tradition and transformation: democracy and the politics of popular power in ghana by maxwell owusu

Tradition and Transformation: Democracy and the Politics of Popular Power in GhanaAuthor(s): Maxwell OwusuSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), pp. 307-343Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162035Accessed: 08/03/2009 12:45

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with thescholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform thatpromotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to TheJournal of Modern African Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/stable/162035?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup

The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34, 2 (I996), pp. 307-343 Copyright C I996 Cambridge University Press

Tradition and Transformation: Democracy and the Politics of

Popular Power in Ghana

by MAXWELL OWUSU*

IN April I992, after nearly i i years of military rule in Ghana, a draft democratic constitution of the Fourth Republic was overwhelmingly approved in a national referendum.' The ban on multi-party politics was lifted by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) Government in the following month. An independent interim National Electoral Commission was established, and a hotly contested presidential election in 200 constituencies monitored by teams of international observers was held in November I992. After multi-party parliamentary elections to the National Assembly, boycotted unfortunately by opposition groups, the democratically elected Government of Ghana's Fourth Republic was inaugurated in January I993.2

This is not the place for a critical and comprehensive account of the PNDC regime, which would need to analyse a variety of setbacks and achievements, albeit in more detail and at greater length than is feasible here.3 This article focuses on an important aspect of the 3Ist December i 98I revolution: namely, the place of 'tradition' and 'traditionalism', which is generally neglected or not paid the close and systematic attention that it deserves, but without which much of what has been written about the revolution and the transition from military rule to constitutional democracy cannot be fully appreciated.

* Professor of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 1 Maxwell Owusu, 'Democracy and Africa - a View from the Village', in The Journal of Modern

African Studies (Cambridge), 30, 3, September 1992, pp. 369-96. 2 Richard Jeifries and Clare Thomas, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1992', in African Affairs

(London), 92, 368, July 1993, pp. 33i-66. 3 See, for example, E. Gyimah-Boadi (ed.), Ghana Under PNDC Rule (Dakar, I993), and

Maxwell Owusu, 'Government and Politics', in L. Berry (ed.), Ghana: a country study (Washington, DC, I 995). Also, Victoria Brittain, 'Ghana's Precarious Revolution', in New Left Review (London), 140, July-August I983, pp. 5o-6i; Baffour Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana, 1982-6: the politics of the P.N.D.C.', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 4, December I987, pp. 6I3-42; and James C. W. Ahiakpor, 'Rawlings, Economic Policy Reform, and the Poor: consistency or betrayal?', in ibid. 29, 4, December 1991, pp. 583-600.

308 MAXWELL OWUSU

TRADITION AS REVOLUTION

I would contend that ' tradition', notably 'chieftaincy' and the values and ideals embodied in that institution, influenced popular reaction to the rhetoric of the PNDC revolution, to the point of controlling its major themes - social justice, public accountability, probity, and people power. The focus on Ghana's cultural and political heritage is meant to correct and provide context for interpretations of the revolution based on assumptions about the politics of ideology, either of the 'left' or of the ' right', thus underestimating the pervasive influence of 'tradition' and 'traditionalism '.' The latter is a powerful force in Ghanaian politics, and should be the starting point of any serious analysis, especially of a revolution that aimed to empower the great mass of citizens from the grassroots up - farmers, fishermen, soldiers, workers, rich and poor -and unite them around the core values of discipline, service to the community, patriotism, and participatory democracy.

The revolution was intended to unite not divide Ghanaians. It was to give effective political representation to the average man and woman whose interests were frequently misrepresented or unrep- resented, even abused by corrupt soldiers and multi-party politicians. From the available evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that PNDC 'populism' revived a process of genuine democratic change, with roots deep in Ghanaian history, which was thus more endogenous and less radical than originally conceived by the regime's 'leftist' friends, but clearly better adapted to local culture and -circumstances. The piece de resistance of this project was, of course, decentralization embodied in a new system of local government based on freely elected non-partisan district assemblies.

The notable democratic vision which led to the formation of Peoples Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers Defence Committees (WDCs) as the bedrock of 'people power' was quickly undermined by their rash and cynical campaign of unprovoked attacks against so- called 'enemies of the revolution'. The beatings, fines, extortions, and detentions of so many innocent citizens, including elders, threatened the acceptance of the revolution by the general public which considered PDC/WDC atrocities as un-Ghanaian and clearly undemocratic.

Again, instead of fostering true representation of all the people, crucial to every modern democratic aspiration and experience, the

4 For example, Donald I. Ray, Ghana: politics, economics and society (London and Boulder, i 986).

TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION IN GHANA 309

PDCs/WDCs were in danger of fast becoming an exercise in exclusion, rather than inclusion as originally proclaimed by Jerry Rawlings. The decision taken by the PNDC in late I984 that they should be abolished and replaced with Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) was a timely and courageous recognition of the serious threat to the struggle for true democracy posed by the PDCs/WDCs as then constituted.

The preamble to the i986 CDR Guidelines stated explicitly that the effective functioning of the new committees was 'crucial to the advancement of the Revolution', and that required 'a tolerant attitude to all groups of the society that could be part of the process without compromising our revolutionary principles, aims and objectives'. Membership was open to all citizens of Ghana who were prepared to uphold and defend the basic objectives of the national democratic revolution. Indeed, 'the totality of the membership of a community or work-place are eligible for CDR membership', except for (i) those 'who opt out because they do not wish to participate', and (ii) 'those who are rejected by the majority as lacking integrity, patriotism and genuine concern for their countrymen and women'.5

Dismantling the Third Republic

Following a successful coup d 'etat come-back on New Year's Eve I 98 I,

Rawlings and his PNDC embarked on a strategy designed to rehabilitate the declining and stagnating economy, and to restructure the society and polity in favour of genuine democracy. Among its objectives, the self-proclaimed 'revolution' was to replace 'the bottom power' of big market women and their accomplices, as well as the corrupt power wielded by politicians and by the ubiquitous black- marketers roaming the streets of urban centres and major cities, with 'people power'. This would spell the doom of rampant, endemic corruption, economic shortages, runaway inflation, and the ills that characterised the Third Republic.

It must be recalled that when the 32-year old Rawlings first seized power in I979 after the uprising of 4 June by junior military officers, and installed the short-lived Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the new regime wasted no time in executing eight senior army officers, including two former Heads of State (Generals Ignatius Kutu

5 CDR Guidelines (Accra, i986), pp. I and 3.

31O MAXWELL OWUSU

Acheampong and Frederick W. K. Akuffo), confiscated land and other property acquired illegally or through corrupt practices, and impri- soned dishonest officials. His firm and often ruthless manner in dealing with corruption (public and private) and abuse of power enjoyed widespread popular support, especially among the urban and rural poor. The measures imposed by the AFRC meant that initially some economic hardships were seemingly and artificially reduced as consumer goods, which had been hoarded by would-be profiteers, became readily available in the shops and markets, and as prices fell through the enforcement of price-controls and compulsory sales, supervised by military officers.

Accordingly, in handing over power to the elected People's National Party (PNP) Government in September I 979, Flight-Lieutenant Rawlings gave a stern warning to the new civilian administration to avoid corruption and complacency, and to take effective measures to arrest the economic decline and improve the welfare of Ghanaians. Thereafter, President Hilla Limann not only politely congratulated the Chairman of the outgoing AFRC and his 'gallant colleagues' for conducting the general elections and organising the activities which led to the birth of the Third Republic, but commended them for their 'efforts, selfless devotion and sincerity of purpose'. What is even more important, given its implication for the subsequent evolution of democracy, was Limann's assurance to all Ghanaians that 'guided by the lessons drawn from the events since June I979' (when the corrupt Supreme Military Council II headed by Akuffo was overthrown), he would be firm in his ' commitment to open and clean government based on participatory democracy at all levels'. 6

Ironically, the PNP administration was ousted in part for its failure to implement this political pledge, as well as its inability to check inflation and economic stagnation. For Rawlings, what took place on 3' December i98i was 'the culmination of the spirit ofJune 4, I979'

when, according to him, 'true and genuine democratic foundations finally began to take roots in Ghana'.7

6 Hilla Limann, Democracy and Ghana (London, I983), p. 124.

7 Jerry J. Rawlings, The Process of Consolidation. Selected Speeches and Interviews of Flt-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, Chairman of the PADC, January i, 1984-December 31, 1984, Vol. 3 (Accra, Information Services Department, I984), pp. Io-s.

TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION IN GHANA 3I I

THE JUNE 4 NEMESIS?

Given that the charismatic Flight-Lieutenant still commanded large and growing popular support, it is perhaps not surprising that he was retired from the Ghana Airforce within two months of Limann becoming President. Thereafter Rawlings became the target of a massive propaganda campaign aimed at undermining his popularity, while members of the police special branch and military intelligence began to intimidate his close associates and friends. Meetings at which Rawlings was frequently the main speaker and principal attraction were routinely disrupted, sometimes on the baseless grounds (since there was no such law) that the organisers had no police permit to hold such functions. C. K. Asher, editor of The Palaver (Accra) and a close friend of the late General Acheampong, used his weekly tabloid to repeatedly vilify and tarnish the image of Rawlings, and similar attacks appeared in the state-owned media. However, this campaign was so badly handled that it greatly increased the popularity of, and sympathy for, the very man who was being denounced.

Rawlings openly challenged in i98i the moral if not the constitutional basis of the Limann administration in order to mark the second anniversary of the June 4 uprising. His undeniably patriotic address revealed justifiable anger and frustration at the political and socio-economic drift of Ghana, and included reasons why emerging reform measures and actions had to be taken to arrest the country's economic stagnation and hopeless decline, an urgent need which was clearly not being met by the democratically elected national leadership.8

In the end, it was the political in-fighting and bickering, not to mention the sheer inexperience, incompetence, lack of courage and resolve of the PNP administration, and its mismanagement of the economy, that forced Rawlings and his supporters to move decisively against the PNP regime. The calamitous effects of the food crisis on urban and rural populations increasingly assumed the dimensions of a 'ntamkese' (great oath) to the more traditional Akan people, and allusions to 'okom' (hunger) were becoming a 'ritual taboo'. The full impact of the situation can only be grasped by relating food prices to the current earnings of the fortunate minority who had regular wage employment. As Emmanuel Hansen graphically indicated for Accra:

8 See Maxwell Owusu, 'Current Socioeconomic Situation: what is to be done', in The Daily Graphic (Accra), 27 June I 980, pp. 4-5.

