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© Copyright 2017 Farsight Security, Inc. All Right Reserved. ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) Analysis and Update on JAR Report

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Page 1: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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© Copyright 2017 Farsight Security, Inc. All Right Reserved. © Copyright 2017 Farsight Security, Inc. All Right Reserved.

ThreatConnectandFarsightResearchersTackleaGrizzly(Steppe)

Analysis and Update on JAR Report

Page 2: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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INTRODUCTION

KYLEEHMKETHREATCONNECT

ERICZIEGASTFARSIGHTSECURITY

•  THREAT INTE L L IGENCE R E S EARCHER

•  RECENT LY WORK ING ON RE S EARCH INTO RUSS I AN E L ECT ION

ACT I V I T Y AND TARGETED E F FORTS AGA INST B E L L INGCAT , WADA , AND OTHERS .

•  D I S T INGU I SHED D I S TR I BUTED S Y S TEMS ENG INEER

•  DEVE LOPED THE S ECUR I T Y I N FORMAT ION EXCHANGE ( S I E ) –

R EA L - T IME DATA COL L ECT ION AND D I S TR I BUT ION IN FRASTRUCTURE

•  PRESENTS AT S ECUR I T Y CONFERENCES ABOUT DDOS , MANAGES S INKHOLES , EVANGEL I Z E S PAS S I VE DNS

Page 3: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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AGENDA

●  INTRODUCTIONTOPIVOTINGWITHPASSIVEDNS&WHOIS

●  THREATCONNECT’SINTEGRATION●  USINGTHEFARSIGHTDNSDBINTEGRATIONINTHREATCONNECT

TOENHANCETHEGRIZZLYSTEPPEJARANDMAPOUTANADVERSARY’SINFRASTRUCTURE

Page 4: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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DNS RECURSION / PASSIVE DNS

DNS Servers

www.example.com

93.184.216.34

Devices & Users

Registry Servers

Recursive Server

Root Servers

Cache

Farsight Security

Page 5: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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DNS DATA WORLDWIDE - OUR SENSOR ARRAY

GLOBAL COVERAGE

DIVERSE SOURCES • Consumer • Government • Education • Enterprise •  ISPs & Mobile • Social media

REAL-TIME & HISTORIC •  200k+ Resolutions / sec •  5+ TB / Day •  100+ Billion DNS Resolutions

Page 6: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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TWO WAYS TO EMPOWER SECURITY OPERATIONS

I. SECURITY INFORMATION EXCHANGE •  Proactivelydetectandblock•  EmpoweryourFirewall&MailServers•  200,000+observations/second•  Compliantwithleadingprotocolsforeasyingestion

II. DNS INTELLIGENCE DATABASE – DNSDB • World’slargesthistoricdatabaseofDNSresolutionandallrecords

•  EmpoweryourSIEMandThreatPlatform•  Started2007,rebuiltin2010,updatedinreal-time,100+Billionresolutionsrecorded

• APIandOn-PremSolution

SIE (REAL-TIME Streaming)

DNSDB (HISTORIC)

Page 7: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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THREATCONNECTANDDNSDB:DNSASAMAP

§  DNSISUSEDEVERYWHERE§  Desktop,Mobile,Laptops,Servers,Sites

§  MAPEXISTINGINFRASTRUCTUREBASEDONOBSERVATIONS§  Naturallyavoidprivateinformation(weavoidknowingwhoqueriedwhat)

§  OBSERVATIONS&FACTSàCONTEXTFORINVESTIGATIONS

àENHANCETHREATINTELLIGENCE

§  MISCREANTSNEEDDNSFORTHEIRINFRASTRUCTURE,TOO

DNSDataCan’tbefaked

Page 8: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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PIVOTING:

UNDERSTANDING PIVOTING WITH PASSIVE DNS AND WHOIS

Page 9: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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PIVOTING: GUILT BY ASSOCIATION – PASSIVE DNS

KNOWN BAD HOSTNAME OR IP ADDRESS

WHAT OTHER HOST NAMES AT THE SAME ADDRESS AT THE SAME TIME?

KNOWN BAD DOMAIN

WHAT OTHER HOSTS ARE IN THE DOMAIN?

WHAT OTHER DOMAINS ARE SERVED BY THE SAME NAMESERVER?

WHAT OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE IS HOSTED IN THE SURROUNDING NETWORK BLOCK?

Page 10: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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PIVOTING: GUILT BY ASSOCIATION – PASSIVE DNS

SIMILAR NAMING PATTERNS

FAST-FLUX BOTNET INFRASTRUCTURE

UNCOMMON NAMES USED IN MANY DOMAINS

DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS

SIMILAR LOOKING ANSWERS SOA RECORDS?

TXT RECORDS? SPF RECORDS?

