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Just days after lavishly celebrating Easter with his crusade army in April of 1192, King Richard I of England received some stunningly bad news. A messenger from England informed him that his younger brother John had expelled the king’s administrators and would soon seize most of Richard’s lands and revenues if the king did not return to England immediately.1 The Third Crusade had not been going well, and after some deliberation Richard elected to leave for home as soon as possible. Before heading to England, the crusader-king needed to grant someone the authority to command the crusade in his absence. Guy of Lusignan, whom Richard supported, and Conrad of Montferrat, who enjoyed the support of many of the barons in the crusader states, emerged as the most likely candidates. Richard could not simply appoint his preferred candidate and be on his way, however. According to Ambroise, the eyewitness Third Crusade chronicler who authored L’Estoire de la Guerre Sainte, the king’s men informed him that “if he did not create in the land a lord who understood war and whom everyone could support…they would all follow him and

1 A mbroise, L’Estoire de la Guerre Sainte, ed. Marianne A iles and Malcolm Barber, trans. Marianne A iles (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2003), 146.

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Kingship in Miniature: Richard I and the Third Crusade

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abandon the land.”2

Faced with this reality, Richard put the issue to a vote, and the crusade army unanimously voiced their support for Conrad. Although Richard did not care for this outcome, he had little choice but to respect the camp’s decision. This episode perfectly encapsulated Richard’s style of command both as a ruler of the Angevin empire and as a monarch on crusade. Far from an all-powerful ruler, Richard needed the support of his men in order to lead successfully, and he rarely acted without at least consulting a council of advisors, even on crusade.3 The king ultimately derived his power through the support of the great men of the realm. If his support base dried up, the monarch faced political catastrophe. Richard therefore used a variety of methods to ensure both the stability of his position and the satisfaction of the aristocrats surrounding him. Angevin rulership entailed a constant give-and-take between the king and his leading men, and an armed expedition into the Levant proved no different for Richard I.

This article argues that Richard I effectively transposed many of the

2 Ibid., 148.

3 Ibid., 173.

This 1927 oil painting by artist Glen Warren Philpot depicts Richard I departing England for the Holy Land with his crusading host. (Photo courtesy of www.parliament.uk.)1

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ruling strategies he employed in governing the Angevin Empire onto his attempt to lead the Third Crusade. For Western European monarchs in the late twelfth century, successful rule required a delicate balance of negotiation, persuasion, and occasional force, and this balance could often be quite difficult to strike correctly. Indeed, the crusader camp became something of a laboratory for Richard, allowing him to experiment with and determine the degree to which various aspects of Angevin kingship translated to the Levant. Richard the Lionheart’s preferred methods of rule proved exceedingly adaptable, to the point that the king of England enjoyed great success implementing them during his pilgrimage to the Holy Land. These malleable tools of the trade included the king’s personality and skillful manipulation of his image, patronage, readiness to negotiate, and warfare tactics.

Historians of Richard I generally fall into one of two schools, viewing Richard as either a poor monarch who neglected and exploited his kingdom, or conversely as an exemplary ruler who either met or exceeded contemporary ideals of kingship. The less rosy view of Richard’s reign came into prominence in the late nineteenth century, with the publication of England Under the Angevin Kings by Kate Norgate, who found Richard to be a reckless warmonger, and something of a political lightweight.4 Sir Steven Runciman reinforced this negative portrait in the 1950s with his towering work, A History of the Crusades. Runciman cast Richard as an impetuous hothead who “had neither the political astuteness and administrative competence of his father, nor Queen Eleanor’s sound sense.”5 In 1974, James Brundage largely echoed Runciman’s view of Richard as a talented military leader with few other virtues of note, going so far as to label Richard “one of the worst rulers that England has ever had.”6

This school of thought held sway until the late 1970s, when John Gillingham began attempting to counterbalance what he viewed as inaccurate portrayals of Richard’s reign. In 1999 he published a biography, Richard I, that stands as the premier piece of scholarship in the field.7

4 Kate Norgate, England Under the Angevin Kings (London: MacMillan, 1887).

5 Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades, vol. 3, The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 35.

