thinking strategically about nuclear nonproliferation

8/14/2019 Thinking Strategically About Nuclear Nonproliferation

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You know that the best you can expect is to avoid the worst1

Nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable. Oil supplies are stretched thin as climate coolingdrives up demand. Many countries seek to shore up their energy supplies with nuclear energy,accelerating nuclear proliferation. Japan, South Korea, and Germany develop nuclear-weapons capabilities, as do Iran, Egypt, and North Korea. Israel, China, India, and Pakistanalso are poised to use the bomb.2

SUMMARYThe White Houses Nuclear P osture Review needs to take into account thePentagons present Deterrenc e Doctrine continued use that:

relies on maintaining a large stockpile of hydrogen nuclear weapons atthe ready for purposes of deterrence;

includes the expansion of the Doctrine to include cyberspace; 3 and

produces deleterious effects from the militarys continued use of the Doc-trine on the NNSAs (National Nuclear Security Agency) ongoing abilityto achieve national and global non-proliferation objectives as promul-gated by the Executive Branch and Congress in response to bilateral andmultilateral treaties and agreements.

If a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the continued use of the presentDeterrence Doctrine was performed, 4 these surprising outcomes may becomeevident concerning the Deterrence Doctrine, in its present weak form:

the consequences of a failure of deterrence are unacceptably l arge;

the probability of the failure of deterrence is beyond acceptable levels of risk;

the present Doctrine of Deterrence is not appropriate for use in environ-ments such as cyberspace; 5

the present Doctrine of Deterrence in its weak form is a barrier to the ef-cacy of any nonprolife ration objectives. In fact, it is highly unlikely thatmeaningful nonprolif eration can be achieved as long as the Doctrine in itsweak form persists as deterrence strategy across nations;

the Doctrine creates an urgent need for ever increasing National Defense budgets that usurp necessary capital for other threats to the Nation, suchas from climate change, solar storms that can disrupt the national electric-ity grid, protecting the domestic cyberspace, depletion of oil supplies, etc.

T H I N K I N G S T R A T E G I C A L L Y A B O U T N O N P R O L I F E R A T I O N

LYLE A. BRECHT 410.963.8680 DRAFT 4.3 UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL DISCUSSION DOCUMENT --- June 5, 2009 Page 1 of 10


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PROPOSITIONSThe proliferation vs. nonproliferation game, 6 a non zero sum game, 7 aspresently being played, is unwinnable. 8 We we call this game the NonProliferation Game (NPG); 9

If proliferation proceeds apace, the probab ility of a nuclear accident ornuclear terrorist attack or nuclear exchange between countries (a nuclearevent) approaches certainty ( P < 1.00) within probabilistic risk assess-ment planning periods of as few as 20-50 years; 10

The consequences of a nuclear event range from the death of 500,000 peo-ple within 30 days and a few hundred billion dollars in medium-termeconomic damage to the extinction of life on the earth and the destructionof virtually all accumulated capital globally. The average case for a nu-clear event (in this case, a terrorist attack with three nuclear devices onurban areas of the U.S. within 3-4 month period) is assumed to be a morbidity of 1,000,000 people total (within 5 years) and $1,000 billion/year inGDP losses from normal growth rates for a period of 7 years.

Time, the length of time quantities of nuclear weapons and HEU (highly-enriched uranium) exist and are vulnerable to theft, is a factor driving theprobability of a nuclear event towards certainty. Thus, time, quantities of nuclear materials, and level of security to avoid theft or misuse of thesematerials are determinant factors. Together, they account for about 45% of the factors that place the world at risk from a nuclear event occurring;

The overriding driver for the near certainty of nuclear accident, terroristattack, or nuclear exchange is the playing of an unwinnable game. Thisfactor accounts for about 55% of the risk of a nuclear event;

