Kant and Teleological Ethics.1)By Frank Thilly, University of Missouri.

The goal at which every System of ethics aims, is the dis-covery of a principle of morality, that is, to give a satisfactoryanswer to the question, What shall I do? How ought I to act?For the ancient Greeks the problem assumed the form of an in-quhy into the highest good. By the highest good they meautthe highest end or purpose, something which has absolute worth,which is desired not for the sake. of something eise, but for itsown sake, unconditionally. Aristotle expresses the idea in a cele-brated passage: As it appears that there are more ends thanone, and some of these, e. g., wealth, flutes, and Instruments ge-nerally, vve desire s means to something eise, it is evident thatthey are not all final ends. But the highest good is clearly some-thing final. Hence, if there is only one final end, this will bethe object of which we are in search, and if there are more thanone, it will be the most final of them. We speak of that whichis sought after for its own sake s more final than that which issought after s a means to something eise; we speak of thatwhich is never desired s a means to something eise s morefinal thau the things which are'desired both in themselves and sa means to something eise; and we speak of a thing s abso-lutely final, if it is always desired in itself and iiever s a meansto something eise"2).

1) A paper read before the American Philosophical Association, Co-lumbia University, New-York, at its first nieeting, April l, 1902. See theEeport of the Secretary The Philos. Keview". XI, 3, 279.

2) Nicoinachean Ethics, Bk. I chap.'V, Welldon's translation, See .also Plato, P h i leb u s, 20 ff.

Kant and Teleological UthicS. 31

For the Greeks, then, the highest good was the principle orcriterion by which they judged of actions. Modern thinkers ap-proach the problem of ethics from a different side, perhaps, buttliey, too, endeavor to find a criterion which will enable them todistinguisli between right and wrong conduct. Thus, there is aschool of moralists which examines so-called right and wrong acts,and finds that acts are right or wrong because they tend to pro-duce certain effects or realize certain ends. The hedonists say,this end is pleasure or happiness; the perfectionists seek it inperfection or development or progress. Their reasoning is some-what s follows: Such and such an act is wrong because it tendsto hinder the realization of such and such an end, say happinessor welfare. I ought not to perform such acts because they makeagainst this end. The end or purpose itself, however, thesethinkers do not attempt to justify, because it cannot be justifiedor proved. The act is right or wrong because of the end realizedor not realized by it, but the end or purpose is something thathas absolute worth, it is desired and approved for its own sake.John Stuart Mill, for example, agrees with Aristotle when he says:Questions of ultiniate ends are not amenable to direct proof.Whatever can be proved to be good must be so by being shownto be a means to something admitted to be good without proof.The rnedical art is proved to be good by its conducing to health;but how is it possible rto prove that health is good ? The art ofmusic is good for the reason, among others, that it produces plea-sure; but what proof is it possible to give that pleasure is good?"1)

In short, the attempt is made in ethics to discover a prin-ciple which is self-evident in the sense that everyone will acceptit, which no human being will reject, or at any rate, which so-called normal human beings accept or unconsciously obey in theirjudgment of actions. According to this view, the particular actsare good or bad according to the effects which they teud to pro--duce. The moral laws serve a purpose; they are means to aneiid; not absolute, but relative. They are, in the last analysis,commanded or prohibited because of their effects; the final ground

*) Mill, Uti l i tar ianism, chap. 1. See also Hume, Principlesof Morals, Appendix I, v; Spencer; Data of Ethics, chap. , 9;Sigwart, Vorf ragen der Ethik, pp. 11 f., Logik, vol. , pp. 529 ff.;PauLsen, System der Etkikj Bk. , chap. 1.

32 F. thilly,

of their rightness and wrongness lies in the puri)ose which theyserve.

