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?Academy

of Management

Review

1983,

Vol.

8,

No.

1,

50-60

Theoretical

Information

Processing

n d

Situational

a c t o r s

Affecting

Attribution

T h e o r y

M o d e l s

o

rganizational

ehavior

ROBERT

G.

LORD

JONATHAN

E. SMITH

University

of

Akron

Attributional

theories used

to

explain

organizational

behavior

are

overly

restrictive.

A

ttributional

processes

may vary

with

the

type of

attributional

question

addressed

and

with

the

level

of

information

processing

consistent

with situational

or motivational

factors.

Several attributional

principles

are

organized

into a

typology involving

type of

attributional

question

and

level of information processing. Boundary conditions affecting the use of

particular

principles

are

identified

and

the

importance

of

differences

among

attributional

processes

are discussed.

Attribution

theory

recently

has been

applied

to

several

topics

of

concern

to

organizational

research-

ers. For

example,

Mitchell

and

his

associates

(Green

&

Liden, 1980;

Green

&

Mitchell,

1979;

Ilgen

&

Knowlton,

1980;

Knowlton

&

Mitchell,

1980;

Mitchell,

Green,

&

Wood, 1981;

Mitchell &

Wood,

1980)

have used

supervisors'

causal

attributions

to

explain

their

reactions

to

subordinates'

perfor-

mance. Other researchers have relied on attribu-

tions

and

implicit

theories

to

explain

the effects of

bogus

performance

feedback

on

a

variety

of

percep-

tions.

Binning

and

Lord

(1980)

and Staw

(1975)

found

that

performance

affected

perceptions

of

numerous

group

processes.

Several

researchers

(Lord,

Binning,

Rush,

&

Thomas,

1978;

Mitchell,

Larson,

&

Green,

1977;

Rush,

Thomas,

&

Lord,

1977;

Staw

&

Ross,

1980)

have

shown

that

perfor-

mance

feedback

affects

leadership

ascriptions

or

perceptions

of

leader behavior.

Finally,

several

researchers

concerned

with motivation

have linked

attributions

to

internal

factors

to

intrinsic

motiva-

tion

(Deci,

1975; Fisher,

1978;

Phillips

&

Lord,

1980).

Such

works

represent

fruitful

applications

of

social

psychological

theories

to

applied

topics.

It is

'An earlier

version

of this article

was

presented

at the annual

meeting

of the

Academy

of

Management,

San

Diego,

1981.

useful

to consider

several

factors

that

affect these

applications

of attributional

theories. These restric-

tive factors

can be

analyzed using

a framework that

focuses

on both the

type

of attribution

being

made

and

the

level of information

processing

compatible

with constraints

of the situation

and

the

attributor.

In

this

paper

two

dimensions

will

be

used-type

of

attribution

and level

of

information

processing-to

develop a typology of principles for forming attri-

butions.

Type

of Attribution

The

type

of attribution

is

important

because

several

distinct

questions

have been

explored by

at-

tribution

theory

research.

In

particular,

attribution

theory

may

be

applied

to

understanding

causality

for a

specific

event

(Kelley,

1973),

to

assessing

re-

sponsibility

for a

particular

outcome

(Hamilton,

1980),

or to

assess

the

personal

qualities

of

persons

involved

in

the event

being

considered

(Jones

& Da-

vis, 1965).

Attributions

concerning

causal

assessments

in-

volve

producing

explanations

for

unexpected

or

puzzling

events.

Attributors

typically

are viewed as

following logical

or

quasi-scientific

processes

through

which

they assign

relative

priority

to

poten-

50

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tial causal

agents

such as

actors,

situations,

or

cir-

cumstances.

The

key

issue in

assessing

causality

in-

volves

deciding

whether

the event

in

question

would

have occurred

without

the

presence

of

a

particular

agent (Hamilton,

1980).

Thus,

necessary

factors

are

assigned

highest

causal

priority.

For

example,

Kel-

ley's (1973)

covariation

principles

can be viewed

as

describing rules for determining whether an event

would

have occurred

in the

absence

of

particular

ac-

tors, entities,

or

circumstances

(time)

because

events would

covary only

with

necessary

factors.

Attributions

concerning

responsibility

assess-

ments involve a somewhat

different

issue-whether

sanctions

should be administered

to a

particular

ac-

tor

(Hamilton,

1980).

