thrasymachus glaucon & callicles three challenges to conventional morality

ThrasymachusGlaucon &Callicles

THREE CHALLENGES TO CONVENTIONAL

MORALITY

Plato begins by articulating a powerful attack on conventional morality.

He responds to the challenge by developing a novel approach to morality.

The new approach depends on a theory of human psychology which departs from Socrates’ preferred view.

The new approach also depends on striking metaphysical & epistemological claims.

In an attempt to clarify and defend his moral psychology, Plato develops analogies between the individual and the state. In the process Plato presents his vision of how an ideal state would be organized.

PLATO’S REPUBLIC: SOME HIGHLIGHTS

To appreciate what Plato’s Republic accomplishes, we need some background onthe kinds of moral skepticism Plato is responding to,

andSocrates’ moral psychology.

PRELIMINARIES

In Plato’s dialogues some actual historical figures are depicted as presenting skeptical positions. It is unclear whether these positions were held by actual historical figures.

The most famous statements of moral skepticism in Greek philosophy are attributed to the following characters:Thrasymachus (Republic I)Glaucon & Adeimantus (Republic II)Callicles (Gorgias)

We will discuss each of these in turn.

PLATO’S SKEPTICAL OPPONENTS

The initial question of the Republic: What is justice?

Socrates thinks that this question is critical. Unless we know what justice is, we cannot decide whether we have reason to be just.

Some theories of justice, like that of Thrasymachus, have the consequence that we have reason to avoid being just.

The deeper issue for Plato is whether we have reason to be just.

STAGE SETTING

What is Thrasymachus’ definition of justice in slogan form?

THRASYMACHUS’ ACCOUNT

What is Thrasymachus’ definition of justice in slogan form? Justice is the advantage of the stronger. (338c)

Who are the stronger?



Who are the stronger?The rulers, i.e. those who set up the rules/laws that

govern behavior (338d)

What are the stronger doing in coming up with rules/laws?



Who are the stronger?The rulers, i.e. those who set up the rules/laws that

govern behavior (338d)

What are the stronger doing in coming up with rules/laws?An empirical thesis about rulers: “Each makes laws to

its own advantage.” (338de)


Thrasymachus’ empirical thesis about rulers leads to a reformulation of his account: Justice is a system of rules governing behavior

devised by rulers who have their own advantage in mind. (339c)

What is it for a citizen to be just?

THRASYMACHUS’ ACCOUNT REFORMULATED



What is it for a citizen to be just?Being just is a matter of conforming to the system of

rules devised to promote the interests of the rulers. (339bc)

So do we have reason to be just?




What is it for a citizen to be just?Being just is a matter of conforming to the system of

rules devised to promote the interests of the rulers. (339bc)

So do we have reason to be just?No, justice is another’s good. Being just amounts to

promoting someone else’s interests. (next slide)


“You are so far from understanding about justice and what’s just, about injustice and what’s unjust, that you don’t realize that justice is really the good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys and serves.” (343c)

Do you agree that justice is solely another’s good and always amounts to a loss/harm/sacrifice for the one who is just?

Is Thrasymachus overlooking positive benefits of justice?

Suppose Thrasymachus’ empirical thesis is correct. Does it really follow that being just amounts to a loss?

JUSTICE AS ANOTHER’S GOOD

Thrasymachus’ challenge to commonsense morality. Justice is nothing but a system of rules governing behavior devised by rulers who have their own advantage in mind. Being just, i.e. conforming to such rules, is really just a matter of promoting someone else's interests and always amounts to a loss/harm/sacrifice for the one who is just.

SUMMING UP

One of the central aims of the Republic is to combat moral skepticism. But the target is not so much Thrasymachus’ formulation of skepticism as Glaucon and Adeimantus’ formulation.

Plato seems to think that Thrasymachus’ position can be dismissed in a few pages. The objections raised by Socrates are presented as decisive.

