19

TheWheatRoad

TheBritishmagazineHomes&Gardenshaslongprideditselfonbeingatthecuttingedgeofinteriordesign. ‘Mixing beautiful features with gorgeous real-life homes and gardens, expert advice andpracticalinformation’,themagazinedeclaresinitsrecentmarketingstrapline,is‘theultimatesourceofdecorating inspiration’. ItsNovember1938 issuegushedwithpraiseaboutamountainbolt-holerichinAlpinechic.‘Thecolourschemethroughoutthisbright,airychaletislightjadegreen,’wrotethe correspondent, enlivened by the passion for cut flowers displayed by the owner – who as ithappened was also the property’s ‘decorator, designer and furnisher, as well as architect’. Hiswatercoloursketcheshungintheguestbedrooms,alongsideoldengravings.A‘drollraconteur ’,theownerlovedbeingsurroundedbyarangeof‘brilliantforeigners,especiallypainters,musiciansandsingers’,andwouldoftenbringin‘localtalent’toplaypiecesbyMozartorBrahmsforafter-dinnerentertainment.Thearticle’sauthorwasveryimpressedbyAdolfHitler.1Nine months later, on 21 August 1939, an eagerly awaited call came through to the telephone

exchangewhichHomes&Gardens reportedwasnext tohismodernoffice andwhichallowed ‘theFührer ’ to be in contact with ‘his friends orMinisters’. During supper, a message was passed toHitler.According to onewhowas present, ‘he scanned it, stared into space for amoment, flusheddeeply, then banged on the table so hard that the glasses rattled’.He turned to his guests and saidexcitedly,‘Ihavethem!Ihavethem!’2Hesatdowntoeat,nodoubtfacedwith theusual ‘imposingarrayofvegetariandishes,savouryandrich,pleasingtotheeyeaswellastothepalate’,admiredbythe Homes & Garden journalist a year earlier, and prepared by Hitler ’s personal chef, ArthurKannenberg–whooftencameoutofthekitchenintheeveningstoplayhisaccordion.3Afterthemeal,Hitlercalledhisdinnergueststogether,andtoldthemthatthepaperhewasholding

containedthetextofareplythathehadbeenwaitingforfromMoscow.Stalin,theundisputedmasterof the Soviet Union, had agreed to sign a treaty of non-aggression with Germany. ‘I hope’, theteletyperead, ‘that [this]willbringaboutadecided turnfor thebetter inrelationsbetweenour twocountries.’4Twonightslater,afterthenewshadbeenannounced,Hitlerandhisentouragestoodonthe terrace, looking into thevalleybelow. ‘The final act ofGötterdämmerung could not have beenmoreeffectivelystaged,’notedtheleadingNazi,AlbertSpeer.5Ironically,theextraordinaryagreementwaspromptedbyBritishandFrenchforeignpolicy.Both

countrieshadbeentryingdesperatelytofindwaystocontaintheGermanChancellorafterbecomingalarmed by his high-stakes political poker in the 1930s –with little success. So little, in fact, thatMussoliniconfidedinhisForeignMinisterCountCianothatBritain’spoliticiansanddiplomatswerenotmadeofthesamestuffas‘theFrancisDrakes’andtheother‘magnificentadventurerswhocreatedthe empire’; in fact, they are ‘the tired sons of a long line of rich men, and they will lose theirempire’.6FollowingGermany’soccupationofCzechoslovakia,atougherlinewastaken.Intheafternoonof

31March1939,thePrimeMinisterNevilleChamberlainroseintheHouseofCommons.‘Intheeventof any action which clearly threatened Polish independence,’ he said solemnly, ‘His Majesty’sGovernmentwouldfeelthemselvesboundatoncetolendthePolishGovernmentallsupportintheir

power.TheyhavegiventhePolishGovernmentanassurancetothiseffect.ImayaddthattheFrenchGovernmenthaveauthorisedmetomakeitplainthattheystandinthesamepositioninthismatterasdoHisMajesty’sGovernment.’7RatherthanguaranteeingPoland’ssecurity,thissealeditsfate.AlthoughthePrimeMinistertoldthe

HouseofCommonsthattheForeignSecretaryhadmetwiththeSovietambassador,IvanMaiskii,thesamemorninginanattempttosmooththingsover,theassurancesofferedtoPolandsetinmotionachainofeventsthatledstraighttothewheatfieldsofUkraineandsouthernRussia.Thestrugglewastospelldeathformillions.8TheaimhadbeentolockGermanyintostalemate,usingthethreatofwartodeteranymoveagainst

itsneighbourtotheeast.Infact,asHitlerquicklyunderstood,hehadbeendealtanace–albeitonethatrequiredastonishinggall toplay:herewasachancetomakeadealwiththeCommunistSovietUnion.AlthoughtheUSSRwasabitterrivaltoNaziGermanyinmanyrespects,suddenlytherewascommon groundwhere the interference ofBritain and others had provided an opening. Stalin toorealisedhow thecards fell.Hehadalsobeengivenanopportunity–one thathe likewise requiredastonishinggalltotakeadvantageof:reachingtermswithHitler.