Now this school of thiukers is opposed by those who denythe relative charactcr of morality, and insist upon the absolutenessof the inoral law. In onr day these moralists seek support fromthe System of Iminanuel Kant, and refer to hini s the great ad-vocate of their positiou. But it can be sliown, it seems to me,that they err in appealing to hira, and that bis standpoint is byno means s aiitagonistic to the socalled teleological theory, whichI have just described, s is generally assumed. Kant's methodof p rocedure differs from that employed by most modernthinkers, but his results do not differ much from theirs afterall. He, too, is seeking for a principle upon which to base mora-lity, and tries to find one that will prove acceptable to every ra-tional human being. Gegenwrtige Grundlegung ist aber nichtsmehr", he says, als die Aufsuchung und Festsetzung des ober-sten Princips der Moralitt, welche allein ein, in seiner Ab-sicht, ganzes und von allen anderen sittlichen Untersuchungen ab-zusonderndes Geschft ausmacht"1). But while they examine theparticular moral acts and attempt to read the supreme principleout of thern, Kant, true to his rationalistic proclivities, endeavorsto deduce it, a priori, from the notion of a rational being ssuch. Also unterscheiden sich die moralischen Gesetze, samtihren Principien, unter allem praktischen Erkenntnisse von allembrigen, darin irgend etwas Empirisches ist, nicht allein wesent-lich, sondern alle Mora lph i lo soph ie beruht gnzlich aufi h r e m reinen Teil, und; auf den Menschen angewandt, ent-lehnt sie nicht das Mindest^ von der Kenntnis desselben (Anthro-pologie), sondern giebt ihm, als vernnftigem Wesen, Gesetze apriori", etc.2) He works desperately at this task, and we al-most hear him panting for breath in his labors, but the resultdoes not seem to me to differ*so much from that'of the modernteleologist, s I shall attempt to show in the following.*)

li G r u n d l e g u n g zur Metaphys ik der Si t ten, Vorrede, p. 9,Eosenkranz.

2) Grundlegung, Vorrede, p. 6. See also Metaphys ik derSitten, pp. 15 i :

3) I have based what follows largely upon the Grund legung ,because I do not believe there is any fundamental difference betweenthiswork and Kant's later book, Krit ik der p r. V e r n u n f t , so far s thequestion involved in this article is concerned.

Kant and Teleological Ethics. oo

In the first sectioh of the G r u n d l e g u n g zur Metaphy-sik der Sitten, Kant first attacks Ms problem in a populrway. Without quitting the moral knowledge of common humanreason" *), s he says, he searches for the suprenie principle. Hisline of thought is somewhat s follows: What is the highest good?A good will. What is a good will? One that is actuated by'duty. What is duty? Duty is to be deterinined by the formalprinciple of willing. Hence a good will is one that is determinedby the formal principle of willing, i. e., not by material desires,not by empirical motives, but by an a p ri o ri form. A good willis one that is determined by law, and not by desires or inclina-tions. I must act from respect for law. But what is this law?What have I left after elimiuating all empirical motives? It isthis: Act so that you can will the maxim of your willing to be-come universal law. If I cannot will that my maxim become auniversal law, then this maxim must be rejected, not on accountof the hrm it proinises me or some one eise, but because it can-not be made to fit into a possible universal legislation s a prin-ciple. This universal legislation commands my respect, although Ido not, s yet, understand upon what this is based. I do know,however, that my evaluation of it far surpasses the value of any-thing praised by inclination, and that the necessity of my actsfroin pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty.This principle is present in every human consciousness. . Andalthough common men do not conceive it in such an abstract anduniversal form, yet they always have it before their eyes, and useit s the Standard of their decision".

What eise does tbis mean than that morality is grounded inhuman nature; not in the particular, temporary (empirical) desiresof the individual, but in the (a priori) human reason s such?There is present in every rational being a formal principle orlaw, a principle which is the condition of all morality, which thebeing respects and sets the highest value on: Act so that youcan will the maxim of your conduct to become universal law. Donot lie. Why not? Because you cannot will that lying shouldbecome universal. And why not? So werde ich bald inne, dassich zwar die Lge, aber ein allgemeines Gesetz zu lgen gar

*) I frequently follow Abbott's ^ercellent translations in the courseof the paper.

KAutetudien VIII.

34 P. Thilly,

nicht wollen knne; denn nach einem solchen wrde es eigentlichgar kein Versprechen geben, \veil es vergeblich wre, meinenWillen in Ansehung meiner knftigen Handlungen ndern vorzu-geben, die diesem \7orgeben doch nicht glauben, oder, wenn sie esbereilter Weise thten, mich doch mit gleicher Mnze bezahlenwrden, mithin meine Maxime, sobald sie zum allgemeinen Gesetzgemacht wrde, sich selbst zerstren msse"1). That is, ifeverybody lied, there would be no confidence in promises, andlying would lose its raison d'etre, and there would be no uni-versal legislation or society. The lie is wrong, not because itmay happen to injure you or some other person in this particularcase, but because the lie s such imdermiiies confidence andh inders the realization of a good \vhich you and every other ra-tional being value for its own sake. The teleological moralistwill have no difficulty in accepting these thoughts.

