"toward a sociology of truth: a reply to charles powers"
TRANSCRIPT
"Toward a Sociology of Truth: A Reply to Charles Powers"Author(s): Stephan FuchsSource: Sociological Theory, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 205-206Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/201944 .
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LETTERS LETTERS
point. If they are unsatisfactory it merely confirms my point. Sociologists do not discuss general tendencies enough to be in agreement about the empirical regularities our theories ought to explain. As long as that situation prevails, our theories are likely to become even more fragmented and fanciful in character.
Statements of general tendency should enable us to have a meaningful reconciliation of theoretical discussion with empirical inquiry, and to develop theories that bear closer approximation to reality. The discovery of real sociological laws could be closer at hand than people realize.
"TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF TRUTH: A REPLY TO CHARLES POWERS"'
STEPHAN FUCHS
University of California/Riverside
The Western empiricist philosophical tradi- tion has claimed that the difference between the sentences "The rose is beautiful" and "The rose is red" is more than just a historical and sociological difference between alternative ways of describing and making sense of reality. Empiricism can be reduced to the claim that the first statement is unscientific and merely ex- presses subjective aesthetic taste, whereas the second is scientific since it corresponds to reality. From a philosophical standpoint, the epistemic task is to distinguish "true knowl- edge" from metaphysical nonsense; from a sociological standpoint, the task is to explain various types of knowledge as forms of cultural and organizational capital.
Surprisingly, in his critical note on my "The Social Organization of Scientific Knowledge" (Sociological Theory, 4(2) 1986, pp. 126-142), sociologist Charles Powers ("In Search of Sociological Laws: A Reply to Stephan Fuchs") advocates the philosophical rather than the sociological way of conceptualizing knowledge. Powers wants to maintain the "positivistic faith" that true scientific knowledge corresponds to reality and that the history of science slowly but safely approximates truth. While he will agree with standard sociological insights such as the social construction of reality, Powers wants to reserve a privileged epistemic position for the social construct of truth. Most sociologists would probably share his view; Max Weber, who was well aware of the historical particular- ity of Western science, certainly did: while we do not believe in universal norms and in transsocial definitions of, say, crime, deviance, or mental retardation, we do believe in the universality of our truth claims. The truth of (sociological) knowledge is held to be exempt
point. If they are unsatisfactory it merely confirms my point. Sociologists do not discuss general tendencies enough to be in agreement about the empirical regularities our theories ought to explain. As long as that situation prevails, our theories are likely to become even more fragmented and fanciful in character.
Statements of general tendency should enable us to have a meaningful reconciliation of theoretical discussion with empirical inquiry, and to develop theories that bear closer approximation to reality. The discovery of real sociological laws could be closer at hand than people realize.
"TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF TRUTH: A REPLY TO CHARLES POWERS"'
STEPHAN FUCHS
University of California/Riverside
The Western empiricist philosophical tradi- tion has claimed that the difference between the sentences "The rose is beautiful" and "The rose is red" is more than just a historical and sociological difference between alternative ways of describing and making sense of reality. Empiricism can be reduced to the claim that the first statement is unscientific and merely ex- presses subjective aesthetic taste, whereas the second is scientific since it corresponds to reality. From a philosophical standpoint, the epistemic task is to distinguish "true knowl- edge" from metaphysical nonsense; from a sociological standpoint, the task is to explain various types of knowledge as forms of cultural and organizational capital.
Surprisingly, in his critical note on my "The Social Organization of Scientific Knowledge" (Sociological Theory, 4(2) 1986, pp. 126-142), sociologist Charles Powers ("In Search of Sociological Laws: A Reply to Stephan Fuchs") advocates the philosophical rather than the sociological way of conceptualizing knowledge. Powers wants to maintain the "positivistic faith" that true scientific knowledge corresponds to reality and that the history of science slowly but safely approximates truth. While he will agree with standard sociological insights such as the social construction of reality, Powers wants to reserve a privileged epistemic position for the social construct of truth. Most sociologists would probably share his view; Max Weber, who was well aware of the historical particular- ity of Western science, certainly did: while we do not believe in universal norms and in transsocial definitions of, say, crime, deviance, or mental retardation, we do believe in the universality of our truth claims. The truth of (sociological) knowledge is held to be exempt
from sociological knowledge. I cannot see why we - especially as sociologists - should continue the search for the foundations of reason instead of treating science as another form of social organization.