6 James A. Brundage, Richard Lion Heart (New York: Scribner, 1974), 258.

7 John Gill ingham, Richard I (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).

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Gillingham contends that, far from a neglectful king or feckless knight-errant, by the standards of his day Richard I was an excellent monarch and skilled diplomat. Jean Flori’s excellent study of Richard’s reign in connection with the emerging chivalric ethic arrives at many of the same conclusions, although Flori chides Gillingham for his tendency toward hero-worship.8 Nevertheless, Gillingham’s view of Richard I gained traction throughout the final decades of the twentieth century, particularly in the works of J.O. Prestwich and Richard Heiser. Prestwich praises King Richard as a ruler “intelligibly concerned to employ his great military talents in the widely extended interests of the house of Anjou,” while Heiser points to Richard’s shrieval appointments as proof of his administrative competence.9 Even so, such positive portrayals of Richard’s reign by no means enjoy universal acceptance, and in many ways his legacy remains a topic of debate.10

Regardless, this almost obsessive focus on whether Richard ought to be remembered as a “good’ or “bad” monarch has left a gap in scholarship that this paper is intended to fill. While the reign of Richard I has been scrutinized extensively, particularly his involvement in the Third Crusade, there has been no study analyzing the commonalities between Richard’s strategies of rulership in the Angevin and his strategies of command on crusade. The majority of the work dealing with Richard’s time on crusade attempts to determine whether the Third Crusade should ultimately be deemed a “success” or a “failure.” As with the good king/bad king dichotomy, this preoccupation does little to forward our understanding of Richard I or the period in which he lived. By looking at Richard’s methods of command and governance both in Europe and on crusade, this paper sheds some light on a neglected area ripe for further study.

8 Jean Flori, Richard the Lionheart: King and Knight, trans. Jean Birrell (Paris: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 40.

9 J.O. Prestwich, “R ichard Coeur de Lion: Rex Bell icosus,” in Richard Coeur de Lion in History and Myth, ed. Janet L. Nelson (Exeter, UK: Short Run Press, 1992), 15. See also R ichard R. Heiser, “R ichard I and His Appointments to English Shrievalties,” English Historical Review 112, no. 445 (1997): 2 .

10 Michael Markowsk i, “R ichard Lionheart: bad k ing, bad crusader?” Journal of Medieval History 23, no. 4 (1997): 351-365.

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The Man Who Would Be King: Richard I in Aquitaine and the AngevinAt its height, the Angevin Empire extended from England’s Scottish border to the Pyrenees.11 It encompassed all of England, as well as large swaths of continental territory that included Brittany, Poitou, and Normandy, among others. The term “empire,” however, with its connotations of centralization and relatively unified governance, is something of a misnomer in the Angevin case. The territories comprising Angevin dominions functioned as completely separate entities, a loosely connected collection of lands with distinct sets of laws and customs.12 Henry II treated his “empire” as something akin to a family business, owned and operated by the king and his sons. Each son received a parcel of land for his own that he then ruled as a fief.13 Despite his position as the duke of Aquitaine, however, Richard remained his father’s vassal, owing him both loyalty and service.

In contrast to more firmly attached Angevin dominions like England and Normandy, Richard’s duchy of Aquitaine harbored an independent streak that often made it more difficult to rule effectively. As Gillingham put it, “in Aquitaine … it is not that ducal authority did not exist at all; it is rather that it was ‘patchy.’”14 As duke of Aquitaine, Richard found himself constantly at odds with rebellious local lords, particularly Viscount Aimar of Limoges and Count William of Angoulême. Dealing with this cabal of enemies dominated Richard’s time and efforts until his accession to the throne.15

Thus, the nature of the Angevin Empire, and feudal societies more generally, accustomed Richard I to recognizing another’s authority over him, as well as to the difficulties of enforcing his will on unruly vassals and seigneurs. The concept of an all-powerful king simply did not exist in twelfth-century Western Europe. In its place there existed a constantly shifting balance of power between the king and his nobles. If Richard wished to govern Aquitaine and the Angevin Empire effectively, this balance required him to make good use of all the techniques of rulership

11 John Gill ingham, The Angevin Empire (London: Hodder A rnold, 2001), 1 .

12 R ichard Huscroft, Ruling England: 1042-1217 (London: Pearson, 2005), 152 .

13 Ibid., 159.

14 Gill ingham, Angevin Empire, 54.

15 Gill ingham, Richard I, 52 .

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at his disposal, methods that he effectively transposed onto his attempt to command the Third Crusade army. These included Richard’s personality and image, patronage, ability to negotiate, and warfare tactics. All proved useful to the king in the Levant.

