear to regional and international third parties that in all this it is not Palestinians who are lacking in commitment to a negotiated outcome but Israel Palestinians have persisted for twenty years with their historic offer of 1988 Israel has refused to honour it That is why Israeli protestations are no longer credible to Palestinians Israel has given Palestinians no option but to look elsewhere for fulfi lment of their national aspirations Israel bears full responsibility should negotiations fail

bull In conclusion it needs to be understood clearly that we Palestinians will never allow Israel to continue its encroachments and domination under the pretence of insincere negotiations nor to go on imagining falsely that there are better alternatives available to Israel Israel will have to decide whether to accept the time-limited negotiation offer that is evidently in its own best interest or not And we Palestinians will then act accordingly at a time and in a way of our own choosing

It is now up to us as Palestinians to regain the strategic initiative and to take control of our own national destiny Israel regional partners and international actors must understand defi nitively that Palestinians will not be divided in their strategic objectives and that the Palestinian people steadfast and determined will never give up their national struggle

Praxis 175

Figure 71 shows a tabular outline of the evaluation of scenariosIt is not so much the details of Regaining the Initiative that are significant for

this chapter but the process Readers will come to their own conclusions about the force of the central argument given in outline here But the report already clearly demonstrates two things First the great advantage of a sustained inclusive internal strategic engagement of discourses of this kind for the challenging partyin asym-metric conflicts Second its potential for opening space for inter-party exchanges even in the least propitious circumstances

On the first count the report was well received by many Palestinians who regarded it as the first serious attempt at coordinated and systematic public stra-tegic thinking by Palestinians ndash hitherto jealously guarded as a preserve of the PLO leadership under Yasser Arafat

The overwhelming majority of the members of the project Regaining the Initiative are still in touch and extremely eager to further develop and con-tinue the initial ideas they have agreed on and reached in their meetings and discussions I have had the opportunity to speak with participants who are members of Fatah Hamas or women student academic and human rights and democracy organizations They all passionately agree about the desperate

Figure 71 Evaluation of scenarios preferences and capabilities

Scenarios acceptable to Palestinians

Scenario

Palestinian capability to promote

Israeli capability to block

Third-party capability to infl uence

Two-state low high medium (US high)

One-state low (short term)increasing (long term)

high (short term)decreasing (long term)

low (short term)increasing (long term)

PA reform high low low

UN trustee low medium medium (US high)

Scenarios unacceptable to Palestinians

Scenario


Palestinian capability to block

Israeli capability to promote

Status quo high medium medium

Pseudo-Two-state high low low

Unilateral separation low (short term)high (long term)

high (short term)low (long term)

medium

EgyptJordan high low medium


need to develop and sustain long term Palestinian strategic thinking Indeed this approach has already had a real major impact A few months ago I received a phone call from a senior member of the Negotiation Support Unit (NUS) of the Palestine Authority informing me that the Unit has discussed thoroughly the Palestinian strategy document and adopted several parts of it

(Bashir Bashir 2009)

Some were critical of the fact that the lsquoone statersquo alternatives were relegated to back-up status as if they were second-best for Palestinians whereas for many Palestinians they are the only way to redress the historic dispossession of the Naqba One commentator detected a damaging discrepancy in wording between the English version and the Arabic version on the strategic objectives (clearly the Arabic version is the authoritative one)

But this is all part of the ongoing inclusive internal strategic thinking It is the SED process itself that shows up what still stands most in need of detailed thought and discussion by as many internal constituencies as possible and provides the main incentive to do so It is I would argue what has been missing from the Palestinian national debate almost from the outset

For example in this case Regaining the Initiative showed up clearly how little thought had so far been put into public discussion about what the various lsquoone state alternativesrsquo to a two state solution are This is of vital strategic significance because as is widely recognized in negotiation studies unless alternatives to a negotiated settlement are clearly thought through weighed up and communicated there is no sound foundation for effective internal strategic decision and strategic planning or for its subsequent external projection As Tony Klug puts it

Depending on the proponent lsquoone statersquo could be unitary federal confederal bi-national democratic secular cantonal (Switzerland) multi-confessional (Lebanon) Islamic (Hamas) Arab (PLO Charter) or Jewish (Greater Israel)

(Klug 2008 3)

On the one hand does the fact that nearly all Jewish Israelis vehemently reject a one-state outcome make it a strategic impossibility On the other hand would the indefinite perpetuation of the present situation not be equivalent to a one-state outcome since the only state (Israel) already has effective control of the whole territory (see below) Would one state not be likely to end up bloodily in two states And does the most likely route towards one state not in fact lie via two states ndash for example in the form of some future confederation These are vital strategic considerations Unless an inclusive internal strategic engagement of discourses is successfully promoted and sustained they may never be properly thought through and planned for to the great impoverishment of the Palestinian national project

This is an example of the creative possibilities opened up by the logic of internal strategic engagement of discourses Participants in the Regaining the Initiative Palestine Strategy Group identified a number of other topics that called for further elucidation For instance the idea of dissolving the Palestinian Authority (on which

Praxis 177

thousands of families are dependent for wages) or transforming it into a Palestinian Resistance Authority There was also the possibility of apparently doing the oppos-ite ndash building an embryonic Palestinian state unilaterally with a view to a swift unilateral declaration of independence on 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital even though this has not yet been agreed with Israel and then appealing to the international community for endorsement This carries the risk that it might play into Israeli hands by appearing to condone a lsquoprovisionalrsquo or lsquoquasirsquo state but that is what the internal debate has continually to argue out

Or there is the question of what would be required for Hamas to acquiesce in a two state settlement (including the possibility of formal de facto acknowledgement of the existence of Israel of a long-term Hudna or truce of a national referendum whose results Hamas would accept) This includes the question whether national reconciliation is indeed a prerequisite for effective Palestinian policy or whether say the Palestinian National Authority in Ramallah would do better to carry on independently and wait for Gaza to follow later

Or there is the requirement to clarify what exactly is meant by the lsquosmart resist-ancersquo called for in the Report and what its implications are under various scenarios This is a vital consideration in distinguishing extremism of ends from extremism of means identified as a key issue below and requires maximum discussion from as inclusive a number of Palestinians as possible

Above all what the promotion of a sustained and detailed strategic engagement of discourses of this kind does from the perspective of challengers (in this case Palestinians) at internal level is to enhance their capacity to match and outma-noeuvre their opponents (in this case Israelis) at their own game It is thus a key component of capacity-building and empowerment

Having now looked at an example of inclusive internal strategic debate we are in a better position to address the next question In relation to the main theme of this chapter ndash the management of agonistic dialogue between enemies in times of maximum conflict intractability ndash how does continuing inclusive intra-party stra-tegic thinking of this sort (SED 1) contribute to the possibility of promoting an inter-party strategic engagement of discourses (SED 2)

Another look at Regaining the Initiative clarifies why the possibility of an inter-party strategic engagement of discourses is always implicit in the very nature of strategic thinking There are six main points to be made each of which is illustrated by an extract from the text

(A) By its nature strategic thinking looks not to the past but to the future

The Group met for extended three-day workshops in order to analyse and discuss strategic options for Palestinians in the months coming up to the six-tieth anniversary of the Naqba These sixty years have been very long and bitter years for Palestinians But the main focus of the Group is not on the past It is on the future What options lie ahead What overall strategy best equips Palestinians to achieve success in our unwavering determination to achieve national independence How can Palestinians refocus on the strategic


objectives that all of us share Can a common platform be articulated that will enable Palestinians to speak with one voice regionally and internationally Can Palestinians regain the initiative in determining their own future


Intense and intractable political conflicts are fuelled by bitter past experience trau-mas hatreds and fears Desire for revenge can overwhelm other considerations Conflict parties can be trapped in recurring patterns of re-enactment These do not go away and are certainly not forgotten They fuel and shape the strategic thinking But strategic thinking itself at least encourages reflection on what the future impli-cations of this are What strategic conclusions follow It is up to conflict parties to define their strategic goals But what are the implications for action and how can these goals be best attained The orientation is by its nature forward-looking

(B) Strategic thinking recognizes the prerequisite not of cancelling internal rad-ical disagreement but of subordinating it to the priority of presenting a united front to the external world

The second prerequisite is national unity A house divided against itself can-not stand Palestinian strategic action is impossible if the Palestinian nation is unable to speak with one voice or to act with one will This does not mean agreeing about everything Nor does it cancel internal Palestinian politics But it does mean that when it comes to formulating and enacting a national plan in relation to the outside world Palestinians must subordinate internal politics to the superior demands of shared destiny and unity of purpose


As seen above this is the main motive for counter-balancing the interest of the would-be internal hegemons who want to monopolize strategic space and avoid inclusive internal dialogue Overcoming this internal resistance is a central ingredi-ent in the SED approach Crucially it also clearly lays out inner differences within broad political organizations like Fatah and Hamas which are far from monolithic This is of vital importance for would-be peacemakers as emphasized later in the last section of this chapter

For example at the moment there is talk of a national referendum on the out-come of current negotiations with Israel The problem is that without extensive prior national strategic debate and consensus the Palestinian voters are likely to be swayed more by political expediency than by strategic priorities This is not a good basis for wise national decision-making It weakens Palestinians and hands the major strategic card to their opponents Nothing could indicate more clearly how important it is for political leaders to rise above partisan ambition when it comes to guiding public Palestinian debate about national strategic options No doubt disagreement about strategy is sincere and not just a mask for partisan political interest Even so the requirement is for

Praxis 179

political leaders from all parties to articulate a broadly agreed national strat-egy Otherwise there is no prospect of rallying coordinating energising and empowering Palestinians And without the focused and determined effort of the Palestinian people there can be no effective implementation of strategy


(C) Strategic thinking links objectives to strategies through realistic assessments of relative power

The analysis of relative power lies at the heart of strategic thinking It is the main link between objectives and strategies Power analysis revisits the scen-arios in order to determine what is and what is not in the power of Palestinians Israelis and third parties to achieve either on their own or via the actions of oth-ers Power analysis assesses the capacity of agents to convert their aspirations into reality This injects hard-headed realism into the procedure It identifies the main obstacles that block preferred strategic pathways and it suggests what can and should be done to reduce or remove them


This requirement of strategic thinking ensures that the discussion gets beyond empty sloganizing and uncriticized wishful thinking It does not guarantee that lsquopragmaticrsquo outcomes will prevail Conflict parties may still prefer to pursue options with little prospect of success or may prefer damaging the other even when this entails a greater risk of damaging themselvesBut at least this is done after a discussion and weighing up of the alternatives As seen above Regaining the Initiative considers various possible futures (scenarios) and weighs up prefer-ences and dispreferences and the capacity to achieve the former and block the latter From this the preferred strategic path that gains most internal consensus is constructed Strategic thinking translates wish lists into viable political options ndash at any rate in intention

(D) Strategic thinking understands that the chessboard must be looked at from the perspective of the opponent

It is essential in strategic thinking to take constant account of how the chess-board looks from the perspective of the opponent A player who does not do this hellip will lose The strategic purpose is to exert mounting pressure on the opponent to act as we want This can only be done if we understand what the opponent desires and fears and the sources and limits of the opponentrsquos power The same applies to inducing third parties to behave in the ways we want them to


Here is the seed from which a future inter-party strategic engagement of discourses (SED 2) can grow even in the most unpropitious circumstances when conflict


resolution initiatives are still premature Once again it does not have anything to do with lsquohelping each side to accept and conceivably to respect the validity of the competing narrativersquo or lsquoexposing each side to the narratives of the other in order gradually to foster an understanding if not an acceptance of their deeply felt importance to each sidersquo It flows from an entirely different strategic require-ment ndash the requirement to win

(E) Strategic thinking chooses the most appropriate strategic and tactical means to attain its overall strategic ends ndash and keeps these under constant review

Power is the ability to get what you want done If you get what you want done you have power If you do not get what you want done you do not have power hellip In strategic planning agents must choose the most effective form of power (or combination of forms) in different circumstances and must be prepared to be flexible in switching from one to the other where appropriate


From the perspective of managing ongoing radical disagreement this is perhaps the key aspect of the enterprise of promoting SED ndash working with it rather than against it As elaborated below it introduces the distinction between strategic ends and strategic means which is the key to opening up the possibility of separating rad-ical disagreement from violence There are different forms of power Joseph Nye distinguishes hard power and soft power (2002) Kenneth Boulding distinguishes three lsquofacesrsquo of power (1990)

1 Threat power lsquoDo what I want or I will do what you do not wantrsquo 2 Exchange or bargaining power lsquoDo what I want and I will do what you wantrsquo 3 Integrative power lsquoDo what I want because you want it toorsquo

The Report advocates the use of all three forms of power as appropriate The ques-tion then is what are the most appropriate strategic means in relation to different strategic objectives and assessments of relative distributions of power

Within this lies the question of lsquosmart resistancersquo also advocated in the Report What forms of threat power are most effective and legitimate

The range of options open to Palestinians under the general heading lsquoresist-ancersquo is great reaching from non-cooperation through various forms of boycott and economic measures and on to more active forms of resistance This broad category of implementation can be deployed in support of all the strategic options so long as the tools are selected and applied with strategic precision Here the distinction between civilian resistance and armed resist-ance is critical and within the latter the distinction between armed attack on Israeli military assets and armed attack on Israeli civilians raises addi-tional moral issues Members of the Palestine Strategy Group were clear that in choosing means of implementation Palestinians must make sure that the

Praxis 181

overwhelming justice of their cause is implemented by means that are also seen to be just


As further commented upon below the distinction between strategic ends and stra-tegic means is vital in distinguishing extremism of ends from extremism of means ndash one of the two keys to the way the strategic engagement of discourses can open the way to or inform a possible future peace process (the other is the framing of the political settlement)

(F) Strategic thinking clearly understands that the communication of strategic mes-sages to supporters opponents and third parties is an essential part of strategy

The second strategic task is to make sure that Israel understands the terms on which the 1988 offer is still held open by Palestinians and is clear about what Palestinians can and will do should these terms not be met hellip The third strategic task is to ensure that it is the Palestinian discourse that frames inter-national discussion of the Palestinian future


This requirement of strategic thinking reinforces D above It is not just that the chessboard must be looked at from the perspective of other players but that signals must be given and received if strategic moves are to have the desired effect So it was that it was decided not without controversy that the wording of Regaining the Initiative must itself be seen to be part of the strategic approach it set out and as such was consciously addressed simultaneously to different readers (Palestinians Israelis others)

These six aspects of strategic thinking can be seen to offer scope for a poss-ible strategic engagement of discourses (SED 2) between conflict parties In this sense they might even be said to mimic conflict settlement and transformation approaches which is why inclusive intra-party strategic thinking of this kind is capable of playing that role

But this section should end with a reaffirmation of the fact that the prime discurs-ive goal of inclusive internal strategic thinking (SED 1) is not to expedite conflict resolution but to determine how best to ensure that the discourse in question in this case the Palestinian discourse prevails in the war of words Quotations from Regaining the Initiative on this point have already been given in the prologue They emphasized the importance of ensuring that it is the Palestinian discourse that frames all discussion about the Palestinian future and the rejection of attempts by international power brokers prematurely to impose discourses of peacemaking and state-building The lsquorequirement of a new discoursersquo is one of the three strategic prerequisites listed in Regaining the Initiative Box 72 contains an extract from a later part of that section


Box 72 The requirement of a new discourse

Source Palestine Strategy Group 2008 15

Regaining the Initiative therefore is a clear example of the significance of what was shown in Chapter 5 to be the moments of recommendation justification refutation and explanation in the internal economy of radical disagreeing At the root of linguistic intractability in this case is Palestinian determination to make the Palestinian discourse the primary language within which the Palestinian issue is discussed not because it is a narrative but because it is true Dialogue for mutual understanding does not accommodate this ndash it tries from the outset to persuade conflict parties to drop the language of truth (this is so) and to adopt the language of self-reference (this is my perception) The strategic engagement of discourses on the other hand begins with it Indeed the very phrase lsquoPalestinian discoursersquo already contains the seeds of such misapprehension because it may thereby suggest that this is lsquoa mere Palestinian discoursersquo And that as became clear in Chapter 5 and is reaffirmed in this example is to miss everything

Meanwhile here is the key question that the challenging Palestinian discourse ndash as shown through inclusive intra-party strategic engagement of discourses ndash poses for would-be peacemakers

Why should Palestinians give up violent resistance and accept permanent dispossession

Would this not be a betrayal of past sacrifices and an endorsement of perpetual occupation Would it not be a capitulation in the face of manifest injustice Would it not be a final defeat for the national project an abandonment of the Palestinian homeland and the destruction of the Palestinian people

Perhaps the most appropriate comparable discourse here is the discourse of decolonisation This needs to be clearly understood by the international community For example before 1947 Gandhirsquos primary discourse in India was not a peace-making discourse because he was not making peace with Britain but struggling to end British occupation And it was not a state building discourse because there was not yet an Indian state His primary discourse was one of emancipation and national struggle The same is true of the Palestinian discourse Palestinians are of course ready to enter serious negotiations They are more ready to do this than Israelis But such peacemaking has to be defi ned within a context that genuinely aims to deliver Palestinian national aspirations Anything less is simply not peacemaking but a confi rmation of continuing occupation and repression

There is no space to pursue this in detail further here except to note the importance of combating a central idea in the peacemaking discourse that what is at issue is two equivalent lsquoIsraelirsquo and lsquoPalestinianrsquo lsquonarrativesrsquo No doubt there are Israeli and Palestinian narratives But what is centrally at issue is not a mere Palestinian narrative but a series of incontrovertible facts ndash facts of expulsion exclusion dominance and occupation bitterly lived out by Palestinians day by day over the past 60 years and still being endured at the present time This is not a narrative It is a lived reality Finding the best strategy for ending this lived reality is the main purpose of this Report Transforming the discourse within which it is discussed is a major part of that effort

Praxis 183

The strategic engagement of discourses level one IsraelindashIsraeli ndash the hegemonic discourse

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation Israel is the hegemon and the Israeli discourse is the hegemonic discourse in the sense that it is the dis-course of the hegemon Whether it is the hegemonic discourse in terms of the wider struggle is what is fought over in the war of words At the moment within the ArabMuslim world clearly it is not In the USA it still is

The project that produced the Palestinian strategic response Regaining the Initiative also included a parallel process among Jewish Israelis Once again a representative group of a similar size from across the spectrum of constituencies convened for a series of meetings to explore and evaluate possible futures The process is described here by an Israeli participator

The main criterion for selecting the participants was that together they rep-resent the major currents of thought in Jewish-Israeli society hellip The group thus included several members of the Knesset with diverse political views former heads of the security services (GSS IDF) leading business people key religious and spiritual leaders (ultra-orthodox national-religious [secular] Jewish renewal) prominent social activists well-respected journalists senior academics and various celebrities and publicly known figures

(Zalzberg 2009 assessment of the project)

Once again quoting Zalzberg lsquoto a large extent the grouprsquos thinking was led by the assumption that internal cohesion is the key to resolving the problems of Israelrsquos Jewish populationrsquo

But in this case the outcome was different To some extent the difference was fortuitous and was the result of a different facilitation methodology But I think that it was also a result of the fact that in general the discourse of the possessor does not concern itself with those who do not immediately threaten its possession West Bank Palestinians no longer posed a major threat after the suppression of the al-Aqsa intifada even though rockets were still fired from Gaza Hegemons rely on military power for protection In this case participants showed little interest in discussing strategic alternatives vis-agrave-vis Palestinians and were much more concerned with internal disputes about the character of the future Jewish State of Israel The distinctions between Jewishness (cultural Jewish identity) Zionism (national Jewish identity) and Judaism (religious Jewish identity) were recurrently discussed Jewish-Israeli society was seen to be fragmented

This is as a result both of social cleavages (religious-secular socio-economic left-right Ashkenaz-Sepharad immigrants-natives) and of the pressures caused by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hellip As a result the national conver-sation about the conflict has become a cacophony To a large extent as time passes the discussion becomes increasingly polarised filled with taboos and thus simplistic This leaves Israeli Jews with no real capacity to agree on a


common strategy Israelrsquos significant power in the Middle East means that as long as it continues to muddle through without a conscious strategy the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is likely to continue to defy resolution efforts hellip In short a collective Jewish-Israeli focus on the plausible rather than the desired is needed Experience of other conflict regions in the world has shown that such mapping provides the leadership and the public with a new vocabulary which is needed for an effective national conversation hellip After so many decades of violence and with Israel facing a truly complex rapidly changing reality a mapping of alternative scenarios should be used to broaden the discursive space alleviate some taboos and legitimise a conversation on certain futures that are so far unspoken This is a requirement if Israeli Jews are to take a well-informed decision about their future ndash one that takes seriously into account the domestic regional and international constraints costs and benefits

(Ibid)

In the end four lsquofuture storiesrsquo were produced based on four possible scenarios

1 A Jewish Home ndash from the Jordan to the Mediterranean A Jewish state in which Israel resumes full control in Judea and Samaria (the

West Bank) and the demographic influence of National Religious and Ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups increases Palestinians have full residential rights (personal and cultural) but not full political rights Militant Palestinians are suppressed with severe violence

2 Two Homes for Two Peoples ndash Good Neighbours Two states for two people in which it is recognized that without a partition of

the land between Palestinians and Jews the outcome will be the creation of an untenable bi-national state between the Jordan and the Sea A multinational force safeguards the security of Jewish populations on Palestinian territory while in Israel efforts are made to close social gaps by including Israeli-Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews in governmental institutions

3 One Home for Two Peoples ndash Isra-Palestine The bi-national State in which the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority

forces Israel to resume full control of the West Bank and Gaza and interna-tional pressure including weakening American support makes Israel comply Both Israeli and Palestinian societies are torn amongst themselves between those who see the new reality as an opportunity and those who prefer a nation-state either in a secular or in a religious version Opposition on both sides is vehement There is a mass emigration of Jews

4 A Shared Home ndash A Jewish Home as Part of A Regional Confederation The State of Israel enters the Confederacy together with Palestine (by agree-

ment with the Palestinian Authority) and Jordan Israel embodies the Jewish national identity and becomes the spiritual-educational centre for Jewish com-munities all over the world

The process of production of these future stories was of great interest Discussion

Praxis 185

was passionate open and creative as is characteristic of the vibrancy of Israeli soci-ety The whole enterprise was an innovative attempt to widen Israeli debate which it succeeded in doing But the possibilities were not thought through strategically (that was not what participants wanted) And the decision was taken not to publish the results so I will not comment ndash or quote ndash further here

Instead in the remainder of this section I will partially shift focus away from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation and towards the Israeli response (or lack of response) to the main strategic initiative to come from the Arab side in the wider Arab-Israel conflict This is the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) or Saudi peace plan endorsed by all 22 member states of the Arab League in Beirut in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington which partly conditioned it This remarkable ndash and brief ndash document effectively reversed the three lsquonoesrsquo famously enunciated at the Arab League meeting in Khartoum after the Six Days War in 1967 no peace no negotiation no recognition of Israel Moreover as careful readings show the API buys into what had by then become the generally acknowledged framework for a final settlement as recently articulated in the December 2000 Clinton parameters (Alon 20078)

bull The API for the first time explicitly refers to the June 4 1967 borders in rela-tion to a final settlement thus recognizing Israelrsquos permanent claim to 78 per cent of the disputed territory

bull The API for the first time affirms that only East (Arab) Jerusalem will be the Palestinian capital ceding the rest to Israel ndash it does not use the language of al-Quds or Holy Jerusalem the place from which Mohammad made his lsquonight journeyrsquo to heaven the site subsequently marked by the building of the seventh century Dome of the Rock and the place to which the earliest Muslims turned in prayer before the Qibla was transferred to Mecca

bull The API for the first time says that a lsquojust solutionrsquo to the refugee problem will be lsquoagreedrsquo with Israel thus acknowledging Israelrsquos right to negotiate an acceptable outcome and determine who will and who will not be allowed to settle in Israel

All of this it is argued by those who advocate a positive Israeli response should be cause for Israeli rejoicing Together with the 1988 PLO transformation of strategy described above it represented an astonishing triumph for Israel Now is the time to cash in on it and render the remarkable gains of the past 60 years permanent UN resolutions will have been satisfied there will be no further demographic threat from the three million Palestinians in the new Palestinian state Israelrsquos borders can be given cast-iron guarantees by a powerful UN-sanctioned peacekeeping force led by the US any remaining Arab and Islamist irredentists will find their support drastically reduced and Iranian influence will be sharply curtailed The economic rewards would also be great And Israel could then set about inspiring its younger generation and restoring its reputation abroad as a progressive and principled exemplar of the Jewish vision

The alternative to a positive Israeli response from this perspective is said to be a


collapse of the two-state solution leading to a further radicalization of Palestinian and Arab youth including the Arab citizens of Israel who make up 20 per cent of the Israeli population The move is seen to be likely to be more in the direction of al-Qaeda jihadi nihilism than political Islamist movements like Hamas that are amenable to negotiation on concrete political agendas Iranian influence would increase and strain would be put on relations with a new US administration wanting to mend fences with the 12 billion-strong Muslim world Above all the argument goes blocking the creation of a genuine Palestinian state would be by far the greatest threat to the survival of Israel not for military reasons which would have become irrelevant but for demographic reasons Palestinians in Gaza the West Bank Jerusalem and Israel would come to constitute a majority of the population in mandate Palestine The claims of these populations for full citizenship would become irresistible It would effectively spell the end of the idea of a democratic Jewish state

Such is the main case against current Israeli strategies at the level of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation I will follow Tony Klug in calling it the argument for an Israeli Peace Initiative It is the argument that led presidential candidate Obama when he first heard of the Arab Peace Initiative on his visit to the region in July 2008 to say that it would be lsquocrazyrsquo for Israel to refuse a deal that could lsquogive them peace with the Muslim worldrsquo Drowned out by the move to the right in Israeli politics and by the nature of Israeli coalition politics which makes even public discussion of these issues electorally dangerous it is a case that has so far hardly been seriously made ndash or rather heard ndash in Israel

The text of the Arab Peace Initiative is contained in Box 73

Box 73 Official translation of the Arab Peace Initiative

Source wwwal-babcomarabdocsleaguepeace02htm

The Council of Arab States at the Summit Level at its 14th Ordinary Session Reaffi rming the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo Extra-Ordinary Arab Summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab countries to be achieved in accordance with international legality and which would require a comparable commitment on the part of the Israeli government Having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in which his highness presented his initiative calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967 in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 reaffi rmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land-for-peace principle and Israelrsquos acceptance of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel

Emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the confl ict will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties the council

1 Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well

Praxis 187

But instead of a vigorous internal strategic engagement of discourses and inclusive national debate around the argument for an Israeli Peace Initiative from 2002 to 2008 the API was lsquogreeted with a yawn by the Israeli governmentrsquo and aroused surprisingly little public interest in Israel This was no doubt partly due to its timing coinciding as it did with the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada (including a suicide attack killing 29 Israelis on 27 March 2002) the early months of the Sharon government which rejected the premise on which the API was constructed and the Bush administrationrsquos reorientation of US policy as a lsquowar on terrorrsquo after the 11 September 2001 attacks The incremental nature of the 2003 Road Map and Israelrsquos strategy of lsquounilateral separationrsquo entirely sidelined the API Nor was it mentioned in the Joint Understanding that initiated the Annapolis summit on 27 November 2007 even though this revived lsquoend-statersquo negotiations

From 2007 a belated attempt was made by a number of Israelis with outside support particularly from Europe and the United States and to a limited extent

2 Further calls upon Israel to affi rm I ndash Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967 including the

Syrian Golan Heights to the June 4 1967 lines as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon

II ndash Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194

III ndash The acceptance of the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since June 4 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital

3 Consequently the Arab countries affi rm the following I ndash Consider the Arab-Israeli confl ict ended and enter into a peace agreement with

Israel and provide security for all the states of the region II ndash Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive

peace

4 Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which confl ict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries

5 Calls upon the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood enabling the Arab countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighbourliness and provide future generations with security stability and prosperity

6 Invites the international community and all countries and organisations to support this initiative

7 Requests the chairman of the summit to form a special committee composed of some of its concerned member states and the secretary general of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels particularly from the United Nations the Security Council the United States of America the Russian Federation the Muslim states and the European Union


coordinated with the Arab League to revive interest in the API in Israel with a view to eliciting an official response from the Israeli government2 In November 2008 for example more than 500 former Israeli generals diplomats and intelli-gence military and security officers signed a full-page advertisement in Israeli newspapers urging the country lsquonot to ignore a historic opportunity which a moder-ate Arab world presents us withrsquo (Financial Times 27 November 2008) At about the same time President Peres in a letter to the Oxford Research Group wrote

The Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 broke the united front of the Khartoum policy of the Arab League This represents a revolution in the Arab approach which should not go unanswered by Israel

But the right wing response was swift Yuval Steinitz of the Knessetrsquos Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee for example reiterated why the Saudi plan was a non-starter

It doesnrsquot recognize Israelrsquos right to defensible borders and demands that Palestinian refugees settle in the Jewish state as well as the Palestinian state which is totally unacceptable and contradicts the essence of the two state solution

(Haaretz 19 October 2008)

Israeli Ambassador to London Ron Prosor elaborated this theme in a letter to the Guardian See Box 74