Page 11: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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PIVOTING PASSIVE DNS: REDUCING FALSE POSITIVES

INDICATOR FOR A HOSTNAME OR IP ADDRESS

KNOWN REVERSE PROXY SERVICE? KNOWN SINKHOLE? HOSTING SERVICE? DOMAIN PARKING SERVICE? DYNAMIC DNS SERVICE? WIDELY USED CDN INFRASTRUCTURE?

Example: “ICE takedown mooo.com”

Page 12: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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PIVOTING WHOIS: COMMON REGISTRATION FINGERPRINTS

KNOWN BAD DOMAIN REGISTRATION EMAIL USED ELSEWHERE? SAME OR SIMILAR REGISTRATION NAME USED ON OTHER DOMAINS? SAME OR SIMILAR POSTAL OR PHONE INFORMATION USED ON OTHER DOMAINS?

Doesn’t matter if registration is real or faked – just similar. One known bad domain could lead to more. Similar registration information (and hosting patterns) helps confirm two domains could be managed by same actor.

Check out https://www.domaintools.com/partners/integrations/threatconnect/

Page 13: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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PIVOTING:

PIVOTING EXAMPLES

Page 14: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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PIVOTING EXAMPLE: REGISTRAR HACK

;; first seen: 2011-09-04 20:17:34 -0000 ;; last seen: 2011-09-04 21:40:24 -0000 betfair.com. IN NS ns1.yumurtakabugu.com. betfair.com. IN NS ns2.yumurtakabugu.com.

acer.com. betfair.com. dell.co.kr. hsbc.co.kr. nationalgeographic.com. ups.com. vodafone.com. ...more...

Page 15: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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PIVOTING EXAMPLE: SPAM -> CANADIAN PHARMA DOMAINS

healthtr.com medicacpr.ru medicannk.com mediccker.ru mediccklr.ru medicehok.com medicelcr.ru medicellk.com medicemur.ru medicheek.com medichmar.ru …etc…

medicostb.com HOSTED ON SAME IPS

Page 16: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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PIVOTING EXAMPLE: ZEUS DOMAINS

xsnnsynlsnfhklun.com

xqoyjkmnrhqmxpty.net outqrpskulndkxne.info xsnnsynlsnfhklun.com aonqrnernvqret.net gkoijyqmyjklqpv.info llnepksnvvqlzzrs.info krirfqkmckkssgol.biz www.jfjpdsqirhsypqnn.org jfjpdsqirhsypqnn.org vroxnpojiomtenlq.biz uitppyflfsnkpxid.info jwdwlqqqqiwhxkt.com ryqqfjhctkptirn.biz pcrslsynooqorrwj.biz rjtsnpveowswsglp.com cqojeuyikosljoqw.biz ttfhvhmusnkkov.net

same IP

Page 17: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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PIVOTING EXAMPLE: SEARCH “Z-BOT FAST-FLUX”

lindabstewart.com (ß zeus-tracker)

arexan.at astro-travels.net boombom.at complianceanyone.ru csh0p.cc cyajon.at

dumpstreet.vc gmumwmiwoqegwiwo.org jvcc.su lictheshallunitedenteit.ru magasoldator.ru

missionsthhartmanencopa.com monpasevashumamin.cm mrbin.cc myprivatepicts.com popeyeds.cc

robinson98.com royaldumps.tw ruise.ru sdn-comm.at termlawfulfeessoft.ru try2swipe.me try2swipe.ws

unclesam.ws uoeeukyackaagagg.org uvvv.ru verifyandmeet.com vvservop.at ycorporation.ru

anymansjentnrwe.net bigbropos.top ekrosha.com kqwenhanebnbama.net. kronashjeeeaqqforny.com

lkdmsmnfjznfreqas.com mcduck.org naheqbhbzgbnqbza.net njandhasdnppp.com

immortald.ru. marcusd.ru oqwnqwnfauwneebd.net paysell.bz prvtzone.ws ronymanyantiynewww.net

try2swipe.ws verified.vc wjenqianywenet.net

Combinations of IP hosting patterns, expanding into subnets, nameservers, other information Fast-flux infrastructure has been resilient through multiple takedowns

2015

2016

2017 / today

Page 18: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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HOW FARSIGHT DATA IS USED

FARSIGHT SECURITY

THR EA T P L A T FORMS

F I R EWA L L S

MA I L S E R V E R S

O R CH E S T RA T I ON / AU TOMAT I ON

BU L K QU E R I E S

MACH I N E L E A RN I NG

S I EMS

Page 19: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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USINGFARSIGHTDNSDBINTEGRATIONINTHREATCONNECT

Page 20: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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USINGFARSIGHTDNSDBINTEGRATIONINTHREATCONNECT

Page 21: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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THEGRIZZLYSTEPPEJAR

Page 22: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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GRIZZLYSTEPPEJAR-WHATISIT?