We’ll look at the back-and-forth between Socrates and Thrasymachus because it provides a nice illustration of Socrates’ methods.

THE LARGER CONTEXT

Socrates’ initial observation: Rulers can fail to legislate to their own advantage. They can make mistakes.

How does this observation raise a problem for Thrasymachus’ overall theory?

SOCRATES CONTRA THRASYMACHUS

Socrates’ initial observation: Rulers can fail to legislate to their own advantage. They can make mistakes.

How does this observation raise a problem for Thrasymachus’ overall theory?

On the assumption that being just consists in conforming to the laws, whether or not those laws in fact promote the interests of the rulers, being just is not always a matter of promoting someone else’s interests. (339de)

How does Thrasymachus reply to this worry?

SOCRATES CONTRA THRASYMACHUS

A ruler is like a craftsperson. The ruler qua ruler does not make mistakes. (340d)

Take a lens grinder. A lens grinder is one who practices the art of lens grinding. When a so-called “lens grinder” makes a product that fails to focus light in the desired manner, she is not exercising the art of lens grinding. Strictly speaking, she is not being a lens grinder.

Likewise, a so-called “ruler” who makes bad laws isn’t exercising the art of ruling.

Accordingly, we do not have an exception to the claim that justice is the advantage of the stronger. Strictly speaking, it is.

THRASYMACHUS’ RESPONSE

If the ruler is like a craftsperson, then the ruler does not aim at her own good. (342bc)What is Socrates’ point here?

SOCRATES’ RESPONSE

If the ruler is like a craftsperson, then the ruler does not aim at her own good. (342bc)What is Socrates’ point here?

A lens maker qua lens maker aims to make a properly functioning lens. She does not aim at her own good.

SOCRATES’ RESPONSE

Thrasymachus appeals to the case of the shepherd. (343b)What is the relevance of shepherds in this context?

THRASYMACHUS’ RESPONSE

Thrasymachus wants to speak in a strict manner: strictly speaking, the ruler doesn’t make mistakes.

Well, strictly speaking the art of lens grinding is directed toward making properly functioning lenses, not the advantage of the lens grinder. The art of making money from lens grinding is, strictly speaking, something else.

Strictly speaking, the art of ruling is not directed toward the ruler’s advantage; it is directed toward the advantage of the ruled.*Does this seem like a satisfying response?

SOCRATES’ FINAL BLOW

It might appear that Socrates and Thrasymachus are engaged in a verbal dispute about the term “ruler.” More charitably, they are in genuine disagreement about the relation of ruling.

Thrasymachus: ruling amounts subordinating, enslaving, dominating, oppressing, exploiting… If he offers an argument at all, it is very quick: “each makes laws to its own advantage. Democracy makes democratic laws, tyranny makes tyrannical laws…” (338de)

Socrates: rulers are in fact the ones having to service the ruled. He offers the following supporting evidence: “no one willingly chooses to rule and to take other people’s troubles in hand and straighten them out, but each asks for wages” (346e ff.)

THE DEEPER ISSUE

A problem with Thrasymachus’ challenge. His account of justice fails to acknowledge ways that living in a just society seems genuinely beneficial. Consider two possibilities:

1. Everyone pursues self-interest without regard to the welfare of others.2. Everyone acts morally.

*Why would we prefer to live in world 2 over world 1?

As we will see, Glaucon's theory has the advantage that it explains why we prefer world 2.

TRANSITION TO GLAUCON

People “decide that it is profitable to come to an agreement with each other neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. As a result, they begin to make laws and covenants, and what the law commands they call lawful and just. This, they say, is the origin and essence of justice. It is intermediate between the best and worst. The best is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge. Justice is a mean between these two extremes.” (358e ff.)

Rules of justice/morality are profitable agreements involving compromise. Roughly: we agree to set aside pursuit of self-interest in the name of self-interest.