Although responsibility

gen-

erally

is

assigned

to

causally

predominant

sources,

responsibility

assessments

may

be

mitigated by

fac-

tors such

as

foreseeability,

intention,

and

justifica-

tion

(Fincham

&

Jaspars,

1980; Heider,

1958).

Moreover,

responsibility

sometimes

may

be as-

signed

to sources of low

priority

in causal

explana-

tions.

Here

the

key

issue is whether an actor could

have

produced

a

different

outcome

by

behaving

dif-

ferently

(Hamilton,

1980).

Thus,

even if

most lead-

ers would behave

similarly

in a

given

situation,

leading

to

similarly

bad

outcomes and

yielding

cau-

sal

assessments

to entities and

circumstances,

each

would be held

responsible

if

by behaving

otherwise

she/he could

have

produced

different outcomes. It

is

to be noted that

leadership

positions

often

may

involve

responsibility

for

outcomes

even

though

leaders

may

not be

causally

important

(Pfeffer,

1977).

Attribution of

personal

qualities emphasizes

a

third

issue-determining

the

qualities

of

individuals

that

generalize

across

situations

and

time.

Thus,

the

key question

involves

determining

how

to

charac-

terize

a

particular

social

stimulus.

Although

per-

sonal

qualities

may

be

inferred from

behaviors

or

their

outcomes

(Jones

&

Davis,

1965),

such

general-

izations also

may

be

based on

characteristics

such as

race, sex,

cultural

background,

or

appearance.

Thus,

implicit

theories

and social

stereotypes

also

are

related

to

attributions of

personal

qualities.

Level of

Information

Processing

Level of

information

processing

appropriate

to

the

attributor

or

situation

also is

important

because

alternative

theoretical

explanations

differ in

the

amount of

information

processing

they

assume.

In-

deed,

conceptually,

one

might employ

a

continuum

that

ranges

from the

assumption

that

attributors are

highly

active,

involved

information

processors

to

an

assumption

that

they

are

passive

and limited

infor-

mation

processors

as

one describes

differences

in

at-

tributional theories.

Recent research on

cognition

and social judgment supports such an approach.

Schneider and

Shiffrin

(1977)

and Shiffrin

and

Schneider

(1977) argue

that a

stimulus can

evoke

either a

controlled

cognitive

process

in which the

in-

dividual

consciously processes

information

(stimuli)

as he

or she makes

decisions or an

automatic

pro-

cess that does not

require

conscious

monitoring

of

stimuli.

Evidence from

encoding

information

into

memory

also

suggests

that

the

process

varies

in

re-

gard

to

energy

or

attentional

requirements

(Hasher

&

Zacks,

1979).

Encoding

may

be

relatively

automatic and

use little

energy

from the

attentional

mechanism, or it may be highly effortful and

elaborate.

Finally,

this

distinction also can be

re-

cognized

in

the area of

attribution

theory

(Feldman,

1981).

Kelley

(1973),

Jones and Davis

(1965),

and

Weiner

(1972) postulate

that

attributions occur

as a

result

of

individuals

seeking explanations

for

behavior.

They

emphasize

a rational

or

effortful

process

in

which the

individual

weighs

or

considers

multiple pieces

of

information

in

a

conscious

at-

tempt

to

explain

situations or

understand in-

dividuals.

However,

recent

research

points

out

that

sometimes

one

responds

to

cues in a

mindless

manner (Nisbett &

Wilson,

1977)

or one

responds

via an

established

pattern

or

script

(Abelson,

1976).

In

these

instances,

the

attributional

process

requires

little

effort.

Moreover,

as

Lowe and

Kassin

(1980)

have

recently

argued,

attributions

in

everyday

situa-

tions

may

be

guided

as

much

by

perceptual

factors

as

by

the

cognitive

factors

emphasized

in

ex-

perimental

studies.

These

two

dimensions-type

of

attribution

and

level

of

information

process-

ing-are

used to

develop

the

typology

of

attribu-

tional

principles

presented

in

Table

1.

The

prin-

ciples

associated with

a

high

level of

information

processing

have received

widespread

attention

and,

therefore,

will

not be

discussed

further.

However,

the

attributional

principles

associated with

a

low

level of

information

processing

have

not

received

sufficient

consideration.