Box 74 Letter from the Israeli Ambassador to the UK

Source Ron Prosor Israeli Ambassador to London the Guardian December 2008

A Revived Peace Initiative Will Stumble Unless Arab States Recognise Israel and Make Rhetoric Reality

The Palestinian Authority recently took the unprecedented step of advertising the Arab Peace Initiative in Hebrew in the Israeli press Adverts also appeared throughout the international media including this newspaper Many Israelis welcomed it as a step in the right direction

Yet before the world shouts lsquoeurekarsquo it is important to realise that the Arab initiative cannot be seen as a lsquotake it or leave itrsquo offer It cannot serve as a diktat or replace the need for bilateral negotiations on both the Palestinian and Syrian tracks The plan is an interesting starting point for negotiations but the international community should be under no illusions Elements of the text are a cause for grave concern as regards the survivability of the state of Israel

The demand that Palestinians should be able to relocate to areas inside the borders of the state of Israel jeopardises Israelrsquos very existence Most Israelis understand and support the creation of a future Palestinian state It is diffi cult however to understand why Palestinians having created a state of their own would subsequently insist on

Praxis 189

sending their own people to the Jewish state Instead of demographically undermining the state of Israel surely Palestinians would be better able to help build their own nation within their own state

Israelrsquos concern over the future of Jerusalem should also not be underestimated From time immemorial Jerusalem has been the eternal capital of the Jewish people and will always remain so

Meanwhile the fi nal borders between Israel and the Palestinian state can only be determined bilaterally The 1967 borders might provide a reference point for negotiations but the demographic realities and security concerns of Israelrsquos population must be taken into account

Nevertheless the revival of interest in the plan fi rst proposed by the Saudi king in 2002 met with interest in Israel In contrast the reception elsewhere in the Middle East ranged from the sceptical to the hostile Several Arab papers refused to publish an advert with an Israeli fl ag For many the very notion of Israeli statehood as represented by our national fl ag is still taboo

[Paragraphs on Iranian hostility to Israel and how oil-rich Gulf countries encourage unrealistic Palestinian irredentist dreams but fail to provide the funds needed to build a viable Palestinian infrastructure and do not lsquosteer their less fortunate counterparts towards the path of moderation and progressrsquo]

For too long the Middle East has been crippled as Arab populations have been force-fed the lie that Israelrsquos destruction is both desirable and imminent Today as Iran continues to inject these poisonous concepts into the body of the region the Middle East must abandon the mindset of the 1967 Khartoum conference and its infamous three noes

For the twenty-fi rst century three realities must instead be acknowledged Israel exists Israel belongs and recognising Israel would be to the benefi t of every Arab society Everyone in the region with the ability to promote this understanding must be urged to do so

Ambassador Prosor says that lsquomost Israelis understand and support the creation of a future Palestinian statersquo Why is it then that when it comes to it most Israelis have not been prepared to take the necessary steps in this direction Some Israelis resist on principle because they identify Eretz Israel (the land of Israel) with Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) But Ambassador Prosor says that they are a minority as regularly confirmed in opinion polls So where has the inhibition lain at any rate up to the time of writing

The only way to answer this question is once again to ask Israelis And that is precisely the aim of the SED process The answer given is that there is a structural strategic reason for this which needs to be clearly understood by anyone wanting to participate effectively in the debate Although there is a persistent majority in favour of a two state solution in principle there is an equally persistent majority that when it comes to it does not think that the Palestinians are lsquoready for self-rulersquo A key moment in the eyes of most Israelis was what they see as the refusal


by Yasser Arafat to settle at Camp David in 2000 followed by the catastrophic outbreak of the lsquosecond intifadarsquo which left Israel with no option but to crush it The Hamas take-over of Gaza ndash seen to be orchestrated by Iran ndash and sub-sequent rocket attacks confirmed this Only when lsquothe circumstances are rightrsquo can Israel safely relinquish its iron grip on Gaza (controlled by siege) and the West Bank

This is a function of deep history the overwhelming fear of a second holocaust fuelled by past wars rocket and suicide attacks the existential nuclear threat from Iran and what ambassador Prosor calls the poisonous lsquolie that Israelrsquos destruction is both desirable and imminentrsquo A blatantly racist passage like this from the Hamas Charter (1988) which could have been lifted straight from Mein Kampf and is ech-oed by the current rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad certainly confirms this and effectively silences those in Israel who argue for dialogue and accommodation with Hamas

[Pro-Zionist forces] were behind the French Revolution the Communist revolution and most of the revolutions throughout the world hellip Concerning local and international wars hellip they were behind the First World War in which they destroyed the Islamic Caliphate picked the material profit monopolized the raw wealth and got the Balfour Declaration They created the League of Nations through which they could rule the world They were behind the Second World War in which they grew fabulously wealthy through the arms trade They prepared for the establishment of their state they ordered that the United Nations be formed along with the Security Council so that they could rule the world through them There was no war that broke out anywhere with-out their hands behind it hellip Today it is Palestine and tomorrow it may be other countries because the Zionist scheme has no bounds after Palestine they want to expand from the Nile River to the Euphrates When they have occupied the area completely they look toward another Such is their plan in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion The present is the best proof of what is said

(Hamas Charter 1988 Articles 22 and 32)

Through bitter experience Israelis have learned that they can rely on no one but themselves Their security depends on their enemiesrsquo fear of the deterrent power of the Israel Defense Forces ndash Jabotinskyrsquos lsquoiron wallrsquo From this perspective a prime purpose of the December 2008ndashJanuary 2009 Gaza action was to restore deterrent credibility after the perceived failure of the 2006 campaign against Hezbollah in South Lebanon

In sum the strategic root of the Israeli reluctance to respond positively to the API ndash to regard it as a deceptive and dangerous ploy ndash lies in perceived balance of strategic risk However great the long-term inducement of a final settlement might be as the possessor it will be Israel that has first to relinquish its grip on the West Bank in order to reach out for what remains a distant prize offered by those who remain Israelrsquos enemies So even if the long-term balance of risk of retaining con-trol may be greater since the short-term risk of letting go is seen to be palpable

Praxis 191

immediate and dangerous it will never get to the point where decision-makers will irrevocably commit themselves to it

So it is that all Israeli governments since 1967 have been determined not to lose the lsquostrategic depthrsquo necessary to make Israel defensible Even Yitzhak Rabin was clear that he had no intention of permitting a truly independent Palestinian state in this vital area The rate of increase of Israeli settlements around Jerusalem and on the West Bank itself increased between 1993 and the time of his death in 1995 Ariel Sharonrsquos 1982 blueprint map for the permanent carving-up and subjugation of the West Bank has not been put away President Bush endorsed a section of it in his April 2004 confirmation that the large settlement blocs on the West Bank should be assigned to Israel

Looking eastward from the sea the West Bank is a small piece of territory beyond which lies the large Palestinian population in Jordan and beyond that Iraq and beyond that proto-nuclear Iran and beyond that the lsquoStansrsquo (Kazakhstan etc) If the West Bank is vacated what forces will pour into the void When Gaza was vacated the result was the Hamas take-over and rocket attacks Israeli intelligence understands exactly how Iran controls its proteacutegeacutes and how military supplies reach Gaza from East Africa Only preemptive attacks such as the Israeli raid on Sudan in early 2009 can in the end halt supply Is there any prospect that an immature Palestinian state will be able to control the situation even if it wanted to Once ceded there will be no possibility of reasserting control The Israeli military-secu-rity community is adamant that no possibility of hostile armed forces operating on West Bank territory or airspace is tolerable This is a one-way ticket Why should Israel buy it when it gets nothing in return but unreliable and probably disingenu-ous promises from those who in the past have done all they can to destroy it That is how the argument goes

Such is the strategic logic that binds Israelis to current policies ndash the Catch-22 situation where military control of the West Bank by the IDF renders the build-ing of a Palestinian state to the point that it might be strong enough to take over and control forces hostile to Israel impossible Some Israelis welcome this The majority who sincerely say that they favour an eventual two-state outcome find that they cannot escape it

At the time of writing therefore the broad challenge that the prevailing Israeli strategic discourse poses for would-be internal and external peacemakers at the level of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict formation to match that given above in relation to Palestinians above is

Why should Israelis give up violent defencerepression and share powerIs this not the only thing that has worked in the past Is it not what has forced

Israelrsquos enemies to sue for peace What can Israelis possibly get in return other than a dramatically increased security risk Why should Israel abandon everything that has been gained at such cost Would this not immediately open the floodgates to Israelrsquos worst nightmares


The strategic engagement of discourses level two Israeli-Palestinian ndash the hexagon of radical disagreement

Turning from the promotion of inclusive internal strategic engagement of dis-courses on both sides separately (SED 1) to the possibilities thus opened up for their extension into a strategic engagement of discourses between the conflict parties (SED 2) the significance of the wider conflict formations is not forgotten ndash for example the regional power struggles between Israel Egypt Saudi Arabia and Iran It may well be that this is the decisive arena within which the fate of the Palestinians will be decided But that is beyond the scope of this chapter The focus here is only on possibilities for strategic discursive exchange at the level of the IsraelindashPalestinian conflict formation during a time of maximum conflict intractability

It has already been seen that the strategic engagement of discourses at intra-party level (SED 1) can lead naturally to some form of inter-party strategic engagement (SED 2) because strategic thinking looks to the future not the past strategic thinking prioritizes internal national unity strategic thinking assesses capability and relative power as well as preference strategic thinking entails looking at the chessboard from the perspective of the opponent strategic thinking continually reviews the most appropriate means to attain its strategic ends and strategic think-ing requires the continuous delivery of strategic messages to supporters opponents and third parties

Moreover it can be seen how as a result the existence of internally inclusive strategy groups on both sides at least keeps open the possibility of continuing chan-nels of communication across the spectrum of internal constituencies even at times of maximum political attrition when other communicative avenues shut down This is best illustrated by means of the simplest model of inclusive composite two-party strategic discursive engagement ndash the hexagon of radical disagreement See Figure 72

In this model there are two conflict parties (A and B) each of which is intern-ally composite (both contain extremists and moderates) This generates six axes of radical disagreement Evidently this is a highly simplified model There may be

Figure 72 The hexagon of radical disagreement

Party A Party B

Extremists

Moderates

Extremists

Moderates

Axis 1

Axis 2 Axis 3

Axis 6

Axis 4 Axis 5

Praxis 193

more than two conflict parties There are many cross-cutting internal divisions The terms lsquoextremistrsquo and lsquomoderatersquo will vary across different issues and are them-selves contested Third parties have not been included And so on Nevertheless the model is useful for illustrating the main dynamics involved

Axis 1Radical disagreement is popularly identified with Axis 1 ndash the disagreement bet-ween extremists (as normally defined) But this is if anything the least significant axis As demonstrated in Chapter 6 it is radical disagreement between moderates (as normally defined) that is by far the most important element Extremists often feed off each other and are mutually dependent Leaders who want to resist com-promise rely on enemy intransigence and may deliberately provoke it Extremists play on the well-known psychological and strategic-political dynamics of mutual polarization and escalation

|lsquoWhat is called a ldquopeaceful solutionrdquo to resolve the Palestinian problem is contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement because giving up any part of Palestine means giving up part of religion hellip There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihadrsquo (Hamas Charter 1988 Article 13)

lsquoNo government has the authority hellip to abandon parts of the Land of Israel (Eretz Israel) to foreigners and anything done to this end is null and void in the name of the God of Israelrsquo (Union of Rabbis for the People of Israel and the Land of Israel quoted Dershowitz 2005 46)|

Axes 2 and 3These constitute level 1 of the SED process They form the basis for the possibility of strategic engagement between a majority on either side It is via axes 2 and 3 that the other axes remain operational It is often here that the most bitter strategic discursive engagements take place ndash for example between the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) lobby and the J Street lobby among Jewish Americans

Axes 4 and 5These are the exchanges (often indirect) that are only made possible so long as Axes 2 and 3 remain inclusive and Axis 6 remains active Extremists do not want to participate directly in or to encourage these axes of communication (Iranian President Ahmedinejad preferred dealing with US President Bush than with US President Obama) Extremists are more at home in the stark stand-off of Axis 1 These are axes of radical disagreement that SED makes possible and ndash if the aim is to dilute extremism ndash promotes

Axis 6This is the most crucial ndash and underrated ndash axis of radical disagreement It is easy to assume that being moderates there is bound to be agreement across this axis


about most of the main issues But that is not the case in intractable conflicts On the contrary this is where the central lines of radical disagreement lie and where agonistic dialogue that explores this is most urgently needed Chapter 6 showed how it is radical disagreement between moderates like Nadim Rouhana and Mordechai Bar-On that encapsulates the linguistic intractability at the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict And how even in a book dedicated to accommodating narratives of conflict to which they were both contributors this was exactly the strategic exchange that even there did not take place Exploring and understand-ing Axis 6 is fundamental to the possibility of managing radical disagreement in intractable political conflicts

In short structurally it can be seen that so long as prior inclusive strategy groups (Axes 2 and 3) are created and maintained on each side then even if direct exchanges only take place across axis 6 this is enough to keep channels of com-munication open generally across all six axes This allows a possible space for that most crucial (but rare) eventuality ndash a strategic engagement of discourses between majorities issue by issue on either side

This is one of the main mechanisms through which when dialogue for mutual understanding gains no purchase dialogue for strategic engagement can neverthe-less sustain some sort of contact between the conflict parties

But there is no reason why this should be conducive to positive management and peacemaking There is no reason why a majority on either side should be amenable to compromise on any specific issue This information is vital for peacemakers but dialogue for strategic engagement does not assume that more contact means more understanding It may result in the opposite The SED process does not in itself determine what strategic decisions will be made by conflict parties nor what will emerge from the promotion of strategic discursive engagement between them Unlike dialogue for mutual understanding dialogue for strategic engagement is not necessarily orientated towards peacemaking

Nevertheless I would strongly argue that when there are opportunities for movement in the direction of a possible future settlement it is the promotion of strategic engagement of discourses at level 2 that optimizes chances that these will be noticed and can be acted upon Strategic discursive engagement raises sails to catch any stray winds that may be blowing The sails may not catch enough wind to propel the ship forward in a particular preferred direction But one thing is certain ndash if the sails are not raised there will be no motion however many winds are blowing

I have already given two reasons why SED 2 can be sustained during periods of intractability ndash the intrinsic nature of strategic thinking itself and the capacity of inclusive intra-party strategy groups to keep communication channels open across the spectrum

There is also a third related reason This is derived from the difference in strategic thinking between strategic ends and strategic means as exemplified in Regaining the Initiative above which highlights the crucial distinction between extremism of ends and extremism of means The key point is that in managing intractable conflict there is always scope for detaching violence from ongoing radical disagreement because it is always possible to pursue uncompromising

Praxis 195

strategic ends by non-violent means Mahatma Gandhi Martin Luther King and Ibrahim Rugova were extremists of ends who unwaveringly pursued their strategic objectives ndash the end of British rule in India the overthrow of racial discrimination in the US Kosovan independence ndash with a view to ultimate victory They engaged in vigorous radical disagreement and agonistic dialogue with their opponents As part of their goal to destroy the unjust system their discursive aim was to elimin-ate the unjust discourse Indeed in order to achieve this they wanted to raise the level of intractable conflict not to reduce it Here is King in his famous Lincoln Memorial Address in Washington on August 23 1963

We have also come to this hallowed spot to remind America of the fierce urgency of now This is no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquillising drug of gradualism Now is the time to make real the promises of democracy The whirlwind of revolt will continue to shake the foundations of our nation until the bright day of justice emerges

(King 19921963 533ndash4)

But Gandhi King and Rugova were moderates of means pursuing their strategic objectives non-violently All three believed that non-violence was strategically more effective than violence

We can remind ourselves of the radical disagreement looked at in Chapter 6

|lsquoCan even the most moderate and understanding Israeli agree to deny the legit-imacy of the Israeli state Can such an Israeli really be expected to embrace the original sin or original crime that Zionism inflicted upon the Palestiniansrsquo

lsquoCan even the most moderate and understanding Palestinian agree to deny the legitimacy of Palestinian demands for equal rights in their own homeland Or be expected to accept responsibility for initiating violence in attempting legitimate resistance to disenfranchisementrsquo|

This tells us that a majority of those who would normally be called moderates on either side ndash most Israelis and Palestinians ndash are in the context of this radical disagreement extremists of ends on issues such as the rights of Palestinians to rectification of past injustice or on questions such as recognition not just of the State of Israel but as the current Israeli Prime Minister insists of Israel as lsquothe state of the Jewish peoplersquo No Israeli government can acknowledge responsibility for the former and survive No Palestinian government can recognize the latter and survive In other words no matter what settlement may be achieved the deep core of the conflict together with its associated radical disagreements will go on

The main lesson for peacemakers is to focus on managing the continuing rad-ical disagreement between extremists of ends (who may be a majority on key issues) so that this does not fuel support for extremists of means (who thus remain a minority)

But before moving on to this question I offer a reminder of what it is at ground


level that such engagement seeks to transform This is the tragic core of the agon-istic dialogue that the third party is attempting to address (Brown 2007)

Kenize Mourad travelled through Israel Gaza and the West Bank in 2002 at the height of the al-Aqsa intifada and at exactly the time the Arab Peace Initiative was being launched Here is her conclusion having spent months interviewing lsquoordinary Palestinians and Israelisrsquo so that they could lsquotell their storiesrsquo It is not surprising that the API did not make an impact in these circumstances

During my time there I was filled with the sense that every encounter was weighted down by a terrible misunderstanding Manipulated by extremists at either end most of the people whom I interviewed were convinced that the other side wanted to annihilate them

(Mourad 2004 2)

This is an example of a radical disagreement recorded by Mourad involving the mother of the first female Palestinian suicide bomber and the Israeli sister of a bomb victim the two younger women were both 27

|lsquo[My daughter] had joined the Red Cross as a nurse and there she saw the worst She witnessed atrocious things in Nablus Jenin Ramallah ndash women and children killed when they broke the curfew to go and buy food wounded people dying without her being able to help Three times when she had tried to go to people she had been shot with rubber bullets She had seen women give birth in front of checkpoints and lose their baby and sick people dying because they could not get to hospital She told me how she had pleaded in vain with soldiers to let ambulances through hellip Every night she would come home exhausted and stressed and tell us everything she had seen She was more and more outraged by what the Israelis were doing to civilians and by the worldrsquos indifference But she never talked to me about the suicide bombingsrsquo

lsquoArafat is no different from Hitler ndash you canrsquot negotiate with him Why doesnrsquot the world understand that How can the world not see that we have nothing but this country Where can we go It is the only place we Jews have The Palestinians want to force us to leave hellip How can you compare Sharon and Arafat hellip Perhaps you think I hate Arabs Not at all There are two Arab women in the firm where I work I donrsquot have any problem with them even since my sister died I have nothing against Palestinians or Israeli Arabs I will never hate them Itrsquos Arafat that I hate He exploits his people and doesnrsquot give them any means of educating themselves All he can do is teach them how to kill hellip You think the Israelis are just as much to blame You donrsquot understand You put us on the same level but itrsquos false We are not the same Our soldiers are not there to kill Itrsquos a war and they are defending themselves sometimes therersquos an accident thatrsquos all The Palestinians want a bloodbath They donrsquot care if they die or if they see

Praxis 197

their children dying You canrsquot compare us and you donrsquot have the right to do thatrsquo|

(Mourad 2004 76 80)

Why should Palestinians give up violent resistance and accept dispossession Why should Israelis give up violent defencerepression and share power Any answers given by internal and external peacemakers to these questions will have to satisfy this Palestinian mother and this Israeli sister

The strategic engagement of discourses level three third-party peacemaking

Third parties are engaged in great numbers at every point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and play many different roles Sometimes they are involved or inter-vene on their own initiative Sometimes they are appealed to by conflict parties Sometimes they are brought in by other third parties Their discourses compete with each other and with those of the conflict parties to occupy the whole of dis-cursive space They participate as combatants in the war of words In this sense they become conflict parties

As mentioned in Chapter 4 the introduction of third parties opens the complex network of relations that make up the wider conflict formations within which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is embedded The formal definition of a lsquothird partyrsquo depends on the conflict formation under consideration

In this case the Quartet formed by the US Russia the EU and the UN represents the international community All are deeply implicated historically in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Russia in its former embodiment in the Soviet Union was among the earliest to encourage the creation of the State of Israel and played a highly intrusive role thereafter Russian immigrants to Israel have had a profound demo-graphic and political impact The US was at first more ambivalent at one point in 1948 advising against the setting up of an Israeli State and forcing Israel to withdraw from lands taken in 1956 but is now the main guarantor of Israeli survival The EU contains Germany France (provider of Israelrsquos first nuclear reactor in 1957) and the UK prime actors in the events in question The UN set up the commission that advised that Palestine be partitioned and the General Assembly voted in support

Peacemaking analysis repeatedly shows that given the strategic impasse it is only a third party that can break the deadlock At the time of writing (April 2009) all eyes are turned towards the new US administration of President Obama George Mitchell has been appointed Middle East envoy and the President plans to visit the region next month This is the period of maximum activity for those who want to influence the US administration So here as an example of would-be third-party discursive peacemaking I take the Executive Summary of A Last Chance for A Two-State IsraelndashPalestine Agreement presented immediately after the November 2008 Presidential election by the USMiddle East Project This was a bi-partisan lsquostatement on US Middle East peacemakingrsquo by ten former senior government offi-cials including former Democrat National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski


and former Republican National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft (see Box 75) Although by the time the book is published this report will be out of date it is

a useful text for illustrating the main points made here

Box 75 A Last Chance for a Two-State IsraelndashPalestine Agreement executive summary

Source USMiddle East Project 2008 extracts

We urge the next US administration to engage in prompt sustained and determined efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflicthellip

Unless the president tackles this problem early it is unlikely to be done at all Political capital will erode domestic obstacles will grow other issues will dominate and the warring parties will play for time and run the clock

Failure to act would be extremely costly It would not only undermine current efforts to weaken extremist groups bolster our moderate allies and rally regional support to stabilize Iraq and contain Iran but would also risk permanent loss of the two-state solution as settlements expand and become entrenched and extremists on both sides consolidate their hold In short the next six to twelve months may well represent the last chance for a fair viable and lasting solution

To maximise the prospects for success we urge the following key steps drawing on lessons from past successes and failures

1 Present a clear US vision to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflictThe dispute between the two sides is too deep and the discrepancies of power

between them too vast for them to solve their conflict without the US acting as a determined and evenhanded advocate and facilitator

The most important step President Obama should take early in his presidency is to flesh out the outlines of a fair viable and sustainable agreement based on principles that both Israel and the Palestinians have previously accepted by signing on to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 the Oslo Accords the 2003 Road Map and the 2007 Annapolis understandings The charge that advancing such principles would constitute improper ldquooutside impositionsrdquo is therefore groundless

The US parameters should reflect the following fundamental compromisesbull Two states based on the lines of June 4 1967 with minor reciprocal and agreed-

upon modifications as expressed in a 11 land swap to take into account areas heavily populated by Israelis in the west Bank

bull A solution to the refugee problem consistent with the two-state solution that does not entail a general right of return addresses the Palestinian refugeesrsquo sense of injustice and provides them with meaningful financial compensation as well as resettlement assistance

bull Jerusalem as home to both capitals with Jewish neighbourhoods falling under Israeli sovereignty and Arab neighbourhoods under Palestinian sovereignty with spe-cial arrangements for the Old City providing each side control of its respective holy places and unimpeded access by each community to them

bull A non-militarized Palestinian state together with security mechanisms that address Israeli concerns while respecting Palestinian sovereignty and a US-led multinational force to ensure a peaceful transitional security period This coalition peacekeeping structure under UN mandate would feature American leadership of a NATO force supplemented by Jordanians Egyptians and Israelis We can envision a five-year renewable mandate with the objective of achieving full Palestinian domina-tion of security affairs on the Palestine side of the line within 15 years

Praxis 199

Readers will have their own views on the particular recommendations made in the Executive Summary of the USMiddle East Project Report By the time they read this they will know to what extent the new US administration has acted along the lines recommended here and how successful the new Israeli government has been in postponing any irrevocable move towards a genuinely independent Palestinian state Perhaps the US administration will try to orchestrate international pressure on Israel if not use the leverage of its economic and military support Perhaps the Israeli government will mobilize the pro-Israel lobby in the US press and Congress or try to deflect attention to Iran and court Saudi fears or play up the Syrian track as a delay-ing tactic or enmesh negotiations in detail and play for time or work to prevent the consolidation of a united Arab front or attempt to focus on economic alleviation for Palestinians but not significant political concessions Or perhaps conversely Israel may be induced to make concessions towards a Palestinian state in exchange for a free hand against Iran and Arab states (Egypt Saudi Arabia) will connive at such arrangements Predictions are perilous in complex conflict systems

But for would-be third-party peacemakers this example of attempted third-party peacemaking can already demonstrate some of the main lessons to be drawn from a strategic engagement of discourses in intractable conflicts Lessons can be drawn from all three levels ndash third-party inter-party and intra-party

Level three

At third-party level the authors of the Report describe the recommended US inter-vention as neutral (the US is an lsquoeven-handed advocate and facilitatorrsquo) impartial (the word lsquofairrsquo is repeated) and disinterested (it is not a case of imposing a US solution) The third level of the strategic engagement of discourses however shows why interveners would be wise to accept that in the cauldron of intract-able political conflict it is not up to them to define this Everything is politicized The intervention will be widely seen as not even-handed or fair and to be driven mainly by US regional and global interests ndash as is indeed already explicit in the text As clarified in Chapter 6 third-party peacemakers want to occupy the whole of discursive space

Also at level three come the complex of relations among other third parties which includes the containing conflict formations (Arab-Israel wider Middle East) that are not the focus of this chapter but may now play the decisive role Has shared fear of the Iranian threat shifted priorities both for Arab regimes in Cairo and Riyadh and for the Israeli government ndash opening the way for conces-sions on the question of Israeli settlements and moves towards a Palestinian state in exchange Here the would-be peacemaker can use the knowledge gained from

[The Executive Summary ends with advice to lsquoencourage Israeli-Syrian negotia-tionsrsquo to lsquoadopt a more pragmatic approach toward Hamas and a Palestinian Unity Governmentrsquo]


analysis of intra-third party strategic engagement of discourses in general to orches-trate pressure accordingly

Level two

The strategic engagement of discourses between conflict parties within the con-flict configuration in question clarifies the daunting nature of the challenge facing third-party peacemakers in relation to the two chief components of any future set-tlement The first is the formulation of a mutually acceptable political framework that reflects relative balance of power and can accommodate unresolved political struggle and continuing radical disagreement The second is the persuasion of the conflict parties that their undefeated political and moral-religious aspirations are from now on best pursued non-violently

On the question of political framework the USMiddle East Report assumes that a lsquotwo-state IsraelindashPalestine agreementrsquo is the only viable political framework But what does this mean As seen in Chapter 5 it is the naming of what is in contention that lies at the heart of linguistic intractability If and when the new Israeli Prime Minister eventually refers to a lsquoPalestinian statersquo what is he naming Does this bear any resemblance to what Palestinians refer to And crucially how does what Israelis see as the alternative(s) to a two-state solution relate to the alternative(s) as envisaged by Palestinians ndash along the lines invoked in Regaining the Initiative for example Only a strategic engagement of discourses can clarify this so that third-party peacemakers can act accordingly

On the question of a possible renunciation of violence the strategic engagement of discourses specifies what is required of the two linked tasks

Within the disputed framework Palestinians must be persuaded that giving up violent resistance and accepting a settlement far from amounting to capitulation and dispossession represents the most potent way to continue the struggle and reach the strategic goal of a final rectification of injustice A key argument for the challenging discourse here ndash as in Northern Ireland ndash is that a definitive giving up of violent resistance will put more pressure on Israel to shift in the desired direction not less As also that it may be through a two-state solution that a lsquoone-state out-comersquo ndash perhaps in the form of some future confederation between the two states ndash will be most easily attained however remote the idea may seem at the moment The horizon may be 50 years or more But the rights of those unjustly expelled have not been abandoned The Palestinian fear as made clear in Regaining the Initiative is that to make this move will be to fall into the Israeli trap of a lsquoquasi-statersquo and result in the Palestinian cause being ignored not only by Israelis but also by the Arab world and the international community Third-party peacemakers have to focus all their persuasive powers on meeting this fear and persuading Palestinians that on the contrary this is the only way to secure full and sustained international support for a genuine sovereign and independent Palestinian state ndash a transforma-tion that will then make all other things possible

The possessor in this case the Israelis must be persuaded that ending violent repression and sharing power is the most effective way to maximize gains over

Praxis 201

the longer term Is the possessor lsquodoing all the givingrsquo Yes in the sense that it is already in possession of what is disputed If the possessor has a monopoly of power it can keep everything with impunity The enemy has been definitively defeated But in ongoing intractable conflict this is by definition not the case The question then is what cards does the possessor have to play and when in order to stabilize its gains at the maximum level possible Israel made peace with Egypt in 1979 When if ever will the strategic calculation be seen to favour peace with Palestinians It is always timing that is of the essence in wise and flexible stra-tegic thinking Third party peacemakers need to convince key Israeli advisers and decision-makers that the moment is now ndash the driving consideration once again is not giving up and compromise but maximizing long-term gains and winning The Israeli fear is that to relinquish control is to open the floodgates through which their sworn enemies will swiftly pour The third-party peacemaker has to be prepared to do everything that is necessary to allay this fear