GLAUCON ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE

OF JUSTICE

How can it be true that we promote self-interest by setting aside self-interest?

A PUZZLE

A helpful way to think about Glaucon’s proposal: rules of justice are solutions to problems of collective agency.

We have a problem of collective agency when rational pursuit of self-interest leads to a worse outcome for all .

Two illustrations: 1. Paying taxes (in a just society)2. Conserving water (in a severe shortage)

PROBLEMS OF COLLECTIVE AGENCY

RANKING YOUR PREFERENCES

Ranking options in the matrix: 4=best, 1=worst. Player B = you. Player A = an arbitrary player.

PLAYER A’S PREFERENCES


THE COMPLETE MATRIX


A CONSEQUENCE OF OUR RANKINGS

Whatever Player A does (cooperate or defect), Player B rationally prefers to defect.

A CONSEQUENCE OF OUR RANKINGS

The same goes for Player A: whatever Player B does, A prefers to defect.

PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE AGENCY

So rationally pursuing self-interest, we end up defecting even though we would be better off cooperating.

Glaucon develops a contractarian theory of the nature of justice/other-regarding morality. The rules of morality come about through (hypothetical) negotiations.

Origins. Laws of morality arise in the face of problems of collective agency. Rational agents recognize that unchecked pursuit of self-interest leads to a worse result for all. They make agreements to set aside pursuit of self-interest.

Nature. Laws of morality are nothing more than agreements rational agents make (or would make) that prohibit pursuit of self-interest in those cases where unstifled pursuit of self-interest leads to a worse result for all.

GLAUCON ON THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF JUSTICE

If the laws of morality arise through rational reflection on self-interest, it might seem that we have prudential reasons to be moral, i.e. reasons of self-interest.

After all, we have prudential grounds for preferring world 2 over world 1:1. Everyone pursues self-interest without regard to the welfare of others.2. Everyone acts morally.

Is there perhaps a world even better than world 2, as far as self-interest is concerned?

DO WE HAVE REASON TO BE MORAL?

1. Everyone pursues self-interest without regard to the welfare of others.2. Everyone acts morally.3. Everyone acts morally except me.

Yes, we as a group have reason to prefer world 2 over world 1. But the question of the Republic is whether I have reason to be moral.Why do I have reason to prefer world 3, given

Glaucon’s view of morality?

DO I HAVE REASON TO BE MORAL?

1. Everyone pursues self-interest without regard to the welfare of others.2. Everyone acts morally.3. Everyone acts morally except me.

Yes, we as a group have reason to prefer world 2 over world 1. But the question of the Republic is whether I have reason to be moral.Why do I have reason to prefer world 3, given

Glaucon’s view of morality?Because morality is a compromise that involves genuine sacrifice of self-interest. (go back to the matrices)

DO I HAVE REASON TO BE MORAL?

But what about the obvious advantages which come with being just? Things like—the benefits that go along with a good reputation—avoiding punishmentsDon’t these obvious considerations show that I have

prudential reasons to be just? (How does Glaucon respond to this question?)

AN OBVIOUS QUESTION

But what about the obvious advantages which come with being just? Things like—the benefits that go along with a good reputation—avoiding punishmentsDon't these obvious considerations show that I have

prudential reasons to be just? (How does Glaucon respond to this question?)

No, all that these considerations establish is that I have reason to seem just, not reason to be just. (next slide)

AN OBVIOUS QUESTION

What these reflections reveal is that I have reason to prefer option 4 over the rest:

1. Everyone pursues self-interest without regard to the welfare of others.2. Everyone acts morally.3. Everyone acts morally except me.4. Everyone acts morally except me and my transgressions go unnoticed.

ACKNOWLEDGING THE BENEFITS OF SEEMING JUST

We need not worry about punishment by fellow citizens as long as we seem just. But the gods know better. Doesn’t divine retribution provide a prudential reason to be moral?How does Adeimantus respond?