But the philosopher is not satisfied with a mere Statementof the principle s it is found even in the commonest man. Thecommon man, of course, needs no proof of the principle; it wouldbe a sad thing for morality if he did. We do not need scienceand philosophy to know what we should do to be honest andgood, yea, even wise and virtuous". The thinker, however, whoendeavors to construct a System of morality, must show the logi-cal necessity of the truths he presents. The principle spoken of,is not derived from experience, says Kant; it is a priori andmust be proved by a priori reasoning. We cannot derive mora-lity from examples, we need a priori principles, that is, we needa metaphysic of morals, which will give us universal and neces-sary knowledge. Aus dem Angefhrten erhellt, dass alle sitt-lichen Begriffe vllig a priori in der Vernunft ihren Sitz undUrsprung haben, und dieses zwar in der gemeinsten Menschenver-nunft ebensowohl, als der im hchsten Masse spekulativen; dasssie von keinem empirischen und darum bloss zufllige Erkenntnisseabstrahiert werden knnen; dass es nicht allein die grssteNotwendigkeit in theoretischer Absicht, wenn es bloss auf Speku-lation ankommt, erfordere, sondern auch von der grssten prak-tischen Wichtigkeit sei, ihre Begriffe und .Gesetze aus reiner Ver-nunft zu schpfen, rein und UDvermengt vorzutragen, ja den Um-fang dieses ganzen praktischen oder reinen Vernunfterkenntnisses,

G r u n d l e g u n g , p. 24, R,

Kant and Teleological Ethics. 35

d. i. das ganze Vermgen der reinen praktischen Vernunft, zu be-stimmen, hierin aber nicht, wie es wohl die spekulative Philoso-phie erlaubt, ja bisweilen notwendig findet, die Prinzipien von derbesondern Natur der menschlichen Vernunft abhngig zu machen,sondern darum, weil moralische Gesetze fr jedes vernnftigeWesen berhaupt gelten sollen, sie schon aus dem allgemeinenBegriffe eines vernnftigen Wesens berhaupt abzuleiten, und aufsolche Weise alle Moral, die zu ihrer Anwendung auf Menschender Anthropologie bedarf, zuerst unabhngig von dieser als reinePhilosophie, d. i. als Metaphysik, vollstndig vorzutragen"1).

The problem is to deduce morality from the conception of arational being s such. This Kant struggles heroically to do inthe second section of the Grundlegung. A rational being, hefinds, is one that has power to act according to the conceptionof laws, i. e., a will. When reason determines the will inevitably,then the acts of the rational being are subjectively necessary.But in human beings the will is not determined sufficiently byreason alone, it does not completely accord with reason; hencetheir acts are subjectively contingent; the will does not of neces-sity follow the principles of reason. Hence we have here in sucha will Obligation (Nthiguug). The conception of an objectiveprinciple which is obligatory for a will, in the way just shown,is a command, and the command is expressed in imperative form.There are two kinds f imperatives, hypothetical and categorical.The hypothetical imperative does not command the action absolu-tely, but only s a means to another purpose. The categoricalimperative commands a certain conduct immediately, without havings its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. Itconcerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, butits form and the principle of which it is itself the result.

Now the important question arises, Is there really such animperative s this? We cannot determine this empirically fromexamples, says Kant; the existence of the imperative must beproved a priori , that is, must be shown to follow necessarilyfrom the conception of a rational being. But before this difficulttask can be performed, we must first inform ourselves concerningthe content of the imperative. We can deduce this content apriori from the notion of a categorical imperative, that is, its