The USMiddle East Report makes several concrete proposals of a familiar kind on the determination of future borders (including Israeli settlers) the right of return of Palestinian refugees the status of Jerusalem security arrangements economic resource control and management This is a well-worn litany repeated with variations through the 2000 Clinton parameters the 2001 Taba discussions the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative the informal 2003 Geneva accords and so on lsquoEverybody knows what a final settlement will look likersquo is the common refrain But the strategic engagement of discourses shows that everyone does not know what a final settlement will look like That is the problem For example a land-swap to accommodate Israeli West Bank settlements inside Israeli borders entails equivalent incorporation of largely Arab-populated territory currently in Israel into a new Palestinian state What are the views of the Arab IsraelisPalestinian citizens of Israel affected Indeed should Arab IsraelisPalestinians in Israel not form a distinct inclusive strategy group as part of the SED process ndash as has to some extent already happened (the Haifa Declaration)

In short the main lesson for third-party peacemakers from the strategic engage-ment of discourses is that in making peace between undefeated conflict parties the language to use is not the language of compromise or giving up It is the lan-guage of strategic victory The proposed settlement means that the conflict party in question will win Above all those who need to be convinced on either side and to be transformed into peacemakers are not the habitual doves but precisely the extremists of ends who the strategic engagement of discourses shows are a majority on both sides on the existential issues The settlement is not itself the terminus and end of conflict The conflict ndash and the radical disagreements that go with it ndash continues The precious gift that third-party peacemakers have to offer is hope This is taken further in Chapter 8

Level one

And now the great benefit of all the hard work that has gone into the level one inclusive intra-party strategic engagement of discourses becomes available


Supplied with this information third-party peacemakers can learn in detail issue by issue how each element in the list of specific recommendations plays among the various internal constituencies The focal point here would be to channel third-party efforts through small groups of influential military security and political advisers and opinion-formers on each side This would be developed further in a more detailed study It includes vital insight into the make-up of cross-cutting sub-groups ndash who the pragmatists and ideologues are within Hamas on different issues or which ultra-orthodox Jewish groups oppose Zionism and in what ways Under-tested areas of strategy can also be analysed ndash for example how true is it that economic factors are decisive and that challengers will accept political and ideological compromise in return for the future prospect of material well-being Is the current Netanyahu strategy of economic peace likely to work Why not ask

If the new US strategy to be announced in a few weeks from the time of writ-ing follows anything like the line suggested in this Report it will be closely akin to what I earlier called the lsquoargument for an Israeli Peace Initiativersquo Although Palestinians would have many difficulties with it at the moment it is most profoundly at odds with prevailing Israeli strategy In that case third-party peace-makers will find themselves on course for a head-on collision with one of the conflict parties They will need all the skill they can muster to win the resulting discursive battles at the different levels of the interlocking conflict formations along the lines indicated above

Conclusion let words die not people

In intractable conflicts in which dialogue for mutual understanding proves prema-ture it is dialogue for strategic engagement that offers the best hope for conflict management in the discursive sphere This may not deliver a settlement It is not pre-negotiation Nor is it even pre-pre-negotiation But at least all the sails are kept up and spread to catch any hopeful gusts of wind that may unexpectedly arise Otherwise without sails permanently hoisted it will be much more likely to be a continuing story of mistiming and missed opportunities

The idea is not to muzzle or silence radical disagreement but on the contrary to amplify and develop it It is to promote the war of words so that the full lineaments of linguistic intractability can be seen and understood In this way the struggle between the challenging discourse the hegemonic discourse and the third-party (peacemaking) discourse becomes manifest This clarifies what is at issue and what each of the competing discourses has to do in order to prevail

The promotion of an inclusive internal strategic engagement of discourses is undoubtedly good for the challenging discourse It is more likely to lead to wise flexible and realistic strategies for attaining transformative goals including back-up strategies in case first preferences fail It helps to clarify what messages need to be sent to opponents and third parties and when It maximizes active and orchestrated participation and support to mobilize the full energies of the people behind the national project It sustains determination and hope

I would strongly argue that promotion of an inclusive internal strategic

Praxis 203

engagement of discourses is also in the interest of the hegemonic discourse by helping to ensure that no strategy goes untested or uncriticized The process does not dictate which particular outcome will prevail But it helps to ensure that the pilots are not flying blind and that the rapidly opening and closing opportunities for a safe landing are noticed in time lsquoDefaultrsquo strategy and instinctive reliance on brute power is highly vulnerable to wishful thinking and strategic sclerosis

In both cases it is ongoing strategic engagement of discourses that best clarifies the shifting cost-benefit analysis that can provide the best incentive for a peace process (Strategic Foresight Group 2009) A sustained strategic engagement of discourses of this kind was missing in the 1990s in support an apparent break-through And it was missing after 2000 to help fill the dangerous vacuum after the collapse of the Camp David talks It will be needed in the current peace efforts both if they succeed (the immediate post-settlement period is often the most dan-gerous) and if they fail

Unlike dialogue for mutual understanding dialogue for strategic engagement has no natural bias towards peacemaking It is up to the conflict parties and third parties to conduct their own strategic thinking and reach their own conclusions But I have suggested four ways in which a strategic engagement of discourses can at least provide communication channels and vital information for peacemakers when all other avenues have shut down

1 the inherent nature of strategic thinking itself as exemplified in the six points noted earlier in this chapter

2 the possibility of interchange permanently held open by the promotion of inclusive intra-party strategic groups as exemplified in the hexagon of radical disagreement

3 the light continually cast by the SED process on the constantly changing rela-tion between extremism of ends and extremism of means and the consequent early warning of danger and openings for peace

4 the detailed information constantly made available for internal and external peacemakers with consequent invaluable guidance on whom to put pressure on and how at the three SED levels commented upon above

Even when this is not the case and no realistic possibilities for a sustainable set-tlement have yet emerged at least the quality of systemic strategic thinking fully cognisant of the complex conflict environment may be improved Perhaps promo-tion of the battle of discourses may rule out some of the worst decisions for action in advance Perhaps in this way and to this extent it may even be that more often than would otherwise be the case words will die rather than people

Notes

1 The Directors of the ORG EU project were Gabrielle Rifkind (Director of the ORG Middle East programme) and Ahmed Badawi the Palestinian track was advised and guided by Husam Zomlot and facilitated by Ahmed Badawi the Israeli track was led


by Avner Haramati Mario Schejtman and Ofer Zalzberg with workshop methodo-logy devised and conducted by Adam Kahane assisted by Shay Ben Yosef and Tova Averbuch Oliver Ramsbotham is Chair of ORG and has been a major contributor to the project as has Middle East expert Tony Klug

2 The Oxford Research Group played a modest but quite influential part in this con-vening a three-day meeting in November 2008 between leading Arabs Israelis and internationals to determine ways in which the API could be moved higher up the agenda ndash particularly in Israel

8 Re-entryFeeding back into conflict settlement and conflict transformation

When the management of radical disagreement via a strategic engagement of discourses is successful conflict parties otherwise not amenable to transformat-ive dialogic approaches are brought to a point where they may have an incentive to participate Dialogue for mutual understanding again becomes possible space for conflict settlement is opened up and continuous monitoring and exploration of radical disagreement can play a key role in early warning for prevention and post-war reconstruction In these circumstances the strategic engagement of discourses is a pump-primer for conflict resolution

But difficult questions remain In what circumstances is dialogue for strategic engagement not possible Can it make things worse How does it impact on relat-ive discrepancies of power in asymmetric conflicts What when conflict parties conclude that violence works Who are the enemies of peace and how should they be dealt with Answers to these questions lead to a reconsideration of the roles of moderates peacemakers and spoilers in intense political conflicts when radical disagreement is ongoing

In Chapter 4 objections to the enterprise of taking radical disagreement seriously in conflict resolution discourse analysis and conflict analysis were bracketed This opened the way for the phenomenology epistemology and praxis of radical disag-reement ndash exploring understanding and managing the agonistic dialogue between enemies that constitutes linguistic intractability The claim in Chapter 7 was that in intractable conflicts it is only by actively promoting a strategic engagement of discourses ndash by taking the war of words itself seriously ndash that the full force of the discursive battle is grasped intra- and inter-conflict party verbal exchanges are kept open and conflict parties ndash including third-party peacemakers ndash learn best what is required if they are to prevail

Chapters 8 9 and 10 now unbracket the objections from conflict resolution dis-course analysis and conflict analysis outlined in Part I in order to see how much of the investigation undertaken in Part II survives

This chapter unbrackets conflict resolution Conflict resolution is taken as a generic term that encompasses conflict settlement at one level and conflict trans-formation at another See Figure 81


The chapter begins by revisiting the conflict resolution enterprise of dialogue for mutual understanding in general and then moves on to conflict settlement and conflict transformation Conflict transformation includes attempts to prevent viol-ent conflict pre-war and attempts to build sustainable peace post-war

Radical disagreement and dialogue for mutual understanding

Before looking at the promotion of a strategic engagement of discourses in rela-tion to conflict settlement and conflict transformation it is worth revisiting the rich tradition of constructive dialogue and problem solving looked at in Chapter 3 What contribution if any can the exploration of agnostic dialogue (Chapter 5)

Conflict transformation

Conflict settlement

Managing radical disagreement

Conflict settlement


Structuralcultural violence

Political polarization

Intractable conflict



Figure 81 The hourglass model of conflict escalation and de-escalation

Moving from the top to the bottom the hourglass model illustrates in highly schematic form the escalation and de-escalation of intense political confl ict The two triangles represent decreasing political space during the escalation phase (the top triangle) and increasing political space during the de-escalation phase (the bottom triangle) The aim of confl ict resolution is to maximize political space It aims to prevent escalation by addressing underlying structural and cultural violence and by settling disputes once confl ict parties have formed and polarized (top triangle) If this fails it tries to contain and end direct violence as soon as possible to achieve some form of political settlement and then to (re)build sustainable peace by transforming the structural and cultural exclusions exploitations and inequities that might otherwise ignite another cycle of confl ict (bottom triangle) It can be seen that the management of radical disagreement offers a means of maintaining channels of communication and keeping open possibilities for future settlement and transformation at the point of zero political space ndash when confl ict settlement and confl ict transformation themselves can no longer or cannot yet gain purchase

Re-entry 207

and dialogue for strategic engagement (Chapter 7) make to dialogue for mutual understanding in general

The Gadamerian approach to dialogue ndash recognizing and thereby overcoming prejudice through a fusion of horizons that creates a lsquothird culturersquo ndash is close to David Bohmrsquos idea that in genuine dialogue participants attempt to overcome these lsquoblocksrsquo by suspending judgement

What is called for is to suspend those assumptions so that you neither carry them out nor suppress them You donrsquot believe them nor do you disbelieve them you donrsquot judge them as good or bad hellip

(Bohm 1996 22)

Perhaps here the exploration of agnostic dialogue and dialogue for strategic engagement can help bridge those situations where conflict parties do not recognize their prejudice and are not ready to suspend judgement

I think that something like this applies generally across the field of dialogue for social change For example the authors of Mapping Dialogue (2006) see the lsquounderlying structurersquo of dialogue for mutual understanding as a process of diver-gence followed by convergence

The divergent phase of a process is a time of opening up possibility It is about generating alternatives gathering diverse points of view allowing disagree-ment in and suspending judgment We are often afraid of really opening up to allow for full divergence to occur because we are uncomfortable or even fearful of the messiness of too many new and divergent ideas and perspectives Yet the greater the divergence at the beginning of the process the greater the possibility of surprising and innovative outcomes


But what when the disagreements that are lsquoallowed inrsquo during the divergent phase are radical that is to say when they cannot be described merely as lsquodivergent viewsrsquo but involve fiercely contested political incompatibilities Once again I think that in these circumstances dialogue for strategic engagement offers addi-tional resources to keep parties engaged who would otherwise drop away One example is Harold Saunderrsquos Sustained Dialogue approach which focuses on underlying relationships linked to identity interests power perceptions of the other and patterns of interaction This approach has proved effective in conflict arenas such as Tajikistan (Saunders 1999) In this approach there are five stages of sustained dialogue Dealing with disagreement comes at the beginning of stage two when stories are told grievances are expressed and an attempt is made to lsquoclear the airrsquo At the end of stage two the conversation changes

lsquoMersquo becomes lsquoWersquo lsquoWhatrsquo becomes lsquoWhyrsquo Participants shift from speaking lsquotorsquo each other to speaking lsquowithrsquo each other

(Ibid 60)


In this case I think that dialogue for strategic engagement may help to handle those situations in which conflict parties are unable or unwilling to move from lsquomersquo to lsquowersquo at such an early stage in the programme or from lsquowhatrsquo to lsquowhyrsquo or from speaking lsquoatrsquo to speaking lsquowithrsquo each other

An example from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian School of Peace project which goes back to 1972 when Arab and Jewish Israelis created a joint village ndash Neve ShalomWahat El Salam (Oasis of Peace) ndash to embody peace and reconciliation in their daily lives At first the emphasis in the School of Peace was on individual relationships Then it came to be accepted that collective identities could not be ignored and needed to be explic-itly worked through Arabs and Jews meet uni-nationally as well as bi-nationally and one of the tasks of the uni-national groups is to negotiate wide internal differ-ences There is also a focus on political inequalities with Arab-Israeli participants often expressing resentment about disempowerment and needing to overcome ini-tial feelings of inferiority and Jewish-Israeli participants needing to acknowledge the equality of their fellow-citizens and shed instinctive feelings of superiority These groups are regarded as microcosms of Israeli society and the process aims to redress mutual ignorance and bring Arab and Jewish Israelis together to shape a common Israeli future But what is to be done when Arab Israelis challenge the very basis of a democratic Jewish state or when Jewish Israelis question whether such citizens should be part of it Perhaps dialogue for strategic engagement may help to sustain communication even across such chasms (Halabi and Sonneschein 2004)

An example from Northern Ireland is provided by the Corrymeela Community whose founder Ray Davey describes the remarkable transformative potential that dialogue for mutual understanding can have between individuals from divided societies

When Sean and Damian from a Catholic inner-city school in Derry agreed to come on the weekend they feared that they would be in the minority and no-one would be prepared to listen to their experiences and views So they arrived wearing sweatshirts ablaze with the colours and the flag they supported and brandishing slogans proclaiming their cause Then expecting to be put down by their opponents they adopted a macho image projecting their outlook in the most aggressive tones Their first surprise was to discover that they were not in the minority Their second was when they learnt that many of the other Catholics present did not share their political outlook Their biggest surprise was to discover that most of the others were prepared to accept without reac-tion their dress listen calmly to what they said and ask them why they felt that way rather than arguing back

As the weekend went on their voices went down by decibels their aggress-ive behaviour subsided and they acknowledged that they were not sure themselves about all of the most extreme positions they had proclaimed on the Friday night Most importantly on Sunday at the final worship they said that the group gave them hope that it was possible to pursue change through negotiation rather than force as the only way that people will consider As a

Re-entry 209

result they planned to meet together with others of the group in their home town and keep in touch and hopefully to come back to Corrymeela

(Davey 1993 135)

When this works there is no more to be said But perhaps the exploration agnostic dialogue and dialogue for strategic engagement could usefully supplement the pro-cess in cases where the other does answer back or political differences are too stark to be bridged in this way or lsquocontactrsquo far from helping to ameliorate the situation only serves to make things worse

Finally an example from South Africa is offered by Adam Kahanersquos Montfleur process (Kahane 2007) In 1991 after Nelson Mandelarsquos release from prison and at a time of great uncertainly in South Africa Kahane convened a group of 22 leading figures from across the political and social spectrum in South Africa to explore and discuss possible future scenarios for the country Participants came from the white business and academic community and included leaders from the main challenging parties (including the ANC PAC South African Communist Party) Over a period of months the group identified and explored four scen-arios in relation to the question How will the transition go and will the country succeed in lsquotaking offrsquo In the first scenario (the ostrich) the white government tries to avoid a negotiated settlement In the second scenario (the lame duck) the transition takes too long in an unsuccessful attempt to satisfy everyone In the third scenario (Icarus) a black government takes power and bankrupts the economy by over-spending In the fourth scenario (the flight of the flamingos) the transition is successful and all South Africans rise slowly together The group ended by unanimously choosing the fourth scenario as the best blueprint This was a very successful and influential exercise Clearly in this case there was no need for a supplementary methodology because the process worked perfectly But perhaps dialogue for strategic engagement might be useful where the former hegemon is in a stronger position than was the tottering apartheid regime and where all par-ticipants do not agree on a joint scenario (in this case even the names of the three rejected scenarios were pejorative)

At this point it is worth revisiting Heidi and Guy Burgessrsquo lsquoConstructive Confrontationrsquo approach to transforming intractable conflicts looked at in Chapter 4

Constructive confrontation is a way to approach resolution-resistant conflicts that utilizes the best aspects of consensus-based conflict resolution processes but does not require consensus to be effective It can be used by disputants themselves or by third parties who want to help individual or multiple parties confront these conflicts in the most effective way Rather than replacing nego-tiation or consensus-based techniques we see constructive confrontation as a complementary process that can be used when traditional consensus-building has failed or appears unlikely to yield a consensual agreement

(Burgess and Burgess 1997 9)


Burgess and Burgess have developed Constructive Confrontation primarily to deal with unavoidably intractable public policy conflicts The ultimate goal is still to transform conflictual into cooperative relationships by stressing the primacy of lsquocommunity values over selfish valuesrsquo (1996 320) But the emphasis is on pro-cess and incremental improvements rather than comprehensive resolution within a frame that shifts emphasis away from short-term disputes to a lsquolong-term view of the underlying conflictrsquo Conflict parties are encouraged to develop approaches that serve their own interests but in the light of an awareness of other parties involved and of principles of justice and fairness The diagnosis distinguishes lsquocore issuesrsquo from lsquooverlay problemsrsquo such as misunderstandings fact-finding problems escalation dynamics and procedural controversies Power relations are addressed by empowerment of conflict parties through the encouragement of intra-coalition consensus building and external assistance in advocacy by lsquoconstructive confrontation advisersrsquo

There is much in common with dialogue for strategic engagement here as acknowledged in Chapter 4 But I think that the focus on radical disagreement agonistic dialogue and linguistic intractability makes dialogue for strategic engage-ment more directly adapted to the kinds of intractable conflict mainly considered in this book rather than the public policy arena from which constructive confronta-tion has come So perhaps dialogue for strategic engagement and the strategic engagement of discourses that it promotes may have something to add in cases where the question of lsquoincrementalrsquo vs lsquofinal statersquo processes is part of what is at issue ndash for example Israelis as possessors favour the first Palestinians as challeng-ers the second Or the distinction between lsquocore issuesrsquo and lsquooverlay problemsrsquo is itself embroiled ndash for example core issues include questions such as whether there has been misunderstanding or what counts as fact-finding Or appeals to justice and fairness are themselves contested ndash it is the very distinction between these distinctions and what they dodo not distinguish that lies at the heart of the dispute

Radical disagreement and conflict settlement

At the core of the extensive literature on conflict settlement is the question of how to facilitate agreement between undefeated conflict parties This book deals with intractable conflicts where by definition settlement has not yet proved poss-ible In terms of Friedrich Glaslrsquos lsquoU-procedurersquo the focus in this book has been on the gap between his four lsquodiagnostic stagesrsquo that lsquotake us step by step from a description of factual observable behaviour to the deeper underlying assumptions and principles which govern behaviourrsquo on the one hand and his lsquonew maximsrsquo that transform the conflict in stages five to seven on the other (Glasl 2008 48) Chapter 7 suggested ways in which even in these circumstances a three-level strategic engagement of discourses might help prepare the ground for an eventual resumption of efforts at direct settlement But now it is worth considering briefly what happens when the search for a settlement does succeed Is this suddenly the end of radical disagreement In the light of what has been seen earlier in Part II

Re-entry 211

my response is that in the case of undefeated and as yet unreconciled antagonists I do not think so

As seen in Chapter 7 the heart of the settlement in these cases is usually a framework that reflects relative strength at the time (military and non-military) together with an arrangement whereby challengers have been induced to give up violent resistance and possessors have been induced to give up violent repression and share power But the undefeated parties have not yet surrendered their long-term aspirations or dreams What Glasl calls the lsquocognitive turning pointrsquo lsquothe lsquoemotional turning pointrsquo and the lsquointentional turning pointrsquo are not yet complete (2008 47) They have been persuaded that their continuing incompatible strategic goals are now best served by different strategic means In short the core of the settlement is what I call lsquoClausewitz in reversersquo ndash not the end of the conflict but its transmutation into a different ndash and it is hoped permanently non-violent ndash form1

The misconception that settlement means an end to conflict is encapsulated in the popular misnomers that the aim of conflict resolution is lsquoconflict preventionrsquo or lsquopost-conflict reconstructionrsquo whereas the proper aim is to transform actually or potentially violent conflict into non-violent forms of ongoing political struggle Conflict lies at the heart of all serious politics And radical disagreement as its chief linguistic manifestation remains integral to it

The Middle East conflict is often compared to conflicts in South Africa and Northern Ireland In this respect what can the latter teach the former

In South Africa Nelson Mandela did not give up his long-term strategic goal in the confrontation with apartheid In this sense like Gandhi and Martin Luther King he was an extremist of ends Although he still had testing conflicts to man-age within the black majority it became plain relatively soon after his release from prison in 1991 that the white minority dominance that he had devoted his life to bringing down was effectively finished despite what seemed at the time a dangerous rearguard resistance He showed great skill and vision in reassuring the former hegemons that they would not be victimized in the transfer of power but the outcome was decisive The discourse of apartheid was defeated Mandelarsquos discourse triumphed Mandelarsquos achievement at this stage was to be magnanimous and wise in victory

In Northern Ireland in contrast the settlement was made between undefeated parties In this sense it is nearer to the Israeli-Palestinian case A changing com-plex conflict environment constantly closes and opens opportunities for settlement Changing relations between the Irish and British governments within the EU played a major role as did economic transformation in the Irish Republic The mediation role of centrist politicians like John Hume of the SDLP was important But what-ever the systemic nuances at the strategic core of the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998 was the willingness of the challengers (republicans) to give up violent resistance and of the possessors (loyalists) to share power As with the Palestinians the fear of the challenger was that to give up armed resistance was to give up the challenge As with the Israelis the fear of the possessor was that to share power was to give up possession What each feared was defeat And the art of the peace-maker was to persuade both that on the contrary their continuing incompatible


strategic goals (a united Ireland a permanent union with the UK) were more likely to succeed through an agreed non-violent but power-sharing framework

So it was that both republicans and loyalists hailed the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998 (and in the case of the DUP the St Andrews Agreement of October 2006) as a victory This is indeed the lsquodiscursively paradoxical realityrsquo so carefully and revealingly charted by political discourse analysis (Hayward and OrsquoDonnell eds forthcoming 2010)

[I]t can be claimed that the ambiguity of the language of the Agreement has allowed the creation of a discursively paradoxical reality which is manifested through different nuances of discourse which lie in turn at the heart of the success of the peace process as we know it today


The key point here is that in the years leading up to the Good Friday Agreement settlement only became possible when the Sinn FeinIRA leadership decided that in altered circumstances the unchanged strategic goal of a united Ireland would now be more likely to succeed by non-violent means ndash the political route would in future be more effective than a continuation of the armed struggle Gerry Adams the Sinn Fein leader like former IRA prisoners and nearly all staunch republicans continued and continues to interpret the conflict in exactly the way he did before the peace deal and as a result openly expects to achieve a united Ireland in the near future Some have said that this is disappointing ndash that he should now be using the language of political moderation and reconciliation But it is because he has been unwavering in his radical political disagreement with the unionists (he has remained an extremist of ends) that he has not been politically lsquooutbidrsquo and there-fore outflanked by more than a handful of IRA die-hards (extremists of means) He has succeeded in carrying the bulk of the republican movement with him in the decision that continuing and unchanged republican political goals are now best attained non-violently A brief glance at the Sinn Fein website makes this clear

Political discourse analysis also shows the same to be true of loyalist counter-parts They too have not changed their ultimate strategic goal of maintaining the union indefinitely This may explain why contrary to some peoplersquos expectations whatever role may have been played by centrist politicians in helping to bring about the initial agreement once it had been secured centrist parties (Alliance SDLP) suffered heavy electoral losses

This is the main lesson for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the Northern Ireland case The settlement does not end the conflict nor does it end the radical disagreement that is part of it It transmutes it into non-violent mode to be fought out ndash in the Northern Ireland case ndash constitutionally Conflict parties still retain their dreams Republicans dream of a United Ireland Loyalists dream of a per-petual Union They have not given them up

This lesson has not been lost on other challenging groups In May 2009 Murad Karayilan acting leader of the Kurdistan Workersrsquo Party (PKK) offered an end to the 25-year war of independence with Turkey in which 30000 had lost their lives

Re-entry 213

Kurds do not want to continue the war We believe we can solve the Kurdish question without spilling more blood We are ready for a peaceful and demo-cratic solution in Turkey ndash to be solved within Turkeyrsquos borders

(The Times 26 May 2009)

Was this a capitulation on behalf of the 12 million Turkish Kurds Not in the eyes of the Kurdish leader

Britain accepted the will of the Scots by giving them a parliament of their own and thatrsquos what the Turks have to do with us

His eyes were on the distant horizon Scots today have the chance of full inde-pendence after 300 years of union Their future is in their own hands Kurds can plan accordingly Alsace-Lorraine was fought over between France and Germany for a century The lsquotwo-statersquo option of partition (Lorraine to France Alsace to Germany) never transpired In the end France won But now there is open access and freedom of movement

Settlement between undefeated conflict parties does not terminate the conflict or the radical disagreements associated with it but transmutes them Only by con-tinuing to take the ongoing radical disagreements seriously can the settlement be consolidated and made secure As noted in Chapter 7 ongoing strategic engage-ment of discourses is needed both to underpin apparent success and to provide fall-back positions in case of apparent failure That is the chief way in which the management of radical disagreement remains relevant even when the door is at last opened once again for conflict settlement and ndash beyond that ndash eventual con-flict transformation

Radical disagreement and conflict transformation

The primary task of conflict transformation ndash to overcome structural and cultural violence and to lift conflict parties out of the mire of antagonism into wider rela-tions and visions that can accommodate paradox inclusiveness and diversity ndash is a long way from the embattled terrain of intractable conflict where dialogue for strategic engagement is rooted But the previous section has already suggested why taking the phenomenon of radical disagreement seriously and continuing to manage it accordingly is also of significance for early warning both in the pre-vention of violent conflict (the top triangle in the hourglass model) and in post-war peacebuilding (the bottom triangle)

Preventing violent conflict

The enterprise of early warning and prevention of violent conflict has been a major international enterprise particularly since the end of the cold war (see Ramsbotham Woodhouse and Miall 2005 106ndash31) The well-known Carnegie Commission Report of 1997 for example distinguished lsquostructural preventionrsquo that


addresses underlying causes from lsquooperational preventionrsquo that addresses particular confrontations once they have formed (Carnegie Commission 1997) This follows from earlier studies of conflict escalation that point to a pattern where failure to satisfy basic human economic political security and identity needs provides fer-tile soil for violent conflict but whether this in the event leads to the formation of political groupings polarization and the emergence of armed resistance depends on strategic choices made by possessor and challenger leaders and their mutual impact (Azar 1990)

Ted Gurrrsquos analysis of lsquominorities at riskrsquo concludes that on average it takes 15 to 20 years from the first manifestation of an organized political challenge to the outbreak of armed conflict ndash for example in Sri Lanka or Kosovo or the forma-tion of the Taleban (Gurr 2000) This is the window of opportunity during which taking the phenomenon of radical disagreement seriously gives ample notice and clarifies what needs to be done to keep unfulfilled political aspirations separate from militarization and the control of those who espouse extremism of means and to minimize the chances of uncontrolled escalation It gives detailed early warning of three fatal rubicons that are very hard to reverse once they have been crossed

1 the transition from internal discontent to a direct challenge to the state (its nature in ideological conflicts its integrity in secessionist conflicts control of its resources in economic conflicts)

2 the moment when police and judiciary are no longer seen by significant com-munities as administering impartial law

3 the formation of armed militia and the counter-violence of forcible repression

At these points intransigent leaders on both sides are much more likely to rise to the surface exert control over their constituencies and increase the momentum towards war It is too late to put the genie back into the bottle Systemic reinforcers of intractability and intransigence lock in

Post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding

At the other end of the spectrum is post-war reconstruction ndash another extensive topic that cannot be properly covered here (see Ramsbotham Woodhouse and Miall 2005 185ndash245) But once again the phenomenology of radical disagreement ndash the exploration of the agonistic dialogue associated with linguistic intractabil-ity ndash offers indicators of progress or lack of progress that cannot be secured in any other way

Since as seen the cessation of direct violence between undefeated conflict parties is a transmutation of conflict not an end to it it is not surprising that the failure rate of interim settlements is high (Hampson 1996 Doyle and Sambanis 2006) Radical disagreement persists into the post-settlement environment and has to be managed in circumstances that are often increasingly volatile The conflicting

