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Thimphu’s Growing Pains Challenges of Implementing the City Plan

Manka Bajaj

དཔལ་འབྲུག་ཞིབ་འཇུག་ལྟེ་བ། The Centre for Bhutan Studies & GNH Research

Thimphu’s Growing Pains: Challenges of Implementing the City Plan

By Manka Bajaj

Copyright © 2014 The Centre for Bhutan Studies & GNH

Research

Published by:

The Centre for Bhutan Studies & GNH Research

Post Box No. 1111

Thimphu, Bhutan

Tel: 975-2-321005/321111

Fax: 975-2-321001

E-mail: [email protected]

http://www.bhutanstudies.org.bt

The views expressed in this publication are those of the

author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of

the Centre for Bhutan Studies & GNH Research.

ISBN 978-99936-14-76-0

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Patrick Le

Galès, who mobilized his vast knowledge of the literature to

diagnose my musings and prescribed the most fitting

readings. Thank you for putting up with my incohesive drafts

and allowing me to chart my own course without getting lost

in the universe of fields! I am also very grateful to the

pedagogical team of Sciences Po‟s MA, “Governing the Large

Metropolis”, for all their support, notably Prof. Tommaso

Vitale for teaching me how to write a policy paper.

I would like to acknowledge Omair Ahmad whose book was a

useful introduction to Bhutan and who connected me with

the Centre for Bhutan Studies. I am very grateful to the

Centre, especially Dasho Karma Ura for his encouragement

as well as Mr. Tshering Phuntsho. Also Ms. Yangrey Lhamo

for her assistance. I would like to extend my gratitude to

everybody in Bhutan for being so helpful - Rajni Chavda for

being there from the beginning to the end and Karma

Choden, day and night! My collective thanks to Thimphu‟s

very own Aam Admi Party which includes friends at Thimphu

Thromde especially Ugyen Dorji and Thinley Norbu without

whose inputs this work would not be possible. A special

thanks to Sarvajit Rai for opening the door for me. In

particular, Mr. Geley Norbu, not only for his time but also for

sharing some of his own work which was a key foundation for

my research.

My family, especially mom for being my crisis cell. Dad,

Samar and of course Kanak and Kanika for being their

always, especially in the end. My friends, Hugo Ribadeau

Dumas and Unnati Pant for listening to my ramblings and

sharing their thoughts, especially Arthur Crestani for taking

the trouble to read my first chapter and reminding me to

connect the dots.

iv

I would also like to thank Dasho Thrompon and Mr. Meghraj

Adhikari for making the time for me on more than one

occasion. Friends at DHI, who would get up in their meals to

drop me off, Passang, Kinzang and Sonam. Finally all the

others, who made the trouble to talk to me including, Supe,

Kelly, Sangay Kidd, Tashi, Deki‟s mom and my landlords for

some very interesting discussions. The list is endless,

everybody helped and put together a piece of what is here

today. However none of the above persons are responsible for

my speculative analyses.

v

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .................................................... iii

GLOSSARY .................................................................... vii

ABSTRACT ..................................................................... ix

I. Introduction ................................................................ 1

1.1 Thimphu 2027: A Dream City ..................................... 2 1.2 Thimphu today: Paradoxes of planning ....................... 5

1.3 This study: Why do rules not work? .......................... 13 1.4 Argument and logic of chapters ................................. 16

II. Research Design ....................................................... 19

2.1 Literature review ...................................................... 19 2.2 Puzzle: How do actors escape institutional constraints?

...................................................................................... 26 2.3 Theoretical framework: Strategic action fields ............ 26 2.4 Methodology ............................................................. 34

III. Thimphu City: Growth Dynamics ............................. 37

3.1 The Residents: Socio-economic & demographic profile 37 3.2 The city: Spatial changes & the construction boom.... 43 3.3 Housing Market: Characteristics & disparities ........... 47 3.4 Conclusion ............................................................... 55

IV. Thimphu Structure Plan: Objectives & Outcomes .... 57

4.1 Policy vision: Development control ............................ 57 4.2 Plan implementation: Increased precinct densities .... 68 4.3 Analysis of deviations: Case by case exemption ......... 75

4.4 Conclusion ............................................................... 78

V. Planning Governance: Actors & their Interests ......... 80

5.1 State authorities: City Corporation & Central agencies

...................................................................................... 81 5.2 Citizens: Landowners & People‟s representatives ....... 88 5.3 Market: Infrastructure investors& private sector ....... 90

vi

5.4 Conclusion ............................................................... 92

VI. Authorization of Deviations: Why & How ................. 95

6.1 Why? Gaps and conflicts in rule design ..................... 98 6.2 How veto players challenge the rules ....................... 103 6.3 How municipal officials authorize deviations ........... 106 6.4 Conclusion ............................................................. 114

VII. Conclusion ............................................................ 116

7.1 Findings: Why don‟t rules work in Thimphu? .......... 118

7.2 Contribution: Busting three common myths ............ 126 7.3 So what? Lessons for the way forward ..................... 132 7.4 Conclusion: Taking a pragmatic approach to policy . 134

Bibliography ................................................................ 137

Annexes ...................................................................... 150

vii

GLOSSARY

ADB Asian Development Bank

BAF Bhutan Archery Foundation

BBR Bhutan Building Rules

DCD Development Control Division

DCR Development Control Regulation

DUDH Department of Urban Development and

GNHC Gross National Happiness Commission

I&MS Implementing and Monitoring Section

MoC Ministry of Communication

MoF Ministry of Finance

MoHCA Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs

MoWHS Ministry of Works and Human

Settlements

NEC National Environment Commission

NLCS National Land Commission Secretariat

NHDCL National Housing Development

Corporation Ltd.

PAVA Property Assessment and Valuation

Agency

RBA Royal Bhutan Army

RBG Royal Body Guard

RBP Royal Bhutan Policy

RGoB Royal Government of Bhutan

TCC Thimphu City Corporation

TSP Thimphu Structure Plan

UNCHS United Nations Centre for Human

Settlements

UPD Urban Planning Division

ix

ABSTRACT

This study analyses the urban planning efforts of the

government for an explanation of some unintended outcomes.

A popular perception is that development in Thimphu city

could do with better planning. On the contrary, there have

been extensive efforts from both the Thimphu Thromde and

MoWHS to control land use and regulate building design

through policies like the Thimphu Structure Plan 2003-27 and

its attached Development Control Regulations 2004. The

question driving the research is to explain why despite the

rules in place, planning goals are not achieved. The study

identifies why and how actors avoid compliance to the original

planning codes.

It is observed that the implementation process has been

extremely slow and even after ten years, only six (of the first

set of twelve) Local Area Plans (LAPs) have been implemented.

This is mainly due to a lengthy process of land readjustment

prolonged by limited organizational capacity, faulty cadastral

information and some resistant landowners. In areas where

the LAPs have been implemented, deviations are already

evident by reduced share of planned public spaces (e.g.

neighbourhood servicing node in Babesa). Authorization of

deviations on a case by case basis accumulated towards an

overall level of denser development.

Although the plan wanted to balance development with

nature, traditional architecture and affordable housing, it has

aggravated imbalances on all three parameters. Plan

implementation proceeded in a way that community & green

spaces diminished and private buildings came up in areas not

reserved for development.To explain these rule deviation, it is

argued that implementation was a highly individualized

process of negotiation between the municipality and property

x

owners. The predominant mechanism for non-compliance is

legal authorization of deviations either by a government

order/letter or by rule revision.

The study is relevant for governments and international

development partners for understanding policy

implementation failures. It provides real illustrations of

organizational issues in a rapidly growing bureaucracy and

how multiplicity of authorities weakened the authority of the

plan, which was frequently overruled.

1

I. Introduction

Last year in June, the flash floods of north India swept over

entire towns like Kedarnath, endangering the life of over

100,000 residents and pilgrims (Sati 2013). The immediate

cause was attributed to a cloud burst but precipitation excess

of 400 mm isn't unprecedented in the Himalayan region; in

1965, Uttarakhand received as much as 900m rainfall in a

single day (Bidwai 2013). Environmentalists have argued that

the 2013 cloudburst would not have become a disaster of

such magnitude had the state government complied with

India‟s Environment and Forest Ministry to ban construction

in the river banks (The Guardian). To quote Dr. Sunita

Narain, Director General of the Centre for Science and

Environment

This is very much a man-made disaster… exacerbated

by the reckless construction of buildings, dams and

roads in a fragile environment. Many of the

settlements have been built right next to the rivers in

blatant violation of environmental laws. There is a

strong need to evolve a holistic Himalayan policy

which will deal with all these issues (Sehgal 2013).

Unlike Himalayan countries like India and Nepal which have

been complacent to regulate urban sprawl in their ecologically

sensitive hill towns, the tiny kingdom of Bhutan has paid

strong policy attention to temper the speed of development.

Bhutan is famous for its “High Value Low Impact”1 tourism

policy which regulates the inflow of tourists through a daily

tariff of up to $250/day. While regulation of the tourism

industry is presently sustained by the economic interests of a

1 Tourism Council of Bhutan http://www.tourism.gov.bt/about-

tcb/about-tcb

http://www.davidpublishing.com/davidpublishing/Upfile/12/17/2013/2013121709315691.pdf

http://www.tourism.gov.bt/about-tcb/about-tcb

http://www.tourism.gov.bt/about-tcb/about-tcb

Thimphu’s Growing Pains

2

lobby of tour operators2, the policy was initially proposed to

restrict the volume of visitors in Bhutan. For a country with a

population of not even a million, this was probably seen as a

measure to check both environmental and “cultural

pollution”3. Bhutan‟s tourism policy is an expression of its

“happiness” ideology which emphasizes that economic growth

should not be pursued at the expense of Bhutan‟s

environment and culture. The origins of this ideology go back

to a UN conference in the 1970s when His Majesty, the fourth

king, surprised the world by saying that Gross National

Happiness is more important for Bhutan than the pursuit of

Gross Domestic Product (Ahmad 2013). Over the years, the

meaning and form of GNH has evolved and today it has been

institutionalized by Bhutan‟s planning commission in the

form of a policy screening tool to ensure all new policies are

GNH compatible. Given this context, it is not surprising that

the Bhutanese government has been concerned about the

ecological and cultural impacts of urbanization such as the

disappearance of traditional forms of architecture. These

concerns are quite aptly reflected in the plan for the capital

city, the Thimphu Structure Plan (TSP) 2003-2027.

1.1 Thimphu 2027: A Dream City

The Thimphu Structure Plan is a 25 year plan for Thimphu. It

envisages Thimphu as a “dream city” by 2027 which would

provide residents adequate space to work, drive, jog, cycle,

picnic, relax and be close to nature (Gyeltshen 2002b). In its

preamble, the plan cites the alarming examples of Indian hill

towns like Darjeeling, Gangtok and Srinagar which have

transformed from “serene hill station resorts” into “chaotic

bazaar towns” (MoWHS 2004:2). It argues that Thimphu

would meet the same fate unless efforts are made to plan its

2 Discussions in Better Business Summit, Thimphu: Workshop 1:

Making Business Easy, March 27, 2014 3 Reinfeld 2003

Introduction

3

urbanization. It finds that with a population of 43,4794 in

2000, Thimphu was already home to a third of Bhutan‟s

urban population. As early as 2003, the plan complained that

The city is already facing housing shortages, traffic

congestion, air pollution and chaotic building

patterns. The forests, which preside over the city, are

being encroached upon. Orchards in the ecologically

fragile areas are being irrationally sub-divided,

without reference to the carrying capacity of the land

(MoWHS 2004: 2).

As a solution, the plan proposes to guide Thimphu‟s planning

by a set of principles which it calls “Intelligent Urbanism”

(MoWHS 2004: 3)

…What is essential to allay this disaster is a

common set of principles, which all agree upon and

all act by.

Intelligent Urbanism, the plan‟s guiding philosophy, is

proposed by Harvard-trained and Pune-based Christopher

Charles Benninger whose firm was contracted to prepare the

plan in June 2001. Mr. Benninger had worked in Bhutan as a

consultant on UN projects in 1979 and was well known to

royal government officials. The plan acknowledges the

influence of architects such as Lewis Mumford, Jose Luis

Sert, Constantine Doxiadis, Team Ten, and the expansions of

their concepts by the New Urbanist and Smart Growth groups

in America (MoWHS 2004: 3). Due to this influence, the plan

places great emphasis on making Thimphu a walkable city.

The New Urbanism school of planning, which inspires the

4 This figure excludes the floating population in the city as well as

Institutions like Embassies, IMTRAT, DANTAK, RBA, RBG (MoWHS

2004: 2).


4

TSP, incorporates elements of mixed-used space as opposed

to orthodox planning which advocates zoning5. The TSP

divides the city into dense compact neighbourhoods or 16

“Urban Villages” which serve as the basic unit of planning

rather than the typical administrative ward (See Annex). Each

Urban Village is primarily residential but is serviced by its

own “Neighbourhood Node” which offers all facilities at

walking distance like shopping stores, ATMs and also a

business centre with offices (MoWHS 2004: 90). The

Neighbourhood Node also doubles up as a nodal point in the

city transport network as the bus stop is planned here.

Moreover, it forms the linkage between apartments and the

city-wide footpath which crosses through green areas and is

intertwined with heritage walks and river promenades.

The plan, which is based on several months of data collection

on the city‟s topography, land use and density, estimates that

Thimphu would have a population of 1,62,327 by 2027. This

is appearing to be an underestimate as Thimphu‟s population

is already reaching 1,30,000. To accommodate the growing

numbers, TSP proposes a strategy of densification through

both vertical and horizontal infilling (MoWHS 2004: 214)

while retaining a significant area of the city as green land

(MoWHS 2004: 13). In 1999, the boundaries of Thimphu

municipality were extended from an area of 8 sq km to 26 sq

km (Dorji 1999). One of the main purposes of the TSP was to

bring municipal services to extended areas in a planned

manner. This was to be achieved through the “Precinct Plan”

which is based on land use and guides building regulations.

For example, ecologically sensitive areas like steep slopes and

river banks which are prone to erosion are categorized under

“Environmental Conservation Precinct” where no building

5 Although critics of orthodox planning like Jane Jacobs would argue

that New Urbanism retains the principle of zoning at the

neighbourhood scale.

Introduction

5

activity is allowed. Based on the “Forest and Conservation

Act, 1995”, the plan does not allow construction within 30

metres on either side of the Wang Chhu river and major

streams (MoWHS 2004: 96). This 30 metre river buffer is thus

as a zero-density precinct. The “Development Control

Regulations” (DCR) 2004, which is an addendum to the TSP,

coordinates permissible building activity with the Precinct

Plan in a way that zero or low density precincts have lower

building heights compared to higher density precincts. As the

Precinct Plan serves to protect the environment, it also serves

to protect national heritage. For example, land around the

Tashichho Dzong is categorized as a low density precinct to

maintain a sanctity buffer around the Dzong. The plan

compiled a comprehensive inventory of heritage structures

and sites of religious importance that should be preserved.

Similarly, old settlements in Zilukha, Dechencholing, Chang

Jiji, and Babesa were categorized under the “Traditional

Village Precinct” so that structures in traditional architecture

form would not be replaced by modern buildings. When a

building permit application is submitted to the Thimphu City

Corporation, the municipal authorities refer to the area‟s

Precinct category in order to determine permissible building

construction. In this way, the Precinct Plan serves as a guide

for the DCR as building heights vary with precinct densities.

The TSP is thus a clear articulation of Bhutan‟s GNH

principles into policy. To get a sense of plan outcomes, we

now fast forward by a decade from planning for Thimphu in

2003 to what Thimphu looks today in 2014. The next section

shows that despite so much foresight, instituting the plan

could not guarantee outcomes.

1.2 Thimphu today: Paradoxes of planning

The present status of planning in the extended areas is that

most LAPs have been approved but infrastructure provision


6

has not kicked off everywhere, especially where infrastructure

funding is not readily available. While slow implementation

with some success has been one result, there have also been

some unintended outcomes, three of which are presented

below.

Loss of green areas

The plan accelerated development in the peripheries both

outside and inside the municipal area. Outside, it activated

incentives for development without taking any preventive

measures. It did not institute any mechanism (e.g. urban

growth boundary) to keep developments outside the

municipal area in check. Inside, it legitimized construction on

paddy fields through the tool of Local Area Planning. We see

that the pressure to build on spaces allocated for open and

green areas in the extended areas continues to grow. The

result is urbanization of paddy fields from Babesa in the

south to Kabesa in the north.

Inside the boundary: Babesa

According to the Director General of the Department of Urban

Development and Housing (DUDH), 70% of the new municipal

areas would be kept as open and green areas (Gyeltshen

2002b). If we look at Babesa today, the numbers don‟t quite.

Less than 7% of the Neighbourhood Node precinct remains

(MoWHS 2008), the rest has been allocated to private plots.

Introduction

7

Urbanization of Babesa village

Outside the boundary: Kabesa

The concept of urban boundary holds little meaning in

Thimphu. In fact, building regulations only get more lax as

one gets out of the municipal boundary. The following picture

captures real estate housing projects in the north outgrowth

of Thimphu, beyond the municipal boundary which ends at

Pangri Zampa monastery.


8

Urbanization spreads outside Thimphu‟s northern boundary

Disappearance of traditional architecture

In 2002, when the Kuensel started to report on the TSP and

its grand vision for the city, it was said that the city‟s

traditional and cultural heritage would be kept intact. A

Senior Planner in DUDH went on the record to say that

Introduction

9

All new buildings will be required to incorporate the

elements of traditional architecture. We will now be

more vigorous and firm in implementing this rule

which was often violated in the past (Gyeltshen

2002b).

It is true that places like Changangkha, Tashichhodzong and

Dechenphodrang have been protected as Heritage precincts.

It is also true that monitoring of the building permit has

become more stringent. Despite this effort, it could be argued

that rather than preserving traditional architecture of

residential buildings, the plan has diluted it. This is because

alongside the building rules, the plan also promoted a

densification strategy and increased permissible building

heights up to six floors. Traditional architecture guidelines

have therefore been adapted from the rural to the urban

context. In this process of translation, many of the traditional

features have been diluted. As a result, the urban form

retains symbolic but not functional aspects of Bhutan‟s

traditional architectural practices.

Traditionally in Bhutan, a community would pool in their

labour and a master carpenter would perform the role of the

architect. Because building was a craft, every house had a

unique form and shape. However, the new buildings in

Thimphu are all standardized and look the same, as evident

by the “Babesa Boxes”. They lack the character of a

traditional Bhutanese house precisely because of processes of

“state simplification”6 which have heavily institutionalized the

building permit application process. Although with good

intentions, the plan has created a regimented routine for each

application to go through a series of approvals (architectural,

structural, electrical, sewage, site plan and so on). The master

carpenter who was a wealth of experience and knowledge has

6Scott 1998: 3


10

been replaced by young architects in the municipality. Their

concern is not to handcraft each structure but to meet the

checklist in the 40 page document on Traditional Architecture

Guidelines. Because the state was so worried about losing

traditional architecture, it tightened its hold over building

regulations and in the process standardized the process as

well as form of buildings.

Traditional structure in a background of new buildings

in Babesa

Babesa Boxes: New residential buildings displaying one design

across Babesa

Introduction

11

Lack of affordable housing

Last year in June, a World Bank sponsored conference was

hosted in Thimphu on “Promoting Access to Affordable Land

and Housing” (The World Bank 2013) where policy makers

discussed this challenge for South Asia including Thimphu.

Compared to its giant counterparts across the Chinese and

Indian borders, Thimphu is hardly a megalopolis; so how

hard could it be to accommodate a population of 130,000

people? Moreover the boundary extension in 1999 extended

the urban zone from 8 km2 to 26 km2. Despite these

advantages of a “governable”7 population size and fresh

supply of land, the city has familiar big city symptoms of

shortage of affordable housing. In 2002, more than 10% of

the population of Thimphu was living in hutments and

squatter settlements without proper basic services

(Mayerhofer et al ADB 2002: 1). In a recent survey, shortage

of affordable housing was identified as the priority issue by

the urban poor (ADB-NSB 2013). According to a study

conducted in 1999, there was an annual requirement of

about 780 dwelling units in Thimphu (MoWHS 2006).

The plan document makes repeated references to the issue of

shelter for low income groups and even proposes to land for

low income housing.

Where we are proposing land pooling and Local Area

Plans we must designate plots for lower middle class

group units, by providing for them in the layouts…

There is a hidden population in the city of Thimphu,

which we must bring out into the open, and address

as a public policy and planning issue… In every

Local Area Plan of the city a small high-density

village of low-income units should be constructed for

domestic servants who will work in the area. Another

7Yates 1977


12

strategy.... this is a policy area that cannot wait!”

(MoWHS 2004: 38).

Although the plan made this proposition, in practice, housing

provision was left to the market and virtually no new stock

has been built for the low income groups. The National

Housing Development Corporation Ltd (NHDCL) which has

the mandate to provide affordable housing has not invested in

Thimphu since the Changjiji Complex proposed in the late

1990s.Consequently, low income groups are coping by living

in shared accommodation. In 2007, 16% of Bhutan‟s urban

population was neither homeowner nor tenant but living with

family and friends (National Council of Bhutan 2010: 82).

On the other hand, because of the fresh supply of land in

extended areas, housing supply has shot up and many new

homes are going empty. However, as it is priced for a different

set of clients, the low income housing group cannot afford it.

Although many government officials claim that affordable

housing is not a problem for Thimphu because some houses

are going vacant (Rai 2013), it may be argued that there is

instead a gross mismatch between supply and demand for

housing, with too much supply of highly priced stock and too

little stock of affordable housing. Not only is this an issue for

the low income group but also for the landlords who built by

borrowing from the bank as they are unable to pay back their

loans (Dema 2013).

Despite the foresight of the Bhutanese government and plan

for development control, the outcomes in the aftermath of

plan execution have been the opposite. So what went wrong?

The Thimphu Structure Plan made one small assumption

that didn‟t hold true. Although it calculated many technical

details to perfection, it miscalculated one tiny detail - that

once rules are codified in a plan or a rule book, it will be

Introduction

13

implemented. Why is that not so? This is what the study has

set sail to discover.

1.3 This study: Why do rules not work?

This study is about the challenges of institutionalizing a new

policy, illustrated by the case of urban planning in Thimphu,

the capital city of Bhutan. It shows that the implementation

of the Thimphu Structure Plan 2003-27 was full of gaps, which

led to paradoxical outcomes including imbalances in the

housing stock, construction on green areas allocated for open

spaces and dilution of traditional architecture – the very

features that the plan was designed to regulate.

Question & Hypothesis

The question driving the research is to explain why there is a

lack of compliance to the city plan and identify the

mechanisms through which the planning rules codified in the

Thimphu Structure Plan are being deviated.

The hypothesis is derived from the literature on the „Sociology

of Compliance‟ which is dominated by two main hypotheses a)

misfit and b) veto players (Falkner 2006). The misfit argument

has been used often to explain the difficulties of transferring

policies of the European Union to EU nations. According to

his hypothesis, the higher is the misfit between a policy (e.g.

EU norms) and national norms, lower is the policy

compliance. The veto hypothesis is less grounded in

institutions and more about the role of actors in policy co-

production. It predicts that the higher the number of veto

players (or veto power) in opposition to a given policy, the

lower is the level of policy compliance. To explain the lack of

compliance to the TSP, we assume that both hypotheses may

turn out to be valid (or not) and the study aims to identify

potential misfits as well as veto players that may be slowing

down plan implementation.