This does not mean, of course, that we "can never really know anything" as Powers inter- prets my argument. It does mean, however, that the value of knowledge does not reside in the accuracy of objective representations. Only if we conceive of knowledge as accurate represen- tation of objective reality does the critique of truth as a mirror of nature imply the uselessness of our efforts to make sense of the world. But there is more to knowledge than accurate representation; in fact, accurate representation is not even a very important dimension of knowledge. Knowledge may be invested as symbolic capital, employed as a means of organizational and credential control, or as a mechanism of social exclusion from scientific discourse. If we adopt this sociological instead of the old and-since Kuhn, Feyerabend, Foucault and others- "deconstructed" philo- sophical notion of knowledge, "truth" boils down to a rather vain and uninteresting self-congratulation with which we celebrate ourselves as distinguished professional produc- ers of sense.
Since we do not know what objective reality really looks like, we should abandon the philosophical distinction between science and fiction; and this is probably the most fundamen- tal disagreement between the positions ex- pressed by Powers and myself. We probably learn more about the declining old mercantile bourgeoisie reading Thomas Mann's "Bud- denbrooks" than reading social history. Gadamer shows us that by treating art and literature as somehow inferior to science, we lose valuable forms of cultural experience and reflection that could sensitize us-even as scientists-in our judgments about "reality". Like science, litera- ture, art, and music produce some forms of knowledge, have certain patterns of organization and communication, employ certain rules of how to articulate experiences; and sociolo- gists-unlike traditional philosophers-should be concerned with these differences, not with what form of knowledge tells us what reality really looks like. Or, as Rorty puts it, during certain times it was much easier to decide which painters would achieve immortality than it was to decide who had a valid scientific explanation to offer.
Arguing in the positivistic tradition, Powers wants to develop a natural science of society. Contrary to his suspicion, I do not have any doubts as to the feasibility of such a program, but I would object to his claim that a natural science of society is superior since it is the only
from sociological knowledge. I cannot see why we - especially as sociologists - should continue the search for the foundations of reason instead of treating science as another form of social organization.
This does not mean, of course, that we "can never really know anything" as Powers inter- prets my argument. It does mean, however, that the value of knowledge does not reside in the accuracy of objective representations. Only if we conceive of knowledge as accurate represen- tation of objective reality does the critique of truth as a mirror of nature imply the uselessness of our efforts to make sense of the world. But there is more to knowledge than accurate representation; in fact, accurate representation is not even a very important dimension of knowledge. Knowledge may be invested as symbolic capital, employed as a means of organizational and credential control, or as a mechanism of social exclusion from scientific discourse. If we adopt this sociological instead of the old and-since Kuhn, Feyerabend, Foucault and others- "deconstructed" philo- sophical notion of knowledge, "truth" boils down to a rather vain and uninteresting self-congratulation with which we celebrate ourselves as distinguished professional produc- ers of sense.
Since we do not know what objective reality really looks like, we should abandon the philosophical distinction between science and fiction; and this is probably the most fundamen- tal disagreement between the positions ex- pressed by Powers and myself. We probably learn more about the declining old mercantile bourgeoisie reading Thomas Mann's "Bud- denbrooks" than reading social history. Gadamer shows us that by treating art and literature as somehow inferior to science, we lose valuable forms of cultural experience and reflection that could sensitize us-even as scientists-in our judgments about "reality". Like science, litera- ture, art, and music produce some forms of knowledge, have certain patterns of organization and communication, employ certain rules of how to articulate experiences; and sociolo- gists-unlike traditional philosophers-should be concerned with these differences, not with what form of knowledge tells us what reality really looks like. Or, as Rorty puts it, during certain times it was much easier to decide which painters would achieve immortality than it was to decide who had a valid scientific explanation to offer.