G r u n d l e g u n g , Rf, pp. 34 f.3*

36 F. flnliy,

content will follow logically from the very notion of it. When Ithink a eategorical imperative, I know at once Avhat it contains.It contains the iujunction: Act only on tliat maxirn whereby thoucaust at the same time will that it should become a universallaw". Or it may also be expressed s follows: Act s if themaxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Lawof Nature". Let us now note the application of this principle, toparticular examples. You cannot will to take your life, becauseyou cannot will that the maxim prompting the deed, which wouldbe self-love in this case, should become a universal law. Youcannot will to break your promises, because you cannot will thatsuch a breach become universal. No nature could exist in whichthe maxim prompting these acts, self-love, became the law. In athird example Kant shows that no one can will that his highernature be subordinated to his lower. Here he seems to inodifythe principle somewhat. He finds that a nature would actuallybe possible in which persons subordinated their higher functionsto the lower, but that no one could will such a nature. Simi-larly, s is brought out in a fourth example, it would be possiblefor a nature to exist in which I injured no one, but at the sametime contributed nothing to his welfare. However, it would beimpossible for me to \vill such a principle. Why? Because sucha will would contradict itself; a person would will that otherpersons help him, and at the same time he would will not to helpothers himself. Einige Handlungen sind so beschaffen, dass ihreMaxime ohne Widerspruch nicht einmal als allgemeines Natur-gesetz gedacht werden kann; weit gefehlt, dass man nochwollen knne, es sol l te ein solches werden. Bei ndern istzwar jene innere Unmglichkeit nicht anzutreffen, aber es ist dochunmglich, zu wollen, dass ihre Maxime zur Allgemeinheit einesNaturgesetzes erhoben werde, weil ein solcher Wille sich selbstwidersprechen wrde"J).

The thought here is this: You cannot will suicide and de-ception to become universal. Why not? Because if they did, anature (society) would be impossible. Nor can you will to sub-ordinate yur own higher powers to the lower. Why not? Anature would be possible in \vhich that were done. But youcannot will that such a nature should exist. Hence certain acts

*) p. 50, R.

Kant and Teleological Ethics. 37

are immoral, not because a nature would be impossible with them,but because a certain natiire, one in which the lower was sub-ordinated to the higher,. would be impossible. Noy can you willmerely not to injure anybody; you must help your fellows directly.Why? Because you want others to help you. If you desire themto help you, you must will to do the same for them.

We see, Kant packs into his categorical imperative a con-tent which he really derives from the practical examples beforehim, and not from the imperative itself, nor from the principlewhich he believes follows necessarily from the very conception ofa categorical imperative. In this way we actually get the follo-wing principles: 1) Do nothing that will hinder the realization ofthe ideal, nature (or society) (the principle of justice); but2) endeavor to promote it positively (the principle of bene-v le nee); 3) Subordinate your lower seif to your reason (theprinciple of selfcontrol) *).

It must next be proved, a priori, of course, from the.na-ture of a rational being s such, that there is such a categoricalimperative s has been described. To do this Kant now beginsall over again. He goes back to the conception of a rationalbeing, and tries to spin out of this the desired results. Eatipnalbeings have the power to determine themselves according to theconception of laws. This power is called will. The will, there-fore, determines itself by an objective principle. Such a principleis a purpose, and, when this purpose follows necessarily from thereason s such, is valid for all rational beings. There are pur-poses which are means to other purposes, but these are only re-lative. A purpose which has absolute value is a purpose in itself,an objective purpose. There is such a purpose. Every rationalbeing is a purpose or end in itself. Irrational beings have onlyrelative worth, s means, and are therefore called t hing s. Ra-tional beings are called persons, because they are ends in them-selves, and therefore objects of respect. Every rational beingconceives itself s such an end in itself, hence this purpose is anobjective purpose or end. This purpose is expressed in the im-perative form, and s a categorical imperative, because it is an

l) It is interesting to compare with the above, Sidgwick's principles:the priuciple of rational self-love, the priuciple of the duty of benevolence,and the principle of justice. See the Methods of Ethics,

38 F. Thil ly,

cnd in itself, a purpose having absolute or unconditional worth.This imperative is: So act s to treat humanity in your own per-son s well s in the person of every one eise always s an endand never s a ineans merely. In order to be raoral your actsmust couform to this principle. You nmst treat humanity s anend in itself; you must promote this end in your own person andin that of others, that is, you must make the end of your fellow-man your own.

This purpose cannot be derived from experience, 1) becauseit is a universal priuciple; 2) because in it humanity is not con-ceived s the end of men (subjectively), that is, s an objectwhich one of oneself makes one's purpose, but s an objectiveend, one which, whatever may be our purposes, must, s a law,constitute the highest limiting condition of all subjective ends orpurposes. That is, it is not a temporary, empirical or subjectivepurpose, but the highest end or purpose, one that has absolutevalue and precedence. Hence the end must spring from purereason *).

