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Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara University, Psychology

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Page 1: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of

Identity in GamesJohn Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics

with Katerina BezrukovaSanta Clara University, Psychology

Page 2: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Motivation Q: Does the strategic setting affect identity?

A: Yes Q: How is it affected?

A: Game type interacts with action selected Q: What is the timing of the identity change?

A: Largely after action is selected Q: What causes the magnitude of the change?

A: Increasing in perception of competitiveness Decreasing in perception of cooperativeness

Page 3: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Strategic Setting

100,100 45,105

105,45 50,50You

C

D

C D

SomeoneElse

You

C

D

100,100 0,150

150,0 50,50

SomeoneElse

C D

“Mean” Game

“Nice”Game

MutuallyBeneficialOutcome

NashEquilibrium

Page 4: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Strategic Setting

100,100 45,105

105,45 50,50You

C

D

C D

SomeoneElse

You

C

D

100,100 0,150

150,0 50,50

SomeoneElse

C D

“Mean” Game

“Nice”Game

“Cheating” yields 5“Cheating” yields 50

Page 5: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Identity and Psychology Literature Since Tajfel in 1970’s

Place people into “minimal” groups Observe subjects discriminate against members of other groups favor members of own group

Identity affects behavior

Page 6: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Identity in the Psychology Literature Some psychologists prefer to study identity in Minimal Groups

Groups which Did not exist prior to experiment Based on a trivial criteria

If identity effects can be found in minimal groups likely to be stronger for “nontrivial” groups demonstration of fundamental characteristic of

people

Ingroup: of the same group Outgroup: of different groups

Page 7: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Identity in the Economics Literature Chen and Li (2007) Ali (2007) Charness, Rigotti and

Rustichini (2007) Eckel and Grossman

(2005) Either Manipulates identity or Observes difference in

behavior to ingroup and outrgoup opponents

By contrast We do not directly

manipulate identity We measure changes in

identity due to the strategic setting

Page 8: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Related Economics Literature

Guth, Levati and Ploner (2008)

Measures identity in a strategic setting

Carpenter (2005)

Measures changes in preferences based on

competitiveness of setting

Uses SVO and GARP

Page 9: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

9

Experiment 130 students from six classes

for course credit entry into lottery for $50

Each student placed into Group X or Group Y Last Digit of Student ID

0-4 into X 5-9 into Y

Minimal group Group membership known

Subjects identified themselves

Page 10: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Experiment Half given “Mean” Game Half given “Nice” Game

Select a single action Told that would play game with

Everyone in group Who received same game

Average payoffs attained Go towards lottery

Higher average payoffs More likely to win prize

Page 11: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

11

Identity Measure1. How much do you like being a member of the group?

2. How much do you feel that you belong to the group?

3. How strong are your ties to the group?

4. How pleased are you to belong to the group?

5. How important is the group to you?

6. How much do you identify with the group?

Adapted from Grieve and Hogg (1999) Appropriate for minimal group setting Scale of 1-7

1 indicated a negative preference 4 indicated "no opinion“ 7 indicated a positive preference

Page 12: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

12

Competitiveness Measure

1. When I make a decision, I only consider my own welfare

2. I make decisions so that my outcome is relatively better than the outcome for others

Scale of 1-7

Adapted from Beersma and DeDreu (1999)

Page 13: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Cooperativeness Measure

1. People know that they can depend on me2. I cooperate with others3. I consider how my decisions affect the

welfare of others4. When making a decision involving my

welfare and the welfare of others, I select the choice which gives the best joint outcome

Scale of 1-7 Adapted from Beersma and DeDreu (1999)

Page 14: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Timeline Time 1:

Before subject knows game Measure baseline competitiveness and cooperativeness Measure baseline identity

Time 2: After game type known

but before action selected Measure identity

Time 3: Choice of C or D Measure competitiveness and cooperativeness Measure identity

Page 15: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Identity Measure

Asked same identity questions all three times

To minimize bias towards previous answers Had subjects pass forward sheets after

completion Used different color paper to verify

Page 16: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Results-Identity Alphas Identity Measure Measure of reliability

How effectively are we measuring latent variable? Between 0 and 1 Acceptable threshold: ≥0.7

Time 1: =0.810 Time 2: =0.858 Time 3: =0.885

Page 17: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Results Did the manipulation

induce different choices?