JointAnalysisReport

•  December29,2016

•  Informationfromseveralagencies

•  Containedgeneralinformationonhackingand911IOCsforseveralRUthreatsandmalware

•  Recommendedmitigations

•  “ThreatsfromIOCs”

Strengths

•  LotsofIOCs

•  Responsive

•  VarietyofThreats

Weaknesses

•  LotsofIOCs

•  Nocontext

•  LotsofTOR•  Notreallythreat

intelligence

Page 23: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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GrizzlySteppeJAR-Indicators?

GRIZZLYSTEPPEJAR–INDICATORS?

Page 24: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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GrizzlySteppeJAR-Indicators?

GRIZZLYSTEPPEJAR–INDICATORS?

Page 25: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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GrizzlySteppeJAR-Indicators?

GRIZZLYSTEPPEJAR–INDICATORS?

Page 26: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR - RECEPTION?NOTGOOD

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Page 27: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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USINGUSGGIVESYOULEMONS

Don’tdespairordiscount

•  Findthreadsyoucanpullon•  Workbackwardstofindthe

intelligenceapplicabletotheindicators

•  Whenpossibleattributeindicatorstoanactor

•  Enrichtheindicatorsandpivotfromthemtofindasmuchasyoucan

•  Continuetracking

OurProcess

•  UseThreatConnecttofindoutwhat’salreadyknownaboutindicatorsandwhatthey’reassociatedwith

•  UseFarsightandWHOISintegrationstoidentifyregistrationandhostingconsistenciestoknowntactics

•  UsepassiveDNStoidentifydomainco-locations

•  MonitorIPs,registrantemailaddresses,andboutiquenameservers

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Page 28: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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USINGTHREATCONNECTANALYZE

Page 29: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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USINGTHREATCONNECTANALYZE

Page 30: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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APATTERN?!??!?!

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Page 31: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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FINDINGTHETHREADTOPULL

FocusingResearch

•  Can’tmakeananalyticleap

•  Reviewedthose80IPsü  Categories

-  IPsalreadyassociatedwithFANCYBEAR

-  IPsthathosteddomainsalreadyassociatedwithFANCYBEAR

-  IPsthathosteddomainswithregistrationconsistenciestopreviousFANCYBEARdomains

-  Newindicatorsweidentifiedfrompivotingoffoffreshinformation

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Page 32: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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FANCYBEAR-THEYHAVEN’TSTOPPEDSOWHYSHOULDWE?

ClintonCampaign

•  ShortenedURLs

DNC

•  misdepatrment[.]com

DCCC

•  actblues[.]com

WADA/CAS

•  wada-awa[.]org

•  wada-arna[.]org

•  tas-cass[.]org

Mouthpieces

•  Guccifer2.0

•  DCLeaks

•  Anpoland

•  FancyBearsHackTeam32

Page 33: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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Page 34: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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Page 35: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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Page 36: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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Page 37: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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Page 38: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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Page 39: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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FINDINGS

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AssociationstoFancyBear

•  43offirst80IPs

AdditionalIndicators

•  68domains•  17IPaddresses

ApplyingIntelligence

•  Nocontext>associations>additionalintel

Page 40: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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MONITORINGNAMESERVERSANDTACTICS

• FANCYBEAR

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Newnameservers

•  Nemohosts[.]com

•  Bacloud[.]com

•  Njal[.]la

AdditionalTactics

•  Registrationtactics

InfrastructureNecessitatesInteraction

•  Procurement•  Expenses

Page 41: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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CONCLUSION

• FANCYBEAR

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Gainadditionalinsight

•  Breadthandsophisticationofcampaign•  Otherindicators

Increasesthreatactors’cost

•  Themoretheyhavetoredotheirinfrastructure,thebetter

Sharingenablesorganizationswithinandoutsideofyoursector

•  Actorsusesimilarinfrastructureandtoolsagainstavarietyoftargets

Page 42: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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Q&A

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION.

Q U E S T I O N S ?

ThreatConnect.com Farsightsecurity.com

Page 43: ThreatConnect and Farsight Researchers Tackle a Grizzly (Steppe) · 2017. 12. 1. · • RECENTLY WORKING ON RESEARCH INTO RUSSIAN ELECTION ACTIVITY AND TARGETED EFFORTS AGAINST BELLINGCAT,

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© Copyright 2017 Farsight Security, Inc. All Right Reserved. © Copyright 2017 Farsight Security, Inc. All Right Reserved.

ThreatConnectandFarsightResearchersTackleaGrizzly(Steppe)

Analysis and Update on JAR Report