14

Limiting the scope of study

Many of these issues (loss of traditional architecture, shortage

of affordable housing) are not new for Bhutan. The 1986-2000

Plan for Thimphu, which preceded the TSP, also expressed

concern about acute housing shortages. If we go back to the

1980s, it seems that some things never change. The United

Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) was assisting

the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) to preserve

traditional architecture in urban areas which was a new

scenario for Bhutan. Even then over 60% of total building

cost was expended on imported materials and labour (UNDP

1987) and even today dependence on India for construction

labour and materials continues to trouble Bhutan as

manifested by the 2012 currency crisis. In that sense, these

issues predate the plan and cannot be solely attributed as

outcomes of the plan. However, the plan with its deep

ambitions has not been able to correct them. In order to not

build up the reader‟s expectations, it must be stated outright

that this study does not dissect the full anatomy of the three

outcomes mentioned above. For that, one would have to study

many inter-related factors including housing finance,

imported labour policy, timber restriction policy, traditional

architecture policy and markets like housing and the

construction industry. Instead, this study is about one policy

- the TSP - to examine why, despite the rules in place, the

plan does not work. Therefore, this study explains only a

fraction of the issue but zooms into the details from one

policy angle.

It should also be pointed out that while zooming into the TSP,

the focus is on the experience of the Local Area Plans (LAP).

Of the 26 sq km within the municipal boundary, only about

12.1 sq km fall under the first set of Local Area Plans (LAP).

Ten of the twelve LAPs are in extended areas to the north and

south incorporated in Thimphu municipality after 1999.

Introduction

15

Therefore, even within the planning story of Thimphu, the

focus is on implementation within LAPs, which is a story

about transformation of peri-urban areas.

Finally, it should also be mentioned that just because this

study is focussing on implementation gaps of the plan, the

reader should not be misled to think that the TSP has failed.

In fact, it is still in a process of implementation. Moreover,

had the TSP not been in place, the extended areas may not

have had access to municipal services like water and roads;

in the worst case scenario, residents would have had to make

their own private arrangements as is the case in many parts

of Asian cities.

To be very clear, the agenda of this research is not to blame

anyone but bring to light the complexity of the issue in a

simplified form. A common perception is that not enough is

being done to guide the development of Thimphu city. This

study aims to provide an informed perspective on what is

being done. Hopefully, the reader will be able to see how

much time and energy is being invested by the City

Corporation on a day-to-day basis even if results are not as

apparent. By seeing how the city‟s affairs are managed from

an outsider‟s perspective, readers can evaluate for themselves

where the wall between individual interests and collective

goals should break for a better city of their future.

Relevance of the study

Although this study will explain only a small part of

Thimphu‟s story, it remains highly relevant because

Thimphu‟s planning is becoming the role model for other

towns in Bhutan. The same modality of “Structure Plan” is

being replicated to develop Structure Plans for other towns

like Phuentsholing. As Thimphu was the first experiment,

turning back to look at what type of unforeseen issues came

up and how they were resolved will be very useful to draw


16

lessons for Bhutan which is rapidly urbanizing like other

Asian cities.

This study will also be relevant for governments and planners

outside Bhutan. Unlike in Indian and Chinese cities, where

planning is the guise behind which the state acquires land

from farmers in peri-urban areas, ultimately to hand over to

the market; planning in Thimphu is based on the technique

of land pooling, which is similar to land readjustment

methods in Nepal, Japan, Thailand and Germany (Dorji

2003b). Instead of land acquisition, the state asks

landowners to contribute up to a third of their land. In

exchange, the state does not provide monetary compensation

but infrastructure and services. This means that when urban

peripheries or extended areas are developed, instead of

displacement induced by development, landowners get to stay

on their land, on a smaller parcel but with higher property

values. Therefore, the study is relevant for anyone interested

in an experiment of urban planning in an inclusive manner.

The study is also useful for research on institutions to know

why codifying laws do not necessarily guarantee expected

results. Despite contradictory evidence, the faith in

institutional design to steer policy outcomes remains

dominant, as evident from the financing agenda of large

multilateral institutions like The World Bank and recent

decentralization reforms of many national governments. This

study will explain which institutional reform is not a

sufficient condition for effective social change.

1.4 Argument and logic of chapters

The main argument is that rules do not work because they

create a conflict of interest for some actors and these veto

players find a way to subvert the rules. The dominant reason

identified for lack of compliance to the plan is authorization of

Introduction

17

deviations on a gradual case by case basis. In the slow but

steady process of exception-making, the shape of the city

evolved and spilled out of the mould of the urban plan. The

main mechanism for plan deviations was not corruption

through bribes or some other blatant form of rule violation,

but a much more subtle process of negotiation and going

around the rules without legally breaking them. This form of

entrepreneurialism to beat the constraints of the system is

termed “strategic action”8 and is the main mechanism to

explain how deviations were legitimized.

The first chapter provides an overview of the profile of

Thimphu city and its residents. Much of the data is extracted

from the Census 2005 at the city level. Data from building

permits is also studied to understand the recent construction

boom. Finally, the last section characterizes the housing

market and comments on inequalities in property ownership,

which is a new urban disparity for Bhutan. Most citizens own

land in rural Bhutan due to the royal policy of “Kidu”, which

allows citizens to apply to His Majesty‟s office for a land grant

but ownership patterns are changing with migration to the

city. Compared to the impressive figure of 84% land

ownership at the national level, only about a third of urban

households (32%) own land in Bhutan (ADB-NSB 2013: 59).

The second chapter turns to the Thimphu Structure Plan

(TSP) to give the reader an understanding of the plan‟s

objectives and outcomes. The first section presents the main

planning tools. The second section gives evidence of some

deviations using data from a planning audit undertaken by

the Ministry of Works and Human Settlements (MoWHS) in

2008. The final section analyses the nature of these

deviations.

8 Fligstein & McAdam 2013


18

The third chapter discusses the governance of Thimphu city

by mapping all the actors who interact with the Thimphu City

Corporation to influence decisions related to the plan.

The fourth chapter is about strategies of negotiation between

veto players who challenge planning codes and the main

implementing authority, the Thimphu City Corporation.

Minutes of the town committee‟s meetings are used to give

illustrations of the kind of complications that arise in plan

implementation. Based on my own three-month fieldwork in

Thimphu earlier this year including direct observation at the

municipal office, I analyse how the original rules are

challenged and how the implementing authorities legitimize

planning deviations.

Finally, the study concludes with the findings by answering

the research question and revisiting the two hypotheses.

Some implications are also presented for policy makers to get

a better grasp on the outcomes of policies that they design.

19

II. Research Design

This study has set sail to discover why rules fail to achieve

their intended objectives by examining how actors interact

with the rules and co-produce outcomes. This is not a new

puzzle in the social sciences, as the question has been asked

before, particularly in Public Policy Analysis, Sociology of

Organizations and Critical Legal Studies. But it is still a very

interesting question that has not been fully explained. At the

same time, this question is absolutely central to understand

the transformation of cities in which urban planning has a

prominent role. Despite attempts by generations of

professionals and governments to organize cities through the

tool of urban planning, the dream city of the plan remains a

mythical place. In most cities, urban planning and

regeneration efforts produced gross dis-functionalities

(Jacobs 1961). While we have drawn some lessons about the

benefits of mixed use and inclusive spaces, we are yet to

understand why improving the design of the plan alone (case

in point: Thimphu Structure Plan) is not a sufficient condition

to guarantee planning success. In other words, why are rules

not sufficient to shape outcomes? Because there are actors

who play with them, as we„ve been told before. This section

takes a quick look at the various angles from which this

puzzle has been entered.

2.1 Literature review

Public policy Analysis: Implementation failures

Implementation failure is a central theme in Public Policy

Analysis and the role of actors, particularly interest groups in

deviating policy outcomes has been a concern both for

scholars and practitioners. In the US from the early 1920s

and 30s, these concerns were expressed notably at the

University of Chicago in Charles E. Merriam‟s pioneering


20

work on Behaviouralism. Merriam emphasized the role of

political behaviour of individuals and groups, which he felt

would be more telling than the characteristics of formal

institutions like the legislature and legal codes (Grigsby

2011:15) basically arguing that rules play only a marginal

role in explaining outcomes.

John Dewey, philosopher and education reformer, founded a

school of thought called Pragmatism in which public policy is

seen as an experiment. The “problematic situations” faced by

public administrators can be resolved through a “process of

inquiry”. The qualitative nature of human experience is

such that the feeling that something is wrong comes

before its recognition can be articulated in words or

measured (Shields 2008). In a pragmatic perspective

therefore, policy-making should be seen as an ongoing

exercise with flexible goals so that retrospective lessons from

field experiences can be integrated into prospective design.

In the 1970s, Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky,

published Implementation in which they observed that an

organization like the American Economic Development

Agency could not fulfil its objectives because there were too

many actors influencing the decision-making process with

multiple goals, bargaining with each other and delaying

implementation. This is very similar to observations of how

organizations work, giving a centre-stage role for actors.

Sociology of Organizations: power games among

competing actors

The literature in the Sociology of Organization has its central

concern in how employees interpret organizational rules and

impact the attainment of collective goals of the organization.

The 1958 book Organizations by Herbert A. Simon and James

G. March criticized the behavioural assumptions of classical

organizational theory, articulated by the “administrative

Research Design

21

management school” and “scientific management”

approaches, for not paying sufficient attention to the

motivations driving employee behaviour (Tosi 2008: 93). They

took a Weberian interest in motivations underlying social

action9 and emphasized the cognitive aspects of organization

members (March 1958: 5). They criticized the classical

approaches for neglecting internal or intra-organizational

conflict but remained confined to analysing the organization

as a black box, with little appreciation for inter-organizational

conflicts (Fligstein 2001).

This is also symptomatic in the pioneering work of Michel

Crozier, father of organizational sociology in France. His work

with Erhard Friedberg stands out in its treatment of power

relations among members of the organization. One of their

main contributions was to show how rules itself are an

enactment of power games among sets of actors who are

constantly negotiating the rules; “system exists only through

the actors, who alone can give it life, and who alone can

change it” (Crozier & Friedberg 1977: 9). In this sense, they

agree that agency is constrained by internal power relations

but not in the Giddens way in which external social

structures constrain action, “the actor doesn’t exist outside

the system which defines his freedom and the rationality that

guides his action” (Crozier & Friedberg 1977: 9). However not

everybody agrees that agency is autonomous from broader

structures of stratification and power, as explicated next in

critiques from the legalist perspective.

Legalist perspective: indeterminacy of rules

The Critical Legal Studies tradition developed as a family of

legal theories in the late 1970s as a sociological critique of the

classical legal thought of 19th century for overestimating the

capacity of legal rules to engineer progressive social change.


22

Many of these scholars had been involved in the civil rights

movement and Vietnam protests and were interested in how

law worked instrumentally against the interests of minorities.

While opinions diverged on the social functions of law, their

central claim was about the “indeterminacy” of legal

reasoning. A given set of legal principles and doctrines do not

yield determinate answers to disputes because the “facts of a

case” are viewed from a particular vantage point. For every

principle or rule in the legal system, it is possible to find a

rival contradictory one because rules are characterized by

substantial gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities (Collins 2008).

Most reviews of Critical Legal Studies typically locate this

literature within the Structuralist tradition because modes of

legal reasoning are coloured by prevailing power structures

and institutions of society. However, here it is argued that

even these scholars have emphasized the role of actors,

subconsciously if not consciously, because their spotlight is

turned on the adjudicator and his interpretation of the “facts

of the case” in the application of law (see for example, the

policy-analysis10 ideal type in Kennedy 2008 and Rheinstein

1954).

In a classic book, Rules and Government (1995), Robert

Baldwin criticized the functionalist perspective (see Davis

1971) which advocated rules as a means of controlling

government discretions. His criticism was that such a

mechanistic treatment of government decision-making pays

inadequate attention to substantial human interpretative

work involved in government decision-making (Baldwin 1995:

25). Discretion is used at several levels in rule applications:

from judgements involved in defining issues as relevant to

ways in which cases/policies proceed through the

10 Policy analysis combines elements of both substantive and formal

rationality in Weber 1978.

Research Design

23

organizational handling system so that „facts of the case‟ are

taken for granted rather than as a constructed reality.

Decision-makers reflect ideological stances of a society and

are products of a whole series of frameworks.

Thus the interaction of actors with rules has been

documented in a variety of contexts before and the common

thread weaving them together is the limited predictive

capacity of policies, organizational rules and legal codes -

broadly conceived under the umbrella term “institutions”.

This research takes a sociological definition of the term

institution, defined as “a relatively enduring collection of rules

and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning

and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of

turnover of individuals…” (March and Olsen 1989, 1995 as

defined in March & Olsen 2009: 3). In this view, rules,

structures and norms are the building blocks of institutions

and prescribe appropriate behaviour for specific actors in

specific situations (March & Olsen 2009, Davies & Trounstine

2012). A distinction is therefore made between institutions as

rules (regulatory norms) and institutions as organizations

(actors).

What prevents rules from working? Actors (veto players)

or Structure (institutional misfit)

Although everybody agrees that rules don‟t work as designed

and create unintended effects, it is not very clear what exactly

the intermediating factor is. Is it human actors (as individuals

or organized groups) who have an agency to manipulate rules

and steer outcomes? Or is it broader structural forces at work

that reproduce the status quo no matter how the rules are

designed (e.g. discrimination against race in the Critical

Legalist perspective)? The structure vs. agency debate has left

a yawning gap in sociology, created by the primacy attributed

to actor agency or structural forces in shaping outcomes.

Anthony Giddens‟ theory of structuration (1984) attempted to


24

strike a balance without ordering one above the other and

show how both micro agents and macro structures mutually

enact social systems, but empirical applications of the theory

have been limited.

Contemporary research on rules, currently developing within

the Sociology of Compliance displays symptoms of a similar

cleavage. The two main hypotheses that dominate the

literature on non-compliance of rules are a) veto players and

b) misfit (Falkner 2006). The former postulates that

successful compliance is inversely related with the number of

veto players (Tsebelis 1995, 2002 in Falkner 2006) and hence

attributes primacy to actors. The misfit hypothesis is that

compliance is directly related to the goodness of fit between

new rules and the existing institutional and regulatory

traditions (Mastaenbroek 2005, He´ritier 1995) and thus

leans towards structure. The empirical study of 15 EU

member states by Falkner et al concluded that both claims

are partially true but contingent on contexts; for example, the

goodness of fit argument works only where countries have a

culture of law observance. Thus more evidence based

research is needed to validate these hypotheses conclusively.

Actor vs. Institutions in the urban context

The structure vs. agency debate, ubiquitous in a sociological

study of any subject, went live on the urban stage post the

1950s‟ developments in theories of urban politics. Actor-

centred theories of „urban politics‟ were constructed

somewhat in opposition to the structuralist „institutional

theories‟ (Lowndes 2001). This provoked „neo-institutional‟

revisions of the old instituionalism from the late 1980s

onwards.

The „structuralists‟ originally camped on grounds of

institutional theory before moving base to varieties of „new

institutionalism‟. In today‟s context, governments promoting a

Research Design

25

policy of decentralization i.e. devolving power from the

provincial to the municipal level of government would qualify

as practitioners of institutional theory. However, empirical

studies of institutional reform challenged the Rawlsian notion

that good institutions can create a just society. For example,

opening up municipal-decision making to citizens did not

weaken but strengthened socio-spatial marginalization in a

Mexican city (Lombard 2013). There is plenty of evidence

discrediting the agency of institutional design. However, this

argument by itself - that rules are not working - is not

sufficient to undermine the determinism of institutions, nor

the primacy of actors; because broader structures of social

inequality and power relations regulating behaviour

(institutions in our definition) could be at play.

What really attacked institutionalism theory from an actor-

centred perspective began with Floyd Hunter's 1953 study of

Atlanta. It showed that the municipal government, although

designated as the official decision-taking body, was effectively

not the one making municipal policy. Instead, the decision-

making process for the city was captured by socio-economic

elites (Hunter 1953). Later Robert Dahl, in his 1961 study of

New Haven came to exemplify the pluralist school as he

showed that urban decision-making was much more

conflicted and policy outcomes were a result of bargaining

between competing members of the community (Dahl 1961).

This debate between the elitists and the pluralists became

famous as the „community power debate‟ but both schools

agreed that more than the institutional structure of local

governments, it was the pursuit of political actors that

determined urban policy (Davies & Trounstine 2012). By the

1980s and 1990s, the word urban “governance” as opposed to

“government” began to be used to turn attention to broader

influences of external actors on government decision-making

(private investor, donors, civil society).


26

2.2 Puzzle: How do actors escape institutional

constraints?

The actor vs. institution debate in urban theories has a great

deal of scope to be further problematized. Those attributing

agency to actors have focused on how actor coalitions shape

institutions and policies. On the other hand, the

neoinstitutionalists have focussed on ways in which

institutions constrain behaviour and steer outcomes. But

there is not yet a fully developed explanation of why, how and

which, actors escape institutional constraints. Agent-driven

perspectives would say that actors subvert the rules but they

do not develop much on the embeddedness of actors in their

broader institutional environments which frame social action.

Some literature on policy implementation failures also

emphasizes the role of actors in co-production of policies,

thereby problematizing theories of institutional design (Lipsky

1980, Ostrom 1990) but they do not explain why even

improved design again falls in the same pit and is not a

guarantee to steer actor behaviour. In fact, a faith in

institutional design to steer policy outcomes remains

dominant, despite contradictory evidence, as evident from the

financing agenda of large multilateral institutions like The

World Bank and recent decentralization reforms of many

national governments.

2.3 Theoretical framework: Strategic action

fields

To explain the loose grasp of institutions on actors, we use

the work of Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam in their new

book, A Theory of Fields. This work is quite fitting because it

provides a very flexible framework for us to think about actor

agency both limited by and yet able to transcend institutional

constraints.

Research Design

27

The key is to break down the big macro structure into smaller

units or “fields” of meso-level order. Actors can act

strategically to change the rules in a given field and yet be

constrained by the larger rules of the game of the broader

field environment – this is the interpretation of Fligstein in

this research. The following are the four key concepts that

will be borrowed and adapted to explain the field set-up or the

“field universe” in our case study.

Field: A field is a meso-level social order and the

fundamental unit of collective action in society. Fields are

socially constructed arenas where actors with different

resource endowments operate with shared understandings

that are not necessarily consensual A field can be

conceptualized fairly flexibly; it has been defined before as a

market (Fligstein 2001), an organization (DiMaggio and Powel

1983), a policy domain (Laumann and Knoke 1987) and a

network (Powell et al 2005).

In this research we employ “field” as an organization –

Thimphu City Corporation (TCC). The interest is to capture

TCC‟s interactions with all those actors who influence its

decisions on the Thimphu Structure Plan (TSP 2003-27). In

other words, the unit is analysis is to study social action of

actors interacting with the TCC in the governance field.

Field Environment: Fligstein characterizes the relationship a

field has with “other fields” and together the two constitute

the field environment. In his view, the broader field

environment resembles a Russian doll which is composed of a

complex web of fields nested in one another (Fligstein

2013:9).

We want to be very clear on the visualization of the relations

between a field and its broader environment in this study.

The Matryoshka doll metaphor is not the best visualization


28

because as Fligstein says, a field is embedded in a complex

network of fields, and hence not tightly encapsulated within

each larger field. It is more appropriate to think of the field in

terms of a universe of networks of fields. This allows us to

look at a field embedded not just within the broader universe

or master field but also within a network of fields. The field

environment governs not just the internal workings of a field

but also how different fields relate to each other. In our study

the “master field” is the state field within which the Thimphu

City Corporation “field” is embedded. However we add an

intermediary and that is the “network of fields” constructed

as the policy governance network comprising of TCC and all

other fields with which it interacts to implement the urban

plan. Thus the field (TCC) is embedded in a network of fields

(policy governance network) which is itself embedded in a

master field (Bhutanese state) and together this set up makes

up the “field universe” in our study, which is simply a more

nuanced version of Fligstein‟s “field environment”.

Strategic Action: Strategic action is the attempt of social

actors to create and sustain social worlds by securing the

cooperation of others.

We just add that rationality of strategic action is bounded so

strategic action is also framed by the common repertoire of

strategies.

Social skill: The ability to fashion such agreements and

enforce them requires that strategic actors possess some

amount of “social skill” (Fligstein 2012: 14). This set of skills

is assumed to be distributed “perhaps normally” across the

population (Fligstein 2001).

We divide social skill into two a) negotiation skills –

distributed normally across society and b) resource

Research Design

29

endowments (social attributes and networks) – distributed

unevenly.

Challengers and Incumbents: Incumbents are those actors

who wield disproportionate influence within a field and whose

interests and views tend to be heavily reflected in the

dominant organization of the SAF. Challengers are those who

challenge the field order to change it.

Since our aim is not to explain field change and stability but

rule compliance and deviation, we completely revise this

definition but retain the idea of conflict in interactions. For us

there are a) claim-makers who challenge a given rule before

the municipal committee and then there are b) decision-

takers who decide whether or not to authorize the claim for

rule exemption or rule revision. Together they enact the

transformation of the urban planning field in Thimphu.

Research question

The broad research question is about limited capacity of

formal rules to effect change. The aim is to explain why and

how actors escape institutional constraints. At least five

dimensions emerge as key themes.

a) Why is legal reform not an adequate condition to achieve

the intended change?

b) What are the other factors that mediate between objectives

and outcomes of rules?

c) What are the conditions for generating compliance?

d) What are some of the unintended consequences and

paradoxes?


30

e) Do rules have some other value even if they cannot achieve

intended objectives?

These broad questions are contextualized for the case study:

urban planning in Thimphu, Bhutan to formulate the

research question driving this research:

How can we explain urban developments that are taking place

in contravention of the 2004 Thimphu Structure Plan? What are

the mechanisms through which rules get deviated and to what

end?

Hypothesis

Deriving from Fligstein‟s framework, the argument is that the

key mechanism explaining the “black hole” of non-

compliance11 is “strategic action” by actors. Legal codes are

not an adequate condition to steer policy outcomes because

actors intervene with their own goals and strategies and

divert the objectives. The two mutually compatible hypotheses

are the following:

Veto: The greater is the veto power, the lesser is the policy

compliance. If legal reform challenges the interests of actors,

they will find strategies to manipulate the system and become

veto players. The greater the social skill (negotiation ability

and resource endowments), the greater the likelihood of

strategic action and subversion of objectives.

Misfit: The greater the fit between legal codes and non-

codified cultural norms12, the greater the compliance. If there

is misfit between the policy‟s norms and prevailing

institutional architecture, actors may not see the law as

legitimate and have little incentive to comply. Misfits can be

11 Mastenbroek 2005 12 Using Weber‟s distinction between law and convention

Research Design

31

various types: authority misfit, policy misfit, institutional

misfit. By using “norm misfit” as the definition, we can

encompass all types of misfit whether in the institutional

architecture or content of the policy.

Case study selection

In a paper calling for “new geographies of theory”, Ananya

Roy argued that dominant theories on cities are rooted in the

EuroAmerican experience and exhibit a neo-orientalist

tendency when they characterize the experience of cities from

the Global South as “interesting, anomalous, different, and

esoteric” (Roy 2009). Her argument is that to capture the

multiple modernities of cities, the dominant centre for theory

making must move to the global south. However, this very

suggestion reifies the difference between the global north and

south – one that Jennifer Robinson tried to collapse in her

book Ordinary Cities (2002). Robinson‟s agenda was similar in

that she too wants urban theory to overcome its Western bias

however the approach is very different. She suggested that we

need to change the gaze with which we look at first-world and

third-world cities because all cities are “ordinary”; at the end

of the day we can find both the high rise CBD and the slum in

Paris and in Delhi. So her point was that we need new criteria

to compare cities in the global north and south without

reifying their binary distinctions.