According to our first principle, the form of universality isthe objective ground of all practical legislation, that is, the for-mal condition of all morality. The subjective ground is the endor purpose. Now according to our second principle every rationalbeing s an end or purpose in itself, is the subject of all ends.Hence follows the. third principle of the will: the idea that thewill of every rational being is a universal legislative will. Thatis, every rational being is an end in itself, the highest end; itgives itself the law. Now the form of all law is universal. Henceevery rational being legislates universally. It follows from allthis that such a universal will can give a categorical imperative.Man is subject to his own will, but his own will legislates forall. The notion of such a wHeads us to the idea of a kiug-dom of ends, that is, a systematic union of different rationalbeings by common laws. This notion of a kingdom of ends is only

x) Kant thinks that because this highest end or purpose isa priorior innate in'man, it cannot be derived from experience. Now the end initself may not be the product of experience, it may be a priori, yet ourknowledge of it might be derived from experience. But Kant will notadmit this, because he aims to base morality on an absolute foiindation,to make the truths of morality s necessary as'those of mathematics, andtherefore rejects everything that smacks of empiricism..

Kant and Teleological Ethics. . 39

an ideal-, but every rational being can become a member of sucha kingdom by virtue of its universally legislating will. Hencemorality is a reference of .all acts to such legislation s wouldmake a kingdom of ends possible. This legislation, however, mustbe capable of being found in every rational being and springfrom its will. The principle of this will is: Never to act on anymaxim which cannot \vithout contradiction be also a universallaw, and accordingly always so to act that the will can at thesame time regard itself s giving in its maxims universal laws".

We conclude, s we started, with the notion of an absolutelygood will. That will is absolutely good which cannot be bad,hence whose maxim cannot contradict itself. Hence this principleis its highest law: Always act upon a maxim which you canwill to become a universal law." The same thought can also beexpressed: Act on maxims which can have s their object them-selves s univeral laws of nature". If these principles-were uni-versally obeyed, the kingdom of ends would be realized.

But we have not proved the possibility of the categoricalimperative after all, Kant now teils us. Wie ein solcher synthe-tischer praktischer Satz a priori mglich und warum er notwen-dig sei, ist eine Aufgabe, deren Auflsung nicht mehr binnen denGrenzen der Metaphysik der Sitten liegt, auch haben wir seineWahrheit hier nicht behauptet, vielweniger vorgegeben einen Be-weis derselben in unserer Gewalt zu haben. Wir zeigten nurdurch Entwickelung des einmal allgemein im Schwange gehendenBegriffs der Sittlichkeit, dass eine Autonomie des Willens dem-selben, unvermeidlicher Weise, anhnge,, oder vielmehr zum Grundeliege. Wer also Sittlichkeit fr Etwas, und nicht fr eine chim-rische Idee ohne Wahrheit hlt, muss das angefhrte Princip der-selben zugleich einrumen. Dieser Abschnitt war also, eben so,wie der erste, bloss analytisch. Dass nun Sittlichkeit kein Hirn-gespinst sei, welches alsdann folgt, wenn der kategorische Impe-rativ und mit ihm die Autonomie des Willens wahr, und als einPrincip a pr ior i schlechterdings notwendig ist, erfordert einenmglichen synthetischen Gebrauch der reinen praktischen Vernunft,den wir aber nicht wagen drfen, ohne eine Kritik dieses Ver-nunftvermgens selbst voranzuscliicken, von welcher wir in demletzten Abschnitte die zu unserer Absicht hinlnglichen Hauptzgedarzustellen haben" *). The key to the riddle which we are trying

i) B,., p. 76.

40 F. T h i l l y ,

to solvc is said to lio in the couception of frccdom. Kant, there-forc, trics to dcduco tho categorical imperative from the notion offrccdom. Frccdom is a kind of causality of rational beings: it isthe powcr to act independently of foreign causes. Stated positi-vely, the frccdom of the will is a u ton o my, the property of thewill to be a law to itself. But this is really identical with theformula of the categorical imperative, which reads: Always act ona maxim which can have s an object itself s a universal law,Hence it is plain that if there is freedom of the will, there ismorality, that is, the principle of all morality, the categoricalimperative, follows necessarily from the conception of free will.

But still the problem is not solved. It must next be provedthat all rational beings are free. Kant argues: A being that can-not act otherwise than on the i d e a o f f r e e d o m is practicallyfree, that is, all the laws hold for it which are inseparably con-nected with freedom. Now we must ascribe to every rationalbeing that has a will, the idea of freedom. For we conceive sucha being s having a reason which is practical, i. e., has causalitywith respect to objects. We cannot think a reason which iscontrolled in its judgments by foreign causes, for if that were thecase, the subject would ascribe its judgments not to its reason,but to something eise. It must regard itself s the cause of itsprinciples, independent of foreign influences, hence it must regarditself s practical reason or s the will of a practical being, hences free. But we cannot really prove this freedom, we must pre-suppose it when we conceive a being s rational and endowedwith the consciousness of freedom.