NPG, as presently being played, is unwinnable for four primary reasons:

the game is inherently unstable. As like many other prisoners di-lemma games, NPG requires large amounts of capital injected on acontinuing basis to stabilize the relative pos itions of game players.This is capital unavailable to address human development, economicgrowth through technological innovation, and emerging national andglobal threats such as global warming; 11

impetus to cheat in pla ying the game is determined by a weak form of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD ).12 We will call this new version:weak-MAD. Weak-MAD assumes my opponent will not attack mycountry if I possess nuclear weapons. 13 Also, my country will havehigher prestige and better negotiating power on the world stage if I




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possess nuclear weapons or a credible threat as to my ability to pro-duce them at any time of my choosing; 14

the advent of cyber warfare and cyber weapons development and

present U.S. National Defense policy that relies on full response op-tions, even response using nuclear weapons means that possessing anuclear weapon capability is even more important requirement tostabilize national security; 15

recent scientic work regarding global warming suggests that climatechange will be much more severe and produce potentially cata-strophic environmental impacts during this century. Thus, it becomesalmost necessary for a state to posses nuclear weapons as a means toassure its position in the upcoming grab for ever more scarce naturalresources, such as water, arable land, oil, capital, etc. 16

The present collapse of international nance and the advent of anthropo-genic global warming reects fundamental and structural inefciencies inthe markets that makeup the global economic system. As r esources(freshwater, food, oil, CO2, etc.) are not allocated optimally in this eco-nomic system, national governments seek to protect their own interests.Countries that do not now posses nuclear weapons, seeing the landscapeof strategic and economic decision-making now seek to acquire nuclearweapons or, at a minimum, the capacity to build nuclear weapons in or-der to secure their position in this precarious world order; 17

If nations continue playing NPG in the present economic environment,they will need signicant additional resources, given the tensions amongplayers of this game and the concurrent game of weak-MAD in order toactually decrease the probability of a nuclear event;

Even with determined nonproliferation, as long as weak-MAD is operant,the probability ( P) of a nuclear event grows, not lessens over time. Thisadded risk will tend to create opportunity costs that put a drag on realGDP growth or may, at any ti me, destabilize the global economy should anuclear event occur or be thou ght to be relatively more probable;

An increased awareness of the probability of a nuclear event occurringmight result in a change in the perception of relative world power, theintroduction of ancillary technology such as launch capability or anti- ballistic missile defense, the repositioning of existing nuclear weaponry,the proliferation of nuclear weaponry or ca pability to build weapons, ten-sions between nuclear states over resources or in response to terrorism;




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Multilateral and bilateral nonproliferation treaties and agreements arenecessary preconditions for NPG, but alone, are probably insufcient toadequately manage risk associated with proliferation driven by the weak-MAD strategy. The weak-MAD strategy will tend to always overpowerthe NPG, in most game situations. Whatever is agreed to via treaty willtend to be subverted by the remnants of weak-MAD strategy;

This also suggests that in bilateral disarmament from present levels, theremay be a point beyond which disarmament actually increases the risk of anuclear event occurring rather than decreases this risk as the number of nuclear weapons is reduced. 18 This is due to weak-MAD still being opera-tive in a multiplayer game environment. This is not to indicate that bilat-eral disarmament should not proceed, but that this alone will be insuf-cient to adequately manage risk of a nuclear event occurring;

What may be required most of all is to develop an alte rnative to theweak-MAD strategic initiative. Dedicated resources will b e required todevelop, try out, prove, and adopt another game;

In all likelihood, it is possible that an alternative to weak-MAD mayevolve outside of risk management strategies that are not primarily mili-tary strategic thinking. At least, a range of potential risk managementgames that are not limited solely to their strategic military value should be included for consideration as alternative to weak-MAD;

The collapse of the normal functioning of global markets and interna-tional nance is a potentially destabilizing forcing function19 in the weak-MAD game that could push the NPG to a tipping point20 toward nuclearproliferation;

