theories on action

8/8/2019 Theories on Action

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Theories of Action

The idea of an action science that we have been describing isgrounded in our pract ice as researchers , educators , and in ter-ventionists working within the theory of action approach (Argy-ri s and Schon, 1974, 1978; Argyris , 1976, 1980,1982,1985).It may well be that o th e r research programs and theoretical ap-proaches can provide alternative ways of conducting action sci-ence. Our particular approach, however, prov ides the perspec-tive f rom which we have been able to envis ion an action science.It is also the perspective f rom which we criticize and providealternatives to examples of mainstream re sea rch in Part Two,and f rom which we describe the process of learning the skillsnecessary to conduct action science in Par t Three. Hence, thischapter presents the theoretical orientation which i n f o r m s ourwork.

The theory of action approach begins with a conceptionof human beings as designers of action. To see human behaviorunder the aspect of action is to see it as constituted by themeanings and intentions of agents. Agents design action toachieve i n t en d ed consequences , and moni to r themselves to learn

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T h e o r i e s of Action 81if their actions are effec t ive . They make sense of their envi ron-ment by constructing m e a n i n g s to which they attend, and t h e s econstructions in turn guide action. In monitoring the ef fec t ive-ness of action, they also monitor th e su i tab i l i ty of their con-struction of the environment.

T h e c o m p l e x i t y of the design task far exceeds th e i n fo r -m a t i o n - p r o c e s s i n g capabili t ies of the human mind ( S i m o n ,1969). Designing action r equ i r es that agent s c o n s t r u c t a s impli -f ied r e p r e se n t a t i o n of the environment and a manageable set ofcausal theor ies that presc r ibe how to achieve the intended con-s e q u e n c e s . It would be very ine f f i c i en t to construct s u c h r ep re -sentations and t h e o r i e s f rom scratch in each s i t u a t i o n . Rather,agents learn a reper to i re of concepts, schemas, and s t ra tegies ,and they learn p r o g r a m s for d r a w i n g f rom their r e p e r t o i r e todesign representations and action for unique situations. Wespeak of such design programs as theories of action.

Theories of ActionThese theories may be thought of as a very large set ofcomplexly re la ted propos i t ions . The form of a proposition in a

theory of action is, "In situation s, to achieve consequence c,do action a" (Argyr is and Schon, 1974). From the p e r s p e c t i v eof the agent who holds the theory, it is a theory of control. Itstates what the agent should do to achieve certain r esu l t s . Froman observer ' s perspect ive, to a t t r i b u t e a theory of action to anagent is to propose a theory of explanation or prediction. In thelanguage of the prev i ous chapter, i t is to make a di spos i t iona l at-tribution. The example we used is, "John fo l lows the ru le , 'If Iam about to deprecate someone, f i rs t deprecate myself . " " Butf rom John's per spec t ive , this is a theory of control. We can seeth i s by mak i ng explici t th e in tended consequence of enact ingthe rule, which, let us su ppo se , is to avoid making the other per-son defensive. Hence a proposition of a theory of action can beu n d e r s t o o d b o t h as a disposition of an agent and as a t h e o r y ofcausal responsibi l i ty held by an agen t .Espoused Theory and Theory-in-Use. There are two k i n d sof t heor ie s of action. Espoused t h e o r i e s are those that an indi-


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82 A ction Sciencevidual claims to follow. Theories-in-use are those that can be in-fer red f rom action. For example, when asked how he woulddeal with a disagreement with a client, a management consultantsaid that he would first state what he understood to be the sub-stance of the disagreement, and then discuss with the clientwhat kind of data would resolve it. This was his espoused the-ory. But when we examined a tape recording of what the con-sultant actually did in that s i tuat ion, w e f o u n d that he advo-cated his own view and dismissed that of the client.Th e discrepancy between what people say and what theydo is an old story. It is somet imes expressed in the saying, "Doas I say,not as I do."But the distinction between espoused the-ory and theory-in-use goes beyond this common conception. Itis true that what people do often differs from the theories theyespouse. We are saying , however, that there is a theory that isconsis tent with what they do; and this we call their theory- in-use. Our dis t inct ion is not between t h e ory and act ion but be-tween tw o diffe rent theories of action: those that peopleespouse , and those that they use.O ne reason for insisting thatw h a t people do is consistent with the theory (in-use) that theyhold, even though i t may be inconsis tent with the ir espousedtheories, is to emphasize that what people do is not accidental.They do not "just happen" to act in a particular way.Rather,the i r action is designed; and, as agents, they are responsible forthe design.