The Robinson way was more appealing but Roy‟s suggestion

could not be ignored. Both challenge classic conceptions of

how we understand the “modern” experience. Why do we

notice the slums of Asia but not Europe? (See Aguilera 2013

as an exception). So one way to reconcile the suggestions of

both was to shift the case study to the global south but

instead of using a post-modernist framework, use a classical

Weber / Fligstein framework and check out how far can their

concepts be stretched to the global south and what value

does the change of context add back to the theory. Weber‟s


32

analysis of rationalization processes is from a typically

modernist standpoint so it would be interesting to see how

right (or wrong?) was he by analysing the experience of a

budding democracy that is just stepping into, what many

would call, the age of “modernity”.

Bhutan, a small country sandwiched between India and

China, is currently in a very interesting process of transition.

Ruled by the Wangchuck family since 1907, the kingdom

adopted its first codified Constitution only six years ago in

2008. In the same year, parliamentarians contested elections

for the first time on political party lines through direct and

universal suffrage. 2008 also marked a century of rule under

the monarchy and commemorated with the fifth king taking

the place of his father. In this new cycle of state development

in Bhutan, the Prime Minister and the king (as Head of State)

are to govern in a formula codified in the Constitution. By

Weberian terms, this qualifies as a “rationalization” process in

which traditional authority of the monarchy is converting into

legal authority.

However, what makes Bhutan unique is that the transition

was a top-down process and hand-held by His Majesty, the

former king, rather than an outbreak of popular mass

uprising or a coup breaking out from elite factionalisms

which characterize most democratic transitions. Unlike

Morocco, international organizations did not play an overt

role in pressuring the monarchy; if there was any pressure, it

is known only to the inner corridors of power and not in

public knowledge. There have been some pressures from

political parties in exile in Nepal notably in the early 1990s,

but this issue goes back to 1954 and there is not a good

match between external pressure and the timing of the

decision for reform. Thus the decision to democratize is rather

seen as a pre-emptive move in a calm time so that the

transition can be carefully planned to provide legal security to

Research Design

33

the monarchy for times to come. The whole episode worked to

further increase the legitimacy of the monarchy as the

international community watched starry-eyed when the

former Druk Gyalpo went across Bhutan campaigning for

democracy against a resistant urban bourgeoisie as well as

rural peasantry. Although this was initially surprising to me

but after having lived for a short period in Bhutan and seen

the kind of respect the elites that I interacted with have for

their king, I no longer doubt the credibility of the media

reports about the Bhutanese people‟s reluctance to

democratic change. I take this attitude as an observable

“social fact” but with my own interpretation. First of all, in

these reports, a very specific definition of Bhutanese is

applied, that of legally recognized citizens and excludes

claims for democracy by some Bhutanese in exile, for

example, founder of the Druk National Congress created in

1994. Second of all, the concept of “democracy” was new for

the country and even today some people don‟t understand the

word in rural Bhutan (as told to me by a GNH surveyor,

20/01/2014). A transition led and planned by the king in a

time when much of the population had not asked for it,

created a situation where democracy has to be learnt through

legal socialization.

Thus, democracy came without a change in politics or

political values. Given this specificity of the transition,

Bhutan forms a fertile case study to explore what legitimacy

of legal authority really means where change in legal codes

precedes change in social norms. It is a context where

authority based on tradition could be more legitimate than

that based on legal authority even as the legitimation basis of

the society is changing. Bhutan is really an ideal case if the

intellectual agenda is to discover limits of formal institutions

because here one can distinguish more clearly between social

norms and the newly codified laws which are yet to be

internalized.


34

To sum up, Bhutan‟s capital city is befitting for a research

agenda seeking to explore rule deviations where misfit

(dissonance of new codified rules with prevailing norms) is a

hypothesis. At the same time the case study offers some

promising revisions to the hypothesis about veto players. In

Bhutan, the state has dominated social life including the

market so the private sector is still very underdeveloped (and

hence few veto players). The bureaucracy forms the most

important elite group after the royals and corruption

perception index is one of the lowest in Asia (Transparency

International corruption perception index), possibly because

the king hand-picked and created the civil service from

scratch within the last few decades and anti-corruption is an

official policy objective. All of these indicate that the state

should have the capacity to govern and compliance should be

high because veto players are few. But this is not the case

and remains a puzzle to be discovered.

2.4 Methodology

This study is an extracted version of the Master‟s thesis

prepared for the M.A. in Urban Affairs (Governing the Large

Metropolis) at the Institut d’études politiques (Sciences Po),

Paris. The data was collected over a three month field trip to

Thimphu, Bhutan during January-April 2014. During my

stay I was hosted by the Centre for Bhutan Studies & GNH

Research. I worked independently and my contribution to the

Centre was to be a 10-15 page report on the structural and

design aspects of Thimphu‟s planning. Although the Centre

played no role in setting the agenda for my research, it

influenced my “problem-definition”. For example, dilution of

traditional architecture is seen as an undesireable outcome.

In terms of methodology, this research made a choice for

qualitative methods because the research is grounded in

Weberian sociology. The aim is to capture a qualitative

Research Design

35

essence of state-society relations, how compliance and social

control works, what is legitimacy based on etc. Since it is a

theory of social action, the aim is to deconstruct individual

perceptions and motivation for action. I did this primarily by

capturing the framings used by claim-makers as well as

decision-takers to legitimize exemptions from planning rules.

My main method was Direct observation. I sat daily in the

office of the Chief, Implementing & Monitoring Section (I&MS)

for about 20 days in the month of March 2014. I also had one

occasion to be invited to an office party which gave me a good

sense of the social milieu of this section of the bureaucracy.

This gives the added advantage of understanding their beliefs,

values and working styles, which is more complex than the

mechanistic bureaucrat described in Weber‟s work. I had the

opportunity to directly observe one part of the organization. I

observed the workings of the Urban Planning Division (UPD)

and the Development Control Division (DCD) which are

divisions under the Thimphu City Corporation (see Annex for

TCC organogram).

My main data source for the case study was the town

committee discussions as I am interested in understanding

how the municipal decision-making process works. I had

access to all 18 samples of the minutes of the bimonthly town

committee meetings from February 2011 to February 2014,

held since the first elected mayor came in 2011. I also

extracted city level data from the Census conducted by the

National Statistics Bureau in 2005. This was indispensable

for characterizing the profile of the city and residents.

The direct observation method is complemented with other

methods such as interviews and historical analysis. The

sample of people I interviewed was mostly government

officials from organizations/agencies that seemed relevant for

the case study such as NHDC, MoWHS, TCC, NLCS. I was


36

interested less by the Parliamentarians as current ministers

had just entered government in 2013. My focus was more on

bureaucrats who had been operating over longer tenures. I

also preferred to talk to staff working on the ground as I felt

that they could give more detailed descriptions than their

superiors. In general, I found the government in Bhutan to be

remarkably accessible. I was able to get interviews within 24

hours of calling and requesting for appointments. However,

many requested for anonymity and I felt that informal

discussion was a a preferred format for my interviewees who

sometimes did not want to be quoted. So in this research any

information quoted from my discussions is only dated but not

named but I have maintained very detailed notes and a

precise record of who I met on which day.

Finally, to understand the broader Bhutanese state-society

field, I used historical and content analysis. The Kuensel

newspaper, dating back to 1968 was a vital source for basic

information on the state‟s programmes and policies as this

paper was the only print media until the mid-2000s. Thus

there is no sample bias but the content requires analytical

discretion as the paper basically worked as a mouthpiece and

information bulletin of the state. Bhutan also has a tradition

to make proceedings of parliamentary debates publicly

available in English since 1953 which allowed me to go back

to crucial moments and dig deeper into the polity‟s history.

This was useful to identify dominant types of rationality and

authority in Bhutan and get a broad understanding of

changes overtime. Although the archives only provided me

with the official view, my complementary informal discussions

with non-technocrats helped me develop my own

interpretation of why news was reporting the way it was or

why the Assembly discussions were prioritizing one issue over

another.

37

III. Thimphu City: Growth Dynamics

This chapter quantifies the changing profile of Thimphu city

in the last decade. This background serves as evidence for

Chapter III which is about the conflict of interests for and

against the plan‟s rules and which follows Chapter II which

lays out the plan‟s objectives. This chapter is divided in three

parts. It first captures the demographic and socio-economic

profile of Thimphu‟s residents as per the Census of 2005. The

second section presents how the shape of Thimphu city is

growing and changing. Finally, the last section characterizes

the housing market while quantifying the proportion of

population that is asset-owning and has access to basic

services to get an extent of socio-economic disparities.

3.1 The Residents: Socio-economic &

demographic profile

According to the 2005 Census, Bhutan‟s total population

stood at 634,982 of which Thimphu dzongkhag alone had

94,102. Of this, Thimphu dzongkhag‟s urban population was

79,185. Data for urban Thimphu has been extracted to make

a profile of Thimphu city. These 79,185 individuals (or

15,728 households) living in Thimphu city constituted over

12% of Bhutan‟s total population in 2005. Of the 79,185

people recorded in the Census, 2851 were visiting.

Age

Thimphu is a very young city. Over 90% of residents are

under 50.


38

Figure 1: City of young people

Education

75.25% residents are literate (of eligible age). This is quite a

remarkable chart because it shows how quickly education

has spread in Bhutan since the 1950s and 60s, when the first

batch of children was sent to school. We can see below that

the generation above 75 years has an average literacy rate of

only 22.9%. Compared to their grandparents, over 83% of the

present generation of youth is literate today.

Figure 2: Literacy Rate by Age Group

Source: Census

2005

N = 79,185

Source: Census 2005

N = 69,864 (Above 6 years)

Growth Dynamics

39

Employment

As the administrative capital, Thimphu has a large share of

the population employed in government service, up to 40%

according to one study (Walcott 2009). However this is

changing as the largely state controlled economy is opening

up to private sector participation.

According to the 2005 Census, over 67% of the population

falls in an employable age (15 to 64 years old).

Table 1: Population in working age

Age Population Percent

0-14 years 23,798 30.1%

15-64 years 53,432 67.5%

65 and above 1955 2.5%

Total 79,185 100%

Source: Census 2005

Of the 55,387 residents aged above fourteen (and hence

eligible for work), 30,190 i.e. 54.5% were employed while the

remaining 45.5% were unemployed or inactive. Of the 30,190

employed, the largest proportion or 20% were working in the

construction sector as road laborers (3263), stone cutters

(1323), carpenters (1141) etc. 15.8% were working in public

administration including a large staff of security personnel

(2191). Transport and communication was the third largest

sector of employment primarily because of a large number

working as drivers (1704). Retailers (1185) and business

professionals (1167), clerks (1024) and maid/baby sitter

(1173) were some of the most frequent occupations in other

sectors (see Annex).


40

Table 2: Sector of employment

Sector of employment Population Percent

Construction 6,089 20.2%

Public administration/security 4,765 15.8%

Transport/communication 2,021 6.7%

Retail/wholesale trade 1,701 5.6%

Education 1,247 4.1%

Agriculture 1,155 3.8%

Hotel/restaurant 1,090 3.6%

Finance/insurance 836 2.8%

Health services 668 2.2%

Manufacturing 569 1.9%

Electricity/gas/water 523 1.7%

Mining/quarring 119 0.4%

Others 9,407 31.2%

Total 30,190 100%

Source: Census 2005

When asked if they had worked in the last one week, 26,547,

i.e. 47.9% of the population aged above fourteen, reported

“no”. The reasons cited for not working are given in the table

below. About 16% was looking for work while some 7%

already had found work from which they were absent or were

going to resume in the future. 8768 or 33% of this population

was studying. This coincides nicely with the 9,485 of

Thimphu‟s population falling in the 15-19 years age group.

Similarly, 1965 reported old age which also coincides well

with the 1955 aged above 65 years. About 32% was

unemployed out of choice mostly because they did not want

to work or had a home to take care of.

Growth Dynamics

41

Table 3: Reason for not working

Reason cited Freq Percent

Unemployed, looking for work 4,350 16.4%

Waiting for work, seasonally employed 875 3.3%

Studying 8,768 33%

Absent from work 1,081 4.1%

Does not want to work 707 2.7%

Taking care of home 7,687 29%

Health / Age 3,079 11.6%

Source: Census 2005 26,547 100%

Place of origin

Less than a third of residents are born in Thimphu. While

32% of residents come from Thimphu, 58% come from rest of

Bhutan. By looking at the languages they speak, we can get

an idea of the regions of Bhutan from which they come. We

can also see that while 6745 report to be born abroad, 6452

speak Indian languages. This indicates that about 8% of

Thimphu city‟s residents are Indian. This makes sense in

light of the recent construction boom in Thimphu which has

created demand for a large number of Indian construction

workers.

Figure 3: City of migrants

Place of birth No. %

Thimphu 25,205 32%

Rest of Bhutan 45,886 58%

Abroad 6,745 9%

Unknown 1,349 2%

Total 79,185 100%

Source: Census 2005, N = 79,185


42

Figure 4: Spoken languages

Reasons for migration

Almost 70% have been staying in current residence for less

than ten years (Census 2005). While 43% previously resided

in an urban area, only 45% display a trend of rural to urban

migration. We may say that the urban to urban figure is

inflated as probably includes those born in Thimphu (31.8%).

But even then, only 53% were born in rural areas. The

predominant reason for migrating is employment followed by

family move (including marriage) and education.

Figure 5: Rural to Urban migration

29,028

18,635

13,490

2,834

2,237

6,452

2,277

4,232

Dzongkha

Sharchhopkha

Lhotshamkha

Kurtoepkha

Khengkha

Indian languages

Others

Babies & disabled

Origins Place of birth Previous residence

No. % No. %

Urban areas 28,497 36.0 34,388 43.4

Rural areas 42,594 53.8 36,079 45.6

Abroad 6,745 8.52 7,342 9.3

Not stated 1,349 1.7 1,376 1.7

Total 79,185 100 79,185 100

Source: Census

2005

N = 79,185

Growth Dynamics

43

Figure 6: Reasons for moving

3.2 The City: Spatial changes & the

construction boom

City growth: 1960s-present

Urbanization of Thimphu kick-started in the 1960s after

Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, visited Bhutan in

1959. India‟s growing dispute with China and Chinese

occupation of Tibet led to some anxiety that Bhutan might

become an arena for Sino-Indian confrontation under

conditions in which China had easier access from the north

than India from the south (Rose 1977). Consequently, Bhutan

opened its gates to India and along with it came a whole

package of development assistance (India financed Bhutan‟s

first Five Year Plan). The Indian army considered it essential

to develop a logistic capacity for itself in Bhutan through

major road construction projects. By 1962 Thimphu‟s first

motor-road had been built (Norbu 2008: 87). What was

hitherto a cluster of villages connected by mule paths began

to slowly transform into Thimphu city as we know it today. In

2001, Thimphu had about 12,700 vehicles up from from

39% 34%

13% 5% 9%

37%

100%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120% Source: Census

2005

N = 77,868


44

2,834 in 1985 and 1,090 taxis, compared with 69 in 1986

(Gyelthen 2002a, Tashi 2002).

In 1966, Thimphu became a full capital of the Royal

Government of Bhutan (Pradhan 2012). This was not always

the case. Even today the Central Monastic Body retains

Punakha as the winter capital while spending the summer in

Thimphu. With the transfer of the Development Secretariat

from Paro to Thimphu in late 1967, Thimphu grew from a

village to a town of 10,000 people by late 1970s (Rose 1977).

The city developed as a centre of administration and grew

around the Tashichho Dzong which was under reconstruction

in the 1960s. Along with roads, large tracts of land were

developed as institutional land – RBA in Lungtenphu, RBP in

Changzamtog, RBG in Dechencholing and DANTAK in Babesa

and India House in north Thimph. By the 1970s, agricultural

land was being used for construction of houses and offices to

meet the demand of the growing civil service13. Hotels came

up to host international dignitaries who came to attend the

fourth king‟s coronation. Norzin Lam developed in the 1970s

(Norbu 2008). In the 1980s, guest houses increased from 3

(1980) to 38 (1990) to accommodate foreigners as Bhutan‟s

international relations with the world were expanding and the

country opening up to foreign visitors.

13 To get a more detailed and visual description of Thimphu‟s

transformation, see Geley Norbu‟s Thimphu: Now and Then.

Growth Dynamics

45

Tashichho Dzong: The heart of the city

Thimphu has the largest share of the urban population in

Bhutan and is growing rapidly as is the economy of Bhutan.

In 1987, Bhutan‟s GDP per capita was $209 (UNCHS 1990)

which is only a tenth of what it is today (~$2000) and has

exceeded that of India‟s (~$1800). The city grew from a tiny

village in the 1960s to a teeming capital city. In the 1990s,

Thimphu‟s population was just around 25,000 (UNCHS 1990)

and has grown five times in the last twenty years; this is

faster than the speed at which Thimphu grew in the entire

twentieth century. According to a World Bank study,

Thimphu had one of the fastest annual growth rates in the

world at over 7% (World Bank 2011: 1).

Table 4: Thimphu's population growth

1977 1980s 1991 1997 2000 2005 2012

Population ~10k <15k ~25k ~35k 43,479 79,185 124,000

Sources Rose 1977

Norbu 2008

UNCHS 1990

NEC: 65

TSP 2002

Census 2005

ADB-NSB 2012

http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Middle%20Path.pdf

http://www.mediawitty.com/test/NewsDetail.aspx?group_id=43&id=20583&folder_id=89&Page_Title=Water%20crisis%20hits%20Thimphu%20again


46

Construction Boom: 2009-2011

The table below shows the spate of construction activity after

2008. This is explained by the release of land after finalization

of LAPs in 2008 aided by the lowering of interest rates for

construction loans since 2003-04 from 13-14% to 10% by

most banks. Credit growth in the housing sector was 25

percent since 200714 (Gyeltsehen 2013). However, building

applications have dropped after construction loans were

stopped in 2012. This is a recent measure taken by the

central bank in order to check the outflow of the Indian rupee

as Bhutan was facing a currency crisis (shortage of the

rupee). The rupee crisis in Bhutan is related with the

construction sector as most of the construction materials and

labour is imported from India mostly for building 7 newly

commissioned hydropower plants but also housing

construction.

Figure 7: Construction boom (2009-11)

14 Bank of Bhutan‟s housing loan increased by 81% in mid 2005

after it decreased its interest rate in 2004.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2004200520062007200820092010201120122013

Appli

cati

ons

Year

Building Permits: new (major) construction

Source: Thimphu City Corporation, I&MS Division

Growth Dynamics

47

Table 5: Applications for building permit

Yr 1985

1999 2000 „01 „02 „03 „08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 „12

App 80

78 65 77 97 92 110 199 255 329 164

Source: Thapa 2005, Rai 2013, UNCHS Habitat 1990

Most of the applications have been for residential buildings.

While the new stock is built for residential use, many of the

buildings are being used as commercial spaces without a

change in property tax.

New residential buildings converted into offices and commercial

spaces

3.3 Housing Market: Characteristics &

disparities

Housing market dynamics

The draft urban development plan of 1986 pointed out an

acute shortage of housing for government employees. At that

time the policy focus was to shift from public housing

provision to encouraging the private sector to build housing.

This was the preferred choice as it was felt that the

government alone could not take on the load of providing


48

Pvt housing

65%

Gov Housing

32%

Other3%

housing to a growing number of civil service staff. However,

today, privately built stock dominates the housing market

and we may once again require a shift in policy thinking.

In 1988, housing benefits and salary payments of the civil

service, (the predominant population of Thimphu at the time)

were consolidated. Salaries were increased and a housing

allowance incorporated. If a government employee took

accommodation in a RGOB-owned house, 30% salary would

be deducted (UNCHS 1990). As a result, many opted to rent

out privately. Prior to this reform, a survey in 1985 found that

a third of the staff eligible for government housing was

renting privately and receiving a rental subsidy equivalent to

15% of salary (UNCHS 2005). It could be thus conjectured

that in that situation, many preferred to rent privately and

receive allowance of 30%. They would continue to do so until

rent exceeded 30% of salary which is the case today.

According to the review by the UN Centre for Human

Settlements (UNCHS 1990), prior to the housing policy reform

in 1988, 72% of housing units in Thimphu were occupied by

public servants and owned or rented by government.

Presently however less than a third (32%) of households live

in government housing, as calculated from the Census 2005

data.

Figure 8: Public vs. Private Housing

Source: Census 2005

N = 15,728 (Households)

Growth Dynamics

49

Table 6: House occupation status

Gov Housing Private housing Other

Rented 2,019 6,534 544

Rent free 2,962 1,556

Owner occupied 2,113

Total (15,728) 4,981 10,203 544

Source: Census 2005

While private construction of housing has mushroomed, most

of it is put on rent. Of the 10,203 households who live in

private housing, only 2,113 live in owner occupied housing.

Overall, there were 15,728 households in Thimphu city in

2005. Of these 83% live in rented housing (public and private)

and only 13% live in owner-occupied housing.

Figure 9: Owner occupied vs. Rental housing

It is interesting to note that just because a house is rented, it

does not automatically mean that rent is charged. This may

be for various reasons depending on whether housing is

privately or publicly owned. Of the 13,071 households or 83%

of the total households living in rental housing, 62% live in

private while the remaining 38% are in government rented

quarters. Of these 13,071 households 35% are not paying any

Rented83%

Owner occupied

13%

Other4%

Source: Census 2005



50

rent (12% in privately rented and 23% in government rented

accommodation). Some government housing is provided free

of cost because it may be on institutional land or because it is

part of the salary package. Cabinet ministers, monks15 and

expatriates (e.g. Dutch development associates)16 are some

examples of the population that does not pay for rented

housing.

Figure 10: Paid vs. Free housing

Public Housing and NHDCL

After July 2003 all government owned housing assets were

transferred to the National Housing Development Corporation

(NHDC) from the variety of agencies who were managing their

own housing stock. This does not include institutional

housing i.e. housing stock located on land owned by various

institutions like the armed forces, Bhutan Power Corporation,

education institutes and the hospital. Put together these

15

2000 monks are accommodated in the Tashichho Dzong, as it is

the summer residence of the central monastic body. 16

Article 7 of Bhutan‟s Agreement with the Kingdom Of Netherlands:

a) provides the development associates with free housing as entitled

to other international and bilateral volunteers working in Bhutan.

Source: Census 2005


Growth Dynamics

51

institutions own a lot of land (at least 15%)17. Therefore,

NHDC housing does not accurately reflect all the public

housing stock that is not privately owned. As an example, in

2010-11, 90 housing units were built at the headquarters of

the Royal Bhutan Police which shows up in RBP annual

reports but not in NHDC‟s.

However, what is generally called “public housing” in Bhutan

is that falling under the mandate of the NHDC. This housing

is available only for civil servants and NHDC‟s own staff

(Gyelmo 2013 article). NHDC‟s primary mandate is to provide

housing to lower income groups (Wangmo 2012) of civil

servants. Then there is also “semi-public housing” (Thapa

2005) provided by NPPF through private contributions of

members who are also government employees.

Changjiji project was initiated in 2000, for low middle income

civil servants (Grade 9-15). “To avoid slums and shanty towns

from developing, there is an urgent need to provide urban

housing for the low and middle income groups” (8th Five Year

Plan 199718). Thus there seems to be a growing intolerance to

unplanned settlements in the late 1990s and by 2000, work

on the city master plan had begun. Low income civil servants

could have been building their own huts, as this is happening

in smaller Bhutanese towns like Zhemgang today where

supply of public housing is not enough. Changjiji Housing

Colony would finally comprise 73 buildings with 700

apartments for about 3,000 people.

