toward a victimology of state crime - researchgate

Critical Criminology 10: 173–194, 2001.© 2002 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.

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TOWARD A VICTIMOLOGY OF STATE CRIME

DAVID KAUZLARICHSouthern Illinois University at Edwardsville

RICK A. MATTHEWSOhio University

WILLIAM J. MILLERCarthage College

Abstract. State crimes have been studied by criminologists for nearly three decades. Whilefar from stagnant, research and theory in this area of criminology have not developed at thepace one may have expected a decade ago. In an attempt to rejuvenate the study of statecrime, we first identify and review the various types of victims and victimizers of state crimeidentified in the criminological literature. By employing a previously created typology of statecrime, we discuss how individuals and groups of individuals can be identified as state crimevictims in both domestic and international contexts. We then highlight the common themesinvolved in the victimizations, and offer six inductively generated propositions intended tofacilitate future developments in the victimology of state crime.

The criminological study of immoral, illegal, and harmful state actions hasnot developed as fully as would have been expected from the explosionof research in the late 1980’s to mid 1990’s, which lifted the optimismabout criminology’s interest in understanding state malfeasance. Attemptsto develop a sophisticated theoretical and empirical criminology of thestate are currently declining, although conceptual and typological effortsabound (Friedrichs 1996; Kauzlarich 1995). Critical criminologists havehistorically been concerned with understanding and correcting harms causedby powerful corporate and state agents and organizations, yet few havefollowed Friedrichs’ (1983) and Quinney’s (1972) calls for a radical or criticalvictimology of state organized harms and immoralities.

In the 1970’s and 1980’s, some radical criminologists and other socialscientists examined state crime (Falk et al. 1971) and a few issues ofthe journals Social Justice and Issues in Criminology were devoted tomatters related to governmental crime. Crimes by political elites and insti-tutions caught the attention of criminologists such as Clinard and Quinney(1973), Michalowski (1985), Quinney (1980), and Simon and Eitzen (1982),whose works are the foundation of the modern criminological study oforganizational-level unethical and illegal state practices. Perhaps the most

174 DAVID KAUZLARICH ET AL.

influential contribution was Chambliss’ 1989 presidential address to theAmerican Society of Criminology calling for the study of state-organizedcrime. Like Sutherland’s American Sociological Society presidential addresson white collar crime fifty years before, Chambliss’ message challenged theprevailing epistemology of criminology, and called for the study of moreharmful and insidious forms of crime previously neglected by mainstreamcriminologists.

By the early 1990’s, state crime research increased dramatically in bothquality and quantity. Barak’s (1991) Crimes by the Capitalist State was thefirst anthology from a criminological perspective that brought together severalpapers on state crime. Tunnell (1993) produced an edited anthology, which,like Barak’s reader, provided case studies and the application of the label“political crime” to phenomena such as the state’s role in the underminingof labor movements, the facilitation of patriarchy, and corporate crime. Ross(1995) assembled a collection of papers that provided an understanding ofhow international, regulatory, and other forms of law and social control maycontain, control, deter, or decrease incidences of unethical and illegal stateactions. Interspersed with these anthologies were a few journal articles bycriminologists as well (e.g., Chambliss 1995; Cohen 1993; Friedrichs 1996a;Kauzlarich et al. 1992; Kauzlarich 1995).

More recent works include those of Friedrichs (1998) and Ross (2000).Friedrichs’ two volume anthology supplied reprinted journal articles on statecrime and, interestingly, contained more articles by non-criminologists thancriminology scholars. Ross’ anthology on controlling state crime includedstudies of several countries, including many western countries as well asJapan, Italy, and Israel. In spite of these works, there appears to be onlyone scholarly monograph published since 1995 that adopts a chiefly crim-inological approach to state crime (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). Whilethere have been a handful of journal articles written on state crime since1995 (e.g. Green and Ward 2000; Kramer and Kauzlarich 1999; Matthewsand Kauzlarich 2000; Mullins and Kauzlarich 2000; Ross, 1998; Ross et al.1999), less than five sessions at each of the last three American Society ofCriminology meetings explicitly pertained to state crime.

In sum, while there have been some important developments in the studyof state crime over the past few years, the subject has yet to develop intoa major sub-field of criminology, and the rate of theoretical and empiricalprogress is slow even within the ranks of critical criminology. Nearly all ofthe works on state crime in the last thirty years have included calls (andsometimes a desperate plea) for more criminological attention to unethicaland illegal actions of states and governments, but the answer has beeninadequate.1

VICTIMOLOGY OF STATE CRIME 175

Even more deficient, however, is the study of the victimology of statecrime. There are some discussions of victimology in the literature (see Foxand Szockyj 1996); but beyond brief descriptions, there has been no attemptto establish the nature, extent, and distribution of the victimology of statecrime. Incredibly, this lack of attention continues in the wake of state atro-cities in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Hundredsof thousands of people have been killed, physically assaulted, rendered home-less and hungry, raped, or emotionally abused by the actions and policies ofgovernments and state officials. State sponsored genocide, ethnic cleansing,and imperialism are clearly not actions of the past, but current, compel-ling, and deeply disturbing problems which require immediate and rigorousscholarly study.