When Richard I left for the Holy Land with his crusading army in July of 1190, he departed less than ten months after his coronation at Westminster as the new king of England.16 Despite his relatively recent ascension to the throne, the newly minted monarch proved anything but a neophyte when it came to rulership. At age thirty-two, Richard already possessed over a decade and a half of experience in governance and warfare through his role as the duke of Aquitaine. Installed as the nominal ruler of the duchy in 1172 at the age of fifteen, Richard spent two years governing Aquitaine under the watchful eye of Henry II, his father and the reigning king of England, before gaining enough latitude to exercise sole control.17 In many ways, Richard the Lionheart’s initial position as a lord in his father’s Angevin Empire served as a training ground in which Richard forged and refined his preferred

16 Ibid., Richard I, 107, 128.

17 Jean Flori, 30.

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ultrices tempus. Suspendisse a quam ex. (Photo by Xxxx Xxxx.)1

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methods of ruling.Ironically, Richard only received free reign in Aquitaine after a failed

rebellion against his father in which he and two of his brothers played leading roles.18 Roger of Howden, a royal clerk who chronicled the reigns of both Henry II and Richard I in his Chronica Magistri, reported that Richard, “coming with tears … fell on his face upon the ground at the feet of his father, and imploring pardon, was received into his father’s bosom.”19

Although Howden’s anecdote seems to imply that Richard’s celebrated career as both a military commander and a leader of men began rather inauspiciously, such an interpretation ignores the societal conventions prevalent here. Performance and ritualized emotion both played important roles in the lives of medieval elites, and in later years Richard repeatedly demonstrated that he understood the importance of putting on a good show.20 True, prostrating himself before his father after a failed military endeavor and begging forgiveness through tears hardly fit the image that Richard later cultivated, when his brave deeds earned him both the adoration of contemporaries and the epithet “Lionheart.” Nevertheless, here Richard might be more accurately characterized as a shrewd diplomat rather than a naïve teenager out of his depth. He recognized his situation, conceded defeat, and performed an elaborate type of public penance to enable reconciliation with his father.

At any rate, this public display of contrition accomplished its objective, and Henry II entrusted Richard with the pacification of the Aquitainian lords that took his son’s side in the revolt.21 Perhaps grateful for the chance to prove himself, Richard embraced his new task of subduing the rebels. Although still a promising young knight at this stage, there clearly remained much for Richard to learn regarding the complexities of both rulership and war in order to become “the Richard of legend” described by J. O. Prestwich.22 The future king proved to be a quick study, however. Over

18 Roger of Wendover, Flowers of History: The History of England from the Descent of the Saxons to A. D. 1235, trans. J. A. Giles (London: H.G. Bohn, 1849), 2:23.

19 Roger of Howden, Chronica Magistr i Rogeri Hoveden , in The Annals of Roger de Hoveden: Comprising the History of England and of Other Countries from A.D. 732 to A.D. 1201, trans. Henr y T. R iley (London: H.G. Bohn, 1853), 2:385.

20 Flori, 407.

21 Ibid., 390.

22 Prestwich,16.

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the next fifteen years, Richard learned to use all the tools of negotiation, leadership, and coercion at his disposal as a feudal lord. These techniques of command and governance informed not only Richard’s decision-making as ruler of the Angevin Empire, but also greatly influenced his leadership of the Third Crusade.

According to Richard Huscroft, “One thing more than any other remained crucial in determining the effectiveness of royal rule: the personality of the king.”23 Richard I understood this well, and his charismatic, larger-than-life personality made him the kind of ruler that other men wanted to follow. One example from Richard’s time in Aquitaine demonstrated this point in spectacular fashion. Then twenty-two years old, Richard established his reputation as both a warrior and a leader by successfully capturing the previously untouchable castle of Taillebourg in 1179. In his Flowers of History, a largely secondhand work compiled during the early thirteenth century, the English monk and chronicler Roger of Wendover makes it clear that contemporaries viewed the young commander’s conquest as a triumph over nearly impossible odds: “Richard duke of Aquitaine … laid siege to Taillebourg, one of his castles, a bold enterprise, which none of his ancestors had dared to undertake, for the castle was up to that time unknown to its enemies … for which reason it entertained no fear from duke Richard’s approach.”24 Nonetheless, within three days, with Richard himself leading the way in the climactic battle at the castle gates on the final day, Taillebourg capitulated, and Richard returned to England, “where he was received with the greatest honors by king Henry.”25 A successful king needed to court the favor of the powerful aristocratic establishment. Such displays of Richard’s chivalric prowess and virtuosic military talents played particularly well with men who viewed themselves as members of an elite military caste.26

Patronage represented another crucial arrow in the king’s quiver. The ruler of the Angevin Empire, as the kingdom’s most powerful feudal lord, had it well within his power to instantly make or break men by determining

23 Huscroft, 170.

24 Roger of Wendover, 2:48-49.

25 Ibid., 49.

26 John France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300 (Ithaca, N Y: Cornell University Press, 1999), 39.

