towards an understanding of the endogenous nature of identity in games john smith rutgers...
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Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of
Identity in GamesJohn Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics
with Katerina BezrukovaSanta Clara University, Psychology
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Motivation Q: Does the strategic setting affect identity?
A: Yes Q: How is it affected?
A: Game type interacts with action selected Q: What is the timing of the identity change?
A: Largely after action is selected Q: What causes the magnitude of the change?
A: Increasing in perception of competitiveness Decreasing in perception of cooperativeness
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Strategic Setting
100,100 45,105
105,45 50,50You
C
D
C D
SomeoneElse
You
C
D
100,100 0,150
150,0 50,50
SomeoneElse
C D
“Mean” Game
“Nice”Game
MutuallyBeneficialOutcome
NashEquilibrium
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Strategic Setting
100,100 45,105
105,45 50,50You
C
D
C D
SomeoneElse
You
C
D
100,100 0,150
150,0 50,50
SomeoneElse
C D
“Mean” Game
“Nice”Game
“Cheating” yields 5“Cheating” yields 50
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Identity and Psychology Literature Since Tajfel in 1970’s
Place people into “minimal” groups Observe subjects discriminate against members of other groups favor members of own group
Identity affects behavior
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Identity in the Psychology Literature Some psychologists prefer to study identity in Minimal Groups
Groups which Did not exist prior to experiment Based on a trivial criteria
If identity effects can be found in minimal groups likely to be stronger for “nontrivial” groups demonstration of fundamental characteristic of
people
Ingroup: of the same group Outgroup: of different groups
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Identity in the Economics Literature Chen and Li (2007) Ali (2007) Charness, Rigotti and
Rustichini (2007) Eckel and Grossman
(2005) Either Manipulates identity or Observes difference in
behavior to ingroup and outrgoup opponents
By contrast We do not directly
manipulate identity We measure changes in
identity due to the strategic setting
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Related Economics Literature
Guth, Levati and Ploner (2008)
Measures identity in a strategic setting
Carpenter (2005)
Measures changes in preferences based on
competitiveness of setting
Uses SVO and GARP
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Experiment 130 students from six classes
for course credit entry into lottery for $50
Each student placed into Group X or Group Y Last Digit of Student ID
0-4 into X 5-9 into Y
Minimal group Group membership known
Subjects identified themselves
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Experiment Half given “Mean” Game Half given “Nice” Game
Select a single action Told that would play game with
Everyone in group Who received same game
Average payoffs attained Go towards lottery
Higher average payoffs More likely to win prize
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Identity Measure1. How much do you like being a member of the group?
2. How much do you feel that you belong to the group?
3. How strong are your ties to the group?
4. How pleased are you to belong to the group?
5. How important is the group to you?
6. How much do you identify with the group?
Adapted from Grieve and Hogg (1999) Appropriate for minimal group setting Scale of 1-7
1 indicated a negative preference 4 indicated "no opinion“ 7 indicated a positive preference
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Competitiveness Measure
1. When I make a decision, I only consider my own welfare
2. I make decisions so that my outcome is relatively better than the outcome for others
Scale of 1-7
Adapted from Beersma and DeDreu (1999)
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Cooperativeness Measure
1. People know that they can depend on me2. I cooperate with others3. I consider how my decisions affect the
welfare of others4. When making a decision involving my
welfare and the welfare of others, I select the choice which gives the best joint outcome
Scale of 1-7 Adapted from Beersma and DeDreu (1999)
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Timeline Time 1:
Before subject knows game Measure baseline competitiveness and cooperativeness Measure baseline identity
Time 2: After game type known
but before action selected Measure identity
Time 3: Choice of C or D Measure competitiveness and cooperativeness Measure identity
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Identity Measure
Asked same identity questions all three times
To minimize bias towards previous answers Had subjects pass forward sheets after
completion Used different color paper to verify
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Results-Identity Alphas Identity Measure Measure of reliability
How effectively are we measuring latent variable? Between 0 and 1 Acceptable threshold: ≥0.7
Time 1: =0.810 Time 2: =0.858 Time 3: =0.885
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Results Did the manipulation
induce different choices?
Nice Game: D: 31 C: 37
Mean Game: D: 42 C: 20
2 (1,129)=6.465
p=0.011
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type
4
4.05
4.1
4.15
4.2
4.25
4.3
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity Mean Game
Nice Game
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type
4
4.05
4.1
4.15
4.2
4.25
4.3
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity Mean Game
Nice Game
t-test
p=0.910
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type
4
4.05
4.1
4.15
4.2
4.25
4.3
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity Mean Game
Nice Game
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type
4
4.05
4.1
4.15
4.2
4.25
4.3
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity Mean Game
Nice Game
No significant relationships
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Action Choice
3.9
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity C
D
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Action Choice
3.9
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity C
D
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Action Choice
3.9
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity C
D
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Action Choice
3.9
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity C
Dp=0.053p=0.273
p=0.332 t-test
SignificanceMann-
Whitney0.036
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity
MC
MD
NC
ND
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity
MC
MD
NC
ND
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity
MC
MD
NC
ND
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity
MC
MD
NC
ND
No significant relationships
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity
MC
MD
NC
ND
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity
MC
MD
NC
ND
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity
MC
MD
NC
ND
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
4.4
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity
MC
MD
NC
NDp=0.016
p=0.076p=0.217
t-test
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Changes in Identity
Perhaps absolute value of identity
less important than changes in identity?