A radical victimology has developed in the areas of street crime (Elias1986; Mawby and Walklate 1994), corporate crimes against women (Foxand Szockyj 1996), wife rape, and intimate violence (Bergen, 1998). It isnow crucial to develop a sophisticated criminology of state crime to beginexamining its victimology. This article is a step in that direction. It starts witha working definition of state crime. It then attempts to enumerate the rangeof victims by way of a typology whose cells are illustrated by examples ofconduct, both foreign and domestic, that violate international or domestic law.Drawing on the illustrations in the typology and previous studies, the articleposits a series of propositions about the harms resulting from state crime andpolicies.

What Is State Crime and Who Are the Victims?

An important task in developing a victimology of state crime is to enumeratethe victims, a task hindered by the lack of a uniform definition of statecrime. While the labels differ (e.g. political crime, government crime, state-organized crime), most scholars working in the area agree that governmentalor state crimes are illegal, socially injurious, or unjust acts which arecommitted for the benefit of a state or its agencies, and not for the personalgain of some individual agent of the state. This way of viewing crimescommitted by political actors and organizations is consistent with the classicdistinction made by Clinard and Quinney (1973) between occupational andcorporate crime, and points to the importance of viewing governmental andstate crime as a form of organizational crime.

Scanning the criminological literature, scholars have identified victimsof state crime as: Civilians and soldiers in war (Kauzlarich, 1995), peoplestargeted for genocide (Friedrichs 1996, 1996a), individuals suffering fromracism (Hazlehurst 1991; Simon 2002), sexism (Caulfield and Wonders


1993), classism (Bohm 1993), crack using mothers (Humphries 1999),research subjects (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998), countries and nationsoppressed by powerful states (Barak 1993, 1991; Kauzlarich and Kramer1998), workers (Aulette and Michalowski 1993; Friedrichs 1996), unionorganizers (Tunnell 1993), immigrants (Hamm 1995), prisoners (Kauzlarichand Kramer 1998), the natural environment (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1993,1998), astronauts (Kramer 1992), suspects in criminal cases (Hazlehurst1991; Henderson and Simon 1994), those subjected to cultural imperialism(Ross 1995), and passengers on planes (Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000).

Likewise, there are numerous definitions of a victim, and hence what isvictimology. Stitt and Giacopassi’s (1995: 67) conceptualization of corporatecrime/harm victimization includes individuals or groups who “(a) have notgiven informed consent, (b) are incapable of making a reasonable judgement,and (c) are forced or deceived into participation in a situation that results inadverse consequences to them.” This way of thinking about victims of statecrime is helpful but ignores the structural patterns and relationships oftenpreceding or facilitating state crime victimization. For example, the poor,racial and ethnic minorities, and women are explicitly or tacitly victimizedby the state partly because of its support of larger structural and culturaldefinitions of worth, status, power, authority, and prestige. Ultimately, strati-fication produces inequality in social relationships between the state, groupsof citizens, and the interests of capital. To the extent that the state supportsimmoral and illegal inequalities and their harmful manifestations, a state canbe in whole or in part considered responsible for victimization. This approachis consistent with literature identifying governmental complicity throughunjust and immoral social structural arrangements (Bohm 1993; Kramer andMichalowski 1990; Aulette and Michalowski 1993). The working definition,drawing on Kauzlarich (1995: 39), thus includes as state crime victims:

Individuals or groups of individuals who have experienced economic,cultural, or physical harm, pain, exclusion, or exploitation because of tacitor explicit state actions or policies which violate law or generally definedhuman rights.

This definition, while somewhat broad, encapsulates most of the substanceand spirit of the criminological literature on the varieties of state crime, andsets the stage for an inclusive typology of victimization. Also, internationaland domestic laws and human rights standards can be used to define certainstate activities as criminal. Thus, in defining the activities of a state as crim-inal, one may employ ratified international law and customary internationallaw (i.e., which may or may not be codified) in addition to domestic law orhuman rights standards.


In a broad sense, victims of state crime generally fall into two categories:(1) victims of domestic state crime and (2) victims of international statecrime. Domestic state crime occurs when a government acts to underminethe social, economic, or political rights of its own citizens. International statecrime occurs when a government violates the economic, political, or socialrights of citizens in other countries. Also, various international and domesticlaws can be legitimately employed as an epistemological framework for crim-inology (Kauzlarich 1995: 41). Thus, in defining the activities of a state ascriminal, one may employ international law, human rights standards, anddomestic law. The resultant typology is captured in Table 1, based on whetherthe victims were domestic or international and whether the action was acrime under domestic or international law and humans rights standards.2 Theremainder of this section defines the contents of each cell in the typologyillustrated in Table 1, and provides examples to demonstrate the utility ofthe typology. This enumeration of the victims, in turn, will be the basis fora series of inductive propositions intended to advance a victimology of statecrime.