Socio-economic disparities

Over 70% do not own the building in which they live and

almost 60% do not own land or a plot in Thimphu. Vehicle

17

Institutional land comprises land owned by: Defense (7%), other

institutes (8.7%) and religious buildings (0.04%) (MoWHS 2004). 18 UNCHS 1990Ch 18


52

owners are presently only 30%. With rising incomes and

consumption, the number of car owners in the city will grow

steadily.

Table 7: Vehicle ownership

Figure 11: Ownership of building and land

Table 8: Asset owning households

Asset Owners No. Owners %

Audio player 10,818 68.8

TV 10,666 67.8

Telephone 7,185 45.7

Mobile 6,623 42.1

Yes30.1%

No69.9%

Source: Census 2005


Source: Census 2005


Growth Dynamics

53

Fridge 5,989 38.1

Washing Machine 2,352 15.0

Livestock 1,919 12.2

Computer 1,799 11.4

Internet 930 5.9

Source: Census 2005, Total households = 15,728

Segregation dynamics

In Thimphu, colonies of labourers and construction workers

live in substandard temporary accommodation. Groups

providing manual labour, cleaning services, clerical work are

unable to pay for formal housing and live in self-built huts. In

late 1987, temporary huts (categorized as squatter by UN

HABITAT) were 407 of which 211 were occupied by nationals;

237 were demolished during 1990. In 2004, Cities Alliance

identified 353 households (1600 residents) living in 28

squatter settlements across the city (Map 2a).

A 2004 map made by Cities Alliance identified 28 squatter

settlements in Thimphu


54

Table 9: Access to basic services

Electricity With access (98.9%)

Piped water Inside house (54.3%) Outside house (44.4%)

Toilet With flush (72%) No facility (3.8%)

Source: Census 2005

The labour camp here houses staff working for Thimphu City

Corporation

Inside the labour camp

Growth Dynamics

55

Toilets in the labour camp

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter presented an overview of Thimphu city‟s growth.

Only 29.7% own the building in which they live. 32% are born

in Thimphu. 30.1% own a car. These are of course not the

same 30% but roughly give an idea of the city‟s profile. 54%

has piped water inside the house. 10% is estimated to be

living in labour camps in squatter-like settlements which

makes sense considering 8% are Indians who are mostly

working as labourers in the construction sector, the largest

sector of employment.

Beyond the socio-economic profile of residents, the chapter

also showed that there has been a construction boom in the

city after 2008 which busted in 2012 after the Central Bank

intervened to discourage construction loans. In 2008, Local

Area Plans were finalized and new land was released in the

extended areas for development. This may be one explanation

for the construction boom. We also saw that most of this

stock is built as residential even if it is being used for

commercial purposes. Given that 83% live in rented housing,


56

62% of which is in the private sector, we can estimate that

much of the new stock has been built for renting out.

Another labour camp at Kalabazaar

57

IV. Thimphu Structure Plan: Objectives &

Outcomes

This chapter puts in perspective the emerging gaps between

the objectives and outcomes of the Thimphu Structure Plan

(TSP) 2003-27. The aim is to characterize the nature of

deviations in order to understand where lies the plan‟s

Achilles heel. Is it a case of misfit in design or is it a problem

of enforcement? Is there a significant role for veto players in

diverting the plan objectives? This chapter is placed here so

that we can be clear about the nature of deviations in the

plan before we go on to analyse actor interests and strategies

to subvert the plan. The first section of this chapter presents

the plan‟s ambitions. The second section gives evidence of

some deviations using data from a MoWHS planning. The

final section analyses the nature of these deviations.

4.1 Policy vision: Development control

Historical background

The story of the Thimphu Structure Plan (TSP) is very good

illustration of the “garbage-can model” elucidated by John

Kingdon to explain how policy issues enter the agenda.

Kingdon adapts the “garbage can model of organizational

choice”19 (Kingdon 1995: 89) from the concept originally

proposed by Cohen, March & Olsen as a critique of the

rational version of decision-making in public administration.

The model argues that policy solutions do not emerge as a

targeted solution to a particular problem. What usually

happens instead is that a set or stream of recognized

problems and a stream of available solutions are present (as if

mixed in a garbage can) and the final outcome is some

combination of these. There is usually a “window of

19 Cohen, March & Olsen


58

opportunity” when the coupling of the problem, policy and

politics streams take place and that is how a particular policy

initiative is born or refined.

In Thimphu, this window of opportunity came towards the

end of the 20th century, when the United Nations

(UNDP/UNCHS20) urban management assistance was coming

to an end as was the 1986-2000 strategic plan and new

programmes funded by the Danish government (DANIDA21),

Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank were

starting. Their investments were not integrated into one plan

at that stage. DANIDA was going to invest 70M Kroner to

develop water, sanitation and sewerage facilities as part of the

UDSSP22 project; ADB was giving US$ 8.2 M ($ 5.7 as loan) to

develop roads, footpaths and bridges (Gyalmo 1999). The

World Bank would complement other donors and emphasize

institutional strengthening at the district and local levels. The

Council of Ministers had just been elected by Assembly

members for the first time in 1998 and they were quite active

in raising funds which might explain that a) funding was

attracted and b) funding available for urban infrastructure

projects may have put urbanization higher on the

government‟s agenda. In Minister Yeshey Zimba‟s own words,

Time has now come for us to give more attention to

urban development. Thimphu is growing all over the

place and things are happening in a haphazhard

manner (Gyalmo 1999).

20 United Nations Commission on Human Settlements (UN Habitat) 21 Danish International Development Agency 22 Urban Development Sector Support Programme

Thimphu Structure Plan

59

Due to the new infrastructure works23 to be started, for

example, internal roads and water systems to the north of the

city in Langophakha and Hejo, it was decided to extend the

boundaries of the Thimphu municipality. The last urban

boundary extension had happened in 1994. It was reported in

Kuensel that “as a part of this overall plan the Thimphu

municipality boundaries will be extended to Pangrizampa,

near Dechenhholing, and NgabeRongchu, near Babesa” (Dorji

1999) – these remain the boundaries even as of today.

Although the reasons framed in the news may not be the real

reason, and there may or may not have been someone‟s

landed interests behind this (which could not be determined),

what we can say is that the decision to extend the boundary

and the decision to implement TSP were separate events.

Although the boundary extension had been announced on

August 14, 1999 (Kuensel), there was not yet a city master

plan. This came shortly after, as a random addition to the

series of events formulating the plan.

In December 1999 a former govt. employee of foreign origin,

Mr. Rajni Chavda (architect - planner) was visiting Thimphu

on a four month holiday. During informal meetings with the

Director General of the Ministry managing urban affairs

(MoC), he had commented on the problems that could arise

as a result of the government publicly announcing Thimphu‟s

boundary extension without a well thought out planning

exercise for this - the possible undesirable outcomes and

people rushing to buy land and engaging in speculation were

pointed out. He suggested that the quickest and most

inexpensive way for the Government to intervene was to

prepare a Structure Plan for the capital and its environs.

23 E.g. main road from Chubachu to taxi stand along BPO; Other

roads joining Chang Gidaphu and Changzamtog, Thori Lam, and

Kawajangsa as well as the hospital area and RICB colony.


60

The Director General then asked him whether he could return

to Bhutan and help prepare a fundable proposal for preparing

such a Structure Plan. Upon his consent, the Ministry

employed him in Sept 2000 and by April 2001 Cabinet

approval from the Royal Govt was obtained for a

comprehensive project to prepare the Structure Plan - the

Royal Govt. approved funds totalling under Nu. 5.0 Million for

hiring a team of urban planning professionals, purchasing

computers and required software, office furniture etc. The

consultants hired by the Royal Government were CCBA

(Christopher Charles Benninger & Associates), Pune, India

who were willing to carry out the required work within the

approved budget and time frame of one year beginning June

2001. Mr. Benninger had earlier worked in Bhutan as a

consultant on UN projects since 1979 and was well known to

royal government officials.

This is the story of the genesis of the idea and subsequent

decisions that led to the preparation of the Thimphu

Structure Plan, as shared with me by Mr. Rajni Chavda

himself. Kuensel reports confirm that the draft plan did

indeed cost the government under 5 million ngultrum

(Wangdi 2002).When one looks for evidence in the public

domain, it is also clear that the plan was indeed prepared by

CCBA as the official consultant appointed by the Royal Govt.

and is thus acknowledged in the plan document.

Reading the plan document and CCBA‟s website, it also

appears that the Thimphu Structure Plan is a pre-emptive24

measure to tackle the city‟s growing pains. But in fact, when

we go back to the beginning of the beginnings, we can see

24“Unserviceable, fragmented, low-density development characterizes

the city‟s present growth. The Royal Government is cognizant of

what is happening, and in its wisdom it is taking action to plan a

better future” (MoWHS 2004: 2)


61

that the story is quite different; TSP is better interpreted as a

retrospective measure to control unplanned developments in

the periphery. This also confronts us with a very different

conception of how decision-making occurs for policy-makers.

The TSP was not a planned solution of a single man to a well-

defined problem. Instead, there was a coupling of the problem

stream (city‟s peripheral developments) with the solution

stream (the visiting architect-planner) and a window of

opportunity was open (funding for urban infrastructure and

extension of city boundary) for these to come together and

amalgamate into the TSP.

As for the politics stream, which remains missing from this

analysis, one is right to be suspicious about the plan working

to serve other interests, particularly of the officials involved.

But unfortunately, the evidence remains blurry and the

conclusion one can safely draw is that there may have

certainly been instances of policy corruption, where some

influential people‟s land remained outside or inside the

boundary depending on whether the purpose was to avoid

urban tax or get municipal services; there may have also been

instances where some of the involved officials‟ land was

classified x and not z, for example, as “Guided Land

Development” instead of “Land Pooling” which would reduce

their land contribution – in fact I did observe this randomly in

the Hejo-Samteling LAP, where amongst the small section of

area classified as “Guided Land Development” was also the

plot of a former Deputy Minister. While there is grounded

reason for suspicion, there is simply no evidence to confirm it.

One also wonders why one of the most important resorts in

Bhutan remains outside the urban boundary today and does

not pay a single Ngultrum in urban land tax. As

demonstrated in a later section, record keeping and

institutional memory is so poor that it is almost impossible to

go back in time and verify such details.


62

Another reason why evidence gathering is difficult is because

once the consultants were hired, the decision-making process

became increasingly closed. The decision-making authority

lay with a small clique of bureaucrats25 and anyone with an

opinion different from the consultants was not heard. This is

the interpretation of those who were excluded but was shared

with me by at least two different sources, both with relevant

technical expertise and holding official positions in the

government at the time (25/03/2014, 22/01/2014).The

official version however is that before being approved by the

Cabinet in 2003, the TSP was thoroughly discussed with the

public giving evidence of nineteen public consultation

meetings (TSP 2003) but number alone is not evidence of the

quality of the consultations.

In conclusion, politics surely shaped the plan in decisions

over the details, but the plan itself was not an idea born out

of motivated strategic action but of a combination of people,

resources and circumstances. In other words, as the plan

proceeded, those who saw or could create the opportunities to

personally gain would have quite likely done so through

strategic action, but at its inception, there was an absence of

clearly defined goals – quite contrary to my initial hypothesis.

This detour was important because to understand if TSP is a

case of design misfit or not, we need to go to the moment of

inception to see who created it and why. Now that we have

covered the agenda-setting context, we can move to the plan

objectives.

25 Possibly including those acknowledged (MoWHS 2004 : 2) -

Deputy Minister, the Director General, the mayor of Thimphu,

the Senior Planner, and Urban Designer of the Department of

Urban Development and Housing (DUDH).


63

Objectives

Every plan has distaste for something which it seeks to

reorganize into its version of order. In Thimphu‟s case, the

problem was defined as “spotty growth” or “patchy sprawl”

(MoWHS 2004: 2). As the plan document describes, pockets of

Thimphu were growing in a scattered and ad hoc manner as

in Babesa and Taba. They were not large or dense enough to

be linked to a network of city services. So the objective of the

plan was essentially to channel the growth into serviceable,

dense and compact settlements.

Based on Thimphu‟s land use at the time (see table below), a

new pattern of medium- and high-density dwelling units was

proposed. This was mainly in anticipation of future land

shortage that could arise with projected population growth. It

was also felt that 3.4% area used for roads was too little

compared to a normative figure of 20%. Given that half of the

city area must be protected as green area (slopes, river basins

etc.) it was proposed that area allocated to roads should

increase to 10% (MoWHS 2004: 48). Finally, it was felt that

too little land was used for commercial and industrial

activities and pressure on the urban core needed to be

deflected. Consequently, two urban hubs were proposed as

counter magnets, one each in the north and south of the city

(MoWHS 2004: 54). An Urban Hub would have all facilities of

a Neighbourhood Node. In addition, it would have

entertainment facilities such as cinema halls, bowling

alleys, restaurants, bars, discos, etc. The automobile

repair workshop was relocated from the Urban Core or city

centre to the southern Urban Hub as a result of this plan.


64

Table 10: Land use in Thimphu before 2003

Category Land Use Percent

Greenfield (48%)

Agriculture/paddy 15.7%

Forest/Orchard 29.8%

Water body 2.3%

Brownfield (23%)

Road 3.4%

Commercial 1.4%

Residential 17.9%

Industrial 0.5%

Institutional

(15%)

Defense 6.7%

Institutional & public 8.5%

Religious 0.04%

Other

(13%)

Recreational 1.9%

Vacant (mostly govt. owned) 7.2%

Data unavailable 4.8%

Total = 2613 ha 100%

Source: MoWHS 2004: 48 (TSP Table 3.1)

Although the plan was made prior to the application of the

screening tool, it is a very good fit with Bhutan‟s GNH

philosophy as evident from its principles of Intelligent

Urbanism (see annex).

Main tools to coordinate land use with building density

The TSP is a 258 page document and it sets up a complex

vocabulary for proposed action. Most planners I met haven‟t

actually read the full document but refer to it as and when

needed. There are two types of land use plans that should be

distinguished to avoid confusion. Finally there is a separate

document called Development Control Regulations 2004 which

specifies building regulations for each category of precinct (to

match a defined land use with building density).


65

Precinct Plan

Based on several types of geographical analyses, the plan

identifies suitable land uses and population densities for

different areas in the city classified into precincts or zones.

Based on its locational attributes, an area is designated a

function as well as density. The Precinct Plan regulates land

use primarily by controlling density and building activity

(number of floors, plot coverage and so on). One example of a

precinct category is E-1 corresponding to the stretch of land

running immediately along the river (30 m buffer) classified

as an ecologically sensitive precinct where building activity

should be prevented to protect the river basin. Similarly,

mountainsides with a slope above 30% are not deemed

suitable for construction and suggested to be better used as

orchards are given a different category of precinct (E-4).

As there is an environmental justification to avoid risks of

deforestation, landslides, soil erosion, floods etc, so there is a

cultural justification to preserve sanctity buffers around areas

of heritage value compiled into an inventory in the plan.

These include sites of religious importance as well as

historical public buildings and royal properties. It also

includes old settlements classified as the “Traditional Village”

(TV) precinct. Each precinct comes attached with a set of

building regulations codified in the Development Control

Regulations (DCR) for Thimphu 2004). The DCR defines what

and how much one can build in a given category of precinct.

Essentially then, the plan is about controlling development

activity. Although it does not separate the city on a traditional

zoning method, it is also very similar to the idea of zoning as

it sorts areas into activities such as heritage, religious;

sports, recreation; trade and commerce; to governance;

residential urban villages, etc. Residential areas fall in the

Urban Village (UV) precinct category of varying densities.

Specific examples of precincts categories include

Neighbourhood Node (NN), Heritage (H), Traditional Village


66

(TV), Urban Core (UC), Urban Hub (UH) and so on. See Annex

for a complete list of 22 precincts designated in the TSP.

Proposed Precinct Plan. Source: TSP (MoWHS 2004: 164)

Local Area Plans

While all of the 26 sq km within the municipal boundary has

a defined precinct use, only about 12.1 sq km falls under the

first set of Local Area Plans (LAP). In the map below, there are

12 LAPs (coloured in white). Most of them try to prospectively

plan green-field areas of the Thimphu valley. These are the

extended areas and fall to the north and south of the brown-

field settlements in the centre. These unplanned areas were

incorporated into the city after the municipal boundary was

extended in 1999. The white areas in the middle correspond

to the Core Area LAP and the Changzamtog LAP26 where

building activity preceded Local Area Planning but most LAPs

in the north and south are green-field areas formerly used as

paddy fields.

26 Changzamtog was the first LAP approved in 2001 & Land Pooling

was experimented the first time.


67

Areas under Local Area Plan (LAP) in white (TCC ca 2009)

The land use in different parts of a given LAP is pre-defined

by the Precinct Plan. The whole exercise of Local Area

Planning is to reconfigure all the plots within it in such a way

that each plot has access to municipal infrastructure and

services. In order to do that, land for public facilities is

acquired through Land Pooling (called land adjustment in

other contexts). Land Pooling is a method by which each

landowner has to contribute up to 25-30% of his land parcel

in exchange for a smaller but developed parcel of land that

may be in a different location but in the same LAP. Land

pooling saves money for the government as no compensation

rates have to be paid but it requires the Local Area Planner to

invest time and get at least a two-third majority of

landowners to agree to land pooling. With that agreement in

hand, he then proceeds to adjust and regularize shapes of all

plots in a way that each plot is connected to a road, water

supply, drains etc.

Each LAP covers, on average, an area of 1 sq km comprising

150-400 landowners (Norbu ca 2014). LAPs are separated by

natural boundaries like streams. The aim is to develop each

LAP area into a dense, compact settlement connected to a


68

Neighbourhood Node (another category of precinct, NN) where

neighbourhood services like shops, markets, school,

healthcare etc. are available at a walking distance. All

Neighbourhood Nodes are linked up together via the transport

corridor. Because there is also a separate precinct plan for

the entire city, precincts allocated to green and heritage uses

automatically fall inside LAP boundaries. In this way each

LAP also has a dedicated area of green and open spaces.

Development Control Regulations 2004

The DCR is another lengthy document and it matches

building type with precinct. It specifies for example, the

number of storeys permitted in a given category of precinct,

and the plot coverage area. It also regulates building design

and architecture and finally lays out the procedure for

obtaining building permits.

4.2 Plan implementation: Increased precinct

densities

The previous section clarified the aims and tools of the plan.

We can now turn to how the plan is fairing in terms of

implementation.

The present status of planning in the extended areas is that

most LAPs have been approved but infrastructure provision

has not kicked off everywhere, especially where infrastructure

funding is not readily available. 10 of the 12 LAPs were

approved between 2004 and 2008 of which 6 are under

implementation (Norbu ca 2014). These include Lungtenphu,

Simtokha, Babesa and Changbangdu in the South (ADB

financing) and Dechencholing and Langjophakha in the north

(World Bank financing). Core Area was approved directly by

the Cabinet in 2003 and Changzamtog, approved in 2001 as

it was the first LAP experiment preceding TSP.


69

Most LAPs have been approved during or before 2008 by the

city committee. However, during my research stay, I noticed

that some LAP planners continued to make minor plot

adjustments as and when a landowner approached them.

Revisions like plot swapping can be done without touching

the overall LAP. To get a sense of change overtime, one would

have to go through a series of internal letters and government

notifications authorizing revisions as there is not a systematic

record of old and revised plans; most planners work on their

digital plan as if it is a living document, making

readjustments without saving an old copy. This makes the

task of tracing deviations extremely difficult, more so because

there is a high staff attrition rate. The planners I interacted

with have been working since 2009, 2011 and even 2013,

with little institutional memory of what happened before due

to poor handing-over processes. One of them along with his

friend in another division was applying for higher studies in

Australia and will probably be gone this year.

Therefore, to maintain some replicability of my research, I use

data from the 2008 Planning audit carried out by the Ministry

for the Thimphu City Corporation (MoWHS 2008). In this

document, we can find evidence that some “structured

aspects of the city, which are not negotiable components of

the urban structure” such as Neighbourhood Nodes (TCC

2013), have in fact been negotiated; in one case to an extent

where the Neighbourhood Node has disappeared altogether.

The extent of deviations from the original structure plan

would be even higher if we accounted for the last six years

after the Audit of 2008 - which I have not incorporated in

respect for researcher rules on data validity. The general

pattern is that the sanctity of the Precinct Plan could not be

maintained, due to public pressures to convert low density

precincts into higher density. The following section gives

evidence from the Audit Report and provides the main


70

precinct categories where deviations were already present as

of March 2008.

Evidence of precinct changes

i) Neighbourhood Nodes (Precinct NN)

All urban villages are supposed to have their own

Neighbourhood Node which has facilities like a commercial

centre, neighbourhood clinic and primary school, taxi stand,

bus stop, postal agency, public toilets as well as space for

infrastructure maintenance (store for recyclable wastes,

electrical sub-station, water supply monitoring and

complaint/bill receipt cell). The idea is that every facility is

available at walking distance. The approximate size of a

Neighbourhood Node is calculated to be 2 hectares (4.9 acres)

(or 494.211 decimals). However, the audit report noted that in

the Babesa LAP, only one 31 decimal27 plot was earmarked

for neighbourhood services, i.e. all but 6.27% of this precinct

had been allotted to private plots in the readjustment

process. While Lungtenphu LAP had the best performance on

this (3.80 acres), other LAPs had retained some land, but less

than the ideal 5 acres e.g. Langjophakha (1.13 acres), Hejo-

Samtenling (2.53 acres) and Taba (1.90 acres).

ii) Environment protected zones (Precinct E)

Similarly, encroachment of private plots (UV2 in light pink)

can be seen on the Forest Environment precinct (E2 in dark

green) in the Changbangdu LAP. According to the TSP, E2

precinct is devoted to natural forest preserves in the “no

development zone” (MoWHS 2004: 162).

27 1 decimal = 40.46 sq m


71

Source: Image shared by LAP Planner in email dated 4 April 2014

With regards to the 30m buffer zone protecting river-edges,

the audit found that this protected zone had been encroached

in non-LAPs but also few LAPs. Although existing structures

with an approval are permitted, no new development is

supposed to be permissible. However, in the Lungtenphu LAP,

all waterfront areas had been fully developed by private

individuals. In the Ngabe Rong Chhu Green Belt, construction

activities and paving of surfaces was noted both in the

workshop area as well outside the southern municipal

boundary. The 30 m buffer zone in the Chhubachhu Stream

Green Belt had been reduced to 15 m by a government order28

dated 3/1/2006.

Similarly, some fauna zones protected by the precinct plan

had been converted. In the south, the Babesa marshland had

been exposed to sand extraction (MoWHS 2008: 19). The

report noted that due to public pressure this area‟s precinct

was changed to UV2 to permit development activities. In the

28 vide note-sheet # 01/TCC/UPD/ADM/2005/06/13

E2

Forest

UV2

Residential

Figure 12: Plot spills onto Forest Environment Precinct


72

north, the stream had been diverted for land reclamation and

the land had been allotted to BAF for developing an archery

range, legalized by government notification29 dated 4/3/2008.

iii) Open and Green Spaces (Precincts G and E)

Most LAPs had not kept space for parks. For example the

Taba Community Park was not retained because it was

increasing the land pooling share of the landowners. Part of

the Hejo Paddy Fields Reserve had been allotted to the new

Supreme Court Building (approved by the government). Half

of the Changzamtok-Changbangdu Community park was

covered by a truck parking. The Hejo Community Park had

been retained in the plan but was partly taken over by the

monk body (Dratshang) for development of a printing press.