51




4/12

Tablel

Principles

Used

by

Attribution

Theories

Level of

Type

of

Attribution

Level

f

Information

Personal

Processing

Causality

Responsibility

Characteristics

High

Covariation

Intent

Correspondence

Configuration

Control

Justification

Low Salience Formal role

Prototype

fit

Temporal

proximity

Critical

feature fit

Spatial

proximity

Context

Causality

The amount of

information

processing

needed to

make

causal

assessments can be

minimized

in

sev-

eral

ways.

The

foremost

is that

people generally

may

be satisfied

with

the first

satisfactory

causal

explanation

that comes

to

mind

(Taylor

&

Fiske,

1978).

Thus,

if

there were some mechanism

by

which more

plausible explanations

would

be

consi-

dered

first,

very

few

(and

frequently

only one)

plausible

explanations

would be considered

in

most

situations.

Taylor

and Fiske

argue

that,

for

the

most

part,

attention is

such

a mechanism

and

that

it,

in

turn,

is directed to a

large

extent

by

salience.

Accordingly,

people

attend

to and see

causality

in salient sources. To

Taylor

and

Fiske,

such

salience arises either from distinctive

qualities

of the

social stimulus or from the

centrality

of

a

particular

cause

in

an attributor's

memory

schema.

Their

point

seems

well

taken,

but there

may

be

factors other

than

salience

that

direct attention

to

plausible

causes.

One

may

be

a

tendency

to look for

causes that are physically proximal to an effect; this

would be

particularly

important

when

visual search

for

causes

predominate.

For

example, equipment

breakdowns

often are

attributed to

the

operator

rather than defective

materials or

poor

mainte-

nance. Another

factor,

temporal

proximity

or

closeness

in

time,

would

seem to

be

particularly

im-

portant

when

searching

memory

for

possible

causes. Because

common

sense

suggests

that

causes

must

precede

results,

one

may

merely

search back-

ward

from

the event

in

question

to the

first

plau-

sible cause when

making

causal

attributions.

If,

as

Hasher

and Zacks

(1979) argue, temporal

informa-

tion

is

automatically

encoded or

if

temporal

order

can

be

inferred from

well learned

scripts

(Schank

&

Ableson,

1977),

such

a

limited

search

should be

quite

feasible and

may

not

be

consciously

directed

or monitored. For

example,

a

change

in

organiza-

tional

performance

often

is

attributed to

im-

mediately

prior

management

decisions rather than

to

events

in

the more distant

past

(i.e.,

the

develop-

ment of inferior

products).

In

short,

it

is

argued

that

causality

often

may

be

assessed

by

either

a

passively (salience)

or

heuris-

tically

(proximity)

directed search for the first

suffi-

cient cause for an

outcome.

In

other

words,

once

a

sufficient cause has been

identified,

search for or

evaluation of other possible causes should be ter-

minated. Because salient or

proximal

causes

(such

as

people)

tend to be considered first and often are

plausible explanations, they

should

predominate

as

explanations

of

causality.

Such

processes

should

place

limited demands on the human information

processing

system.

The

present

authors feel that

these

may

be better

descriptions

of humans'

typical

causal assessments

than the

quasiscientific

mod-

els-associated

with

a

high

level

of

information

processing

in Table

1.

Responsibility

Although

it is

comforting

to believe

that

respon-

sibility

assessments

are

guided by logical

principles

such as

assessment

of

intent,

control,

or

justifica-

tion

(and

in

legal proceedings

they

are),

it is sus-

pected

that

in

many

situations

(or

for

many

people)

cognitively

simpler,

albeit

less

logical,

principles

predominate.

For

example,

perceivers

may assign

responsibility

for

role

related

outcomes

to role oc-

cupants (Hamilton,

1980),

assuming

that these

in-

dividuals,

through

different

actions,

could have

produced

different

outcomes.

In

administering

sanctions, mitigating

circumstances

may

not

even

be

considered.

Thus,

leaders

may

be

replaced

when

their

subordinates

perform

poorly,

or

employees

may

be sanctioned

for failure

to

attain

goals

without

extensive

analysis

on the

part

of

the sanc-

tioner. Such

sanctions

may

be

administered

even

52




5/12

when

recipients

lack control over outcomes

for

which

they

are held

responsible

because sanctioners

use

cognitively simple

rules for

determining respon-

sibility

or

because

organizational policy

determines

sanctioning

(Green

&

Mitchell,

1979).

Personal

Characteristics

Sometimes trait or personal characteristic assess-

ments

may

reflect

quasi-logical

inferences

from

behavior as

suggested by

Jones and Davis

(1965).

