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TORTS ENDTERMS REVIEWER

Compiled By: Someone you know

I. Defenses in Negligence Cases: Partial or

Complete Defenses

Art. 2179 of the Civil Code:

A. Contributory Negligence

2179 When the plaintiff's own negligence

was the immediate and proximate

causeof his injury, he cannotrecover damages. But if his

negligence was only contributory,

the immediate and proximate causeof the injury being the defendant's

lack of due care, the plaintiff may

recover damages, but the courts shall

mitigatethe damages to be awarded.

1. People vs. San Gabriel (NONE)

2. Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.FACTS

Plaintiff Rakes was one of the laborers of defendant, transporting iron rails fromthe barge in the harbor to defendants yard. Piled lengthwise on 2 handcars were7 rails such that the ends of the rails protruded beyond the cars.

The rails lay upon 2 crosspieces or sills secured to the cars but without sideguards to prevent them from slipping off.

Near the waters edge, the tracks sagged, thetie broke, the rails slid off andcaught plaintiff, resulting in a broken leg which was subsequently amputated.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in not provided side guards on thecars, and that the tracks had no fishplates.

Defendant admitted absence of side guards and failed to effectively overcomethe plaintiffs proof that no fishplatesexisted.

The sagging of the tracks was found to have been caused by the water of the bayraised by a recent typhoon.

It wasnt proved that the company inspected the track after the typhoon or thatit had any proper system of inspecting.

ISSUE & ARGUMENTS

W/N plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence to exonerate defendant fromliability.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINo.

The allegation that plaintiff was at fault for continuing his work despite noticeof the sagging of the track constituted contributory negligence that exoneratedefendant is untenable. Nothing in the evidence shows that plaintiff did or couldsee the displaced timber underneath. Plaintiff had worked on the job for less

than two days.

Where plaintiff contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of thedetermining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with theoccurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amountthat the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less thesum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

3. BPI vs. CA, 216 SCRA 51

FACTS

In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person purporting to be Eligia G.Fernando, who had a money market placement as evidenced by a

promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a

maturity value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money MarkeDepartment. The caller wanted to preterminate the placement, but

Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's Money Marke

Department, told her "trading time" was over for the day, which was a

Friday, and suggested that she call again the following week. The

promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an

earlier 50-day money market placement that had matured on September24, 1981.

Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for preterminationto the officer who before had handled Eligia G. Fernando's account

Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination

process. On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous Friday followed up with

Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on the pretermination of theplacement. Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G

Fernando, Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G

Fernando by "verifying" that the details the caller gave about theplacement tallied with the details in "the ledger/folder" of the account

Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G. Fernando to be the Treasurer o

Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) since he was

handling Philamlife's corporate money market account. But neither

Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando's account, nor

anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlifeoffice to verify the request for pretermination.

Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity valuebecause of its pretermination, the caller insisted on the preterminationjust the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proceeds, one

for P1,800,000.00 and the second for the balance, and that the checks be

delivered to her office at Philamlife. Eustaquio, thus, proceeded toprepare the "purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination a

required by office procedure, and from his desk, the papers, following

the processing route, passed through the position analyst, securitie

clerk, verifier clerk and documentation clerk, before the two cashier's

checks, nos. 021759 and 021760 for P1,800,000.00 and P613,215.16respectively, both payable to Eligia G. Fernando, covering the

preterminated placement, were prepared. The two cashier's checks

together with the papers consisting of the money market placement wasto be preterminated and the promissory note (No. 35623) to be

preterminated, were sent to Gerlanda E. de Castro and Celestino

Sampiton, Jr., Manager and Administrative Assistant, respectively, inBPI's Treasury Operations Department, both authorized signatories fo

BPI, who signed the two checks that very morning. Thereafter, the

checks went to the dispatcher for delivery.

Later in the same morning, however, the same caller changed the

delivery instructions; instead of the checks being delivered to her officeat Philamlife, she would herself pick up the checks or send her niece,Rosemarie Fernando, to pick them up. Eustaquio then told her that if it

were her niece who was going to get the checks, her niece would have tobeing a written authorization from her to pick up the checks. Thi

telephone conversation ended with the caller's statement that "definitely

it would be her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, who would pick up thechecks. Thus, Eustaquio had to hurriedly go to the dispatcher, Bernardo

Laderas, to tell him of the new delivery instructions for the checks; in

fact, he changed the delivery instruction on the purchase order slipwriting thereon "Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick

up.

It was, in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from thedispatcher, as shown by the delivery receipt. As it turned out, the same

person impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando

Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G

Fernando's placement, not just a roll-over of the placement, the

dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory noteevidencing the placement. There is also no showing that Eligia GFernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the

pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick upthe two checks, both of which letters were presumably handed to the

dispatcher by Rosemarie Fernando, was compared or verified with

Eligia G. Fernando's signature in BPI's file. Such purported signature habeen established to be forged although it has a "close similarity" to the

real signature of Eligia G. Fernando. In the afternoon of October 13

1981, a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G. Fernando appliedat China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening of a curren

account. She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso

Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have


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opened, earlier that year, an account upon the introduction of Valentin

Co, a long-standing "valued client" of CBC. What Cuaso indicated in theapplication form, however, was that the new client was introduced by

Valentin Co, and with her initials on the form signifying her approval,

she referred the application to the New Accounts Section for processing.

As finally proceeds, the application form shows the signature of "Eligia

G. Fernando", "her" date of birth, sex, civil status, nationality,

occupation ("business woman"), tax account number, and initial depositof P10,000.00. This final approval of the new current account is

indicated on the application form by the initials of Regina G. Dy,

Cashier, who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials onthe application form after reviewing it.