The ideaof an alliancebetween the two states seemedbeyond the realmsofplausibilityor reality.Since Hitler had been voted to power in 1933, relations between Germany and the USSR haddeteriorated sharply, with vitriolic media campaigns in both countries portraying the other asdemonic,ruthlessanddangerous.Tradehadallbutcollapsed:whilenearly50percentofallimportstotheSovietUnionhadcomefromGermanyin1932,sixyearslaterthefigurehadfallentobelow5per cent.9 But with the guarantees extended to Poland, the two countries finally had something incommon:awishtodestroythestatethatwassandwichedbetweenthem.10In the spring of 1939, therewas a flurry of diplomatic activity. The Soviet chargé d’affaires in

Berlin and the leading German expert on eastern Europe met to set out grounds for improvingrelations, and to look for areasofpossible co-operation, including the resumptionof trade.Thesetalksacceleratedquickly,takenforwardinMoscowbydiscussionsbetweentheGermanambassadorand Vyacheslav Molotov, the new Commissar of Foreign Affairs, whose predecessor, MaximLitvinov,hadbeendismissedbecauseofhisJewishbackground–anobstaclewhendealingwiththeanti-Semitic German regime. Litvinov, ‘the eminent Jew’, wroteWinston Churchill, ‘the target ofGermanantagonism,wasflungasidelikeabrokentool...bundledofftheworldstagetoobscurity,apittanceandpolicesupervision’.11Bythesummer,thingshadmovedforwardtothepointthatJoachimvonRibbentrop,theGerman

ForeignMinister, was able to sendmessages toMoscow that explained that just because NationalSocialismandCommunismwereverydifferent, therewas ‘no reason for enmity between our twocountries’.Iftherewasanappetitetodiscussmatters,hesuggested,thenfurtherrapprochementwaspossible. At the heart of the matter was Poland: could a deal be done in which Poland would bedismemberedanddividedupbetweenthem?12ThequestionwastakenupbyStalinpersonally.PolandhadbeenabêtenoiresincetheRevolution.

Foronething,thepeaceagreementsatVersailleshadawardedthePolesaswatheofterritorythathadbeenRussianbefore1914;foranother,PolandhadtakenmilitaryactionthathadthreatenedtheverysuccessoftheBolshevikseizureofpowerintheyearsafter1917.FearofPolishspieswasaregularandcommonfeatureintheSovietpurgesofthe1930sthatsawmillionsarrestedandmanyhundredsof thousands executed. Barely two years before negotiating with Germany, Stalin had personallysigned orders demanding the ‘liquidation of the network of spies of the Polish MilitaryOrganisation’,which led to tensof thousandsmorebeingarrested,ofwhommore than four-fifths

werethenshot.13HisresponsetotheGermanquestionaboutco-operation,notleastoverPoland,waspositiveandencouraging.It was followed up immediately. Two days after Stalin’s reply, two Focke-Wulf Condor planes

toucheddowninMoscowtobemetbyaSovietguardofhonourandtwosetsofflagsflutteringinthewind. Half bore the image of the hammer and sickle, the tools of the urban proletariat and thepeasantry,unmistakablesymbolofCommunism;theotherswereflagsoftheThirdReich,designedbyHitlerhimself–asheexplainedinMeinKampf:‘Inred,wecanseethesocialideaofthe[NationalSocialist]movement,inwhitethenationalistidea,andintheswastikathemissionofthestruggleforthe triumph of the Aryan man.’14 In one of the most extraordinary and unexpected sights of thetwentiethcentury,theflagsrepresentingCommunismandFascismflewsidebysideastheGermansdisembarked from the planes. The delegation was headed by Ribbentrop, the German ForeignMinister, described by one former teacher as ‘themost stupid in the class, full of vanity and verypushy’andnowtrustedtobrokeranagreementbetweenbitterrivals.15AfterbeingdriventotheKremlintomeetwithStalinandMolotov,Ribbentropexpressedhishope