Arguing in the positivistic tradition, Powers wants to develop a natural science of society. Contrary to his suspicion, I do not have any doubts as to the feasibility of such a program, but I would object to his claim that a natural science of society is superior since it is the only
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SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
one that "corresponds to reality". We can construct fundamental laws of social organiza- tion, but the history of sociology and science shows that reality is never strong enough to force us into but one sociological discourse. What type of sociology we favor depends on the types of descriptions we prefer: whether we want law-like explanations of universal social properties, thick descriptions of historical insti- tutions, interpretive accounts of mundane rea- soning, socially engaged humanistic reflections on social problems, or global analyses of the world system. But I can see no way to decide which of these sociologies are scientific and correspond to reality and which sociologies are mere "fiction". All of these sociologies can be "scientific" if they manage to establish profes- sional organizations that control standards of "legitimate" knowledge production.
This brings me to my final point. In "What Makes a Science Mature?" (Sociological The- ory, 4(2) 1986, pp. 143-150), Jonathan Turner and myself have tried to show that the structures of scientific knowledge depend on the control structures of scientific organizations. I fully agree with Powers that a science of society is possible (maybe even desirable), but scientific maturity requires highly professionalized and centralized organizational structures. Thus, if we decide to build a "social physics" we vote for a particular (as it appears: very bureaucratic and rather authoritarian) type of organizational lifeform, not for "objective truth". What "corresponds to reality" will then be decided by those who control the organization; just like the winners of wars decide who is to blame for them. In this view, the label "scientific" is hardly more than a metaphor for powerful knowledge-producing organizations.
REPLY TO DENZIN: POSTMODERN SOCIAL THEORY
WILLIAM BOGARD
Whitman College
There are several points in Professor Denzin's (1987: pp. 194-204) recent article on post- modern social theory with which I must disagree. Some of these involve relatively minor criticisms, having to do with his interpretation of terms or misunderstanding of an author's position. In other places, I have more serious reservations regarding his classification of post-modernist writers and his views regarding the relevance of post-modernist thought to contemporary American theory. On one hand, I think Denzin has performed a service in bringing the ideas of post-modern writers to the attention of sociologists. On the other hand, I
one that "corresponds to reality". We can construct fundamental laws of social organiza- tion, but the history of sociology and science shows that reality is never strong enough to force us into but one sociological discourse. What type of sociology we favor depends on the types of descriptions we prefer: whether we want law-like explanations of universal social properties, thick descriptions of historical insti- tutions, interpretive accounts of mundane rea- soning, socially engaged humanistic reflections on social problems, or global analyses of the world system. But I can see no way to decide which of these sociologies are scientific and correspond to reality and which sociologies are mere "fiction". All of these sociologies can be "scientific" if they manage to establish profes- sional organizations that control standards of "legitimate" knowledge production.
This brings me to my final point. In "What Makes a Science Mature?" (Sociological The- ory, 4(2) 1986, pp. 143-150), Jonathan Turner and myself have tried to show that the structures of scientific knowledge depend on the control structures of scientific organizations. I fully agree with Powers that a science of society is possible (maybe even desirable), but scientific maturity requires highly professionalized and centralized organizational structures. Thus, if we decide to build a "social physics" we vote for a particular (as it appears: very bureaucratic and rather authoritarian) type of organizational lifeform, not for "objective truth". What "corresponds to reality" will then be decided by those who control the organization; just like the winners of wars decide who is to blame for them. In this view, the label "scientific" is hardly more than a metaphor for powerful knowledge-producing organizations.
REPLY TO DENZIN: POSTMODERN SOCIAL THEORY
WILLIAM BOGARD
Whitman College
There are several points in Professor Denzin's (1987: pp. 194-204) recent article on post- modern social theory with which I must disagree. Some of these involve relatively minor criticisms, having to do with his interpretation of terms or misunderstanding of an author's position. In other places, I have more serious reservations regarding his classification of post-modernist writers and his views regarding the relevance of post-modernist thought to contemporary American theory. On one hand, I think Denzin has performed a service in bringing the ideas of post-modern writers to the attention of sociologists. On the other hand, I
am not sure he fully realizes the implications of this project. Post-modernism is a highly diverse field of textual critique, not all of which is relevant to sociological inquiry, and some of which is positively hostile to the very idea of social theory. Denzin is rightly concerned, along with those authors to whom he refers in his article, with the fragmentation and distor- tions of experience in a post-moder world. But this does not mean that sociology is the proper forum to critique those distortions. A central premise in many post-modernist works today is that the historical enterprise of social philosophy and theory is exhausted and rapidly approaching its end (cf. Baynes et al. 1986). Post-modernist works are a curious yet deliberate mixture of social criticism, literature, history, archaeology, philosophy and genealogy. They are not, strictly speaking, social theory and do not necessarily have anything to do with traditional sociological concerns. It is not clear whether incorporating post-modernist conceptions into sociology will transform the discipline in a positive way, which I interpret as Denzin's position, or merely hasten its demise.