BUT WHAT ABOUT DIVINE RETRIBUTION?

We need not worry about punishment by fellow citizens as long as we seem just. But the gods know better. Doesn’t divine retribution provide a prudential reason to be moral?How does Adeimantus respond?

Adeimantus: Perhaps the gods don’t exist. But if they do, all we know about them is from the stories told. And these stories tell us that they can be appeased through gifts.

Another point: on Glaucon’s view, the rules of morality are not divinely sanctioned. It is unclear why the gods would care about them.

BUT WHAT ABOUT DIVINE RETRIBUTION?

This case helps to illustrate the point that each of us most prefers the following world:

4. Everyone acts morally except me and my transgressions go undetected.

Glaucon suggests that anyone in possession of the Ring would be unable to resist the temptation to violate the rules of morality. Each of is just only involuntarily—if we could get away with injustice, we would in fact be unjust.Do you agree with Glaucon or is he being overly

cynical?

THE RING OF GYGES

The task of the Republic is to show that one has reason to be just and not merely to seem just. Glaucon illustrates the challenge vividly with his comparison of lives.

Show me that the just person is happier than the unjust person even though the latter enjoys all the advantages of seeming just and the former suffers all the ills of seeming unjust.

In other words, show me that justice is good in itself, deprived of all of its good consequences. In that case I will have reason to prefer the just life. Is this a hopeless task?

THE COMPARISON OF LIVES

1. Set aside all the advantages that come with being moral, advantages that can be had just by seeming to be moral.

2. Set aside worries about divine retribution.3. Suppose most others will be moral whether or not

you break the rules.4. Let’s grant that being moral involves genuine

sacrifice.

Might you still have reason to be moral? Don’t you want to be moral, knowing full well that there are costs involved? So what reasons do you have?

FOR DISCUSSION

We are looking for reasons independent of self-interest. A couple possibilities to consider:1. Respect for the moral law. 2. Concern for the welfare of others.

Does Glaucon’s view of morality as a product of self-interested negotiations have the effect of deflating whatever lofty status morality seemed to possess?

Do you worry, with Glaucon, that people are by nature selfish? (The Ring of Gyges example is supposed to provide some insight into human nature.)

REASONS TO BE MORAL

This remarkable passage from Thucydides offers a reconstruction of negotiations between the Athenians and representatives of the island of Melos during the Peloponnesian War (431-404), a war in which Sparta defeated Athens.

Inhabitants of Melos hoped to remain neutral in the war, but the Athenians had different ideas. “Be our allies or perish” was the ultimatum set before the Melians.

THUCYDIDES ON THE ATHENIANS VS. MELIANS

The Athenians assume that justice is in play only when we are dealing with parties of approximately equal power: “since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”How do Glaucon’s views on justice help us to make

sense of this dark claim?

GLAUCON, THE ATHENIAN

“Justice (fairness) originates between parties of approximately equal power, as Thucydides correctly grasped (in the terrible colloquy between the Athenian and Melian ambassadors): where there is no clearly recognizable superiority of force and a contest would result in mutual injury producing no decisive outcome the idea arises of coming to an understanding and negotiating over one another's demands: the characteristic of exchange is the original characteristic of justice. Each satisfies the other.” (Human, All Too Human 92)

NIETZSCHE ON JUSTICE

“Justice is thus requital and exchange under the presupposition of approximately equal power position: revenge therefore belongs originally within the domain of justice, it is an exchange. Gratitude likewise. Justice goes back naturally to the viewpoint of an enlightened self-preservation, thus to the egoism of the reflection: ‘to what end should I injure myself uselessly and perhaps even then not achieve my goal?’ So much for the origin of justice.” (Human, All Too Human 92)

NIETZSCHE ON JUSTICE (CONT.)

So Glaucon’s theory of morality has the consequence that there is nothing morally problematic about the strong using the weak against their will.