Re-entry 215

interpretations of the settlement deliberately left ambiguous often become more difficult to accommodate as the terms and consequences of the settlement become clearer

And there are other much studied factors that dictate that conditions will deteri-orate further before they finally improve Increased levels of conflict are seen by most analysts to be likely in weakened or divided post-war states seriously depleted by long periods of fighting Mutual loss and victimization is compounded by dis-illusionment at lack of quick economic returns the cumulative disappointment of thwarted political interests unemployment among returning refugees and former combatants the frustrations of those who had profited from the fighting or ideolog-ically irreconcilable lsquospoilersrsquo inside and outside the country implacably opposed to the settlement In the post-cold war world the prevailing convention for how to end major violent conflicts has been to rely on democratization market economies and regulatory justice systems as long-term underpinnings for sustainable peace During the transition phase all three increase instability and conflict ndash elections create power struggles markets generate economic competition judicial reform stokes up the fight for legal redress

This is the arena in which constant awareness of the level and nature of radical disagreement gives early warning of danger while there is time to counter it warns against complacency and teaches that the challenges of post-war reconstruction are not to be underestimated

Difficult questions

Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 up to this point have been written from a broadly conflict resolution perspective Dialogue for strategic engagement in intractable conflicts has been treated as a placeholder for a possible future revival of settlement and transformation approaches And when settlement and transformation become poss-ible the strategic engagement of discourses has been seen to retain its relevance as a source of early warning and information The exploration understanding and management of radical disagreement has been treated as an extension of or pump-primer for conflict resolution

But at this juncture I have to part company with that assumption I have to face a number of difficult questions that challenge the idea that taking radical disagree-ment seriously and exploring agonistic dialogue can always ndash or even often ndash play that role

When is dialogue for strategic engagement not possible or appropriate

Are there circumstances in which even a strategic engagement of discourses is not possible or appropriate How typical is the Israeli-Palestinian case

What when brutal authoritarian regimes crush opposition and succeed in silen-cing discursive challenge ndash as in Myanmar (Burma) or North Korea or the Chinese suppression of Tibet What when a hegemon is ruthless in monopolizing internal


control ndash like the late Velupillai Prabhakaran and the LTTE in Sri Lanka What when extremism of means is integral to strategic ends ndash as in the case of al-Qaeda What when the conflict is not about political or ideological differences but about economic gain ndash not lsquogrievancersquo but lsquogreedrsquo ndash as in the drug wars in Mexico What when the war zone has disintegrated into a chaotic confusion of clan- or family-based factions where fighting has become a means of sustenance and a way of life ndash as in Somalia

When does dialogue for strategic engagement make things worse

What of the possibility ndash or is it probability ndash that promoting a strategic engage-ment of discourses may deepen rather than alleviate conflict intractability Is it not likely that the focus on incompatibilities divisions and strategies for victory will as noted in Chapter 3 just stoke up antagonism and make conflict parties realize all the more clearly why they hate and fear each other Does this not link to the culture critique which says that the whole idea of radical disagreement and a strategic engagement of discourses is western and inappropriate in cultures based on different practices conventions and ways of life Does it not just make things worse to introduce or encourage such oppositional approaches

Is dialogue for strategic engagement not superficial if not counter-productive in relation to the systemic structures of domination oppression and exclusion

What of the deep systemic drivers of conflict such as the profound structural inequalities and manipulations of power that characterize late capitalism and are studied through critical political economy analysis What when it is the inter-national system itself that generates exploitation and oppression All of this is prior to the emergence of conflict parties and dictates why protest and challenge is stifled before it appears

This is part of a wider critique of the whole peace industry The critical theoretic question lsquowhose peacersquo is conjoined to the question lsquowhose justicersquo (Pugh et al eds 2009) And the answer regularly given is lsquonot a form of peace and justice that is in the interest of the weak and vulnerablersquo lsquoVictorrsquos peacersquo may have evolved into various hybrid forms of the lsquoliberal peacersquo that now shape prevailing inter-national norms and institutions (Richmond 2005) But this is still seen to retain its original character stamped in the image and interest of the dominant epistemic community of Western nations that created it and subsequently exported it to the rest of the world Conflict on the unruly periphery of global capitalism is seen to be contained and policed by the hegemonic powers in their own interest and is treated pathologically within a therapeutics of aid development and peacekeeping whose aim is to perpetuate not reform the system (Duffield 2001)

What is the relevance of taking radical disagreement seriously in these circum-stances The oppressed and excluded are denied a voice so the idea of a strategic engagement of discourses has no relevance This is what I called the lsquosilence of

Re-entry 217

the oppressedrsquo at the beginning of Chapter 4 and recognized in the preface as the long ndash the very long ndash pre-history of radical disagreement

Does violence work

This question relates to the core assumption in conflict resolution that direct viol-ence does not work and is always wrong

Certainly in intractable conflicts embattled parties often believe that violence works and act accordingly As a challenger in Kosovo the KLA (UCK) rejected the pacifism of Ibrahim Rugova deliberately provoked Serb retaliation and was instrumental in triggering NATO intervention As a possessor in Russia President Putin cancelled earlier attempts at accommodation with secessionist Chechens and a few years later declared victory over the rebels In both cases the argument is that (only) violence works

Is violence right

What about the further question whether violence can be not just effective but right

Frantz Fanon famously invoked the need for violence in the bloody process of decolonization

lsquoThe last shall be first and the first lastrsquo Decolonization is the putting into practice of this sentence hellip The violence of the colonial regime and the counter-violence of the native balance each other and respond to each other in an extraordinary reciprocal homogeneity

(Fanon 1961 28)

Sartre agreed and was dismissive of post-colonial advocates of non-violence in his preface to Fanonrsquos book

A fine sight they are too the believers in non-violence saying that they are neither executioners nor victim Try to understand this at any rate if violence began this very evening and if exploitation and oppression had never existed on earth perhaps the slogans of non-violence might end the quarrel But if the whole regime even your non-violent ideas are conditioned by a thousand-year-old oppression your passivity serves only to place you in the ranks of the oppressors

(Sartre in Fanon 1961 21)

This is echoed among the lsquolost generationrsquo of Palestinian youth in Gaza and the West Bank the lsquochildren of the second intifadarsquo

We never see anything good in our lives Ever since we were little we see guns and tanks the sound of the apaches and the F-16s and the little kids wanting


little guns to fight against Israel A negotiated agreement is not possible None of us believes a Palestinian state will be established like that All of us expect a more violent struggle over the next years The first intifada failed The Oslo peace process was useless and benefited Israel No one can resist with stones or build a nation without violence

(International Herald Tribune March 2007 adapted)

Conclusion who are the enemies of peace

Previous chapters have shown how in intractable conflicts peacemakers are also combatants in the discursive sphere The discourse of peace seeks to occupy the whole of discursive space It aims to transform (eliminate) its rivals Who are the enemies of the discourse of peace

The enemies of the discourse of peace are not discourses of conflict for reasons made clear at the outset in this book The discourse of peace may actively promote discourses of conflict in cases where it is necessary to alleviate power asymmetry or confront injustice And as seen earlier in intractable conflicts a majority of the conflictants may be extremists of ends on the key issues ndash these are not spoilers

Nor are the enemies of the discourse of peace discourses of force as such Although militarism has historically been widely identified as an enemy of peace there is unresolved internal controversy about the use of police force in restraint of criminality and about the use of military force in national defence in peacekeep-ing in protecting the vulnerable in maintaining or restoring international peace and security and so on This extends to controversy over whether the use of force on a vast scale may in some cases as in World War II be the only way to overthrow a ruthless and intractable enemy of peace For many pacifists on the other hand the use of military force is violence

The most succinct definition of the enemy of the discourse of peace is to say that it is the discourse of violence There are many discourses of violence that embrace the discourse of violent repression as well as the discourse of violent resistance at lsquoconflict settlementrsquo level and extend to the discourse of structural violence and the discourse of cultural violence at lsquoconflict transformationrsquo level

In line with this idea those working in the conflict resolution field might respond to the difficult questions accordingly In situations where there is not yet enough space even for a strategic engagement of discourses the response might be not to give in but to persist in efforts to open the inclusive agonistic dialogue up There may be cases where the promotion of dialogue for strategic engagement will make things worse or even where it would be better for the stronger party to win quickly but this is already well known ndash there are no exceptionless rules it is always a matter of chance and judgement

On the key question of global institutions and practices of exclusion and dominance these might be confronted by identifying them with the associated discourses of structural and cultural violence and combating them accordingly although it would be well understood that this reintroduces the whole of politics

Re-entry 219

via the struggle to define what counts as global injustice Where the silence of the oppressed still prevails the aim would be not to speak for the oppressed as can happen in the more didactic tradition of prior critical third-party analysis but to create a space where the oppressed are able to speak for themselves however ignorant mistaken or politically incorrect this may seem to be from a sophisticated critical perspective For Oliver Richmond

This points to a need for international actors and institutions such as the UN EU World Bank USAID state donors and major NGOs to think and operate in terms of local ownership of the peace projects that they engage in which must be focused on developing the agency of those actors on their own terms

(Richmond 2008 147)

And now the questions whether direct violence works and whether in some cases it may be right become even more central It might well be that a different answer is given in the two cases But advocates of conflict resolution do not want to accept that violence works and argue that it just breeds further violence In Sri Lanka for example the challenger the LTTE chose violence rather than acceptance of the 2002 peace agreement and lost Although the Sri Lankan government also chose violence and won with external help the argument is that none of this would have been necessary if non-repressive policies had been adopted forty years before and that the violent crushing of the revolt is now only likely to perpetuate it in future The debate goes on

Is violence sometimes right Here I think the discourse of peace is likely to make a final stand and simply say lsquonorsquo What answer then is given to the lsquolost generationrsquo of Palestinian youth in its claim that violent resistance is the only recourse left in the face of violent national dispossession and continuing violent Israeli occupation and repression Perhaps the only response is to redouble efforts to transform the hegemonic discourse of violent repression so that the challenging discourse of violent resistance is not necessary ndash as well as to transform the deeper discourses of structural and cultural violence This may be extraordinarily difficult to do since violent repression and violent resistance are symbiotic But as Chapter 7 showed it is the strategic engagement of discourses in the communicative sphere that best informs the discourse of peace in such an ambitious and hazardous mission

I end this chapter with one or two further illustrations of the discursive struggle of the discourse of peace against its enemies In what follows it is not forgotten that in the history of terror state terrorism (including lsquocounter-terrorismrsquo) is responsible for much greater numbers of atrocities than insurgent terrorism Nor are political or religious movements in general being conflated with the advocacy or practice of direct violence against civilians associated with some of them Here is an example of a discursive challenge to the violence of the discourse of Muslim jihadism from a 38-year-old Muslim woman in the UK Gina Khan


Itrsquos all happening on your doorstep and Britain is still blind to the real threat that is embedded here now All these mosques are importing jihad The rad-ical teaching is filtering through and these mosques are not regulated They are supporting everything that is wrong about Islam Most of the British Muslims from my community are ignorant uneducated illiterate people from rural areas It is very easy for them to be brainwashed These are people who have been taught from the beginning that our religion is everything It is the right way You are going to hell simply because you were not born a Muslim Everyone is being taught that Islam is going to take over there are going to be mosques everywhere This is something jihadists have been planning for centuries They were just looking for our weaknesses which they have found Theyrsquove turned the bombersrsquo graves into shrines when theyrsquore just killers They say wersquore being victimised Wersquore not The truth is coming out at last but itrsquos 20 years too late Muslim society is based on male domination and the oppression of women The mosques are run by men The Sharia councils are run by men The lsquovoicersquo of the Muslim Community is always male And it is women who suffer as a result including forced marriages for teenage girls when they should be getting educated and male polygamy supported by the mullahs My mum would turn in her grave if she knew Sharia was here This is England how can this be happening People in Pakistan are fighting for it not to happen there The fundamentalists are looking down at you because you do not want to be like them You get grass thrown in your face You cannot be a good person unless you are reading the Koran unless your children are and you are living as an Asian woman should But you know what I am a human being God gave me a brain equal to the brain he has given you and I am not going to submit and pray behind you just because you are a man Muslim women arenrsquot supposed to make waves I have been told not to say too much But Irsquoll be damned if I let another jerk put the fear back in me again The bot-tom line for my agenda is to eradicate the radicals We need to say lsquowake up you have to understand you are not being taught the right thingrsquo

(Interview by Mary Ann Sieghart The Times(2) 9 February 2007 selected)

Gina Khan is widely seen as a champion of moderation pluralism and tolerance She is hailed as a peacemaker Yet her aim is uncompromising ndash to lsquoeradicate the radicalsrsquo by eliminating their discursive claim to speak for Islam

With reference to works like Mark Jurgensmeyerrsquos Terror in the Mind of God The Global Rise of Religious Violence (2001) Hugo Slim similarly advocates the study of lsquoviolent beliefsrsquo in order to lsquoknow your enemiesrsquo and defeat them

The flurry of new books on charismatic Christianity in Africa on Islamist theology and the increasingly routine monitoring of cults shows that it is both possible and important for secular political and military analysts to engage with and understand religious ideology and the political and military programmes that flow from them Faced with the texts and creeds of certain

Re-entry 221

groups secular analysts and policy-makers may still react by saying lsquoDo peo-ple really believe this stuffrsquo But confronted with repeated suicide attacks in the Middle East and child abductions in northern Uganda the answer is obvi-ous to many ordinary people on the front line lsquoYes they dorsquo The burden of credulity is now on the side of the secular analysts It makes sense to believe that religious movements do believe this stuff and to examine why they do where such belief might lead and how best it may be challenged

(Slim 2005 23)

The Director of the Cambridge University Security and International Society Mindset Project set up in the wake of the 911 attacks in New York and Washington explains the purpose of the project

One of the main aims of the newly established research programme for Security and International Society at Cambridge University is to try to under-stand the mindset of those who threaten our security hellip Bin Laden and his fellow-travellers are so dangerous because like Stalin and Hitler they com-bine obsessional conspiracy theories about their opponents (including myths of Jewish world conspiracy) with great tactical and operational skill in mounting attacks against them

(Interview The Times 5 December 2002)

Here is the reason given by the editor for re-publishing an English translation of Hitlerrsquos Mein Kampf in 1991

Mein Kampf is lengthy dull bombastic repetitious and extremely badly written As a historical picture of Hitlerrsquos life up to the time he wrote it it is also quite unreliable Most of its statements of fact and the entire tenor of the argument in the autobiographical passages are demonstrably untrue Why then revive Mein Kampf Firstly it is an introduction to the mind and methods of Adolf Hitler It is a mind at once concise and repetitive a mishmash of ideacutees reccedilus and insights a second-rate mind of immense power the mind of a man whose early death would have made Europe a safer place to live in for all its citizens The second reason for its study is that we may know and recognise the arguments of the enemies of democracy in our midst lsquoOh that my enemy had written a bookrsquo said Job Hitler did It was there for people to read Despite the omissions from the first British edition bits of it were circulated to the British cabinet and made available through the British pamphlet press Mein Kampf is not in any sense the work of a civilised man who thought peace a desirable or normal state of international relations It does not only raise the historical question of why its British readers did not recognise this and know that in Hitler they faced an implacable enemy It faces us in the post-Cold War era with a similar question Are there enemies of peace in power in the world today Are we trying to recognise them

(Watt 1991 xindashlxi omissions not marked)


What would we as peacemakers have done in 1925 when Mein Kampf first appeared knowing that it would help to propel its author to power a few years later Picking up a theme from Chapter 3 would we have aimed to lsquodeepen mutual understandingrsquo or lsquoexpand sympathy and imaginationrsquo or tried to promote accept-ance of lsquothe validity of competing narrativesrsquo or followed Voltaire in disagreeing with what Hitler said but lsquodefending to the death his right to say itrsquo or acted on Jeffersonrsquos advice to rely on truth to dispel error because lsquotruth is great and will prevail if left to herselfrsquo I do not think that we would have done any of these things I think that as peacemakers we would have done everything in our power not just to refute Hitler in the open court of public opinion but to ensure that his discourse never reached its intended audience at all

Peacemakers have enemies too

Note

1 With his usual perspicacity Clausewitz himself was well aware of this ndash in the sentence immediately following his famous observation that war is lsquoa continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other meansrsquo he adds that the lsquomain lines along which military events progress and to which they are restricted are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peacersquo (von Clausewitz 19761832 75)

Part III

Radical disagreement and the futureTheoretical and practical implications

In Part III the enquiry moves away from the question of radical disagreement and conflict resolution to the theoretical and practical implications of taking radical disagreements seriously in general This means revisiting the terrains of discourse analysis and conflict analysis that were bracketed at the end of Part I How much of the phenomenology epistemology and praxis of radical disagreement survives the process of unbracketing And how adequate are discursive and conflict ana-lytic theories to what the phenomenological investigation shows

Part III looks to the future It asks what the theoretical and practical implications of taking radical disagreement seriously as illustrated in Part II are Chapter 9 unbrackets discourse analysis Chapter 10 unbrackets conflict analysis The epi-logue reviews the book reflexively in the light of this

9 Radical disagreement and human difference

Critical constructivist and post-structural theorists in the West vie with each other in claiming that their approach maximizes space for the celebration of human dif-ference Yet the undervalued phenomenology of radical disagreement shows the sense in which human difference is more different than that The phenomenology of radical disagreement in no way contradicts the insights of discourse analysis But nor do the understandings characteristic of western discourse analysis exhaust what the study of linguistic intractability in intense political conflict shows

At the beginning of Part I the phenomenon of radical disagreement was located at the intersection of the three great spheres of human difference human discourse and human conflict Human discourse and human conflict have featured promi-nently in this book It is time to revisit the question of human difference

Chapter 6 noted how a number of discourse analytic philosophers claim that their readings optimize the liberation of diversity and maximize space for the celebration of human difference Juumlrgen Habermas strongly rebuts accusations that his theory implies a hegemony of social coordination that stifles dissent and smothers what it purports to emancipate lsquoNothing makes me more nervousrsquo than the imputation that the theory of communicative action lsquoproposes or at least suggests a rationalist utopian societyrsquo (Habermas 1982 235) He wants to claim that on the contrary only the idealizations presupposed in lsquothe intersubjectivity of linguistically achieved understandingrsquo can open up the space for divergent voices to be heard

Linguistically attained consensus does not eradicate from the accord the differ-ences in speaker perspectives but rather presupposes them as ineliminable hellip More discourse means more contradiction and difference The more abstract the agreements become the more diverse the disagreements with which we can non-violently live

(Habermas 1992 140)

Michel Foucault has already been quoted in similar vein in Chapter 6

The freeing of difference requires thought without contradiction without dia-lectics without negation thought that accepts divergence affirmative thought

226 Radical disagreement and the future

whose instrument is disjunction thought of the multiple ndash of the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity that is not limited or confined by the constraints of simil-arity hellip What is the answer to the question The problem How is the problem resolved By displacing the question hellip We must think problematically rather than question and answer dialectically

(Foucault in Bouchard and Sherry (trans) 1977 185ndash6 quoted Flynn 1994 42)

In Chapter 6 an adequacy test was applied to see whether putative philosophies of radical disagreement proved to be satisfactory when compared to examples of radical disagreement I suggested that neither Habermas nor Foucault can in the end be called philosophers of radical disagreement I now call this the first adequacy test

1 Does the theory offer a satisfactory account of radical disagreements in which it is not itself directly involved

In this chapter I will briefly apply two further adequacy tests

2 Does the theory succeed in taking account of its own involvement in radical theoretical disagreement or even attempt to do this

3 Does the theory succeed in taking account of its own involvement in radical political disagreement or even attempt to do this

There is no space to do more than touch on the second adequacy test here but I have yet to find a philosophy that passes it The main empirical data is provided by an investigation into the relationship between what the philosophies in question say about radical disagreement and what happens when there is radical disagree-ment between them This is the odium scholasticum only slightly less ferocious than the odium theologicum Stephen White for example notes how many readers of The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity lsquoare perplexed at the intensity and relentlessness of Habermasrsquo attack on his opponentsrsquo (1995 5) The Habermas-Foucault radical disagreement is well known while Michael Kelly ends his study of the radical disagreement between Habermas and Gadamer by concluding

The debate between Hans-Georg Gadamer and Juumlrgen Habermas had a rather ironic feature in that its path and conclusion seemed to contradict their notions of philosophical discourse The path did not conform to Habermasrsquo notion of communicative action oriented to understanding because Habermasrsquo interest in the dialogue was admittedly to establish his differences with Gadamer and as a result his action in the debate was more instrumental than communicative and the conclusion did not conform to Gadamerrsquos notion of a dialogue that culminates in a fusion of horizons for the two participants were farther apart at the end of the dialogue than they had been at the start

(Kelly 1995 139)

Radical disagreement and human difference 227

I suggest that this is not just a lsquorather ironic featurersquo of a specific example of theoretical radical disagreement but a feature of radical disagreement between philosophies in general The fact that in agonistic dialogue participants find that they are lsquofarther apart at the end of the dialogue than they had been at the startrsquo sums up the whole of what Chapter 5 shows Its relevance for the project of man-aging radical disagreement in intractable conflicts lies in what happens ndash what possibilities may be opened up ndash if the participants come fully to realize this

However subtle and self-aware the philosophies in question may be ndash including anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist philosophies ndash in the vortex of radical dis-agreement three characteristic locutions in particular may recall the moments of radical disagreeing illustrated in Chapter 5 They are hallmarks of the didacticism of radical disagreement

1 the predominance of the present indicative tense (this is so) 2 the recurrence of the trope lsquonot hellip rather helliprsquo (that is not so) 3 the preponderance of the form lsquoIt used to be thought that hellip now I can

reveal helliprsquo (I look across the field of contestation to the far horizon)

If the philosophy in question is too coy to engage explicitly with the opposition in this way (we may think of the playful withholdings of Derrida in his fierce radical disagreement with Searle) it is illuminating to turn to the third adequacy test Does the philosophy succeed in taking account of its own involvement in radical political disagreement or even attempt to do so This is perhaps the decisive adequacy test since it is in the end the no doubt crude and simplistic lsquoeitherndashorrsquo choices of intense political confrontation that crush linguistic equivocation and generate the brutal and uncompromising nature of its chief verbal manifestation ndash radical disagreement

Consider the example of Habermasrsquo backing for the 1999 intervention in Kosovo in support of the SPDGreen government of which he was widely seen as unofficial lsquophilosopher-kingrsquo This was not couched in the lsquopurely hypothetical languagersquo of discursive ethical argumentation but in the direct language of justification refuta-tion and admonition Foucaultrsquos response to the threat of Soviet intervention in Poland in 1982 was similarly forthright with no reflexive reference to lsquoregimes of truthrsquo in his unqualified recommendation for action

For ethical reasons we have to raise the problem of Poland in the form of a non-acceptance of what is happening there and a non-acceptance of the passivity of our own governments

(Foucault in lsquoPolitics and Ethics an Interviewrsquo 377 quoted Norris 1994 190)

Derrida rejected the US-led reordering of global priorities post-1989 in unchar-acteristically straightforward prose His radical disagreement was with Francis Fukuyama as he scornfully rejected the lsquoend of historyrsquo thesis and demanded a lsquoNew Internationalrsquo to reignite the struggle against injustice


For it must be cried out at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evan-gelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human history never have violence inequality exclusion famine and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity

(Derrida 1994 85)

As a further example it is instructive to compare the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas ndash the philosopher of lsquothe otherrsquo par excellence ndash with his own political involvement in intractable conflict and radical disagreement Levinas insists on the priority of absolute respect for the other not as a reciprocal relation with lsquoThoursquo as envisaged by Martin Buber but as a lsquopre-ontological absolutersquo For Levinas my very existence is an act of violation in the presence of the vulnerability of the lsquofacersquo of the other My responsibility is concomitantly boundless and precedes any considerations of justice that only spring into being with the advent of a third (Levinas 1998)

So what happens when this philosophy confronts a concrete example of radical disagreement ndash for example disagreement between Israelis and Palestinians about the creation of the state of Israel ndash in which it is itself politically involved

Levinas openly supported the project of the Israeli state (lsquothis return to the land of our forefathers marks one of the greatest events of internal history and indeed of all Historyrsquo) but only to the extent that it genuinely embodied the values pre-served down the centuries in the heritage of Jewish scripture ndash Israel is lsquoa State that should embody a prophetic morality and the idea of its peacersquo At the time of the Sabra and Chatila massacres in Lebanon in 1982 Levinas was asked how his philosophy related to the controversy surrounding those events

Q Emmanuel Levinas you are the philosopher of the lsquootherrsquo Isnrsquot history isnrsquot politics the very site of the encounter with the lsquootherrsquo and for the Israeli isnrsquot the lsquootherrsquo above all the Palestinian

A My definition of the other is completely different The other is the neighbour who is not necessarily kin but who can be hellip

Q Irsquod like to ask you whether Israel is innocent or responsible for what happened at Sabra and Chatila

A Let me begin with our immediate reactions on learning of this catastrophe Despite the lack of guilt here ndash and probably there too ndash what gripped us right away was the honour of responsibility It is I think a responsibility which the Bible of course teaches us but it is one which constitutes every manrsquos respons-ibility towards all others a responsibility which has nothing to do with any acts one may really have committed Prior to any act I am concerned with the Other and I can never be absolved from this responsibility hellip

(Interview 28 September 1982 Hand (ed) 1989 294 290)

The lsquopre-ontological honour of absolute responsibility towards the Otherrsquo does


not extend to include the consequences of an action ndash support for the creation of the state of Israel ndash that was lsquothe great catastrophersquo for an existing concrete other Within the context of radical disagreement the philosopher of the other is the philosopher of the other who does not answer back

There is no space here to go deeper into post-positivist discussions of differ-ence whether critical (Hoffman 1987 Linklater 1998) or post-structural (Walker 1993 Bleiker 2001) nor into attempts to navigate the tension between them for example via concepts of hybridity (Bhabha 1994) or the solidarity of the agents affected whether as individuals movements or communities (Jabri 2007) The no doubt immodest claim here is that taking the phenomenon of radical disagree-ment seriously may in some measure help to temper what is at times a somewhat didactic tendency in the former (critical theory) and a relativist tendency in the latter (post-structuralism) while politically grounding what can be a predilection for abstraction in both

My conclusion in relation to human difference ndash including difference of cul-ture gender and class ndash is that however subtle complex and self-cancelling the philosophy in question may be ndash whether Bakhtinrsquos heteroglossia or Bourdieursquos heterodoxa or Derridarsquos diffeacuterance ndash this does not touch what the simple phenom-enon of radical disagreement shows However disjunctively dilemmatically or problematically we may speak of human difference however much our philo-sophy may disparage the clumsy eruptions of conflicting binaries or expose their prior equivocated self-erasure in the very notion of iteration itself the differences manifested in the crude simple and no doubt naive exchanges of radical disagree-ment ndash insolubly welded as they are to the crisis of contested action ndash are more different than that

In the rest of the chapter I briefly indicate a few of the things that follow from Part II of this book with regard to

bull attempts by democratic theory and meta-ethical pluralism to accommodate radical disagreement and difference

bull media principles of neutrality in the reporting of intractable conflict and radical disagreement

bull a return to the critical theoretic gender and culture critiques in their invoca-tion of radical difference to undercut the very idea of the viability and ethical legitimacy of a phenomenology of radical disagreement

Radical disagreement difference and democracy

The long-standing interest in the handling of difference and diversity in democratic theory confronts particular difficulties when it addresses continuing radical disa-greements of the sort outlined in Chapter 8 which need to be accommodated in settlements between undefeated conflict parties In these circumstances an uncom-promising assertion of classical liberalism that regards the challenge from those who reject status quo norms as lsquonot a very grave onersquo needs to do more work


Why must a political value be made justifiable to those who are scarcely inter-ested in rational debate about justification anyway A liberal political system need not feel obliged to reason with fanatics it must simply take the necessary precautions to guard against them

(Larmore 1987 60)

More promising is the thinking of those who do advocate including a larger area of political disagreement within the realm of public discourse via an extension of liberal lsquoprinciples of accommodationrsquo (for example Amy Gutmann and Denis Thompson 1996) This includes those who positively extol the virtues of diversity and disagreement in enriching democratic life for example in relation to minority rights (Kymlicka 1995) and those who accept the irreducible agonistic plural-ism of democratic politics albeit domesticated within a lsquoshared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracyrsquo that turns enemies into adversaries (Mouffe 2000 102)

Monique Deveaux argues in Cultural Pluralism and Deliberative Justice that few of these authors in the end do justice to the actuality of radical disagreement Gutmann and Thompson for example lsquorely problematically on an unspecified impartial standpoint from which to judge the practices and conduct of moral dis-coursersquo (Deveaux 2000 105) Most forms of discursive democracy (Dryzeck 1990) lsquofail to take seriously the implication of citizensrsquo deep disagreements on questions of moral value in pluralistic societiesrsquo (Deveaux 140) Even agonistic forms of democracy can be said to assume that lsquosome kind of common bond must exist bet-ween the parties in conflictrsquo for hostility to be productive as Paul Muldoon (2008 124) puts it quoting Mouffe (2005 20)

As a result very much in line with the argument in this book Deveaux insists that the emphasis has to shift from hypothetical models of consent to lsquothe require-ments of actual dialoguersquo