But we seem to reason in a circle here, according to Kant.First we assume that we are free in order that we may conceiveourselves s subject to moral laws; then we conceive ourselves ssubject to these laws because we have assumed that we are free.This difficulty is removed by the introduction ef the conceptionof an in te l l ig ib le world. Every rational being regards itself,first, s belonging to the world of sense, and therefore subject tothe laws of nature, and, secondly, s belonging to the intelligibleworld, and 'hence subject to laws which are independent of nature,not empirical, but grounded in reason alone.

It is not necessary, however, for our purposes, to .considerthis question of freedom any further. Kant finally concludes thatwe cannot really prove how the idea of freedom is possible. It

Kant and Teleological Ethics. 41

is possible on the assumption of an intelligible world, but wehave no knowledge of such a world. Die Frage also: wie einkategorischer Imperativ mglich sei, kann zwar soweit beantwortetwerden, als man die einzige Voraussetzung angeben kann, unterder er allein mglich ist, nmlich die Idee der Freiheit, ingleichenals man die Notwendigkeit dieser Voraussetzung einsehen kann,welches zum praktischen Gebrauche der Vernunft, d. i. zur ber-zeugung der von der Gltigkeit dieses Imperativs, mithin auch dessittlichen Gesetzes, hinreichend ist, aber wie diese Voraussetzungselbst mglich sei, lsst sich durch keine menschliche Vernunftjemals einsehen" *). If we assume the freedom of the will, itsautonomy will necessarily follow. It is not only possible to assumethis freedom without contradicting the principle of natural causa-lity in the phenomenal world, but it is absolutely necessary for arational being which is conscious of freedom to assume it practi-cally, i. e., to presuppose it in all its voluntary actions.

We have, in the preceding, frequently compared Kant's ethi-cal teaching with the teleological theory. Let us now gathertogether the results we have reached with respect to this matter,and present them in somewhat more connected form. Accordingto the teleologist, an act is, in the last analysis, right or wrong,because it does or does not tend to realize a certain end or pur-pose. This end or purpose itself is something prized for its ownsake, sometbing of absolute worth. We cannot explain why hu-man beings prize it s they do; it is a law of their nature. Itis a principle common to all human beings, though they are notnecessarily clearly conscious of its existence. A certain school ofteleologists, called hedonists, teaches that pleasure is the end orpurpose described. This view Kant vehemently opposes. There is,however, another school, according to which the end or purposeis not pleasure, but the weif are of humanity, such a developmentof man's nature that his lower impulses, his material seif, shallbe subordinated to his higher powers, his spiritual seif, and thathe may become a worthy member of society. And that is, in myopinion, exactly what Kant teaches, though he states it in some-what different language and attempts to prove it in a diffe-rent way.

He, too, finds in man a principle that is common to all ra-tional beings, a principle over and Hbove his temporary individual

. i) p. 96.

42 F. Thil ly,

desires and inclinations, au end or purpose that docs not derivcits valuo from something elso, but has absolute worth. That is,overy rational being conceives itself s an end in itself, meaningby its seif not its particular, momentary desires, but that whichit has in common with all rational beings, that which makes it ahuman being. This purpose expresses itself in imperative form:Treat every personality, your own s well s others', s au end initself and never s a means. That will make possible a kingdomof ends, a union of rational beings, a society. This society Avouldbe realized if every man obeyed the dictates of his nature, thecategorical imperative. But the ideal caniiot be realized withoutobedience to law. The principle must therefore be observed:Never do anything which you cannot will to become a universallaw. That is, the ideal cannot be reached unless every man ful-fils the primary coudition of its realization. If lying and stealingbecame universal, there could be no kingdom of ends, no society.You can always judge of the morality of an act by asking your-self whether you would be willing to have everybody do s youdo. Its fitness to become a univeral law determines the worth ofthe act. This principle will hinder you from treating your fellowmen s means merely, for you cannot will that they treat you smeans. If you treat each other s means, you cannot realizethe ideal which you prize above everything eise, the ideal of hu-manity.