Espoused theory and theory-in-use may be consistent orinconsistent, and the agent may or may not be aware of any in-consistency. The agent is aware of the e spo u se d theory, by defi-nition, since it is the theory that the agent claims to fo l low. Re-call in this connection our previous discussion of tacit knowledgeand ru le -governed behavior. As many approaches to social in-quiry emphasize, human beings can be understood to act ac-cording to rules that they cannot state.

Theories-in-use are the of ten tacit cognitive maps bywhich human beings design action. Theories-in-use can be madeexplicit by re f lec t ing on action. But we should note that the actof ref lection is itself governed by theories-in-use. Becoming anact ion sc ient i s t involves learning to reflect on reflection-in-


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Theories of Action 83act ion, making explicit th e theories- in-use that in fo rm i t , andlearning to design and produce new theories- in-use for reflec-tion and action.

Nested Theories. Theories of action can be ar t i cu la ted atdifferent levels of detail. Consider a theory-in-use description ofthe c o m m o n i n te rpersona l strategy that w e call "eas ing- in":"If you are a bo u t to cri t ic ize someone w h o might b e come de-fensive and you want him to see the point w i t h o u t undue re-s i s tance , do not state the criticism openly; instead, ask ques-tions such that if he answers them correctly, he will figure outwhat you are not saying." This is a relatively high-level designprogram. The act ion injunction to ask quest ions of a certainkind could be p e r f o r m e d only with the help of a great manydetailed propositions about the production of grammatical sen-tences, motor skills fo r speech, and so f o r t h . S i mi la r ly , th e rec-ognition of a par t i cu la r situation as one in which another personm a y b e c o m e defens ive r equ i r es t he coordinated p e r f o r m a n c e o fcomplicated perceptual routines and higher-order judgmentsabout h u m a n defensiveness.

A full speci f ica t ion of the theories of action held by anyindividua l would be enormously lengthy and complex. Yet inorder to understand theories of action it is necessary to makethem explicit. W h a t is required are mode ls s impl i f i ed r ep resen-t a t ionschosen to i l l uminate those fea tures of theor ies of ac-tion most relevant to par t i cu la r f ields of inqui ry . Linguis t ics , forexample, selects those fea tures relevant to the production ofgrammatical s e n t e n c e s .

Action science concentrates on the level of abstraction atwhich agents in everyday life re f lec t on their actions. The spot-light of attention sh i f t s depending on the concerns of agents inparticular situations, but the example of the questioning strat-egy of easing-in i l lus t ra tes a characteristic level of abstraction.Action science would probably not focus on the par t i cu la r in-tonation patterns by which speakers of English communicatedoubt, although the action scient is t might indeed inquire intowhether hea re r s a t t r ibu ted doubt to a speaker or into the rea-soning that led an agent to c o m m u n i c a te d o u b t .

The models we create in action sc ience are s h a p e d by our


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84 Action Scienceinterest in helping human beings to make more i n fo r m e d choicesin creating the worlds in which they are embedded. Because weare interested in helping human beings design and implementaction, our models should be "connectable" to concrete situa-tions. We seek both general izabi l i ty and attention to the individ-ual case. This is dif f icul t to achieve , but probably no more diff i -cult than for all human beings who must do this as agents ineveryday l i fe,

A s action sc ient is t s we are concerned with the ef fect ivef u n c t i o n i n g of interventionists in behavio ra l systems, whichrange f r o m individuals to groups, intergroups, organizations,and communities. We are therefore centrally concerned with thefea tures of theories of action that promote or inhibit learning inbehavioral systems. The models we will describe were developedin l ight of earlier theories about what it is in the way humanbe ings interact that leads to escalat ing error and the inability tolearn (Argyr i s , 1970). The models prov ide ways to test and ex-tend the t heo ry and, at the same t ime, help client systems tor e f l ec t on their theor ies- in-use and to learn new t heor i es - in -use .

Modeling Theories-in-Use. M o d e l s of theo r i e s - i n -use canbe constructed according to the schematic f r ame shown in Fig-ure 1. Govern ing variables are values that actors seek to sa t i s fy .