312 MAXWELL OWUSU

At the current price of labour at 40 (forty) cedis per day [one US dollar = 2-75 cedis], for those lucky enough to find any wage employment, it would take the worker more than a week to buy an American tin of rice (3 kg), more than a day to buy 3 kg of maize, ten days to buy a tuber of yam, over ten days to buy a bottle of edible oil [one pint], more than a day to buy an American tin of garri (cassava grains). One finger of plantain costs more than half a day's wages, and one egg costs a little over one-third of a day's wage... The plain fact is that most people count themselves lucky to have one square meal a day.9

The considerable negative impact of' hunger' on morality, morale, and economic productivity was evident everywhere. Without cash many reverted to a more primitive mode of foraging for survival. Indeed, the fact that Ghanaians could keep alive at all with some dignity earned them the unenviable title among West Africans of 'magicians'.

In retrospect, it was the fiery simplicity and clarity of the speech made by Rawlings on 4 June I 98 I that portended the fall of the Third Republic and the rise of the decade-long PNDC rule. It is thus an important document that deserves to be quoted at some length. Rawlings began by referring to 'The wild allegations about some of us setting up training camps for subversion when we have been engaged in directing creative youthful energies into productive agriculture':

Through such false allegations some soldiers have been thrown out of their lifetime jobs, dumped into jails without trial for months and finally booted from their quarters without the slightest justification... they are prevented from getting or chased out of any public job in civil life... Last year... I requested Parliament to hear these soldiers out. This has not been heeded. Instead these acts of violence have been intensified and... efforts are being made to sow seeds of dissension among soldiers. There has been a resort to tribal campaigns within the army... It has become a crime to demand justice in a so-called democratic country, and the media have been used to invent and spread lies upon lies...

Rawlings went on to stress that the very first article of the constitution was 'affirming something that was fundamental to the June 4th revolution'; namely, 'that the sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people', and that this 'meant the whole people, not a selected few, not exploiters, foreign or local, or even philanthropists, not even our elected representatives, for all are ultimately accountable to the people'.

Given the conditions that the productive majority face these days - the high cost of living, the state of the roads and railways, the conditions in hospitals - and the high hopes that had accompanied the promulgation of the new

9 Emmanuel Hansen, 'The State and Food Agriculture', in Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin (eds.), The State, Development and Politics in Ghana (London, i989), p. i96.


Constitution and the hand-over, it is disheartening to observe how the elected representatives of the people are responding to the plight of the ordinary man.

How come Parliament can sometimes not obtain a quorum when its members are paid (or rather overpaid) on a full time basis? How can we claim that things are getting better or that we have indeed achieved democracy that we aspire to ? ... Day in day out so many of our people leave for 'Agege' [a shanty- town outside Lagos] or other neighbouring countries or even farther to Britain or America to seek escape from the deprivations of the homeland. The skills of artisans, teachers, engineers, architects, washermen, footballers and many others are thus being lost to this country and for those who remain, the tension of survival mounts to the point of suicide. When is Parliament going to ensure medical and health facilities for all persons and the measures to improve the environment that the Constitution promises?

. Many people are beginning to feel that political parties only profess an interest in the people when it is voting time only to abandon them in between elections. Meanwhile the rich patrons of these parties are desperate to reap the harvest of what they invested in winning power and constantly use their position for profitable deals.

The instrumental view of electoral party politics is as old as the independence of Ghana, and indeed, formed an essential element of my thesis on the uses and abuses of political power.10

As regards the forthcoming registration of voters for all Ghanaian citizens I 8 years of age and above, Rawlings pointed out that they 'have become cynical of exercising their right to vote only to find that there is a wider gulf between them and their elected representatives'. While urging all those qualified under the Constitution to register as voters - for that 'is the first step in a gigantic struggle not only for political democracy but also for economic democracy and social justice' - Rawlings warned that 'Workers, soldiers, farmers, policemen, teachers, students must all realize that they cannot expect to have their needs attended to simply because there is a constitution or simply because civilians are ruling and not soldiers.' And he proceeded to remind Ghanaians that 'In the history of this country we have seen the capacity of civilians too to flout the very Constitution and deny the most elementary rights to the people'. Clearly constitutionalism and democracy are not necessarily synonymous.

Accordingly, Rawlings called upon ordinary people to constantly struggle 'to ensure that the ideals enshrined in the constitution are applied to their situation', a concept that has remained the basis of his democratic practice and his populist project. For, as he put it:

10 Maxwell Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power: a case study of continuity and change in the politics of Ghana (Chicago and London, I970).

3I4 MAXWELL OWUSU

sucess in that struggle will require the initiative of workers themselves to organize effectively the forces of progress to create a common platform with the students, farmers, progressive intellectuals and other patriots and to ensure that victory is not wrenched from their hands ...

For myself, I am ready for whatever sacrifices are required in such a struggle for a better life for our people, and I will forever work with, and be at the disposal of the people who share that common cause ... There are some in this society who resent the initiatives of working people, who are frightened of the prospects of real democracy... The possibility of grassroots democracy was demonstrated during the June 4th era by the Committees that emerged from within various working groups ...

Unfortunately, in the three and a half months that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council gave itself we could not expect to achieve the wholly new society that we cherished. I have no doubt we made mistakes and that there were many unfinished tasks. But at least we provided some corrective to earlier abuses of military rule ... May we point out to the enemies of the people a very vital lesson of June 4th that clearly has not registered in their minds.

Quoting a well-known Ghanaian proverb concerning human greed, Rawlings pointed out that 'it was the monkey's refusal to pick one nut at a time out of the gourd that led to his downfall', and ended by recalling the words ofJohn F. Kennedy, the former US President, that 'Those who make a peaceful revolution impossible make a violent revolution inevitable'.11

UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, DEMOCRACY, AND PNDC RULE

But did the policy mistakes, incompetence, constitutional abuses, and corruption of the PNP administration make the 3ist December i98i revolution inevitable (even a necessary evil), and an essential

aspect of the struggle for genuine democracy? On the evidence of numerous publications on the PNDC period, the answer given to this

question will raise some serious objections and continue to evoke acrimonious debate. For as Thomas Cooke has rightly noted, 'No

government has ... aroused so much passion, and induced the formation of so many [opposition] groups ... as the Provisional National Defence Council'.12 A measured anti-coup position was well summarised by Kenneth Mackenzie in his introduction to a book of selected speeches

" The Believer (Accra), io June i98i, pp. I and 4. See Jerry Rawlings, 'Interview with Christian Tagoe', reproduced in Ghana Bar Bulletin (Accra), i June I 988, pp. 56-6 i, and 'Address at the Opening Session of the National Commission for Democracy Seminar, Sunyani, 5thJuly', reprinted in Home Front Ghanaian News and Views (Accra, Information Services Department, I 990).

12 Thomas Cooke, 'Passion for Politics', in West Africa (London), 27 April i987, p. 798.

TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION IN GHANA 3I5

of President Limann published in I 983, and presented as an indictment of the military 'for their unconstitutional and morally unjustified act in taking power from the elected representatives of the Ghanaian people':

If the government [of the Third Republic] was failing to solve the problems of Ghana... then the people would soon have had an opportunity at an election to have rejected the Limann government and chosen an alternative. If there were provable instances of corruption and malfeasance, then there were processes of impeachment and trial available.

Mackenzie points out that Limann repeatedly committed himself 'to accepting the rule of law and the verdict of democracy', and that 'The military seizure of power is a rejection of both these concepts. Flight- Lieutenant Rawlings claims to speak for the people but his only qualifications are that he has the power of the gun behind him'. Mackenzie was convinced, I think mistakenly, that Rawlings and his associates 'have different ideas' from those held by the Limann administration and the Ghanaian public, albeit concluding, perhaps inevitably, that 'whether they will succeed in allevitating the economic hardships of the Ghanaians (or in effectively containing corruption), or whether their coming will prove the "unmitigated disaster" predicted by Dr. Limann only the future will reveal'.13

Whatever one's view of the 3ist December i98i revolution, it certainly had profound long-term implications for the country's socio- economic and political transformation. In truth, much of the credit for the relatively peaceful transition to constitutional democracy and the Fourth Republic clearly goes (i) to the patience and proverbial good- naturedness of the great majority of ordinary Ghanaians, who, exhausted by economic failure, coups and counter-coups, were never more united in their demand for a stable, democratic, and representative government; (ii) to the pragmatism, patriotism, and shrewd responsible leadership of Rawlings and the PNDC, who did not hesitate to adjust and adapt the 'revolution' to the new and changing realities of both the international and domestic environments; and finally, (iii) to the farsighted resolve of the opposition to the PNDC not only to push for democracy, but also to make the transition relatively peaceful and work hopefully to their advantage, and in the national interest.

I would contend that once allowances are made for the ambition, opportunism, and time-serving found in 'normal' struggles for political power everywhere, the intense rivalty between the PNDC and the

13 Kenneth Mackenzie, 'Introduction', in Limann, op. cit. pp. ix and xiii.

316 MAXWELL OWUSU

opposition was largely between groups and individuals who basically resembled each other more than they would care to admit on most, if not all, the key issues; namely, democracy, liberalism, equality, and a better standard of living as understood by ordinary Ghanaians.