However,

it

is

suggested

that less

conscious

and

less

demanding

means of

forming impressions

of

others

may predominate.

In

many

situations,

attention

and

information

processing capacity

is

directed

at

task,

situational,

or

self-related

factors while in-

teraction

takes

place,

thereby

precluding

elaborate

or

consciously

controlled

assessments of

personal

qualities.

Nevertheless,

trait

assessments still

seem

to be formed in

these

situations,

suggesting

more

automatic processes.

How

might

such

processing proceed?

On the sim-

plest

level,

people

might

be

classified

by

the fit

of

their

behavior,

appearance,

dress,

and

so on

with

category

prototypes (Cantor

&

Mischel, 1979;

Lord,

Foti,

&

Phillips,

1982).

Alternatively,

there

may

be

critical

features that

map

social

stimuli

into

contrasting

sets,

as

with

sex.

Also,

people may

use

context

as

a

means

of

assessing

traits

(people

in

libraries

are

intellectual).

Such

principles

would

equate

the

perceptual

organization

that

makes stim-

uli

meaningful

with

trait

ascriptions.

That

is,

trait

ascriptions would result from processes by which

people

recognize

stimuli,

not

from

logical

analysis.

On

a

somewhat

more

sophisticated level,

subjects

may

generalize

from

ascribed

traits to

other

traits.

Thus,

they

may

base

inferences on

implicit

theories

or

stereotypes

that

are

thought

to

be

generally

ap-

plicable.

Again,

such

inferences

may

not

be

con-

scious,

may

not use

much

information

processing

capacity,

and

often

may

not

be

logical (or

correct).

A

more

cognitively

demanding

means

to

assess

personal

qualities

would

incorporate

information

on

intent,

reliability

(consistency),

or

personal

ver-

sus situational determinism. At this level, one

would

expect

conscious

awareness of

an

attribu-

tional

process

and

a

need

to

devote

a

substantial

portion

of

one's

controllable

processing

capacity

to

the

attributional

task.

Boundary

Conditions

The

model,

as

presented

in Table

1,

argues

that

attributional

processes

differ

in the

type

of infor-

mation

processing

that is

used.

Among

the

potential

determinants of this difference in

effortfulness or

consciousness

of

information

processing

are

such

factors as

situational

characteristics,

the

attributor's

motives,

and

individual

differences

among

attributors.

Whether the

attributor

engages

in an

active,

conscious

effort to

understand

his

world or

whether she/he

expends

little

energy,

passively

processing

information

may

be

deter-

mined

by

such

boundary

conditions. It is

believed

that

analysis

of such

boundary

conditions can be

best

accomplished

by

assuming

a

minimum

level of

information

processing

and

then

articulating

the

factors that

should

increase the

amount of

process-

ing

capacity

allocated to

attributional

questions.

In

other

words,

it

is believed

that

attributional

ques-

tions generally are described by the passive, un-

conscious

processes

described in

the bottom row

of

Table

1;

the

less

common,

controlled

processes

should

occur

only

under

the

specific

circumstances

noted below.

However,

due to

their more

conscious

nature,

controlled

processes

should

predominate

in

memory

for

or

description

of attributional

pro-

cesses.

There

are several

situational or contextual

factors

that

should

increase the

level of information

pro-

cessing

involved in

forming

attributions. One

con-

cerns the

extent to

which

the actions

or

outcomes

being evaluated are consistent with past impressions

of an

actor.

Actions that

are

inconsistent with

prior

expectations

should

lead

attributors

to conscious

assessment of

causality

(Feldman,

1981;

Wong

&

Weiner,

1981).

A

second

factor concerns norms

or

cues

inherent in a

situation. For

example,

a

perfor-

mance

evaluation

context

would

probably produce

more

systematic,

consciously

directed

attributions

than occur

in the

day

to

day

interactions

between

superiors

and

subordinates.

Along

these

lines,

Wil-

son,

Hull,

and

Johnson

(1981)

reported

that

reason-

ing primes

were

required

before

subjects

conscious-

ly

attended

to

attributional

questions

associated

with the intrinsic interest of a task. A third factor

concerns the

informational

context to which an

at-

tributor

is

exposed.

When

attributionally

relevant

information is

easily

available and is in

a form

con-

sistent

with

conscious,

reflective

processes

(e.g.,

53




6/12

written

or

graphic

information),

more

cognitive

modes

of

attributions

should be elicited

(Lowe

&

Kassin,

1980).