Figure 1. Theory-in-Use Model.GoverningvariablesA f|

ActionstrategiesA

. Consequence

Each governing variable can be thought of as a continuum witha pre fe r r ed range. For example, individuals would not wantanxiety to get too high; but they might not want anxiety todrop to zero, either, lest they fee l bored. We commonly speakof actions as directed t o wa rd an end state, as if t he re were onlyone re levan t governing var iable ; but in fact , human be ings live ina field of many governing variables. These variables can be ig-


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Theories of Action 85n o r e d as long as the i r values are within a sa t i s f ac to ry range ;when on e falls out of that range , h o w e v e r , t he ac to r takes s tepsto br ing it back to a sa t i s f ac to ry level. Any action can have animpact on many governing variables. Agents typically musttrade o ff among govern ing variables , b e c a u s e ac t ions that raiseth e value of one may l o w e r th e value of another.

Action strategies are sequences of moves used by actorsin par t i cu la r s i tua t i ons to sat isfy governing var iables . Actionstrategies have intended consequences, which are those that theactor bel ieves will re su l t f rom th e action an d will sat is fy govern-ing var iables . C o n s e q u e n c e s feed back to action strategies andgoverning variables.Actions have consequences for the b e h a v i o r a l w o r l d , fo rlearning, and for effectiveness . Consequences may be intendedo r u n i n t e n d e d , p r o d u c t i ve o r c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . C o n s e q u e n c e sthat are un i n t e nde d m ay nevertheless be des igned, in the follow-in g sense : Action i n t e n d e d to achieve particular consequencesmay, by vir tue of its design, necessarily lead to consequencesthat are unintended. For example, the q u e s t i o n i n g s t ra tegy ofeasing-in typically creates the very defens iveness that it is in-tended to avoid, because the recipient typically understandsthat th e actor is easing-in. Indeed, easing- in can be successfulonly if the r ec ip ien t under s t ands that he is su ppo se d to a n s w e rthe questions in a particular way, and this entails the under-s t a n d i n g that the actor is negat ive ly evalua t ing the recipient andact ing as if this were not the case.

T he c o n s e q u e n c e s of action depend on the theor ies - in-use of recipients as wel l as those of actors. On e ' s t heory- in -useinc ludes a vast store of in fo rmat ion about what pe o p le are likeand how they will respond in var ious situations. We can arguethat c o n s e q u e n c e s are designed, whether they are intended orunintended, when they necessar i ly fol low from the act ion andth e actor's p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s about th e theor ies - in-use o f rec ip-ients.

Single-Loop and Double-Loop Learning. W h e n the con-sequences of an action strategy are as the agent intends, thenthere is a match between intention and outcome, and thet heory- in -use of the agent is c o n f i r m e d . If the c o n s e q u e n c e s


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86 Action Scienceare unintended, and especially if they are counterproduc t ive ,the re is a mismatch or an error . The first response to error istypically to search for another action strategy that will satisfythe same governing variables. For example, if the agent wantsto suppress confl ict (governing variable) and to this end avoidssaying any t h i ng that might be controversial (act ion st rategy) ,but others raise threatening i ssues anyway (mismatch), theagent may try the strategy of ta lking volubly about issues onwhich everyone is l ikely to agree. In such a case, when new ac-tion strategies are used in the service of the same governingvariables, we speak of single-loop learning. W e do so becausethere is a change in action but not in the governing variables.

Another possibility is to change the governing variablesthemselves. For example, rather than suppress confl ic t , theagent might choose to emphasize open inquiry. The associatedaction strategy might be to initiate discussion of confl ic tualissues. In such cases we speak of double-loop learning. We sug-gested in the previous chapter that the deliberative processappropriate to double-loop learning is similar to wha t Rorty( 1 9 7 9 ) calls abnormal discourse. It is concerned not withchoosing among competing chains of means-ends reasoningwithin a given set of standards, but with choosing among com-peting sets of standards ("frames" or "paradigms").

Having made a clear distinction between single-loop learn-ing and double-loop learning, we must note that in fact the twokinds of learning exist on a continuum. Values and strategiesmay be nested, and learning that is double loop with respect topar t icular actions m ay appear single loop with respect to moreencompassing governing variables. For example, both the e f fo r tto suppress confl ic t and the ef for t to discuss conflict openlymi gh t be in the interests of "getting others to do what I thinkbest." Double-loop learning, on this account, might involve de-signing ways to jointly decide whether to discuss conflict . A n-other way of thinking of this nested quality is in terms ofsecond-order s tandards by which alternative f rames or para-digms may be evaluated.There are several cues by which double- loop problemsmay be identif ied in practice. Dealing w i t h double- loop prob-lems requires dealing with th e defenses of h u m a n beings. Thus