On October 14, 1981, the woman holding herself out as Eligia G.Fernando deposited the two checks in controversy with Current Account

No. 126310-3. Her endorsement on the two checks was found to

conform with the depositor's specimen signature. CBC's guaranty ofprior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped on the

two checks, which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI

cleared on the same day.

Two days after, withdrawals began on Current Account No. 26310-3:On October 16, 1981, by means of Check No. 240005 dated the same

day for P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash", which the woman holding

herself out as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the counter, and Check

No. 240003 dated October 15, 1981 for P48,500.00, payable to "cash"which was received through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch; on

October 19, 1981, by means of Check No. 240006 dated the same day

for P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash," which the woman identifying

herself as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over the counter; on October 22,

1981, by means of Check No. 240007 dated the same day for

P370,000.00, payable to "cash" which the woman herself also encashedover the counter; and on November 4, 1981, by means of Check No.

240001 dated November 3, 1981 for P4,100.00, payable to "cash,"

which was received through clearing from Far East Bank. The lastwithdrawal on November 4, 1981 left Current Account No. 26310-3

with a balance of only P571.61.

On November 11, 1981, the maturity date of Eligia G. Fernado's moneymarket placement with BPI, the real Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for

the roll-over of her placement. She disclaimed having preterminated herplacement on October 12, 1981. She executed an affidavit stating that

while she was the payee of the two checks in controversy, she never

received nor endorsed them and that her purported signature on the backof the checks was not hers but forged. With her surrender of the original

of the promissory note (No. 35623 with maturity value of

P2,462,243.19) evidencing the placement which matured that day, BPIissued her a new promissory note (No. 40314 with maturity date of

December 23, 1981 and maturity value of P2,500.266.77) to evidence aroll-over of the placement.

On November 12, 1981, supported by Eligia G. Fernando's affidavit,BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the reason"Payee's endorsement forged". CBC, in turn, returned the checks for

reason "Beyond Clearing Time". These incidents led to the filing of this

case with the Arbitration Committee.

The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC topay the former the amount of P1,206,607.58 with interest thereon at

12%per annumfrom August 12, 1983.

However, upon CBCs motion for reconsideration, the Board ofDirectors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration Committee's decisionand dismissed the complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC the

sum of P1,206,607.58.

BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court ofMakati who dismissed said petition but modified the award by including

a provision for attorneys fees in favor of CBC, among others.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.ISSUES

1. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a warranty of the

validity of all prior endorsements stamped at the back of the checks

2. In the event that the payee's signature is forged, WON the drawer/drawee

bank (in this case BPI) may claim reimbursement from the collecting bankwhich earlier paid the proceeds of the checks after the same checks were

cleared

HELD

1. NO

BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty that "all priorendorsements and/or lack of endorsements guaranteed" stamped at the

back of the checks was an unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prio

endorsements in the checks are genuine. Under this premise petitionerBPI asserts that the presenting or collecting bank, respondent CBC, had

an unquestioned liability when it turned out that the payee's signature on

the checks were forged. With these circumstances, petitioner BP

maintains that considerations of relative negligence become totally

irrelevant.

In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment, the collectingbank made an express guarantee on the validity of "all prio

endorsements." Thus, stamped at the back of the checks are the clear

warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OFENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. Without such warranty, the

drawee bank would not have paid on the checks. No amount of legajargon can reverse the clear meaning of the warranty. As the warranty

has proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for any

damage arising out of the falsity of its representation.

Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements, this Court hasemphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the

loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prio

endorsements considering that the act of presenting the check fopayment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making th

presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the

endorsements. If the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of thepayee was forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holde

thereof, it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank

However, the point that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bankwas negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery.

The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law ito the effect that a forged signature is "wholly inoperative", and payment

made "through or under such signature" is ineffectual or does nodischarge the instrument. The exception to this rule is when the partyrelying in the forgery is "precluded from setting up the forgery or wan

of authority. In this jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the party

invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule.

In the present petition the payee's names in the checks were forgedFollowing the general rule, the checks are "wholly inoperative" and of

no effect. However, the underlying circumstances of the case show thatthe general rule on forgery is not applicable. The issue as to who

between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged

checks necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of theparties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks.

The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank and respondenCBC as representing or collecting bank were both negligent resulting inthe encashment of the forged checks.

The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed the negligence of the

employees of petitioner BPI involved in the processing of the pretermination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement and in the

issuance and delivery of the subject checks in this wise: a) The impostor

could have been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call, which

nobody in BPI bothered to make to Eligia G. Fernando, a vice-presiden

of Philamlife; b) The officer who used to handle Eligia G. Fernando's

account did not do anything about the account's pre-termination; c)Again no verification appears to have been made on Eligia G

Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pre

termination and the letter authorizing her niece to pick-up the checksyet, her signature was in BPI's file; and d) Another step that could have

foiled the fraud, but which BPI neglected to take, was requiring before

the two checks in controversy were delivered, the surrender of thepromissory note evidencing the money market placement that wa

supposedly pre-terminated. The Arbitration Committee, however

belittled petitioner BPI's negligence compared to that of respondenCBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss o

the subject checks to the impostor who impersonated Eligia GFernando.

The PCHC Board of Directors, however, stated that these withdrawalswithout any further showing that the CBC employees had actua

knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts (Sec56, Negotiable Instruments Law) that their action in accepting their

checks for deposit and allowing the withdrawals against the same

amounted to bad faith cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC

liable.

Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the verynature of their work the degree of responsibility, care andtrustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater

than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the


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banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the

selection and supervision of their employees.

In the present case, there is no question that the banks were negligent inthe selection and supervision of their employees. The Arbitration

Committee, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court, however

disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks.