Table 1. Types of governmental crime.

Crime type Abbreviation Definition Examples

Domestic-InternationalGovernmental Crime

DIGC Occurs within a state’sgeographic jurisdictionagainst internationallaw or human rights.

Institutional RacismDOE Human RadiationExperiments

International-InternationalGovernmental Crime

IIGC Occurs outside a state’sgeographic jurisdictionagainst internationallaw or human rights.

Economic Terrorism

Domestic-DomesticGovernmental Crime

DDGC Occurs within a state’sgeographic jurisdictionagainst domestic crimi-nal, regulatory, or pro-cedural laws or codes

COINTELPRODOE EnvironmentalDegradation

International-DomesticGovernmental Crime

IDGC Occurs outside a state’sgeographic jurisdictionagainst domestic crimi-nal, regulatory, or pro-cedural laws or codes

Iran-Contra

Source: Kauzlarich (1995).


Domestic-International Governmental Crime (DIGC)

DIGCs are “acts which occur within a state’s geographic jurisdiction whichrun contrary to the state’s obligations under international law” (Kauzlarich1995, 40), or human rights standards. Examples include violations of Inter-national Covenants (e.g., the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, theInternational Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimi-nation, and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women), and injuryfrom the fallout of nuclear tests. The discussion below elaborates on two addi-tional examples: (1) institutionalized racism, sexism, and classism in socialand criminal justice policy; and (2) human radiation experiments.

Although there have been no appreciable changes in African Americancrime rates over decades, the percentage of African Americans incarceratedsince 1980 has increased tremendously. This trend has continued throughoutthe 1990’s with the advent of get tough on crime measures such as threestrikes and truth in sentencing laws (Tonry 1995). Miller (1996) argues thatthe war on drugs has a racial bias that has increased the prejudice thatalready exists throughout the criminal justice system. This bias increases thelikelihood that young black males will come into contact with the criminaljustice system and will be disproportionately under some form of correctionalcontrol. For example, nearly one in three (32%) black males in the age group20–29 is under some form of criminal justice supervision on any given day –either in prison or jail, or on probation or parole; and 49% of prison inmatesnationally are African American, compared to their 13% representation in theoverall population (Mauer 1999: 3). Racial disparities are also found in drugsentencing policies (e.g. higher sentences for crack than powder cocaine) andthe imposition of the death penalty. The treatment of racial minorities by thecriminal justice system through practices like detaining them for “DrivingWhile Black” violates not only common decency and ethical standards, butalso the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of RacialDiscrimination.

Finally, as Johnson and Leighton (1999; 126) have argued, the effects ofincarceration are only a small part of the problem:

On release, their records will follow them, making them harder to employand in many cases rendering them unemployable. Young men withnothing more than an arrest record – no conviction, no confinement –may increasingly find themselves in the same predicament. Jobs, housing,insurance – the essentials of a secure life – may be placed beyond theirreach (Johnson and Leighton 1999: 126).


Another example of Domestic-International Governmental Crime is thehuman radiation experiments funded and managed by the U.S. Departmentof Energy and a host of other federal agencies. Several of these experimentshave been conducted in violation of the Nuremberg Code, which outlaws non-consensual, reckless, deceptive, and coercive experiments.

From 1945 to 1947, a series of Manhattan Project and Atomic EnergyCommission (AEC) supported plutonium injection studies were conductedon people expressly deceived into participating in the study. They were toldthat the were being treated for a life-threatening disease when in fact thestudies were designed to help the state understand the effects of plutonium onthe human body in the case of nuclear war. The victims of these experimentswere poor and uneducated. The second series of experiments in violation ofthe Nuremberg Code were prison radiation experiments conducted from 1963to 1973. One hundred and thirty one prisoners at the Oregon State Prison inSalem and the Washington State Prison in Walla Walla were subjects in astudy to determine the effects of irradiation on the function of testes. Prisonersreceived $25 per irradiation, and were informed of only some of the possiblerisks. Prisoners are not in a position to exercise the type of free will envisionedby the Nuremberg Code, which among other things requires that researchsubjects have the legal capacity to give their consent free from force, fraud,deceit, or duress (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998).

Domestic-Domestic Governmental Crime (DDGC)

DDGCs include those “acts which occur within the state’s geographicaljurisdiction in violation of the criminal or regulatory code of that state”(Kauzlarich 1995: 41). Such crimes include police violations of procedural,constitutional, and civil law. Illustrations of such crimes include the Tuskegeesyphilis experiments, the injury and disease of workers and communities asa result of nuclear and atomic production, the undermining of political rights(e.g., the FBIs COINTELPRO program), and environmental degradationthrough the U.S. nuclear weapons industry complex.