A final situational factor

is the available

process-

ing capacity

that can

be allocated

to

the

attribu-

tional task.

Hasher and

Zacks

(1979)

have

argued

that controlled

or effortful

processing

involves a

limited

capacity

conscious

system,

whereas

auto-

matic

processing

is

relatively independent

of

such

contraints.

Thus,

other

cognitive

tasks that also

re-

quire

use of this

limited

attentional

capacity

would interfere with controlled

processing

but not

with automatic

processing.

Therefore,

it

is

argued

that

people

will

use controlled

processes

only

when

there

is

available

capacity-that

is,

capacity

not be-

ing

used

by

task,

self,

or

socially

related

cognitive

activities.

Motivational

factors

also

may

serve to

increase

the level of information

processing

directed to

at-

tributional

questions.

For

example,

the level

of in-

formation processing may be dependent on the in-

volvements

of

the

observer.

This

contingency

as-

pect

of information

processing

has

been

suggested

in

several

decision contexts

(Chaiken,

1980;

Langer,

Blank,

&

Chanowitz, 1978;

McAllister, Mitchell,

&

Beach,

1979).

Research

that has

manipulated

pro-

spect

of

future interaction

(Berscheid,

Graziano,

Monson,

&

Dermer,

1976)

also

lends

some

limited

support

to the

notion

that

involvement

may

be a de-

terminant

of

the extent

of information

processing.

Persons

who

anticipate

future

interactions

(involve-

ment)

attend

more to

the

other

and

remember

more

about the other than do persons who anticipate no

interaction-suggesting

that

they

differ

in

informa-

tion

processing.

In

a

related

vein,

Jones

and Davis

(1965)

argue

that

hedonic

relevance

leads

to

disposi-

tional

attributions.

Perhaps

hedonic

relevance,

per-

sonal

importance

or

involvement,

also increases

at-

tentional

energy

or the

effort

expended

in informa-

tion

processing.

An

individual

who

depends

on

another for

rewards

probably

engages

in

conscious

efforts

to understand

that other

individual.

Another

constraint

related

to

involvement

might

focus

on the

need for

control.

Kelley (1971)

postu-

lates

that one

not

only

seeks to

understand

the

world but also seeks to control it.

Wong

and Wei-

ner's

(1981)

assertion

that

individuals

do

not think

in

terms of

attributions

unless

confronted

with

failure

or

unexpected

events

would

be consistent

with

Kelley's argument.

Faced

with

failure

or sur-

prised by

unanticipated

results,

individuals

might

search

for

ways

to avoid future failures or

unplea-

sant

surprises.

Such an

argument

has

implications

regarding

information

processing.

In

situations in

which

individuals feel

in

control,

they may process

information

automatically.

However,

in

situations

in

which individuals

perceive

a

need to

establish

control

of the

environment, they probably engage

in

controlled

or

effortful

processing.

Thus,

when

introduced to new

co-workers,

others should active-

ly

attend to the new workers' behaviors

and

attempt

to size them

up.

Still another motivational

constraint

may

be the

need

for

cognitive

consistency.

Festinger's

(1957)

theory

of

cognitive

dissonance

postulates

that

peo-

ple

find

cognitive

dissonance

stressful and seek to

be

cognitively

consonant.

When dissonance does

occur,

it can be reduced

by

changing

a

cognition,

adding

new

cognitions,

or

reducing

the

importance

of a

cognition.

These

cognitive

changes

can

occur

unconsciously; however, in situations of extreme

stress

and when

both

cognitions

are

important,

the

individual

may

have

to

engage

in

an active

search or

review

of information to reduce

the dissonance.

The vast

body

of research

on individual

dif-

ferences

in information

processing

is

beyond

the

scope

of this

paper.

However,

the

boundary

condi-

tion

or

moderating

effect

of individual

differences

upon

the

extent

of

required

information

processing

must

be

recognized.

For

example,

field

dependence

(Witkin

&

Goodenough,

1977),

repression-sensiti-

zation

(Byrne,

1964),

and

self-esteem

(Weiss

&

Knight, 1980) are just three of the many areas that

may

have

implications

for

the

effortfulness

of

in-

formation

processing

related

to

attributional

ques-

tions.