While the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent

CBC graver, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts declaredthat petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. To the extent that the degree

of negligence is equated to the proximate cause of the loss, we rule that

the issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant. No matter howmany justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility, they

cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercisingextraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their

employees.

2. NO

The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause ofthe payment of the forged checks by an impostor. Petitioner BPI insists

that the doctrine of last clear chance should have been applied

considering the circumstances of this case. Under this doctrine, whereboth parties were negligent and such negligence were not

contemporaneous, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the

impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

Applying these principles, petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine oflast clear chance to clear it from liability is not well-taken. CBC had no

prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the

pretermination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement.Moreover, Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. Hence, a comparison of

the signature of Eligia G. Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G.Fernando, which respondent CBC did, could not have resulted in thediscovery of the fraud. Hence, respondent CBC had no way to discover

the fraud at all. In fact the records fail to show that respondent CBC had

knowledge, actual or implied, of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor

and the employees of BPI.

BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of respondent CBC arethe cause "that set into motion the actual and continuous sequence ofevents that produced the injury and without which the result would not

have occurred." Petitioner BPI anchors its argument on its stance that

there was "a gap, a hiatus, an interval between the issuance and deliveryof said checks by petitioner BPI to the impostor and their actual payment

of CBC to the impostor. Petitioner BPI points out that the gap of one (1)

day that elapsed from its issuance and delivery of the checks to theimpostor is material on the issue of proximate cause. At this stage,

according to petitioner BPI, there was yet no loss and the impostor could

have decided to desist from completing the same plan and could haveheld to the checks without negotiating them.

Petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss mustfail. The gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the

checks bearing the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's

negotiating the said forged checks by opening an account and depositing

the same with respondent CBC is not controlling. It is not unnatural orunexpectedthat after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. Fernando

with the connivance of BPI's employees, the impostor would complete

her deception by encashing the forged checks. There is therefore, greaterreason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged

checks by an impostor was due to the negligence of petitioner BPI. This

finding, notwithstanding, we are not inclined to rule that petitioner BPImust solelybear the loss of P2,413,215.16, the total amount of the two

(2) forged checks. Due care on the part of CBC could have prevented

any loss.

The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their

eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counterwithdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. Theopening of the account itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts

clearly showing negligence. And while we do not apply the last clear

chance doctrine as controlling in this case, still the CBC employees hadample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI.

They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence expected of

bank employees would have sufficed to seize it.

Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of theiremployees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an

impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption ofnegligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. It was

the gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in

the fraud and the subsequent loss While it is true that petitioner BPI'

negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss, respondentCBC's negligence contributed equally to the success of the impostor in

encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under these circumstances

we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while

respondent CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to

mitigation by the courts.

Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution are MODIFIED. BPI

shall be responsible for 60% while CBC shall share 40% of the loss oP2,413,215.16

4. Valenzuela vs. CA

FACTS:

June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue

towards the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had

a flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her

emergency lights and seeked help

She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon

While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires,

she was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who

was intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the ground

She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was

amputated and was replaced with an artificial one.

Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000

(aritificial leg)]

RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under

Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis employer,

jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840

actual damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of

plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24,

1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant,

from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for

unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000,

as exemplary damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorneys fees and costs.

CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved

Li's employer

Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated

Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across

the scene of the accident: Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the

sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle(NOT heavy rain)

ISSUE:

1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO

2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO

3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable -

YES


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4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.

HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision

1. NO

If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road,

he could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient orapplying his brakes at the proper time and distance

it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to

safely avoid a collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space

for both cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards

Manila and the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao

2. NO.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,

contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below

the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection

Emergency rule

An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is

required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be

adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails

to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better

solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence

She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or

turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her

She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she

had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed

she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona

Car

3. YES.

Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts

of the servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in

which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to

exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and

supervision of his employees

Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent

supervision of its employee during the performance of the latters assigned

tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180

in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large

companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their

representatives.

Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the

accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in

Paraaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court

below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his

officemates place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his

officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together

to discuss sales and other work related strategies.

Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it

exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its

company car to Li

4. YES.

As the amount of moral damages is subject to this Courts discretion, we are

of the opinion that the amount of P1, 000,000.00 granted by the trial court is

in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. Physical and

psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis grossly negligent

driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.

the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, i t would

also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which

her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements,

changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and

occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are

painful.

B. Imputed Contributory Negligence

5. Philippine Commercial Intl. Bank vs. CA, Jan. 29, 2001 (FORD

PHILIPPINES INC.)

FACTS:

These consolidated petitions involve several fraudulently negotiated

checks

October 19, 1977: Ford drew and issued its Citibank Check of

P4,746,114.41, in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)

as payment of percentage or manufacturer's sales taxes for the third

quarter of 1977

Check was deposited with the IBAA (now PCIBank) and wassubsequently cleared at the Central Bank

Ford, with leave of court, filed a third-party complaint before the trial

court impleading Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) and Godofredo

Rivera, as third party defendants dismissed the complaint against PBC for

lack of cause of action

dismissed the third-party complaint against Godofredo Rivera because hecould not be served with summons as a "fugitive from justice"

Trial court: Citibank and IBAA (now PCI Bank), jointly and

severally, to pay the Ford

April 20, 1979, Ford drew another Citibank Check of P6,311,591.73,representing the payment of percentage tax for the first quarter of 1979

payable to the CIR

Both checks were "crossed checks" and contain two diagonal lines on its

upper corner between, which were written the words "payable to the

payee's account only."


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building were regularly undertaken. Petitioner was even willing to present its

maintenance supervisor to attest to the extent of such regular inspection but

private respondents agreed to dispense with his testimony and simply

stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice presidents narration.