Given the state of the U.S. economy, nuclear events are of greater nancialthreat to the nations security. Terrorist attacks are more likely to be for-mulated with their economic impacts in mind and these economic im-pacts viewed as more important than the loss of civilian lives in an attack;

In some respects, in the present economic environment, nuclear weaponsand HEU comprise toxic assets with an economic cost far beyond thecost to secure, store, and maintain this material. The purpose of nuclearweapons themselves is to destroy wealth. If they are ever used, there will be a reconstruction cost. Thus, to properly account for their existence atall, it would be proper to calculate an annual imputed insurance pre-mium. This would be the economic cost for possessing a nuclear weapon,given its destructive potentiality and probability of being used, amortizedover time.




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MAD BEGAN AS A NASH EQUILIBRIUM GAME21MAD is a pernicious, expensive and dangerous game that has resulted fromthe unusual physics and particular technology of fusion nuclear weaponry. 22 In 1950, with the Soviets close to having access to this technology, John vonNeumann ( 1903-1957) and others argued for preventive war: First Use of theH Bomb and total annihilation of the Soviet Union. MAD is an alternative, NoFirst Use strategy of deterrence through force. If both sides in a two-partygame have adequate deterrence, then neither side will strike rst if bylaunching an attack, the attacker would be destroyed in a counterattack. Thisgame has two primary assumptions: (1) approximate parity so that neitherside has an advantage for First Use , and (2) the players in this game arerational. 23 Provided these assumptions hold, MAD was thought to place theparties in a Nash Equilibrium where neither party would choose First Use .Thus, the world would be safe from nuclear annihilation.

MAD QUICKLY BECAME A PRISONERS DILEMMA GAME24By the mid-1960s, MAD may have become a prisoners dilemma with noNash Equilibrium. Even though launching a First Strike might produce a dev-astating counterstrike, each party had an incentive to cheat; to break the equi-librium state, gain an advantage, and launch a First Strike that would poten-tially be decisive. Instead of rationality dening the game, fear of the otherside caused each player to continually escalate to achieve an advantage. 25 Thus, an arms race ensued, with ever escalating choices that were supposedto produce an advantage to one player over the other. If the opposing playerdid not keep up, they fell behind and became vulnerable to a First Strike. Thiswas an expensive game to play especially as it rationalized ever increasing budgets for conventional weaponry in order to ght wars successfully with-out resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. 26 Weak-MAD became the defaultstrategic game when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Also, a two-partygame was no longer possible in a world with multiple players with nuclearweapons.

WHY INVENTING A NEW GAME IS IMPORTANT & TIMELYWeak-MAD and its overdetermining impact on NPG is a risk factor in eco-

nomic recovery, addressing climate change, and succeeding at nonprolifera-tion efforts. 27 In formulating our national security strategy and national mili-tary strategy, developing an updated strategic framework dening theunique role of nuclear weapons in deterring threats to the United States, ou rkey interests, and our allies is both timely and important. The U.S. govern-ment and the Federal Reserve System have allocated $11,00 0 billion of capitalin the form of grants, loans, guarantees, and tax relief to address the melt-




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8 A game state where it is impossible for the player to win the game. The only optionsare restarting the game or stopping and deciding to play another game with differentrules. Playing an unwinnable game is a zombie situation ( Wikipedia).

9 The objective of playing the NPG is risk management: to reduce the attendant risksof increasing the probability of a nuclear event in an environment where nuclear pro-liferation is occurring.

10 See Martin E. Hellman, Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence, The Bent of Tau BetaPi , The Engineering Honor Society (Spring 2008) 14-22; Martin Hellman, Soaring,Cryptography and Nuclear Weapons (October 21, 2008) athttp://nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php .

11 For example, an argument can be made that the arms race between the U.S. and theformer U.S.S.R. between 1946 and 1991 cost the world $45,000 billion (in current dol-lars). Global military spending has averaged about $1,000 billion a year in constantdollars since WWII, give or take a few hundred billion dollars each year. The point isthat this is a very, very large amount of capital allocated for the purpose of keepingthe world safe from aggression, all the while starving investments in freshwateravailability, wastewater treatment, soil conservation, food availability, climate changepreparedness, development of renewable energy, etc. An interesting game theoryquestion is whether this amount of money was required to avoid all out nuclear war because the MAD game was so inherently unstable.