Difference in Identity between Time 1 and Time 3 Given Action and Game Type
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Changes in Identity
Difference in Time 3 and Time 1 Identity Given Nice Game who played C:
Mean: 0.451 Given Nice Game who played D:
Mean: -0.322
t-test p-value: 0.0686
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Changes in Identity: Timing
When does the change between Time 1 and 3 occur?
Between Time 2 and Time 3? Only after selecting action
Or between Time 1 and Time 2? Only after seeing game type but before action choice
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Changes in Identity: Timing Difference in Time 3
and Time 2 Identity Given Nice, select C Mean: 0.108 Given Nice, select D Mean: -0.134
t-test p-value: 0.109
Difference in Time 2 and Time 1 Identity
Given Nice, select C Mean: -0.0484 Given Nice, select D Mean: -0.187
t-test p-value: 0.452
Actually making the choice affects identity
In the Nice Game
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Changes in Identity No such relationship exists for the Mean
Game
Being cooperative in Nice Game Stronger identification with group
Being uncooperative in Nice Game Weaker identification with group
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Cooperation and Competition What drives the change in identity?
Difference in Competitiveness between Time 1 and Time 3 Mean or Nice Game C or D
Difference in Cooperativeness between Time 1 and Time 3 Mean or Nice Game C or D
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Perception of Cooperation Difference in Time 3
and Time 1 Coop. Given Nice, select C Mean: -0.831 Given Nice, select D Mean: -2.218
t-test p-value: 0.000510
Difference in Time 3 and Time 1 Coop.
Given Mean, select C Mean: -1.325 Given Mean, select D Mean: -1.845
t-test p-value: 0.197
In the Nice Game playing C more cooperative than DIn the Mean Game playing C not more cooperative than D
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Perception of Competition Difference in Time 3
and Time 1 Comp. Given Nice, select C Mean: -0.374 Given Nice, select D Mean: 1.430
t-test p-value: 2.154x10-7
Difference in Time 3 and Time 1 Comp.
Given Mean, select C Mean: -0.0167 Given Mean, select D Mean: 0.881
t-test p-value: 0.0142
In the Nice Game playing C less competitive than DAlso true for Mean Game
Stronger in Nice Game
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Cooperation and Competition
Evidence that undertaking more competitive actions
or less cooperative actions
Reduces identity
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Study 2 40 Students in same setup as before except Asked for single choice to be played against
ingroup and outgroup
Subset of earlier N=130
Pooling does not qualitatively change the analysis from the earlier study However there are some differences
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Study 2
We now have data on Ingroup choices Outgroup choices Game in which choices were made
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Actions and Game Type
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity
CCM
CDM
DCM
DDM
CCN
CDN
DCN
DDN
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Actions
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
1 2 3
Time
Iden
tity CC
CD
DC
DD
Discriminating Actions
Nondiscriminating Actions
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Average Identity Across TimeBy Actions
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
1 2 3
Time
Ident
ity Disc
NonDisc
p=0.0592 p=0.0109 p=0.00285
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Ingroup/Outgroup Actions
Recall that in initial study In Nice Game:
Action against ingroup affects identity In Mean Game:
Action against ingroup does not
What can we say about the outgroup action?
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Outgroup Choice
Difference between Time 3 and Time 1 Identity in Nice Game
Given Outgroup choice: D -0.0119
Given Outgroup choice: C -0.357
t-test: p=0.177
Difference between Time 3 and Time 1 Identity in Mean Game
Given Outgroup choice: D -0.867
Given Outgroup choice: C 0.226
t-test: p=0.0276
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Ingroup Choice
Difference between Time 3 and Time 1 Identity in Nice Game
Given Ingroup choice: D -0.333
Given Ingroup choice: C -0.0238
One sided t-test: p=0.114
Difference between Time 3 and Time 1 Identity in Mean Game
Given Ingroup choice: D -0.452
Given Ingroup choice: C -0.060
One sided t-test: p=0.292
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Ingroup/Outgroup Actions
In Nice Game, actions against ingroup members affect identity
In Mean Game, actions against outgroup members affects identity
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Conclusion Identity endogenous in *a* game
Depends on game type and action choice Nice Game, ingroup actions
affect identity Mean Game, outgroup actions
affect identity
Largest identity change occurs only after action taken
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Conclusion Identity seems to measure
Less a propensity for cooperation with ingroup but rather the propensity to select a
discriminatory action: C in ingroup, D in outgroup D in ingroup, C in outgroup
over a nondiscriminatory action: C in ingroup, C in ingroup D in ingroup, D in ingroup
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Discussion Different questions to measure identity
Avoid status quo bias? What happens if
games repeated? feedback provided?
Does change in identity affect future behavior? Is new identity more or less helpful in predicting
behavior?
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Discussion
Performed with different games: Battle of sexes, chicken, etc.
Relationship between identity and SVO? Together better predict behavior?