There is little question that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)has engaged in activities directed toward U.S. citizens that were unethicalat best and illegal at worst. One of the most widely recognized forms ofstate suppression of political rights was the FBI’s COINTELPRO program.Waged by the FBI against numerous dissenting groups, the political rightsof dissident political groups like Communist Party of USA (CPUSA),Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Southern Christian Leadership Confer-ence (SCLC), the Black Panthers, the American Indian Movement (AIM),and the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES)


were violated (Caulfield 1991; Churchill et al. 1990; Davis 1992). The covertand illegal activities of the FBI to “neutralize” political dissent by membersof targeted organizations has been well documented, and included suchillegal tactics as wiretaps, bugging, mail-openings, and breaking and entering(Beirne and Messerchmidt 2000). Other activities included group infiltrationand death threats (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990; Davis 1992).

The production of atomic and nuclear weapons by the U.S. Departmentof Energy has resulted in serious environmental contamination. In violationof U.S. EPA laws, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservationand Recovery Act, at least 17 areas in the country have been substantiallydamaged and polluted. At one time in Hanford, Washington, there was 100square miles of groundwater contaminated with extremely high levels oftritium, iodine, and other toxic chemicals. Near the Savannah River Plantin the Carolinas, there have been large releases of mercury into the air andtritium, strontium, and iodine into the soil (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998).

There is evidence to show that there are higher rates of miscarriages,leukemia, and other health related problems in the areas where nuclearweapons have been produced, stored, or tested. The human effects of envir-onmental degradation as a result of the hundreds of nuclear weapons testsin the Western part of the U.S. are also examples of state crime. A recentstudy by the National Cancer Institute estimates that tens of thousands ofpeople have developed thyroid cancer as a result of nuclear tests (Neer-gaard 1997). The victims of these environmental crimes were not only theunknowing civilians who simply happened to be living near the test sites,but also military personnel who were forced to witness nuclear blasts andthen tested for any negative side effects (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). Inthese cases, the victims were easily exploitable because they were eitherunknowing, powerless, or in subordinate organizational positions.

International-International Governmental Crime (IIGC)

IIGCs are “criminal acts by governments which occur outside the state’sgeographic jurisdiction in violation of international law” (Kauzlarich 1995:41) or human rights standards. Examples include: violations of internationalagreements like the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Convention, and theNuclear Non-Proliferation treaty; various forms of overt and covert aggres-sion representing state-sponsored terrorism (Herman 1982, 1987); politicalassassination (Hamm 1993); and subverting state sovereignty and politicalprocesses (Chomsky 1985, 1992, 1993; Chomsky and Herman 1979). All ofthese activities have been defined by the international community as undesir-able, and have been prohibited by international law. States have historically


committed these crimes by facilitating the repression of economic, political,and social rights of citizens in other countries by either implicitly or expli-citly supporting brutal dictatorships. Because many forms of IIGC are welldocumented, this section focuses on the less commonly considered practiceof the economic sanctions placed on Cuba.

While the scope and nature of economic sanctions3 may differ, they can bea form of coercion that is directed toward the civilian population of the targetcountry to bring about a desired political or economic change, or to simplypunish the target country (Hass 1998; Hufbauer et al. 1990). Historically,the use of economic sanctions has been viewed under both domestic lawand international law as a humanitarian alternative to military force. Therehave been instances where economic sanctions have been very successfulin bringing about a desired political change (e.g., Haiti and South Africa)or have been nearly universally supported by the international community(e.g., Iraq). As Weiss (1997) argued, however, even successful sanctions maycollide with humanitarian concerns:

although in theory sanctions are motivated by an implicitly humanerationale, their implementation often wreaks great havoc and civiliansuffering. Inherent in sanctions policy are uncomfortable and, for themoment, still imprecise calculations about inflicting civilian pain toachieve political gain. Where tolerable civilian discomfort ends and full-fledged humanitarian crisis begins is an elusive boundary, particularlybecause pre-sanction conditions in many countries are often so marginal(Weiss 1997: 30; emphasis added).

The passage of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) in 1992, and thepassage of the Helms-Burton Act in 1996, were major steps in tighteningthe economic sanctions on Cuba. As the 1997 American Association forWorld Health (AAWH) found, the tightening of economic sanctions in 1992created health problems for many Cuban citizens in the areas of malnutrition,water quality, and medicines and medical equipment shortages. Further, theban on sales of American foodstuffs has contributed to serious nutritionaldeficits, especially among pregnant women, leading to an increase in lowbirth-weight babies. Additionally, food shortages have led to outbreaks ofneuropathy (diseases of the nervous system), and the embargo has severelyrestricted the access to water treatment chemicals and the parts needed forCuba’s water supply system (AAWH 1997). The decrease in safe drinkingwater for many Cuban citizens led to rising incidences of morbidity andmortality from water-borne diseases (AAWH 1997).