The Poverty of Ideology

Too much has been made, especially by Marxist writers, of the divisive and nasty struggle for power and control between 'left' and 'right', 'progressives' and 'conservatives', 'radicals' and 'reaction- aries', both within and outside the PNDC, in Ghana's protracted transition from military rule to parliamentary democracy. Many of the so-called 'leftists' on close examination turn out to be ' tribalists' more concerned with ethnic and regional interests. Terms like 'left' and 'right', derived as they often are from theories or assumptions about 'class conflict', thwart and distort real understanding of the factors that shape and direct contemporary Ghanaian politics. Indeed, to charac- terise particular regimes as 'left-wing' (Nkrumah's and the PNP) or 'right-wing' (Busia's and the NLC) without some serious qualification, is not only misleading but, more importantly, ignores the reasons why the masses were attracted or opposed to these regimes. Such analyses misinterpret the true nature of national movements and mobilisation for political and economic reform.14

The intelligentsia and those exposed to the political phraseology that had arisen out of industrialised Europe much earlier this century may indulge in the make-believe, however ill-advised, that a 'socialist' revolution was needed and possible, ignoring totally the nature and character of Ghanaian nationalism, political culture, and traditions, including the sources of political legitimation in the wider society.15 To most Ghanaians, it must be stressed, terms like 'left' and 'right' are abstractions, the inventions, however useful, of the highly educated 'booklong' that ill apply to local circumstances. They are not part of everyday political vocabulary.'6

14 For example, Ray, op. cit. and Zaya Yeebo, Ghana: the struggle for popular power. Rawlings: saviour or demagogue? (London, i99i).

15 See Maxwell Owusu, 'Custom and Coups: a juridical interpretation of civil order and disorder in Ghana', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 24, i, March i986, pp. 69-.99, and 'Rebellion, Revolution and Tradition: reinterpretation of coups in Ghana', in Comparative Studies in Society and History (Cambridge), 31, 2, April i989, pp. 372-97.

16 See James C. W. Ahiakpor, 'Recognizing " Left " from " Right " in Ghana: a comment on Ninsin', in Canadian Journal of African Studies (Toronto), 22, I, i988, pp. I32-6, and Kwame A. Ninsin, 'Recognising Left and Right in Ghanaian Politics: a reply to Ahiakpor', in ibid.

pp. I37-9.

TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION IN GHANA 3I 7

There is evidence that 'classes' (as occupational or income groups) do indeed exist in Ghana, and that workers and farmers have organised and agitated for better wages and conditions, as well as against burdensome taxation, or in favour of better prices for their produce.17 But Margaret Peil found in her classic study of factory workers that 'the industrially or technologically based norms claimed to be present in modern societies are largely absent in Ghana and there are, instead, other norms to which workers are expected to respond'. She gives, as example of this, that a Ghanaian 'may leave his job because he has inherited a traditional position... or because his relatives think he should be doing some other type of work'.18

Most politically aware Ghanaians, as followers or supporters of the past views and/or continuing traditions of Kwame Nkrumah, Dr J. B. Danquah and Kofi Busia, or Rawlings, are seldom concerned about differences between 'left' and 'right', let alone 'socialism' and ' capitalism'. In fact, a majority of the population consider the latter as some kind of Ghanaian institution, almost in the same way as 'chieftaincy' is taken for granted. Many hold strong views on political leaders as personalities, who have different ethnic, professional, edu- cational, socio-economic origins, and varying charisma; all seek improvements in their general welfare and standard of living (as do people everywhere); and most are quick to respond to local issues like disputes about chieftaincy and development, or national questions that directly affect them or members of their community. Our political language and analysis has to try to capture such complex historical and ethnographic realities.

MAKING SENSE OF THE 'REVOLUTION

To thousands of his supporters in the early days of the 'revolution', Rawlings was known as 'Junior Jesus ', a young 'messiah' embarked on a timely and necessary 'holy war' to save them and the nation from economic gloom and doom. To his enemies he was 'Junior Judas'. The 3ISt December revolution was first and foremost a crusade against the destruction of the moral fibre of Ghana as a nation: against ill-gotten gains, misappropriation, embezzlement, maladministration, social

17 See Polly Hill, Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa (Cambridge, I970); Margaret Peil, The Ghanaian Factory Worker: industrial man in Africa (Cambridge, I972) ; Richard Jeffries, Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana: the railwaymen of Sekondi (Cambridge, I978); and Piet Konings, The State and Rural Class Formation in Ghana: a comparative analysis (London, i986).

1 Peil, op. Cit. p. 23 I .

3V8 MAXWELL OWUSU

injustice, and lack of accountability among the most influential groups and within the dominant institutions of society, notably the government, the judiciary, the police, and the church.

There was a time that Rawlings had wanted to become a priest, and according to an interview given to Jeune Afrique (Paris) in i982, he had been inspired by the leadership of Jesus Christ, described as 'a fighter... who proved that violence is sometimes necessary' to change people and their evil ways. He went on to claim that his own ' revolution' aimed to sweep away, with popular support and initiative, ' All that is filth, all that is unclean, all that is corrupt' and to curb 'the greed of the dominant group', and restore 'the strong, powerful and pure' national character.19 As reported by Martin Meredith and Cameron Duodu, there is no doubt that Rawlings appeared to have Can almost fanatical belief that corruption is at the root of all Ghana's problems', and that 'if only it could be stamped out the country would once again be prosperous'.20

Ironically, the man ousted by Rawlings held similar views about the dynamics of Ghanaian politics and democratic change. According to Limann, the manifesto of the PNP meant that this Nkrumahist, national grassroots party, 'accommodates the widest cross-section of our society, each with his or her personal aspirations, expectations, and needs':

Our membership... traverses the diverse concepts of our people as to what constitutes the ultimate good life, and the path that leads to that good life. Thus on the wings are the extremes of the left and the right which are always thinner in every national political party. The bulge in the middle embraces by far the largest number of the members of our party, no less than the largest number of people of Ghana who can be reached only by the adoption of policies and programmes which meet their aspirations.

This was so because the PNP spanned the whole range of political ideas, and as a mass party embraced 'peasant farmers, workers, fishermen, professionals, chiefs, members of various religious creeds and so on'.21 These were the same sources from which Rawlings and the PNDC drew enthusiastic support.

A similar view concerning the nature and membership of the 'revolution' was expressed by P. V. Obeng, chairman of the Committee

19 Daily Graphic, 27 May i982, p. 3. 20 Martin Meredith and Cameron Duodu, 'Ghana Prepares for People Power Mark II', in The

Sunday Times (London), i o January I 982, p. 9. 21 Limann Speaks the Way Ahead. Address by His Excellency President Hilla Limann at the Annual

Congress of the People's National Party (29th May to ist June, ig80) at the Prempeh Assembly Hall, Kumasi (Accra, i980), pp. 24-5.


of Secretaries of the PNDC, in an interview given to a Cuban magazine in I989:

the revolutionary core had been a configuration of forces, some progressive, nationalist or whatever, agreeing mainly on what Ghana must be and sometimes not on the means to achieve it and trying to maintain this in the interest of national unity to reduce the extent of internal strife. These are the challenges and difficulties and the constraints we are facing.

... the non-violent nature of the 3 I st December I 98 I revolution means that the transformation process was not going to be a complete 'destroy and rebuild'... it was destroy part, rebuild part, transform. That builds up a certain amount of internal contradiction if you're not able to balance the forces properly.22

THE PARADOX OF CHANGE

The contradictions and paradoxes of change that characterized the revolutionary process from its inception in a small, dependent, capitalist, ex-colonial country, with a proud and vibrant cultural heritage, were illustrated by the outlook and behaviour of a fairly well- to-do Fante who I interviewed in the Central Region in early i982. This septuagenarian farmer, with no political party affiliation, frank in the manner of senior citizens, angrily described the PNP administration that Rawlings had just overthrown as totally inept (wambeye hwee) and corrupt (ewifo). He obviously had no sympathy for the 'Old Guard' - that is, the Convention People's Party (CPP) faithful, including characters like Nana Okutwer Bekoe, a rich patron of the PNP who wished to control and determine national policy as well.

Like many others in the Central Region, the farmer had voted in both the first and second rounds of the presidential elections for Limann.23 But he now supported the 3ist December revolution, and had even backed the 'house-cleaning' exercise carried out by Rawlings under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). All the same, as the 'revolution' evolved he had grown unhappy about what he saw as its apparent attack on genuine, honest capitalists ('dem aban )i okyir obi a wonya ne sempowa'). He thought that the PNDC Government's price and rent control measures, and the strong-arm methods used to enforce them, were unfair and politically unwise, and that unless immediately checked were likely to worsen the national

22 P. V. Obeng, 'Interview with Hugo Alonso - Government on the Spot', in Prisma (Havana), 79, November i 989, pp. 34-40.

23 See RichardJeffries, 'The Ghanaian Elections of 1979', in African Affairs, 79, 316,July 2980, pp 397-4I4.

320 MAXWELL OWUSU

economic crisis. He claimed that the Ghanaian was a capitalist by nature (' wodze wooyen, ewo hen mogya mu', 'capitalism is in our blood'). Arguing in i983 for a new direction in economic policy, the Governor of the Bank of Ghana came to a similar conclusion on the evidence of the country's economic history and social values,24 a claim that echoed the results of research on rural capitalism and indigenous traders by Polly Hill and Peter Garlick.25

The other aspect of the ' revolution' that this farmer found unacceptable was the senseless harassment and beating of decent men and women by youths and soldiers, who seemed to have lost all respect for their elders. Not surprisingly, many ordinary Ghanaians saw the PDCs, considered by the PNDC as the organs of the revolution and 'people power', as composed mainly of school drop-outs, thugs, the unemployed, and even common criminals. Another of my informants, a middle-aged asafoatse of Labadi (a suburb of Accra, where Rawlings grew up), so strongly disapproved of some of the activities and behaviour of the PDCs that he had threatened to throw his son out of his house if he remained a member. Limann naturally shared some of these negative views:

In the early stages of the military take-over in i 98 i, most unemployed people and workers who were misfits joined the revolutionary process. They joined only to take revenge on those they disliked or disagreed with. A lot of innocent people suffered and lost their property through such vicious acts and this alienated most Ghanaians from the process of change, and to this day not many Ghanaians care much about the revolutionary organs.