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Theories of Action 87si tuat ions in which part ic ipants give cues that t h e y or othersmigh t feel embarrassed or t h rea ten ed are l ikely to requiredouble- loop learning. Problems that are undiscussable are l ikelyto be double loop; and the undiscussability itself is most cer-tainly a double - loop prob lem, as is the cover-up of the undis-cussability. Problems that persist despite efforts to solve themare l ikely to have double-loop issues embedded in them. Forexample, a business mi gh t cont inue to lose money because ithas higher costs than its compet i to rs or because its m a rke t isshrinking. But if the business is t ry ing the w ro n g solutions or ifthere are no solutions within its capability, why are the se e r ro r snot d i scove red? Per s i s t en t er ror s in learning point to double-loop problems. These are problems that r e q u i r e inquiry intogoverning variables if t hey are to be solved in such a way thatthey rem ain solved.

There are i n s t ruc t i ve paral lels between th e theory of ac-tion approach and family systems theory. Thus, in discussingfami l ies , Watz lawi ck , Weakland , and Fisch (1974) d i s t i ngu i shbetween f i rs t-order change and second-order change. First-orderchange occurs when people decrease devi a t i on f r o m a set norm.This is an application of the cybernetic principle of negat ivefeedback mechanisms (W atz l aw ick , Beavin , and Jackson, 1967,p. 31). For e x a m p l e , a thermostat turns on the fu rnace whenthe temperature falls below a certain point. In our language, thethermostat is a device for s ingle - loop learn in g .

S e c o n d - o r d e r change is necessary, argue W a t z l a w i c k ,Weakland, and Fisch, when the s t ructure of the fami ly sys temmust undergo change. Indeed, they argue that families developproblems (and wind up in the therapist's off ice ) when attemptsat first-order change are made in situations in which the sys-t em' s s t ruc ture itself has to undergo change. They re fe r to thisproblem cycle as the "more of the same" sy n d ro m e . F or exam-ple, Father may nag Johnny a b o u t h is schoolwork , which leadsthe rebe l l ious Johnny to play hookey more of ten , which leadsFather to escalate his nagging and threats, and so f o r t h . Thetherapis t ' s ro le is to bring a b o u t second-order changechangethat alters th e s t ruc ture of the sys tem, often by in te rvent ionsthat ref rame the meaning of w h a t is going on.

In our approach to action science we focus on double-


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88 Action Scienceloop learning, the theor ies- in-use that inhibit it, and the ways inwhich theories-in-use that enhance a system's capacity fordouble-loop learning may be learned. We f ind that ind ividualsand organizations are generally competent at single-loop learn-ing, but are generally incompetent at double-loop learning.Family systems t heor i s t s seem to agree that human beings havelittle competence for double-loop learning and that the inter-ventionis t provides help by enabling double-loop learning tooccur. B u t there is an important di f fe rence between fami ly sys-tems theory and our approach. We are concerned with increas-ing the client system's capacity for double-loop l ea rn ing . Thefamily the rap i s t is concerned with bringing a bo u t a double-loopchange, but not with increasing the fami ly ' s competence to en-gage in double-loop learning more generally. For example, atherapist might h e l p a fami ly to solve a problem such as chronicb icker ing ; but members of the family do not learn the skills tocorrect such situations without intervention by an outsider.Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch recognize this, but it does notconcern them. A fami ly might have to return to the therapistwhen a new problem ar ises; but the therapist, who is not con-cerned with helping the fami ly gain insight into its problem butrather w i t h correcting the problem, is supposed to be able towork quickly. It may in fact be more eff ic ient to go to a ther-apist per iodica l ly than to learn skills for double-loop learningon one's own; and so this may be an appropriate strategy infami ly therapy, especially with families that are not articulateand reflect ive. But our practice is with organizations and withhelping profess iona ls , both counselors and consultants. Theseare clients for whom it is important not only to solve particu-lar problems but to increase their capacity for double- looplearning more generally.

Model I Theory-in-UseArgyr i s and Schon (1974) deve loped a model, or an ideal

type, that describes features of theories- in-use that inhibi tdouble- loop learning. While espoused theor ies vary widely , re-search indicates that there is almost no variance in t heory- in -


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Theories of Action 89use ( Argy r i s , 1976, 1982). More precisely, the theories-in-use ofvirtually everyone we have studied are consistent with the mas-ter program cal led Model I . There is considerable di f ferencewithin M ode l I in the weightings individuals give to part iculargoverning variables, as well as in the particular strategies individ-uals f av o r , but these lower-order variations appear to be gov-erned by the Model I master program (seeTable 1).