Now such acts are, in the last aualysis, moral s make itpossible to realize the ideal, the union of rational beings, thekingdom of ends. Not only must we refrain from perfonning actswhich hinder the realization of the ideal, we must also endeavorto promote the ideal directly by positive action, by helping our'fellows. And it is not enough to have any union whatever.The" highest ideal is a society of a certain Mnd, a kingdom inwhich the lower desires and Impulses of man are controlled byreason, and in which the individual has regard for the whole. Itwould be possible, perhaps, to have a society in which every maurefrained from injuring his fellows and indulged his lower appetites.But such union is not Kant's ideal. Even if such a state werepossible, we could not will its existence.

It is held by some that Kant eliminates the teleological ele-ments which we have pointed out, in his later work, the Kritikder praktischen Vernunft . Thus Dr. Thon, in a recent work, ,

Kant and Teleological Etliics. 43

Die Grundpr inc ip ien der Kan t i s chen M o r a l p h i l o s o -p h i e in ihrer Entwickelung, admits tliat the principle: Actso tliat you can will the- maxim of your action to become uni-versal law, is a disguised eudaemonism, but asserts that the prin-ciple is modified in the Kritik der pr. Vernunf t in such amanner s to escape this Charge. The new reading is: Act sothat the maxim of your will can always at the same time holdgood s a principle of universal legislation. I quote from Dr.Thon: Ganz anders aber gestaltet sich die Beurteilung des kate-gorischen Imperativs, wenn in seiner Formel an die Stelle desWollen-Knnens" ein Gelten-Knnen" tritt. Die Entscheidungist dann nicht mehr subjektiv, sondern objektiv, nicht mehr psy-chologisch, sondern nur logisch. Der Massstab fr die Tauglich-keit der Maxime zum allgemeinen Gesetz liegt dann nur im logi-schen Satze des Widerspruchs. Hebt sich eine Maxime, wenn sieverallgemeinert wird, nicht selbst auf, d. h. bergeht sie nicht inihr kontradiktorisches Gegenteil, dann knnte sie ein allgemeinesGesetz werden, und sie ist daher moralisch-zulssig. Wir nehmennun das klassische Beispiel Kant's vom Depositum vor. Ich binim Besitze eines Depositums, dessen Eigentmer gestorben ist,ohne eine Urkunde darber hinterlassen zu haben. Soll ich esden Erben zurckgeben, oder nicht? Gesetzt, ich wrde mir zurMaxime machen, ein Depositum nicht zurckzugeben. Nun ver-suche ich, diese Maxime zu einem allgemeinen Gesetz auszubauen.Da sehe ich sofort ein, dass sie in ihr kontradiktorisches Gegenteilbergeht. Depositum heisst: Die Anlage eines Wertgegenstandes,mit der ausdrcklichen Bedingung der Rckerstattung desselben.Das aus der Verallgemeinerung meiner Maxime hervorgegangeneGesetz wrde also lauten: Der Gegenstand, der zurckgegebenwerden soll, soll nicht zurckgegeben werden. Meine Maximetaugt also offenbar nicht fr ein allgemeines Gesetz und ist somitunmoralisch. Wir haben hier mit reinen Begriffen operiert, dieErfahrung gar nicht zu Hilfe genommen, und die Formel hat sichdoch als zuverlssig erwiesen" >).

I cannot agree with Dr. Thon. I do not believe that Kantintended to modify the principle in his later work in the mannerindicated by Dr. Thon, but simply to state it raore coucisely andaccurately. I see no , great difference between the examples of

*) pp. 63-64.