... bold decisions ought to be taken to re-educate members of the revolutionary organs to make them more acceptable to their Ghanaian public. They should also be made to acquire useful skills that would benefit the development of the country as a whole.26

That the ex-President did not call for the outright abolition of the PDCs, but rather for their reform so that they could contribute more meaningfully to national development, implies an admission of the importance of the broad aims of the 'revolution'.

Nene Azzu Mate Kole, the Konor of Manya Krobo, while echoing these views at the annual Ngmayem Festival durbar in October i982, admonished the PNDC to ensure that 'the practical means of achieving

24 G. K. Agama, 'New Directions in Economic Policy for Ghana', in The Journal of Management Studies (Legon), 2, i, March i985, pp. 14-19.

25 Hill, op. cit. and Peter C. Garlick, African Traders and Economic Development in Ghana (Oxford, I97).-

26 Hilla Limann, 'Ghana (Interview)', in African Concord (London), 128, i9 February I987, pp. I7-i8.

TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION IN GHANA 32I

the noble aims [of the revolution] do not in any way undermine them'. He referred to the

sad and rather disappointing experience of our people here and in several parts of the country over the activities of some PDCs and WDCs. Many of these groups have obviously upheld the essence of what the Government stands for and some have made concrete and worthy contributions to the noble exercise of the People's Power, namely to seek the welfare of all. Some made farms, built schools, helped in clearing bush and motor roads and other social activities ...

[But many PDCs and WDCs had] used the opportunity for witch hunting and the settlement of personal scores. We therefore wish to emphasize that such elements cannot but undermine the noble aims of Government from within if they are permitted to continue in that manner.27

It is worth pointing out that the forms of' communal labour' performed by the PDCs and WDCs, such as clearing the bush and roads, were the traditional functions of asafo and other youth groups.28

My septuagenarian farmer had backed the 'revolution' because 'Ghanaians were difficult to govern' ('hen aso ye dozen ) and needed someone with the courage and integrity of Rawlings 'to straighten us out'. He particularly praised the PNDC for demanding accountability, honesty, probity, and hard work in public and private life. But the widespread criticisms of the attitudes and behaviour of many PDCs were not lost on the PNDC leadership.

'Part Three' of the Guidelines for the Proper Functioning and Effectiveness of the Peoples Defence Committees, issued in I 986 by the Press, Information, and Interim National Co-ordinating Committee for the PDCs, identified four categories of abuse of power that members were to avoid or face 'unprecedented revolutionary action', namely: (i) extortion of money for personal gain and other economic advantages; (ii) conscious use of PDCs to victimise other people; (iii) using PDCs to subvert the national effort, e.g. disrupting production, causing unnecessary strikes, public panic, and false alarms, spreading false rumours about the PNDC and its agencies; and (iv) humiliating and dehumanising attitudes towards members of the public, especially senior persons in charge of production.

27 Azzu Mate Kole, 'Address Delivered at the Ngmayem Festival Durbar', Krobo Odumase, i982, p. 2.

28 On the asafo, see Owusu, 'Rebellion, Revolution and Tradition', and Uses and Abuses of Political Power.

322 MAXWELL OWUSU

NATIONAL CHARACTER AND CORE VALUES

Ghana is a deeply religious and deferential society that strives for moral excellence, peace, and harmony in human relationships. Although described in official publications and popularly viewed as a 'Christian country' and her people 'God-fearing', Ghana contains a large number of people, including many Muslims, who adhere to indigenous religious beliefs and practices embodied in chieftaincy and family institutions.

During the most radical phase of the 3ist December revolution (in the early and mid-ig8os), an estimated 45 per cent of Ghanaians belonged to various Christian denominations (principally Roman Catholic, Methodist, and Presbyterian), and about I2 per cent were Muslim. Bodies such as the Christian Council of Ghana, the Catholic Bishops Conference, the Ghana Muslim Representative Council, and the National House of Chiefs continued to function as independent pressure groups for the promotion and fostering of common, rather than special interests, insisting on negotiation and mediation, rather than confrontation and violence in the management of national disputes, and advocating programmes and policy alternatives that emphasise the long-term needs of society.

For example, in February i99i, the Catholic Bishops circulated a pamphlet which argued that in their 'search for true democracy' Ghanaians should recognise the importance of human rights, traditional values, and stable institutions that could guarantee freedom, justice, and individual as well as national progress. They claimed that Ghana's traditional cultures contained modalities of public behaviour and proper conduct of affairs of state which deserved to be carefully studied and incorporated into structures for modern democratic government.

In I982, the head of the Afrikania Church who was a member of the PNDC, the Rev. Dr Kwabena Damuah, under whose auspices the so- called 'Positive Christian Movement' had been formed with the apparent blessing of the Christian Council of Ghana to sustain the 'Holy War',30 called for a national consultative religious conference involving Christians, Muslims, and practitioners of indigenous African religions on 3 June I982 to promote the objectives of the revolution.3'

29 Catholic Bishops Conference, The Catholic Church and Ghana's Searchfor a New Democratic System (Accra, February i 99 I).

30 Obeng Manu, 'State of the Nation', in Ivor Agyeman Duah (ed.), Political Reflections on the Motherland (Kumasi, I 92), p. I30. 31 Daily Graphic, 27 May i982, pp. 4-5.


Later that year, in one of its numerous memoranda to the PNDC Government, the Christian Council asked Ghanaians (obviously with the advocates of a 'leftist' revolution in mind) to recognise the peculiar structure and nature of their society, and to be on guard against any class or ethnic group that kept calling for the downfall or destruction or blood of others, since without social cohesion no real progress could be made in efforts to pull the country back to its feet again.32

On the question of the structure of Ghanaian society and traditional values as they relate to class identification and consciousness, William Ofori Atta, one of the leaders of the independence struggle, had this to say when addressing Ghana's 'new masters' who were preaching class- war:

The messenger you have in your office may be the son of a rich farmer in a village called Brenya, and also a member of the stool [i.e. chiefly] family of Brenya. His older brother may be a medical doctor and his younger a squadron leader. One of the great amanhene [i.e. paramount chiefs] in Nkusukum was a driver. My own father [a paramount chief] was a lawyer's clerk and his successor was an electrician, working for the P.W.D. [Public Works Department]. This is still the nature of our society and we must not forget it. The messenger does not see himself as belonging to a low class system of workers.33

A similar point was made by Elizabeth Ohene, who as an early supporter of the revolution had been appointed editor of the state- owned Daily Graphic by the PNDC. She later became one of the regime's bitterest critics, not least because some members and supporters were deliberately sharpening class antagonisms: their 'desperate attempt to transplant alien concepts to Ghanaian society' meant that 'our traditional values and institutions are likely to be destroyed in the process, leaving us poorer'.

The lowly clerk in an office in Accra, the mechanic on the factory floor in Tema might well be 'Odikros' or sub-chiefs in their towns and villages and after 5 p.m. he immediately becomes the chief or elder that he is and the man who is his Managing Director ... from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. would have to (as we say in Ghana) lower his cloth [as a sign of respect] before speaking to his clerk or mechanic and on occasion might have to remove his sandals before approaching this mechanic at a dawn gathering and [the same Managing Director would] be giving orders to him just a few hours later. This is just to illustrate that words like the 'working classes, peasants', as understood in

32 Christian Council of Ghana, November i982. 3 William Ofori Atta, Ghana: a nation in crisis. The J. B. Danquah Memorial Lectures, Eighteenth

Series, February 1985 (Accra, Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, i988).

324 MAXWELL OWUSU

other societies, might have difficulties being transplanted wholesale into Ghana.34

The aforementioned memorandum of the Christian Council of Ghana called on the PNDC to initiate a meaningful dialogue with all important, identifiable, and recognized civil organizations and bodies in the interest of national reconciliation and national consensus. The listed objectives included finding ways and means for reconciliation and peace in the country; reduction of tension, sense of insecurity, divisiveness, bitterness, vindictiveness, and vengeance; consideration of a meaningful programme for economic recovery; the promotion of respect for existing law and order; the involvement of people realistically in the decision-making process; and the rehabilitation of social and moral order.

There is evidence that the 'Holy War' fired the imagination not only of the struggling poor and down-trodden, who believed that Rawlings could provide the much needed honest and decisive national leadership to pull the country out of its mounting economic problems, but also of people from all walks of life, including, as Obeng Manu reluctantly admitted:

the students of the three universities, workers in Accra, Sekondi-Takoradi, Kumasi, Sunyani, Koforidua and other places... Even the Association of the Recognized Professional Bodies did not initially oppose the second coming of J.J. The Bar Association appraised the situation and issued a non-committal statement which in effect did not reject the second coming of J.J. So it was generally believed that non-condemnation of the PNDC in its early days meant its approval by the nation as a whole.35

In an earlier study I argued that the moral-legal themes of populism, trusteeship, and leadership accountability, as well as social justice and civic duty, provided a charter for the 3 I st December revolution, as they had for earlier national struggles for political and economic reform.36 Max Assimeng, in a more recent attempt to explain why 'Ghanaians looked on the Rawlings phenomenon unprotestingly', finds the answer in the core values as presented above. Their acceptance 'was due to the fact that Rawlings harped on themes of moral purism, probity in social and economic life, conscience racking and the institutional imperatives of accountability'. Assimeng went on to point out correctly that 'These themes affected virtually all Ghanaians: big chiefs and small chiefs; army generals and privates; university professors and students;

Elizabeth Ohene, 'Is Military Rule Really the Answer?', in West Africa, 3i May i982,

p. I45I. 35 Manu, loc. cit. p. I30. s' Owusu, 'Rebellion, Revolution and Tradition', i989.


principal secretaries and office messengers; managing directors and clerical assistants'; and so on-that is nearly all classes of society.37

As study after study has shown, whatever the current ideological terminology, Ghanaian politics is not really about 'class' or 'ethnic' conflicts in any unambiguous sense (though elements of these may be present). Much more important are local disputes over sharing power, over legitimate but rival claims about the values of economic individualism and populism; about enlightened self-interest, community service, and the common good; and abut 'the ordering of society in the village, or chiefdom or district'.38

For every Ghanaian citizen belongs to, and is often emotionally and ideologically attached to, a village, chiefdom, or district; indeed, one's national self-image is defined to a large extent by the sense of belonging to one's home locality. Dennis Austin has observed that no party politician or military ruler in Ghana has dared to proclaim 'the republic of the common man at the village level, or to abolish the office of chief'. Indeed, 'ordinary illiterate Ghanaians have ... been moved to violent action in defence of " rights" ... when local loyalties have been passionately aroused '.3 This is because in the tradition of 'customary law' and 'usage', as well as in popular ideology, 'chiefs' and 'people' are inseparable: they are united by reciprocal rights and obligations, and by a sacred duty to protect and advance the interests of the community. This is not 'tribalism'.