The right of individual nations to place economic sanctions on othercountries is usually enshrined in domestic law. For example, the legal justifi-


cation of the U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba has been found under theauthority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the Foreign AssistanceAct of 1961, and the Export Administration Act of 1919. Internationally, theUN permits the use of economic sanctions under Article 41 of Chapter VII ofthe UN Charter, which also contains provisions for the use of military force.Each year since the passage of the CDA in 1992, however, the U.N. GeneralAssembly has passed resolutions condemning the sanctions placed on Cuba.Cuba has maintained that the U.S. economic measures (particularly the CDAand Helms-Burton Act), which are intended to coerce changes in Cuba’spolitical and economic institutions, violate the fundamental international lawprinciples of non-intervention and the sovereign equality of states (Krinskyet al. 1993). The issue that has been raised with concern to the CDA andHelms-Burton Act has been their extraterritorial nature and not necessarilythe sovereign right of the U.S. to apply its own economic sanctions on Cuba.

International-Domestic Governmental Crime (IDGC)

IDGCs are “criminal conduct by a government abroad in violation of itsown criminal or regulatory code” (Kauzlarich 1995: 41). Examples includeviolating domestic law like the Boland Arms Amendment, in the case of Iran-Contra, and assorted constitutional directives. On a technical level, any breachof international law or custom would also be an IDGC under Article VI ofthe U.S. Constitution, often referred to as the supremacy clause, that situatesinternational treaties and the like as the “supreme law of the land.” Giventhe tenuous status of international law in the American popular culture andin political circles (especially when its application is directed against U.S.interests), it is not surprising that this technicality rarely surfaces in populardiscussions of crime and law. If taken seriously, however, the supremacyclause further widens the scope of criminological analyses of state crime, andcould prove useful in helping legitimize the study of state crime in traditionalacademic quarters.

Iran-Contra is a form of IDGC because the Reagan administration,through the covert activities of Oliver North, John Poindexter, RichardSecord, and Albert Hakim, violated U.S. domestic law in supplying theContras with arms in spite of the Boland Arms Amendments of 1982 and1984 (the 1984 Amendment expressly forbade the U.S. from supportingthe Contras with military aid or financing).4 Between 1984 and 1986, theReagan administration deliberately ignored these amendments in supportingthe Contras with arms and financing. In addition to illegally channeling armsand military support to the Contras, the Reagan administration also particip-ated in an extensive program of bribery, coercion, and quid pro quos aimed


at the countries of Central America whose political, military, and logisticalsupport was pivotal to sustaining the Contra war. Quid pro quos, which VicePresident Bush, at a June 1984 NSPG meeting, declared “would be wrong,”were used to “entice” cooperation from Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Ricaand Panama.

It is difficult to assess the extent of the harm caused by these illegal activ-ities. As a start, a fact finding mission to Nicaragua between 1984 and 1985revealed that the U.S. funded Contras had engaged in many forms of terrorismand war crimes which included killing unarmed men, women and children;torture, kidnaping and rape; assaults on economic and social targets; and, thekidnaping, torture and murder of religious leaders (Beirne and Messerschmidt2000).

Propositions of a Victimology of State Crime

Propositions about the victimology of state crime can be developed from thisreview to help shed light on the larger phenomenon of state crime victimi-zation, although a caveat is in order because state crime takes a variety offorms. For instance, it is difficult to compare the victimology of internationaleconomic terrorism against the people of Cuba and Iraq to institutionalizedracism, sexism, and classism, or the suffering of human radiation subjects tounjust criminal justice system practices. Nevertheless, several general propos-itions about the victims of state crime may be formulated based on current andprior research in the area.

(1) Victims of State Crime Tend to be among the Least Socially PowerfulActors

Even a cursory examination of state crime reveals large power differencesbetween the victim and victimizer. The authority of the state extends wellbeyond crude asymmetries in the ability to control others, and constitutionaland due process protections also vary relative to the power of subjects.State officers, agencies, and organizations often exploit scarce resources toadvance larger agendas through the use of specialized terminology, scientificknowledge, and information technology. Clearly the victims of the humanradiation experiments, those harmed by environmental degradation, atomicand nuclear weapons tests, and the COINTELPRO, did not have the resourcesto marshal commensurate levels of technological, terminological, or scientificexpertise. The state also has the ability to conceal illegalities and immoralitiesby privileging concerns about “national security” over humane, fair, and dueprocesses. In the case of those victimized by criminal justice and the prison


experiments, one senses a great deal of dehumanization and ideology, whichallows unjust practices and policies to flourish.

Victims of other state crimes – such as civilians in war, people targeted forgenocide, workers, and the homeless – also have less social power than stateagencies and officials. Scapegoating, stereotyping, profiling, and typifyingpeople belonging to these groups is far easier for the state because of broadasymmetries in power. It is therefore not surprising that galvanizing supportfor unethical and illegal practices and policies against these groups is notdifficult for the state. As a result, the likelihood of the legitimation of a crisisor substantial social protest movements is diminished. It also militates againstconceptualizing unjust state actions as crime. One can see evidence of thisprocess at work in the cases of economic and domestic terrorism and thesupport of terrorism abroad.