The City Central Park, planned to the east of the road going

from ChubaChhu to Tashichho Dzong fell in an area under

royal property.

The TSP heavily emphasizes the “pedestrian movement

system” because pedestrian paths serve multiple functions

including mobility, open spaces and buffers. Green and open

spaces are proposed to be interlinked in a network of

pathways including riverside paths, city peripheral paths and

transverse link pathways. These pathways also act as buffer

lines; for example, the city peripheral pathway as the buffer

line between the urban area and the forest; the river pathway

as a boundary for the river buffer precinct and so on. This

complex network of pathways is also to be linked to

residential areas via the neighbourhood nodes as well as to

heritage sites and other wilderness areas. (MoWHS 2004:

107). However, signs of such an elaborate footpath system are

not evident yet. One cannot simply walk along the river as

there is no seamless access. My observation was that

pedestrian movement remains confined to the roads, which

29 MoWHS/2/571


73

have footpaths in the core area (primarily due to intensive

investments in 2008 for the royal coronation ceremony (TCC

2010a) but not in northern areas like Langjophakha.

iv) Heritage Precincts (Precinct H)

TSP proposed that sites of heritage importance should also

have a buffer of open space around them and vehicular

access should be permitted only up to a point at a reasonable

distance (MoWHS 2004: 137) in order to enhance their

prominence. The idea was to link the pedestrian access to

these heritage sites in the city with the open space pathway

system mentioned before. Some 65 km of heritage walks are

proposed in the plan (MoWHS 2004: 139, Table 4.7) and also

routes charted for heritage drives. This would require some

efforts in landscaping, signage and small development works.

As of 2008, none of these walks had been initiated except for

some footpath and park space around Lungten Zampa -

which was possibly a spill-over effect of improvements made

to the Sunday Vegetable Market in preparation for the 2008

royal Centennial and Coronation Ceremony (TCC 2010).

v) Traditional Villages (Precinct TV)

Although the preserved old structures in the “Traditional

Village” precinct of the LAPs provide aesthetic respite to the

eye in a landscape of mushrooming new buildings, it poses

much discomfort for the residents living there. Many of them

want to renovate their buildings and capture rental incomes

as their neighbours are doing. However, the precinct

classification of their plot, although saved them from land

pooling, prevents them from constructing. Although TSP

proposals include an artist‟s village at the Babesa traditional

village, currently the very concept of TV precinct is under

review (Interviews 17/02/2014). Flooded with building

applications from owners residing in TV precinct, TCC wrote a


74

letter30 in September 2010 to the two relevant Ministries

(MoHCA and MoWHS) and the Office of Gyalpoi Zimpon in the

His Majesty‟s secretariat office seeking for policy directives,

and hesitantly asking if they should convert the TV precinct

to the residential UV2 precinct (TCC 2010). The issue as I

understand is that owners need to be given incentives if

development is to be frozen.

vi) Urban Villages (Precinct UV)

This is a residential precinct where landowners are allowed to

build but of varying building densities – UV1, UV2 etc. The

building height is regulated by the Development Control

Regulations (DCR) 2004 attached to the TSP. Although

property owners in UV precincts are allowed to build, many

want to build more as there are many requests in the meeting

minutes for precinct changes in order to increase permissible

building height. There was a rule revision in 2011 (amongst

the first initiatives of the mayor) which allowed attics to be

converted into a full floor after approval was gained directly

from the Prime Minister. Previously attics were not permitted

as habitable spaces although they were being used as such in

many buildings. The revision technically contradicts the

Precinct Plan in terms of the number of floors permitted in

each precinct by adding an extra storey everywhere,

increasing the density and infrastructure requirements. It

also raises other issues for example, when a 4-storeyed

building regularizes its attic, the building rules require that

all buildings above 4 floors to provide an elevator (Interview

10/01/2014, DCR 2004, BBR 2002). My observation was that

this is not the case and very few such buildings have

elevators and it was observed that the Implementation and

Monitoring Section of TCC treats this as a non-issue, contrary

to the seriousness attached to this by the Ministry.

30 Letter vide 22/UPD/TCC/General/2010-11/


75

4.3 Analysis of deviations: Case by case

exemption

Now that we have a fair idea of what are the planning rules

prescribed by the TSP and which are the ones most

vulnerable to non-compliance, we can proceed to characterize

the nature of these deviations.

Rule revisions as the negotiated outcome

The principle argument proposed is that the mechanism of

deviations from the precinct plan was authorization of these

deviations either by rule revision or regularization of an

individual anomaly. Sometimes precinct changes were

sanctioned from above by some government body‟s orders,

thus overruling precinct plan for a small part of the city.

Sometimes, rules were modified as in the attic case. Thus the

plan deviations are not always legal violations nor involve a

blatant form of corruption. Instead, they fall in the realm of

exception-making, whether through authorization on case by

case basis or rule revisions.

Individual negotiation played quite a prominent role.

Sometimes rules were considered for revision due to public

pressure. Sometimes, the landowner insisted on plot

readjustment and as there was no other vacant place

available; green and open spaces were encroached in the LAP

itself, as is the case in the Babesa LAP and also the

Changbangdu LAP. When rules were not enforced,

development preceded monitoring; later the preferable option

was authorization rather than demolition. Sometimes it is

lack of monitoring or ignorance as new constructions in the

river buffer zones are still coming up.

According to the Audit Report of 2008, the major

shortcomings faced by the TCC were identified as a) a result

of short-sighted solutions of the past, b) lack of motivation to


76

the staffs and c) co-ordination problems. It identified limited

organizational capacity as the core issue constraining plan

implementation. As of 2013 the whole of Bhutan had 10

professionally trained urban planners, trained in the last

decade (Norbu ca 2014). When the TSP was being prepared,

only 2 officials were trained as planners. The audit report also

reveals that other divisions of TCC had no idea about the

TSP. Furthermore, the TCC office was scattered in four

locations and some divisions did not even have internet

facilities (MoWHS 2008). So organizational capacity was

certainly an issue in 2008 and although the present status is

not glamorous, there have been significant improvements.

Particularly, with the mayor coming in 2011, emphasis has

been given to improve service delivery and his personal

involvement on the field helps settle disputes faster.

Although capacity is recognized as an issue, it is not the main

point of focus in this study, which instead zooms onto

negotiation strategies. It certainly led to a situation where

developments were not monitored and preceded planning,

especially in ecological zones where land was owned privately.

All this time it took TCC to get its act together, people

constructed; and today the city is legalizing some

unauthorized structures for a nominal amount of

regularization fees. (See meeting 1, Agenda 2). Thus capacity

is incorporated as a factor, but individual negotiation is the

predominant mode of deviation.

Individual cases vs. General issues discussed at town meeting

This interpretation can be further corroborated by the TCC

town committee meeting minutes. Property owners are

negotiating at several levels. Negotiation during land

readjustment process for either plot relocation or favourable

precinct use (higher building heights); or reduction of land

pooling contribution in exchange for a much lower monetary

“betterment charge”. Betterment charges in lieu of land


77

pooling also squeeze out the amount of land available for

public purposes. It also appears that the city committee

spends quite a substantial amount of time adjudicating on

individual disagreements between the planner and the

landowner. For example, in meeting 2 held on 15 April 2011,

out of the total 33 agendas discussed, 7 were internal

organizational issues. Of the remaining 26, 11 were cases of

individual plot owners or building owners.

Table 11: Issues discussed in the town committee meetings

Meeting

Date

Individual

cases

Internal

issues

General

Issues

Total

issues

15-04-2011 11 7 15 33

Remark: Sometimes a set of many plots is discussed but this is

counted as one agenda item (eg. situation of 18 plot owners in one).

So actual number of individual cases is an under-estimation.

Types of claims

An analysis of individual issues discussed in the 18 Thimphu

town committee meetings from 2011 to 2013 reveals the

following. Deviations from the precinct plan can happen

either because direct demands of precinct changes for specific

areas are made. This happens for example, if a plot owner(s)

perceives that the topography of his/her plot is not very

different from an adjacent precinct which may have higher

density use (one extra floor). But apart from direct demands,

precinct plan deviations can also happen because of claims

made in related or proximate “fields”, particularly, those

relating to the building section and the land management

section of the city corporation.

Precinct change demands from Building Division: For

example if a builder‟s request to build or authorize a

structure that is not compatible with the precinct (e.g. 4

storeys in a low density precinct originally permitting 3


78

storeys) is accepted, then the precinct plan is automatically

violated.

Precinct change demands from Land Division: Any

requests for plot adjustments in the LAP may also impact the

Precinct Plan. For example, when a private plot is allotted in a

green space precinct and later private owner applies for a

building permit. Or for example, precinct changes may be

necessitated due to revisions in the cadastral map, as is the

case in Thimphu since 2007.

Who are the claim-makers?

The claim-maker here is not only the individual landowner

but anybody who proposes a claim against implementation of

a planning code. It includes a) Landowner (individual,

individual as an institution or individuals represented as a

group) b) the planner himself, either bringing up a „technical‟

matter or on behalf of the citizen whose grievance he is

unable to settle at a personal level. c) Claims also come from

the people‟s representatives like the mayor or local councillors

in the town committee. Occasionally, claims also come from

other government authorities like the National Land

Commission (NLC) or from the Cabinet. In all cases, the

original planning rule is being challenged through a specific

framing. This is described in detail in the subsequent

chapters.

4.4 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to be precise about the rules

under scrutiny and characterize the nature of deviations. The

finding was that rules of the Precinct Plan (which freezes land

use and building density) have been deviated. This has

resulted in more development in low density precincts leading

to a horizontal spread of built-up activity. At the same time,

there is also a degree of vertical outgrowth particularly when


79

individual builders demand a change of precincts in order to

increase permissible building heights. Notably, the

abolishment of the attic rules in 2011 has added one

additional floor to all buildings in Thimphu. After

understanding what the TSP is all about, one can also bring

to understand how one deviation leads to another like a mini

domino effect: if an ecological buffer zone or neighbourhood

node is encroached upon by private buildings, it disrupts the

mobility network and system of pathways and thus the

interconnectedness of the plan breaks down.

The principal reason for the plan‟s deviations is attributed to

a high degree of flexibility on the part of the implementing

authorities to accommodate individual complaints. This is a

very different argument from the usual critiques levelled at

the urban planning exercise, directed at a single

authoritarian planner who imposes his aspirations onto the

city or at the government for facilitating displacement of

landowners by acquiring their land for new developments.

Because planning in the extended urban areas has depended

on the instrument of Land Pooling, the above mentioned

critique is not applicable to Thimphu; original titleholders

lose a part and not all of their land. The final outcome is thus

a negotiated compromise between the original planning rule

and the landowners. The next chapter looks at why and how

precinct deviations were authorized.

80

V. Planning Governance: Actors & their

Interests

This chapter maps the network of actors involved in the

“governance” of urban planning in Thimphu. Here

“governance” is taken as a much broader concept than

“government” in order to include all those

actors/organizations who have policy influence on the TSP.

Deriving from the community power debate and critiques of

institutionalism in the 1960s-70s, it is assumed that there

will be actors outside the formal governing structure who will

have some influence in shaping municipal decision-making.

After mapping all the actors involved in the governance

(beyond government) of urban planning in Thimphu, we move

on to examine how their “field position” (position in the

governance network) shapes their interests in rule compliance

or rule deviations from the vantage point of their identity in

the governance network. This chapter is divided into three

parts, each one covers the range of actors involved across the

spectrum from the state, citizens to the market.

The figure below provides a simple illustration of the most

proximate fields (actors/organizations) involved in the

governance of urban planning in Thimphu. The locus of the

network is the Thimphu City Corporation (TCC), which is the

main body in charge of implementing the plan. We explain

briefly the roles of all field players within this governance

network and then go on to argue that players‟ field positions

shape their identities and basic interests in following or not

the planning rules. Identifying these tension points gives us a

better sense of the pressure from outside and inside the TCC

to push building practices off the road codified in the

Thimphu Structure Plan.

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5.1 State authorities: City Corporation &

Central agencies

TCC as an organization internally differentiated

We start with the Thimphu City Corporation (TCC) as the

central point in the governance network and show that it is

itself divisible into smaller fields which generate conflicts and

pressure to make the rules more flexible, notably from the

elected members, as they have to represent the tribulations of

the landowners. On the other hand, civil servants staffing the

Urban Planning Division displayed a tendency to comply with

the TSP as per the original version.

Figure 13: Governance Network: Actors with policy influence on

TCC

Plan Implementing

Authority: TCC

(Bureaucrats +

Elected Councillors)

Policy maker +other govt.

bodies

(MoWHS +

NLC, NEC, Cabi-net)

Infrastructure investors

(World Bank, ADB +

Pvt Sector)

Landowners

(Individuals, Institutions )

State-State

Relations

State-society

relations State-market


82

As the local government, TCC is the implementing agency of

programmes and plans of MoWHS including the TSP. Local

Area Planning is the primary mandate of TCC, in terms of

getting land pooling consent from landowners. TCC has the

power to revise rules and regulations but not policies as per

the recent decentralization laws. The Local Area Planner is

the key person taking decisions at the ground level, and when

he is unable to settle disputes, he forwards the matter to the

mayor and puts it up for discussion in the town committee.

When issues cannot be settled at the city level, which can

happen when institutions like the monastic body are involved,

the matter is forwarded to the Ministry (MoWHS), the Cabinet

headed by the Prime Minister and sometimes to the His

Majesty‟s secretariat office31. TCC is staffed with civil servants

who report to an elected mayor since 2011.

The first local government elections were held in 2011 in

accordance with the 2009 Local Government Act which

supersedes the Bhutan Municipal Act (BMA) of 1999. As a

result, Thimphu is now governed by the City Council

(Thromde Tshogdu). The members consist of one elected

Mayor (Thrompon) who was previously appointed and one

Executive Secretary appointed by the Government as well as

7 elected councillors from respected areas. The mayor heads

the town committee composed of 8 elected local councillors

including himself as well as an appointed Executive Secretary

(civil servant). This committee is the main decision-making

authority when landowners put up their grievances. However

the number of registered voters is very small: 6226. This is

because only those having a census in Thimphu are eligible to

vote. According to the 2005 Census, Thimphu city had a

population of 79,185 out of which only 25,205 (31.8%) are

born in Thimphu. From Chapter I, we also know that about

42% of the population is aged nineteen and below. From this

31 E.g. Letter on issue of traditional village

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we can estimate that only about 14,618 would be the eligible

voter base as long as people keep their census in the region of

Bhutan where they are born.

Consequently, in this city of migrants – only 1335 voted for

the winning candidate in the 2011 elections, whereas the

resident population in Thimphu is currently around 130,000.

As only those holding a census in Thimphu are allowed to

vote, we can also assume that a majority of these voters own

property in Thimphu as the rate of land ownership in Bhutan

is high due to His Majesty‟s kidu policy. A 2012 Survey notes

that about 8 in 10 rural households (84%) own land (ADB-

NSB 2013: 59). As a result elected members represent the

interests of those holding a census in Thimphu (landowning

class) and not the tenants which form the majority of

residents.

After the 2011 elections, new pressures are emerging to revise

some of the original concepts codified in the TSP such as

“traditional village” settlements, building regulations codified

in the DCR 2004, Attic Rules 2009. This pressure to make

revisions to the original plan comes from two sources a)

people‟s representatives in the committee as their voters are

mostly landowners with an interest in developing their

properties. b) The second source of pressure to adapt the

rules comes from bureaucrats working in the divisions

notably when they discover a gap in the rules or resistance

from landowners and are unable to proceed with

implementation. Often issues are raised in fields proximate to

the planning division, notably the building division (DCD) and

the land division (LMS). Addressal of their issues spills over to

create changes in the precinct plan under the planning

division (UPD), very much in the way Fligstein observed that

changes in one field induce changes in other proximate fields.


84

TCC vs. other government organizations

TCC is in a relation of dependence with most other

government authorities with overlapping jurisdictions. In

preparation for recent democratic reforms – a lot of new

institutional restructuring was initiated, for example,

centralizing all land management issues and charging it to

the National Land Commission (NLC).

i) Ministry of Works and Human Settlements (MoWHS):

The Ministry is in charge of urban affairs in the country and

is responsible for policy making in urban areas. Although in

principle, it is the department of local government in the

Ministry of Culture and Home Affairs that oversees local

governments, in practice it is the MoWHS monitoring

activities of urban local governments. The Ministry is

composed mainly of bureaucrats trained as engineers and led

by the Secretary reporting to the Minister who until 2008 was

also a senior member of the civil service. MoWHS (formerly

the Ministry of Communication) is in charge of interacting

with donors and consultants providing technical expertise

and was the key office overseeing the preparation of the

Thimphu Structure Plan (TSP). One of the Senior Planners I

interviewed in the Ministry was closely involved in the

drafting of the TSP and his main interest therefore is in

ensuring that the rules are followed as codified in the original

TSP. However with recent developments in the

decentralization process, the details of urban planning are

increasingly left to other authorities like the Thimphu City

Corporation (TCC) and the National Land Commission (NLC)

on land management issues. In my interviews I sensed a

disappointment that planning is increasingly being left to

“unprofessionals” (Interview with Senior Planner). The

message was that those who are not trained as planners, like

elected members in the city committee or bureaucrats from

the National Land Commission (NLC), intervene with their

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own issues and interests and end up compromising the

quality of the plan.

In the context of decentralization of authority to local

governments, local area planning is now a mandate of the

local authority. As per the Local Government Act 2009, local

governments can modify rules and regulations but the

Ministry retains its function for policy making. This has

created some confusion, for example, with respect to

modification of Thimphu‟s Development Control Regulations

(DCR) 2004 which specifies building codes as per land use

defined in the Thimphu Structure Plan. While TCC has

proposed to revise the DCR, the MoWHS has remained

reluctant. According to interviews with members in the TCC

Development Control divisions, MoWHS lacks the staff

capacity to revise the rules but does not want/trust TCC to

do it by themselves. Although DCR revision was stuck, with

building pressures within TCC to revise it, we may soon

expect a revision. MoWHS therefore is like the lone watch-

guard of the TSP, the only one around with a strong interest

in having the rules applied, since it is them who made the

plan. If TCC was not in a relation of dependence, rule revision

would have proceeded at a much faster rate. Currently this is

slowed in getting approvals from the Ministry.

ii) NLC

Finally there are other government bodies that have some

capacity to influence decision-making on urban planning. The

biggest intervening authority is the National Land Commission

(NLC) as authority over land issues has been centralized with

the 2007 Land Act. NLC is yet another channel available to

plot owners in case of inability to negotiate with TCC. From

the view of the Ministry, NLC‟s role is only to keep land

records and not intervene in how land readjustments are

made by the planner. In practice however, NLC has played a

very important role in governance of land in Thimphu and in


86

Bhutan, as evident from its role in annulling the very high

profile Education City Project (Lamsang 2014). The NLC

secretary is appointed by His Majesty and remains a powerful

institution and has overruling powers over TCC. In fact, TCC

has decided to approach the Attorney General‟s Office (AGO)

(See Meeting 17) to clarify the autonomy of its powers. NLC‟s

interests are in ensuring that no violations of the Land Act

are made (breach of minimum and maximum ceiling of land

ownership for example). NLC has been involved in a major

project of revamping the cadastral survey (one of its main

responsibilities as part of Land Act 2007). This created huge

issues because the original Local Area Plans of the TSP were

made as per the last cadastral survey so correction of areas

with excess and deficit land created delay in plan

implementation and continue to pop up as claims from

landowners.

iii) NEC and other government agencies

Other government authorities involved include the Ministry of

Finance (MoF) with the Department of National Properties

under it to calculate the values of land through Property

valuation agency (PAVA of the government. Then there is also

the National Environment Commission (NEC) to coordinate

development control in environment precincts and the

Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs (MOHCA) to consult on

changes to Heritage Precincts. Similarly there may be others

that need to be consulted in cases of overlapping mandates.

In that sense, pressure to maintain the rules also comes from

this lack of autonomy as any rule revisions have to be made

with permission. Vice versa, multiplicity of authority also

creates a situation of non-compliance, as these central

agencies can overrule the TSP. The whole process of state-

building, rationalization and institutionalization process has

been central to responsibility sharing over TSP and sight of

this fact should not be lost with the policy of decentralization.

Despite an overt policy of decentralization, in practice there

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has been centralization of some functions including land

management to NLC. The TCC remains thoroughly embedded

in the broader state field.

At the same time, the same embeddedness also creates

pressures for rule deviation. It is therefore not uncommon

that pressures for plan deviation to be generated from other

government departments in their horse-vision like focus on

implementing other rules more important to them. For

example, recently, the NEC has put to question the creation

on an automobile workshop in the northern hub which was

originally in the TSP. NEC questions this from a point of view

of pollution to the river whereas the plan was trying to

diversify density from the Urban Core area. Thus, when some

other rule is a priority, TSP goes down the order of

importance. The sole guardian of the TSP really is the MoWHS

but that‟s because they made the plan and they still have a

staff member who cares about the rules. Gone tomorrow, and

this veto power to rule revision may change.

iv) NHDCL

National Housing Development Corporation Limited (NHDCL)

is officially charged with the mandate of affording housing in

the country. The TSP had anticipated that demand for

affordable housing would rise even faster with the city‟s

growth and advocated that part of the neighbourhood service

nodes should be used for providing sites for affordable

housing. While lack of space availability is certainly an issue,

in one or two sites space has been reserved for affordable

housing. The problem is that there is no investor and NHDC

is too busy with its other mandates. Only recently, World

Bank is considering to invest in a pilot project (Gelay ca

2014).

The National Housing Development Corporation was set up in

early 2000s as part of housing finance restructuring in which


88

ADB played an important role. The decision was taken that

all public housing would be managed by NHDC and since its

corporatization in 2011, ownership has also been taken over

from various other government agencies. In my interviews

with NHDCL staff, I noticed that NHDCL is so bogged down

with the new task of transferring property ownership, that

there is simply no one to attend to the needs of affordable

housing in Thimphu. Also when I interviewed the M.D, it was

clear that building more stock in Thimphu is clearly not a

priority a) because at least Thimphu has houses, other towns

don‟t even have that. Even if they had the funds, the M.D.

said, they would focus elsewhere (Interview on 1/4/2014).

NHDC already has a flagship project in Thimphu, the Chang

jiji housing complex with 767 units.So in a way there is a

sense that a contribution has already been made. But in fact,

the housing shortage demand is high as NHDC received over

1600 applications (1/4/2014 NHDC Real Estate Division)

whereas exits are less than 30 per year.

5.2 Citizens: Landowners & People’s

representatives

Having covered the multiple organizations and interests in the

realm of state-state relations, we now move to state-society

relations.

i) People‟s representatives

Apart from the elected local councillors and mayor for urban

Thimphu, Thimphu district is also a constituency for two

Members of the Parliament (Lower House), one each from

North Thimphu and South Thimphu. Currently both MPs are

from the opposition party, DPT. There is also one member

representing the Thimphu district in the National Council

(Upper House). There is a regional government at the district

level which is more relevant for rural Thimphu than urban

Thimphu. Finally, the Prime Minister is also sought as a

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direct representative of the people. The Cabinet of ten

Ministers from the ruling party headed by the Prime Minister

is the highest body in the hierarchy of all elected

representatives. So democratization has opened new channels

for people to voice their claims. For example, people taking

their land issues to the Prime Minister (e.g. Hejo Green Area)

directly when not resolved at the city level.

ii) Citizens

Individuals: As individuals, residents living in the municipal

boundary are property owners (minority) or tenants

(majority). Although TCC only invites the landowners to the

Local Area Planning (LAP) consultation meetings, LAPs also

affect tenants especially if their structures are affected or if

higher property values result in a form of displacement or

gentrification. However, tenants are usually not consulted

except in impact assessments of donors and IFIs like the

World Bank and ADB. This is despite the fact that the

proportion of tenants is very high, for example, over 70% in

Lower Taba LAP (Thimphu Thromde - Pradhan 2013).