Nice Game: D: 31 C: 37

Mean Game: D: 42 C: 20

2 (1,129)=6.465

p=0.011

Page 18: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type

4

4.05

4.1

4.15

4.2

4.25

4.3

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity Mean Game

Nice Game

Page 19: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

19

Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type

4

4.05

4.1

4.15

4.2

4.25

4.3

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity Mean Game

Nice Game

t-test

p=0.910

Page 20: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type

4

4.05

4.1

4.15

4.2

4.25

4.3

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity Mean Game

Nice Game

Page 21: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type

4

4.05

4.1

4.15

4.2

4.25

4.3

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity Mean Game

Nice Game

No significant relationships

Page 22: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Average Identity Across TimeBy Action Choice

3.9

4

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity C

D

Page 23: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Average Identity Across TimeBy Action Choice

3.9

4

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity C

D

Page 24: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

24

Average Identity Across TimeBy Action Choice

3.9

4

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity C

D

Page 25: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Average Identity Across TimeBy Action Choice

3.9

4

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity C

Dp=0.053p=0.273

p=0.332 t-test

SignificanceMann-

Whitney0.036

Page 26: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action

3.6

3.8

4

4.2

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity

MC

MD

NC

ND

Page 27: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

27

Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action

3.6

3.8

4

4.2

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity

MC

MD

NC

ND

Page 28: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

28

Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action

3.6

3.8

4

4.2

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity

MC

MD

NC

ND

Page 29: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

29

Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action

3.6

3.8

4

4.2

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity

MC

MD

NC

ND

No significant relationships

Page 30: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

30

Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action

3.6

3.8

4

4.2

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity

MC

MD

NC

ND

Page 31: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

31

Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action

3.6

3.8

4

4.2

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity

MC

MD

NC

ND

Page 32: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

32

Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action

3.6

3.8

4

4.2

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity

MC

MD

NC

ND

Page 33: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

33

Average Identity Across TimeBy Game Type and Action

3.6

3.8

4

4.2

4.4

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity

MC

MD

NC

NDp=0.016

p=0.076p=0.217

t-test

Page 34: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Changes in Identity

Perhaps absolute value of identity

less important than changes in identity?

Difference in Identity between Time 1 and Time 3 Given Action and Game Type

Page 35: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Changes in Identity

Difference in Time 3 and Time 1 Identity Given Nice Game who played C:

Mean: 0.451 Given Nice Game who played D:

Mean: -0.322

t-test p-value: 0.0686

Page 36: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Changes in Identity: Timing

When does the change between Time 1 and 3 occur?

Between Time 2 and Time 3? Only after selecting action

Or between Time 1 and Time 2? Only after seeing game type but before action choice

Page 37: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Changes in Identity: Timing Difference in Time 3

and Time 2 Identity Given Nice, select C Mean: 0.108 Given Nice, select D Mean: -0.134

t-test p-value: 0.109

Difference in Time 2 and Time 1 Identity

Given Nice, select C Mean: -0.0484 Given Nice, select D Mean: -0.187

t-test p-value: 0.452

Actually making the choice affects identity

In the Nice Game

Page 38: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

38

Changes in Identity No such relationship exists for the Mean

Game

Being cooperative in Nice Game Stronger identification with group

Being uncooperative in Nice Game Weaker identification with group

Page 39: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Cooperation and Competition What drives the change in identity?

Difference in Competitiveness between Time 1 and Time 3 Mean or Nice Game C or D

Difference in Cooperativeness between Time 1 and Time 3 Mean or Nice Game C or D

Page 40: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Perception of Cooperation Difference in Time 3

and Time 1 Coop. Given Nice, select C Mean: -0.831 Given Nice, select D Mean: -2.218

t-test p-value: 0.000510

Difference in Time 3 and Time 1 Coop.