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who received coveted marriage rights, wardships, and other privileges.27 An especially famous example of Richard dispensing patronage concerned the favor he bestowed on William Marshal, a knight in his father’s household.28 Richard awarded William the right to marry the daughter of the Earl of Pembroke. As Gillingham put it, this action made Marshal “a millionaire overnight” and ensured the loyalty of a potentially hostile holdover from the reign of Henry II.29 Fortunes stood to be made through the process of royal patronage, and the nobles and great men of the realm hoping to become the next William Marshal clamored for the king’s attention. This zero-sum game often required a deft touch on the part of the monarch. Favoring one man usually meant spurning another, and as a result patronage spawned many aristocratic malcontents. Theoretically, the king could also demand full repayment of outstanding debt at any time, although in practice this rarely occurred.30 Thus, patronage served as both a carrot and a stick, and political stability in the Angevin often hinged upon the king’s skillful management of a small but incredibly powerful class of nobles and landowners.31

Richard I’s skill at settling disputes emerged as another hallmark of his reign. Examples abound of Richard’s aptitude at the negotiating table, with many of the most prominent occurring amid the flurry of activity that accompanied the monarch’s preparations to embark on crusade. In November of 1189, Richard successfully arbitrated a seemingly insoluble dispute between the archbishop and monks of Canterbury.32 According to Richard of Devizes, an English monk writing about a generation after the king’s death, before departing Richard “accepted a pledge from the petty kings of the Welsh and the Scots that whilst he was on pilgrimage they would not cross their borders to do harm to England.”33 In the case of his agreement with William the Lion, the king of Scotland, Richard also received 10,000 silver marks, no doubt an appreciated addition to the crusade war chest.34

27 Huscroft, 158.

28 Roger of Howden, 2:115.


30 Gill ingham, Angevin Empire, 79.

31 Ibid.

32 Roger of Wendover, 2:85.

33 R ichard of Devizes, Cronicon Richardi Divisensis de Tempore Regis Richardi Primi, ed. and trans. John T. Appleby (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963), 7.


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Finally, Richard proved particularly adept at transplanting Western methods of warfare into the Levant. Indeed, his overall strategy changed remarkably little. Eighteen years of constant campaigning and nearly unbroken fighting in Aquitaine left Richard well prepared to lead an army, especially since warfare in the Holy Land revolved around sieges and supply lines just as it did in Europe.35 Gillingham noted that “if one looks at Richard’s campaigns in Europe … they conform [to] a pattern of ravaging and besieging.”36 Medieval warfare rarely involved engaging enemies in battle. Most commanders found pitched combat far too risky, and balked at the idea that the careful work of months might be undone in a few unlucky hours. Only in the most extreme circumstances did commanders consider risking their prohibitively expensive medieval war machines on the battlefield.37 Indeed, Gillingham estimates that, at most, Richard fought only two or three battles during his entire military career.38

The dominant strategy, then, became outlasting opponents by cutting off their supplies and starving them out. Roger of Howden described a typical campaign of the period led by Richard’s younger brother Geoffrey against Henry II, in which Geoffrey and a group of foreign mercenaries began to “ravage his father’s territories, and nefariously lay them waste … burning towns and villages to the ground … so as to cause utter destruction in every quarter.”39 Richard himself engaged in similar activities at the siege of Taillebourg, where he “carried off the produce, cut down the vines,

35 John Gill ingham, “R ichard I and the Science of War,” in Richard Coeur de Lion: Kinghsip, Chivalry and War in the Twelf th Century, ed. John Gill ingham (London: Hambledon Press, 1994), 212, 217.

36 Ibid., 218.

37 France, 8.

38 Gill ingham, “R ichard I and the Science of War,” 213.

39 Roger of Howden, 1:23.

Lorem Ipsum yada yada yada. (Photo courtesy of Xxxx Xxxxx.)