Ordering

of

Attributional

and

Behavioral

Processes

Up

to

this

point,

the

analysis

has avoided

the

question

of

how attributions

tie into

behavior

or at-

titude

change.

In most

typical

attributional

models,

attributional

assessments

precede

behavior.

For

ex-

ample,

the

Green

and Mitchell

(1979)

model

depicts

leaders' causal attributions as preceding their

behavior

toward

subordinates.

This

is

fully

consis-

tent

with the

logical,

cognitive

emphasis

found

in

the

attributional

models associated

with a

high

level

of

information

processing

in

Table

1.

However,

54




7/12

there

may

be

many

instances

in which behavior

is

contrained or determined

by

external

factors,

and

in

those situations

attributions

may

follow

behaviors as

part

of a

justification

or

rationaliza-

tion

process (Staw,

1980). Experimental

evidence

il-

lustrating

such

ordering

has

been

provided

by

Strickland

(1958)

in

the area of

monitoring

behavior and more recently by Wilson, Hull, and

Johnson

(1981)

in

assessing

the

relationship

of

over-

justification

to

intrinsic

motivation.

Kipnis,

Schmidt,

Price,

and

Stitt

(1981)

also found

that

behavioral

differences

in

the

leadership styles

and

influence

tactics

of

managers

of

experimental

work

crews

induced

managers

to make different

attribu-

tions

concerning

workers' motivation and

different

evaluations

of

workers'

performance.

A

somewhat

more

complex picture

of

ordering

emerges

when

one

considers the

relations

among

the

various

types

of

attributional

principles presented

in

Table 1.

For

example,

consider

the

question

of

whether an individual

possesses

leadership

quali-

ties.

Highly

cognitive

models

explaining

leadership

perceptions (Calder,

1977)

might

build

on

Jones

and

Davis's

(1965)

principles

of

correspondent

in-

ference to

explain

attributional

processes,

whereas

less

cognitive

models

might rely

on

principles

such

as the match

of the

stimulus

person

in

question

to

the

perceiver's

leadership

prototype (Lord

et

al.,

1982).

Recent

experimental

studies now

suggest

that

this

latter

more

automatic

process

may precede

the

former,

more

controlled,

process

in

explaining

leadership perceptions

(Cronshaw

&

Lord,

1982;

Phillips & Lord, 1981).

These

results

are

consistent with

an

information

processing

model in

which

social

information is en-

coded

and

organized

via

automatic

processes

that

required

minimal

processing

capacity

and

minimal

conscious

attention. If

subsequent

causal

assess-

ments

were

made,

they

would

be based

on the

infor-

mation

input

and

organized

by

such

automatic

pro-

cesses.

This

model

also is

consistent

with

recent

work

by

Wilson et al.

(1981)

and

Wong

and

Weiner

(1981)

that used

unobtrusive

methodologies

that

did

not

force

subjects

to

think

in

attributional

terms.

They found that

subjects

did not think in attribu-

tional

terms

unless

induced

to

do

so

by

inconsisten-

cies

of

results

with

expectations,

failures,

or ex-

perimenter

provided

reasoning primes

that

engage

inferential

processes.

Implications

of

Attributional

Typology

It has

been

argued

that

researchers

often have

failed to

distinguish adequately

among

different

at-

tributional

questions

and

among

the

various

infor-

mational

processes by

which

these

questions

could

be

addressed

by

attributors.

Moreover,

attribu-

tional

processes usually

have

been

considered

ante-

cedents

to

associated

cognitive

or

behavioral

pro-

cesses

of

attributors.

The

possibility

that

attribu-

tions

follow

related

cognitions

or

behaviors,

as

they

may

in

rationalization or

reconstructive

processes,

rarely

has

been

considered.

Theoretical

Implications

One obvious

implication

of this

typology

is that

no

single

model of

attributional

processes

seems

adequate

for

describing

the

thought processes

grouped

under the

rubric

of

attribution

theory.

Humans

seem

quite

eclectic in the

principles they

can use to form attributions. In order to describe at-

tributional

processes

accurately,

therefore,

re-

searchers

must be

equally

eclectic.

Further,

they

must be

careful

in

generalizing

models of

attribu-

tional

processes

developed

in a

particular

context

to

other

types

of

attributional

questions

or other

situa-

tions.

The

potential

for

overgeneralization

can

easily

be

illustrated

by

considering superiors'

attributions

concerning

their

subordinates.