12 See below for a description of this strategic risk management game strategy.

13 For example, Mr Shamshad Ahmed, foreign secretary of Pakistan in 1998, who has been a staunch supporter of the bomb, observed recently, If we were not a nuclearpower, our fate would have been worse than that of Afghanistans. That is, citizens

of other countries are told that a nuclear-armed power is safe from an attack by for-eign powers because of the danger of the nuclear conagration it poses. See Zu- beida Mustafa, How many bombs will deter? Dawn.com (27 May, 2009) athttp://www. dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/ news/pakistan/16-how-many-bombs-will-deter-hs-16.

14 Weak-MAD may be obsolete in a world with 8 nuclear states possessing readyparts and supplies for 12,000 nuclear weapons, 40 states capable of going nuclear atanytime, and nuclear proliferation with eno ugh HEU for building 240,000 nuclearweapons in the future.
http://www.dawn.com/http://nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.phphttp://www.dawn.com/http://www.dawn.com/http://nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.phphttp://nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php


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15 The proliferation of nuclear power globally does not help nuclear nonproliferationobjectives. For example, Russia's state nuclear energy company, Rosatom, has pro-vided 80 tons of low-enriched uranium (LEU) manufactured into fuel assemblies toIran for use in that countrys Bushehr reactor, according to Atomstroyexport, the

Russian contractor building the reactor. Now, Rosatom will supply LEU from virginuranium directly to United States utilities rather than through the United States En-richment Corporation (USEC) that was previously given the monopoly by the USDepartment of Energy (DOE) to sell diluted, or blended-down, Russian weapons-grade uranium processed by Rosatom. See ANDREW E. KRAMER and MATTHEWL. WALD, Russian Uranium Sale to U.S. Is Planned, Wall Street Journal (May 25,2009) at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/world/europe/26russia.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss.

16 For example, scientists from MIT have published peer-reviewed results in the Jour-nal of Climate showing a 90% probability of global temperature will rise as much as7.4 degrees Celsius, more than twice the previous projection from 2003 unless there is

"rapid and massive action" on reducing global carbon emissions. "A 7.4C rise wouldmean severe ecosystem collapse worldwide, with total economic collapse in manyparts of the world. The planet would face resource wars between people, and youcan safely say many, many hundred of millions of people would die." Present esti-mates are that the morbidity of as many as two billion people are presently at risk.See http://www.desmogblog.com/mit-researchers-unveil-climate-roulette-wheel.

17 See Kurt Campbell, et. al., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nu-clear Choices(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). The U.S. 2003 pre-ventive war in Iraq only served to cement this new incarna tion of MAD strategy.Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, in a Guardian interview pub-lished Thursday 14 May 2009 indicated that the current international regime limit-

ing the spread of nuclear weapons was in danger of falling apart under its own ineq-uity resulting in the number of potential nuclear weapons states doubling in a fewyears unless the major powers take radical steps towards disarmament.

Also, concerns about North Korean weapons proliferation were heightened recentlywith Pyongyang's underground test of a nuclear weapon and several short-rangemissile launches. Sales of short- and medium-range missile systems remain amongNorth Korea's largest export earners, part of an arms trade that generates $1.5 billionannuall y for Pyongyang....North Korea's arms trade has focused on Iran and S yria,countries Washington views as state sponsors of terrorism, as well as Libya. Ofcialssay North Korean arms have also been sold to nations allied with the U.S., such asEgypt and Pakistan, and to the military regime in Myanmar. See