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burned the villages, and demolished every thing” in the hopes of inducing a quick surrender.40 Thus, military engagements in the late twelfth century often amounted to wars of attrition, with victories determined by solid supply routes and well-built fortifications, as opposed to brilliant battle strategies. Military historian John France declared Richard I the greatest European commander of the period from 1000-1300 precisely because Richard enjoyed unparalleled success at this type of siege warfare.41

The Best-Laid Plans: Difficulties, Detours, and Delays on the Road to AcreUpon his accession to the throne in 1189, Richard hurriedly set about making preparations for the crusade. Although ten months passed before he departed for the Levant, Richard hardly sat idle during the intervening period. The king’s most pressing concern involved raising money for his crusade, an incredibly expensive enterprise. Although Richard gained access to approximately 100,000 silver marks that remained in the treasury of Henry II, this sum still fell short of his needs.42 To address the problem of fundraising, Richard shifted the regular business of royal patronage into overdrive and began selling offices, lordships, and lands at breakneck speed. Richard of Devizes famously recorded the king joking that he “would have sold London itself” if he had managed to find a buyer, a comment that captures the remarkable efficiency with which Richard I conducted financial transactions during this period.43

Richard needed funds not only to provide for his troops in the field but also for reasons closely bound up in contemporary methods of rule. Royal largesse, a critical component of kingship, served several purposes. It helped cement loyalties and alliances with major lords and also functioned as payment and encouragement for lesser men.44 Richard regularly used largesse on crusade to accomplish a variety of goals, from securing loyalty to raising his own prestige.

After several delays and false starts, Richard I and Philip II of France


41 France, 142 .

42 Flori, 84.

43 R ichard of Devizes, 9.

44 Flori, 337, 340.

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departed for the Holy Land on July 4, 1190, with the understanding that they shared command of the crusade equally.45 The Sicilian port of Messina served as the first major stop along the monarchs’ rather episodic journey to Outremer, and this extended layover functions as a useful case study for kingship on crusade.

Ambroise’s L’Estoire de la Guerre Sainte and the Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi I comprise the two major primary sources for the Third Crusade and Richard’s time in the Levant. An ardent admirer of Richard’s, the Norman minstrel-crusader Ambroise personally witnessed much of what he describes and probably wrote his chronicle sometime between the conclusion of the crusade and Richard’s death. This is evidenced by the fact that he makes no mention of the monarch’s demise. The unknown author of the Itinerarium, believed to be a monk named Richard de Templo writing around 1216, borrowed much of his material from Ambroise, although the account contains a great deal of original content as well.

Both chroniclers make it plain that rulers in the twelfth century were fully expected to look the part. The author of the Itinerarium believed that “he should not appear less than he is; no, his appearance should match his actual power” and “whatever sort of character the king has, it is naturally reflected in outer appearance.”46 Richard I understood the importance of image and thus calculated his arrival at Messina to create a sense of awe among onlookers, which included French crusaders. Sailing with a huge fleet of galleys, the king of England “stood out on a prow which was higher and more ornate than the rest … willingly putting himself on show for all to see.”47 Richard’s grand entrance achieved its aim, and viewers on the shore remarked that such a display befit his royal status.

While in Messina, tensions ran high between the crusaders and the native Sicilians, called Griffons by the crusade chroniclers. Although Philip chose to ignore these spats, Richard took a decidedly more demonstrative tack: “The king of France concealed whatever his men did or suffered, or kept silent about it. The king of England, giving no heed to the nationality

45 A mbroise, 35.

46 Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi , in Chronicle of the Third Crusade,trans. Helen J. Nicholson (Brookf ield, VT: Ashgate, 1997), 156.

47 Ibid., 157.

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of anyone involved in a crime, considered every man his subject and left no offence unpunished.” He continued, “For this reason the Griffons called one king the Lamb and the other the Lion.”48 Thus, the king of England demonstrated his zeal for justice by taking actions both public and symbolic. As with his carefully stage-managed arrival, Richard inflated his reputation and gained respect through a combination of image and personality.

