UMIL vs. RAMOS (187 SCRA 311)

FACTS: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the 5 male "sparrows" who murdered 2 Capcom mobile patrols the day before. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," however, it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested

HELD: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

PEOPLE vs. BURGOS (144 SCRA 1)

FACTS: Due to an information given by a person, who allegedly was being forcibly recruited by accused to the NPA, the members of the Constabulary went to the house of accused, asked about his firearm and documents connected to subversive activities.

Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty.

ISSUE: Whether defendant’s arrest, the search of his home and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and NPA-related documents were lawful

HELD: At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any “subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have been in fact or actually have been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. There was no reason why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

MILO vs. SALANGA (152 SCRA 113)

FACTS: An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein private respondent Barrio Captain Tuvera and some other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter, without legal grounds and with deliberate intent to deprive the latter of his constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two members of the police force of Mangsat conspired and helped one another in lodging and locking petitioner inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about 11 hours.

Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst. Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto. Consequently, averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether accused, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention

HELD: YES. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.

STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO (20 SCRA 383)

FACTS: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

ISSUE: Whether warrants issued were maliciously obtained

HELD: Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.

Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances. Petitioners were not the proper party to

question the validity and return of those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.

BURGOS vs. CHIEF OF STAFF (133 SCRA 800)

FACTS: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner. Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the two warrants were valid despite indication of same address(2) Whether the two warrants lack probable cause

HELD:

(1) The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

(2) Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations. Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. The

description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

PEOPLE vs. BAES (61 PHIL. 203)

FACTS: Baes, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna, charged the accused with an offense against religion for causing the funeral of a member of the “Church of Christ” to pass through the churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, belonging to said church and devoted to the religious worship thereof. The parish priest opposed this, but through force and threats of physical violence by the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said churchyard.

ISSUE: Whether the act complained of is notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, thereby violating Article 133 of the RPC

HELD: The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established, the court may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code. Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic and not those of other faithful ones.