Besides, no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever

been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench.

It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this

country. If subject school buildings roofing was not firmly anchored to its

trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several

typhoons even stronger than Saling.

Petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction

and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon Saling

was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents

house.

8. Napocor vs. CA

FACTS:

In the early morning hours of October 27, 1978, at the height oftyphoon "Kading", a massive flood covered the towns near Angat Dam,causing several deaths and the loss and destruction of properties ofthe people residing near the Angat River.

Private respondents are residents of such area. They were awakenedby the sound of rampaging water all around them. The water cameswiftly and strongly that before they could do anything to save theirbelongings, their houses had submerged, some even swept away bythe strong current.

Private respondents blamed the sudden rush of water to the recklessand imprudent opening of all the three (3) floodgates of the Angat Damspillway, without prior warning to the people living near or within thevicinity of the dam.

Petitioners denied private respondents' allegations and contended that

they have maintained the water in the Angat Dam at a safe level andthat the opening of the spillways was done gradually and after allprecautionary measures had been taken.

Petitioner NPC further contended that it had always exercised thediligence of a good father in the selection of its officials and employeesand in their supervision.

It also claimed that written warnings were earlier sent to the townsconcerned. At the time typhoon "Kading" hit Bulacan with its torrentialrain, a great volume of flood water flowed into the dam's reservoirnecessitating the release of the water therein in order to prevent thedam from collapsing and causing the loss of lives and tremendousdamage to livestock and properties.

Petitioners further contended that there was no direct causalrelationship between the alleged damages suffered by the respondents

and the acts and omissions attributed to the former. That it was therespondents who assumed the risk of residing near the Angat River,and even assuming that respondents suffered damages, the causewas due to a fortuitous event and such damages are of the nature andcharacter of damnum absque injuria, hence, respondents have nocause of action against them.

The Trial Court awarded damages, interest, and attorneys fees. TheCA affirmed such ruling.

ISSUE W/N the injury caused to private respondents was due tofortuitous event.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

No. Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinaryevents not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseenor which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is not enough that theevent should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonlybelieved, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.

As a general rule, no person shall be responsible for those eventswhich could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable

The act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be

occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is tobe excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief.When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation ofman, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act,the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rulesapplicable to the acts of God.

o Rainfall was classified only as moderate and couldnt have causedflooding.

o Despite announcements of the coming of a powerful typhoon, thewater level was maintained at its maximum.

When the negligence of a person concurs with an act of Godproducing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showingthat the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God.To be exempt he must be free from any previous negligence or

misconduct by which the loss or damage may have been occasioned.

D. Doctrine of Assumption of Risk

9. Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. CA

Facts:

1. On June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name "Gening"buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains andconsequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on

June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the

floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao

Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her

son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, LaoagCity, and proceeded northward towards the direction of the FiveSisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to

look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged.

2. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased wasfollowed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery

also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the

deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of

between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased,

3. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank intothe water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded

them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased

sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and

moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shoutsfor help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio

Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters

away from her he turned back shouting that the water was

grounded. Aida and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from

Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or

five blocks away.

4. When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-inlaw had been electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife

Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the

City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people o

defendant I locos Norte Electric Company or I NEL CO to cut of


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the electric current. Then the party waded to the house on

Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights insidethe house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut

off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of

the deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an

electric post.

5. In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful date, June 29,1967, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the

National Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant,

noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicatedsuch abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between

6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on aninspection. On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines.

Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he

could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the

INELCO Office at the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way ofGuerrero. As he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and

Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long strung across

the street "and the other end was seeming to play with the currentof the water." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Finding the Office of the

INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he returned to

the NPC Compound.

6. At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound againon another inspection trip. Having learned of the death of IsabelLao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at the corner of

Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had beentaken. Using the resuscitator which was a standard equipment in

his jeep and employing the skill he acquired from an in servicetraining on resuscitation, he tried to revive the deceased. Hisefforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm

of the deceased, Engr. Juan noticed a hollow wound. Proceeding to

the INELCO Office, he met two linemen on the way. He told them

about the grounded lines of the INELCO In the afternoon of the

same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the

restoration of power. The dangling wire he saw on Guerrero earlyin the morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there.

7. Many people came to the house at the corner of Guerrero and M.H.del Pilar after learning that the deceased had been electrocuted.

Among the sympathizers was Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal

Health Officer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Upon the request of therelatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the body at about

8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967. The skin was grayish or, in medical

parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On theleft palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" (Exh.

C-1: p. 101, TSN, Nov. 28, 1972) or a first degree burn. About the

base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. (Exh. C-2,

pp. 102-103, Ibid.) The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro

stated the cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock electrocution"

(Exh. I; p. 103, Ibid.).

8. In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies ofits officers and employees, namely, Conrado Asis, electricengineer; Loreto Abijero, collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero,

lineman; and Julio Agcaoili, president-manager of INELCO

Through the testimonies of these witnesses, defendant sought toprove that on and even before June 29, 1967 the electric service

system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area, including Area

No. 9 which covered the residence of Antonio Yabes at No. 18Guerrero Street, did not suffer from any defect that might

constitute a hazard to life and property. The service lines, devicesand other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. As a public service operator

and in line with its business of supplying electric current to the

public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoidinjuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural

calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others. Defendant had

12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock

check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them.