This step is perhaps the most critical amendment of discourse ethics in my view for it seems likely that procedures based on a commitment to secur-ing actual agreement will take seriously the need to solicit and include the voices and perspectives of cultural minorities hellip In particular I suggest that by seeking to secure citizensrsquo actual agreement on procedures for debate and decision making and even on procedures to manage disagreements we might better ensure the inclusion and consent of diverse groups in plural democratic statesrsquo

(Deveaux 2000 145 166 original italics)

The phenomenology of radical disagreement advocates doing exactly that in the context of intractable conflict And if there is a settlement this is carried forward into the ensuing raw political arrangement where detailed constitutional working out is not fully determined in advance ndash the lsquoparadoxical realityrsquo embodied in the agreement still has to be resolved ndash and is likely indefinitely to remain a lsquowork in progressrsquo As seen above conflict parties are in this sense still enemies


In view of this Deveauxrsquos final position is disappointing

Although I do not advocate jettisoning reasoned argumentation or the attempt to reach agreements I suggest that as an ideal for deliberation in pluralistic societies strong consensus is simply impracticable Theorists of deliberative democracy should instead devote more of their attention to the problem of how we might secure reasonable agreement or compromise on procedures for deliberation which is still a difficult task

(Ibid 140)

The trouble here is that in the nexus of settlement between undefeated conflict parties radical disagreement extends precisely to the foundational principles and procedures which define the constitutional framework in the first place This is not finally determined in advance but is worked out in the continuing struggle between enemies The constitution itself becomes a site for antagonistic contestation and within this the procedural rules are part of what is at issue Even Mouffe who with great insight places ineradicable antagonism at the heart of her politics expects the resulting agonistic pluralism to create a space for opponents to respect each other as adversaries not enemies because there is shared lsquocivilityrsquo based on a residuum of common ethico-political democratic principles

That cannot be presumed in the accommodation of continuing radical disagree-ment in many post-war settlements It is worth spelling this out In intractable ideological conflicts ndash what SIPRI calls lsquogovernmentrsquo conflicts ndash the very form of democratic politics may still be in question Is Sharia law for example compat-ible with democracy This raises the question of what democracy is (as already quoted in Chapter 6)

In the American form of democracy any issue is allowed to be put to a vote of the people and the majority decision prevails upon all Can we Muslims put an issue that has already been decided for us by Allah up for a vote and accept the will of the majority if they vote against the will of Allah Of course we cannot so therefore we can never accept democracy as defined practised and promoted by America Islam offers a political system that is based on consul-tation and consensus that allows each individualrsquos voice to be heard but can never make a decision against the will of Allah The nature of this political process is such that it could easily be described as an Islamic democracy

And in intractable ethno-nationalist or secessionist conflicts ndash what SIPRI calls lsquoterritoryrsquo conflicts ndash the very definition of the polity within which democratic processes are to be conducted in the first place is what is at issue If Northern Ireland is the electorate the Unionists win if the whole of Ireland is the elector-ate the Republicans win This applies with infinite variety to innumerable other conflicts such as appeals to the democratic rights of Falkland Islanders in relation to the challenge to the prior legitimacy of this electorate in the Malvinas conflict or justifications for army action based on the democratic rights of the majority Turkish


electorate in relation to the democratic rights of the minority Kurdish electorate claimed as prior by the secessionist PKK Possessors appeal to status quo demo-cracy disparaged as an accident of history and anti-democratic abuse of power by the challengers Here ndash in a manner familiar from Chapter 5 ndash foundational distinctions between democratic legitimacy and force majeure are themselves caught up at the heart of the radical disagreement through the involvement of the distinction between the distinction invoked and what it doesdoes not distinguish This constitutes the core of the linguistic intractability As such it confronts the-ories and understandings of radical democracy with some of their most testing practical challenges

So radical disagreement in ideological (government) conflicts and secessionist (territory) conflicts of the kind explored in Part II continue to pose deep problems for procedural approaches to handling human difference like Deveauxrsquos and for agonistic forms of radical democracy like Mouffersquos The suggestion here is not that these models are in themselves deficient but that there is great scope for testing and exploring them further in relation to the project of containing ongoing radical disagreements within political frameworks that make the non-violent accommoda-tion of human difference possible

Radical disagreement difference and meta-ethical pluralism

In applied ethics the topics of difference and disagreement feature most promi-nently in relation to the question of moral conflict ndash especially lsquoconflicts of valuersquo and the meta-ethical debates associated with them1 In the meta-ethical realm the fact of moral conflict and disagreement has traditionally been used by cultural and ethical relativists as a stick with which to beat ethical absolutists (Mackie 1976) But the fact of ethical disagreement is just as often invoked by ethical pluralists to discredit the claims of ethical subjectivists and ethical relativists in their turn (Walzer 1983 Kekes 1993)

Hinman (2003) for example argues that difference and disagreement are lsquosources of moral strengthrsquo

The fact that different moral theories point to different courses of action is not necessarily bad indeed the disagreement can help us ultimately to arrive at the best course of action

(Hinman 2003 57)

For Hinman in a conflictual world action is guided best by a pluralist stance that values cultural and moral disagreement while avoiding the pitfalls of relativism in line with four principles

1 the principle of understanding that encourages us to try to comprehend the moral practices of another person or culture before passing judgement

2 the principle of toleration that persuades us to allow space for ethical and cul-tural variation in the pursuit of moral vision


3 the principle of standing up against evil that leads us to debar repugnant acts that flout pluralistic values

4 the principle of fallibility that induces us to retain humility in the face of human diversity

How does this relate to the phenomenology epistemology and praxis of radical disagreement I think that it does not relate very closely at all

The phenomenology of radical disagreement does not pronounce in general on meta-ethical controversies such as those between relativists and rationalists (Hollis and Lukes eds 1982) or between communitarians and absolutists (Rasmussen ed 1990) since none of these positions is immune and all may be invoked by conflict parties in the course of their agonistic dialogue And this extends to what happens (what is said) in those meta-ethical debates themselves ndash not when they form part of a mere intellectual game of setting-to-partners but when they emerge in deadly serious political conflicts where real-life decisions are thereby passionately contested

In these radical disagreements relativist and communitarian philosophies are just as forthright as rationalist and absolutist philosophies Yet disappointingly a pluralist like Hinman shies away from commenting further on this because it threatens to break through the stipulative rules for public decision-making that define the pluralism that he advocates

Sometimes if the disagreements are too great and the possibility of genuine dialogue and compromise too small the system of checks and balances can immobilize us preventing us from choosing any course of action at all

(Hinman 2003 57)

But radical disagreement does not arise primarily from a mere decision-making impasse nor can the antagonists just throw up their hands and walk away because an overarching system of checks and balances does not resolve their differences It is this that defines their disagreement as radical And they cannot lsquoagree to disagreersquo when they are locked together in the passionate and bitter embrace of mutually thwarted action

|lsquoThis is the true wayrsquo

lsquoThat is your opinion and I respect it My opinion is that there are many ways one of which is yoursrsquo

lsquoFar from respecting my opinion you take no account of it at all You refer to one way among many but I am speaking of the one true way If you under-stood what I was saying you would see for yourself and believersquo

lsquoYour way is true for you and mine is true for me Each has a partial viewrsquo


lsquoBut it is your idea of what we each have a partial view of that I deny You do not seem to realize that perspectivism is itself a perspective ndash and as it turns out a false onersquo

lsquoI am not advocating perspectivism I am simply recognising that we disagree with one another ndash something that you are either unable or unwilling to dorsquo

lsquoOn the contrary I am the one who takes our disagreement seriously I at least acknowledge that what you say is a direct contradiction of everything that I believe That is why I repudiate it so vehemently and am trying so hard to show you where you have gone wrong You on the other hand do not even realize that what you lsquotake account ofrsquo as lsquomy opinionrsquo is simply not my opinion at allrsquo

lsquoBut does it not cross your mind that there may be other ways than yoursrsquo

lsquoI am sure that there are innumerable other ways ndash but only one is the true way Does it not cross your mind that there could be a way other than the fashionable one of which you have been persuaded ndash namely that the world is full of equivalent philosophies among which are yours and minersquo

lsquoYou are so bigoted that you do not even conceive of the possibility of your own bigotryrsquo

lsquoDo you call a person who has come to recognize the truth a bigot A bigot is a person who is too blind to see either reality or that he does not see reality You are the bigotrsquo

lsquoWell let us at least agree that what you believe to be the true way I see as one among many Neither of us it seems really understands what the other is sayingrsquo

lsquoWe understand each other perfectly I know exactly what you are saying and doing I know why I must stop you acting accordingly before it is too latersquo

lsquoYou are beyond the reach of reason I will have to prevent you from going on harming othersrsquo|

And this is not a philosophy

Radical disagreement difference and the media

At the beginning of his interview with Rowan Williams Archbishop of Canterbury in the Humphrys In Search Of God series on the BBC the British broadcaster John Humphrys said that in this case he was off the hook because he did not have to


be impartial Normally lsquoalthough interviewers donrsquot have to observe many rules we are required to be impartial not to express our own convictionsrsquo (Radio 4 31 October 2006) This is the BBC convention for objective news reporting as understood by one of its most prominent interviewers

So what is the difference between an interview in which the BBC rules do apply and an interview like this one where they do not We might expect the former to be more constrained and the latter to be more controversial But what if the non-impartial interview does not but the interview bound by the BBCrsquos impartiality rule does concern a radical disagreement

When the BBCrsquos objectivity and impartiality rules are lifted but there is no radical disagreement as in the case of the interview with the Archbishop of Canterbury the result can be ndash at any rate in my view ndash somewhat tame and bland Although as an agnostic the interviewer was challenging the interviewee to con-vert him ndash which he failed to do ndash the exchanges were polite and deferential There were no serious political implications The same was true of the equally decorous interviews with prominent Jewish and Muslim interviewees in the same series (Humphrys 2007)

In contrast at almost the same time Humphrys interviewed a young radical British Muslim (Abu Izzadeen) on the Today news programme (22 September 2007) Here the full BBC objectivity and impartiality convention applied But because this was a radical disagreement with highly contentious political implica-tions the emotion drama and confrontation easily broke through the constraints The BBC convention was shown to be itself already involved

Here is a short extract from the interview followed by all the emails that were read out immediately after it (JH is John Humphrys AI is Abu Izzadeen) The BBC controlled the studio decided what questions should be asked (lsquoon programmes like this the presenter asks the questions and the guest answers the questionsrsquo) deter-mined when the interview should start and end chose which portions of it should be broadcast and selected the emails from listeners to be read out at the conclusion

JH If yoursquore not happy with this country a lot of people would say hellipAI Who says Irsquom not happy with this country I love this country Allah created

the whole universeJH Yoursquore telling me itrsquos led by a tyrant You donrsquot approve of the rules and the

way in which this country functionsAI Thatrsquos correctJH Then why can you not go somewhere where Islam is the lawAI Oh I see Itrsquos to be mass deportation for those who are in this community hellipJH Did I suggest thatAI Irsquom asking you a questionJH There is a convention on programmes like this during which the presenter asks

the questions and the guest answers the questions If this country is so offens-ive to you and to some of your friends you donrsquot have to stay here You can move somewhere where there is Islamic law You can go to Saudi Arabia

AI Letrsquos look at the reality As a Muslim I believe Allah is the one who created


the whole universe He created the UK It doesnrsquot belong to you It doesnrsquot belong to the Queen It doesnrsquot belong to the Anglo-Saxons

JH I suggest it doesnrsquot belong to you eitherAI It belongs to Allah the creator And he put us on the planet earth to live wher-

ever we want and implement the Sharia rules If I live in the UK I will call for Islam Democracy means sovereignty for man And as a Muslim we believe sovereignty for the Sharia Therefore I would never take part in a democratic election

JH Forgive me that is your view You want Sharia law in this country Right then Irsquoll tell you what you do Let me get a word in Irsquoll tell you what you do You stand as a member of parliament you encourage your friends and your colleagues to stand as members of parliament and you try to change the law in this country democratically Thatrsquos the way we do things in this country Unlike for instance Saudi Arabia where they do have the sort of law of which you approve Now if you want to change the way this country functions why can you not do it in a democratic way Whatrsquos wrong with that And if not what are you doing here

ALAN NEWLAND I am outraged at the time you have given to this madman I am outraged at the insult to the Muslim community you have perpetrated by allowing this man even to appear to represent even a tiny minority of extreme Muslim youths

JANE PARSONS I suppose you are right to give airtime to this man but I have to say I had to keep switching the radio off because I was so angry He twisted everything to make out that a crusade was being waged against Islam by Britain and America I do not agree with the invasion of Iraq and went on the march before it happened but I deplore the way some Muslims have hijacked the issue to make out that it is a war against Islam

BEVERIDGE SUTHERLAND If he represents Islam I say deport the lot of them Then again all organised religion has hate and fear of others at its core

HUMPHREY TREVELYAN It was encouraging to hear the Today programme invite a young radical Muslim to express his views about John Reidrsquos lecture to the Muslim community Many non-Muslims in this country would have found Reidrsquos patronising and overbearing remarks distasteful and hypocritical

DOMINIC MITCHELL I congratulate you on the interview By allowing his true colours to shine through you revealed the torrid depths of his extremism Irsquom sure it was a repugnant experience but thank you anyway

MARGOT CUNNINGHAM It was truly alarming to hear such a fanatic express his hate for our government and our democratic system It leaves one wondering how many more Muslims think like that and how the government can even begin to tackle it

VIV RAINER Muslims like him will fight according to Muslim theology to make the UK subject to Sharia law The question now is just how much of a minority are they As I said itrsquos frightening


Radical disagreement and the gender and culture critiques revisited

Finally I return to the radical gender and culture critiques of the phenomenology of radical disagreement For the issue of gender and culture in relation to conflict resolution in general see Ramsbotham Woodhouse and Miall (2005) 265ndash74 and 302ndash15 respectively

At the beginning of this book I noted how the radical gender critique particu-larly in the form of difference feminism cuts the ground from under the very idea of a phenomenology of radical disagreement by identifying it lock stock and bar-rel with the symbolic (thetic) order that the pre-symbolic (semiotic) transgression of the thetic subverts Let this stand The simple point made now having followed through the implications of nevertheless taking the phenomenology of radical dis-agreement seriously in Part II is that radical disagreements between feminism and patriarchy clearly evident in many of the most vicious conflicts across the world appear to share precisely the characteristics noted with reference to intractable con-flict and radical disagreement in general It extends to a highly complex but for all that also a very vigorous radical disagreement between the gender and the culture critiques This revolves around the fact that many if not most non-western cultures are even more patriarchal than western cultures So radical feminism despite its best efforts is widely interpreted as a western export in the radical disagreements that surround intense political conflicts in those parts of the world

I will end this chapter with another look at the radical culture critique In the search for a characteristic sample it seems reasonable to look to Cultural Studies the interdisciplinary university field that takes human culture as its main topic (the other alternative would be anthropology) So the question is how does Cultural Studies describe itself and what does it say about the phenomenon of radical disagreement in intractable conflicts that are such a striking feature of human cul-tural behaviour in general Does the account given by Cultural Studies undercut the enterprise of the phenomenological investigation of radical disagreement and show up what was explored in Part II as parti pris to a discredited and bankrupt epistemology

To answer this question I take one of the best-known student textbooks in the field ndash Chris Barkerrsquos Cultural Studies Theory and Practice ndash and collect all those passages that tell students what the interdisciplinary field of Cultural Studies itself is What follows quotes these passages verbatim but does not indicate all the breaks

Cultural studies is an interdisciplinary or post-disciplinary field of enquiry that explores the production and inculcation of maps of meaning Representationalist epistemology has largely been displaced within cultural studies by the influence of poststructuralism postmodernism and other anti-representationalist para-digms Common sense and realist epistemology understands truth to be that which corresponds to or pictures the real in an objective way Constructionism of which cultural studies is a manifestation argues that truth is a social


creation Cultural studies has argued that language is not a neutral medium for the formation of meanings and knowledge about an independent object world lsquoexistingrsquo outside of language Rather it is constitutive of those very meanings and knowledge Thus we make the switch from a question about truth and representation to one concerning language use Cultural studies seeks to play a de-mystifying role that is to point to the constructed character of cultural texts and to the myths and ideologies which are embedded in them It has done this in the hope of producing subject positions and real subjects who are enabled to oppose subordination These concepts all stress the instability of meaning its deferral through the interplay of texts writing and traces Consequently categories do not have essential universal meanings but are social construc-tions of language This is the core of the anti-essentialism prevalent in cultural studies That is words have no universal meanings and do not refer to objects that possess essential qualities One way we can understand this approach hellip is by practising the art of deconstructing key binaries of western thinking Thus throughout the book I put forward a particular binary [such as truefalse] for students to deconstruct Eitheror binaries are dissolved by denying that the problem is best described in dualistic terms at all

(Barker 2003 7 31 33 34 54 85)

It may seem remarkable that the phenomenon of intractable cross-cultural conflict and radical disagreement does not feature in Barkerrsquos book at all But it is not hard to see why As noted in Chapter 1 the explicit prior assumptions that dismiss rep-resentationalist common sense realist essentialist epistemologies and substitute post-structural postmodern constructionist and deconstructionist epistemologies are pre-emptive and wholesale What is swept away includes just those features ndash naiumlve simplistic and uncritical though they no doubt are ndash that Part II of this book showed to be characteristic in radical disagreement ndash including reference to binaries such as truth falsehood justice injustice and to claims about how things are and should be in the external world

We may remind ourselves of the example of the revolutionary Palestinian dis-course of national determination freedom and liberation This lies at the heart of the linguistic intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict The Palestinian discursive struggle is to make the Palestinian discourse the lsquoprimary language within which the Palestinian issue is discussedrsquo not because it is a narrative but because it is true

What is centrally at issue is not a mere Palestinian narrative but a series of incontrovertible facts ndash facts of expulsion exclusion dominance and occupa-tion bitterly lived out by Palestinians day by day over the past 60 years and still being endured at the present time This is not a narrative It is a lived reality Finding the best strategy for ending this lived reality is the main purpose of this Report Transforming the discourse within which it is discussed is a major part of that effort



The phenomenology of radical disagreement shows why it is misleading even to refer to this as a lsquoPalestinian discoursersquo in the first place

But the self-description of Cultural Studies as defined in Barkerrsquos book rules all of this out from the beginning Cultural Studies already knows how words can and cannot be used and how they are to be understood It immediately translates questions of truth representation (reality) and justice into locutions about language use It deconstructs lsquoeitheror binariesrsquo by denying from the outset that the prob-lem ndash in this case the problem of Israeli occupation of Palestinian land ndash is lsquobest described in dualistic terms at allrsquo So the radical disagreement is not allowed to get off the ground in the first place

Instead Cultural Studies as presented here self-descriptively reifies itself and substitutes its own epistemology by fiat In doing so its language evinces the three rhetorical hallmarks of didacticism the pervasiveness of the present indicative tense the recurrence of the trope lsquonot hellip ratherrsquo and the predominance of the discursive form lsquoit used to be thought hellip but now we can revealrsquo In this way it re-imports the binaries that have ostensibly been expelled So now it is the whole of Cultural Studies that finds itself engaged in a titanic conflict and rad-ical disagreement with all those cultures ndash I suggest a majority including many western examples ndash that explicitly reject secular post-structuralism of this kind as anathema

But that is another story

Note

1 See for example Nagel T (1979) lsquoThe fragmentation of valuersquo in Mortal Questions 128ndash41 Williams B (1981) lsquoConflicts of valuesrsquo in Moral Luck 71ndash82 Hampshire S (1983) Stocker M (1990)

10 Radical disagreement and human survival

A survey of possible upcoming conflict formations suggests that the phenomenon of radical disagreement will continue to generate linguistic intractability

Taking radical disagreement seriously ndash learning how it can be acknowledged explored understood and managed ndash is not the least of the requirements for human survival in an irredeemably agonistic world

Looking to the future what conflict formations are appearing over the horizon What role is radical disagreement likely to play in the discursive sphere What can and should be done to anticipate and manage linguistic intractability In this chapter the field of conflict analysis surveyed in Chapter 2 is unbracketed

Life on earth began about 3500 million years ago Homo sapiens emerged less than 200000 years ago Short of an unforeseeable intervening cosmic catastrophe the earth could remain habitable for up to another 5000 million years until the sun having consumed its inner hydrogen begins to expand into a red giant and incinerates the earth in the process How long can the human species survive Let us begin modestly with the next 100 years What needs to happen to prolong human existence that long Setting aside the medical battle with future generations of viruses what lsquoman-madersquo threats loom

Prediction of the future in complex environments is hazardous Few can guess what will happen even ten years ahead when there are sudden discontinuities Which experts foresaw the Wall street crash in 1919 or the outbreak of the second world war in 1929 or the Iranian revolution in 1969 or the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1979 On some projections the Chinese GDP per capita will reach half that of the United States soon after the middle of this century Given population discrepancy this means that total Chinese GDP will be twice that of America What are the implications It will be the first eclipse of the West for 500 years Will it usher in a genuine lsquoclash of civilisationsrsquo not so much Samuel Huntingtonrsquos politico-military free-for-all but a lsquotransvaluation of all valuesrsquo as the assumption that western norms are now global norms is tested to destruction This scale of future change is beyond present computation Nevertheless I will end this book by proposing three linked predictions of a general kind First human history will continue to be conflictual ndash there will be no lsquoend of historyrsquo Second the chief lin-guistic aspect of human conflict will continue to be radical disagreement Third in

Radical disagreement and human survival 241

order to manage linguistic intractability and avert future disaster the phenomenon of radical disagreement will need to be acknowledged explored and understood better than it is at the moment

Radical disagreement and future conflict

All four of the main types of large-scale conflict looked at in Chapter 2 are likely to recur in the foreseeable future and all four are likely to go on being associated with radical disagreement To be succinct I will focus on the role of the state in each case because whatever other levels of analysis may be prominent it is at state level at the moment that the crisis is in the end usually played out States are still the chief actors on the international stage and the chief satisfiers of human needs in the domestic arena This is not to underestimate the increasing power and significance of transnational forces or the implosions that have engulfed or threaten to engulf vulnerable states If the state system evolves into something else with the passing of western hegemony this is another eventuality that is beyond present pro-jection Inter-state conflicts are conflicts between states Ethno-national conflicts are conflicts to determine the identity of the state Ideological governance conflicts are conflicts to decide the nature of the state Economic conflicts are conflicts to control the resources of the state

Interstate conflict

Realists wrongly discount the significance of radical disagreement in interstate conflict In Chapter 2 mention was made of Thucydidesrsquo Melian Dialogue in his History of the Peloponnesian War This is usually seen as the locus classicus of the realist view The Athenian generals dismissed the moral arguments of the Melians and asked them to decide in accordance with the reality of the discrepancy in power But the Melian dialogue invented though it was by Thucydides can just as well be seen as itself a radical disagreement Given the discrepancy in power in favour of the Athenians it was in the interest of the Athenians to argue (and no doubt at the same time believe) the realist case This was a stick with which to beat their main opponents the Spartans through accusations of hypocrisy

Of all the people we know the Spartans are most conspicuous for believing that what they like doing is honourable and what suits their interests is just

(Thucydides 1954 363)

We do not have a record of how the Spartans would have replied But in that radical disagreement integral to the linguistic intractability accompanying and structuring the Peloponnesian war the realist position itself would have been part of what was disputed Such too I suggest is likely to be the case in any future geo-political confrontations between China and India or between China and the United States Even if Thucydidesrsquo prediction is borne out and lsquothe growth of Chinese power and the fear this causes in Americarsquo makes conflict inevitable in the discursive


sphere just as in the case of earlier confrontation with the Soviet Union ndash and the current lsquowar on terrorrsquo ndash the lsquobattle for hearts and mindsrsquo will be at the centre of the physical struggle In the political conflicts of his day Machiavelli was a passionate FlorentineRoman republican Radical disagreement is still the chief verbal mani-festation of intractable interstate conflict

Ethnonationalist conflict

Given the continuing mismatch between state borders (some 200 states) and the geographical distribution of peoples (in some estimates up to 5000 groups) there is no prospect of the two coinciding Even breaking up the current state system would not help because however small the fragments there are still smaller minor-ities cut off within them So ethno-nationalist conflict can be expected to persist In this case I do not think that the further suggestion that this will be marked by radical disagreement in the linguistic sphere is likely to be denied Radical dis-agreement centres on disputed questions of identity and rights As to the scale of ethno-nationalist and other kinds of conflict that would accompany the collapse of states the size of Pakistan or Nigeria or Indonesia ndash let alone India or China ndash only experience of the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union or former Yugoslavia may give an indication

Ideological government conflict

It is much harder to predict future ideological contests to determine the nature of government ndash fascist versus democratic communist versus capitalist religious versus secular What will follow Few predicted the increase in religious conflict over the past 30 years Perhaps it is when existing systems of government prove incapable of meeting needs and delivering desired goods that the ground is fertile for the rise of alternatives The fascist and communist tide was on the rise in the 1930s during the great depression which destroyed middle-class incomes and the bases for centrist politics In the Arab world it was into the vacuum left by the failure of nationalist and socialist experiments in the 1950s and 1960s that Islamist political ideology has rushed At transnational level hierarchical-imperial structures such as those underpinned by United States economic and foreign policy interests elicit various forms of globalized reaction I think that we simply have no idea what future ideological configurations may arise But whatever they are here again it hardly seems contentious to say that the phenomenon of radical disagreement will be prominent

Economic conflict

Some conflict analysts claim that statistical indicators of need deprivation do not correlate closely with the incidence of armed conflict in comparison with indica-tors for economic incentives As a result they argue that economic lsquogreedrsquo causes major armed conflict more than lsquogrievancersquo


The combination of large exports of primary commodities a high proportion of young men and economic decline drastically increases risk Greed seems more important than grievance

(Collier 2000 110)

This leads to a setting aside of verbalized lsquogrievancersquo explanations and a concomit-ant discounting of the significance of radical disagreement

I should emphasise that I do not mean to be cynical I am not arguing that rebels necessarily deceive either others or themselves in explaining their motivation in terms of grievance Rather I am simply arguing that since both greed-motivated rebel organizations will embed their behaviour in a narrative of grievance the observation of that narrative provides no informational con-tent to the researcher as to the true motivation for rebellion

(Collier 1999 1)

But this controversy has run its course to the point where Paul Collier himself acknowledges that whatever the lsquotrue motivationrsquo may be those wanting to prevent war or support post-war peacebuilding need after all to address expressed griev-ances seriously he tries to save his argument by distinguishing between lsquoobjectiversquo and lsquosubjectiversquo grievances

This requires at a minimum that the grievances be addressed even if though on average they are not objectively any more serious than those in peaceful societies If indeed group grievance has been manufactured by rebel indoc-trination it can potentially be deflated by political gestures While grievances may need to be addressed objectively the main purpose of addressing them is probably for their value in changing perceptions

(Collier 2001 159)

Even in economic conflicts verbalized grievance and hence the phenomenon of radical disagreement remains significant after all

Future drivers of conflict

Behind all this lie major global drivers of future conflict Here the connection with the phenomenon of radical disagreement is as it were at one remove ndash except in respect of the international struggles to define them and to determine what to do about them The global drivers of future conflict fuel the conflict complexes and conflict configurations from which the axes of radical disagreement themselves emerge and contribute to the reinforcement of systemic linguistic intractability

It is easy to be overwhelmed by the scale of the gloomy prognostications They seem to start so far back and to build to such a size that the late-emergent phenomena of protest conflict party formation and radical disagreement seem no more than the froth on the surface itself already shaped from the outset by the


economic political and cultural forces that have produced it On the other hand if the articulation of human choices has any purchase at all in the shaping of the future then once again a site for radical disagreement has been defined in the ensuing political struggles

Doom-laden lists of future global drivers of conflict include the following

Economic inequality

The vast deprivations exclusions co-optations and controls that make up the slowly evolving lineaments of late capitalist global political economy are seen to remain impervious to protest and reform Always the victims are the lsquobottom bil-lionrsquo no matter what convulsions may shake the upper echelons as in the recent lsquocredit crunchrsquo This huge unfairness seems to be reinforced rather than under-mined by the evolution of international institutions from the state system itself to UN agencies and the International Financial Institutions that purport to embody universal emancipatory norms and to work to implement lsquomillennial goalsrsquo in the interest of the dispossessed

According to the World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER)

while the richest 10 of the adults of the world own 85 of global household wealth the bottom half collectively owns barely 1 Even more strikingly the average person in the top 10 owns nearly 3000 times the wealth of the average person in the bottom 10

(WIDER 2006 quoted Rogers 2007 90)

Three areas ndash North America Europe and the rich Asia-Pacific (Japan South Korea Taiwan Singapore Australia New Zealand) ndash own 88 per cent of global household wealth Rapid recent economic growth in countries like China and India is lsquolifting millions out of povertyrsquo although wealth discrepancy is still extreme and rising expectations and relative deprivation are recognized by students of revolu-tion as perhaps more dangerous than habitual and apparently ineluctable poverty