The f o u r governing variables of Model I are (1) achievethe purpose as the actor d e f i n e s it; (2) win, do not lose; (3) sup-press negative feelings; and (4) emphasize rationality.

The primary behavioral strategies in Model I are to con-trol th e re l evant env i ronment and tasks uni la te ra l ly and to pro-' tect oneself and others unilaterally. Thus, the underlying behav-ioral strategy is unilateral control over others. Characteristicways of implementing this strategy include making unillustratedattributions and evaluations, advocating courses of action inways that discourage inqui ry , t reat ing one ' s own views as ob-viously correct, making covert attributions, evaluations, andface -sav ing moves such as leaving potentially embarrassing fac t sunstated.The consequences of Model I strategies include defensiveinterpersonal and group relationships, low freedom of choice,and reduced production of valid information. There are negativeconsequences for learning, because there is little public testingo f ideas. The hypotheses that people generate tend to becomeself-sealing. What learning does occur remains within the boundsof what is acceptable. Double-loop learning does not tend to oc-cur. As a result, error escalates and e f f e c t iv e n e s s in problemsolving and in execution of action tends to decrease.

In claiming that human beings are programmed withModel I theory-in-use, we are making predictions about thekinds of strategies they wil l and will not use, and the kinds ofconsequences that wil l and will not occur. These predictionshave been tested in dozens of client groups that included thou-sands of individuals, and to date they have not been discon-f i r m e d (see Argyris, 1982, chap. 3). Most people hold espousedtheories inconsistent with Model I; and, when confronted withour predictions about the strategies they wil l use, seek to dem-


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Table 1. Model I Theory-in-Use.

Governing Variables Action Strategies Consequences for theBehavioral World ConsequencesforLearning EffectivenessDefine goals and try toachieve them.

Maximize winning andminimize losing.

Design and manage theenvironment unilater-ally (be persuasive, ap-peal to larger goals).

Own and control thetask (claim ownershipof the task, be guard-ian of definition andexecution of task).

Actor seen as defensive,inconsistent, incongru-ent, competitive, con-trolling, fearful ofbeing vulnerable, manip-ulative, withholding offeelings, overly con-cerned about self andothers or undercon-cerned about others.Defensive interpersonaland group relationship(dependence upon ac-tor, little additivity,little helping of others).

Self-sealing.

Decreased effectiveness.

Single-loop learning.


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Minimize generatingor expressing negativefeelings.

Be rational.

Unilterally protect your-self (speak with inferredcategories accompaniedby little or no directlyobservable behavior, beblind to impact on oth-ers and to the incon-gruity between rhetoricand behavior, reduceincongruity by defen-sive actions such asblaming, stereotyping,suppressing feelings,intellectualizing).Unilaterally protect oth-ers from being hurt(withhold information,create rules to censorinformation and behav-ior, hold private meet-ings).

Defensive norms (mis-trust , lack of risk tak-Little testing of the-ories publicly. Muching, conformity, external testing of theoriescommitment, emphasis privately,

on diplomacy, power-centered competition,and rivalry).

Little freedom ofchoice, internal com-mitment, or risk tak-ing.

Source: Argyris and Schon, 1974.


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92 Act ion Scienceonstrate that our predictions are not valid. But even when Mod-el I has been explained and people are trying to produce actionthat does not fit the model, they are unable to do so. This re-sult holds whenever people are dealing with double-loop i ssues ,which is to say whenever they are dealing with threateningissues. At best, they are able to produce strategies consistentwith opposite Model I, the mirror image of Model I.The governing variables of opposi te Mo d e l I are (1) par-ticipation o f eve ryone in def in ing purposes; (2 ) everyone wins ,no one loses ; (3) express fee l ings; and (4) suppress the cogni-tive intellective aspec ts of action. The associated behavioralstrategies include emphasiz ing inqui ry and minimizing unilat-eral control (Argyr i s , 1 9 7 9 ) .

Opposite Model I is more common as an espoused theorythan as a theory-in-use. Elements f rom it are practiced in T-groups and nondirect ive therapies . Usual ly elements of opposi teModel I are embedded in an underlying Model I theory-in-use inwhich unilateral protection of self and others is prominent, andcompet i t iveness and unilateral control are present but camou-flaged. It is of t en used in oscillation with M o d e l I; the agenttries some elements f r om opposite M o d e l I, and, if they don'tseem to be working, switches to M o d e l I. The consequences ofopposite M o d e l I for the behavioral world, for learning, and foreffectiveness are similar to those of the more overt variety ofModel I. In our discussion of the learning process in Part Threewe w ill i l lustrate these ideas with concrete examples .