There are some minor substantive points in Denzin's essay where I think he misinterprets or misunderstands the post-modernist writers to whom he refers. In referring to Baudrillard's use of the term "simulacrum," for example, Denzin writes that it signifies "that which 'conceals' the truth or the real" (1986: p. 195). In the following sentence, however, Baudrillard is quoted: "The simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth-it is the truth which conceals that there is none. The simulacrum is true." This is the very opposite of Denzin's interpreta- tion. A number of the so-called post-modernist writers who emerged from the Continental tradition of social and philosophical thought in the last twenty years (Baudrillard, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze) were heavily influenced by the works of Husserl, Heidegger, and particu- larly Nietzsche. The notion of truth for each of these philosophers was, in different ways, internally bound to the idea of error or fiction, and it was in investigating the nature of this bond that the post-modernist project of reversing and deconstructing the values of Western metaphysics was born. For Nietzsche, the error which confronts truth is not a falsehood in the logical sense of that term but rather a moment in the eternal movement of opposing forces necessary to sustain a mode of life (Nietzsche 1968: pp. 272, 282, 290). In Nietzsche's excursus on the will to power, truth emerges as a form of lived error. Nietzsche thus imparts to the ideas of truth and error an existential rather than metaphysical significance. In his polemical works, Nietzsche forces truth and error to stand against one another in a manner that results in a
am not sure he fully realizes the implications of this project. Post-modernism is a highly diverse field of textual critique, not all of which is relevant to sociological inquiry, and some of which is positively hostile to the very idea of social theory. Denzin is rightly concerned, along with those authors to whom he refers in his article, with the fragmentation and distor- tions of experience in a post-moder world. But this does not mean that sociology is the proper forum to critique those distortions. A central premise in many post-modernist works today is that the historical enterprise of social philosophy and theory is exhausted and rapidly approaching its end (cf. Baynes et al. 1986). Post-modernist works are a curious yet deliberate mixture of social criticism, literature, history, archaeology, philosophy and genealogy. They are not, strictly speaking, social theory and do not necessarily have anything to do with traditional sociological concerns. It is not clear whether incorporating post-modernist conceptions into sociology will transform the discipline in a positive way, which I interpret as Denzin's position, or merely hasten its demise.
There are some minor substantive points in Denzin's essay where I think he misinterprets or misunderstands the post-modernist writers to whom he refers. In referring to Baudrillard's use of the term "simulacrum," for example, Denzin writes that it signifies "that which 'conceals' the truth or the real" (1986: p. 195). In the following sentence, however, Baudrillard is quoted: "The simulacrum is never that which conceals the truth-it is the truth which conceals that there is none. The simulacrum is true." This is the very opposite of Denzin's interpreta- tion. A number of the so-called post-modernist writers who emerged from the Continental tradition of social and philosophical thought in the last twenty years (Baudrillard, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze) were heavily influenced by the works of Husserl, Heidegger, and particu- larly Nietzsche. The notion of truth for each of these philosophers was, in different ways, internally bound to the idea of error or fiction, and it was in investigating the nature of this bond that the post-modernist project of reversing and deconstructing the values of Western metaphysics was born. For Nietzsche, the error which confronts truth is not a falsehood in the logical sense of that term but rather a moment in the eternal movement of opposing forces necessary to sustain a mode of life (Nietzsche 1968: pp. 272, 282, 290). In Nietzsche's excursus on the will to power, truth emerges as a form of lived error. Nietzsche thus imparts to the ideas of truth and error an existential rather than metaphysical significance. In his polemical works, Nietzsche forces truth and error to stand against one another in a manner that results in a
206 206
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