Some questions to consider:Does Glaucon’s theory have the consequence that

‘anything goes’ in our relations to other animals?Do you think it is a problem with Glaucon’s theory

that it fails to acknowledge a greater role for equality?

Does anyone know how modern contractualist theories of morality avoid the problem?

JUSTICE WITHOUT EQUALITY?

Do you think it is a problem with Glaucon’s theory that it fails to acknowledge a greater role for equality?

Suppose you think the strong ought to confer equal status to the weak. But ought implies can. And perhaps it is part of human nature that the strong impose their will. (see next slide)

JUSTICE WITHOUT EQUALITY?

According to Thucydides, the Athenians forego justification in favor of explanation:

“Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do?”Cf. Glaucon’s Ring of Gyges. Or consider the ways we use non-human animals.

AN APPEAL TO HUMAN NATURE

On Callicles’ understanding of our everyday morality, we think all people ought to enjoy equal shares of power and other goods. Callicles insists that conventional morality is a complete sham: it is a mere convention that is contrary to the laws of nature.What, on Callicles’ view, gives rise to this idea that

all should get equal shares?

CALLICLES

On Callicles’ understanding of our everyday morality, we think all people ought to enjoy equal shares of power and other goods. Callicles insists that conventional morality is a complete sham: it is a mere convention that is contrary to the laws of nature.What, on Callicles’ view, gives rise to this idea that

all should get equal shares?

A desire on the part of the weaker to get more than their natural allotment.What do you think is meant here by ‘weaker’ and

‘stronger’?

CALLICLES

What do you think is meant here by ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’?

Very likely he has in mind the sorts of gifts of fortune which make people better able to attain power and other goods: creativity intelligencebeautydiligence/driveathleticism/physical strength People with such attributes are naturally superior: by nature they will typically get more.

CALLICLES

Conventional morality is a contrivance of the naturally weak that keeps the more powerful in check to create a balance of power.

Suppose this view of morality is correct. In that case do we have reason to be moral?

CALLICLES

Natural justice: “nature itself reveals that it’s a just thing for the better man and the more capable man to have a greater share than the worse man and the less capable man.” (483d)

Evidence: “Nature shows that this is so in many places; both among the other animals and in whole cities and races of men, it shows that this is what justice has been decided to be: that the superior rule the inferior and have a greater share than they.” (483d)What sort of evidence do you think he has in mind?

CALLICLES’ ALTERNATIVE TO CONVENTIONAL MORALITY

“We mold the best and the most powerful among us, taking them while they’re still young, like lion cubs, and with charms and incantations we subdue them into slavery, telling them that one is supposed to get no more than his fair share, and that’s what’s admirable and just. But I believe that if a man whose nature is equal to it were to arise, one who had trampled underfoot our documents, our tricks and charms, and all our laws that violate nature, he, the slave, would rise up and be revealed as our master, and here the justice of nature would shine forth.” (484a)Why do you think Callicles describes this individual

first as slave and then as master?

CALLICLES’ BOLD PREDICTION

CREATED DISCOVEREDCALLICLESConventional morality is just a contrivance of the weak (inferior) in a power struggle.

True morality: it’s a law of nature that the strong (superior) have more power and other goods.

GLAUCON/THUCYDIDESAmong parties of approximately equal power, agents pursuing self-interest arrive at agreements to set aside pursuit of self-interest.

Among parties of unequal power, the strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must. It’s a necessary law of human & divine nature: we rule wherever we can.

THRASYMACHUSRules of morality are devised with the aim of satisfying the interests of the ruling class.

MORALITY AS CONTRIVANCE

Do you find the view of morality as a human creation a worrisome one? (Plato will ultimately reject this view.)

MORALITY AS CONTRIVANCE

The idea that morality is a contrivance issuing from a power struggle gets its most influential formulation in the work of Nietzsche, the great classicist and philosopher of the 19 th century.

Nietzsche’s views are especially reminiscent of the views expressed by Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias.