Much greater relative population growth in poorer parts of the world concen-trates increasing numbers of unemployed young people ndash particularly young men ndash in politically fragile often autocratic and repressive states without hope of better-ment Kept on the margins of global capitalism and largely excluded from rapid development in the richer areas a huge pool of recruits for revolutionary move-ments and often violent black market operations is continually being replenished and deepened On some estimates more than 40 million new jobs would need to be created in the Arab Middle East alone to neutralize this These populations are increasingly concentrated in cities In 1975 one third of the worldrsquos population lived in cities By 2025 it is likely to be two-thirds In some poor countries half the population is under 18 Even in oil-rich Saudi Arabia two-thirds are under 30 of whom a third are unemployed


The environment

The linked effects of material scarcity climate change and natural resource depletion are widely projected to have major political impacts Thomas Homer-Dixon predicted some time ago a looming concatenation of severe environmental constraints and human conflicts (1991 1994) with lsquosimple scarcityrsquo conflicts over water forests fishing and agricultural land lsquogroup-identity conflictsrsquo triggered by large-scale population movements (climate change will disproportionately affect tropical and sub-tropical landmasses where most of the worldrsquos population lives) and lsquodeprivationrsquo conflicts caused by relative depletion of natural resources There are any number of predictions in this area from war in the Arctic over the hunt for oil and gas to lsquowater warsrsquo to control disputed aquifers that lie under and across international borders (the Tigris affects Iran Iraq Syria Turkey the Nile affects Burundi DRC Egypt Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Rwanda Sudan Tanzania Uganda

Drivers of future conflict are seen to be systemically interconnected A combina-tion of environmental pressure and the global socio-economic divide for example is predicted in some estimates to be likely to accelerate migratory pressures poss-ibly by a factor of ten over the next decades Existing political structures may be unable to control them

Gender oppression

From a different angle of analysis the continuing plight of a high proportion of one half of the human family oppressed by structures and traditions of patriarchy is highlighted as a deep source of future conflict and a site for emancipatory struggles that will challenge most of the dominant power structures attitudes and behaviours that are in one way or another based on it

The passing of Western hegemony

Here is the predicted looming lsquotransvaluation of all valuesrsquo as the Western lib-eral values that have been dominant for so long ndash democracy human rights free markets secularism developed civil societies individualism the state system itself ndash are challenged by the rising economic and political power and sheer demo-graphic weight of non-western societies polities and cultures At the beginning of the twentieth century Europe contained 25 per cent of the worldrsquos population By the middle of this century this is predicted to fall to 75 per cent In 1950 the combined Arab population was 60 million compared with 120 million in Britain France and Spain the three main imperial powers in the region By 2000 the population of Iraq alone which had been 2 million in 1918 compared to 45 mil-lion in the UK had reached 30 million The average age in Iraq was 18 in 2000 in Europe it was 38 (Ehrman 2009) Will the main declared values on which the existing international system is based evolve into truly global values or will they turn out to have been merely lsquowesternrsquo If so what will replace them


Weapons development

Into this complex systemic set of actual and potential conflict formations flow ever-evolving military technologies and proliferating supply routes These weap-ons range from numerically by far the largest killers ndash knives and small arms ndash up to the potentially catastrophic weapons of mass destruction Looking a hundred years ahead the odds on biological chemical or nuclear weapons technology at some point falling into the hands of governments or groups willing to use them are impossible to calculate but frighteningly easy to imagine Linked to this are the extraordinary prospects for enhanced governmental control via new generations of surveillance technologies lsquonon-lethalrsquo crowd control weapons and methods of persuasion

Putting all this together the question is can existing economic and political structures contain and manage these enormous stresses particularly at a time when the revolution in communications is making the huge discrepancies between the resources available to the haves and the have-nots increasingly obvious Given political convulsion in the state system or a possible future economic collapse as at one time threatened in 2008 it is not hard for pessimists to envisage the possibility of a break-up of the institutions in the international system as we have known them and the onset of a chaotic and warring global anarchy (the lsquoMad Maxrsquo scenario)

Conclusion

But none of this is inevitable The advent of the new Obama administration in the United States has heartened those who look to a further evolution of liberal cosmo-politanism to guide humanity through the present turbulence Criticism from the right that this lacks hard-headed realism and from the left that it fails to address structural global inequalities are still to be argued out as are a complex of as yet sporadically developed critiques from non-western non-liberal parts of the world Will world economic and political institutions be reformed to meet basic human needs more adequately ndash particularly those of the lsquobottom billionrsquo Will humanity learn to live within a sustainable environment for the benefit of future generations Will the aspirations of women in all their variety be recognized and acted upon to the same extent as those of men Will the eirenic elements in the HinduBuddhist Confucian Judeo-Christian and Islamic civilizations ndash as well as secular and other traditions ndash prevail and provide mutual meaning and hope for those who live by those values Will the constant development of ever-more lethal weaponry be controlled Or will the opposites of all these happen

What is the main battleground where future wars of words associated with the most intractable global conflict formations and with the main concerted efforts to overcome them are likely to be fought out The ongoing revolution in global com-munication strongly suggests that it will be via the mobile phone and the internet perhaps even putting global access into the hands of the most disadvantaged for the first time in history once literacy levels the cheapness of the technology and the interest of providers in increasing the global market make this possible


Still in its infancy but developing at astonishing speed who can tell what forms the World Wide Web may ramify into over the next century It seems likely that it will be the locus for political struggles of all kinds in which the balance between defence (shutting it down and controlling it) and emancipation (circumventing restrictions) will ebb and flow This is a vast global laboratory for understanding and managing the associated radical disagreements Across the internet the strug-gle for values will be played out ndash for example the battle of languages such as Mandarin challenging English for pre-eminence

Part I of this book identified a gap in the analysis of complex conflict systems The phenomenon of radical disagreement the chief verbal manifestation of intractable political conflict does not appear in monological third-party analysis or complex systemic maps As a result a careful tracing of patterns of competing discourses embedded in the dynamic conflict system is missing from the analysis Mental models are described subjectively and the discursive battle is consequently dismissed as merely epiphenomenal or functional for the deeper sociological cultural psychological or political drivers of conflict Recommendations for dis-cursive transformation based on this analysis take the form of the promotion of dialogue for mutual understanding Although this achieves remarkable results when conditions are propitious ndash outstanding grass-roots dialogue work creates the whole foundation for future transformation ndash it is not surprising that in times of maximum intractability at political level it proves impotent

The suggestion in Part II of this book is to look in the opposite direction in these circumstances by taking the phenomenon of radical disagreement itself as the main focus of attention Radical disagreement introduces a different order of complex-ity It is a systemic and emergent manifestation in which the whole is dramatically different from the sum of its parts In light of this insights gained from the phenom-enology and epistemology of radical disagreement can better inform the practice of managing agonistic dialogue A greater focus on the strategic engagement of discourses can sustain communication even during times of maximum intract-ability helping to build capacity for challengers assisting possessors to decide if when and how it is best to settle and aiding those who seek to manage conflict non-violently In terms of emancipation inclusion and respect it can give voice to those involved in political struggles who often are not heard and can encourage them to speak in their own words not words put into their mouths by third parties however expert or well-intentioned The fact that in the phenomenology of agon-istic dialogue conflict parties find that they are not nearer but much further apart than was thought and the fact that in the epistemology of agonistic dialogue third parties find that there is no adequate theory or philosophy of radical disagreement may themselves eventually turn out to be transformative discoveries This book has aimed to open up the topic It makes no claim to have developed it very far Its empirical base is still very small But I think that the potential is great

Part III looks to the future It suggests that the phenomenon of radical disagree-ment gives insight into the nature of human difference that monological accounts ndash however subtle ndash cannot match It predicts that the phenomenon of radical disagreement will not go away and it proposes that awareness and knowledge


of agonistic dialogue may help to some extent to neutralize the most devastating consequences of linguistic intractability At the moment the phenomenon of rad-ical disagreement is dismissed as naive simplistic and superficial But if so it is a naivety that confounds third-party explanation however sophisticated a simplicity that defies expert analysis however complex and a superficiality that nevertheless reaches right down to the bottom Faced with the prospect that human history will continue to be conflictual and that the chief linguistic aspect of human conflict will continue to be radical disagreement taking the phenomenon of radical disagree-ment seriously ndash learning how it can be acknowledged explored understood and managed ndash is not the least of the requirements for human survival in an irredeem-ably agonistic world

EpilogueHaving the last word

At the end of Chapter 5 the exploration of agonistic dialogue suggested that what shows this to be my opinion in a radical disagreement is that it is a true opin-ion A true opinion is my opinion In the epilogue it is usual for the author to address the reader directly This is the authorrsquos last word All at once the author becomes reflexive In didactic books the author anticipates the readerrsquos objec-tions in advance The author is writing under the moment of description In the pre-imagined radical disagreement between author and reader the moment of description plays the function outlined in Chapter 5 The author refers to the work and to the readerrsquos criticism of the work and thereby absorbs the consciousness of self-distance and irony The author expresses modesty in the face of the listenerrsquos expected response or is braced for criticism or takes the opportunity to clear up objections with polite condescension But the function of the last word is to include all of this in the beam of light that the book shines into the future The book is a window through which having accounted for and thereby neutralized opposition the author can once again finally enjoy the peaceful experience of looking to the far horizon ndash and pointing at how things are

These are Hans-Georg Gadamerrsquos last words in Truth and Method

But I will stop here The ongoing dialogue permits no final conclusion It would be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he could have or had to have the last word

(19601986 579)

Gadamer refers to Truth and Method and to the readerrsquos response to Truth and Method He says that within the terms of his book neither Truth and Method nor the readerrsquos criticism of Truth and Method is or can be the last word That is Gadamerrsquos last word He foresees and has accounted for the future and the post-humous existence of Truth and Method into the future

This is how Theodor Adorno addresses his anticipated critics in Negative Dialectics

The author is prepared for the attacks to which Negative Dialectics will expose him He feels no rancor and does not begrudge the joy of those in either camp

250 Epilogue

[Marxist or anti-Marxist] who will proclaim that they knew it all the time and now he was confessing

(19662004 xxi)

In expectation of radical disagreement Adorno refers to Negative Dialectics and to expected readersrsquo attacks on Negative Dialectics In so doing he refers to the fact that the attacks will come from the two camps into which he has penned his critics His last word anticipates the future and the nature of his readersrsquo reactions

And here is Juumlrgen Habermasrsquo final communication in his postscript to Between Facts and Norms

There is a sense in which an author first learns what he has said in a text from the reactions of his readers In the process he also becomes aware of what he meant to say and he gains an opportunity to express more clearly what he wanted to say I find myself in this position hardly one year after the appearance of my book hellip Certainly the interpreter enjoys the advantage of understanding a text better than the author himself but on the occasion of a new printing the author may be permitted to take the role of an interpreter and attempt to recapitulate the core idea that informs the whole book as he sees it This also allows him to clear up some of the objections that have been raised in the meantime

(19921996 447)

In response to radical disagreement Habermas refers to Between Facts and Norms and to readersrsquo criticisms of Between Facts and Norms He points to the fact that the interpreter understands a text better than the author that the author can become interpreter in response and that in this case the last word in the new postscript to Between Facts and Norms clarifies what the original text says and clears up some of the objections raised against it He is able in his new last word to reaffirm and strengthen his previous last word Both together can now project themselves confidently into an already anticipated future

So it must be with this book In my last word I address the reader I refer to my book and to the readerrsquos future criticism of my book I write under the moment of description In doing so I anticipate the readerrsquos objections by saying for example that I cannot anticipate them That is after all what this book predicts Like all polemical authors who anticipate radical disagreement I try to neutralize my reflexive awareness of my own mortality in this way and thereby make a bid for immortality This book is a window and through it my last word can point at what lies beyond See Figure E1

Readers react in different ways Acceptance brings happiness to the author Abstention or faint praise brings disappointment Indifference brings a sense of loneliness But what about outright rejection

So far I have referred to myself and to lsquothe readerrsquo But now I hand the micro-phone over to ndash you And all at once the kaleidoscope of reflexive terms (this book I you temporal references) is affected This is not what I anticipated at all You

Epilogue 251

refute what is written here You see that this book contains all the tell-tale marks of didacticism ndash the prevalence of the present indicative tense the recurrent phrase lsquonot hellip ratherrsquo the general form lsquoit used to be thought that hellip now I can revealrsquo You point to errors of fact misreadings of texts superficiality of judgement and contradictions in argument And now this book is a picture ndash namely a false picture ndash that is shown up as such by how things are That is what you point at in refuting this book See Figure E2

But this is still my last word I have not in reality handed the microphone over yet Perhaps this is the situation

lsquoFirst I as author write this book then you as reader criticize itrsquo

But now it is plain why this description fails When you seize the microphone and I seize it back our radical disagreement becomes a struggle to control the micro-phone This affects all the reflexive terms Familiar landmarks defined by them slide What do lsquothis bookrsquo lsquoIrsquo lsquoyoursquo and the temporal references refer to In the radical disagreement they are contested This book is not separate from the rad-ical disagreement about it The distinction between author and reader is already hopelessly equivocated

Figure E1 The window

Figure E2 The picture

An aspect of the world

A falsepicture of the world

Theworld

252 Epilogue

At first I want to say that in our radical disagreement this book is and is not both a window and a (false) picture But now this third-party description fails too There is no room for it So is this book a mirror See Figure E3

If this book is a mirror then what this book says is that in our radical disagree-ment neither you nor I appear in the mirror at all

Figure E3 The mirror

Glossary

Given the unusual nature of the subject it has not been possible to avoid either coining new terms or interpreting existing terms in new ways All usages are explained where they appear but it also seems helpful to collect some of these terms together here

Linguistic intractability Intractable conflict is conflict that resists settlement and transformation Linguistic intractability is the verbal aspect of intractable conflict

Radical disagreement Radical disagreement is the chief linguistic manifestation of intense political conflict It is the key to linguistic intractability

The bar line notation and the limits of radical disagreement Bar lines mark out examples of radical disagreement in written notation If there is not enough in common the bar lines are empty This is mutual misunderstanding The parties are talking about different things If there is too much in common the bar lines disappear This is mutual convergence Either way there is not yet or no longer a radical disagreement These are limits to radical disagreement

The phenomenon of radical disagreement The phenomenon of radical agree-ment is what is said in the exchanges between conflict parties It is what appears between bar lines in written notation

The phenomenology of radical disagreement The phenomenology of radical disagreement is the study of (the phenomenon of) radical disagreement It is the study of what conflict parties say in intractable conflicts Any third-party verbal contributions are fed back for comment into these exchanges In the end it is the conflict parties who undertake the exploration

The sociology psychology politics etc of radical disagreement In contrast the sociology psychology and politics of radical disagreement are the study of the social psychological and political origins and functions of radical disagree-ment These are descriptions analyses interpretations and explanations of other peoplersquos texts utterances speech acts and discourses by third-party experts

The epistemology of radical disagreement The epistemology of radical disag-reement is the study of what third parties (analysts or interveners) say about radical disagreement In the epistemology of radical disagreement what these parties say is tested by applying it to examples of the radical disagreements

254 Glossary

that they purport to describe interpret explain or transformRelations of interest relations of power and relations of belief Relations of

interest are the contradictory aspirations of conflict parties in intractable con-flicts Relations of power are the relative capacities of conflict parties to fulfil their aspirations Relations of belief are the radical disagreements that both express and fuel these struggles Relations of belief in intractable conflicts are not juxtapositions of announced conviction (beliefs and belief systems) considered separately and attributed to conflict parties accordingly but the clash of claim and counter-claim (recommendation justification refutation) in the crucible of dynamic conflict

The polylogical and the monological The polylogical refers to the fact that radical disagreement is made up of contributions by many speakers in dynamic interconnection Radical disagreement is systemic and emergent ndash the whole is greater than the sum of its parts The monological refers to the fact that third-party accounts (including this book) are single voiced Demonstrations of the discrepancy between these two terms reveal key insights into linguistic intractability in the epistemology of radical disagreement The polylogical nature of radical disagreement is distinct from more general forms of dialo-gism (heteroglossia) or intertextuality

Agonistic dialogue Agonistic dialogue is the dialogue of struggle it is the dialogue between enemies in intense and intractable conflicts It is that part of radical disagreement in which conflict parties directly engage each otherrsquos utterances

Dialogue for mutual understanding Dialogue for mutual understanding is the form of dialogue favoured in conflict resolution (settlement and transforma-tion) Its aim is to overcome radical disagreement

Dialogue for strategic engagement Dialogue for strategic engagement is the form of dialogue promoted in the management of intractable political conflicts when settlement and transformation are premature Its aim is to explore the strategic implications of radical disagreement

The strategic engagement of discourses The strategic engagement of discourses (SED) is the result of success in the promotion of dialogue for strategic engagement The strategic engagement of discourses operates at three levels intra-party radical disagreement inter-party radical disagreement and radical disagreement among and within third parties as well as between third parties and conflict parties

The hexagon of radical disagreement The hexagon of radical disagreement is the simplest model for two-party composite radical disagreement It defines six axes of radical disagreement within and between conflict parties and illu-minates the SED aim of combining inclusive intra-party strategic dialogue tracks with inter-party and third-party strategic engagement

Extremism of ends and extremism of means Extremism of ends is intrans-igence in relation to strategic goals Extremism of means is intransigence in choosing violent means to achieve strategic goals The distinction between these two concepts is a key to managing continuing radical disagreement non-violently even when dialogue for mutual understanding so far fails

References

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Abu-Nimer M (2003) Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam Florida University Press of Florida

Adorno T (19662004) Negative Dialectics trans E Ashton New York ContinuumAlrsquo Alwani T (1997) The Ethics of Disagreement in Islam trans A Hamid Herndon VA

The International Institute of Islamic ThoughtAlon I (20079) A Linguistic Analysis of the 20022007 Arab Peace Initiative Documents

Available online at httpwwwpeace-security-councilorg articlesaspid=763Althusser L (19701971) lsquoIdeology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an

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Anderson B (1991) Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (2nd edition) London Verso

Adrey R (1966) The Territorial Imperative London CollinsArnswald (2002) lsquoOn the certainty of uncertainty language games and forms of life in

Gadamer and Wittgensteinrsquo in Malpas et al (eds) Gadamerrsquos Century Cambridge MA MIT Press 25ndash42

Atkinson J and Heritage J (eds) (1984) Structures of Social Action Studies in Conversation Analysis Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Aughey A (2002) lsquoThe art and effect of political lying in Northern Irelandrsquo Irish Political Studies 17(2) 1ndash16

Augsburger D (1992) Conflict Mediation Across Cultures Louisville KY WestminsterJohn Knox Press

Avruch K Black P and Scimecca J (1991) Conflict Resolution Cross Cultural Perspectives Westport CT Greenwood Press

Axelrod R (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation New York Basic BooksAzar E (1990) The Management of Protracted Social Conflict Theory and Cases

Aldershot DartmouthBarash D (2000) Approaches to Peace Oxford OUPBarker C (2003) Cultural Studies Theory and Practice (second edition) London SageBar-On M (2006) lsquoConflicting narratives or narratives of a conflictrsquo in R Rotberg Israeli

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Barthes R (19571993) Mythologies London Vintage

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Sociology of Knowledge New York Doubleday and CoBenhabib S (1992) Situating the Self Gender Community and Postmodernism in

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Frank CassBillig M (1991) Ideologies and Beliefs London SageBlair J and Johnson R (eds) (1980) Informal Logic The First International Symposium

London EdgepressBlake R and Mouton J (1970) lsquoThe fifth achievementrsquo Journal of Applied Behavioral

Science 6(4) 413ndash26Blake R and Mouton J (1984) Solving Costly Organizational Conflicts San Francisco

Jossey-BassBleiker R (2001) lsquoThe aesthetic turn in international political theoryrsquo Millennium 30(3)

509ndash33Bohm D (1996) On Dialogue London RoutledgeBooth K and Dunne T (eds) (2002) Worlds in Collision Terror and the Future of Global

Order Houndmills UK Palgrave MacmillanBouchard D (ed) and Sherry S (1977) Language Counter-Memory and Practice

Selected Essays and Interviews Ithaca NY Cornell University PressBoulding K (1962) Conflict and Defense A General Theory New York Harper and

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RoutledgeBradford B (2004) lsquoManaging disagreement constructivelyrsquo online source Handout 9Broome B (1993) lsquoManaging differences in conflict resolution the role of relational

empathyrsquo in D Sandole and H van der Merwe (eds) Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice Integration and Application Manchester Manchester University Press 97ndash111

Brown C (1992) International Relations Theory New Normative Approaches Hemel Hempstead UK Harvester Wheatsheaf

Brown C (2002) lsquoNarratives of religion civilization and modernityrsquo in K Booth and T Dunne (eds) Worlds in Collision Terror and the Future of Global Order 293ndash302

Brown C (2007) lsquoTragedy lsquotragic choicesrsquo and contemporary international political theoryrsquo International Relations 21(1) 5ndash13

Burgess H and Burgess G (1996) lsquoConstructive confrontation a transformative approach to intractable conflictsrsquo Mediation Quarterly 13(4) Summer 305ndash22

Burgess G and Burgess H (1997) Constructive Confrontation A Strategy for Dealing With Intractable Environmental Conflicts Working Paper 97ndash1 wwwcoloradoeduconflict

Burns D (2006) lsquoEvaluation in Complex Governance Arenas The Potential of Large-Scale System Action Researchrsquo in B Williams and I Imam Using Systems Concepts in Evaluation Fairhaven MA American Evaluation Association 181ndash95

Burr V (1995) An Introduction to Social Constructionism London Routledge

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Chagnon N (1983 3rd edn) Yanomamo The Fierce People New York Holt Reinhart and Winston

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RoutledgeCohen R (1991) Negotiating Across Cultures Communication Obstacles in International

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Collier P (1999) lsquoDoing Well Out of Warrsquo Paper Given at London Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars April 26ndash7

Collier P (2000) lsquoDoing well out of war an economic perspectiversquo in M Berdal and D Malone (eds) Greed and Grievance Boulder CO Lynne Rienner 91ndash111

Collier P (2001) lsquoEconomic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policyrsquo in C Crocker F Hampson and P Aall (eds) Turbulent Peace The Challenges of Managing International Conflict Washington DC United States Institute of Peace

Collier P and Hoeffler A (2001) Greed and Grievance in Civil War World Bank Development Research Group

Cox R (1981) lsquoSocial forces states and world orders beyond international relations the-oryrsquo Millennium Journal of International Studies 10(2) 126ndash55

Davey R with J Cole (1993) A Channel of Peace The Story of the Corrymeela Community Grandville MA Zondervan

Davidson D (1984) lsquoOn the very idea of a conceptual schemersquo in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation Oxford Clarendon Press 183ndash98

Dawkins R (1989) The Selfish Gene Oxford Oxford University PressDeacutedaic M and Nelson D (eds) (2003) At War with Words New York Mouton de

GruyterDeleuze G and Guattari F (19761981) lsquoRhizomersquo trans P Foss and P Patton I amp C

8 49ndash71Derrida J (1994) Spectres of Marx The State of the Debt the Work of Mourningand the New International trans P Kamuf London RoutledgeDershowitz A (2005) The Case for Peace How the Arab-Israeli Conflict Can Be Resolved

Hoboken NJ John Wiley amp Sons IncDeveaux M (2000) Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice Ithaca NY Cornell UPDe Waal F (1989) Peacemaking Among Primates Cambridge MA Harvard UP

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Deutsch M (1973) The Resolution of Conflict Constructive and Destructive Processes New York Yale University Press

Deutsch M (2000) lsquoCooperation and competitionrsquo in M Deutsch and P Coleman (eds) The Handbook of Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice San Francisco Jossey-Bass 21ndash40

de Zulueta F (2006) From Pain to Violence The Traumatic Roots of Destructiveness second edition Chichester John Wiley

Dollard J Doob L Miller N Mowrer O and Sears R (1939) Frustration and Aggression New Haven Yale UP

Doyle M and Sambanis N (2006) Making War and Building Peace United Nations Peace Operations Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Drew P (1992) lsquoContested evidence in courtroom cross-examination the case of a trial for rapersquo in Drew and Heritage Talk at Work Interaction in Institutional Settings 470ndash520

Drew P and Heritage J (eds) (1992) Talk at Work Interaction in Institutional Settings Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Dryzek J (1990) Discursive Democracy Politics Policy and Political Science New York Cambridge University Press

Dudouet V (2006) Nonviolent Resistance and Conflict Transformation in Power Asymmetries Berlin Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management

Duffield M (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars The Merging of Development and Security London Zed Books

Dukes F (1996) Resolving Public Conflict Transforming Community and Governance Manchester Manchester University Press

Edwards D and Potter J (1992) Discursive Psychology London SageEhrman R (2009) The Power of Numbers Buckingham University of Buckingham

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by the four main Northern Irish parties through timersquo Ethnopolitics 7(1) 21ndash42Filardo L (forthcoming 2010) lsquoLegitimising through language political discourse worlds

in Northern Ireland after the 1998 Agreementrsquo in K Hayward and C OlsquoDonnell (eds) Political Discourse and Conflict Resolution

Finnis J Boyle J and Grisez G (1987) Nuclear Deterrence Morality and Realism Oxford Oxford University Press

Fisher A (1988) The Logic of Real Arguments Cambridge Cambridge University PressFisher Roger Ury W and Patton B (19811991) 2nd ed Getting to Yes Negotiating

Agreement Without Giving In New York PenguinFisher Roger Kopelman E and Schneider A (1994) Beyond Machiavelli Tools for

Coping with Conflict Cambridge Mass Harvard University PressFisher Roger and Shapiro D (20057) Building Agreement Using Emotions As You

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Companion to Foucault Cambridge CUP 28ndash46Follett M (1940) in H Metcalf and L Urwick (eds) Dynamic Administration The Collected

Papers of Mary Parker Follett New York HarperFoucault M (1977) Language Counter-Memory and Practice Selected Essays and

Interviews trans D Bouchard and S Sherry Ithaca NY Cornell University PressFoucault M (1980) PowerKnowledge Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972ndash1999

trans C Gordon New York PantheonFowler R Hodge B Kress G Trew T (1979) Language and Control London

Routledge amp Kegan PaulFrost M (1996) Ethics in International Relations A Constitutive Theory Cambridge

CUPFry D and Bjorkqvist K (eds) (1997) Cultural Variation in Conflict Resolution Alternatives

to Violence Mahwah NJ Lawrence Erlbaum AssociatesGadamer H-G (1975) Truth and Method London Sheed and WardGadamer H-G (19601986) Truth and Method second revised edition New York

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Civilization London SageGaltung J (2000) Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (the Transcend Method)

Participantsrsquo and Trainersrsquo Manual New York United NationsGaltung J (2004) Transcend and Transform London Pluto PressGantzel K and Schwinghammer T (2000) Warfare Since the Second World War London

Transaction PublishersGarfinkel H (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice-HallGergen K (1973) lsquoSocial psychology as historyrsquo Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology 26 309ndash20Gergen K and Gergen M (1984) Historical Social Psychology Hillsdale NJ Lawrence

Erlbaum AssociatesGilligan C (1982) In A Different Voice Cambridge MA Harvard UPGilligan C (2002) The Birth of Pleasure New York KnopfGlasl F (2008) lsquoEnriching conflict diagnosis and strategies for social change a closer look

at conflict dynamicsrsquo in Koumlrppen et al (eds) 43ndash51Gleick P (1995) lsquoWater and conflict fresh water resources and international securityrsquo in

S Lynn-Jones and S Miller (eds) Global Dangers 84ndash117Goodall J (1986) The Chimpanzees of Gombe Patterns of Behaviour Cambridge Mass

Harvard UPGrice H (1975) lsquoLogic and conversationrsquo in P Cole and J Morgan (eds) Syntax and

Semantics Vol 3 Speech Acts New York Academic Press 41ndash58Groebel J Hinde J and Hinde R (eds) (1989) Aggression and War Their Biological and

Social Bases Cambridge Cambridge University PressGulliver P (1979) Disputes and Negotiations A Cross-Cultural Perspective New York Academic PressGurr T (2000) Peoples Versus States Minorities at Risk in the New Century Washington

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Rationalization of Society trans T McCarthy Cambridge Polity PressHabermas J (1981b1987) The Theory of Communicative Action Volume II The Critique

of Functionalist Reason trans T McCarthy Cambridge Polity PressHabermas J (1982) lsquoA reply to my criticsrsquo in Thompson J and Held D eds Habermas

Critical Debates London MacmillanHabermas J (19921996) Between Facts and Norms Cambridge Polity PressHabermas J (1992) Postmetaphysical Thinking Cambridge Mass MIT PressHalabi R and Sonneschein N (2004) lsquoThe Jewish-Palestinian encounter in time of crisisrsquo

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DC US Institute of PeaceHand S (ed) (1989) The Levinas Reader Oxford BlackwellHarrison N (ed) (2006) Complexity in World Politics Concepts and Methods of a New

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Resolution London RoutledgeHendrick D (2009) Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation An Exploration of

Potential and Implications University of Bradford Working Paper 17 Bradford UK Centre for Conflict Resolution

Heritage J (1984) Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology Cambridge Polity PressHinman L (2003) Ethics A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory Belmont CA Thomson

(Wadsworth)Hoffman M (1987) lsquoCritical theory and the interparadigm debatersquo Millennium 16

231ndash49Hollis M and Lukes S (eds) (1982) Rationality and Relativism Oxford Basil