Institutions as residents: A lot of land in Thimphu (about

15%) is owned by institutions including the army, police,

royal bodyguard force, monk bodies, the Indian Embassy,

schools and the hospital. The monk body owns over 200 acres

alone (Gelay ca 2014: 85). There is also government owned

land of different Ministries and Departments such as the

Agricultural Ministry in Babesa, Forestry in the north etc.

Landowners as institution have much more power to

negotiate and stall the plan if their property is threatened by

the plan. For example, the Cabinet has been trying to build a

diplomatic enclave in Hejo but this requires some

readjustment in the monk body‟s land which it has not

agreed with and so the proposal is stuck and hence delayed

plan (LAP) implementation.


90

5.3 Market: Infrastructure investors & private

sector

TCC‟s interaction with this other network is almost nil except

with the donors. This is to say that even an absence of a tie

can affect outcomes within a field. This section explains why

this is the case by exploring actors in state-market

interactions.

i) International Financing Institutions

In urban development in Thimphu, the World Bank and the

Asia Development Bank (ADB) are the two key actors.

Towards the end of the 20th century, when the United Nations

(UNDP/UNCHS32) urban management assistance was coming

to an end, as was the 1986-2000 strategic plan, new

programmes funded by the Danish government (DANIDA33),

Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank were

starting. Their investments were not integrated in one plan at

that stage. DANIDA was going to invest 70M Kroner to

develop water, sanitation and sewerage facilities as part of the

UDSSP34 project; ADB was giving US$ 8.2 M ($ 5.7 as loan) to

develop roads, footpaths and bridges (Gyalmo 1999). The

World Bank would complement other donors and emphasize

institutional strengthening at the district and local levels.

Presently however, the Danish government (DANIDA) who was

a big player in the 2000s is now packing up and quitting the

country. Along with DANIDA has gone the grant-based

funding. Now the ADB and World Bank remain to provide

upfront costs for infrastructure in the new LAPs. The total

cost of implementing the TSP was estimated at US$ 90

million (Wangdi 2003).

32 United Nations Commission on Human Settlements (UN Habitat) 33 Danish International Development Agency 34 Urban Development Sector Support Programme

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These institutions seem to interact more closely with the

central government (GNHC, MoWHS) and approach TCC when

data is needed. When the World Bank conducted a study of

water supply system in North Thimphu, they were involved

with the Policy Planning Division of the Ministry. As local

government was not consulted in plan preparation, some

confusion was created during implementation.

The main role of these institutions is in providing finance and

technical expertise. They don‟t usually set the agenda but

they shape it sometimes by insisting on clarification of rules.

For example, ADB and World Bank required Land Pooling

Rules to be codified which were approved in 2009. They also

insist on 100% land pooling agreements and conduct socio-

economic and environment impact surveys. This puts

pressure on TCC to get consensus agreements before

proceeding with planning an area, thus leveraging the power

of the landowners.

ii) Private Sector

Although the private sector‟s role is invisible, its conspicuous

absence is extremely important. Once the government

approves the Local Area Plans, it is the private sector which

has to come forward and invest in infrastructure and

facilities. While contractors are keen to invest in civil works,

so far there remains little interest in investment for

neighbourhood services, or green/open space development.

As a result of this, these spaces have remained undeveloped

and vacant. An effect of that has been that when plot owners

approach Local Area planner for plot readjustment, it is these

spaces that become the scapegoat and most vulnerable to be

given away.

On the other hand, there is interest in other types of private

investment that the plan had not envisaged. For example,

multi-level parking (IFC), snooker bars, mobile bar, and so


92

on. Many of these requests seek to develop bars in the

basement but current rules don‟t allow basement to be used

for purposes other than parking. Thus there is lack of interest

from private sector to lease land where the TSP planned it

and more interest in developing commercial uses of properties

planned for residential use by the TSP.

5.4 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to show how an

actor/organization‟s interest in compliance is shaped by its

position in the governance network of organizations (or fields)

involved in planning governance. Actor identity & interests

are determined vis a vis other players in the network. But this

network of field is itself embedded in a broader state field

which structures how state-society, state-state and state-

market relations are organized in Bhutan. An example of the

first type of embeddedness is that actors‟ location in the field

network will orient their interests in accordance with their

field identity - so for example, a landowner is generally likely

to be more oriented to rule avoidance while the local area

planner is generally grappling with rule enforcement.

However, the way broader state-society relations are

structured in Bhutan will also impact the way landowners

and city officials interact.

Within the state-state interactions, we saw that there are

multiple authorities involved which leads to a constant

undermining of the authority of the Thimphu City

Corporation. Within state-society relations, we saw that

pressure against compliance comes from landowners seeking

to maximize returns from their property with high preference

for increasing building heights or reducing land pooling.

Finally, in the realm of state-market relations we saw that

even when the private sector is absent, the plan is affected.

One way is that spaces planned for commercial use in the

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Neighbourhood remain vacant as the private sector displays

little interest in leasing it. As a result, pressure for

encroachment of private plots on these vacant areas build up.

Secondly, because the private sector is so weak, the City

Corporation is dependent on IFIs to invest who insist on

consensual land pooling. Further, where infrastructure

finance is not available, LAPs have not been implemented. In

both ways, compliance is compromised because delayed

implementation creates opportunities for landowners to

construct and later seek authorization.

By deconstructing the actors involved, this chapter showed a

conflict of interest for and against compliance to TSP. Now

that we understand why compliance is an issue and for

whom, we move to the last chapter which explains how

planning deviations are legalized in practice.

In the 2011 elections, the winning candidate received votes

from only 1% of Thimphu‟s present population as only those

with registered Census in Thimphu are eligible to vote. We

saw in Chapter I that only 31.8% of residents are born in

Thimphu. Where are the others coming from? 8.5% are born

abroad. Most others have their census in other parts of

Bhutan, predominantly Eastern Bhutan: Trashigang followed

by Samtse, Sarpang and Monggar.

Figure 14: Thimphu residents’ origins

Origins Place of birth Previous residence

No. % No. %

Thimphu 25,205 31.8 25,248 31.9

Trashigang 5,887 7.4 5,138 6.5

Samtse 3,906 4.9 3,557 4.5

Sarpang 3,267 4.1 3,728 4.7

Monggar 3,196 4.0 2,486 3.1

Wangdue 2,810 3.6 3,204 4.1

Chhukha 2,766 3.5

5,160 6.5


94

Samdrupjongkhar 2,682 3.4

2,580 3.3

Lhuentse 2,478 3.1

1,869 2.4

Paro 2,471 3.1

3,180 4.0

Trashiyangtse 2,421 3.1

1,778 2.3

Tsirang 2,356 3.0

1,758 2.2

Zhemgang 2,244 2.8

1,593 2.0

Punakha 2,009 2.5

2,541 3.2

Pemagatshel 1,855 2.3

1,347 1.7

Dagana 1,620 2.1

1,278 1.6

Trongsa 1,413 1.8

1,269 1.6

Bumthang 1,309 1.7

1,410 1.8

Haa 1,071 1.4

1,222 1.5

Gasa 125 0.2

121 0.2

Abroad 6,745 8.5

7,342 9.3

Not stated 1,349 1.7

1,376 1.7

Total 79,185 100

79,185 100

95

VI. Authorization of Deviations: Why &

How

Having demonstrated that the plan is evolving constantly, we

now move to mechanisms through which these changes

occur. As we have seen in the previous chapter, overruling

codes of the planning document is a prominent mechanism

characterizing deviations in the Thimphu Structure Plan

(TSP). When rules are revised or when an exception is

authorized, it is worth asking how the original rule lost its

authority and a deviation became legitimate. This chapter

deconstructs the mechanisms through which rule breaking is

authorized. The aim of this chapter is to show how actors

overcome the constraints of the planning codes. In the overall

argument, this is about how strategic action really works in

practice. The chapter deconstructs the strategies of

negotiation of the various actors involved in the governance

network.

To analyse how deviations from the original set of rules are

authorized by the city committee, the chapter proceeds in

three parts. First we look at gaps and conflicts in the design

of rules that create the conditions ripe for strategic action.

The next two sections analyse the tactics or strategies used

by each claim-makers as well as decision-takers. Claim-

makers are those who point out a flaw with the rules and

claim that an exception or rule revision be considered. It

includes landowners but also municipal officials themselves.

Decision-takers are those who decide whether a claim should

be accepted and is usually the elected town committee.While

presenting how veto players challenge the rules of the plan,

this section also provides an idea of the resource endowments

of actors that leverage their claim-making powers.


96

This analysis builds on Robert Baldwin‟s critique of Kenneth

Culp Davis‟s book Discretionary Justice (1971) and Baldwin‟s

assessment of legitimacy claims made in government

decision-making. Baldwin‟s argument is that rule clarification

cannot limit government discretion in decision-making

because there are multiple paths to make a decision. In other

words, there is simply no right decision. He identifies five

rationales or “legitimacy claims” underlying decision-making

in government (Baldwin 1995: 41) with respect to second

order rules made by bureaucrats (unlike legislations of the

parliament). A decision can seek legitimacy in legislatively

mandated rules or in the assent of authorities to which an

organization is accountable. Decisions can be justified in the

interest of individual rights or for efficiency goals. Finally

decisions can also seek legitimacy in the knowledge of an

expert.

In this research the typology of legitimacy claims is derived

purely from the evidence but Baldwin‟s method is used to

analyse the data in a similar way. The assumption is that

even when one set of rules is applied to resolve another set,

there is discretion in terms of which rules to recall and which

norms to value. Thus the decision-making process is treated

as a subjective process of interpretation. The main source of

data used is the city corporation‟s meeting minutes. The

“field” in focus is the city corporation but of most interest to

us is to analyse TCC‟s interactions with other “fields” or

actors that also have a say in the TSP.

It is observed that changes in the original precinct plan result

from requests not only in the planning division but also the

building division and the land management sections.

Individual requests are of at least three types:

a) Direct demands for precinct change

Authorization of Deviations

97

b) Requests for authorization of a building structure that

is incompatible with a given precinct and finally

c) Requests for plot readjustments which affects the

precinct proportions in each LAP

Apart from authorization of individual claims there may also

be changes at the policy level. These include:

a) Proposals to revise rules originally codified in the TSP

2003

b) Revision of rules originally codified in the DCR 2004

c) Modifications made to approved LAPs

Using these criteria, a smaller sample of total agendas

discussed in the meetings was extracted. This sample was

then studied to deconstruct the competing legitimacy claims

of various actors.

The sample of claims and corresponding decisions that affect

the original precinct plan either directly or indirectly (through

the six discussed above) is then analysed in two stages:

i) Claim-making: Onset of contention

First we ask, what are the tactics used by claim-makers so

that an individual‟s case enters the agenda of the town

committee‟s discussions. The claim-maker here is not only

the individual landowner but anybody who proposes the

agenda, most often the planner himself, particularly in cases

where his readjustment of plots is not acceptable by plot

owners.

Cautionary note: We should remember that the actual

number of claims for change (e.g. plot readjustment without

touching the LAP) may be settled on the field and may not

enter the meeting discussion. This sample is therefore not

representative of all the claims in the city; just those that

cannot be settled at the level of the planner. This could


98

happen if the owner is persistent or if discretion is required

with respect to which rules to apply. So by definition, sample

will over-represent those claims where conflicts and gaps in

rules are most stark. The word of caution is that this is not a

sample of how claims are settled for the city generally, most of

which happens on the ground between the planner and plot

owners.

ii) Decision-taking: Settlement

In the second part, I analyse the sample of claims to see how

many claims for change were accepted and on what official

grounds were the others rejected. I then proceed to look at

how deviations were legitimatized, using what alternative

claims and strategies to secure the deviation as permanent.

The last part of this chapter thus deconstructs the framings

used by decision-takers to justify authorization of deviations.

It extracts the values or legal principles invoked to legitimize

exception-making. The decision-taker is usually the

committee comprising elected councillors and the Executive

Secretary, chaired by the mayor.

6.1 Why? Gaps and conflicts in rule design

This section is why claim-makers put planning codes in a

legitimacy crisis.This section aims to explain why challenging

of a given rule comes to be recognized as a legitimate claim.

The answer is that actors use strategic framings to challenge

the rule‟s legitimacy and make claims for an exception. The

second part looks at the formats rule challengers use to

express their claims.

This section tries to describe how some cases enter the

agenda and become cases of discussion in the town

committee meetings. The assumption is that surely, there are

more grievances than those entering the agenda. From my

discussions with the Local Area Planners, I learnt that the


99

planner plays a very important role as most issues raised by

landowners are settled at his level. He thus plays a key role in

the attrition rate of disputes in the early stages usually

through the “consultation” process where he informs the

landowners about planning goals. At the beginning this

process was filled with gaps, sometimes landowners did not

understand what the readjustment exercise would mean by

merely looking at a paper plan which condensed their plot

into a number of area and shape but did not give more details

about its attributes in terms of location, slope etc. (Interview

with DU). Thus in a large number of cases, “experiences are

not perceived as injurious; perceptions do not ripen into

grievances; grievances are not voiced to the city” (Felstiner et

al 1980) even though the planning exercise may have been

unfair. From the meeting minutes we can see that even if

landowners approved at time of pooling, grievances could be

born later – for example, when they couldn‟t construct as

much as their neighbours because their plot was allocated in

a lower density precinct.

What then leads the situation into a stage where claims are

made to the city committee? Deconstruction of conflict is a

complex process that is beyond the scope of the study which

is concerned with only one slice of it – the legitimacy claim.

This is analysed in two parts. First what is the framing used

to bring an individual case onto the meeting discussion

agenda - on what grounds is an issue framed as a grievance

against the rules? Second, what are the strategies used to

justify a remedy especially when it overrules the original rule.

This is strategic action at play, using a variety of tactics, of

which “framing” is prominent. The channel used to express

the claim also matters in ordering the urgency of the claim.

Loopholes in policy design & enforcement

Claim-makers use a variety of framings to de-legitimize a rule.

These were possible because loopholes in the rule design


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create the ripe conditions for actors to exploit. The following

examples are an illustration of flaws in rule design.

i) Conflicts and gaps in rules

The legitimacy of a codified rule can be challenged if a given

rule is in conflict with another rule of the plan itself or the

rules of another organization. For example, the Land Act

2007 has a minimum ceiling of 10 decimal for plot

transaction in order to limit subdivision, “The minimum

parcel of land that shall be registered in a Thram is 10

decimals” (RGOB 2007: 35, point 132). However, after land-

pooling of 30%, plot owners with an initial holding of 10

decimal go under the ceiling and would not get permissions to

construct or transact. Therefore, they approach the

authorities and make claims for an exception (Meeting 2,

Agenda 13). Although it seems fair to make an exception for

such a case, it technically contradicts a clause of the Land

Act: “Upon acquisition, if the remaining land parcel is less

than 10 decimals, such and both in Thromde and rural areas

shall also be acquired”. (RGOB2007: 38, point 150).

Sometimes, there can also be a gap in the rules and the

planner has no direction on how to proceed further. An

example is the request from plot owners below the hospital

JDWNRH (Hotel Rignam line) to change their precinct to a

higher density precinct (from UV-II, MD to UV-I) in order to

increase the building height (Meeting 9, Agenda 12). They

claimed that their plots had been designated as a commercial

area in the 1992 urban development plan, prior to the 2004

building regulations codified in the DCR. Their legitimacy

claim was that they had been paying commercial tax rates all

this while.

ii) Conflicting authority of various government bodies

A second reason for why a claim arises is when a given rule is

challenged by the authority of another government body or


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official, usually by a letter of approval or some other form of

assent. One such case was the request from an individual to

waive off his penalty for regularization of illegal structures

inside his premise. Although he did not have a formal

building approval, his claim was that he had got verbal

approvals from the previous mayor to construct kitchen and

toilet (Meeting 8, Agenda 1).

Frequently, intervention comes from the Cabinet as and when

there are special projects to be implemented in a given area of

the city, example Chubachu circle. The Attic Rules 2009 were

also abolished after direct approval from the Prime Minister.

Recently, the National Environment Commission (NEC) has

vetoed a component of the plan which proposes an auto-

mobile workshop in the north of Thimphu.

Sometimes overruling by the court on a personal dispute case

affects land allotment (Meeting 2, Agenda 12). Generally

however, the courts have played a minimal role as most

landowners do not take their disputes to the courts except

some high profile ones. This maybe because traditionally in

Bhutan, local level disputes have been solved by the

decentralized level of government. Before 1969, the district

officer was the Dzongpon (dzungpa) and the governance

format was such that both administrative as well as judicial

powers rested with the local government. Courts have played

minimal role in influencing TSP because despite a landmark

judgement on July 13 in 2003, in which land pooling was

declared illegal, it continues,. The courts said that land

pooling had no legal base as government does not have the

right to take private property without compensation (Dorji

2003a). However Land pooling continues to be practiced in

the city on grounds that it is obtained with consent from the

landowners (Norbu 2014).


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iii) Implementation feasibility is questionable

Here the claim is that rule is not feasible or not conforming to

the practices of the people, thus making it difficult to monitor

or control. It was one of the framings used to abolish the Attic

Rules 2009 allowing conversion of non-habitable attics into

full floors (Meeting 3, Agenda 16). Similarly, it was observed

that the space between the plot and road under the RCC slab

was being used for habitable purposes so the head of IMS,

DCD put it up for discussion claiming that it was becoming

difficult to control (Meeting 3, Agenda 15).

iv) Logic of the rules is disputed on grounds of fairness/utility

Here the claimant will provide a framing that questions the

logic or “efficiency” of the rule. Plot owners for instance have

challenged the way the plan has categorized and

distinguished areas by precinct density. For example, one

owner wanted to construct in her apple orchard (convert her

precinct from E-4 precinct to UV-II MD). As she was

persistent, her claim was represented by the planner, and

was framed in his technical logic “the plot is accessible to

road and the topography is very gentle” (Meeting 7, Agenda 5).

Or the landowner tries to rationalize, “even if the land is

pooled it will be of no use to the government” (Meeting 7,

Agenda 6).

On another instance, the plot owners themselves take on the

role of the planner to judge the geographical attributes of

their properties. “The plot owners are of the view that there is

hardly any difference in terms of topography and soil texture

between UV-1 and theirs which are located in the same

locality” (Meeting 7, Agenda 4). Their claim was that they

contributed the same percentage of land pooling, and yet they

are disadvantaged due to restriction in floor height so the

claim was to either reduce their land contribution or increase

precinct density (converting from UV 2-II to UV 2-MD).


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6.2 How veto players challenge the rules

Once claim-makers identify the framing to challenge the

legitimacy of a given rule, they have to choose a format to

express that claim. The channel used to express has a

consequence on the final decision. So the “facts of the case”

include not only the content of the claim but also how the

claimant voices his/her claim. If a landowner for example

refuses to consent to land pooling, (s)he may end up stalling

the plan35, thereby increasing the sense of urgency for the

planner to address the claim. There are at least five strategies

that are observed from the sample of claims. While presenting

how veto players challenge the rules of the plan, this section

also provides an idea of the resource endowments of actors

that leverage their claim-making powers.

i) Appealing/Petition

Usually when landowners appeal to the city authorities, they

do it in an individual capacity. But increasingly one finds that

people have started to form small groups from within the

community. These groupings are very small for example 18

plot owners in Changbangdu (Meeting 7, Agenda 4), 15

owners in Upper Taba. The tactics used are usually framing

and bargaining. Examples of bargaining include paying

betterment charges instead of land pooling, or increasing

building height and reducing plot coverage and vice versa.

Appealing is obviously more likely to be successful when

people do it as a group instead of as individuals. But

sometimes if an individual‟s status is high enough, just a

word will do to get the mayor and the planning team

brainstorming on how to address the claim without breaking

35This is a case where 100% pooling is required (initially in the ADB,

WB funded LAPs)


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the rule. Thus coming from well-known elite families would be

able to command immediate attention.

ii) Dissenting & stalling the plan

This is when landowners refuse to cooperate and not give

their assent to the land pooling agreements. One landowner,

who had the maximum land in Taba (and hence was at stake

to lose most from the land pooling contribution), did not sign

the agreement (Meeting 6, Agenda 3). Another 15 also were

not in accord (Kuensel). As a result the Upper Taba LAP could

not be finalized and got delayed until the city authorities

finally conceded by taking betterment charges instead of land

contribution. “The main reason for the consideration was if …

(plot owner‟s name)… does not sign the land pooling

agreement, then the LAP cannot be implemented even if there

are donors willing to fund the LAP.” (Meeting 6, Agenda 3).

Another case was of a plot-owner refusing to show up for site

visit even after two notifications because he did not want to

comply with a court decision of subdividing his land (Meeting

2, Agenda 12).

This power is certainly greater for larger landowners because

their land pooling contribution makes available a larger

amount of land for the city.

iii) Bypassing municipal authority

Here the strategy of the claimant is to simply bypass the

municipal authorities and approach another, possibly higher

government body. There was a case, when the building

inspector informed an individual that he did not have a

formal approval to build his attic as an extra floor and hence

the structure was illegal and construction should be stopped,

“the inspectors were counter-informed that the approval

process is underway in the Ministry of Works and Human

Settlement. In the light of awaiting the anticipatory approval

by competent authorities, it has become a practical difficulty


105

for the TDM inspectors to refrain the property owners from

constructing illegally.” (Meeting 3, Agenda 16).

The Land Commission (NLCS) is the most frequent intervener.

With an expansion of the mandates of the Land Commission

since 2007, plot owners often beseech the Land Commission

on the unfairness of land pooling and then Land Commission

forwards a claim to the city officials on behalf of the

landowner (Kuensel). In other cases, it challenges some of the

decisions already taken by the planner on its own accord

(Interview 10/01/2014), hence introducing a new set of

claims from the point of view of the Land Act.

Surely one‟s social network is a key resource here. The more

people one knows in the government, the more likely his/her

ability to have an access point. However, as we have seen, the

planner can also be a representative. So all landowners do

have access to the state, but not all may have access to senior

level bureaucrats in the Ministry for example.

iv) Encroaching anyway

Finally, there is a silent36 way of claim-making. This is by not

actively demanding for an exception but just going ahead and

doing it. This is at the landowner‟s risk for it may lead to a

situation where the city authorities will demolish the

structure. At the same time, it can also work the other way –

the option to pay a nominal fees for regularization. An

example is of a plot-owner who was supposed to make a land

pooling contribution of 12.67% but by the time the planner

got to the stage of plan approval, the plot owner‟s plot was

fully developed with retaining wall all around her plot. Finally

the decision was ruled in her favour by taking betterment

charges instead of land contribution (Meeting 9, Agenda 8).

36 Silent encroachment?


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6.3 How municipal officials authorize deviations

The last two sections explained the different types of claims

used to challenge the legitimacy of a given rule. Moving on

from how claims entered the agenda, we now try to

understand why they were accepted. Since most claims were

accepted, we focus on how deviations were legitimatized -

invoking what values? Further, what strategies were used to

secure the legitimacy of these deviations? The table shows

that most claims tend to be accepted by the court of the

committee.