More broadly, there seems to be a positive relationship between theunequal distribution of power and the level and frequency of state crime, bothdomestically and internationally. Clearly, social power is unevenly distrib-uted among states as well, providing further opportunities for state crime.The United States has more control over the definition, enforcement, andprosecution of state crime than most countries. The World Court, the UnitedNations’ Security Council, the World Bank, and the International MonetaryFund are likely to support U.S. interests. With few exceptions, peripheral andsemi-peripheral states are less likely to have any victimization by the U.S.acknowledged and redressed. There is a direct link between U.S. supportedand enforced sanctions against Iraq and the death of innocent Iraqi childrenbecause of starvation. Sanctions against the Cuban people have also resultedin social and physical harms.

Authority-subject relationships (Turk 1969) in an international contexthelp explain how these harms are marginalized in popular U.S. discourses:The claims-making and legitimation exercises of the authority (the U.S. state)are seldom met with organized opposition by subjects. If there is a size-able movement against U.S. policy and practice, citizens might either beunaware of its existence or may perceive opposition as the work of radicalsdisconnected with reality (Iraqi politicians, Castro, prisoners’ rights, welfarerights, and anti-nuclear weapons groups). Social harms and higher immor-alities might therefore be overlooked, or even worse, supported because ofthe apparent lack of overt conflict over the policy or practice. This makes itappear as though the harms are actually necessary, fair, and consensus-based.U.S. public support of the Gulf War is most illustrative of this point.


(2) Victimizers Generally Fail to Recognize and Understand the Nature,Extent, and Harmfulness of Institutional Policies. If Suffering and Harmare Acknowledged, It Is often Neutralized within the Context of a Senseof “Entitlement”

The most important difference between victimizers and their victims is thepower to exert their will. Victimizers often do not acknowledge the degreeto which their policies have caused harm while assessing the effectiveness oftheir policies to bring about desired change, maintain hegemony, or promoteother forms of dominance. Unjust and deleterious domestic and interna-tional policies can also be downplayed by neutralizing reasonable categoricalimperatives (e.g. do no harm) by employing bankrupt consequentialism,perhaps guided by ethnocentric paternalism. Following Sykes and Matza(1957), others have found evidence of this at work in the wider problemof elite deviance. Denying responsibility, dehumanizing the powerless forpurposes of exploitation, and appealing to higher loyalties (i.e. the capitalistpolitical economy and national security) are often employed in the victimo-logy of state crime. Specialized vocabularies may also be used to aide in thedehumanization.

Tifft and Markham (1991) have noted that the way policy makersneutralize the destructive and harmful effects of their policies is similar to themanner batterers view their victims. Noting the long history of U.S. abuses inLatin and Central America, they argue that:

U.S. policy makers have consciously decided (1) that the U.S. is entitledto control Central America and that the peoples of Central America areobligated to acquiesce in this power exercise; (2) that violence is permis-sible, and policy makers can live with themselves and conclude that theyare ethical/moral persons and that these policies are ethical/moral even ifthey involve violence; (3) that the use of violence, intimidation, and threatof violence will produce the desired effect or minimize a more negativeone; and (4) that the policy of violence and control will not undulyendanger the United States, and the country will neither sustain phys-ical harm nor suffer legal, economic, or political consequences that willoutweigh the benefits achieved through this violence (Tifft and Markham1991: 125–126).

Similarly, Cohen (1996) has documented how governments construct offi-cial responses to allegations of human rights violations. Cohen (1996: 522)contends that the forms of denial on the part of governmental officials to suchallegations typically include one of the following: “a literal denial (nothinghappened); interpretive denial (what happened is really something else); andimplicatory denial (what happened is justified).”


At the domestic level, few policy makers have recognized that the cumu-lative effects of the policies supportive of institutionalized racism and struc-tural inequality have caused considerable harm to various minority groupsand women. Often times, the victims are viewed as undeserving or unworthyof the social, political, or economic rights bestowed to others.

(3) Victims of State Crime are often Blamed for Their Suffering

Victim blaming is unfortunately a common reaction to those most woundedby state crime. The poor, minorities, the homeless, and women become targetsof criticism because of the false belief in the ease of achieving vertical inter-generational mobility in the U.S., even in the face of overwhelming structuralodds. Prisoners and those accused of crimes are less likely to be treatedsympathetically because their assigned master status solipsistically leads toa marginalization of their human worth, morality, and potential. Subjects inthe prisoner experiments were viewed as less deserving of informed consentat best and expendable at worst.

Harms caused by economic terrorism and the support of anti-democraticgovernments can be neutralized by popular audiences (and victimizers) asa part of the United States’ interests in national security or the previouslymentioned technique of neutralization, “appealing to higher loyalties.” Theharms caused by sanctions in Cuba and Iraq are good examples because,while they are easy to see, there is a tendency to assume victim respons-ibility on the part of citizens because they have not waged successful civilinsurrections against their oppressors.