9. Defendant asserts that although a strong typhoon struck theprovince of Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967, putting to streets of

Laoag City under water, only a few known places in Laoag were

reported to have suffered damaged electric lines, namely, at the

southern approach of the Marcos Bridge which was washed awayand where the INELCO lines and posts collapsed; in the eastern

part near the residence of the late Governor Simeon Mandac; in the

far north near the defendant's power plant at the corner of Segundo

and Castro Streets, Laoag City and at the far northwest side, near

the premises of the Ilocos Norte National High School. Fabico

Abijero, testified that in the early morning before 6 o'clock on June29, 1967 he passed by the intersection of Rizal and Guerrero

Streets to switch off the street lights in Area No. 9. He did not see

any cut or broken wires in or near the vicinity. What he saw weremany people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan.

Issue:WON Ilocos Norte Electric Corporation was liable

Held: In this case, it was held that while it is true that typhoons and

storms are considered as Acts of God for which no person may be heldresponsible, it was not said eventuality which directly causes the

victims death. It was through the intervention of petitioners negligence

that death took place. Indeed, under the circumstances of the casepetitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the public

The negligence of petitioner shown, it may not now absolve itself from

liability by arguing that the victims death was solely due to a fortuitousevent.

E. Prescription for quasi-delict

Article 1146

1146 The following actions must beinstituted within four years:

(1) Upon an injury to the rights ofthe plaintiff;(2) Upon a quasi-delict;

However, when the action arisesfrom or out of any act, activity, orconduct of any public officerinvolving the exercise of powersor authority arising from MartialLaw including the arrest,detention and/or trial of the

plaintiff, the same must bebrought within one (1) year. (Asamended by PD No. 1755, Dec.24, 1980.)

10. Kramer Jr. vs. C.A

FACTS:

On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernest

Kramer,

Jr. and Marta Kramer were navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila.

Somewhere near the Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured

in a collision with an inter-island vessel (M/V Asia Philippines) owned by

Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.

Due to the collision, F/B Marjolea sank, taking along its fish catch.

The captains of both vessels filed a protest with the Board of Marine Inquiryof the

Philippine Coast Guardfor the purpose of determining the proximate cause of

the maritimeCollision

On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the collision was due to thenegligence of the employees of private respondent (Trans-Asia).

On the basis of such decision, the Philippine Coast Guard, on April 29,

1982,


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suspended M/V Asia Philippines from pursuing his profession as a marine

officer. On May 30,1985, petitioners filed a complaint for damages in the RTC,

Pasay City.

Private respondent filed a MTD on the ground of prescription based on Art.

1146 of the Civil Code which provides, An action based upon quasi-delict

must be instituted within 4 years from the day the quasi-delict was committed.

The RTC denied the MTD on the basis of the Boards resolution that there

was a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collision,hence, the prescriptive period under the law should begin to run only from

April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of M/V AsiaPhilippines had been finally ascertained.

On appeal to the CA, the said court reversed the RTCs decision and granted

theMTD, hence the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N a complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private

respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of

limitations


YES. The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which

consists of 3 elements, namely:o A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under

whatever law it arises or is createdo An obligation on the part of defendant to respect such righto An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right

of the plaintiff

The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause of action arise

Aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body

that the collision was caused by fault or negligence of the other party before

he can file action for damages

1. Petition is DISMISSED.

II. CAUSATION

a. Proximate Cause

11. Bataclan vs. Medina

FACTS

Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the MedinaTransportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a

certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way

to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon.

There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor.

Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right ofthe driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger

apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya,

apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and awoman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned.

At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running withinthe jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle

began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road

and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best

way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three

passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan

and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out ofthe overturned bus.

Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans

and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan andLara, who said they could not get out of the bus.

There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers

already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any

attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside

the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in theneighborhood.

After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torchmade of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum.

These men presumably approached the overturned bus, and almostimmediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus,

including the four passengers trapped inside it.

It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escapefrom the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and

permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that

the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help setit on fire.

That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside thebus were removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan.

The widow instituted a suit to recover damages from Medina. The trial courtruled in favor of the widow of Bataclan. But the trial court contends that the

overturning of the bus was not the proximate cause of Bataclans death.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS Whether the overturning of the bus was the proximate cause of Bataclans

death or

the fire that burned the bus


In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not

hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this

for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completelyon its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or

unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to

the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by thedriver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30

in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as

they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available;and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach

the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.

In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and

was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of

its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of thebus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is

driver and its conductor.

According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road

walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have

known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline couldand must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and

around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially

over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yetneither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken

steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Saidnegligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal

provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733,

1759 1763.


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12. Pilipinas Bank vs. CA

Facts:

As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes,

Florencio Reyes issued post-dated checks to Winner Industrial

Corporation and Vicente Tui with due dates on October 10 and 12, 1979,

respectively.

To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979,

requested PCIB Money Shop's manager Mike Potenciano to effect the

withdrawal of P32, 000.00 from his savings account therein and have it

deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank (then Filman

Bank), Bian Branch. Roberto Santos was requested to make the

deposit.

In depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from the

teller the current account number of Florencio Reyes to complete the

deposit slip he was accomplishing.

He was informed that it was "815" and so this was the same current

account number he placed on the deposit slip below the depositor's name

FLORENCIO REYES.

Nothing that the account number coincided with the name Florencio,

Efren Alagasi, then Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank,thought it was for Florencio Amador who owned the listed account

number. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing

that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES.

On October 11, 1979, the October 10, check in favor of Winner

Industrial Corporation was presented for payment. Since the ledger of

Florencio Reyes indicated that his account had only a balance of P4,

078.43, it was dishonoured and the payee was advised to try it for next

clearing. On October 15, 1979, the October 10, 1979 check was

redeposited but was again dishonoured.

Likewise, the October 12, 1979 check in favor of Vicente Tui when

presented for payment on that same date met the same fate but was

advised to try the next clearing.