Action takes on the f ea tu re s represented by Model Iespecially in situations that agents perceive as potentially threat-ening or embarrass ing. It is in such si tuat ions that agents aremost oriented to control l ing others and to protec t ing them-selves. Self-protection f r e q u e n t l y takes the f o r m of attributingresponsibility for error to others or to the situation rather thanto oneself. The very situations that most require double-looplearning are the ones that most evoke Model I actionactionthat i nh ib i t s double-loop learning.

Model O-I: The Behavioral World. Individuals are em-bed d ed in a behavioral world or culture. This behavioral worldhas a dual na ture . On the one hand, it is created by the act ions


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94 Action ScienceFigure 2. Mo d e l O-I Limited Learn ing Systems.

( 1 )Informationthat rangesfrom:inaccessible/accessible,ambiguous/unambiguous,vague/clear,inconsistent/consistent,incongruent/congruent

(2)interacts

with

(3)Model Itheories-in-use(advocacycoupled withunilateralcoercion;avoidance ofthreateningissues;nondisconfirmableassertions;privatetesting)

(4)

(5)Unawareness of:impact on error discoveryand correction; inability todiscover/invent/ producedouble-loop solutions ( 6 )

Secondaryysfunct ional groupPrimary dynamics (win/ losedynamics; nonadditivity;inhibitoryconforrmty; group think) inhibitoryloops . . . 1PSDysfunctional intergroupdynamics (polarization ofissues; d estructive warfare)

Dysfunctional organizationalnorms an d activities(games of deception; systems 3expected to be brittle andunchangeable; organizationsnot for double-loop learning)

Indicates feedback loops to columnsidentified by numbers( 2 ) , (3), ( 4 ) , (5)

Source: Argyris, 1982.


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Theories of Action 95

( 7 )Correctable errors(those errors of which peopleare aware and whosediscovery and correction poseminimal threat to individuals

1( 1 0 )(8)

Learning cycle(discoverinventproduceevaluate)

Error (mismatch)

Action Appropriate___ . response

(match/match)

discovery is a threat bu twhose camouflage is morethreatening) Camouflage errorCamouflage primary

Uncorrectable errors(errors whose discovery is athreat to individuals and tosystem of hiding error an dinability to correct error; jJinformation that threatens ^Model I theroy-in-use theerrors that they are unawareo f )

ana secondaryinhibitory loopsCamouflage thecamouflageBackup protectiveactivities

( 2 ) , (3), (4), (5),(6) (2), (3), (4), (5),

Decreaseprobability fo rdouble-loopSecond- learning5 ' Decreaseorder probability forloops deuterolearning

Increasedouble bindsJ for individuals5 5 JCO

( 6 ) , (7) (2), (3), (4),(5( 6 ) , (7), (8 )


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96 Action Sciencecompiling special files "just in case the boss asks." All this cre-ates double b i n d s for committed individuals . On the one handthey see errors and unproductive activities that, as responsiblem em bers of the organizat ion , they feel an obligation to correct ;but on the other hand, to bring these threatening issues to thesurface may be perceived as disloyal and as a threat to the or-ganiza t ion.

Relation to Other Descriptive Theories. There is subs tan -tial agreement among scholars from several theoretical perspec-tives on the empir ical nature of the phenomena that we explainwith M o d e l s I and O-I. The descriptions produced by leading re-searchers in social psychology, sociology, and organiza t iona l be-havior are consistent with our descr ip t ions of the Model Iworld . Where we differ is in the generative or causal mecha-nisms that w e ident i fy and in the attention w e give to possibili-ties for changing the world as it exis t s .

One of the most popular topics in contemporary socialpsychology is the reasoning processes of everyday l i fe (Ni sbe t tand Ross, 1980; Einhorn and Hogar th , 1981). M u c h of this re-search has focused on the seeming er rors and biases of socialcognition. Not only are people prone to i n fe ren t i a l errors, butthey also reason in ways that cause errors to persist. New dataare interpreted in terms of previous ly f o r m e d opinions , to thepoint that d i sconf i rmi ng data are ignored or mis in te rp re t ed .People act in ways that elicit data that conf i rm their op in ions ,and express grea t conf idence in reasoning that has little valid-i ty . They are pred i sposed to attribute the behavior of other s(but not their own) to dispositional traits.Such f ind ings are consistent with what we would expectf r o m individuals p r o g r a m m e d with M o d e l I theo ry - i n -use . Theseindividuals see their own views as obvious and do not test thempub l i c ly . They m a k e attributions about others f r o m scantydata, act in ways that elicit data that they then interpret as con-firming their attributions, and remain unaware of their respon-sibili ty for genera t ing these data.