(4) Victims of State Crime Must Generally Rely on the Victimizer, anAssociated Institution, or Civil Social Movements for Redress

Theoretically, the U.S. criminal justice system carries out the criminalizationprocess in the name of the state, not the particular victim. The “people”are identified as the abstracted victim. What happens, however, when “thepeople” or a group of peoples are victimized by the body who holds dominionover them and the law? What institutionalized justice process is available tothe victim?

Often times, as in the case of the prisoner and plutonium experiments,and some instances of racial and gender discrimination, reparations maycome about in civil court, and often involve the efforts of special interestgroups, people in social movements, and of course private attorneys. In othercases, appeal may be made to the United Nations Human Rights Committee,through the United Nations General Assembly, or the International Courtof Justice. The opportunities for international redress of domestic victimi-


zation, to some extent, depend on the primary state’s membership status.For example, the United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention fordecades because it sought to limit “foreign intrusion” into what were definedas domestic affairs. Citizens victimized in countries with tenuous or marginalstanding in the international community as it pertains to human rights maytherefore find little in the way of assistance.

The most potentially dangerous act that could ever by undertaken by astate, the use of nuclear weapons, has recently been criminalized through thislatter avenue. Six billion people still live under the nuclear threat, but at leastone organization of legitimate authority, the World Court, has conceptualizedthe entire world population as potential victims of state crime by declaringthe use and threat to use nuclear weapons illegal under international law(see Kramer and Kauzlarich 1999). More often than not, however, interna-tional organizations like the U.N. have been slow to enforce existing laws orto punish nation-states that are powerful. For example, each year, the U.N.General Assembly has voted to condemn the U.S. embargo on Cuba, but noofficial action has been taken by the U.N. to end it. In short, there is littlehope of formal intervention on the part of the international community whenthe offending state is powerful like the U.S. On another level, U.S. oppositionto international agreements because of the state’s fear of the loss of sover-eignty (no matter how slight) also thwart the materializing of democratic andrestorative justice.

In any case, the process of helping victims or even ending the victimiza-tion of state crime is very different than in cases of traditional or white-collarcrime. This stems from problems related to the identification of the actors,organizations, and institutional forces responsible for state crime, if thepolicy, actions, or omissions are even recognized as unethical, harmful,criminal, or worthy of resistance.

(5) Victims of State Crime Are Easy Targets for Repeated Victimization

The manner in which victims of state crime are harmed may change overtime; however, the harm incurred by most victims of state crime does notdecrease – rather it merely takes another form. Additionally, some victims arecontinually victimized by the same organization. Examples include women,minorities, the poor, workers, and those living in less developed countries,in much the same manner as some victims of traditional street crime (e.g.,domestic violence and child abuse) who are targeted for repeat victimization.

In the cases of the poor, there have been few genuine attempts to alleviatethe structural conditions that create abject poverty (Bohm 1993). Women havefaced institutional sexism and the “glass ceiling” in spite of superficial effortsdesigned to give them equal status in society. Minorities have long been the


targets of overt and institutionalized racism. While some have argued thataffirmative action policies have eliminated the effects of racism, institutional-ized racism persists in spite of the progress which has been made. NativeAmericans have been repeatedly victimized throughout U.S. history, andremain one of the most repressed minority groups in our society (Churchill1995).

Another example is the repeated victimization of the plutonium subjectsand their families, who continued to be treated unethically by state agenciesfor decades. Several years after the deaths of many of the plutonium subjects,the families were sent a letter from the Atomic Energy Commission, whichexhumed the bodies for additional research:

The purpose of the exhumation was to examine the remains in order todetermine . . . residual radioactivity from past medical treatment, and thatthe subjects had an unknown mixture of radioactive isotopes (AdvisoryCommittee on Human. Radiation Experiments 1995: 260).

Two willful lies are told in this memo: (1) that the subjects were treated, and(2) that they had received an unknown quantity of radiation. The truth is this:(a) the subjects were guinea pigs not expected to react favorably to the injec-tions, and (b) internal records clearly showed how much plutonium had beeninjected into their veins (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). Rowland providesfurther evidence of higher immorality when he wrote to his colleagues aboutthe exhumation project:

Please note that outside the Center . . . we will never use the wordplutonium in regard to these cases. “These individuals are of interest to usbecause they may have received a radioactive material at some time is thekind of statement to be made, if we need to say anything at all” (MarkeyReport 1986: 27).

(6) Illegal State Policies and Practices, while Committed by Individuals andGroups of Individuals, Are Manifestations of the Attempt to AchieveOrganizational, Bureaucratic, or Institutional Goals

A recurrent theme has been that the harms caused by the state are due to theactions of individuals or groups of individuals who are pursuing the largergoals of their respective organizations. These larger institutional goals mayor may not be consistent with the goals of particular individuals. Ratherthan viewing the harm to the victims of state crime as the result of a fewpeople engaging in immoral, unethical, and/or illegal behavior, it is moreinstructive to conceptualize state crime as the product of organizational pres-sures to achieve organizational goals. Many forms of state crime persist


for long periods of time (e.g., Iran-Contra, the economic embargo againstCuba, institutionalized discrimination in the criminal justice system), andare carried out by many different actors. If the unethical, immoral, and/orillegal behavior in question were the result of a handful of people, then onewould presume that either the activities would desist once those people leftthe organization or that there would be other people waiting to fill those roles.Since many state crimes persist over time with different people filling variousroles, one can only presume that either there are a lot of immoral peoplewho come into positions of power to carry out the immoral or unethicalbehavior, or that there is something about the organizational culture itselfwhich fosters such immorality. In the best case, the organization itself hasa problem screening out immoral/unethical decision-makers. In the worstcase, the organizational climate itself fosters, facilitates, or encourages suchbehavior (e.g., see Braithwaite 1989: Ermann and Lundman 1996).