What the mass of people sought who supported the revolution proclaimed by Rawlings was obviously not some illusory workers' paradise on earth, but effective, realistic, and tangible means to cope with misery, hunger, starvation, unemployment, and poverty. Extreme hardship, on the whole, failed either to generate any spontaneous ' revolutionary consciousness' or to breed chiliastic illusions among the masses as ' Agegemania' clearly attests - the nearly uncontrollable streams of economic migrations out of Ghana to neighbouring countries and elsewhere in the early ig80s.40

It needs to be emphasised that most African countries are basically village and small-town societies rooted historically and culturally in kinship, family, and chiefship. Territorially, Ghana consists of a

37 Max Assimeng, 'Rawlings, Charisma and Social Structure', in Universitas (Legon), 8, n.d. p. 153.

38 Dennis Austin, Ghana Observed: essays on the politics of a West African republic (Manchester, 1976), p. 157. See also, Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, and Dennis Austin and Robin Luckham (eds.), Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966-1972 (London, I975).

39 Austin, Ghana Observed, p. I57. 40 See Maxwell Owusu, 'Agegemania', in The Legon Observer, 3, 2, 1981, pp. 124-6.

326 MAXWELL OWUSU

contiguous, overlapping, or cross-cutting system of so-called 'traditional areas', each with a paramount chief under whom are various subordinate chiefs and headmen, with more or less exclusive claim to lands and other natural resources vested in extended families, lineages, and communities. It suffices simply to point out here that their natural resources, including labour, are in the main controlled, in theory if not in practice, by family and lineage heads, as well as by local chiefs who act as trustees of group or communal property, albeit accountable to their members who have user-rights. This system is basically intact despite important changes associated with colonial rule, capitalism, and reforms introduced by successive governments, as well as pressures from outside interests.

Accordingly, the true meaning of 'people-power' as proclaimed by the architects of the 3 I st December revolution cannot be fully appreciated without reference to 'tradition' and 'traditionalism' as defined above. Indeed, in their everyday socio-political behaviour, Ghanaians may be characterised, quite paradoxically, as republican royalists and aristocratic proletarians, and as conservative or aristocratic populists. The great majority seem to have very little difficulty living with the awkward contradictions and paradoxes of their cultural heritage and contemporary society. These are the distinguishing characteristics of Ghanaian rural and urban society that cannot be ignored because of their impact on the 'revolutionary' politics of economic and political transformation, liberalisation, and democrat- isation. Significantly, one of the objectives of the revolution as provided for in the Directive Principles of State Policy (PNDCL 42) was the adaptation and development of traditional cultural values as an integral part of the growth of Ghanaian society.

Mention must be made of the intriguing decision taken by the PNDC to retain the relevant provisions pertaining to chieftaincy in the suspended I 979 Constitution, and to continue to make the process of cultural adaptation and change a major if not the primary responsibility of traditional leaders and institutions; namely, the 130 or more traditional councils, the ten Regional Houses of Chiefs, and the National House of Chiefs. Thus, contrary to Donald Ray's claim, the PNDC Establishment Proclamation of i i January I 982 did not remove 'the constitutional structures that had legitimized the wealthy's political control by suspending the old constitution'."4 His ideologically preconceived description of chiefs as forming 'the parallel, though

41 Ray, op. cit. p. I25.


decaying, system of authority to parliament', and his sweeping observation that 'In both chieftaincy and party politics, the elders had kept a stranglehold on the decision-making process... [and that] the defence committees broke this stranglehold and acted as a democratizing force in this regard',42 completely misrepresents the place of chieftaincy and tradition in Ghanaian society, and the meaning of the revolution to Rawlings, the PNDC leadership, and the general public.

Looked at from the viewpoint of the thousands of Ghanaians who welcomed the revolution, and who believed that Rawlings 'will bring an end to the corruption, shortages and rampant inflation that marked the government of the ousted president, Hilla Limann', it could be reasonably argued that what was perhaps farthest from their minds was the re-imposition of a discredited and unpopular Nkrumah-type Marxist-Leninist regime as a strategy for solving their economic misery.43 The spirit, intent, and language of the revolution as articulated repeatedly by Rawlings, not to mention the ideological orientation of a majority of PNDC members and appointees, were obviously non-Marxian - a point to which we return in light of the controversy over whether policies adopted by Rawlings and the PNDC, notably the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, really constituted a betrayal of the revolution as critics on the 'left' maintain.

Clearly, the principles of the revolution as enunciated by Rawlings and the PNDC and embodied in PNDCL 42 (which I have described elsewhere as being an evolutionary document), spoke to common aspirations and ideals which were at once nationalist, populist, liberal, Christian, and traditionalist.44 This is supported by the fact that Rawlings and the PNDC did not hesitate to condemn and punish the atrocities committed in the name of the revolution by a minority of self- styled Marxist cadres operating through the PDCs and WDCs, and to disband and reconstitute them as Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) under new guidelines that were more consistent with the spirit and intent of PNDCL 42.

It is necessary to distinguish between two broad stages in the revolution: the first, from early I982 to mid- I 983, the phase of ' extraordinary' politics, was utopian, populist, anarchistic, and adventurist, rather than Marxist in any serious sense of the term; the

42 Ibid. p. 7I. 43 See Meredith and Duodu, loc. cit. p. 9. 44 Owusu, 'Custom and Coups', p. 86.

328 MAXWELL OWUSU

second, from I 983 to I 988 and from I 989 to I 992, the phases of ordinary, more or less 'normal' politics, were more stable, pragmatic, conciliatory, democratizing if authoritarian. The fact is that it is a gross error in analysis not to recognise the dynamic and positive role of tradition in the revolution. Participatory democracy at the grassroots level is unthinkable in Ghana without some active involvement of both chiefs and people.

It is also important to remember that the 3Ist December I98I revolution coincided with developments in the international political and economic environment that imposed severe constraints on its future direction. For those who naively hailed the revolution as ushering in a real socialist transformation of society, it could not have occurred under more inauspicious circumstances. The policies of the Reagan-Bush Administrations in the United States (i980-92), the decade of Thatcherism in Britain, not to mention Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost which initiated the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as the collapse of communism, all conspired to create an international policy climate that was vigorously anti-socialist, pro-market economy, and pro- democracy, and assumed in the words of Leo Panitch and Ralph Miliband that 'humankind has no viable alternative to global capitalism '.45

TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION

It has been argued by Eric Hobsbawn that the extent to which the formal political and social institutions of a country can be transformed depends on three factors: 'on the flexibility, adaptability, or the resistance of its old institutions, on the urgency of the actual need for transformation, and the risks involved in the great revolutions which are the normal ways in which they come about'.46 What was the role of traditional institutions, particularly chieftaincy, in the 3Ist December revolution? Was this opposed by Ghana's ancien regime? To what extent are chiefs adaptable or reactionary?

What follows is an attempt to answer these and related questions on the basis of systematic data collected in the course of fieldwork and participant observation extending over several years. My findings

45 Leo Panitch and Ralph Miliband, 'The New World Order and the Socialist Agenda', in Panitch and Miliband (eds.), The Socialist Register, 1992 (London, I992), p. I.

46 Eric J. Hobsbawn, Industry and Empire: from 1750 to the present day (Harmondsworth, i968), p. i6.


have, I believe, some important theoretical, substantive, and practical implications, as well as providing much needed light on the nature and contribution of the 3ist December revolution, and of chieftaincy to political and economic reform in Ghana.

The fact that the Rawlings revolution put so much emphasis right from the very beginning on placing power in the hands of ordinary people, organised from the grassroots upwards, in order to ensure genuine participation in the decision-making process, immediately raises questions abut the role of chieftaincy. Indeed, a member of Ghana's I978 Constitutional Commission admitted that the moment one talked about grassroots democracy one was already making overtures to chieftaincy, because in Ghana one could not realistically implement successfully a programe of empowerment without the involvement of chiefs. As Alex Kwame Aidoo explained:

you cannot go to any village and ... start propagating an ideology or political programme or anything in the air... the chiefs are very important if we are going to think about participation of all the people in Government. We have to use them from the grassroots level to the national level.47

That factual admission echoes essentially the views expressed 30 years before by the famous Coussey Constitutional Commission of I949 on the place of traditional rulers in representative institutions in Ghana:

The whole institution of chieftaincy is so closely bound up with the life of our communities that its disappearance would spell disaster. Chiefs and what they symbolise in the society are so vital that the subject of their future must be approached with the greatest caution. No African of the Gold Coast [Ghana] is without some admiration for the best aspects of chieftaincy and all would loathe to do violence to it any more than the social values embodied in the institution itself. Criticisms there have been, but none coming from responsible people whom we have known or met is directed toward the complete effacement of chiefs.48

It is remarkable that a generation later, the Constitutional Commission's proposals in I978 contained similar recommendations on chieftaincy:

in spite of certain features which have often given cause for serious concern and the not altogether satisfactory record of some chiefs in national life, we remain convinced that the institution of chieftaincy has an important and indispensable role in the life and government of Ghana, both for the present and for the foreseeable future. We, therefore, consider it right and necessary

47 Alex Kwame Aidoo, 'Chieftaincy', in Proceedings of the Constitutional Drafting Commission held at the Kwame Nkrumah Conference Centre (Old Conference Hall) on Wednesday, 7th June 1978 at 8:40 in the Fore noon (Accra, 1978), p. 48.