Throughout his stay in Sicily, Richard negotiated with the island’s ruler, Tancred, for the return of his sister Joan’s dower. Joan had been married to the recently deceased William of Sicily, and now Tancred refused to surrender what Richard felt was rightfully his.49 Negotiations seemed to be at an impasse when, during a meeting with Tancred, news reached Richard of street fights between the crusaders and Sicilians. Seizing his chance, Richard “at once put on his armour, took up his weapons, shut them up inside their city and laid siege to it.”50 Throwing himself into the fray, the king of England quickly took Messina. Never missing a chance to praise Richard for prowess in warfare, the author of the Itinerarium wrote he “was the first in every attack … giving his troops an example of courage and striking fear into the enemy.”51 Although this account of Richard’s role in the fighting is likely overblown, a clear picture nonetheless emerges of Richard as a commander who preferred to lead from the front. This trait greatly endeared the king to his men, who respected him for his courage in battle.

Sufficiently cowed by Richard’s show of force, Tancred came to terms quickly enough, offering twenty thousand ounces of gold for peace.52 Richard self-consciously associated himself with chivalric ideals, and reciprocated by presenting Tancred with Excalibur, the Arthurian sword of legend.53 Afterward, in a representative display of royal largesse, the king of England handsomely rewarded his soldiers: “Richard—who is not mean or miserly—gave them such great gifts … that all men praised him for his fine gifts … and he did them such honour that even he who went on foot had one hundred sous from him.”54


49 Gill ingham, Richard I, 137.

50 Itinerarium Perigrinorum , 160.

51 Ibid ., 162 .

52 A mbroise, 45.


54 A mbroise, 46.

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According to Gillingham, several unexpected months in Sicily had begun to wear on many of the crusaders, and “only Richard’s generosity in distributing gifts to all and sundry held the troops together.”55 Through a combination of calculated acts, military prowess, and a healthy dose of charisma, Richard lived up to contemporary notions of rulership at Messina. Much of medieval kingship involved performance, and Richard the Lionheart excelled as a performer.

The next lengthy stopover along Richard’s route to the Holy Land came at Cyprus. Philip sailed from Messina on March 30, 1191, and arrived without incident in Acre three weeks later.56 Richard’s fleet, however, became separated by a storm, and three ships ran aground at Cyprus. At the orders of Isaac Comnenus, the rogue Byzantine ruling the island without imperial sanction, Cypriots pillaged the wrecks and captured the surviving sailors.57 When Isaac refused Richard’s order to hand over the prisoners and treasure, military engagement became inevitable. The chroniclers found in the interlude at Cyprus yet another opportunity to extol Richard’s heroic


56 Itinerarium Pergrinorum , 173.

57 A mbroise, 51 .

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deeds, and the king provided them with ample material. The Itinerarium reports that Richard “took the lead himself in jumping out of his barge into the sea, and boldly attacked the Griffons.”58 After Richard’s army routed the Cypriots into a full retreat, Ambroise records a chivalric anecdote bordering on the preposterous: the king of England chasing the fleeing Isaac on horseback and shouting, “Emperor, come joust!”59 Although the veracity of such tales is questionable, they reinforced Richard’s formidable reputation for valor. Far from mindless bravery, the king’s recklessness in warfare accomplished the practical goals of elevating his troops’ morale and intimidating his enemies.60 There was a method to Richard’s apparent madness.

Two important developments for Richard’s future role as a crusading monarch stemmed from the Cyprus campaign. First, he acquired an enormous treasure haul from his capture of the island, and this money gave him the freedom to spend extravagantly and recruit soldiers.61 Second, while at Cyprus Richard threw his support behind Guy of Lusignan in the succession crisis facing the Latin crusader states. This decision proved controversial in the extreme, as Guy’s rival, Conrad of Montferrat, enjoyed more widespread support in the crusader settlements.62 It appears that Richard ultimately supported Guy because he considered him family, since Guy had been married to Richard’s cousin, Queen Sibylla of Jerusalem, until her death a few years earlier. This conformed to the well-established Angevin ruling philosophy that placed a premium on protecting family land interests, however distant the relationship.63 Richard’s widely criticized choice amounted to an act of royal patronage firmly rooted in the traditional ruling methods of the Angevin Empire.

58 Itinerarium Peregerinorum , 185.

59 A mbroise, 53.

60 Gill ingham, “The A rt of K ingship: R ichard I 1189-99,” in Richard Coeur de Lion: Kingship, Chivalry and War in the Twelf th Century, ed. John Gill ingham (London: Hambledon Press, 1994), 101 .