44 F. Thi l ly ,

t ho applicatiou of this principlc, s given, say, ou pages 137,150 f., and 192, of Kosenkmnz's edition of the K r i t i k derp r a k t i s c h e n V e r n u n f t , and the corresponding examples inthe earlier work. Thns Kant says on page 159: Eben so wirddie Maxime, die ich in Ansehung der freien Disposition ber meinLeben nehme, sofort bestimmt, wenn ich mich frage, wie sie seinmsste, damit sich eine Natur nach einem Gesetze derselben er-halte. Offenbar wrde Niemand in einer solchen Natur sein Lebenw i l l k r l i c h endigen knnen, denn eine solche Verfassung wrdekeine bleibende Naturordnung sein, und so in allen brigen Fllen".He likewise says in connection with the deposit-example: I amnot williug to make a general law that everyone should keep adeposit provided it cannot be proved that such a deposit hasbeen made. Ich werde sofort gewahr, dass ein solches Princip,als Gesetz, sich selbst vernichten wrde, weil es machen wrde,dass es gar kein Depositum gbe. Ein praktisches Gesetz, dasich dafr erkenne, muss sich zur allgemeinen Gesetzgebung quali-ficieren; dies ist ein identischer Satz und also fr sich klar. Sageich nun, mein Wille- steht unter einem praktischen Gese tze , sokann ich nicht meine Neigung (z. B. im gegenwrtigen Falle meineHabsucht) als den zu einem allgemeinen praktischen Gesetzeschicklichen Bestimmungsgrund desselben anfhren: denn diese,\veit gefehlt, dass sie zu einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung tauglichsein sollte, so muss sie vielmehr in der Form eines allgemeinenGesetzes sich selbst aufreiben. Denn da sonst ein allgemeinesNaturgesetz Alles einstimmig macht, so wrde hier, wenn man derMaxime die Allgemeinheit eines Gesetzes geben wollte, gerade dasusserste Widerspiel der Einstimmung, der rgste Widerstreit unddie gnzliche Vernichtung der Maxime selbst und ihrer Absichterfolgen. Denn der Wille hat alsdann nicht ein und dasselbe Ob-jekt, sondern ein Jeder hat das. seinige (sein eignes Wohlbefinden),welches sich zwar zuflligerweise auch mit Anderer ihren Ab-sichten, die sie gleichfalls auf sich selbst richten, vertragen kann,aber lange nicht zum Gesetze hinreichend ist, weil die Ausnahmen,die man gelegentlich zu machen befugt ist, endlos sind, und garnicht bestimmt in eine allgemeine Kegel befasst werden knnen".

I do not see that there would be any logicl contradictionin keeping a deposit, s Dr, Thon asserts. Suppose we define adeposit s something which is given one man by another withthe understanding that it be returned. Now suppose I refuse to

Kant ana Teleologicai Ethics. 45

return a deposit. I ask myself: What if everybody refused toreturn a deposit? Well, even if everybody should refuse to returna deposit, a deposit would still remain a deposit. If everybodyshould refuse to return a deposit, that would not contradict thedefinition of a deposit by any means. A deposit would still be adeposit. There is no logical contradiction in saying, Let everyonerefuse to return what he promised to return. Failure to returndeposits, can become a universal law without violating the logicalprinciple of contradiction, but it cannot become a law withoutdefeating its own purpose and making social life impossible. Ifno one ever returned a deposit, no one would ever inake one, noone would trust any one eise, and the ideal, the kingdom of ends,would not be realized. Heiice why not keep deposits? Becauseof the effect which failure to restore his rightful property to anowner would tend to produce.

Kant's standpoint may safely be characterized s teleological.The difference between his theory and that of the modern teleo-logical moralist is one of method. Kant attempts to follow theold rationalistic method, to construct a logic-proof System, afterthe manner of mathematics, to deduce from principles that areuniversal and necessary (a priori), other truths having the sameabsolute validity. This he is particularly anxious to do in hisethical inquiries. He endeavors to base the truths of ethics uponan absolutely sure foundation, a task which in his opiniom, empi-iicism is utterly unable to perform. The moral laws must notonly seem absolute to the common man, but must be proved tobe to by the philosopher. In order to realize this rationalisticideal and to deduce every possible moral truth from the conceptionof a ratiunal being s such, Kant is, of course, compelled to givethis conception the content \vhich he afterwards draws out of it,or to pretend that somethiug follows from his so-called first prin-ciples that does not follow at all. Thus the content of the cate-.gorical imperative cannot be derived from the conception of suchan imperative without the application of force. Nor is it possibleto deduce from the conceptiou of a rational being \vhat its pur-pose is, unless we first read that purpose into our definition ofsuch a being. It is, of course, possible to define a rational beingin such a'way s to make it the bearer of any kind and anynumber of qualities we choose, but in any event the definitionwill ultimately have to rest upon experience in order to have any

46 #. ihilly, Kant and Teleological Ethic.

value at all. The modern teleogist examines the laws whichhuman beings accept s moral and analyzes the mental states towhich they owe their existence. By reflection upon experiencehe hopes to reach the principle or principles upon which moralityis based, and may then attempt to deduce from these their logi-cal consequences, In other words, he employs the methods follo-wed by all sciences, and his results have the same value s thoseof any other brauch of scientific knowledge, no more, no less.