48 Quoted by N. A. Ollennu, 'Chieftaincy Under the Law', in W. C. Ekow Daniels and G. R. Woodman (eds.), Essays in Ghanaian Law, i876-1976 (Legon, Faculty of Law, 1976), p. 52.

330 MAXWELL OWUSU

that the institution should be protected and preserved by appropriate constitutional guarantees.49

Along similar lines but on a broader level, 'The basic problem for Africans', according to Basil Davidson, 'is to find their own way of revolutionizing the structures of the past, and ... the colonial structures they've had imposed upon them, and which they inherited, in large part, when they [became] politically independent'. He went on to explain in the I970S that 'Africans need this dual revolution along African lines.... because they have to move on to new systems and modes of production '." This historian's point is, I believe, quite consistent with my own position that the challenge faced by the 3ISt December revolution was

basically both a question (i) of appropriate constitutional reforms that are capable of providing a competent and accountable government, with an effective means of political control, participation, and representation for the masses at the grass roots; and (2) of political leadership, imbued with popular values about social justice, which could come up with coherent policies for economic reconstruction and regeneration, as well as popular democratic rights, which can be realistically implemented."

The position of chiefs in modern Ghana remains controversial in some quarters for a variety of reasons. There are, for example, those who on doctrinal grounds believe that such 'institutional obsoletes' impede the development of a virile, prosperous, democratic, and just

society, and thus must have no place in any progressive society.52 Accordingly, the guidelines written by the self-styled Marxists who controlled the National Defence Committee of the PDCs in the early period of the revolution, excluded chiefs from membership, as well as the rest of the corrupt 'propertied classes', considered at the time 'the enemy classes'. The new organs of local and 'popular' power began a

systematic, if highly selective and pre-planned attack on chieftaincy. Indeed, several PDCs, notably in the Greater-Accra and Central

Regions, 'took over' traditional councils and in some cases 'destooled' or chased chiefs out of their palaces, accusing them of corruption, misappropriation and misuse of people's money and lands, and calling for the nationalization of all stool lands.

In headline after headline of the government-controlled press, the

4 The Proposals of the Constitutional Commissionfor a Constitution for the Establishment of a Transitional (Interim) National Governmentfor Ghana (Accra, I978), p. 96.

5 Quoted by Peter Waterman, 'Introduction: on radicalism in African studies', in Peter C. W. Gutkind and Waterman (eds.), African Social Studies: a radical reader (London and New York, I977), p. 2- 5 Owusu, 'Custom and Coups', p. 72.

52 See, for example, Waterman, loc. cit. p. 2.


institution of chieftaincy was threatened with abolition by PNDC secretaries and PDC executives, unless the chiefs threw their weight behind the revolution. Even an editorial in the Free Press, the independent and influential Accra weekly, called for the 'democrati- sation' of chieftaincy in February I 982 on the grounds that the present- day institution 'is diametrically opposed to any system which will ensure that the people really participate in decision-making at the village-level where the odikro reigns'5 - implying, I believe, mistakenly, that chieftaincy was incompatible with the popular aims of the revolution.

All the same, the important issue of the relationship between participatory democracy, power-sharing, decentralization, and 'tradition' as chieftaincy has to be addressed. It is noteworthy that the institutional framework for bringing about 'true democracy' was provided for in the PNDC's first enabling legislation, the Establishment Proclamation, the same document which created the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), and which outlined its functions in PNDCL 42 .

Concerning the issue of decentralization of power and its implication for popular democracy and progressive forms of government in Africa, Davidson raised the following questions in i988 which are directly relevant to the Ghanaian situation: (i) Can decentralization create a viable tradition in which rural power based in rural communities is able to counterbalance effectively the constraining, often repressive and exploitative power of the central government? (ii) Does devolution to rural communities with their customary self-help and community development imply a wish to strengthen traditional authority or return to pre-independence or even pre-colonial forms of government which cannot work unreformed in today's circumstances? (iii) Can de- centralisation lead to a revival of old political traditions or rather to the general acceptance of new and radical organising ideas from urban centres ?5

According to Samir Amin, a distinguished Marxist scholar writing in I985, the historical experience of decentralization would seem to indicate that 'all the great progressive changes in history have been effected by centralized social forces while decentralization has often reinforced conservative power controlled by local notables ... and

5 Free Press (Accra), 7 February I982, p. I. 5' See Owusu, 'Rebellion, Revolution and Tradition'. 5 Basil Davidson, 'Nationalism Reconsidered', in UCLA African Studies Center Newsletter (Los

Angeles), Spring I988, pp. IO-I2.

332 MAXWELL OWUSU

contributed to depoliticization'.56 In support of this position, S. A. Nkrumah, who argued against the involvement of chiefs in a decentralized system in Ghana, insisted in I973 that they would use their presence in decentralized bodies to maintain what he considered to be their 'untenable and declining position'." In an earlier study, Amin concluded in i964 that

British colonisation systematically practised a policy of reinforcing the traditional chiefs in Ghana with the Ashanti Kingdom ... And the descendants of those who were the heroes of the resistance to the conquest, the Ashanti chiefs... are today the best agents of imperialism. These traditional rulers have in general become powerful pseudo-feudalities, reducing the peasants to a state of servitude.58

This view completely overlooks the critical distinction between constitutional' and 'feudal' chieftaincy, and as Busia showed in I 95 I,

Asante/Ashanti chieftaincy is anything but feudal.59 Clearly, there are those who view the representation or active

participation of chiefs in decentralized institutions, such as Ghana's new District Assemblies, or in the organs of popular power, as both undemocratic and even 'counter-revolutionary'. In the early years of the revolution (between i982 and i984), my long discussions and interviews with members of the Eastern and Central Regional Houses of Chiefs, as well as the National House of Chiefs, revealed that many were openly agonised over the uncertain and tense political climate, notably the attacks in the press and by PDCs which they felt were due in most part to ignorance and misunderstanding of the place of chieftaincy in contemporary Ghana. As custodians of the national cultural heritage the chiefs assured me that they had no difficulty supporting causes that were truly in the national interest, morally and spiritually uplifting, and aimed at improving the material welfare of the people.

It is widely recognised in Ghana that those introducing new ideas, let alone hoping to implement important changes, almost always seek the support of chiefs, either in the form of quiet approval, open declaration, or active participation, not least because of their local prestige, charisma, and persuasive powers. In Ghana, chieftaincy has

5 Samir Amin, 'A Propos the " Green " Movements', in Herb Addo et al., Development as Social Transformation: reflections on the global problematique (London, i 985), p. 279.

57 S. A. Nkrumah, 'Reflections on Local Government in Ghana', in The Legon Observer, 8, I2-25, January 1973, pp. Io-I5.

58 Samir Amin, 'The Class Struggle in Africa', in Revolution (Paris), i, 9, i964, p. 38. 59 K. A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti: a study of the

influence of contemporary social changes on Ashanti political institutions (London, 195 I).


demonstrated over the years that it can respond to the challenge of a national effort.

The public views of chiefs towards the PNDC revolution must be put in some historical perspective in order to appreciate their real significance. The Convention Peoples Party (CPP), formed and launched by Nkrumah in June 1949, saw itself from the beginning as ' a Socialist Party - the party of the workers, farmers (including fishermen) and co-operative societies'. It aimed, inter alia, (i) to release the people 'from the bondage of foreign colonialism and the tyranny of local feudal despotism', and (ii) to replace ' feudal and despotic chieftaincy' with 'democratic and constitutional chieftaincy 60 But in keeping with the proverbial paradoxes of Ghanaian political change, Nkrumah indicated that 'If... chieftaincy can be used to encourage popular effort, there would seem to be little sense in arousing the antagonism which its legal dissolution would stimulate',61 as some CPP members had demanded.

As part of Nkrumah's later policy to centralise executive power in his new one-party Marxist-Leninist state, the responsibility for matters relating to chiefs was transferred from the Ministry of Justice to the Office of the President, along with the creation of a new Chieftaincy Secretariat with effect from March I964. The Northern Regional House of Chiefs immediately welcomed the announced change as proving 'beyond doubt that chieftaincy is part of our socialist pattern', and members expressed their determination 'to give the lead in the socialist programme' 62 In April I965, the signatories of a letter from chiefs addressed to 'Comrade Chairman' Nkrumah included Nana Agyemang Badu of the Brong-Ahafo Region and Togbe Teprehodo III of the Volta Region, both members of the Chieftaincy Secretariat, who appealed to Osagyefo the President to give approval to the organisation of chiefs as an integral wing of the Marxist-Leninist CPP. Among the reasons given for what would seem to be such an unusual step was that 'the party is the vanguard of the people and chiefs are nominated, elected, and installed from among the people'.,63 Indeed, Nkrumah himself seemed not particularly bothered by the apparent ideological contradictions associated with integrating chieftaincy in a socialist economic and political strategy of development. As he had told John Gunther while Prime Minister in I953:

60 Kwame Nkrumah, 'Movement for Colonial Freedom', in Phylon (Atlanta), i6, 4, 1955, pp- 403 and 405. 61 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (London, i963), p. 84.

62 The Ghanaian Times (Accra), i8 February I964, p. 3. 63 Maxwell Owusu, I982, personal notes.

334 MAXWELL OWUSU

We are building on the old heritage of the chiefs, not superimposing something from above. Our chiefs are much more democratic than most outsiders think. Our biggest asset is that our movement rises from people who understand our goals.64

It is thus hardly surprising that nearly 40 years later, at a time when chiefs were forbidden by PDC guidelines from membership of PDCs, a group of 'concerned citizens' submitted a petition in November I982

to the Chieftaincy Secretariat in Accra, in my presence during fieldwork, in which they urged the formation of a Chieftaincy Defence Committee, 'to campaign for support of the December 3ISt Rev- olution', since 'chieftaincy is an institution for social and cultural development'. Educated chiefs had been rewarded by the CPP as opportunities were created for them to play a more active role in Nkrumah's Marxist-Leninist regime. One was made ambassador to India, another served as a delegate to the UN General Assembly, yet another with an Oxford doctorate in anthropology became a cultural adviser to the Ministry of External Affairs, while others were appointed to serve on important boards and commissions.65 At the local levels, chiefs were urged to identify with development projects to ensure their successful implementation. The fact is that even under the CPP's policy of' democratic centralism' as opposed to the strategy of decentralization initiated by the PNDC, the active involvement of chiefs was considered essential in a process of radical change.