Meeting

Date

Total

Agendas

Precinct

related

Claims

Authorized

Claims

Rejected

25/01/2012 25 9 9 0

There are two main ways in which claims for plan deviation

can be accepted. First by authorizing a single case of

exception and second, by altogether revising the rule. The

decision-taker is the Thimphu City committee comprising of

elected members. The aim in this section is to deconstruct

certain values invoked in the committee‟s “language of

justification” (Baldwin 1955: 47) as well as strategies to

secure the legitimacy of the deviation. Once the deviation has

been authorized, the transformation is complete. What was

formerly a rule violation is now the new codified norm. Thus

strategic action in the TCC “field‟ contributes to the

transformation of the urban planning “field” basically by de-

codifying original rules and codifying new norms.

Authorizing an exception

Invoking alternative legitimacy claims: Framing

The reasons why it is acceptable to authorize an exemption

vary. An analysis of different legitimacy claims made is

summarized below:


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i) Public mandate

Decisions can seek legitimacy in public opinion, “it was

observed that it is more benefitting to the general public to

have a full floor rather than attic” (Meeting 3, Agenda 16).

“Many land owners have approached Thromde with the

request to allow them construct on plots with less than 25

decimal” (Meeting 7, Agenda 1).

ii) Precedence

Legitimacy can be sought in a precedent even if it breaks the

rule. In one case, most of the 14 plots in a protected river

buffer zone were already developed and the remaining two

were seeking permission to develop. In such a case, the

legitimacy claim involved equal rights for all which was

ordered above the importance of rule compliance. The

decision was that “special consideration should be made for

the two remaining plots to develop like others”. However, to

reduce guilt for authorizing building in an ecologically

sensitive zone, it was decided that more trees should be

planted in the area to protect the river eco system (Meeting 6,

Agenda 4).

iii) Self-Blaming

Sometimes, the reason is that the fault lies with the

government, not the people. “The house decided that it was

the weakness on the part of the Thromde for not completing

the property assessment to charge the above taxes and

therefore it was unfair to charge the taxes let alone penalties”

(Meeting 4, Agenda 9).

iv) Democratizing exception-making

Deviation becomes legitimate so long as exemptions are made

for all cases equally. For example, in the proposal of

betterment charges in lieu of land pooling, the committee said

that all issues in one area should be submitted together


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rather than case by case basis (Meeting 9, Agenda 6). Or to

create an inventory for example of all the plots smaller than

25 decimal in E-4 areas (Meeting 6, Agenda 14) or plots

falling under traditional village settlement. By processing

approvals for an inventory of cases, justification can be

sought in the fairness of making exceptions equally.

v) Other plot owners are not affected

(Meeting 6, Agenda 3) “After a brief deliberation the council

approved the submission based on the fact that the land

pooled would not affect the overall plan of the local area”

(Meeting 9, Agenda 8). This is the utility argument. If a rule

deviation does not cause any harm, then what is the harm in

accepting a claim?

Securing legitimacy of a deviation: Conditional Bargain

The main strategy to authorize an exception is striking a

conditional bargain i.e. the city authorizes landowner to

violate the original planning code in exchange for or under

the conditions of something else. Framing of course is at the

Traditional Village in Babesa


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heart of how and why claims are considered legitimate to be

accepted but this was already covered in the last section. This

part focuses just on one way how a deviation is legitimized,

particularly if the formal channels for rule revision are not

feasible to pursue. This is more relevant to individual

exception making rather than general issues considered for

policy revision. This is to regularize a structure in exchange

for some conditions. By doing this the interaction becomes a

conditional bargain between the state and its citizens. This

creates the security that rules are being followed.

The strategy here is trading rights: regularizing a structure in

exchange for penalty fees. Pardoning land contribution in

exchange for betterment charges. A typical bargain is to

increase building height but reduce coverage (Meeting 5,

Agenda 5). For example, change category of precinct to

increase building height but allow only G+ 3 constructions

with 50% coverage, creating a new combination altogether of

the TSP-DCR (Meeting 9, Agenda 12). Another example is to

accept claims for precinct change but modify the land pooling

percentage (Meeting 7, Agenda 5).

The E4 precinct mandates a minimum of 25 decimal size of

land. There was an instruction from the Cabinet to permit

land transfer for plot size between 10 to 25 decimal but on

condition that the applicants would not ask for extra land

from the government in the future (Meeting 4, Agenda 16).

Following this, the Land Record Section proposed that DCR

should be reviewed so that irrespective of land size,

construction and transaction might be allowed. In this way,

sometimes, individual cases build up to generate a rule

change or shift in policy. This is the substance of the next

section.


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Revising a rule

The basic analysis is that the members want to show that

whatever decision is taken, it is not personally motivated as it

comes up quite frequently in the discussions that the

committee does not want to set the wrong precedent and

avoid the trouble with similar claims in the future (as said by

Executive Secretary in a meeting). However, many times the

decision-makers also double up as claim-makers. This can

happen when a people‟s representative puts up a case for

discussion. So the committee is sympathetic and often

looking for a legitimate way to authorize the request for

exemption. In order to disown it as a case of personal

discretion, the strategy is to outsource it to other legitimate

sources of authorities. This section provides some concrete

examples of how this is done.

i) Framing: Invoking religious significance

The Buddhist religion and culture are deeply preserved in

Bhutan and even the Plan (TSP) respects the sanctity of

religious structures. This means that if a new road meets a

religious structure (such as a lakhang, prayer wheel etc.) on

its way, the road pays its respects by diverting its path. In an

informal discussion, a property owner joked with me saying

that if anybody wants to avoid land pooling or road cutting

through their property, the best strategy is to build a small

religious structure (Discussion on 28/03/2014). He shared

an example of developments near the Sunday vegetable

market which supposedly left a religious structure

untouched.

Moving to a concrete example of strategic action: a high

status monk was acquiring property where some government

land was already encroached upon by the previous owner.

The issue during the process of his application was that the

Land Commission would not accept his land transaction


111

request if there are structures encroaching on government

land. The committee decided to regularize the structure (a

garage) by saying that it is (or will be? – not clear) used as a

“prayer house/temple”. The concerned division then

proceeded with NLCS to regularize occupied excess land. An

added justification was that the area occupied is small

(Meeting 2, Agenda 6).

ii) Gathering evidence: outsourcing to knowledge expert

A “feasibility study” is the classic way to put a request under

consideration. An example is the request of 19 property

owners to reduce the penalty fees for regularizing their illegal

structures. They had approached the mayor complaining

about the biases in the penalty which was not in proportion

to the illegal portion of their structures. Similarly, when the

issue of taking betterment charges in exchange of land

pooling was first brought up, it was decided that “A

Betterment Charges Committee/Land Acquisition Committee

has to be instituted” (Meeting 9, Agenda 6).

Making an “inventory” of all cases when one case is looking

for an exception is another strategy. Deviation becomes

legitimate so long as exemptions are made for all cases

equally. For example, in the proposal of betterment charges in

lieu of land pooling, the committee said that all issues in one

area should be submitted together rather than case by case

basis (Meeting 9, Agenda 6). Similarly, it was decided to

create an inventory of all the plots falling under Traditional

Village precinct.

This is the pre-stage of evidence gathering, before proposals

can be put to the Ministry for change. After compiling the

inventory of all plots in E-4 area below 25 decimal, TCC

wanted to put up a proposal to the Ministry to consider the

possibility of allowing such plots some construction with

coverage from 20% to 30% (Meeting 6, Agenda 14; Meeting 7,


112

Agenda 1). E-4 is the precinct for Agriculture based

Environments. Because it is characterized by very steep

slopes, the TSP had proposed that instead of developing

buildings, it is better used as orchard / green house or

agriculture for farm food processing and research.

iii) Approaching higher authority/overruling

Just like claim-makers, the TCC committee too seeks to

secure legitimacy for its decisions by getting the assent of a

higher authority. Sometimes the institutionally designed path

is followed; for example, propose evidence-based rule

revisions in the DCR (Meeting 9 Agenda 10). But sometimes,

just like claim-makers, TCC too uses the tactic to bypass the

assigned authority (in this case, MoWHS) and gain the assent

of higher authorities. For example, to convert the attic into an

additional floor, TCC sought the approval from the Cabinet

(Meeting 3 Agenda 16). This is a proposal that the Ministry

was surely not going to agree on for it changes the entire

density and population plan of TSP by adding one more storey

to all buildings across the city area.

Outsourcing decisions to another authority is also a strategic

way to disown responsibility for a decision. An example is to

entertain a request by a plot owner who wanted to pay

betterment charges in lieu of land pooling. Some members

were not in favour as they felt that the pooled land may be

necessary to set up a transformer station by the Bhutan

Power Corporation (BPC). The decision was to write to BPC

and if they did not require space provision for transformer

then to accept the plot owner‟s request (Meeting 7, Agenda 6).

In a future event, this would secure the municipal decision of

criticism by outsourcing responsibility to BPC.

iv) Revising rule to make a deviation legal

Finally and this is the last step to secure the legitimacy of a

deviation – codify it. The TCC does not have policy making


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powers but it does have the power to modify rules and

regulations. Although we don‟t see its policy-agenda setting

role when we look only at formal documents, there is, on

digging deeper, a layer upon layer of revisions in internal

letters and circulation orders which revised the rules codified

in the original Thimphu Structure Plan (TSP) 2003 and

Development Control Regulations (DCR) 2004. Some examples

of new addendums to the DCR include a) Narrow Plot

Guidelines 2011 b) Minimum plot size after subdivision 2012

c) Abolishing Attic Rules 2009. Betterment charges instead of

land pooling is slowly becoming an institutionalized practice,

for example by codifying the Betterment Charges “criteria”

and forwarding it to NLCS for their information (Meeting 9,

Agenda 16). There are also the revisions to the Local Area

Plans. But these are numerous and even the planner does not

have a good record of the changes preceding his tenure.

Currently, DCD is in a process of evidence collection and

getting together its proposals to revise the whole DCR into a

second version. Some of the changes we can expect to see

will be on the Traditional Village concept. Which area should

fall under traditional precinct is being discussed and finalized

and DCD was required to comes up with the number of

traditional houses in different locations. Then there are the

basements (Interview 17/02/2014) – to allow these to become

habitable, since already they are receiving request from

snooker bars and parking is not feasible in all basements.

And then there are the river buffer zones – some committee

members are already pondering to make them developable.

During the course of a discussion on the plot of an ex-

Minister which falls in the buffer zone, issues began to be

raised about the general concept of the buffer. Members

debated “whether the buffer is indeed necessary for a stream

which has no source but is fed by the overflow of a nearby

power plant. Further some members suggested that the buffer


114

rule should be reviewed and accordingly introduce buffers for

river, stream and spring category so that precious land is not

lost and is being prevented from being beneficial for only few

people residing near such buffers” (Meeting 15, Agenda 2).

Notice the subtleness of this process – reason for putting

buffer zones into the agenda is that only rich people are

benefitting from it so the legitimacy claim is to spread the

benefits. In the process, the planning rules evolve.

We can also see changes in related “fields”. After the attic was

abolished and all buildings gained an additional floor, a rule

conflict was created with an existing rule – where all buildings

with more than four floors must have lift provision. Using the

framing that for a standard plot size, lift cannot be provided

as the allowable coverage (40%) is just enough for living space

– a new claim entered the agenda. The choices debated by the

committee were a) either to do away the lift requirement for

residential building even if it is four storied and above or, b) if

the lift provision has to be kept, the coverage be increased by

1.9-2%. After lengthy deliberation, it was agreed to have lift

provision for more than 4 storied and increase the coverage.

This was also an opportunity to discuss another DCR related

rule – set-back provision of 5m – whether it should or not be

maintained. It was decided to flag this as an agenda for

review during the overall DCR revision (Meeting 6, Agenda

11).

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter showed that no matter what the constraints of

the system, actors can find a way around them. The plan is

not working partly because there are genuine issues in the

rules and partly because when the plan challenges an actor‟s

interests, he or she can use “strategic action” to manoeuvre

around the rules. This was true of both claim-makers and

decision-takers. This chapter showed different strategies and


115

framings used by each to challenge the original planning

codes. For example, land pooling requires up to 30%

contribution from all plot owners in a given Local Area Plan

(LAP). This contribution is not monetarily compensated but

the state provides access to roads and other infrastructure.

But what if one plot owner has already invested and has

access to a road. Should he too give up his land in the same

proportion as his neighbours? These are some of the issues

the come up during plan implementation. When claim-

makers identify a rule conflict, they frame their claim in such

a way that the legitimacy of the original code is challenged. In

response, the town committee tries to address each grievance

and it too finds a way to legitimize its actions of exception-

making. Some of the rationales used by them was that the

claim was public mandate or followed a wrong precedence set

before. Quite frequently, when an exception is made for one

plot owner, then an inventory is compiled of similar cases in

order to make exceptions on a uniform basis. In this way,

there is a diffusion of the exception-making process and some

of the original planning codes were either not implemented or

modified.

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VII. Conclusion

This study looked at the case of urban planning in Thimphu,

capital city of Bhutan to explain why the spatial organization

of a city cannot be determined by codifying rules in a city

plan. In the introduction, we saw that that although over ten

years have passed since the Cabinet of Ministers approved

the Thimphu Structure Plan 2003-27, the plan has not been

able to achieve the outcomes for which it was designed. It

proposed to keep 70% of the peri-urban areas, incorporated

into the municipality in 1999, as open and green areas. It

also anticipated the growing problem of affordable housing

and proposed to build low income housing units where new

land was available through land pooling contributions. And

finally, the plan promised to tighten building regulations to

preserve traditional architecture. However, the outputs on all

of these commitments have been poor. Keeping this context

as the starting point, the study analysed the implementation

stage of the policy cycle to understand why planning rules

had not been implemented.

To answer the question why there was a lack of compliance to

planning rules, we started with two hypothesis a) policy misfit

and b) veto players, derived from the literature in the

emerging domain of “Sociology of Compliance”. The former

predicts that the higher is the incompatibility between a

policy and norms of the prevailing institutional environment,

lower is the policy compliance. The veto hypothesis predicts

that the higher is the number of veto players in opposition to

a given policy, the lower is the level of policy compliance.

Like in a sociological study of any subject, this literature on

compliance is also symptomatic of the “agency vs structure”

divide. The “actor-agentic” perspective highlights the role of

actors (veto players) in diverting the objectives of a policy or

an organization implying that rules cannot channel their

Conclusion

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behaviour. In contrast to this is the “institutional-

structuralist” tradition (misfit). This argument is that actor

behaviour is itself regulated by norms of the broader society

and hence some written or unwritten rules guide social

action.

In order to use insights from both sides in the agency vs.

structure debate, the study adopted Fligstein and McAdam‟s

theoretical framework of “strategic action fields”. A field can

be conceptualized in various forms: a network, a policy

domain, a market or even an organization.

This study took an organizational definition and the field in

focus was the municipal corporation, which is the main

implementing authority of the plan. The study constructed a

network of actors/organizations interacting with municipal

officials on matters relating to plan implementation. This

network, including the municipal corporation and all other

actors who influenced and co-produced the policy, was

termed the policy governance field. Thus the field universe

was composed of the city corporation as the locus field and its

interacting counterparts. The locus field was internally

divided into sub fields (bureaucratic divisions vs elected

committee). At the same time, the locus field was also

embedded in a larger network of organizations (Bhutanese

bureaucracy). This framework makes analysis useful by

breaking up the abstract macro structure or field universe

into multiple “fields”, each field being the site for “strategic

action” and at the same time, each field being embedded in

the broader “field environment”. This visualization thus

captured the agency of actors to negotiate rules within a given

field (e.g. urban planning) and at the same time see that

actors‟ agency was constrained by the rules of the larger field

environment (state bureaucracy).


118

In other words, we could see that municipal officials had

some freedom to go around the rules codified in the urban

plan but their negotiation powers were constrained by

broader relations of governance in Bhutan. As the

municipality was in a relation of dependence, other actors

frequently undermined its authority to govern the plan. By

using the field framework, the study could therefore capture

how control over municipal policy-making differs and is

reflected in spatial developments in the city. The next section

presents a summary of findings and revises the hypothesis.

7.1 Findings: Why don’t rules work in Thimphu?

Veto pressures: deviating the rules away from the plan

We saw that there are several pressure points pushing for

deviation from the plan, even inside the implementing

authority, which we could discern after breaking the TCC as

an organizational “field” into sub-fields. For example the

bureaucrat-run divisions tended towards compliance but the

elected town committee tended towards grievance-redressal,

with greater flexibility in rule application. The approach to

deconstruct the insides of the organization is inspired by the

micro-politics approach of Crozier-Friedberg. While their work

emphasizes the role of actors, here the argument is that the

identity of field players derives from their field position which

is institutionally-determined. This is also indispensable to

understand actor‟s interests before they go on to be

articulated into strategic action.

Chapter III emphasized that TCC‟s relations with other

government bodies were of dependence so orders from above

are constantly undermining the authority of the plan. Veto

players in Thimphu are not the same as in other cities but

they are there. Whereas in many cities today, we find that the

private infrastructure investors are completely taking over the

Conclusion

119

policy agenda, this is not the dominant trend in Thimphu.

There was virtually no interaction between TCC and the

infrastructure investors, which may be because private sector

development has remained stunted in Bhutan. This also

impacted city planning because without private players

stepping to lease land from the municipality, most

neighbourhood nodes remained vacant and hence vulnerable

to encroachment of individual residential plots.

Landowners, who in many Asian city contexts have been

displaced through exercises of urban planning and urban

renewal, are actually a powerful veto group in Thimphu. Two

examples provide convincing evidence. In Upper Taba a

petition by a small group of affected landowners stalled the

plan for almost 6 years. In 2003, a group of landowners sued

the municipality and won the case. The High Court ruled in

their favour and said that land pooling is illegal. The fact that

landowners in Thimphu are a strong veto group also has to

do with their resource endowments and status in society.

There is a sizeable overlap between voting power, land

ownership and senior positions in government. So veto

players are present but of a different kind - not the usual

private sector investors but citizens who command elite

status. The main interest of landowners is to maximize the

exchange value of their properties and least in the

development control objectives of the plan.

Instead of market players, financial institutions funding

infrastructure have played a much more important role. Their

interest lies more in ensuring that the land acquisition

process is through landowner consensus and less in how the

building codes are followed during implementation. Their role

has further leveraged the bargaining power of landowners

during the land readjustment process.


120

The fact that state-society relations are so individualized and

state-market interactions are conspicuously absent is specific

to Bhutan. This is because the governance network field is

embedded within the broader state field. The type of state

development processes in Bhutan structured how state-

society, state-market and intergovernmental relations are

structured in the first place. Collective action is a very

controlled process, for example an organized street protest is

not a dominant mode of strategic action. But one-on-one

negotiation between state and citizens is prevalent in the

repertoire of strategies that actors use for claim-making (see

also Pain & Dema 2003). Is this a neutral process? Is

exception-making open to everybody equally? This is a

question open for debate.

Structural determinacies: Predictability in rule deviation

When we zoom out of specific situations and look at how

decision-making in the municipal committee is working, we

can find some contradictions. On one hand, the city

committee is very committed to adjudicating individual cases

scrupulously. It takes great efforts to conduct feasibility

studies, make inventories etc. There are recurring references

to how the wrong precedent must not be set implying that

rules need to be followed no matter who the claim-maker is.

But at the same time, we cannot deny that the process was

characterized by some gaping indeterminacies. One could

question, why not conduct a feasibility study for all the

claims that come? Why reject some? If one sits through these

meeting discussions long enough, one will be able to identify

a pair of cases in which the claim was very similar but the

decision completely opposite. For example, there was a

request that deficit area of a landowner, which disappeared in

the cadastral survey, to be considered as his land pooling

contribution (Meeting 6, Agenda 7). While this claim was

rejected, there were some other claims which the city

committee blew its brains over just so that it could find a

Conclusion

121

solution without breaking the rules. See Meeting 15, Agenda

2 for an example on how the whole Local Area Plan was

modified through plot reconfiguration so that the claimant

could get what he claimed; now is it just incidental that the

claimant was an ex-Minister?

So the question that we are asking is, that even though there

is no blatant bias in exception-making by the committee –

after all majority of the claims have been accepted – and even

through the committee is very concerned to operate “within

the rules”, it finds a way out, when it needs to. There was

indeed a very strong commitment to not set the wrong

precedents and follow the rules. And yet, there is a direction

to where plan deviations are headed. We can already predict

that the next edition of the DCR will be more property-

developer friendly, allowing landlords to maximize values from

their properties – be it by permitting habitable uses of the

basement, or by allowing buildings with lifts to increase

coverage, or maybe even permit some construction in the

buffer zones. What is it about the workings of this policy field

that the decision-making is so indeterminate (no clear basis

for exception-making) and yet so predictable? This brings us

back to the discussion about what intervenes between a

policy‟s objectives and its outcomes; what ultimately

predominates – actors or larger structures of society?

Intermediating factor – actors or institutions?

This study showed that certainly actors intervene with their

goals/interests using a given repertoire of strategies. The

argument was that through strategic action, the constraints

of the rules of a field can be avoided without actually

breaking the rules and while perverting the outcomes. This is

because when actors do not want to comply - and this

happens if they do not see the rule as worthy or legitimate

enough to be complied with – then they find ways and means

to go around it. However, society doesn‟t exist as vacuum; it


122

is created through actor interactions so it is actors who are

actually doing the work of intermediating and diverting the

outcomes from objectives of rules. But the question is, are

they agents representing something else? Is there a larger

force that is reproducing prevailing power relations and

shaping exception-making to favour the already powerful?

The argument here is that just because actors have the

agency to intervene does not mean that they have the

autonomy. They remain embedded in a larger field universe

and the path of their “strategic action” is determined to some

extent. It was argued here that actors are twice embedded in

the field universe.

First, by their position in the policy governance network (field

network). This field position defines what their goals and

interests are in the first place. Relations among actors in the

policy field network is organized by the state. Therefore, an

individual actor‟s interests are not determined from vacuum

but very much a product of what roles the institutional design

has for them. For example, within the TCC, the interests of

the bureaucrat for rule compliance vs. the interests of the

elected representatives for rule revision is very much a

function of their field positions. Therefore, studies that have

emphasized the role of actors without looking at how these

actors are embedded in the larger institutional framework

have not identified the source from where the interests of

actors are born.

The second type of embeddedness is social positions. Social

position is very bluntly defined here but the idea is that each

individual is embedded in her/his personal network of social

relations. This personal network is a vital source of

information and hence the key channel through which

cultural frames of interpretation are transmitted to

individuals. It mirrors the pattern of resource endowments in

society and provides them many ingredients for the recipe of

Conclusion

123

strategic action. First, it tells them whether a given rule

challenges some other norm of their world. If it does, only

then do they go about finding a suitable strategy to challenge

the rules. Strategic action involves how to frame the rule as

illegitimate (the reason they give to the committee is not the

actual reason they want to avoid the rule – it is just a

framing). Social position is what guides actors‟ interpretation

of social reality, informing them of the do‟s and don‟ts of

Bhutanese culture, and the type of framings that are

available in the repertoire of legitimacy claims to challenge

the authority of the plan.

At the same time, social networks also provide useful

connections with government officials that one can approach

when s/he needs to bypass the concerned authorities.

Sometimes, social networks (e.g. family relations) even

determine occupation and hence social attributes - If one

comes from an important family, their chances of holding

government positions and being the elite is also high. This is

especially true in Bhutan where corruption is not present in

the form of bribery as in India but pervasive in the form of

nepotism and favouritism. In short, social networks are

conceived here as resource endowments. And resource

endowments leverage possibilities for strategic action.

Therefore, actors‟ agency in strategic action is structured by

their social positions in at least two ways a) information on

type of legitimacy claim and b) repertoire of strategies

available. At any given point some strategy is always available

for all but the well resource-endowed just have more options.