Also, to reduce state crimes to the individual level is to ignore thesocial, political, and historical contexts which shape the nature, form, andgoals of state agencies. Even a cursory examination of the various formsof state crime reveals that these larger contexts are macrologically linkedto state crime victimization and offending. Sometimes these contexts areexigent, such as when cold war hysteria provided motivation for illegal andunethical human radiation experiments, weapons testing, and environmentaldegradation. Other times, the crimes may be politically and geographicallycontextualized (i.e., Cuba’s proximity to the U.S.). The state, therefore, maybe instrumental in creating and sustaining the conditions that account for thepersistence of institutional harms caused by its agencies.

Conclusion

Even with a universally accepted definition of state crime, the developmentof a victimology of the phenomenon is unlikely to occur soon. It is, however,time for state crime scholars to spend less energy arguing for the inclusionof this phenomenon into the criminological enterprise, and more time andenergy studying the harms that result from state actions and policies.

One point of departure is the extant literature on victims of white-collarcrime, including both occupational and organizational varieties. For instance,unlike many forms of traditional street crime victimization, victims of elitecrime can be unaware of the source of the injury, or in some cases, unawarethat they have even been injured at all (e.g. lags in correlating corporate andstate eco-crimes with regional health problems). Just as price-fixing and othertypes of economic and financial fraud can often go unnoticed by the public,the larger cultural and political normalization of economic, racial, and gender


inequalities shields some forms of resultant state crime from the kind ofscrutiny they deserve. This is much less likely to be the case in state crimessuch as genocide, imperialism, and perhaps economic terrorism – the problemshifts from acknowledging the fact that some harm actually occurred (i.e.visibility of the victim) to whether the behavior or policy is actually criminal.Then other questions surface such as whether the policy or behavior is anappropriate criminological subject, whether it is a potential candidate for legalproceedings (and if so, whether international or domestic), and whether thevictims are entitled to restitution. Criminologists interested in advancing thestudy of state crime are not without guidance in addressing these issues – theywere raised decades ago about retail terrorism, occupational crime, and manyforms of corporate crime. Our response to these issues should be similar tothose made by Sutherland (1945) on the topic of white-collar crime, Clinardand Yeager (1980) on corporate crime, and Barak (1991) on state criminality:State crime is real, it is harmful, it produces victims, and therefore shouldbe subject to social control and criminological analysis. In the end, the realsignificance of the study of state crime is found in its potential to reduceor eliminate human exploitation, suffering, and exclusion. The current bodyof criminological literature of the etiology, control, and victimology of statecrime is unhelpful in this endeavor, much like the thousands of books andarticles published each year that seldom have any affect on the safety offamilies and communities victimized by street crime and violence. For a hostof reasons – inter alia, scholarly, political, and humanistic – the victims ofstate crime should be studied criminologically. It only stands to reason thatthe development of a victimology of state crime might help promote the socialchange necessary for state crime to decline in frequency and severity.

Notes

1. Additionally, small inroads have been made into mainstream arenas. Most white collarcrime and elite deviance textbooks (e.g., Ermann and Lundmann 1996; Friedrichs 1996;Hagan 1997; Rosoff et al. 2002; Simon 2002; Simon and Hagan 1998) have at leastone section on unethical or illegal, organizationally rooted actions of governments andgovernment officials. Even then, with the exception of Friedrichs (1996), the examplesare often unrepresentative of recent criminological work on state crime. Several crimino-logy textbooks include examples of state crime as a part of their “white collar crime” or“political” crime chapters (e.g., Barlow and Kauzlarich 2002; Beirne and Messerschmidt2000; Siegel 1998).

2. Kauzlarich (1995) notes that this typology is intended to be an alternative or compli-mentary conceptualization as opposed to a substitution for sociological and otherdefinitions of crime.

3. The term economic sanctions, as used here, is consistent with the Hufbauer et al. (1990: 2)definition: “economic sanction means the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or


threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations. ‘Customary’ does not mean‘contractual’; it simply means levels of trade and financial activity that would probablyhave occurred in the absence of sanctions.”

4. Additionally, some have suggested that these activities also violated other domestic lawssuch as the Arms Export Control Act, which prohibits the sale or export of arms to statesthat sponsor terrorism (i.e., Iran), and the U.S. Neutrality Act.

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