One of the mo s t inf luent ial theoris ts of everyday interac-tion has proposed that people manage the presentation of selfso as to establish a definition of the situation that controls how


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Theories of Action 97others will respond (Gof fman, 195 9 ) . When events occur thatdi s rupt th e def ini t ion of the situation presented by a partici-pan t , the in teract ion breaks down. Part ic ipants of ten experiencesuch breakdown as confus ing , embarrassing, shamefu l , or in-fur ia t ing . Hence, participants cooperate (col lude?) to avoid d i s -ruption: "Theperson shows respect and politeness, making sureto extend to others any ceremonial t r ea tmen t that might betheir d u e . H e employs discret ion; he leaves unsta ted facts thatmight impl ic i t ly or explicitly contradict and embar ra ss the posi-t ive claims made by others. He employs circumlocutions anddecept ions, phrasing his replies with careful ambigui ty so thatth e others' face i s preserved even i f their wel fa r e is not"(1967,pp. 16-17).

In our language, these are M o d e l I s t ra teg ies for the u n i -lateral protection of self and others. The ways in which suchstrategies re inforce the self-sealing, error - re inforc ing features ofeveryday reasoning should be obvious . Leaving unsta ted factsthat might be threatening or embar ras s i ng is a sure way to re-duce the l i ke l ihood of double-loop learning.

In the field of organizational behavior, one prominenttheme was f irst sounded by Cyert and March (1963), who p i c -tured organizations as f ields of confl ict and barga ining amongcoalitions. D if fe ren t groups have di f fe ren t p re fe rence order -ings, and organizat ional goals are establ ished t h r ough politicalmaneuver ing . The goals of an organizat ion are f requent ly in-consistent, and the incons i s t ency is maintained by attending tothe goals favored by different groups sequentially rather thansimultaneously. Organizat ional goals are f r equen t ly n o n o pera -tional in the sense that they neither require nor preclude anypart icular behavio r , because "nonopera t ional objectives are c o n -s is tent with vi r tual ly any set of objectives" (p . 3 2 ) . Hence byallowing organizat ional objectives to be inconsis tent and n o n -opera t ional , it is possible to appear to satisfy mo re of the de-mands of di f fe rent groups .

In our view, this is an accurate description of part ofwhat takes place in a Model O-I world. There are inconsistenciesin organiza t iona l theory - i n -use , which are perce ived in win-loseterms. Groups learn to protect t hemse lves , to fo rm coal i t ions


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98 Act ion Sciencewith other groups to enhance their positions, and to withholdor distort i n fo rmat ion that m ay increase their vulnerabi l i ty .These are the strategies characteristic of a limited learning sys-tem. They are rat ional within the constraints of an O-I world,and at the same t ime t h e y inhibi t th e double-loop learning thatmight perm i t a bet te r overall solut ion.

Mode l II Theory-in-UseThe action scien tist is an intervent ionist , seeking not only

to describe the world but to change it. More precisely, he or sheseeks to help members of client systems re f lec t on the worldthey create and learn to change it in ways more'congruent withthe values and theories they espouse. The normative perspectivethat guides the action scientist is found in Model II (Argyris andSchon, 1974). Mo d e l II as an espoused theory is not new; in-deed most people readily espouse it. But as a theory-in-use it israre. The action sc ient i s t intends to produce action consistentwith Model II, b e c a u s e it is by so doing that the counterproduc-tive features of Models I and O-I can be interrupted. Just asaction consistent with Models I and O-I creates threats to valid-ity and inhibits learning, action consistent with Models II andO-II is hypothesized to enhance validity and learning. Model IIprovides an image of the theory-in-use that the action scientistas interventionist seeks to help clients learn.

The governing variables of Model II (Table 2) include (1)valid i n fo rmat ion , (2 ) free and in formed choice, and (3) internalcommitment. These are the fea tures of the alternative worldsthat action science seeks to create (Argyris , 1980). Creatingcondi t ions in which these values are realized is the pr imary taskof the interventionist (Argyris, 1970).