WHY THESE VIEWS SOUND SO MODERN

“Society is in origin an organization of the weak to create a balance of power with the forces that threaten them, internal as well as external.” (The Wanderer and his Shadow 22)

“You preachers of equality…: your most secret ambitions to be tyrants thus shroud themselves in words of virtue.” (Zarathustra II.7)

“Struggling ‘civilization’ (taming) needs every kind of irons and torture to maintain itself against terribleness and beast-of-prey natures.” (The Will to Power 871)

“…the meaning of all culture is the reduction of the beast of prey ‘man’ [the splendid blond beast] to a tame and civilized animal, a domestic animal…” (Genealogy of Morals I.11)

CALLICLES & NIETZSCHE

Nietzsche sees conventional morality as a historical response to the evaluative attitudes of aristocrats and nobles. He seems to be thinking principally, but by no means exclusively, of values prevalent among the Ancient Greeks.

When the nobles think of good and not-good (bad), their point of reference is self and not-self. Evaluation is principally about ranking.

MASTER MORALITY

good (noble) not-good (ignoble)strong weakpowerful powerlessself-governed subordinateproud humble… …

The disadvantaged are angry about their plight, but they are unable to react openly. They suppress their anger and it becomes unconscious. This resentment gives rise to a set of evaluative attitudes that invert the evaluations of the nobles. Whence conventional morality.

THE ORIGINS OF “SLAVE MORALITY”

good of the nobles

evil not-evil (good)

strong strong meekpowerful powerful obedientproud proud humble… … …

“That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem strange: only it gives no ground for reproaching these birds of prey for bearing off little lambs. And if the lambs say among themselves: “these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb—would he not be good?” there is no reason to find fault with this institution of an ideal, except perhaps that the birds of prey might view it a little ironically and say: “we don't dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender lamb.”” (Genealogy, I.13)Here Nietzsche says “there is no reason to find fault

with this institution of an ideal,” but Nietzsche is in fact highly critical of conventional morality. Any idea what his complaints are?

PARABLE OF THE LAMBS &BIRDS OF PREY

Calliclean point: Conventional morality is unnatural or even against nature (preachers as “haters of the earth”) & harmful for the best.Platonic point: Equality stifles excellence.

In part Nietzsche thinks that morality has bad effects because of its emphasis on happiness as good, suffering as bad. A negative consequence of this way of thinking is that people seek contentment rather than arduously striving to be creative.Plato’s moral theory emphasizes happiness as a goal,

but the happiness sought is not absence of suffering. Why do I say this? (think of the comparison of lives)

THE CRITIQUE OF SLAVE MORALITY

In line with Callicles, Nietzsche envisions a day when higher individuals are unshackled by the values of the weak. But the suggestion is not a return to preexisting laws (of nature).

“[T]he passion that attacks those who are noble is peculiar….It involves the use of a rare and singular standard cold to everybody else; the discovery of values for which no scales have been invented yet; offering sacrifices on altars that are dedicated to an unknown god; a courage without any desire for honors; self-sufficiency that overflows and gives to men and things.” (The Gay Science 55)

SUPERMAN

How can Nietzsche agree both with Glaucon and Callicles? Aren’t they offering competing accounts of morality?

A suggestion: Nietzsche agrees with Glaucon that justice has its origins in rational reflection on self-interest. He also recognizes that Glaucon’s contractarian view of morality leaves out an important dimension of commonsense morality: it fails to respect our concern for equality. Commonsense demands that we treat each person equally—even the weak. This concern for equality—the idea that everyone has an equal standing at the bargaining table—is something additional to the contractarian view, and Callicles is right that it is a mere contrivance on the part of the weak.

A PUZZLE & PROPOSED SOLUTION

Any worries about the Calliclean-Nietzschean critique of conventional morality?

DISCUSSION

thrasymachus glaucon & callicles three challenges to conventional morality

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