BlackwoodHomer-Dixon T (1991) lsquoOn the threshold environmental changes as causes of acute con-

flictrsquo International Security 16(2) 7ndash16Homer-Dixon T (1994) lsquoEnvironmental scarcities and violent conflict evidence from

casesrsquo International Security 19(1) 5ndash40Honig B (1993) Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics Ithaca NY Cornell

UPHoward M (1984) The Causes of Wars Cambridge MA Harvard University PressHowarth D (1998) lsquoDiscourse theory and political analysisrsquo in E Scarborough and

E Tannenbaum (eds) Research Strategies in the Social Sciences A Guide to New Approaches Oxford Oxford University Press 268ndash93

Howarth D Norval A and Stavrakakis Y (eds) (2000) Discourse Theory and Political Analysis Identities Hegemonies and Social Change Manchester Manchester University Press

Humphrys J (2007) In God We Doubt Confessions of a Failed Atheist London Hodder amp Stoughton

References 261

Hutchby I (1992) lsquoThe pursuit of controversy routine scepticism in talk on talk radiorsquo Sociology 26 673ndash94

Hutchby I and Wooffitt R (1998) Conversation Analysis Cambridge Polity PressIrigaray L (19771985) This Sex Which Is Not One Cornell University PressJabri V (1996) Discourses on Violence Conflict Analysis Reconsidered Manchester

Manchester University PressJabri V (2007) War and the Transformation of Global Politics London PalgraveJanis I (1972) Victims of Groupthink Boston Houghton MifflinJervis R (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics Princeton NJ

Princeton UPJohnson D Johnson R and Tjosvold D (2000) lsquoConstructive Controversyrsquo in M Deutsch

and P Coleman (eds) The Handbook of Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice 65ndash85

Jones D (1999) Cosmopolitan Mediation Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords Manchester Manchester University Press

Jones P and Carey C (2003) Disagreement and Difference special issue of the Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 6(3) 154ndash64

Jurgensmeyer M (2001) Terror in the Mind of God The Global Rise of Religious Violence Berkeley CA University of California Press

Kahane A (2007) Solving Tough Problems A Creative Way of Talking Listening and Creating New Realities Berrett-Koehler

Kekes J (1993) The Morality of Pluralism Princeton Princeton UPKelly M (1995) lsquoThe GadamerHabermas Debate Revisited The Question of Ethicsrsquo in D

Rasmussen (ed) Universalism Vs Communitarianism Contemporary Debates in Ethics Cambridge MA The MIT Press 139ndash59

King M L (1963) Lincoln Memorial Address Reprinted in Safire W (ed) (1992) Lend Me Your Ears Great Speeches in History New York WW Norton

King S (2000) lsquoA Global Ethic in the light of comparative religious ethicsrsquo in Twiss and Grelle (eds) A Global Ethic The Declaration of the Parliament of the Worldrsquos Religions 118ndash40

Klug T (2008) lsquoThe Last Chance Saloonrsquo PalestinendashIsrael Journal of Politics Economics and Culture 15(2) 161ndash65

Koumlrppen D Schmelze B and Wils O (eds) (2008) A Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation Exploring Strengths and Limitations Berlin Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series

Kress G and Hodge B (1979) Language as Ideology Routledge amp Kegan PaulKriesberg L (1982) Social Conflicts Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice-HallKriesberg L Northrup T and Thorson S (eds) (1989) Intractable Conflicts and Their

Transformation Syracuse NY Syracuse University PressKristeva J (1986) The Kristeva Reader ed T Moi Oxford Basil BlackwellKuumlng H (19781980) Does God Exist An Answer for Today trans E Quinn London

CollinsKuumlng H (ed) (1996) Yes To A Global Ethic New York ContinuumKuumlng H and Kuschel K-J (eds) (1993) A Global Ethic The Declaration of the Parliament

of the Worldrsquos Religions New York ContinuumKuttab J (1988) lsquoThe pitfalls of dialoguersquo Journal of Palestine Studies 17(2) 84ndash108Kymlicka W (1995) Multicultural Citizenship A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights

Oxford OUP

262 References

Kymlicka W and Bashir B (eds) (2008) The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies Oxford Oxford University Press

Labov W and Fanshel D (1977) Therapeutic Discourse Psychotherapy as Conversation New York Academic Press

Laclau E and Mouffe C (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy London VersoLakoff G and Johnson M (1980) Metaphors We Live By Chicago IL University of

Chicago PressLarmore C (1987) Patterns of Moral Complexity Cambridge CUPLaurence W (1946) Dawn Over Zero New York KnopfLederach JP (2003) The Little Book of Conflict Transformation Intercourse Pa Good

BooksLederach JP (2005) The Moral Imagination The Art and Soul of Building Peace Oxford

Oxford University PressLevinas E (1998) Entre Nous On Thinking-Of-The-Other trans M Smith and B Harshav

London Athlone PressLevinson S (1983) Pragmatics Cambridge Cambridge University PressLewin K (1935) A Dynamic Theory of Personality New York McGraw-HillLewin K (1947) lsquoFrontiers in group dynamnicsrsquo Human Relations 1 5ndash41Linklater A (1998) The Transformation of Political Community Cambridge CUPLocke J (16901975) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Oxford Oxford

University PressLorenz K (1966) On Aggression New York Harcourt Brace and WorldLynn-Jones S and Miller S (eds) (1995) Global Dangers Cambridge MA MIT PressMacdonell D (1986) Theories of Discourse Oxford BlackwellMackie J 1976 Ethics Inventing Right and Wrong London PenguinMcDowell J (2002) lsquoGadamer and Davidson on understanding and relativismrsquo in Malpas

et al (eds) Gadamerrsquos Century 173ndash94Malpas J Arnswald U and Kertsche J (eds) (2002) Gadamerrsquos Century Essays in

Honour of Hans-Georg Gadamer Cambridge MA MIT PressMead M (1940) lsquoWarfare is only an invention ndash not a biological necessityrsquo Asia 40

402ndash5Mertus J (1999) Kosovo How Myths and Truths Started A War Berkeley CA University

of California PressMitchell C (1981) The Structure of International Conflict London MacmillanMitchell C and Banks M (1996) Handbook of Conflict Resolution The Analytical

Problem-Solving Approach London PinterCassellMontefiore S (20078) Young Stalin London Weidenfeld and NicolsonMontville J ed (1990) Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies Lexington

MA Lexington BooksMorgenthau H (1948 4th edn 1967) Politics Among Nations The Struggle for Power and

Peace New York KnopfMouffe Chantal (1999) lsquoDeliberative democracy or agonistic pluralismrsquo in Social

Research (66)3 745ndash58Mouffe C (2000) The Democratic Paradox London VersoMouffe C (2005) On The Political London RoutledgeMourad K (2004) Our Sacred Land Voices from the Palestine-Israeli Conflict Oxford

OneworldMuldoon P (2008) lsquoldquoThe very basis of civilityrdquo on agonism conquest and reconciliationrsquo

in Kymlicka and Bashir 114ndash35

References 263

Musab A (2003) Article from Kcom Journal online source (no longer available)Nagel T (1979) Mortal Questions Cambridge CUPNeuberg A and Waltman M (2006) Why We Believe What We Believe Uncovering Our

Biological Need for Meaning Spirituality and Truth New York Free Press Simon and Schuster

Nicolic L (2003) lsquoEthnic prejudices and discriminations the case of Kosovorsquo inF Bieber and Z Daskalovski (eds) Understanding the War in Kosovo London Frank

CassNietzsche F (1974) The Gay Science trans W Kaufmann New York VintageNordstrom C (1994) Warzones Cultures of Violence Militarisation and Peace Canberra

Australian National UniversityNorris C (1994) lsquoldquoWhat is enlightenmentrdquo Kant according to Foucaultrsquo in G Gutting

(ed) The Cambridge Companion to Foucault Cambridge Cambridge University Press 159ndash96

Northrup T (1989) lsquoThe dynamic of identity in personal and social conflictrsquo in L Kriesberg T Northrup and S Thorson (eds) Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation Syracuse NY Syracuse University Press 35ndash82

Nye J (2002) The Paradox of American Power Why the Worldrsquos Only Superpower Canrsquot Go It Alone Oxford OUP

Palestine Strategy Group (2008) Regaining the Initiative Palestinian Strategic Options for Ending Israeli Occupation London Oxford Research Group Text in Arabic and English wwwpalestinestrategygroupps

Parekh B (2002) lsquoTerrorism or intercultural dialoguersquo in K Booth and T Dunne (eds) Worlds in Collision Terror and the Future of Global Order Houndmills UK Palgrave Macmillan 270ndash83

Parker I (1992) Discourse Dynamics Critical Analysis for Social and Individual Psychology London Routledge

Peacutecheux (197582) Language Semantics and Ideology Stating the Obvious trans H Nagpal London Macmillan

Pinker S (2002) The Blank Slate London Penguin BooksPioneers of Change Associates (2006) Bojer M and McKay E Mapping Dialogue with

German Technical Cooperation wwwpioneersofsocialchangenetPomerantz A (1984) lsquoAgreeing and disagreeing with assessments some features of pre-

ferreddispreferred turn-shapesrsquo in J Atkinson and J Heritage (eds) Structures of Social Action Studies in Conversation Analysis Cambridge Cambridge University Press 79ndash112

Potter J and Wetherell M (1987) Discourse and Social Psychology Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour London Sage

Potter J (1996) Representing Reality Discourse Rhetoric and Social Construction London Sage

Pressman J (2003) lsquoVisions in collision what happened at Camp David and Tabarsquo International Security 28(2) 5ndash43

Priest G (2002) Beyond The Limits Of Thought Oxford Clarendon PressPugh M Cooper N and Turner M (eds) (2009) Whose Peace Critical Perspectives on

the Political Economy of Peacebuilding Houndmills UK PalgraveMacmillanQuine W and Ullian J (1970) The Web of Belief Random HouseRamsbotham O (1987) Choices Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Defence Options London

Brasseyrsquos

264 References

Ramsbotham O Woodhouse T and Miall H (2005) Contemporary Conflict Resolution Cambridge Polity Press

Rapoport A (1989) The Origins of Violence New York Paragon HouseRasmussen D (ed) (1990) Universalism Vs Communitarianism Contemporary Debates

in Ethics Cambridge MA The MIT PressRichmond O (2005) The Transformation of Peace London PalgraveRichmond O (2008) Peace in International Relations Abingdon RoutledgeRicigliano R (2008) lsquoPlanning for systemic impactrsquo draft chapter for Berghof Systemic

Thinking and Conflict Transformation (forthcoming)Risse T (2004) lsquoGlobal governance and communicative actionrsquo Government and

Opposition 39(2) 288ndash313Rogers C (1980) A Way of Being Boston Houghton MifflinRogers P (2000) Losing Control Global Security in the Twenty-First Century London

PlutoRogers P (2007) Towards Sustainable Security Alternatives to the War on Terror Oxford

Research Group International Security Report London Oxford Research GroupRopers N (2008) lsquoSystemic conflict transformation reflections on the conflict and peace

process in Sri Lankarsquo in D Koumlrppen B Schmelzle and O Wils (eds) A Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation Exploring Strengths and Limitations Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management 11ndash41

Rorty R (1988) Contingency Irony and Solidarity Cambridge Cambridge University Press

Rose H and Rose S (eds) 2001 Alas Poor Darwin Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology London Vintage

Rosenau J and Earnest D (2006) lsquoSignifying nothing What complex systems theory can and cannot tell us about global politicsrsquo in N Harrison (ed) Complexity in World Politics Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm New York State University of New York

Ross D (2004) The Missing Peace The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace New York Farrar Straus and Giroux

Ross M (1993) The Culture of Conflict Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective New Haven Yale University Press

Rotberg R (ed) (2006) Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict Historyrsquos Double Helix Bloomington IN Indiana University Press

Roth-Cline M (2004) lsquoHalf measuresrsquo online source (no longer available)Rothman (1992) From Confrontation to Cooperation Resolving Ethnic and Regional

Conflict Newbury Park Calif SageRothman J (1997) Resolving Identity-Based Conflicts in Nations Organizations and

Communities San Francisco Jossey-BassRouhana N (2006) lsquoZionismrsquos encounter with the Palestinians the dynamics of force

fear and extremismrsquo in R Rotberg (ed) Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict Bloomington Il University of Illinois Press 115ndash41

Rouhana N and Koumlrper S (1996) lsquoDealing with dilemmas posed by power asymmetry in intergroup conflictrsquo Negotiation Journal 12(4)

Ryder C and Kearney V (2001) Drumcree The Orange Orderrsquos Last Stand London Methuen

Sacks (1984) lsquoNotes on methodologyrsquo in J Atkinson and J Heritage (eds) Structures of Social Action Studies in Conversation Analysis Cambridge Cambridge University Press 21ndash7

References 265

Said E (1986) lsquoBurdens of interpretation and the question of Palestinersquo paper presented to the conference of the International Society of Political Psychology Amsterdam

Said E (1995) Peace and its Discontents London VintageSandole D (1999) Capturing the Complexity of Conflict Dealing With Violent Ethnic

Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era London RoutledgeSandole D and van der Merwe H (eds) (1993) Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice

Integration and Application Manchester Manchester University PressSaunders H (1999) A Public Peace Process Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and

Ethnic Conflict New York PalgraveSchaumlffner C and Wenden A (eds) (1995) Language and Peace London RoutledgeSchofield V (1996) Kashmir in the Crossfire London IB TaurisScriven M (1976) Reasoning New York McGraw-HillSearle J (1969) Speech Acts An Essay in the Philosophy of Language Cambridge

Cambridge University PressSinger D (1996) lsquoArmed conflict in the former colonial regions from classification

to explanationrsquo in L van de Goor K Rupesinge and P Sciarone (eds) Between Development and Destruction An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States New York St Martinrsquos Press 35ndash49

Singer D and Small M (1972) The Wages of War 1816ndash1965 A Statistical Handbook New York Wiley

SIPRI Yearbook 2008 Oxford Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Slim H (2005) lsquoViolent beliefsrsquo RUSI Journal April 2005 20ndash3Sperber D and Wilson D (1986) Relevance Communication and Cognition Oxford

BlackwellStaub E (1989) The Roots of Evil The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence

Cambridge CUPStewart J and Thomas M (2005) lsquoDialogic listening sculpting mutual meaningsrsquo in

J Stewart (ed) Bridges Not Walls A Book About Interpersonal Communication 9th edn New York McGraw-Hill 192ndash210

Stocker M (1990) Plural and Conflicting Values Oxford Clarendon PressStrategic Foresight Group (2009) Cost of Conflict in the Middle East Mumbai SFGStroh D (2002) A Systemic View of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in The Systems Thinker

13(5) 2ndash7Taylor C (2002) lsquoUnderstanding the other A Gadamerian view on conceptual schemesrsquo in

Malpas et al (eds) Gadamerrsquos Century Boston MIT Press 279ndash98Thompson J 1984 Studies in the Theory of Ideology Cambridge Polity PressThompson J 1990 Ideology and Modern Culture Cambridge Polity PressThucydides (1954) History of the Peloponnesian War trans Warner R London PenguinToulmin S (1958) The Uses of Argument Cambridge Cambridge University PressTurnbull C (1978) lsquoThe politics of non-aggressionrsquo in A Montagu (ed) Learning

Non-Aggression The Experience of Non-Literate Societies Oxford Galaxy Books 161ndash221

Twiss S (1993) lsquoCurricular perspectives in comparative religious ethics a critical examina-tion of four paradigmsrsquo The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 249ndash69

Twiss S and Grelle B (eds) (2000) Explorations in Global Ethics Comparative Religious Ethics and Interreligious Dialogue Boulder CO Westview Press

USMiddle East Project (2008) A Last Chance for a Two-State IsraelndashPalestine Agreement New York httpwwwusmepus

266 References

Van Dijk T (1993) lsquoPrinciples of critical discourse analysisrsquo Discourse and Society 4(2) 249ndash83

Volkan V (1988) The Need to Have Enemies and Allies From Clinical Practice to International Relationships Northvale NJ Jason Aronson

Volkan V (1990) lsquoPsychoanalytic aspects of ethnic conflictsrsquo in J Montville (ed) Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies Lexington Mass Lexington Books 81ndash92

Volkan V and Harris M (1992) lsquoNegotiating a peaceful separation a psychopolitical analysis of current relationships between Russia and the Baltic Republicsrsquo Mind and Human Interaction 4(1) 20ndash39

Volkan V and Harris M(1992) lsquoVaccinating the political process a second psychopoliti-cal analysis of relationships between Russia and the Baltic statesrsquo Mind and Human Interaction 4(4) 169ndash90

Volosinov VN (19301973) Marxism and the Philosophy of Language trans L Matejka and IR Titunik New York Seminar Press

von Clausewitz C (19761832) On War trans and ed M Howard M Paret and P Paret Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

von Neumann J and Morgenstern O (1944) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior New York Wiley

Walker R (1993) InsideOutside International Relations as Political Theory Cambridge CUPWallensteen P (2002) Understanding Conflict Resolution London SageWaltz K (1979) Theory of International Politics New York McGraw-HillWalzer M (1977 2nd edn 1992) Just and Unjust Wars A Moral Argument With Historical

Illustration New York Basic BooksWalzer M (1983) Spheres of Justice A Defense of Pluralism and Equality New York

Basic BooksWarnke G (1987) Gadamer Hermeneutics Tradition and Reason Stanford Stanford

University PressWasserstrom B (2001) Divided Jerusalem The Struggle for the Holy City London Profile

BooksWatt D (19911964) Mein Kampf trans Manheim R London PimlicoWehr P (1979) Conflict Regulation Boulder CO Westview PressWheen F (2004) How Mumbo-Jumbo Conquered the World London HarperCollinsWhite S (1995) The Cambridge Companion to Habermas Cambridge CUPWhyte J (1990) Interpreting Northern Ireland Oxford Clarendon PressWilliams B (1981) Moral Luck Cambridge Cambridge University PressWilliams B (2002) Truth and Truthfulness Princeton Princeton University PressWilliams R (2004) Analysing Atheism Unbelief and the World of Faith London Lambeth

Palace Press OfficeWils O Hopp U Ropers N Vimalarajah L and Zunzer W (2006) The Systemic

Approach to Conflict Transformation Concepts and Fields of Application Berghof Foundation for Peace Support

Wittgenstein L 1961 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus D Pears and B McGuinness (eds) London Routledge

Woodrow P (2006) Advancing Practice in Conflict Analysis and Strategy Development Interim Progress Report Reflecting on Peace Practice Project Cambridge MA CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

Wright S (1998) Language and Conflict A Neglected Relationship Bristol Multilingual Matters Ltd

Zalzberg O (2009) lsquoReport on the Time is Ripe Projectrsquo unpublished

Index

Note page numbers in bold refer to figures and tables

abortion 80ndash1ad hominem judgement 113Adorno Theodor 150 249ndash50aggression 7 40ndash2 56 72 97 116 128

144 208agonistic dialogue and agonism 94n1 and

alignment 112 analysis of 3 31 50 96 98ndash9 101ndash2 122 169 249 and conflict narratives 137 exploration of 3 31 50 98ndash9 102 122 169 206ndash7 209 249 and hermeneutics 160 in Jabri 91 and justifications 111 managing 95 165 169 247 and moments of disagreement 114 116 131ndash2 non-violent 195 outcome of 98 227 247 study of 95ndash6 104 and third-party descriptions 142 and truth conditions 98 unruly nature of 93 validity claims in 125

Alternative Dispute Resolution 58ndash60ambiguity 25 212anthropology 40ndash2 237API (Arab Peace Initiative) 185ndash8 186ndash7

190 196 201argumentation theory of 149ndash50arguments real 96 98 structure of 97ARIA methodology 67ndash9 86assertibility question 98asymmetric conflicts 30 43 81 86 99

168ndash9 175 205

Bakhtin Mikhail 229bargaining 61Barthes Roland 146 148ndash9 164belief clouds 47beliefs in conflict analysis 45 conflicts

of 6ndash8 43 142 roots of 31 and subjectivity 154 web of 104 116

binaries 164 229 238ndash9Bourdieu Pierre 229

Burton John 45 66ndash7Burundi 47 49

charity principle of 25 98 161children upbringing of 8 10 122Christianity 9ndash10 12 78 123ndash4 220class struggle 36 101co-existence education 102Cold War 38 127 213communication and conflict drivers 246

and conflict resolution 72 cross-cultural 107 failures of 60 inequalities in 30 and radical disagreement 69ndash70

communicative action 89ndash91 133 149ndash51 155 225ndash6

complexity 18 50 81ndash3 148 163 247conflict analysis 15 33 35ndash6 40ndash1 45ndash6

51 91 93 104 205 223 240conflict dynamics 50conflict engagement 67ndash8conflict escalation 18 206 214conflict management 61conflict mapping 33 45 51conflict narratives 133 137 141conflict resolution aims of 211

assumptions of 18 and asymmetry 87 and conflict mapping 45 constructive 53 56 cultural bias in 52 and data collection 33ndash4 and Gadamer 156 interactive 65 72 interpersonal 74 methodological boundaries of 102ndash3 and moment of description 114 and moment of revision 115ndash16 public 71ndash3 103 and radical disagreement 52 68ndash74 91 127 and SED 179ndash80 types of conflict in 91 and unseen powers 70 and violence 217 219

conflict settlement 52 54 91 169 181 205ndash6 210 213 218

268 Index

conflict theories 5 33 35 40conflict transformation 50ndash2 57 81ndash3

86ndash7 132 137 146 205ndash6 213conflict triangle 43ndash4 43conflict understandings 5confrontation constructive 91 103ndash4 209ndash10connotations 2 25constructivism 19 26ndash8 31 50 237ndash8contestations 3 8 31 50 88ndash90 99 102

116 227 231context analysis 100controversy constructive 53 62 81 91

103 166convergence 2 207conversation analysis (CA) 19ndash22 26 31

95ndash6 example of transcription 20ndash1conversion radical 116Correlates of War (COW) 33ndash4criminality 6 8 47 218critical conceptions 29critical theory 36ndash7 86ndash7 89 229critical thinking movement see informal

reasoning analysiscriticizeability 150 155cross-cultural conflict 238cultural studies 42 237ndash9culture critique of 5ndash6 216 229 237 and

translation 161ndash2

de-escalation 43ndash4 206defence mechanisms 70delusory facts 58democracy 25 85 91ndash2 103 115 162ndash3

195 221 229ndash32 236 245democratic theory 229Derrida Jacques 164 227ndash9Deutsch Morton 53ndash4 56 65 91dialogic attitudes 74ndash5dialogue definition of 73 aim of

82 between civilizations 102 constructive 114 206 conversational 157 159 Gadamerian approach to 207 hermeneutic 73 146 inter-communal 75ndash6 inter-religious 75 77ndash8 interpersonal 74 for strategic engagement 194 202ndash3 205 207ndash10 215ndash16

disagreement definition of 6ndash7discourse analysis and language 88

political 7 19 29ndash30 99 140 212 and radical disagreement 7 17ndash19 91 93 166 225 task of 100ndash1

discourse ethics 86ndash7 89ndash90 149 230discourse psychology 27

discourses clash of 17 91 factual 26 hegemonic 88 165 168 183 202 219 human 15 31 225 as inherently argumentative 28 Israeli 18 183ndash91 188ndash9 Palestinian 17ndash18 169ndash82 171ndash5 177 217ndash19 238ndash9 peacemaking 17ndash18 50 86 182 197 218ndash19 221ndash2

discursive engagement 106 108 168 192ndash4

economic conflict 8 214ndash15 241ndash3emotions 44 47 57ndash8 60 65ndash6 69 71

96 106 116 126ndash7 139 141 211 235empathy 74ndash5 131environmental conflict 245equivalence 123ndash4 139 143escalation 43 65 143 193 206 210 214ethno-nationalist conflict see secessionist

conflictevolutionary psychology (EP) 41ndash2externalization linguistic 27ndash8 70extremism 165 177 181 193ndash4 203 214

216 236

facilitation methodology 183fallacies 25family quarrels 8 9ndash12 70 121Fanon Frantz 217feminism 237football matches 8 17Foucault Michel 146ndash7 163ndash4 225ndash7fundamentalism 11 42 75 220

Gadamer Hans-Georg 73ndash4 146 156ndash61 163 226 249

Galtung Johan 43 45 53 81gender 4ndash5 36 170 173 229 237 245GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) see Sri

Lankagroupthink 39

Habermas Juumlrgen 86 90 125 146 149ndash56 163 225ndash7 250

habitus 122Hamas 166ndash7 169ndash70 175ndash8 186 190ndash1

193 199 202hegemony 96 178 183 209 211 215

225 245hermeneutics 74 76 157ndash61 249Hinduism 78history deep 190Hitler Adolf 196 221ndash2holocaust denial 79horizons fusion of 73ndash4 76 82 161ndash3

Index 269

166 207 226human conflict 5ndash6 15 33 40 53 65

225 240 245 248human difference 5 15 225ndash6 229 232hypocrisy 38 163 236 241

identity and conflict resolution 70 208 decentring 74 national 2 144 172 183ndash4 partisan 150 polarized 44

ideological commitment 56ideological conflicts 231ndash2 241ndash2ideology 29ndash30 36ndash8 91 102 123 136

147 214 238India 63ndash5 120 182 241ndash2 244indignation 50 126 138 141inequalities 30 36 53 102 123 208 216

228 244 246informal logic see informal reasoning

analysisinformal reasoning analysis 19 22ndash5 31

96 98ndash9 112 127ndash8inter-state conflicts see international

conflictinternational conflict 39 46 61 66 241international relations theory 33 36ndash7Internet 246ndash7interpretations disputed 34 35intersubjectivity 20 89 150 155ndash6 225intertextuality 31intractable conflicts consequences of 1intransigence 9 40 61 116 137 139Iraq Body Count 34Ireland see Northern Irelandirony 74ndash5 78 114 249Irving David 79Islam 75ndash6 78 84 102 106 115 123ndash4

162ndash3 166 220 231 235ndash6Israeli discourses see discourses IsraeliIsraeli-Palestinian conflict clash of

discourses in 17ndash18 current initiatives in 169 dialogue in 208 and discourse analysis 30ndash1 essence of 119ndash20 extremists and moderates in 193 195 future stories for 184 lessons from Northern Ireland 212 and Levinas 228ndash9 linguistic intractability of 238 narratives in 1ndash3 133ndash41 and needs theory 67ndash8 and prisonerrsquos dilemma 55 and problem-solving approaches 86 radical disagreement in 106ndash7 167 196ndash7 199 and SED 167 176 189 192 199ndash201 third parties in 105 134 141ndash3 166ndash7 197ndash8 198ndash9 in TRANSCEND methodology 81

Jabri Vivienne 81 86ndash91Jerusalem 3 7 67ndash9 120 185ndash6 189

191 198 201jihadism 193 219ndash20Judaism 78 123 183July 7 2005 79justice restorative 58justification ratinoal and pragmatic 25

Kahane Adam 82 204 209Kashmir 7 34 65Kosovo 7 47 57 133 143ndash6 149 195

214 217 227Kurdistan Workersrsquo Party (PKK) 212ndash13

232

language of argument 22 and conflict 15 and gender 4 and misunderstanding 107ndash8 and modes of thought 52ndash3 relationship to reality 27 29 31 of war 87

Levinas Emmanuel 228liberalism 10 80 229ndash30 246lifeworlds 122 151ndash2 156logic binary 82 85LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)

83 216 219

Mandela Nelson 142 211media 30 34 36 79 91 188 229 234mediation 57ndash9 82 102 211mental models 46ndash7 84 109 247Mertus Julie 143ndash6 148ndash9metalanguage 148ndash9Middle East conflict complex in 104ndash5

holocaust denial in 79misperception 39 44misunderstanding 2 12 22 57ndash8 60 105

107ndash9 124 144ndash5 158 160ndash1 196 210

Mouffe Chantal 231ndash2Muslims see Islammyths 90 143 145 148ndash9 221 238

Nagarjuna 84narratives as motivational tools 134needs theory 66ndash8 67negotiation comparative studies of 58

interest-based 58 61ndash4neo-realism 39neutrality 229Nietzsche Friedrich 33 42ndash3 147 164non-violence 5 53 73 77 86 168 195

211ndash12 217 232

270 Index

Northern Ireland 7 18 34ndash5 40 75 133 200 208ndash9 211ndash12 231

objectivity 66Oslo Accords 86out-groups 5ndash6overlay problems 210

Pakistan 64ndash5 120 220 242Palestine Strategy Group (PSG) 17ndash18

170 180Palestinian discourse see discourses

Palestinianparadox 83 212 230Parekh Bikhu 75 78 102PKK see Kurdistan Workers Partypluralism 220 229 232ndash3political conflicts intractable 47 93 107

117 178 194 199 212 226ndash7 247positionality 30 50post-structuralism 27 225 229 238ndash9power asymmetry 89 137 149 218

discursive 100 faces of 180pragmatics 20 100prejudices 53 58 74ndash5 90 157ndash60 207prisonerrsquos dilemma 54ndash6problem solving and conflict 5 interactive