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124347081988160711.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.18 As one example of a possible early step, Russia and the United States each havethousands of nuclear weapons, whereas a few hundred would more than deter anyrational actor and no number will deter an irrational one. Either side could thereforereduce its nuclear arsenal with little to no loss in national security, even if the otherside did not immediately reciprocate. In light of the growing specter of nuclear ter-rorism, a reduced nuclear arsenal could even enhance national security by lesseningthe chance for theft or illicit sale of a weapon.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124347081988160711.html?mod=googlenews_wsjhttp://www.desmogblog.com/mit-researchers-unveilhttp://www.desmogblog.com/mit-researchers-unveilhttp://www.desmogblog.com/mit-researchers-unveilhttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/world/europe/26russia.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB124347081988160711.html?mod=googlenews_wsjhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB124347081988160711.html?mod=googlenews_wsjhttp://www.desmogblog.com/mit-researchers-unveilhttp://www.desmogblog.com/mit-researchers-unveilhttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/world/europe/26russia.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/world/europe/26russia.html


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19 A forcing function is the process that moves a dynamical system from one state toanother state. An interesting game theory question is whether this amount of capitalwas productively spent to avoid nuclear war between the USSR and the U.S. or wasit instead necessary to spend this amount because the MAD strategy was inherently

unstable?20 All systems have a tipping point , a set of stresses (an overload beyond a thresholdrate of change of inputs) beyond which they breakdown (loose complexity and ceaseto function within normal ranges) and sometimes collapse (recovery is uncertain). Asfailure proceeds, moments of contingency arise.

21 John Nash showed that John von Neumanns minimax theorem also applied to nonzero sum, non cooperative games. Cooperative games means that players can formcoalitions where each other knows the others strategy beforehand. Non cooperativegames involve each player formulating their strategy without each player knowingthe others strategy. Even though this is the case, there is a way of playing the gamerationally where each player will have no regrets at the outcome. They would not doanything differently, given how the other party played the game (Poundstone, 96-99).

22 Nuclear fusion weapons even today remain potentially the most destructive weap-ons ever invented and the greatest threat to global security. See Lifting the nuclearshadow: Creating the conditions for abolishing nuclear weapons , Foreign & Common-wealth Ofce, UK.

23 This follows from von Neumanns minimax theorem that as long as the two rationalplayers interests are completely opposed, they can settle on a rational course of ac-tion going forward in a zero sum game. An equilibrium is forced by an interplay be-tween self interest and mistrust and a strategy can be devised for playing the gamewhere there are no regrets, no matter what each player ultimately choses for gamemoves (Poundstone, 97).

24 A game dened by a strategy whereby one is rewarded for cheating, but if theother party also cheats, both players will be worse off than if they had cooperated(Poundstone, 120-1).

25 At the height of the Cold War, parts and supplies for 75,000 fusion nuclear weap-ons existed. It is not known with certainty at what level of reduction in nuclear war-heads, destructive tonnage, and launchers that any meaningful lessing of the risk of afailure in deterrence signicantly alters the consequences of such a failure.

26 Some historians of the Cold War (1950-91) like John Gaddis believe that MAD was

a smart strategy. The argument goes that since no nuclear holocaust occurred duringthe fty years of the Cold War, MAD worked. It was a smart strategy. But, was in-stead the massive amounts of capital spent to manage an inherently unstable game,human fortitude, and/or just plain dumb luck that prevailed instead? See John LewisGaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: The Penguin Group, 2007).


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27 Nuclear war cannot be won and cannot be fought (President Ronald Reagan).Today it is conceivable for a poorly thought-out strategic policy choice that leaves theconsequences of the failure of deterrence as it presently is or inadvertently increasesthe probability of failure of deterrence, the result of which makes a nuclear terror at-

tack more probable, that could produce circumstances whereby, for example, insteadof global GDP going from $60 to $240 trillion (in $2005 purchasing power parity) by2050, it declines to $6 trillion (global GDP estimate is from U.S. Central IntelligenceAgency).

thinking strategically about nuclear nonproliferation

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