9/17/13 5:20 PMI.Intentional TortsA.BatteryRule: Intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, or an apprehension thereof, and the harmful or offensive contact occurs. Restatement 13 and 18Intent Actual: Purpose to bring about the harmful or offensive contact; orConstructive: Having knowledge that the harmful and offensive contact is substantially certain to result.Garratt v. Dailey: Caudle v. Betts: A harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from an act intended to cause him to suffer such a contact, is a battery.Gragg v. Calandra: Intent to do good does not eliminate liability for battery.Transferred Intent: If a harmful or offensive contact (or an apprehension thereof) is intended against one person, and that contact is made with a third person, then the first actor is liable for batter against the third person.Davis v. WhiteFacts: Plaintiff was hit by a bullet fired by the defendant, intended to hit someone else. Rule: If an actor intents to cause a harmful or offensive contact on one person, and ends up making the contact with another, he is still liable for battery.ContactDirect or indirectExtension of the PersonFisher v. Carrousel Motor Home: Actual physical contact is not necessary to constitute a batter so long as there is contact with clothing or an object closely identified with the body. Harmful, orOffensive: A bodily contact is offensive if it offends reasonable sense of personal dignity. Restatement 19.McCracken v. Sloan: Glass-case argument. Leichtman v. WLW Jacor: Changing times can affect whether or not something is considered offensive.

B.AssaultRule: An actor is liable for assault if he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with a person or a third person, or an imminent apprehension there of, and the other person is thereby put in such an imminent apprehension. Restatement 21.IntentImminent Apprehension: for an actor to be liable for assault, he must put the other in an apprehension of an imminent contact. Restatement 29.The person put in the imminent apprehension need not be fearful, upset or scared, they only need to anticipate the contact,A threat for a future contact does not make an actor liable for assault.

C.False ImprisonmentRule: An actor is liable for false imprisonment if he intended to confine another or third person within boundaries fixed by the actor, and the action directly or indirectly results in the confinement that the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it. Restatement 35.IntentDirect or indirect confinementConfinement must be totalPhysical force is not necessary if there is a threat of force.Others conscious awareness of the confinement or harm by the confinement.Coblyn v. Kennedys Inc.Facts: Plaintiff shopped at defendants store. He was wearing an ascot which he put in his pocket while in the store. Right before exiting, he stopped, pulled it out of his pocket and put it on. An employee of the store who believed he had stolen the ascot stopped him. The employee, who grabbed the plaintiffs arm, and told to go upstairs to the manager, physically stopped him.Shopkeepers PrivilegeDefendant claimed shopkeepers privilege as a defense.Shopkeepers Privilege: A merchant, or an authorized agent may detain any person suspected of committing a larceny if 1) the person was detained in a reasonable manner, 2) for a reasonable amount of time and 3) there were reasonable grounds for believing that person detained was committing or attempting to commit a larceny.To act in a reasonable manner, the actor must identify him or herself and behave appropriately.To determine if an actor has reasonable grounds to detain someone, objective standards must be used. The Prudent and cautious man rule is to be used when considering this issue.

D.Intentional Infliction of Emotional DistressRule: One who by extreme or outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is liable for the distress and if bodily harm is caused, the actor is subject to the harm. Restatement 46. Extreme or outrageous conductObjective StandardMust be so outrageous that upon hearing of it, one exclaims Outrageous!Intentional or recklessResulting in severe emotional distressState Rubbish Collectors Association v. SiliznoffFacts: Siliznoff took a rubbish collector job while not part of the union. The union threatened to harm him unless he met their demands. Rule: Threatening injury is an outrageous and extreme conduct intentionally performed and if it results in emotional distress, the actor is liable. Logan v. SearsFacts: Plaintiff received a call about his Sears bill. He overheard the telephone operator calling him queer as a three dollar bill. Plaintiff claimed IIED. Court relies on the reasoning that the word queer is not extreme and outrageous, and thus fails to establish IIED. Snyder v. Phelps Facts: Phelps, of the infamous Westboro Baptist Church, protested a soldiers funeral with signs with hateful, clearly extreme and outrageous messages. The conditions for IIED were clearly met. Issue: Were the church members protected from liability under the First Amendment?Rule: If the extreme and outrageous speech is in a public place on a matter of public concern, it is protected under the First Amendment, and the actor cannot be held liable for IIED. II.PrivilegesConsentWillingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be manifested by action or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor. If the words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact. Restatement 892

Bang v. Charles T. Miller HospitalFacts: Defendant was operating on the plaintiff to fix a prostate problem. The defendant did more than the plaintiff had consented to and ended up sterilizing the plaintiff. Rule: Where a physician or surgeon can ascertain in advance of an operation alternative situations and no immediate emergency exists, a patient should be informed of the alternative possibilities and given a chance to decide before the doctor proceeds with the operation. Hackbart v. BengalsFacts: Plaintiff was injured by an opposing player during a football game. The defendant intended to cause harm beyond that which is typical for the game.Rule: A player consents to those actions which might be expected in the course of the game. However, if the rules prohibit such an action, then the players consent does not extend to that action. Self-DefenseRestatement 63(1) an actor is privileged to use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to defend himself against unprivileged harmful or offensive contract or other bodily harm which he reasonably believes that another is about to inflict intentionally upon him. (2) Self-defense is privileged under the conditions stated in Subsection (1) although the actor correctly or reasonably believes that he can avoid the necessity of so defending himself,(a) by retreating or otherwise giving up a right or privilege, or(b) by complying with a command with which the actor is under no duty to comply or which the other is not privileged to enforce by the means threatened. C.Defense of OthersD.Defense of PropertyIII.NegligenceA.Historical BackgroundB.Duty and Breach1.Reasonable Care2.Violation of Statutes3.Custom4.Res Ipsa Loquitur5.Limitations of Dutya. General Rules for the existence of a dutyb.Duty to Rescuec. Duties to ProtectC. Cause-In-Fact1.Defining Cause2.Multiple Tortfeasors3.Concurrent and Preemptive Causal Conditions4.Causal Uncertainty and Apportionment5.Vicarious LiabilityD.Proximate Causae1.Defining Proximate Cause2.Intervening CausesE.Damages1.Medical Expenses2.Lost Earnings & Impairment of Earning Capacity3.Pain & Suffering and Hedonic Damages4.Wrongful Death5.Damage to Personal Property6.Emotional Distress 7.Consequential Economic Loss8.Loss of Chance9.Punitive DamagesIV.DefensesA.Contributory NegligenceB.Assumption of the RiskC.Comparative NegligenceV.ImmunitiesVI.Strict LiabilityA.AnimalsB.Abnormally Dangerous ActivitiesVII.Alternative Compensation Systems and Limits on LiabilityA.Boundaries of Workers CompensationB.Legislation Limiting Tort Liability