Two days after the October 10 check was again dishonoured, the payee

returned the same to Florencio Reyes and demanded a cash payment of

its face value which he did if only to save his name. The October 12,

1979 check was redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again dishonoured

for the reason that the check was drawn against insufficient fund.

Furious over the incident, he immediately proceeded to the bank and

urged an immediate verification of his account. Upon verification, the

bank noticed the error.

The P32,000.00 deposit posted in the account of Florencio Amador was

immediately transferred to the account of Reyes upon being cleared by

Florencio Amador that he did not effect a deposit in the amount of

P32,000.00. The transfer having been effected, the bank then honored

the October 12, 1979, check.

Issue: WON the proximate cause of the mis-posting of deposit was due

to the error of the representative of Reyes

Held:

No. For Article 2179 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established

that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and

proximate cause of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is well

defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural

and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,

produces the result complained of and without which would not have

occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably

anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or

some similar injury, would result there from as a natural and probable

consequence."

In the case at bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence

of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of

private respondent in the name of another depositor who had a similar

first name. As held by the trial court:

Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have

failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his

duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit in

the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name

Florencio appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the

full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip.

He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which was

proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty, considering

the amount involved and the repercussions it would create on the totality

of the person notable of which is the credit standing of the person

involved should a mistake happen. The checks issued by the plaintiff in

the course of his business were dishonored by the bank because the

ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a balance insufficient to cover the

face value of checks.

b. Remote Cause, Nearest Cause, Concurrent Cause (Art. 2194, Art.

2202 of the Civil Code)

2194 The responsibility of two or more

persons who are liable for quasi-

delict is solidary.

2202 In crimes and quasi-delicts, the

defendantshall be liable for all

damages which are the natural andprobable consequences of the act or

omission complained of. It is not

necessary that such damages have

been foreseen or could havereasonably been foreseen by the

defendant.

13.The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company vs. The Govt of the Phil.

Islands (Warning: Incomplete)

FACTS

Atlantic Gulf commenced construction of a steel fabrication plant in Bauan,

Batangas which necessitated dredging operations at the Batangas Bay, in an

area adjacent to the property of private respondents.

Two actions for damages were filed by different respondents and were

consolidated as the plaintiffs therein intended to present common evidence

against defendant, by reason of the virtual identity of the issues involved in

both cases.


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Private respondents alleged that petitioners personnel and heavy equipment

trespassed, damaged, and made into depots and parking lots without payment

of rent the land owned by the respondents.

Moreover, the sea silt and water overflowed and were deposited upon their

land. Consequently, the said property which used to be agricultural lands

principally devoted to rice production and each averaging an annual net

harvest of 75 Cavans, could no longer be planted with Palay as the soil

became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture.

Petitioner denied allegations about its personnel and heavy equipment. And

it further contended that the sea silt and water was due to the floods and heavy

rains of typhoon Ruping

Trial court ruled in favor of respondents ordering Atlantic to pay damages.

Upon appeal to the CA, judgment was affirmed with modifications increasing

the amount of damages.

Petitioner is now asking for nullification or at least partial modificat ion on

the grounds of double recovery.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the awards to the respondents constitute double recovery and thus,

prohibited by the NCC.

Petitioners: Article 2177 of the Civil Code states that: "the plaintiff cannot

recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant"

W/N the CA committed grave abuse in discretion by granting excessive

damages


SC may not reverse a judgment on a Certiorari case under Rule 45. But CA

committed grave abuse of discretion when it increased the damages

Evidence on record support findings of trial and appellate courts that

petitioner was liable. The fact that the appellate court adopted the findings of

the trial court, as in this case, makes the same binding upon the SupremeCourt, for the factual findings of said appellate court are generally binding on

the latter. For that matter the findings of the Court of Appeals by itself, and

which are supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of

review by the Supreme Court.

Only questions of law may be raised on certiorari under Rule 45. It is not the

function of the SC to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Its jurisdiction

is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the

lower court. Unless the findings are glaringly erroneous.

However, CA committed reversible error when it increased damages. Only

the petitioner appealed and the respondents are presumed to be satisfied with

the judgment.

The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who has not

himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief

other than those granted in the decision of the lower court.

Judgment modified.

14. Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad Company

Facts:

Defendant Railroad Company operates a line through the district of Daraga in

the municipality of Albay; as one of its trains passed over said line, a great

quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and

fire was thereby communicated to four houses nearby belonging to the four

plaintiffs respectively, and the same were entirely consumed. All of these

houses were of light construction with the exception of the house of Remigio

Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with

nipa and cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train,

and a strong wind was blowing at the time. It does not appear either in the

complaint or in the agreed statement whose house caught fire first, though it is

stated in the appellant's brief that the fire was first communicated to the house

of Remigio Rodrigueza, from whence it spread to the others.

In its defense Respondent alleged that it is not liable since petitioner is also

negligent. It appeared that the house of Remigio Rodriguez stood partly within

the limits of the land owned by the defendant company. It further appears that

after the railroad track was laid, the company notified Rodriguez to get his

house off the land of the company and to remove it from its exposed position.

Rodriguez did not comply with this suggestion, though he promised to put an

iron roof on his house, which he never did. Instead, he changed the materials

of the main roof to nipa, leaving the kitchen and media-aguas covered with

cogon.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner's negligence absolves respondent, despite also its

negligence, from liability.

Ruling:

No.

Explained the court, with respect to the case of Remegio Rodrigueza it is to

be inferred that his house stood upon this ground before the Railroad

Company laid its line over this course; and at any rate there is no proof that

this plaintiff had unlawfully intruded upon the railroad's property in the act of

building his house. What really occurred undoubtedly is that the company,

upon making this extension, had acquired the land only, leaving the owner of

the house free to remove it. Hence he cannot be considered to have been a

trespasser in the beginning. Rather, he was there at the sufferance of the

defendant company, and so long as his house remained in this exposed

position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have resulted

from fires occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if operated and managed

with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any

damage that might result from the unlawful negligence acts of the defendant.

Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible

negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use

the care of the ordinary prudent man.

In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only cause of

the damage that occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing

this fire. The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the

property of the defendant company and therefore in dangerous proximity to

passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made


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the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as

contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that

condition was not created by himself; secondly, because his house remained

on this ground by the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad

Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the house to be improperly

there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.

[The destruction must be via lawful means and not via negligence!]

Moreover, the circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its

line near Remigio Rodrigueza's house, had requested or directed him to

remove it, did not convert his occupancy into a trespass, or impose upon him

any additional responsibility over and above what the law itself imposes in

such situation. In this connection it must be remembered that the company

could at any time have removed said house in the exercise of the power of

eminent domain, but it elected not to do so.

Petitioner's negligence is the nearest cause of the fire that destroys the

house of the three others, since without his house that is built near the rail line

which absorbs the spark, there have been no fire. However, it must be noted

that even if the the negligence of the person is the nearest cause; it does not

absolved a party if he is also negligent.

15. Caltex vs. Africa

Facts:

A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo Street

and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a

tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving

tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted, when an unknown bystander

threw a matchstick into the nozzle after lighting a cigarette.

The fire spread to and burned several neighbouring houses, including the

personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them

petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the

first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of

operation.

Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners fai led to prove

negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and

with respect to the supervision of their employees.

Issue:

Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the

part of appellees.

Held:

Reversed.

The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was

under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and

burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known

how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no

explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the

incident happened because of want of care.

The report submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties on

the basis of his own personal observation that the gasoline station being

located on a thickly populated area, a person lighting a cigarette cannot be

excluded and poses as a secondary hazard, may properly be considered as an

exception to the hearsay rule.

These facts, descriptive of the location and objective circumstances

surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the

presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on

their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those which

would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances.

Even then, the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses

were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely,

their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from

leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and

beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would

predictably crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat.

Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of

the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.

16. Sabido vs. Custodio, 124 Phil. 516

NATURE

Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS

In Barrio Halang, , two trucks, one driven by Mudales and belonging to

Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Lagunda and owned

by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road

curve. Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board

astruck was full of passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by

Lagunda.

As a result, Custodio was injured and died.

To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales.

However, Makabuhay, widoy of Custodio, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was

running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And Lagunda had time and opportunityto avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious becausethe

two trucks never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right

side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio.

The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on

broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bu

with full load to passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and

sliding downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up with

no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and

driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). LTB passengers had testified to the

effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed.

Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of

the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus.

Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he

could pass over with ease, Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because

to use his own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks.

Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of

Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co.hereinafter referred

to as the carrierand its driver Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had

violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners

Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of

them were held solidarity liable.


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ISSUES

1. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence

2. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its

driver

HELD

1. YES. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its

location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which

we cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari, such as the one at bar.

At any rate, the correctness of said findings is borne out by the very testimony

of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the

running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away

from the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance between the two vehicles

was such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck

were not running at a great speed.

Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its

execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of

negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio.

In fact, the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result

without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners'

negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running

board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the

opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear

chance.

2. YES. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of

contributory negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running

board of the bus, and where the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of

contributory negligence, because that vehicle was running at a considerable

speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of

being close to its right side of the road, it was driven on its middle portion

thereof and so near the passenger bus coming from the opposite as to

sideswipe a passenger on its running board, the owners of the two vehicles are

liable solidarily for the death of the passenger, although the liability of one

arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the other springs from a quasidelict.

Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more

persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the

direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is

impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury,

either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not

have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from

the acts of the other tort-feasor.

c. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

17. Picart vs. Smith (Taken up Already)

18. Del Prado vs. Manila Electric Co

FACTS:

The Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the City

of Manila for the conveyance of passengers; and on the morning of 18

November 1925, one Teodorico Florenciano, as Meralcos motorman, was in

charge of car 74 running from east to west on R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of

the accident being at a point near the intersection of said street and Mendoza

Street.

After the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and letting off

passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its course at a moderate

speed under the guidance of the motorman. The car had proceeded only a

short distance, however, when Ignacio del Prado ran across the street to catch

the car, his approach being made from the left. - The car was of the kind

having entrance and exit at either end, and the movement of del Prado was so

timed that he arrived at the front entrance of the car at the moment when the

car was passing. Del Prado, upon approaching the car, raised his hand as an

indication to the motorman of his desire to board the car, in response to which

the motorman eased up a little, without stopping.

Upon this, del Prado seized, with his left hand, the front perpendicular

handpost, at the same time placing his left foot upon the platform. However,

before del Prados position had become secure, and even before his raised

right foot had reached the platform, the motorman applied the power, with the

result that the car gave a slight lurch forward.

This sudden impulse to the car caused del Prados foot toslip, and his hand

was jerked loose from the handpost. He therefore fell to the ground, and his

right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car.

The next day the member had to be amputated in the hospital (ouch). - An

action was instituted in the CFI of Manila by Ignacio del Prado to recoverdamages in the amount of P50,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been

caused by the negligence of Meralco in the operation of one of its street cars

in the City of Manila. Upon hearing the cause the trial court awarded to del

Prado the sum of P10,000, as damages, with costs of suit. Meralco appealed. -

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment with the modification tha

the sum to be recoveredreduced to P2,500; with costs against Meralco.

