Totalitarian Consolidation and the Chinese ModelAuthor(s): Benjamin SchwartzSource: The China Quarterly, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1960), pp. 18-21Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/763339 .

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BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ

Totalitarian Consolidation and the Chinese Model

WHAT facts stand out in bold relief when one surveys the turbulent history of Communist China during the last ten years? It is by no means easy to answer this question. Ten is a good round number, but there are few indications that the tenth year of Chinese Communism marks a terminal point in any sense. The shifts and fluctuations of the last three years have been, if anything, more violent than those of the previous period. It is as difficult as ever to distinguish relatively enduring facts from sensational, transitory facts.

In the following remarks I shall focus my attention on two facts (and I take them to be such) of internal development which seem to me of overriding importance: (1) the achievement of totalitarian con- solidation, (2) the unique characteristics of Chinese totalitarianism. Within the ten-year period under review, these facts strike me as most significant, whatever may be their significance for the future.

The phrase "totalitarian consolidation" refers to factors such as the following: the ability of the r6gime to involve the total population in its organisational network and to control every area of life through this network; the ability to make the pressure of its decisions felt in every area (even if they are not always fully implemented) and down to the grass roots level; the unremitting pressure of ideological indoctrination in its peculiar Chinese form which has, at the very least, conditioned the population to make all the proper verbal responses, and finally the ability to harness the energies of a vast population to a programme of forced draft industrialisation and to the immediate, overriding goal of state power. It is interesting to note that in China totalitarian consolidation preceded (ca. 1949-53) the full-scale economic effort. Far from being a "by-product" of forced draft industrialisation, it made the industrialisation effort possible.

In using the phrase "totalitarian consolidation " I do not mean to imply that any of us (including visiting pundits) are in any position to know what is going on in the hearts and minds of six hundred million Chinese. The fact that the r6gime has been able to organise and harness energies to serve its purposes does not prove that it enjoys the fanatical support of all the masses. With an organised population of this size much can be accomplished regardless of the amount of energy invested by given individuals. On the other hand neither demonic pressures

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THE FIRST DECADE-SCHWARTZ

from above nor acute economic hardship will necessarily lead to any revolt from below. Among these millions one can safely assume that the whole gamut of feeling from fanatical devotion to the utmost loathing can be found. It is possible that some accept wholeheartedly certain separate accomplishments of the r6gime while being driven to despair by the totalitarian framework as a whole. The "Chinese peasants " are as silent as ever and we have no way of getting through to them. They may already be the "blue ants" which the ruling class desires or they may not. We certainly cannot tell simply by looking at their garments. We cannot venture to guess what the "Chinese people" will be like if the high tide of totalitarianism ever recedes. It will certainly not be the people of the pre-1949 period. It may also be quite different from the people which the r6gime is trying to fashion.

While the main model of totalitarianism has been the Soviet Union, certain characteristic Chinese features have become, if anything, more pronounced in the course of time. These features reflect both the "peculiarities" of China's objective situation and the evolving subjec- tive outlook of the leading group in the C.C.P.-perhaps of Mao Tse- tung in particular. In terms of objective factors, the attempt to apply the Stalinist model of industrialisation mechanically in a Chinese environment has forced the r6gime to confront certain intractable facts. In the Soviet Union the population problem was not a factor of any importance. In China it is a factor of overwhelming importance. The pre-Stalinist industrial base of the Soviet Union was much more con- siderable than the industrial base of China before 1950. The reservoir of available industrial skills and probably of natural resources was much larger in the Soviet Union. The Chinese effort to make a maximum use of labour power as a substitute for limited capital, the recent effort to develop a whole sector of medium and small enterprise in rural areas, and to some extent the whole "commune" experiment reflect this quite different objective situation.

The subjective outlook of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage are equally important. Not everything can be explained in terms of that lazy man's universal tool of explanation, the "industrialisation process." It must be remembered that the present Chinese Communist leadership had become Communist long before the Stalinist model of industrialisa- tion had emerged, and the latter has formed only one component in Mao's evolving image of the world. What is happening in China is a resultant both of an objective situation and the specific evolving out- look of a determinate group of people which is responding to that situation.

One of the peculiar features of Chinese Communism is the whole 19

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THE CHINA QUARTERLY

area of phenomena known as "thought reform" and "remoulding." Underlying it is the assumption that totalitarian collectivism can be internalised as it were into the very soul of a whole people by pre- scribed techniques of psychological "persuasion" and that specific therapy is available for the cure of all ideological "sickness" (the therapy may, of course, involve physical labour). The Soviet "con- fessional" is undoubtedly one ingredient in this notion but the Chinese Communist experience of the Yenan period is probably more decisive as a background factor.

Arresting as the whole experiment may be, it is still doubtful whether some of the more extravagant claims concerning its success have been proven. The "hundred flowers" experience demonstrated that many of the best minds of China came through the whole "thought reform" experience relatively unscathed, much to the chagrin of the leaders. Whatever may be the case, the effort to remould continues unabated.

The notion that in China whole classes of people such as the "national bourgeoisie" and "rich peasantry" may be "persuaded" into "Socialism" and "Communism" remains a persistent and peculiar theme of Chinese Communism. It may be considered, in fact, a corollary of the whole "thought reform" philosophy. The notion that in China the "whole people" will display those qualities reserved by Marx to the proletariat harmonises nicely with the mood of strident nationalism which now prevails. It also indicates to Asia that Chinese Communism has its own unique message over and above the message of the October Revolution.

Finally, the last two years have been marked by a new access of apocalyptic fervour. Even though the initial pressures behind the "commune" were probably economic, the ideological framework into which it has been set has a significance of its own. In China, it was proclaimed in 1958, Communism is not far off. Individual, family and group interests will be totally extinguished in the mystic body of the Great Collective. Because of Chinese conditions this will be accom- plished at a relatively early point of industrial development. In China, necessity itself will create Communist virtue. While there has, of course, been some retreat in the actual operation of communes since 1958, this new vision has only been partially muted in Communist propaganda and may soon be actively revived. This ultra-totalitarian utopianism may represent a response to both success and failure. The previous success of the regime in controlling the masses may have led Mao and his entourage to the view that there are no limits to the regime's ability to manipulate the human factor at least among the masses. On the other hand, the unreliability of the intelligentsia and the persistence of formidable objective difficulties may have encouraged

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the view that bolder and more drastic experiments were called for all along the line.

It has been common to refer to the present period of Chinese Communism as its "Stalinist phase" with the implications that the totalitarian tide will eventually recede. I tend to share the view that totalitarianism in its more extreme forms is not an eternally viable system anywhere. All analogies are, however, specious. It is precisely in its "Stalinist phase" that China is departing most significantly from many features of the Stalinist model. It may also be assumed that if the totalitarian tide ever begins to recede the "post-Stalinist" develop- ment of China may be radically different from the post-Stalinist development in the Soviet Union (a development which until now has been highly amorphous and inconclusive in any event).

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