CHIEFS VERSUS PEOPLE OR CHIEFS AND PEOPLE?

There has been a tendency in Ghana for political history to be repeated in certain predictable ways, not least because of the continuing significance of tradition and traditionalism. For example, all post- colonial constitutions have guaranteed to preserve the honour and dignity of chieftaincy as established by customary law and usage. Indeed, the Third Republican Constitution (which the PNDC suspended) went even further in I 979 by seeking to protect chieftaincy from an arbitrary executive, and from parliamentary and party control, interference, and encroachment. Since chiefs appeared as indispenable agents of modernization, as they had in the colonial period, they were made members of new district, municipal, city, and regional councils, and of village, town, and area development

64 John Gunther, Inside Africa (London, I955), pp. 779-80. 6 St. Clair Drake, 'Traditional Authority and Social Action in Former British West Africa',

in Pierre L. van den Berghe (ed.), Africa: social problems of change and conflict (San Francisco, 1965),

P. 528.


committees established in order to decentralise decision-making and implementation. Chiefs and their traditional bodies were given responsibilities for mobilising support for local development projects aimed at improving living standards. This has been the tradition. It is assumed that these age-old institutions are well-adapted to encourage increased popular participation at the grassroots. Ghanaian chiefs do not, as a rule, see central authority as their adversary but as a partner. They are ready in the national interest to work with and offer advice to any government in power, whatever its professed ideology. Sym- bolically, chiefs see themselves as 'fathers' of all their people to whom they are ultimately accountable.

It therefore did not come as a surprise when, within a week of the onset of the 3ist December revolution, and in spite of the subsequent PDC attacks on chieftaincy, the Omanhene of the Ahanta Traditional Area called on the PNDC to stay in office until Ghanaians, particularly workers, were completely free from what he described as the bondage of economic strangulation. He pledged his people's support for the revolution, and called on other chiefs to rally behind the PNDC to fight tooth and nail to wipe out corruption and exploitation of the masses by the privileged few. 'In the interest of peace and unity', Nana Baidoo Bonsoe XV appealed to all the chiefs to use their traditional authority 'to support this glorious revolution'.66 Thereafter other chiefs from different regions of the country also openly pledged their support for the aims of the revolution, even though they did not hesitate to condemn the draconic measures adopted by the PNDC, as well as the widespread human rights abuses by some PDCs.

It must be noted here that the majority of the thousands of chiefs found in Ghana's hamlets, villages, towns, and big cities, who still command the respect and loyalty of the people, enjoy modest lifestyles that are scarcely distinguishable from those of the workers, peasants, or fishermen they lead. The socio-economic backgrounds and the ideological orientations of chiefs, as my own studies confirm, are as varied as those found among the general population of Ghana. The 'average chief', no less than the 'average worker' (and many chiefs are themselves workers in their occupational lives), has a vested interest in the stability, survival, and continuity of any government that is seen to be in favour of improving the general welfare of ordinary people. But support for 'populist' policies does not necessarily imply or mean a preference for socialist economic and political strategies.

66 Daily Graphic, 7 January i982, p. I.

336 MAXWELL OWUSU

By the close of i982, the National Defence Committee (NDC) - the parent body of the PDCs and WDCs - had been dissolved in large part because of popular outcry, domestic political pressures, and strong lobbying by chiefs and a variety of civic bodies, including the Christian Council of Ghana and the National Catholic Secretariat, all urging the PNDC to take effective steps to check PDC atrocities against ordinary citizens and chiefs. The official explanation for the dissolution of the NDC was that certain of its personnel were 'acting like lords competing for spheres of personal power'. The nine-member standing committee appointed by the PNDC to replace the NDC soon formulated new guidelines for the proper functioning of the PDCs, whose membership could henceforth include chiefs.

As an illustration of the new influence that some chiefs began to exercise, the Kyebi PDC executive was dismissed in early i983 after a public meeting held in the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Area, presided over by Barima Boakye Nkyira I, the Abontendomhene of Kyebi, had found that it was guilty of imposing heavy fines on individuals for petty offences, and of failing to give proper account of money collected, as well as being unable to mobilise the town people for greater productivity."

More importantly, PNDC leaders began to stress in their official speeches, press releases, and interviews that the evolving 'true democracy', far from being a carbon copy of any foreign revolution, was being built on Ghana's indigenous political traditions and values. Rawlings himself reassured the chiefs that the PNDC valued the 'positive potential of chieftaincy as a means of mobilizing the people for meaningful development'.68 In this connection, it should be observed that an editorial in The Legon Observer - the unofficial mouthpiece of intellectuals and academics - marking the 25th anniversary of Ghana's independence in March i982, came to the following conclusion after a critical assessment of the country's post-colonial political experience:

The popular view is that the structures of consultation and governance so far tried have failed the people. Whatever the case may be, there can be no quarrel with a continuing search for more appropriate models of governance. In this search, hardly a day passes without somebody urging- that indigenous institutions and practices be adopted.69

In i985 an exasperated opponent of the PNDC regime complained helplessly that 'Rawlings employed his connubial ties with the Asante

67 West Africa, 24 January i983, p. 238. 68 Afrique-Asie (Paris), May i985, p. 9. 69 The Legon Observer, i982, p. 5I.


Stool to keep the Asantehene in his fold',70 a reference to the fact that the First Lady was a member of the Asante royal family. After the I 986 CDR Guidelines had confirmed that all who were prepared to uphold and defend the basic objectives of the revolution could join, it was not long before the Asantehene became an honorary member. The good work of the CDRs in Ashanti was praised in July I988 by Otumfuo Opoku Ware II, who invited all chiefs in Ghana to co-operate effectively with CDR cadres to enhance efforts at national reconstruction. After having called Rawlings 'my son', the most powerful traditional ruler in Ghana was photographed publicly embracing the Head of State, a ritual act signifying acceptance and support for the 3ist December revolution with far-reaching political implications.

The PNDC on its part appointed a number of chiefs to influential positions: Nandom Na, Polkuu Konkuu Chiiri VI, became PNDC member and Secretary for Defence; Nana Akuoku Sarpong was made Secretary for Health; and Emmanual G. Tanoh, an Agona chief and lawyer, was appointed Secretary for Chieftaincy Affairs and Acting Attorney-General. P. V. Obeng, PNDC member and chairman of the powerful Committee of Secretaries, in explaining the prominence given to chieftaincy in the revolution, noted in i989 that 'we have co-opted the traditional authorities some way into the structure so that the cultural aspect of our nationhood is maintained and that they are involved in the process of development.'71 By then the PNDC had enacted several important laws and instruments that gave legal backing to the role of traditional institutions and practices in the revolution, notably:

the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Law, i982 and i985; the Regions of Ghana (Amendment) Law, i983, which created two new Regions along with their Houses of Chiefs; the Head of Family (Accountability) Law, i985; the Local Government Law, i988; and the various Local Government Instruments in i988 that established the new ii o District Assemblies throughout Ghana.

The Regional Co-ordinating Council (RCC) in each of the ten administrative regions of Ghana initially consisted of the Regional Secretary and all District Secretaries appointed by the PNDC, as well as Presiding Members of the District Assemblies, but the I992

constitution provided for the addition of chiefs as members. As for the functions of each RCC, these included (i) the co-ordination and formulation of integrated plans and programmes (through consultation and sharing of views with the District Assemblies), and (ii) their

70 Talking Drums (London), 25 March i985, p. I4. 71 Prisma, November i989, p. 38.

338 MAXWELL OWUSU

harmonisation with national development policies and priorities for the approval of the PNDC; also (iii) the monitoring and implementation of programmes and projects within the region, and (iv) the evaluation of their performance.

The District Assemblies have yet to achieve their full and real potential. According to Jeffrey Herbst's otherwise excellent study of the politics of reform in Ghana from 1982 to i99i, they are described as 'apolitical organizations ... [which] cannot be expected to provide political support'. He also sees as a 'defect' in the system the fact that

there is no way in which the district assemblies can transmit information from the rural areas to the national leadership. The assemblies are not designed to transmit information, and they currently lack the expertise or the resources to competently survey their constituencies even if they desired to inform the central government about the state of agriculture, the roads, or social services.72

Is this simply because members have been recruited on the basis of free non-partisan elections and appointments by the PNDC?

The fact that District Assemblies are non-partisan does not mean that they are apolitical, as T. H. Ewusi-Brookman explained in an editorial in The Pioneer:

It is reasonable to say that if one is helped to stand on a campaign platform mounted on one's behalf and others by the National Commission for Democracy, and by one's pledges to help improve the life of the community, one is elected to a district or metropolitan assembly established by PNDC Law 207, one is doing politics ... Furthermore, if a person is a PNDC appointee or nominee to a district or metropolitan assembly, that person is... also doing politics. The layman's view of the PNDC, its membership and all its components of secretaries at cabinet, regional and district levels, as well as the various revolutionary organs are all doing politics. This is despite the fact that they are doing so under no party concept and mandate.73

Indeed, the members of the Agona District Assembly saw themselves as 'politicians', and some even acted like old party-elected parliamen- tarians at district level. Moreover, according to the I986 CDR Guidelines, as thereafter provided for in the Local Government Law of i988 and the Local Government (Amendment No. 2) Law of i990,

they felt the need to keep in close touch with their constituents,

72 Jeffrey Herbst, The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-91 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford,

1993), pp- 91-2.

7 See T. H. Ewusi-Brookman, 'Is the Politician, The Scape Goat? Editorial Opinion', in Ivor Agyeman Duah (ed.), op. cit. pp. 38-9.


including their traditional authorities and Presiding Member, as well as the District Administra tive Officer and the PNDC District Secretary. The latter acts as the Government's eyes and ears, not least by channelling information from the centre to the district and vice versa, thereby helping the District Assembly to identify the needs and priorities of Agona, as well as the required resources.