61 Flori, 118.

62 Itinerarium Peregrinorum , 303.

63 Gill ingham, Angevin Empire, 41 .

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A Crusade Deferred: Rivalry, Infighting, and the Derailment of the Third CrusadeHaving been delayed nearly two months, Richard finally left Cyprus and sailed into Acre on June 8, 1191.64 Almost a year after his departure, the king of England at last arrived in the Holy Land. He entered Acre with his customary pomp and, as Richard of Devizes describes it, “was received by the besiegers with as much joy as if he had been Christ Himself returning to earth to restore the kingdom of Israel.”65 The king of England’s behavior during the siege of Acre, however, could hardly be described as Christ-like. Throughout the crusade, the rivalry between Philip and Richard simmered, and at Acre things finally came to a boil. The Itinerarium describes Richard’s determination to outdo Philip in every conceivable sphere: “He later learnt that the king of France paid each knight three gold coins a month, and as a result had won the favour and gratitude of everyone. King Richard did not wish anyone to seem superior or even equal to him in dealings of any kind.” He therefore “ordered a proclamation made to the whole army that he would pay a fixed rate of four gold coins a month to each knight who wanted employment, regardless of country of origin.”66

In addition to generosity and valor, pride constituted an integral element of Richard’s kingly personage, at times to the detriment of the crusade. For example, soon after Richard’s arrival, Philip urged an immediate full-scale assault on the city.67 Richard had fallen ill, however, and according to Ambroise wished to delay the attack until he recovered.68 Richard, then, showed himself unwilling to help Philip take the city unless he could personally play a significant role in the fighting. By the time Acre finally fell a month later, the relationship between the two monarchs had soured beyond any hope of reconciliation. Making excuses related to an illness—although the Itinerarium claims “there was no evidence to support his assertion”—Philip returned to France.69

64 A mbroise, 62, 66.



67 Justin L. Matthews, “The Great Men of Christendom: The Failure of the Third Crusade” (Master’s Thesis, Western Kentucky University, 2011), 40. Accessed April 7, 2013. http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/1115/

68 A mbroise, 95.

69 Itinerarium Peregrinorum, 223.

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In theory, Philip’s sudden departure left the king of England in sole command of the crusader army. The reality of Richard’s situation proved much more complicated. Although serving as the nominal leader for the remainder of the expedition, Richard could not simply issue commands and expect them to be universally followed. The Third Crusade army contained English, French, Genoese, Pisan, and German crusaders, in addition to Templars, Hospitallers, and knights from the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.70 Balancing and pacifying so many competing interests became the chief

task confronting Richard for the remainder of the crusade. As a result, his practiced skill of negotiating the complex political landscape of Western Europe came to the fore in the Holy Land.

Following the departure of Philip, Richard encountered great difficulty convincing the French crusaders to leave their comfortable positions at Acre and variously resorted to prayer, bribery, and force to compel them to follow him.71 According to the Itinerarium, Richard regularly convened councils of “princes and magistrates of the people” when deciding strategy and generally consented to the majority view.72 Even after deciding on a course of action, the king of England could still be convinced to change his mind. On two separate occasions, Richard bowed to the wishes of the crusader army and began to

march toward Jerusalem, only to ultimately side with the military orders and call off the march when the army was within a few miles of the Holy City.73

The first time a march on Jerusalem ended in a disappointing retreat, the French crusaders left the army and only agreed to rejoin Richard several

70 Flori, 148.


72 Ibid., 263.

73 A mbroise, 137, 173.

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days later, with the conditions that they were only to be bound to him until Easter, and that if they wished to leave before that date they should be free to do so.74 The second occasion so incensed the rank-and-file that it more or less led to the dissolution of the Third Crusade. Distraught Frenchmen camped as far as possible from the rest of the army, and Hugh of Burgundy composed a mocking tune about Richard that Ambroise described as “a base song, full of baseness, which spread throughout the army.”75 Never one to be outdone, Richard attempted to save face in front of his men by responding with an unflattering song of his own directed at Hugh.76 By this juncture, no doubt remained that Richard’s efforts to balance opposing interests had failed, and factionalism soon tore the crusade apart.