Given Mean, select C Mean: -1.325 Given Mean, select D Mean: -1.845

t-test p-value: 0.197

In the Nice Game playing C more cooperative than DIn the Mean Game playing C not more cooperative than D

Page 41: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Perception of Competition Difference in Time 3

and Time 1 Comp. Given Nice, select C Mean: -0.374 Given Nice, select D Mean: 1.430

t-test p-value: 2.154x10-7

Difference in Time 3 and Time 1 Comp.

Given Mean, select C Mean: -0.0167 Given Mean, select D Mean: 0.881

t-test p-value: 0.0142

In the Nice Game playing C less competitive than DAlso true for Mean Game

Stronger in Nice Game

Page 42: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Cooperation and Competition

Evidence that undertaking more competitive actions

or less cooperative actions

Reduces identity

Page 43: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Study 2 40 Students in same setup as before except Asked for single choice to be played against

ingroup and outgroup

Subset of earlier N=130

Pooling does not qualitatively change the analysis from the earlier study However there are some differences

Page 44: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Study 2

We now have data on Ingroup choices Outgroup choices Game in which choices were made

Page 45: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Average Identity Across TimeBy Actions and Game Type

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity

CCM

CDM

DCM

DDM

CCN

CDN

DCN

DDN

Page 46: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

46

Average Identity Across TimeBy Actions

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

1 2 3

Time

Iden

tity CC

CD

DC

DD

Discriminating Actions

Nondiscriminating Actions

Page 47: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

47

Average Identity Across TimeBy Actions

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

1 2 3

Time

Ident

ity Disc

NonDisc

p=0.0592 p=0.0109 p=0.00285

Page 48: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

48

Ingroup/Outgroup Actions

Recall that in initial study In Nice Game:

Action against ingroup affects identity In Mean Game:

Action against ingroup does not

What can we say about the outgroup action?

Page 49: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

49

Outgroup Choice

Difference between Time 3 and Time 1 Identity in Nice Game

Given Outgroup choice: D -0.0119

Given Outgroup choice: C -0.357

t-test: p=0.177

Difference between Time 3 and Time 1 Identity in Mean Game

Given Outgroup choice: D -0.867

Given Outgroup choice: C 0.226

t-test: p=0.0276

Page 50: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Ingroup Choice

Difference between Time 3 and Time 1 Identity in Nice Game

Given Ingroup choice: D -0.333

Given Ingroup choice: C -0.0238

One sided t-test: p=0.114

Difference between Time 3 and Time 1 Identity in Mean Game

Given Ingroup choice: D -0.452

Given Ingroup choice: C -0.060

One sided t-test: p=0.292

Page 51: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Ingroup/Outgroup Actions

In Nice Game, actions against ingroup members affect identity

In Mean Game, actions against outgroup members affects identity

Page 52: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Conclusion Identity endogenous in *a* game

Depends on game type and action choice Nice Game, ingroup actions

affect identity Mean Game, outgroup actions

affect identity

Largest identity change occurs only after action taken

Page 53: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

53

Conclusion Identity seems to measure

Less a propensity for cooperation with ingroup but rather the propensity to select a

discriminatory action: C in ingroup, D in outgroup D in ingroup, C in outgroup

over a nondiscriminatory action: C in ingroup, C in ingroup D in ingroup, D in ingroup

Page 54: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

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Discussion Different questions to measure identity

Avoid status quo bias? What happens if

games repeated? feedback provided?

Does change in identity affect future behavior? Is new identity more or less helpful in predicting

behavior?

Page 55: Towards an Understanding of the Endogenous Nature of Identity in Games John Smith Rutgers University-Camden, Economics with Katerina Bezrukova Santa Clara

55

Discussion

Performed with different games: Battle of sexes, chicken, etc.

Relationship between identity and SVO? Together better predict behavior?