57 65 and needs theory 66 68 workshops 67 72 86 103

projection 8 26 44 70pseudo-communication 69public space 88ndash9

radical disagreement acknowledgement of 106 and alternative dispute resolution 58ndash61 analysis 19 21 30 98ndash9 authorsrsquo reactions to 250ndash2 in Barthes 149 between philosophies 227 and complexity 247 and conflict analysis 23ndash8 35 40 51 91 104 and conflict attitude 44ndash5 and conflict resolution 52 68ndash74 91 103 127 and conflict settlement 210ndash11 and conflict theory 40ndash3 and conflict transformation 213 and conversation 19ndash20 and critical language study 102 critiques of 216ndash17 237ndash9 and data collection 34 and democracy 229ndash32 and destructive conflict 53ndash4 57 and dialogue 78ndash83 93ndash4 165 206 and discourse analysis 225 in economic conflicts 243 and emotion 126 and empathy 75 fact and value in 125ndash6 form and content in 127ndash8 in Foucault 147 and fusion of

horizons 163 future of 240ndash1 243ndash4 in Gadamer 157 159ndash61 and gender 4ndash5 in Habermas 149 151 155ndash6 hexagon of 192ndash4 192 203 and human difference 229 247ndash8 identification of 99 and identity 242 and ideology 30 in inter-state conflict 241ndash2 internal economy of 58 169 in Jabri 88ndash91 limits to 2 5ndash6 and linguistic intractability 2ndash3 28ndash9 31ndash2 37 119ndash21 140 management of 165 194 205ndash6 213 215 227 mapping of 104ndash6 109ndash10 in Marxism 36ndash7 and the media 234ndash6 and mental models 46ndash7 50 in Mertus 145ndash6 and meta-ethics 233ndash4 models of 163ndash4 226 moments of 110ndash18 125ndash6 131ndash2 182 227 and narrative 135ndash9 and negotiation 61ndash5 non-violent 195 notation for 129ndash30 political 6 8 17ndash18 47 107 122ndash3 143 in post-conflict environment 214ndash15 prerequisites of 105ndash6 109ndash10 and problem-solving 65ndash6 and psychotherapeutic concepts 70ndash1 and realism 38ndash9 reality and perspective in 126ndash7 as relation 84 religious 123ndash5 reporting of 229 and SED 193 202 and sincerity 4 study of 96 subject and object in 130ndash1 third-party descriptions of 121 130 133ndash4 141 165

radical gender critique 4ndash5 237rationalization 5realism 33 36ndash8 88 179 237ndash8 241 246reality versions of 26reconstruction post-conflict 205 211

214ndash15religious belief 8ndash13 90religious ethics 75ndash8rhetorical ploys 23 25ndash8Rothman Jay 67ndash8 86

Said Edward 30 86Sartre Jean-Paul 217secessionist conflict 214 231ndash2 241ndash2secondary conflicts 44self-criticism 137 152self-distance 74 249self-reference 182semantics 30 100September 11 2001 75 80 221Sharia 162ndash3 220 231 236Sikhs 63ndash4silence of the oppressed 93 216ndash17 219

Index 271

sincerity 4 9 113 135 154SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute) 34 231social change 53 71 73 207social psychology 26ndash7 46 53social worlds 152South Africa 209 211speech acts 2 20 96 125 150ndash1 153speech situation ideal 87 153 166Sri Lanka 18 34 48 57 83ndash5 85 214

219Stalin Josef 4 221strategic engagement of discourses (SED)

and communication 247 and conflict management 202ndash3 ends and means in 181 inter-party 179ndash80 192 194 200ndash1 internal dimension of 177ndash8 193 201ndash2 levels of 168ndash9 limits of 216ndash18 and power 180 and radical disagreement 182 193 205 213 third-party dimension 197 199ndash200 and transformation 165ndash6

strategic thinking 168 170 175ndash81 192 194 201 203

structuralism 39subjective worlds 125ndash7 129 151ndash5subjectivism 142ndash3 161subjectivity 66 69 90 115 120ndash1 124

139 147 152ndash3superordinate goals 56symmetric conflicts 43sympathy 74ndash5systemic complexity 45ndash6

terrorism 75 121 187 219ndash20 242tetralemma 84ndash5 85textual analysis 30 100Thatcher Margaret 99 101ndash2 122ndash3thetic linguistic order see radical gender

critique

third-party interventions 50 58 133 142 165ndash6 169 197 199ndash202 205

Thucydides 37ndash8TRANSCEND method 81ndash2transformationism see conflict

transformationtruth claims 5 96 147 154 160

competing 145ndash7 conditions 98 in constructionism 28 non-factual 144ndash5 and validity 23ndash4 25 98

turning points 211

undefeated conflict parties 165ndash6 201 210ndash11 213ndash14 229 231

universalism 82unseen powers 70ndash1

validity 23ndash4 in agonistic dialogue 98 assessment of 22 24 claims 89 125ndash6 149ndash55 163

values conflicts of 232 Western 245Vietnam 62violence anthropological perspectives

on 41ndash3 and conflict behaviour 44 cultural 52ndash3 206 213 218ndash19 and disagreement 147 effectiveness of 217ndash19 intrinsic 5 in Israeli-Palestinian conflict 200 and losendashlose outcomes 57 prevention of 213ndash14 and radical disagreement 194ndash5 structural 52ndash3 218

visual fields 129 131Volkan Vamik 70ndash1

Waltz Kenneth 39Weinberger Caspar 96ndash9 97 108 127ndash8

zero-sum games 54 61 67 81 144Zionism 62ndash3 119 135ndash7 139ndash40 183

190 195 202

Transforming Violent Conflict

This book investigates intractable conflicts and their main verbal manifestation ndash radical disagreement ndash and it explores what can be done in the communicative sphere when conflict resolution fails

Conflict resolution sees radical disagreement as a terminus to dialogue that must be overcome from the outset not learnt from The book argues that on the contrary radical disagreement ndash agonistic dialogue ndash is the key to linguistic intractability When dialogue for mutual understanding proves premature it is agonistic dialogue that needs to be acknowledged explored understood and man-aged through a strategic engagement of discourses This is illustrated through the Israeli-Palestinian conflict It begins not with exchanges between conflict parties but with inclusive strategic dialogue within them This approach challenges some of the basic assumptions in the fields of discourse analysis conflict analysis and conflict resolution and opens up new possibilities for discursive engagement It also has wider implications for cognate disciplines such as applied ethics demo-cratic theory cultural studies and the philosophy of difference

This book will be of great interest to students of conflict resolution peace and conflict studies ethnic conflict security studies and international relations as well as to practitioners and analysts

Oliver Ramsbotham is Emeritus Professor of Conflict Resolution at the University of Bradford UK Chair of the Oxford Research Group President of the Conflict Research Society and co-author of Contemporary Conflict Resolution











Oliver Ramsbotham















Contents



PART I





PART II







PART III






Figures and boxes

Figures



Boxes




x Figures and boxes



Preface





xii Preface







conflict




Preface xiii






2 Prologue






Prologue 3








4 Prologue





The gender question



Prologue 5







6 Prologue











Prologue 7







(Nicolic 2003 54)








8 Prologue









A family quarrel




Prologue 9










10 Prologue






B


A



Prologue 11



B



A



12 Prologue



B



A



Prologue 13


Part I































(1984 27)



(1977 299)


























(Ibid 12)











Argument (1)


Therefore


Argument (2)


20067

Therefore














(Rouhana 2006 133)






(Potter 1996 5)














(Burr 1995 58)







In short


(Burr 1995 81)



















(1986 95)







Conclusion






Notes



















1 Britain v Ireland








Contextual

Relational

Contextual

Conflict

Party A

Conflict

Party B

Internal Internal







(2000 7)





(Macdonell 1986 7)
















(1948 83ndash4)












(Waltz 1979 112)




(Howard 1984 22)










(Ross 1993 9)






(1997 252)












(Rose and Rose 2001 3 125 8)













contradiction

attitude behaviour


































R

elat

ive

depr

ivat

ion

Sec

essi

onis

tac

tion

Str

engt

h of

mili

tant

mov

emen

t (LT

TE

) +

mili

taris

atio

nab

solu

te c

ontr

ol

Ben

efits

and

defic

its o

f war

econ

omy

Dia

spor

a fu

ndin

g+

sup

port

Vio

lent

con

flict

inte

nsity

los

s of

lives

etc

Em

battl

edlsquom

inor

ityrsquo

(Fea

r di

stru

st r

esen

tmen

t)+

Asy

mm

etry

Mus

lim te

nsio

nw

ith L

TT

ELe

ader

ship

gove

rnan

ce +

part

y fo

rms

Den

ial o

fTa

mil

iden

tity

Lim

ited

acce

ss fo

r Tam

ils(e

duca

tion

pub

lic s

ervi

ce

deve

lopm

ent f

unds

etc

)

Mus

lim s

trug

gle

for

influ

ence

inG

OS

L

Eco

nom

icpe

rfor

man

ce(N

+ E

)

Dis

enfr

anch

isem

ent o

fot

her

min

oriti

es

Maj

orita

rian

polit

ics

+

stru

ctur

es

Sys

tem

icex

clus

ion

mar

gina

lisat

ion

+In

adeq

uate

in

equi

tabl

ede

velo

pmen

tsc

hem

es+

Cen

tral

isat

ion

of p

ower

and

adm

inis

trat

ion

Eco

nom

icpe

rfor

man

ce(S

+ W

)

Rel

ativ

ede

priv

atio

n

ldquoGre

atra

cerdquo

imag

e

Div

ide

+ r

ule

colo

nial

pol

icie

sS

tren

gth

ofm

ilita

nt m

ovem

ents

Eco

nom

icpe

rfor

man

ce

Ben

efits

and

defic

its o

f war

econ

omy

Mili

taris

atio

n

Em

battl

ed lsquom

inor

ityrsquo

(Fea

r di

stru

st r

esen

tmen

t)

Feu

dal m

inds

et

patr

onag

e d

ynas

ticpo

litic

s d

rive

for

pow

er

App

eals

to e

thni

city

+re

ligio

n fo

r vo

tes

sup

port

(nat

iona

lism

ext

rem

ism

)

Dis

enfr

anch

ised

maj

ority

(cas

te +

cla

ssfa

ctor

s)

Ext

erna

l fac

tors

Indi

a

Inte

rnat

iona

lco

mm

unity

C

C( R)

( R)

R

R

R

RR

R

R

R

R

R

R

CC

C

= d

elay

= c

ount

erac

ting

= r

einf

orci

ng=

bull T

amils

=

min

ority

with

in

Sri

Lank

a

bull S

inha

lese

=

min

ority

in

reg

ion

RC

Fig

ure

23

Con

flic

t in

Sri

Lan

ka a

sys

tem

s pe

rspe

ctiv

e

Sou

rce

Rop

ers

2008

26ndash

7

Fig

ure

24

Und

erst

andi

ng th

e B

urun

di c

onfl

ict

a s

yste

ms

pers

pect

ive

Sou

rce

Woo

drow

200

6 8

ndash a

par

tici

pato

ry w

orks

hop

prod

uct

=

tim

e de

lay

=

men

tal m

ode

Fact

ors

in B

old

con

side

red

maj

or d

rivin

g fo

rces

Reg

ions

of B

urun

di

imba

lanc

e of

influ

ence

Inse

curit

y of

the

maj

ority

Vio

lenc

e

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are

the

maj

ority

W

ede

serv

em

ore

Pea

ceke

epin

gP

eace

acco

rd

Inte

rnat

iona

lin

terv

entio

nD

iffic

ulty

in c

omin

gto

an

acco

rd

Pol

itica

lin

stab

ility

Ove

rall

leve

lof

res

ourc

esS

tren

gth

of th

ena

tiona

l eco

nom

y We

mus

tto

pro

tect

wha

t we

have

Bad

gov

ern

ace

Eth

nic

man

ipu

lati

on

Co

mp

etit

ion

for

po

wer

Res

ou

rces

of

the

maj

ori

ty

Po

wer

of

the

Elit

eC

lass

vs

th

e M

ajo

rity

Reg

ion

ald

ynam

ics

Res

ou

rces

of

the

elit

e cl

ass

Imp

un

ity

Imp

un

ity












Conclusion














(2000 28)





Par

ty X

gai

ns

Party Y gains












(22)

(30)

(03)

(11)

Cooperate

Prisoner B

Prisoner A


Cooperate

Defect

Defect
















(Ibid 32 35)
















(Ibid 10)




(Ibid 76)







(Ibid 100ndash1)










(Ibid 123)


























(Ibid 20 28)






(Ibid 27ndash8)





(1994 39)








(Ibid 36)

























(Burton 1997 xv)



(Burton 1997 38)








(Rothman 1992 19)



(Ibid)



Party A Party B

Positions

Interestsvalues


sharedinterests

values

A B






(Ibid 31)



(Ibid 170)





(Ibid 170)



(Ibid 171)




(Ibid 175)






















(Dukes 1996 1)



(Ibid 7)








(Dukes 1996 69)


(Ibid 130)





(Fisher 1997 121)








(Ibid 10)







(Gadamer 1975 272)




(Broome 1993 104)












(Fitzduff 1989)






(Parekh 2002 274)





(Parekh 2002 276)










womenrsquo










(Ibid 608)



















(Ibid)





















(Galtung 2004 13)




(Ibid 38)



(Ibid 57)



(Ibid 80)

















(Ropers 2008 17)
















(Ropers 2008 17)
















(Said 1995 37)






(Rothman 1992 72)








(Jabri 1996 155)








(Ibid 133)




(Jabri 1996 140)



(Ibid 163)





(Ibid 158ndash9)



(Ibid 177)



(Ibid 161ndash3)





(Jabri 1996 165)




(Ibid 166ndash7)



(Ibid 167)







Conclusion



Notes






Part II









Note


















Methodology 97






10 + 11

1 +

C (main conclusion)

2

12 + 13 + 14

8 + 9 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7

15











Methodology 99

















Methodology 101








(Ibid 192)



(Ibid 176)











Methodology 103




















Methodology 105























Methodology 107
















Note
















Phenomenology 111




























Phenomenology 113



















Phenomenology 115




(Roth-Cline 2004)

















Phenomenology 117





















Phenomenology 119




















Phenomenology 121






















Phenomenology 123







(Williams 2004)




(1997 17)





Phenomenology 125














Phenomenology 127


















Phenomenology 129



p not-p




















Phenomenology 131










Conclusion






















Epistemology 135












(Rouhana 2006 118)




(Ibid 116)




Epistemology 137


(Ibid 127)




(Rouhana 2006 128)






(Ibid 127)




(Ibid 125)







(Bar-On 2006 154)


Epistemology 139



(Ibid 148)




(Rouhana 2006 133)












Epistemology 141














(Ross 2004 767 756ndash7)




(Pressman 2003 5)



Epistemology 143


(Ibid 23)





(Mertus 1999 5)










(Mertus 1999 2)

In other words


(Ibid 9ndash10)






(Ibid 10)


Epistemology 145


(Ibid 10)














(Mertus 1999 4)




Michel Foucault




Epistemology 147









Roland Barthes



(Barthes19571993 149)



(Barthes 19571993 143)


Epistemology 149









(Ibid 2)





(Ibid 128)



(Ibid 73ndash4)




Epistemology 151




(Habermas 1981a 70)




(Ibid 308)










(Ibid 135ndash6)



(Ibid 74ndash5)



Epistemology 153


(Ibid 69)



(Habermas 1981a 69)






(Habermas 1981b 67)







(Ibid 117)



Epistemology 155



(Ibid 100)





(Ibid 288)
















Epistemology 157


(Warnke 1987 174)










(Ibid 272)




(Ibid 324)






(Gadamer 1975 425)



(Ibid 266)

Epistemology 159





(Ibid 354)



(Gadamer 1975 356)








(Gadamer 1975 345)





Epistemology 161




(Arnswald 2002 35)












(Taylor 2002 287)




(Abu Musab 2003)

Epistemology 163




Conclusion





















Praxis 167
















Praxis 169















Praxis 171






















Praxis 173
















Praxis 175







Scenario











Scenario








medium









(Klug 2008 3)



Praxis 177


















Praxis 179





















Praxis 181



















Praxis 183











(Ibid)











Praxis 185

















Praxis 187









peace


















Praxis 189

















Praxis 191















Party A Party B

Extremists

Moderates

Extremists

Moderates

Axis 1

Axis 2 Axis 3

Axis 6

Axis 4 Axis 5

Praxis 193
















Praxis 195



(King 19921963 533ndash4)












(Mourad 2004 2)




Praxis 197


(Mourad 2004 76 80)
























Praxis 199



Level three






Level two






Praxis 201




Level one










Praxis 203









Notes
















Conflict settlement


Conflict settlement









Re-entry 207




(Bohm 1996 22)







(Ibid 60)







Re-entry 209


(Davey 1993 135)











Re-entry 211
















Re-entry 213





















Re-entry 215




Difficult questions














Re-entry 217


Does violence work



Is violence right




(Fanon 1961 28)
















Re-entry 219



(Richmond 2008 147)










Re-entry 221


(Slim 2005 23)










Note


Part III









(Habermas 1992 140)













(Kelly 1995 139)













(Derrida 1994 85)






















(Larmore 1987 60)










(Ibid 140)












(Hinman 2003 57)











(Hinman 2003 57)




















































(Barker 2003 7 31 33 34 54 85)










Note












Interstate conflict











Economic conflict




(Collier 2000 110)



(Collier 1999 1)



(Collier 2001 159)








Economic inequality








The environment



Gender oppression





Weapons development



Conclusion














(19601986 579)




250 Epilogue


(19662004 xxi)




(19921996 447)





Epilogue 251









Theworld

252 Epilogue




Glossary









254 Glossary










References


















256 References






















References 257






















258 References






















University Press

References 259






















260 References






















References 261




















Oxford OUP

262 References



















References 263





















Brasseyrsquos

264 References






















References 265





















266 References




















Index







168ndash9 175 205












268 Index



















216 236




Lankagroupthink 39



193 199 202hegemony 96 178 183 209 211 215


Index 269
















232



83 216 219







211ndash12 217 232

270 Index















Index 271









critique





turning points 211









190 195 202











Oliver Ramsbotham















Contents



PART I





PART II







PART III






Figures and boxes

Figures



Boxes




x Figures and boxes



Preface





xii Preface







conflict




Preface xiii






2 Prologue






Prologue 3








4 Prologue





The gender question



Prologue 5







6 Prologue











Prologue 7







(Nicolic 2003 54)








8 Prologue









A family quarrel




Prologue 9










10 Prologue






B


A



Prologue 11



B



A



12 Prologue



B



A



Prologue 13


Part I































(1984 27)



(1977 299)


























(Ibid 12)











Argument (1)


Therefore


Argument (2)


20067

Therefore














(Rouhana 2006 133)






(Potter 1996 5)














(Burr 1995 58)







In short


(Burr 1995 81)



















(1986 95)







Conclusion






Notes



















1 Britain v Ireland








Contextual

Relational

Contextual

Conflict

Party A

Conflict

Party B

Internal Internal







(2000 7)





(Macdonell 1986 7)
















(1948 83ndash4)












(Waltz 1979 112)




(Howard 1984 22)










(Ross 1993 9)






(1997 252)












(Rose and Rose 2001 3 125 8)













contradiction

attitude behaviour


































R

elat

ive

depr

ivat

ion

Sec

essi

onis

tac

tion

Str

engt

h of

mili

tant

mov

emen

t (LT

TE

) +

mili

taris

atio

nab

solu

te c

ontr

ol

Ben

efits

and

defic

its o

f war

econ

omy

Dia

spor

a fu

ndin

g+

sup

port

Vio

lent

con

flict

inte

nsity

los

s of

lives

etc

Em

battl

edlsquom

inor

ityrsquo

(Fea

r di

stru

st r

esen

tmen

t)+

Asy

mm

etry

Mus

lim te

nsio

nw

ith L

TT

ELe

ader

ship

gove

rnan

ce +

part

y fo

rms

Den

ial o

fTa

mil

iden

tity

Lim

ited

acce

ss fo

r Tam

ils(e

duca

tion

pub

lic s

ervi

ce

deve

lopm

ent f

unds

etc

)

Mus

lim s

trug

gle

for

influ

ence

inG

OS

L

Eco

nom

icpe

rfor

man

ce(N

+ E

)

Dis

enfr

anch

isem

ent o

fot

her

min

oriti

es

Maj

orita

rian

polit

ics

+

stru

ctur

es

Sys

tem

icex

clus

ion

mar

gina

lisat

ion

+In

adeq

uate

in

equi

tabl

ede

velo

pmen

tsc

hem

es+

Cen

tral

isat

ion

of p

ower

and

adm

inis

trat

ion

Eco

nom

icpe

rfor

man

ce(S

+ W

)

Rel

ativ

ede

priv

atio

n

ldquoGre

atra

cerdquo

imag

e

Div

ide

+ r

ule

colo

nial

pol

icie

sS

tren

gth

ofm

ilita

nt m

ovem

ents

Eco

nom

icpe

rfor

man

ce

Ben

efits

and

defic

its o

f war

econ

omy

Mili

taris

atio

n

Em

battl

ed lsquom

inor

ityrsquo

(Fea

r di

stru

st r

esen

tmen

t)

Feu

dal m

inds

et

patr

onag

e d

ynas

ticpo

litic

s d

rive

for

pow

er

App

eals

to e

thni

city

+re

ligio

n fo

r vo

tes

sup

port

(nat

iona

lism

ext

rem

ism

)

Dis

enfr

anch

ised

maj

ority

(cas

te +

cla

ssfa

ctor

s)

Ext

erna

l fac

tors

Indi

a

Inte

rnat

iona

lco

mm

unity

C

C( R)

( R)

R

R

R

RR

R

R

R

R

R

R

CC

C

= d

elay

= c

ount

erac

ting

= r

einf

orci

ng=

bull T

amils

=

min

ority

with

in

Sri

Lank

a

bull S

inha

lese

=

min

ority

in

reg

ion

RC

Fig

ure

23

Con

flic

t in

Sri

Lan

ka a

sys

tem

s pe

rspe

ctiv

e

Sou

rce

Rop

ers

2008

26ndash

7

Fig

ure

24

Und

erst

andi

ng th

e B

urun

di c

onfl

ict

a s

yste

ms

pers

pect

ive

Sou

rce

Woo

drow

200

6 8

ndash a

par

tici

pato

ry w

orks

hop

prod

uct

=

tim

e de

lay

=

men

tal m

ode

Fact

ors

in B

old

con

side

red

maj

or d

rivin

g fo

rces

Reg

ions

of B

urun

di

imba

lanc

e of

influ

ence

Inse

curit

y of

the

maj

ority

Vio

lenc

e

We

are

the

maj

ority

W

ede

serv

em

ore

Pea

ceke

epin

gP

eace

acco

rd

Inte

rnat

iona

lin

terv

entio

nD

iffic

ulty

in c

omin

gto

an

acco

rd

Pol

itica

lin

stab

ility

Ove

rall

leve

lof

res

ourc

esS

tren

gth

of th

ena

tiona

l eco

nom

y We

mus

tto

pro

tect

wha

t we

have

Bad

gov

ern

ace

Eth

nic

man

ipu

lati

on

Co

mp

etit

ion

for

po

wer

Res

ou

rces

of

the

maj

ori

ty

Po

wer

of

the

Elit

eC

lass

vs

th

e M

ajo

rity

Reg

ion

ald

ynam

ics

Res

ou

rces

of

the

elit

e cl

ass

Imp

un

ity

Imp

un

ity












Conclusion














(2000 28)





Par

ty X

gai

ns

Party Y gains












(22)

(30)

(03)

(11)

Cooperate

Prisoner B

Prisoner A


Cooperate

Defect

Defect
















(Ibid 32 35)
















(Ibid 10)




(Ibid 76)







(Ibid 100ndash1)










(Ibid 123)


























(Ibid 20 28)






(Ibid 27ndash8)





(1994 39)








(Ibid 36)

























(Burton 1997 xv)



(Burton 1997 38)








(Rothman 1992 19)



(Ibid)



Party A Party B

Positions

Interestsvalues


sharedinterests

values

A B






(Ibid 31)



(Ibid 170)





(Ibid 170)



(Ibid 171)




(Ibid 175)






















(Dukes 1996 1)



(Ibid 7)








(Dukes 1996 69)


(Ibid 130)





(Fisher 1997 121)








(Ibid 10)







(Gadamer 1975 272)




(Broome 1993 104)












(Fitzduff 1989)






(Parekh 2002 274)





(Parekh 2002 276)










womenrsquo










(Ibid 608)



















(Ibid)





















(Galtung 2004 13)




(Ibid 38)



(Ibid 57)



(Ibid 80)

















(Ropers 2008 17)
















(Ropers 2008 17)
















(Said 1995 37)






(Rothman 1992 72)








(Jabri 1996 155)








(Ibid 133)




(Jabri 1996 140)



(Ibid 163)





(Ibid 158ndash9)



(Ibid 177)



(Ibid 161ndash3)





(Jabri 1996 165)




(Ibid 166ndash7)



(Ibid 167)







Conclusion



Notes






Part II









Note


















Methodology 97






10 + 11

1 +

C (main conclusion)

2

12 + 13 + 14

8 + 9 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7

15











Methodology 99

















Methodology 101








(Ibid 192)



(Ibid 176)











Methodology 103




















Methodology 105























Methodology 107
















Note
















Phenomenology 111




























Phenomenology 113



















Phenomenology 115




(Roth-Cline 2004)

















Phenomenology 117





















Phenomenology 119




















Phenomenology 121






















Phenomenology 123







(Williams 2004)




(1997 17)





Phenomenology 125














Phenomenology 127


















Phenomenology 129



p not-p




















Phenomenology 131










Conclusion






















Epistemology 135












(Rouhana 2006 118)




(Ibid 116)




Epistemology 137


(Ibid 127)




(Rouhana 2006 128)






(Ibid 127)




(Ibid 125)







(Bar-On 2006 154)


Epistemology 139



(Ibid 148)




(Rouhana 2006 133)












Epistemology 141














(Ross 2004 767 756ndash7)




(Pressman 2003 5)



Epistemology 143


(Ibid 23)





(Mertus 1999 5)










(Mertus 1999 2)

In other words


(Ibid 9ndash10)






(Ibid 10)


Epistemology 145


(Ibid 10)














(Mertus 1999 4)




Michel Foucault




Epistemology 147









Roland Barthes



(Barthes19571993 149)



(Barthes 19571993 143)


Epistemology 149









(Ibid 2)





(Ibid 128)



(Ibid 73ndash4)




Epistemology 151




(Habermas 1981a 70)




(Ibid 308)










(Ibid 135ndash6)



(Ibid 74ndash5)



Epistemology 153


(Ibid 69)



(Habermas 1981a 69)






(Habermas 1981b 67)







(Ibid 117)



Epistemology 155



(Ibid 100)





(Ibid 288)
















Epistemology 157


(Warnke 1987 174)










(Ibid 272)




(Ibid 324)






(Gadamer 1975 425)



(Ibid 266)

Epistemology 159





(Ibid 354)



(Gadamer 1975 356)








(Gadamer 1975 345)





Epistemology 161




(Arnswald 2002 35)












(Taylor 2002 287)




(Abu Musab 2003)

Epistemology 163




Conclusion





















Praxis 167
















Praxis 169















Praxis 171






















Praxis 173
















Praxis 175







Scenario











Scenario








medium









(Klug 2008 3)



Praxis 177


















Praxis 179





















Praxis 181



















Praxis 183











(Ibid)











Praxis 185

















Praxis 187









peace


















Praxis 189

















Praxis 191















Party A Party B

Extremists

Moderates

Extremists

Moderates

Axis 1

Axis 2 Axis 3

Axis 6

Axis 4 Axis 5

Praxis 193
















Praxis 195



(King 19921963 533ndash4)












(Mourad 2004 2)




Praxis 197


(Mourad 2004 76 80)
























Praxis 199



Level three






Level two






Praxis 201




Level one










Praxis 203









Notes
















Conflict settlement


Conflict settlement









Re-entry 207




(Bohm 1996 22)







(Ibid 60)







Re-entry 209


(Davey 1993 135)











Re-entry 211
















Re-entry 213





















Re-entry 215




Difficult questions














Re-entry 217


Does violence work



Is violence right




(Fanon 1961 28)
















Re-entry 219



(Richmond 2008 147)










Re-entry 221


(Slim 2005 23)










Note


Part III









(Habermas 1992 140)













(Kelly 1995 139)













(Derrida 1994 85)






















(Larmore 1987 60)










(Ibid 140)












(Hinman 2003 57)











(Hinman 2003 57)




















































(Barker 2003 7 31 33 34 54 85)










Note












Interstate conflict











Economic conflict




(Collier 2000 110)



(Collier 1999 1)



(Collier 2001 159)








Economic inequality








The environment



Gender oppression





Weapons development



Conclusion














(19601986 579)




250 Epilogue


(19662004 xxi)




(19921996 447)





Epilogue 251









Theworld

252 Epilogue




Glossary









254 Glossary










References


















256 References






















References 257






















258 References






















University Press

References 259






















260 References






















References 261




















Oxford OUP

262 References



















References 263





















Brasseyrsquos

264 References






















References 265





















266 References




















Index







168ndash9 175 205












268 Index



















216 236




Lankagroupthink 39



193 199 202hegemony 96 178 183 209 211 215


Index 269
















232



83 216 219







211ndash12 217 232

270 Index















Index 271









critique





turning points 211









190 195 202