The crusader-king also channeled his diplomatic energies outwards and frequently met with Saladin’s brother, Safadin. According to Bahāʼ ad-Dīn, a contemporary Arab chronicler and close confidant of Saladin, during one round of negotiations the king of England attempted to broker a peace settlement by marrying his sister Joan to Safadin.77 Unfortunately, talks broke down when Joan was actually told of the plan: “The royal lady had been presented with the marriage plan by her brother and it made her very displeased and angry.” He continued, “Indeed, she rejected it utterly and swore by her religion with the most binding of oaths that she would not consent. How could she possibly allow a Muslim to have carnal knowledge of her!”78

Richard’s willingness to negotiate with the enemies of Christendom rubbed many crusaders the wrong way. According to the author of the Itinerarium, “His people felt he was open to considerable criticism for this, and it was said to be sinful to contract friendship with Gentiles.”79 While diplomatic overtures and marriage proposals of this sort constituted standard operating procedure for settling disputes between the rulers of Western Europe, this aspect of kingship did not translate particularly well into the Levant. To a number of crusaders, Christians and Muslims were


75 A mbroise, 174.

76 Ibid., 174.

77 Bahāʼ ad-D īn Ibn Shaddād, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin , trans. D.S. R ichards (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), 187.

78 Ibid., 188.


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natural enemies, and that ought to have been the end of it.In contrast, Richard encountered little trouble integrating his deep

knowledge of warfare and tactics into his leadership of the crusade. At Acre, Gillingham points out, “the Franks had faced military problems essentially the same as those they would have faced in any siege of a similar town in Europe.”80 Indeed, a sickly Richard found tactics at Acre so familiar that he managed to command his men from his mattress.81 At Arsuf, the only pitched battle that Richard fought in the Holy Land, under the king of England’s savvy generalship the famed Frankish cavalry charge carried the day.82 As the only Christian commander to defeat Saladin in battle, Richard I greatly enhanced his reputation for military prowess while in Outremer. The Continuation of William of Tyre, a chronicle of events in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem updated at various points in the thirteenth century by Frankish settlers, reports that Richard became something of a bogeyman to Muslims in the Levant: “King Richard’s renown terrified the Saracens so much that when their children cried their mothers would scare them for the king of England and say, ‘Be quiet for the king of England!’” In addition, “When a Saracen was riding his horse and his mount stumbled at a shadow, he would say to him, ‘Do you think the king of England is in that bush?’”83

Richard’s European warfare experiences probably also influenced his decision not to attack Jerusalem and pushed him to seek a truce with Saladin instead. A veteran commander, the king of England knew from his time in Aquitaine that the real trick lay not in capturing territory, but in holding on to it. Even if the crusading army managed to take Jerusalem, the Holy City would not have remained in Western hands for long because the majority of crusaders were sure to depart upon the completion of their pilgrimage.

ConclusionMany of the methods employed by Richard I to govern his dominions

in Europe also served the monarch well when leading a crusade to the Holy Land. As has been demonstrated, the king of England treated the crusading expedition almost as a miniature version of the Angevin Empire, and used a


81 A mbroise, 100.


83 La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197), in The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade: Sources in Translation , trans. Peter W. Edbur y (Brookf ield, VT: Ashgate, 1998), 119.

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great deal of the same ruling strategies to command an armed pilgrimage as he might have used to oversee the daily affairs of Aquitaine.

In both arenas, Richard’s personality and image played key roles. The force of his personality evoked great loyalty from his men, and Richard I keenly understood the importance of performance and symbolic action to project a kingly image. Indeed, no one did more than Richard himself to fan the flames of the Lionheart’s legend among contemporaries.84 Likewise, in the Angevin as well as the Levant, patronage and largesse played crucial roles in cementing alliances, securing loyalty, and raising morale among the king’s men. Richard’s constant willingness to negotiate and engage in diplomatic overtures, whether with rebellious Aquitainian lords or, much to the chagrin of his fellow crusaders, Saladin himself, also carried over to the king’s time in the Holy Land. Finally, Richard the Lionheart’s famed military prowess made a seamless transition to Outremer. Although Richard’s skill as a diplomat went unrecognized for decades, he has never lacked for admirers regarding his generalship. His skill in the art of siege warfare during the Third Crusade won him much renown from Christians and Muslims alike.

Although it might appear obvious that Richard would not entirely abandon the only methods of governance he had known when departing for the Holy Land, what is striking about Richard’s management of the crusade is the degree to which Angevin strategies of rule prevailed in a strange land under strange circumstances. Except for the furor over Richard’s decision to entreat with Muslims, the king of England enjoyed great success adapting European notions of rule and strategies of command to the needs of the crusade. If contemporaries viewed negotiating with the enemy as Richard’s only major misstep, perhaps today’s leaders could learn something from the his ideological flexibility, and seek to emulate aspects of his tenure as a crusading king.

84 Prestwich, 2 .

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