THE AGONA DISTRICT EXPERIENCE

Given the rather great degree of socio-historical and geographical diversity in Ghana, any generalization about the meaning and impact of the PNDC revolution is apt to be invalid unless based on systematic studies of a wide variety of localities and districts. My Agona experience briefly presented here may help to answer the following questions: to what extent were Agona traditional authorities 'co-opted' into the structure of the revolution? and how were they involved in the process of development?

Most of the component localities of the Agona District are either villages or small rural towns, such as Kwanyako, Asafo, Abodom, Nyakrom, Nsaba, Kwaman, Duakwa, Bobikuma, and Bawjiase. Only Agona-Swedru, the district capital, with a population of over 20,000,

enjoyed an array of basic social amenities, notably pipe-borne water and electricity, and only there did commercial life, transportation, and services dominate economic activities, although farming continued to remain important. As for the population of the rural towns in the district, those employed in agriculture ranged from 57 to 8o per cent, as elsewhere in Ghana.74 There are two paramount chiefs in Agona, one at Nyakrom and the other at Nsaba, plus a number of divisional and sub-divisional chiefs, adikro, and headmen, on the Akan pattern, and data collected suggest that the majority of people felt that the district assembly concept, the cornerstone of decentralization and participatory democracy, was a natural and rational product of the basic assumptions of local indigenous political traditions.

The voting patterns and the results of the i988-9 elections for the Agona District Assembly clearly confirm this assessment.75 And so did the highly successful function organised in May i989 specifically for chiefs, cadres, assembly members, town development committees, and district heads of ministerial departments 'on the theme 'Towards Mobilisation of Available Local Resources for Development: the case

7 Ghana Population Census, i984 (Accra, I984), pp. 72-3. 7 See Owusu, 'Democracy and Africa'.

340 MAXWELL OWUSU

of District Assemblies'. About 6oo attended the two-day conference, and the enthusiasm shown by all participants, as well as the nationally respected invited speakers, was indicative of the close bonds being developed between Agona chiefs and the people.

The peaceful manner in which occasional conflicts between chiefs and revolutionary cadres were settled in Agona was another indication of the cordial and productive relationship being forged between the key traditional and non-traditional leaders. For instance, the PNDC District Secretary for Agona, H. Jehu-Appiah, and the Presiding Member of the District Assembly, B. A. K. Griffen (a retired high school principal who was also a chief of Abodom), while on a familiarisation tour in April I989 strongly urged the people of Kwaman, a small rural town, to reorganise the local CDR so as to reduce tension and enable the chiefs to work closely with the new members.76 Again, a timely intervention by Jehu-Appiah and Griffen prevented a potentially explosive situation in Upper Bobikuma, where eight chiefs were unlawfully 'destooled' in a so-called popular uprising, precipitated by an alleged exorbitant increase in funeral contributions ('nsawabode') that they had imposed on the people. An emergency meeting of the CDR convened in November i989 was reminded by the District Organising Assistant that they were not allowed to dabble in

chieftaincy matters. He appealed to the people to exercise restraint, and to resort to lawful procedures to avoid any breach of the peace. In attendance was the Assembly member for the town, and after some discussion the case was duly referred for settlement to the Omanhene of Agona Nyakrom Traditional Area, Nana Okofo Katakyi Kweku Eku IX, and his Traditional Council.

It must be noted that the new bye-laws regulating marriages and

funerals, which applied to 'all natives' living in the Nyakrom Traditional Area as from December i988, had been passed by the Traditional Council in February in exercise of the powers conferred on

its Funeral and Marriage Committee by traditional customary law

under section 4' of the Chieftaincy Act, No. 270 of I97I. The term 'natives' means Cpersons or group of persons living in the Nyakrom Traditional Area ... of Agona Nationality and may include strangers who have naturalized and are willing to adopt these laws'."7 The

Agona CDR leadership appear to have accepted in principle the

76 See 'Report on the Familiarization Tour of the Agona District by the PNDC Secretary and the Presiding Member of the Agona District Assembly', i989.

77'Marriage and Funeral Bye-Laws, i988, by the Agona Nyakrom Traditional Council', I988, p. 4-


dictum expressed by one Agona chief I interviewed, that' Tum bi woho ana aban reba': namely, 'The authority of the chief existed before the establishment of the modern state'. This was certainly a far cry from the early days of the revolution in I 982, when the Agona-Swedru WDC had demanded that the Court Grade I Magistrate and Registrar be transferred because of their 'corrupt and counter-revolutionary activities'.78

These and other isolated and yet 'normal' conflicts between chiefs and CDRs did not disturb the on-going integration of traditional institutions into the structure and dynamics of the revolution in the Agona district, as may be illustrated by the following developments:

I. The National Mobilisation Programme, which started in i983 as an emergency measure to receive and resettle those expelled from Nigeria, soon became a viable and profitable enterprise in Agona thanks to the ready support given by local chiefs. They freely released communal lands to what became known as 'Mobisquads', who undertook a variety of projects in the district - including the cultivation of maize, pepper, coffee, cocoa, and oil palm - with some of the profits made being ploughed back into community development. Some Mobisquads became co-operatives, and the only two with this status in the Central Region were Mensakrom and Mankrong in the Agona district. Concurrently, the 3 I St December Women's Movement, headed by the First Lady, was also allocated lands by chiefs. Some of the I I

branches established in Agona began to manufacture soap, while others ran day nurseries and care centres for working mothers.

2. Like all chiefs throughout Ghana, those in Agona continued to use traditional festivals, such as Akwambo, as well as other ceremonial occasions, including durbars, to explain and propagate the ideals and aims of the revolution, to announce policy decisions, and to 'outdoor' development projects. Chiefs were actively involved in programmes associated with creation of district assemblies and their inauguration in I988-9. Of the 22 appointed by the PNDC as members of the Agona District Assembly, half were chiefs, as well as one of the 48 who had been elected. The Presiding Member, perhaps the most dominant personality in the Assembly, was as already noted a chief. At the national level, chiefs were effectively represented in the National Consultative Assembly inaugurated in August i99i, which debated and adopted the draft proposals for the I 992 Fourth Republican Constitution.

J Nsamankow (Accra), 7, 24-30 September 1982, p. 8.

342 MAXWELL OWUSU

3. The Agona Fankobaa Kuw, a national association of citizens of the District, was founded in early i989 with the full support of chiefs and people of Agona. In May, some 30-40 delegates representing chapters from across the country attended a meeting chaired by Nana Ampim Darko V of Kwanyako, the main brain behind the organisation, which was formally inaugurated two months later at an impressive ceremony in Accra at the Ghana Institute of Journalism (GIJ). The main speaker for the occasion was Nana Kwesi Obuadum XI (Emmanuel G. Tanoh) of Nsaba, the PNDC Secretary for Chieftaincy Affairs and Acting Attorney-General. The guests of honour included Kwesi Botchwey, PNDC Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, a citizen of Agona Asafo; the Paramount Chiefs of Agona-Nyakrom and Agona-Nsaba Traditional Areas; the High Commissioner of Canada to Ghana; and the PNDC District Secretary for Agona, Jehu-Appiah, whose grandfather had founded the nationally famous Musma Disco Christo Church, an African-Christian movement. The masters of ceremony were H. B. Baiden, a wealthy businessman, and Kweku Darko (alias Super 0. D.), a nationally acclaimed and beloved TV and radio entertainer from Agona Abodom.

4. The appointment of so many Agona to PNDC membership was a source of local pride. Apart from those already mentioned, those from this distinct Akan minority included Kojo Yankah, Director of the GIJ, Kwamena Ahwoi, Secretary for Local Government, and Major (Rtd) Abraham Sam, Under-Secretary for Roads and Highways. In I993

the Omanhene of Agona-Nyakrom Traditional Area conferred on Botchwey, Ghana's longest serving Finance Minister, the title of

fkosohene, or 'Chief of National Progress', in recognition of his contribution to economic recovery and development.

5. The CDRs, as well as other revolutionary organs such as theJune 4th Movement and the Civil Defence Organisation, were widely presumed to stand in a similar special relationship to the Agona District Assembly as the Asafo companies enjoyed with the traditional councils of chiefs and elders. Indeed, at the grassroots level, the membership tended to overlap, not surprisingly since their functions were rather similar, and many of the chiefs accepted this as the revolution's tribute to their leadership.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

The hard evidence from Agona is quite consistent with data collected from other districts, and shows that far from being a decaying


institution as some have claimed, the chiefs were deeply involved in the revolution right from the beginning, and made tangible and significant contributions to the process of change. In I935, when the British colonial authorities restored the Asante Confederacy, there were about 9,ooo gazetted chiefs in the Gold Coast of all categories - namely, the Asantehene, paramount chiefs, divisional chiefs, sub-chiefs, adikro, and headmen, with a national population of only 3-5 million. Over 50 years and many radical changes later, the number of chiefs had risen steeply to over 32,000, with a national population of 125 million according to the I 984 census.

The PNDC politics of popular power cannot be completely comprehended without systematic reference to tradition and traditionalism. The revolutionary process itself, right up to the inauguration of the Fourth Republic and constitutional democracy, could be characterised as a mixture of authoritarianism, populism, traditionalism, and liberalism typical of Ghana's deferential society. The mixture, of course, tilted heavily towards one or other of the ' isms', depending on local factors and objective conditions. The reality is that this is a country not only with a mixed economy, but a mixed polity as well. As Carl Stone has argued, all contemporary political systems exhibit a varying mix of basic tendencies - namely, populism, liberalism, and authoritarianism - and political change is a 'dialectical process whereby contending social interests seek to alter the balances and mix among these basic elements' depending on historical circumstances.79 Traditionalism must obviously be added in the African context.

" Carl Stone, 'Democracy and Socialism in Jamaica, 1972-1979', in Henry Paget and Stone (eds.), The Newer Caribbean Decolonization Democracy and Development (Philadelphia, Institute for the Study of Human Issues, i984), p. 236.

tradition and transformation: democracy and the politics of popular power in ghana by maxwell owusu

Documents