The behavioral strategies of Model II involve shar ing con-trol with those w ho have competence and who par t ic ipate indesigning or implementing the action. Rather than unilateral ad-vocacy (Model I) or inqui ry that conceals the agent 's ow n views(opposi te Model I), in Model II the agent combines advocacyand inquiry. Attributions and evaluations are i llustrated withrelatively di rect ly observable data, and the surfacing of confl ict-


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Table 2. Model II Theory-in-Use.GoverningVariables

Valid information.

Free and informedchoice.

Action StrategiesDesign situationsor environmentswhere participantscan be origins andcan experiencehigh personalcausation (psycho-logical success,confirmation, es-sentiality).Tasks are con-trolled jointly.

Consequences for theBehavioral World

Actor experiencedas minimally defen-sive (facilitator,collaborator, choicecreator).

Minimally defen-sive interpersonal

Consequences forLearning

Disconfirmableprocesses.

Double-looplearning.

Consequences forQuality of Life

Quality of life willbe more positivethan negative (highauthenticity andhigh freedom ofchoice).

Effectiveness

Increased long-runeffectiveness.

Internal commit-ment to the choiceand constant moni-toring of its imple-mentation.

Protection of self isa joint enterpriseand orientedtoward growth(speak in directlyobservable cate-gories, seek to re-duce blindnessabout own incon-sistency and in-congruity).Bilateral protectionof others.

relations andgroup dynamics.Learning-orientednorms (trust, indi-viduality, openconfrontation ondifficult issues).

Public testing oftheories.

Effectiveness ofproblem solving anddecision makingwill be great, espe-cially for difficultproblems.

Source: Argyris and Schon, 1974.


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100 Action ScienceFigure 3. Model O-II Learning Systems:

Facilitating Error Detection and Correction.

( 1 )Informationthat rangesfrom:inaccessible/accessible,ambiguous/unambiguous;vague/clear;inconsistent/consistent;incongruent/congruent

Error isSinele diagnosed Invention , .'31"6'c ... . Production

(3)Model IItheories-in-use(advocacy (5).,. coupled with

(2) inquiry; (4> Mfelinteracts surfacing of Error '*threatening ^ with issues; detection 'm uirfdisconfirmablt

loop > > ds d ol . ,learning defective"^ response of resPnsestrategyorassumption

Error diagnosedasincompatibility

of governing' ' values of

Double- variables _ Opposiuon of __I O O D Error diagnosed ideas/personf as incongruityleammS betweenstalements; organizationalpublic testing) espousd theor>,


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Theories of Action 101

Evaluat ion an d^generalization Error (mismatch) Appropria te response(match/match)

Invent response (7 )( n e w configuration Appropriate"strive *to approximate -^invcmed S>impac. ^ match)

espoused theory response Error (mismatch)

(9)(g) IncreasedDecrease in probability fordysfunctional groupdynamics

^Decrease in ___ idysfunct ionalintergroupdynamicsDecrease indysfunctional

s organizational( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) , ( 6 ) norms a n d activmes

double-looplearning

^ Increase inchangeabilily of systemsDecrease in doublebinds fo ri n d i v i d u a l s

( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) , ( 6 ) , (7)

( 2 ) , ( 3 ), ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) , ( 6 ) , ( 7 ) , (8 )


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102 Action Scienceing views is encouraged in order to faci l i tate public testing ofthem.

The consequences of Model II action strategies should in-clude minimally defens ive interpersonal and group relation-ships, high f reedom of choice, and high r isk taking. The l ikeli-hood of double-loop learning is en ha n c ed , and effect ivenessshould increase over time.Mode l O-II(Figure 3) describes the behavioral world cre-ated by individuals interacting on the basis of Model II theory-in-use. W hen members of organizations deal with difficult andth rea tening problems using M o d e l II theory-in-use , they areengaging in Model II inquiry rather t ha n creating primary in-hibiting loops. Previously undiscussable issues will be broughtto the surface , assumptions will be tested and corrected, andself-sealing processes will be in te r rupted . Both single-loop anddouble- loop learning can occur . Dy sfunct ional group and inter-group dynamics should decrease, and there shou ld be less needfor camouflage and games of decept ion .

At the espoused level, Models II and O-II sound likemoth e rh ood and apple pie. Th e trick is to produce them in thereal world. This is quite di f f icul t , both because people havebeen socialized to produce Model I and because the world con-tinues to operate largely according to Model I, even when s om epeople try to act accord ing to Model II, Part Three of th is bookwill be devoted to describing and analyzing the process oflearning M o d e l II at the level of theory-in-use.

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