ISSUES AND RATIO:

1. No obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop cars at

points other than appointed for stoppage

There is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its cars

to let on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for

stoppage. It would be impossible to operate a system of street cars if acompany engaged in this business were required to stop any and everywhere

to take on people who are too indolent, or who imagine themselves to be in

too great a hurry, to go to the proper places for boarding the cars.

2. Duty of the motorman of the car

Although the motorman of the car was not bound to stop to let the passenger

on, it was his duty to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the

passengers peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature

acceleration of the car was a breach of this duty.

3. Nature of relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its

patrons; Duty of the carrier

The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a

contractual nature; and a failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in

carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contractual) under

articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the duty that the

carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars

as well as to those alighting therefrom.

4. Cangco v. Manila Railroad; Culpa Contractual

The case of Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. supplies an instance of the

violation of the duty with respect to a passenger who was getting off of a train


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In that case, the plaintiff stepped off of a moving train, while it was slowing

down in a station, and at a time when it was too dark for him to see clearly

where he was putting his feet. The employees of the company had carelessly

left watermelons on the platform at the place where the plaintiff alighted, with

the result that his feet slipped and he fell under the car, where his right arm

was badly injured. This court held that the railroad company was liable for

breach of positive duty (culpa contractual), and the plaintiff was awarded

damages in the amount of P2,500 for the loss of his arm. In the opinion in that

case the distinction is clearly drawn between a liability for negligence arising

from breach of contractual duty and that arising under articles 1902 and 1903

of the Civil Code (culpa aquiliana).

5. Relevance of distinction between Culpa Contractual and Culpa

Aquiliana as to defenses available

The distinction between the two sorts of negligence is important in this

jurisdiction, for the reason that where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa

aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive obligation, an employer, or

master, may exculpate himself, under the last paragraph of article 1903 of the

Civil Code, by proving that he had exercised due diligence to prevent the

damage; whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master

arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa contractual).

6. Training of motorman irrelevant in breach of obligation under Article

1101 of the Civil Code

Herein, the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the

diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by del

Prado; and to establish this contention the company introduced testimony

showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman

in charge of this car in his art. This proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that

the liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation under article

1101 of the Civil Code and related provisions.

7. Relevance of distinction between negligence arising under Article 1902

and 1101 as to mitigation of liability

Another practical difference between liability for negligence arising under

article 1902 of the Civil Code and liability arising from negligence in the

performance of a positive duty, under article 1101 and related provisions of

the Civil Code, is that, in dealing with the latter form of negligence, the court

is given a discretion to mitigate liability according to the circumstances of the

case (art 1103). No such general discretion is given by the Code in dealing

with liability arising under article 1902; though possibly the same end is

reached by courts in dealing with the latter form of liability because of the

latitude of the considerations pertinent to cases arising under this article.

8. Contributory negligence a mitigating circumstance under Article 1103

Civil Code

As to the contributory negligence of del Prado, as in Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf

and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), it is treated as a mitigating circumstance under

article 1103 of the Civil Code. Herein, the negligence of del Prado was

contributory to the accident and must be considered as a mitigating

circumstance.

9. Proximate cause of the accident

Del Prados negligence in attempting to board the moving car wasnot the

proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury

was the act of Meralcos motorman in putting on thepower prematurely. A

person boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from

boarding the car under the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be

held to assume the risk that the motorman, having the situation in view, will

increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the car before he is planted

safely on the platform. Again, the situation is one where the negligent act of

the companys servant succeeded the negligent act of the passenger, and the

negligence of the company must be considered the proximate cause of the

injury.

10.Rule analogous to the doctrine of the last clear chance

The rule applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which

is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of the last clear chance. In

accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured

will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the

exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of

the negligence of the injured party.

11. Award of damage

With respect to the effect of this injury upon del Prados earning power,

although he lost his foot, he

is able to use an artificial member without great inconvenience and his

earning capacity has probably not been reduced by more than 30%. In view of

the precedents found in the Courts decisions with respect to

the damages that ought to be awarded for the loss of a limb, and more

particularly Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359); Cangco vs

Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768); and Borromeo vs. Manila Electric

Railroad and Light Co. (44 Phil., 165), and in view of all the circumstancesconnected with the case, the Court is of the opinion that del Prado will be

adequately compensated by an award of P2,500.

19. Pantranco North Express Inc. vs. Maricar Baesa G.R. Nos. 79050-51

November 14, 1989

FACTS:

At about 7:00 am of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and

their children Harold Jim, Marcelino and Maricar, together with spouses

David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven persons, were

aboard a passenger jeepney on the way to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan,

Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of the spouses Baesa.

The group in the jeepney proceeded to a barrio to deliver some viands whichthey drove along San Felipe, taking the highway going to Malamlam River.

Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded

Malamlam river at a speed of 20kph. While they were proceeding Malmlam

River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular rout to

Manila, encroached the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided

with it.

As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Baesa and their children died

except Maricar and the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney

was extensively damaged. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO

Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago, Isabella.

From that time on up to the present, Ramirez has never been seen and has

apparently remained hiding. Maricar Baesa, through ther guardian Francisca

O. Bascos and Fe. O. Ico for herself and for her minor children, filed separate

actions for damages from quasi delict against PANTRANCO.

The petitioner contented that the respondent court did not apply the doctrine

of last clear chance against the jeepney driver. Also, under the circumstance o

the case, it was the driver of the jeepney who had the last clear chance to

avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with

reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the

harm.

ISSUE:Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance may be applied to

the case at bar to absolve the petitioner from liabilities?


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HELD:No, the court held that the doctrine of last clear chance applies only in

a situation where the defendant, having the last fair chance to avoid the

impending harm and failed to do so, becomes liable for all the consequences

of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.

Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making

a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty o

torts endterms reviewer all cases

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