Superiors'

responses

to

poor

performing

subordinates

might

best

be de-

scribed

by

principles

related

to

causality

if

their

focus is on understanding poor performance or on

generating

remedial

responses

(e.g.,

training pro-

grams).

Alternatively,

if

the

emphasis

is on

admini-

stering

sanctions to

poor

performing

employees,

superiors

may

be

described

better

by

the

principles

related to

responsibility

attributions in

Table 1.

Finally,

if

superiors

are

required

to

predict

future

subordinate

behavior,

it would

be

expected

that

principles pertinent

to

assessing

personal

qualities

would be

most

descriptive.

The

problem

of

overgeneralization

becomes

more

severe

if one

simultaneously

considers

both

dimen-

sions of Table

1,

for

superiors may

address

some

at-

tributional

questions

in

a

conscious,

logical

fashion

while

using

more

automatic

processes

for other

questions.

For

example, personal

qualities

(traits)

may

be

continually

assessed

during

normal

interac-

tions

with

subordinates

using fairly

automatic

pro-

55




8/12

cesses,

but

more controlled

processes

may predomi-

nate

under the

infrequent

situations

in

which

sanc-

tions

are

considered. The

consequences

of

this

ex-

ample

for

researchers

concerned with

superior

at-

tributional

processes

are

straightforward.

That

is,

one must

not

only

identify

attributional

principles,

but

must also

specify

the

type

of

questions

and

situational

factors that determine which principles

are

likely

to

be

used.

A

second

implication

for scientific

inquiry

con-

cerns

the

chameleon-like

nature of human

attribu-

tors.

It is

maintained

that the

type

of

information

processes

used to

form attributions varies with

the

motivation

of

attributors,

the

form and

amount of

information

presented

them,

the

available

process-

ing capacity

to

devote

to

attributional

questions,

and the

primes

or cues inherent in

particular

situa-

tions. Such

factors,

alone

or

in

combination,

may

easily

determine whether controlled or

more

automatic

processes

are

used

in

forming

attribu-

tions.

Thus,

the troublesome

problem

of demand

characteristics

(Orne, 1969)

seems

particularly

ger-

mane

to

studies of attributional

processes.

As

Lowe

and

Kassin

(1980) point

out,

experimenters

in-

terested

in

testing

more

cognitive

(controlled)

models of attributional

processes

can

easily

induce

such

processes by

their choice of

methodologies.

A

related

problem

concerns

the obtrusiveness and

limitations of data collection

strategies.

Wong

and

Weiner

(1981) point

out

that most data on attribu-

tional

processes

are collected via

self-report

pro-

cedures.

Such

procedures

may prime

attributional

processes, leading subjects to think in terms of at-

tributional

questions

they

otherwise

would not ad-

dress.

Moreover,

such measures

may

be biased in

that the more automatic

processes

may

be

less

ac-

cessible

to

subjects (Nisbett

&

Wilson,

1977;

Wilson

et

al.,

1981)

and, therefore,

may

not

be

adequately

measured

by self-report techniques.

There is a

clear

need

for

development

of

more

varied methodolo-

gies

for

measuring

attributions. Such methodo-

logies

should be

designed

to

tap

both

perceptual

and more

cognitive processes

and

should not be

based

solely

on

subjects' retrospective

insight

into

their own information

processing.

One

potential

approach

would be

to

investigate

attributions

by

analyzing

protocols

generated by

subjects

while

performing

the behavior

in

question.

As Ericsson and

Simon

(1980)

note,

to be

accurate

such verbal

reports

should be concurrent rather

than

retrospective

and should

describe

ongoing pro-

cesses

rather than

judgments

requiring

inferences or

generalizations.

Alternatively,

one

could

use

open-

ended

questions

to

probe

attributions rather

than

the more

common

ratings

of

several

experimenter

provided

causal

sources

(e.g., ability).

Ratings

of

explicit

causal

sources

are

troublesome

because

items may prime the causal source being rated and

thereby

may

affect

ratings.

One

recent

study (Kro-

eck,

1982)

compared

open-ended

responses

that

were content

analyzed

by

a

procedure

based

on

Elig

and Frieze

(1979)

to

ratings

of a

list of

plausible

causal sources

(e.g.,

effort,

ability, luck).

Kroeck

found

frequent

mention of

perceptually

based

in-

formation

(e.g.,

appearance)

when

using

an

open

format measure of

attributions.