For example, all have access to the state and can approach

municipal authorities with a grievance but only some have

the option to bypass municipality and appeal to a higher

authority like the Ministry.


124

Hypothesis revision

We go back now to revisit the two hypotheses. What is that

intermediating variable that distorts a rule‟s outcome from its

objectives? Is it rational and political behaviour of actors as

the hypothesis about veto players? Or is it a misfit between

the rules of the policy and existing norms? Both hypotheses

are validated but modified.

Misfit – What was the misfit? What was the plan expecting

that diverged from the social realities of this place? It is

argued that the misfit is not in the aspirations of the plan

design. In fact, in terms of its objectives, the plan is very well

aligned with Bhutan‟s national policy of “Gross National

Happiness” (GNH). Just like GNH, the Thimphu city plan

seeks to balance growth with preservation of nature and

heritage. So it is certainly not a case of policy misfit. But

there is another type of misfit – between legal codes and

social norms.

The misfit is that the plan judges all properties on the basis of

their geographical attributes without regard for the social

attributes of property owners. This is a misfit because it

treats everybody equally whereas in practice this is not so.

The social relations that prevail as the norm is that some

have more privilege than others. However, privilege cannot be

comprehended by the legal codes of the plan. Social norms

are therefore not in line with the legal codes. Therefore, the

misfit is not in the content of the policy but its conception of

society and relations between actors.

The plan treats all relations as defined by the field network.

All landowners are assumed to have the same relation with

the municipal officials. But in practice this is not so. In

sociology, there is a concept called “multi-vocality”37 or the

37Padgett 1993

Conclusion

125

idea that one actor can have multiple positions and identities

at the same time. This study showed that while holding

his/her field position, the actor also holds a social position.

So a plan that governs actor relations only by considering

field positions and neglecting social positions is going to fail.

Because relations between landowners and municipal bodies

is not the same when an ex-Minister is the claimant vs.

someone else. Another example of a misalignment between

social norms and legal codes is that while the municipal

corporation is the implementing authority of the plan, there

are other types of authorities that trump municipality‟s

authority because the norm is that this organization is low in

the hierarchy vs. the Ministry and other central agencies.

Veto player – Veto player hypothesis is also confirmed and

the veto players in Thimphu‟s case are the landowners

seeking to maximize property values. We saw that 83% of

Thimphu‟ residents live in rented housing, 62% of which is in

the private sector. Much of the new building stock is thus

being built for rented housing.

It was argued that strategic action is a function of both

resource endowment as well as negotiation powers. Therefore,

those better endowed with resources were better placed to

negotiate. Those who are well-connected had strong

negotiation powers to bargain the rule. They set the agenda

on which rules will be modified. Once the decision to revise a

rule is taken, the exception-making is diffused to other levels

of society who are not as well-endowed; one example of this is

paying betterment charges in lieu of making a land

contribution. This was first proposed by a member of National

Council and gradually it came to be universally applied. So

we could see that everybody is capable of some amount of

strategic action and in that sense everybody is a bit of a veto

player.


126

The conclusion is that rules don‟t work because actors

intervene as agents but they are not autonomous from the

larger social structure and power relations (components of the

field universe). Both hypotheses (veto and misfit) are

confirmed for the question why rules don‟t work: but

modified. Rules are not followed because there is a misfit -

not in the content of the policy but in its conception of

society; the plan is very much in sync with Bhutan‟s GNH

ideology of growth balanced with nature and culture. The

misfit is that the plan regulates all properties based on their

geographical attributes whereas governance in the city cannot

be disconnected from the social attributes of property owners.

The veto player hypothesis is confirmed but modified to say

that everybody is a bit of a veto player and strategic action is

not restricted to the domain of resource-endowed actors

alone. Actors and their choices for strategic action remain

embedded in the larger Bhutanese society, they have the

agency to change parts of it like in the urban planning case.

At the same time, their actions are also regulated by the

broader norms of Bhutanese society.

7.2 Contribution: Busting three common myths

The study is very useful to understand dynamics of rule

compliance.It may not tell us how to generate rule compliance

but it explicates what wouldn‟t work and why. The section

below identifies three counter-intuitive findings which may

guide policy makers to be better prepared for implementation

challenges.

Policy contribution: lessons for compliance

i) Rule clarification will not guarantee more compliance

Weber had argued that with modernization, the bureaucracy

becomes more rational. This rationalization process involves a

growth in the size of the bureaucracy as new organizations

Conclusion

127

are created for specialized functions. Indeed, a greater

division of labour is evident in Bhutan‟s modernization

processes. Bhutan‟s democratic transition in 2008 was

accompanied by organizational reforms. New organizations

and new laws were created superseding previous ones.

Although, the intuitive idea would be that such a

rationalization of the bureaucracy increases its efficiency,

according to the findings of this study – this idea is not

validated. The rationalization process (more rules,

specialization of organizations) cannot guarantee “efficiency”

from the point of view of compliance because it will create

more rule conflicts, more authority conflicts, which is

precisely what strategic actors thrive on. In fact, the more

rules you create, (which comes as a package with the

rationalization of bureaucracy) the higher is the probability of

rule conflicts and hence higher the probability of strategic

action to exploit the loopholes in the system. With

rationalization and expansion of bureaucracy, we may think

that rule enforcement will improve. But it can also decrease

effectiveness from a compliance point of view. This is because

each new organization is concerned with its own goals as a

priority which may affect implementation in other fields. The

Land Commission for example, orders the rules of the Land

Act above the rules of the Thimphu Structure Plan. Thus rule

clarification will not guarantee more compliance because it

will create more room for discretionary decision-making.

ii) Even if rules don‟t work, they have a second order value

This is a simple point. Just because rules don‟t work

sometimes, it does not mean they are entirely redundant.

They have secondary functions and can serve an alternative

purpose. Even if rules are not successfully implemented, they

may kick-start a process of change in norms. The plan has

done exactly this in the minds of the bureaucrats

implementing the plan. Since the plan treats all properties

equally without regard for who is the owner of the property,


128

some of the implementing staff has also adopted this attitude.

In my field trip of three months where part of the time was

spent in direct observation sitting in the municipality, I

noticed that some of the officials identified themselves as the

“Aam Aadmi Party”, in reference to the changing politics in

New Delhi. Their message was that rules should be applied

consistently to all, without exceptions for those who are more

powerful such as officials in senior government positions.

This mentality is also percolating among the landowners.

Even the landowners are slowly realizing that they can‟t

always get away with their claims and have to go through a

series of protocols. So rules can have democratizing

tendencies even if they are not applied equally to all.

iii) Unintended consequences cannot be avoided

The norm shift initiated by rules in one field can also spill

over to another. The current democratic shift in the

Bhutanese state field, for example, has created a sense of

entitlements which can see building up in the urban planning

field. We saw that a given field is embedded in a complex

network of other fields. Events in one field spill over into

another, just as Fligstein and McAdam predict. Once we

understand just how complex the universe of fields is we can

see why strategic action in other fields is spilling over and

coming as exogenous events in this field. So the exogenous

influences in any given field cannot be avoided. This

exogenous influence is not some invisible force of power or

gravity as in some conspiracy theory. It is basically strategic

action in another field that has come to this field in the form

of events and changing circumstances, i.e. actors in the form

of events. When change of circumstances affects the field in

focus, then these become opportunities or constraints that

strategic actors have to negotiate with. As they exploit the

loopholes in a given field, it further leads to more strategic

action which spills back elsewhere in the field universe.

Together this is the force of the cosmos of the social world we

Conclusion

129

constructed here, so at the root or core are actors and actions

but it expresses itself in the form of change in rules or

institutions. So yes actors create institutions as the Michel-

Crozier thesis, but not at one scale. But at the same they are

also constrained by the rules of the broader field universe.

Even the most resource-endowed actors have are limited in

the large scheme of the universe to how much change s/he

can initiate. This study‟s development on the nature of

“structure” allows us to understand why unintended

consequences are simply inevitable due to action of actors in

other fields - very different conception of structure from a

broader supernatural force at power like capitalism or

neoliberalism. There may be tendencies for such forces to be

reproduced because they get institutionalized in many fields

and work in favour of actors with resource endowments but

this force does not just exist – it is embodied in actor-

institution interactions.

Academic contribution

Theoretical contribution: Field framework.

Having applied Fligstein‟s framework to a new empirical

study, we are now in a position to assess it. In general, the

framework works really well to explain both embeddedness

and the ability of actors to transcend the rules of the field

(distinguished from rules of the universe) because it separates

the field from the broader field environment.

The main contribution of this study to Fligstein‟s framework

is developing a bit more on the relations between a field and

its environment by trying to understand how exactly is a field

embedded in the larger order. Although their work recognizes

the embeddedness of actors, Fligstein & McAdam‟s concepts

are designed primarily for a theory of social action so it is

more agency-oriented.


130

The main contribution of this research is therefore to develop

more on the “structuralist” angle of their framework. The field

universe metaphor was proposed to replace the Russian doll

one because it captures better the complexity (webs/galaxies)

of fields in which a given field is embedded. It also allows us

to zoom in and out, maintaining the importance of

perspective in understanding interests of actors. This

visualization also gives us a better grasp of change and

stability in the field universe which is in a constant state of

flux as each field is undergoing dynamic change from internal

pressures of actors and their strategic action. By changing

the constitution of a given field, actors also change the

constitution of the universe, just as Fligstein had suggested.

But when we zoom out, we can see that despite so much

agency and change dynamics, the overall structure of the field

universe is really the same and tends to persist. Even as new

fields pop up like stars and some disappear from the night

sky, the milky way looks the same.

Although extremely useful, the Theory of Fields is still young.

By providing the metaphor of looking at a field as just a small

star or planet or system of planets in the field universe, we

can start to think about the complex ways in which a field is

organized in its environment. We can also think more about

interaction at levels other than the usual macro-meso-micro

by thinking of networks organized at varying intermediate

levels of the universe in which they are embedded. Scale is

important because by seeing just how small a field is in the

vast field universe, we can begin to see why change can be so

blindingly bright if we zoom onto a given field. But when we

zoom out, strategic action dims and stability of institutions

can be better grasped. There is also a misfit in field positions

and social positions. Everybody is not embedded in social

networks of the field universe in the same way. They have

different social networks and social positions. The value of the

Conclusion

131

metaphor is in conceptualizing different scales and

organization of networks in which a field is embedded.

Contribution to urban studies

Going back to Jennifer Robinson, what value can we draw

from this research for urban studies? For comparative

Russian Doll: Fligstein‟s visualization of a field and its

environment

The Universe: This study‟s visualization of field structures


132

research, this framework of fields allows us to see all cities as

ordinary because in all cities, new fields are being

institutionalized at a given point. Field population may be

higher in an older field universe i.e. with a longer history of

formal institutionalization, but new fields are emerging all the

time.

One concrete research path is to compare actor interactions

in new fields that are forming across the globe. For example,

today in Europe there is a lot of talk about financing green

infrastructure and in Asia new models of financing mass

transit projects– both are about institutionalizing new models

of financing infrastructure. These are the kind of comparative

criteria we could try to identify to honour what Jenny

Robinson was saying. How to find new criteria for comparison

or common points in studies of the global north and south

instead of distinguishing them on stereotypical attributes.

The concept of fields is very useful to do just that. We can

compare some common property of a field e.g. change,

stability, relations with field universe and so on to get some

fresh insights on social change in diverse contexts. For

research we have thus discovered new criteria for

comparison: field properties.

7.3 So what? Lessons for the way forward

Lesson for policy transfers across contexts

More generally, the lesson is that, those interested in

transferring policies across contexts have to pay attention to

the age of institutionalization of a given policy field, at a later

age more in sync with codified norms but at an early stage, to

find a goodness of fit with prevailing social norms which are

not yet reflected in codified form. We saw that urban planning

is a very young policy domain in Bhutan. We also saw that

over time, some planning rules also got revised to fit the

norms of the place. An emerging hypothesis is that as a policy

Conclusion

133

field matures, there may be convergence between social

norms and legal codes. Based on this hypothesis, we can infer

that when governments and international development

partners seek to transfer policies from one context to another,

they can improve the “goodness of fit” of their policies with

the prevailing institutional architecture in either of two ways.

At a mature stage of a given policy field, more attention

should be paid to goodness of fit with prevailing legal codes. If

a policy field is still new for the given context, compatibility

should be sought between norms of the new policy and

prevailing social norms which are not yet reflected in codified

form. This is because at a later age, a policy field is likely to

be more in sync with codified norms but at an early stage,

legal codes will not sufficiently reflect the norms of that place.

Improving compliance through consultation

For the policy maker, compliance is successful when the rule

has been internalized. No rule can be a silver bullet, it gives

some rights but takes others. Even the plan, which has many

fair practices, is taking away private property through land

pooling without compensation. Hence any rule is always

vulnerable to a legitimacy crisis. For a rule to be successfully

implemented, it needs to be internalized. Legal socialization

can increase its perceived legitimacy. Legal socialization can

be even more important than finding a cadre of honest

officials. Staffing alone cannot guarantee compliance because

if members don‟t see a rule as legitimate, they will find their

way around the rule in a legal way. In Bhutan there is a very

strong distinction between who makes the policy (Ministry)

and who implements it (Municipality). This has its own

reasons, such as technical expertise and so on. However, at

the end of the day, it is very important for the rules to be

internalized. It is not what is legal but what is legitimate that

ultimately matters when actors choose to escape the rules of

the system.


134

One way to increase perceived legitimacy of the rule is

consultation. If it is not feasible to consult all stakeholders in

the governance network, then consulting at least the

implementing authority is essential. Currently in Thimphu

policy-making and implementing functions are segregated –

this creates more issues of compliance. Had the ministry

involved the implementing authority & mayor from the

beginning, the city corporation would have more incentive in

complying. In my fieldwork, I observed that those who had

been part of the planning team since its inception (Senior

Planner in the Ministry and Chief of Urban Planning division),

were also the most interested in ensuring that the original

rules of the TSP were complied with. By virtue of their

involvement in the policy design process, they also became

the watch guards during plan implementation. Participation

is important not only because it makes the process

democratic, but it also gives lawmakers a sense of ownership

which that may generate compliance as implementers are

more likely to believe in it. The local area planners want to

follow the rules but they have a micro perspective and more

concern with landowner consent than green spaces; besides

length of the document, they haven‟t even read the full thing.

So the only watch-guards of the overall plan are those who

made it.

7.4 Conclusion: Taking a pragmatic approach to

policy

To arrive at the final recommendation of this study, we go

back to John Dewey‟s pragmatic approach to public policy.

His message was that policy makers should stay open to

adjusting policy goals in the course of implementation as new

knowledge and experience is continuously gained. This study

reinforces his view because of the opinion that there is no one

right path for policy success. It all depends on what the

objective is and each goal is a trade-off.

Conclusion

135

Judging whether a policy is “efficiently” implemented depends

on what the objective is. If the goal is compliance then policy

success in Thimphu‟s case calls for a tough stand from the

Source: Hotel

Jumolhari website

Is Thimphu a city for tourists? Hotels dominate Thimphu‟s city centre.

Clock-tower square: The only open space left in the city centre.

My interview with a former mayor (24/02/2014) revealed that a

strong lobby was opposed to the plan to keep the clock-tower

square open and construction-free.

http://www.hoteljumolhari.com/local_area.html


136

state, with no regard for individual grievances. If the goal is

participatory planning, then rules will need to adapt as

unfairness in rule design is discovered even if it compromises

the original policy vision. If the goal is faster implementation,

then more power needs to be devolved to implementing

authorities. But this could result in a lack of oversight, which

in the past has resulted in unfair allocation of land (Tshering

2002).

At the end, this is a debate the people of Bhutan must have.

We should recall that although this study highlighted the

remarkably high levels of negotiation between state and

society, citizen consultations have been limited only to the

landowning class despite the fact that the resident majority is

formed by tenants. So a broader definition must be used,

when we say the people of Thimphu should decide what they

want their city to be.

137

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Annexes

Annex: Precinct categories

No. Precinct Category Description

1 UV-1 Urban Village Core

High - density,

residential

2 UV-2 (MD) Urban Village Periphery

Medium - density

residential

3 UV-2 (LD) Urban Village Periphery

Low - density

residential

4 UV-3 Urban Village Enclave

Bagos & unplanned

settlement

5 TV Traditional Village

Precincts of Traditional

Villages

6 UC Urban Core

Town center, a precinct

of trade and commerce

7 UH Urban Hubs

To be created in the North and

South of Thimphu as major

entertainment, transport and

shopping precincts

8

NN Neighborhood

Nodes

Convenience shopping, basic services

and amenities precincts for the Urban

Villages

9 I Institutional

Local, National and International

Institutions

10 H Heritage Precincts Scared places of historical importance

11 D Dzong Precinct

National icon, a symbol of His

Majesty the King and His Holiness

the Je Khempo

12

G-1 National Open

Green Spaces

Precincts of national importance such

as a national sports complex, archery

ranges, and exhibition areas, etc.

13

G-2 Green Space

System

Public assets like parks, gardens, and

recreation areas

14

E-1 Environmental

Conservation

Enhancement and protection of fragile

ecological zones

15

E-2 Forest

Environments

Preserves in the “no development

zone”

Annexes

151

16

E-3 Agricultural

Environments

Paddy lands, flood plains, farming

activities

17

E-4 Agriculture based

Environments

Very steep slopes, orchards, green

houses, for farm food processing and

research

18

SSIC Satellite Service

& Industrial Centres

Industrial, heavy maintenance,

wholesaling and warehousing

19 M Military Related to national security

20 R Royal Uses Related to Royal uses

21

EN Endowment for

Future

Land whose use determination is

deferred to future generations

22

CP Urban Corridor

Precinct

A corridor of land 44 meters wide

running through the city

Source: MoWHS 2004: 162-63


152

Annex: Thimphu City Corporation Organogram

Source: TCC 2010a

Annexes

153

Annex: Map of Urban Villages

Source: TCC, UPD no date: 15


154

Annex: Precinct Plan

Source: TSP (MoWHS 2004: 164)

Annexes

155

Annex: Principles of Intelligent Urbanism

Source: Extracts from the TSP (MoWHS 2004: 4-11)

Balance with nature: Intelligent Urbanism proposes that the

balance of nature can be maintained when fragile areas are

reserved as preservation, conservation, or as low intensity

habitation precincts.

Balance with tradition: Every culture and every society

has its iconography, its signs and its symbols. Intelligent

Urbanism promotes their incorporation into the spatial

order of urban settings.

Conviviality: Intelligent Urbanism sponsors a convivial

society. Vibrant societies are interactive, socially engaging and

offer their members numerous opportunities for gathering…

through design, such units of social space.

Efficiency: It promotes medium to high-density residential

development along with complimentary social amenities,

convenience shopping, recreation and public services in

compact, mixed-use settlements. These compact communities

have shorter pipe lengths, wire lengths, cable lengths and

road lengths per capita.

Human scale: Intelligent Urbanism promotes the scale of the

pedestrian moving on the pathway, as opposed to the scale of

the automobile on the expressway.

Opportunity matrix: Intelligent Urbanism views the city as an

opportunity system. It sees the city as playing an equalizing

role allowing citizens to grow… For example, it does not judge

a “bago” as blight on society. It sees the possibility that such a

settlement may be an opportunity channel for entry into the

city! Such a settlement may be the only affordable shelter,


156

within easy access to employment and education, for a new

immigrant household in the city.

Regional Integration: Planning of the city and its hinterland

is a single holistic process...With thoughtful planning the region

can take pressure off of the city… There are many activities

within the city, which are growing and are incompatible with

urban habitat. Large, noisy and polluting workshops and

manufacturing units are amongst these. Large wholesale

markets, storage sheds, vehicular maintenance garages, and

wood working mills need to be housed outside of the

city’s limits in their own satellite enclaves.

Balanced Movement: Intelligent Urbanism sees movement

and transport in the city, and in the city region, as a

balanced group of systems that are integrated with one

another. These overlapping systems or modes of transit include

pedestrians, cycles, automobiles and buses.

Institutional integrity: Intelligent Urbanism envisions the

institutional framework as being very clear about the rules and

regulations it sponsors … There must be a Cadastral

System wherein all of the land in the jurisdiction of cities

is demarcated, surveyed, characterized and archived,

registering its legal owner, its legal uses, and the tax defaults

against it…Intelligent Urbanism is not naïve! It recognizes

that there are developers and promoters who have no long term

commitment to their own constructions, and their only concern

is to hand over a dwelling, gain their profit and move on. For

these players it is essential to have Development Control

Regulations, which assure the public that the products they

invest in, are safe, hygienic, orderly, durable and efficient.

Annexes

157

Annex: Occupations of Thimphu Residents

Main occupation Freq Percent

road laborer 3,263 10.8

security personnel 2,191 7.3

motor vehicle drivers 1,704 5.6

occupation not classified 1,659 5.5

weavers, pap, bowl making 1,556 5.2

miners, stone cutters, carving 1,323 4.4

retailer 1,185 3.9

household chores, maid, baby sitter 1,173 3.9

business professional 1,167 3.9

carpenter 1,141 3.8

clerks, keyboard operating clerks, secr 1,024 3.4

administrative management 766 2.5

farming 763 2.5

school teachers 761 2.5

financial accountant 693 2.3

watchman, guard 686 2.3

engineers, architects 656 2.2

computer professionals 558 1.9

mechanic 511 1.7

health supervisors, assistant, nurses & 507 1.7

housekeeping, sweeper 505 1.7

occupation not stated 433 1.4

program managers, general managers etc. 423 1.4

gelong, gomchhen, anim 403 1.3

painter, lhadrip 403 1.3

cashiers, teller clerks 395 1.3

electrical equipment fitters 380 1.3


158

chhampoen (dancer), tseepem (singer) an 252 0.8

tailor 236 0.8

tourist guides, ushers 211 0.7

livestock health professional 203 0.7

store keeper, ticket seller 201 0.7

contractors excluding logging 188 0.6

auditor 179 0.6

market oriented crop & livestock raisin 177 0.6

receptionists 168 0.6

government executives 167 0.6

assistant engineers, support engineers 165 0.6

goldsmith 129 0.4

library science, social science & infor 123 0.4

plumber 120 0.4

mathematicians/statisticians 118 0.4

logging contractor 118 0.4

chain operator 115 0.4

messenger, porter, & related worker 112 0.4

pavement vendors (doma, cloth etc.) 104 0.3

beautician, barber 79 0.3

thrimpoen, thrimrap, jab-mee 76 0.3

human & animal doctors 73 0.2

lamas, lopens, rimpochhe 66 0.2

welder 57 0.2

lecturers in college, institutes 55 0.2

customs, taxing related professionals 53 0.2

no skills 52 0.2

printing/binding, paper product worker 41 0.1

food manufacturing workers 40 0.1

civil aviation 32 0.1

Annexes

159

meet (makhep), cheese, butter seller 27 0.1

blacksmiths 27 0.1

teachers of shedra, non-formal and other 23 0.1

cobbling & cleaning services 21 0.1

cattle herder 21 0.1

safety quality inspectors 18 0.1

post mail delivery man 19 0.1

tseep (astrologer) 15 0.1

fashion, models, characters 14 0.1

metals, chemical, other plant machine 12 0.0

sawmill laborer 13 0.0

dungtsho, menpa 10 0.0

building construction finish-ups 6 0.0

garbage collectors 5 0.0

physicist, chemists related professional 4 0.0

business agents, brokers 4 0.0

potters 3 0.0

mining, mineral processing plant operat 2 0.0

heavy machine, locomotive engine operat 3 0.0

transport laborer, freight handler 3 0.0

power production & related plant operat 1 0.0

Total 30,190 100

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