Moreover,

such

in-

formation

was

more

predictive

of

rating

on

some

dimensions

(leadership

potential

and

promotability)

than

was a

structured format in

which

subjects

rated

experimenter provided

causes.

A final theoretical concern stems from the

poten-

tial for what can be

labeled

hybrid

attributional

processes.

Such

processes

would involve

combina-

tions

of

the

principles presented

in

Table 1.

Hybrid

processes

would seem

particularly

likely

when at-

tributional

questions

are

addressed

over

a

period

of

time in which the informational or

motivational

perspective

of the

attributor

may

change

or

when

attributional

processes

are related to other

behavioral

or attitudinal

processes.

One

example

of

a

hybrid process may

be when information that is

encoded,

stored,

and retrieved

by

automatic

pro-

cesses is evaluated by more controlled processes at

some later

point

in time. For

example,

workers

may

be

categorized

as either

high

or low

performer types

over

many

interactions

and

with

little

systematic

or

conscious

processing

by superiors.

Later

on,

super-

iors

may consciously

assess

subordinates

ability,

a

process

that on the surface resembles

a controlled

process.

However,

as

Lingle

and

Ostrom

(1979)

have

demonstrated,

this latter

judgment

may

be

derived

from

prior judgments.

Futhermore,

prior

judgments

may

lead to selective

recall of informa-

tion

consistent

with

already

formed

opinions

(Hastie, 1981).

The

reverse

process

also

may

occur.

Once a

quality

is

attributed

to

an individual

by

some

conscious,

controlled

process,

this label

may

lead

to

subsequent

automatic

encoding, storage,

and retrieval

of information consistent

with

such

a

label. For

example,

if

good performance

is ex-

56




9/12


10/12

hybrid processes

suggests

that

such

attributions

must

be

considered as

evolving

across

time rather

than as a

momentary phenomena

occuring

in

or at a

single experimental

setting.

One

potentially

impor-

tant

question

raised

by

this

perspective

is

whether

attributions

formed

immediately

after

observations

of

behavior or

outcomes would

be

qualitatively

dif-

ferent from

delayed

attributions. It

is

suspected that

immediate

attributions would

be more

dependent

on

perceptual

factors,

whereas

delayed

attributions

may depend

primarily

on the

ease with

which attri-

butors can recall

information,

as is

suggested by

the

findings

of Ross and

Sicoly

(1979).

A

related

con-

sideration is that

attributions that

emerge

as a

response

to

novel stimuli

may

differ from

attribu-

tions

in

response

to familiar stimuli.

Perhaps

novel

attributions

require

a

more active mode of

informa-

tion

processing

than do

attributions

that

only

con-

firm

or

modify

previous

assessments.

It has been

suggested

here that attributions often

may

involve various levels of information

process-

ing

occuring

at

multiple points

in

time. This

sugges-

tion raises

questions

concerning

the

dynamic

as-

pects

of

attributional

processes.

More

specifically,

do

changes

in

factors such as information

load,

perceptual

salience,

or an

attributor's

motivation

produce

shifts

in

the

level of

attributional

processes

used in

addressing

a

single

attributional

question?

Also,

if

such

changes

do

occur,

are

attributors

aware that

they

are

using qualitatively

different

processes?.

Finally,

the

methodological

issue of

how

best to

measure attributions deserves attention. Less ob-

trusive

measures

than

questionnaire

based

self-

report

techniques

need

to be

developed. Moreover,

attention should be

directed

at

the

problem

of

ade-

quate

measurement of

automatic

attributional

pro-

cesses

when

attributors

may

not be

consciously

aware of

their use.

In

conclusion,

it

has

been

argued

that

researchers

need

to

consider both

the

type

of

attributional

ques-

tion and

the

amount of

information

processing

con-

sistent with

situational

factors or

attributor motiva-

tion

when

developing

models

of

attributional

pro-

cesses. A

typology

of

principles

organized

along

these two dimensions and the

research

implications

of this

typology

have been

presented.

The

authors

hope

this

leads to a

more

comprehensive

view

of at-

tributional

processes

than is

typically

found in

the

applied

literature.

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R. P.

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Robert

G. Lord

is Associate

Professor

of

Psychology

in

the

Department

of Psychology,

University

of

Akron.

Jonathan

E. Smith

is

Assistant

Professor of

Psychology

in

the

Department of Psychology,

University of

Akron.

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