forgoodrelations.‘GermanyasksfornothingfromRussia–onlypeaceandtrade,’hesaid.Stalingaveatypicallydirectreply.‘Formanyyearsnow,wehavebeenpouringbucketsofshitovereachother ’sheads,andourpropagandaboyscouldnotdoenoughinthatdirection.Nowallofasudden,arewetomakeourpeoplesbelieveallisforgottenandforgiven?Thingsdonotworksofast.’16Infact,theydid.Withinafewhours,theoutlineofadealhadbeenputtogether,withanagreedtext

tobemadepublictogetherwithasecretannexedelineatingspheresofinfluenceintheBalticsandinPoland,andeffectivelyprovidingeachsidewithcarteblanchetomoveinanddoastheypleaseduptothedefined line.Satisfied,Stalincalled forvodka in the smallhoursof themorning tocelebrateatoast.‘IknowhowmuchtheGermanVolklovetheirFührer,’hesaidusingtheGermanword.‘Iwouldliketodrinkhishealth.’Furtherroundsoftoastsfollowed,withMolotovscarcelyabletocontainhisjoy.‘ItwasourgreatcomradeStalinwhobeganthiscoupofpoliticalrelations,’hebeamed.‘Idrinktohishealth.’17Stalin’seuphoriacontinuedathisdachajustoutsideMoscowthenextdaywherehejoinedsenior

membersofthePolitburoinaduckshoot.Ofcourseitisallagameofbluff,hesaid,‘agametoseewhocanfoolwhom.IknowwhatHitler ’supto.Hethinkshe’soutsmartedme,butactuallyit’sIwho’strickedhim.’18Hitler,ofcourse,thoughtpreciselythesamething.WhenanotewaspassedtohimataroundmidnightinhisAlpineidyll,reportingthatthefinalagreementhadbeensigned,hisreaction–likeStalin’s–wasthatofagamblerconvincedthathe isonahotstreak:‘we’vewon’,hedeclaredtriumphantly.19TheSovietleadercametotermswithGermanytobuytime.StalinhadnoillusionsaboutHitleror

about the long-term threatheposed. Indeed, at the17thPartyCongressof theCommunistParty in1934, sections fromMeinKampf were recited to illustrate the dangers posed byGermany and itsChancellor.StalinhimselfhadreadHitler ’sinfamouswork,underliningpassagesthatsetouttheneedforGermanytoexpanditsterritoriesintotheeast.20TheSovietUnion,however,neededtorecoverafteraperiodofchronicturmoil.Catastrophicfamine,theresultofshort-sightedandbloody-mindedpolicy,hadledtothedeathsofmillionsfromstarvationandillnessintheearly1930s.Thesufferingwas horrific, and on a colossal scale.One boywhowas eight years old at the time later recalledlookingatagirlinhisclassroominKhar ’kov,whohadputherheadonherdeskandclosedhereyesduringa lesson,seeminglyfastasleep; infact,shehaddiedofstarvation.Theywouldburyher,heknew,‘justastheyburiedpeopleyesterdayandthedaybeforeyesterdayandeveryday’.21In the years that followed, Soviet society devoured itself. Senioritywithin theCommunist party

offerednoprotection,asStalinmovedinonhisclosestrivalsandformercolleagues.Inaspectacular

seriesofshowtrials,heldinMoscow,menwhohadbecomehouseholdnames,notjustintheSovietUnion but internationally, were sensationally accused of being counter-revolutionaries, tried andsentenced to death.Men likeGrigorii Zinoviev, LevKamenev, Nikolai Bukharin andKarl Radek,heroes of the 1917 Revolution, were among many sent to their deaths, denounced in venomouslanguage as Fascist dogs, terrorists, degenerates and vermin by the chief prosecutor AndreiVyshinskii. In a travesty of intellectual and cultural history, Vyshinskii was then honoured for hispoisonousattackswhentheInstituteofGovernmentandLawoftheSovietAcademyofScienceswasrechristenedtobearhisname.22Attentionthenturnedtothearmy.TheHighCommandwasnotsomuchdecimatedasannihilated,

ravaged by a perverted and ruthless logic: it stood to reason that if junior officerswere guilty ofsedition, then their seniors were guilty either of complicity or of negligence. So one confession,beatenfromabrokenman,servedtounleashcascadesofarrests.Theaim,onesecretpoliceofficerlater testified, was to prove the existence of a ‘military conspiracy within the Red Army thatimplicatedasmanyparticipantsaspossible’.23Ofthe101membersofthesuprememilitaryleadership,allbuttenwerearrested;oftheninety-one

detained,allbutninewereshot.TheseincludedthreeofthefivemarshalsoftheSovietUnionandtwoofitsadmirals,aswellastheentireseniorairforcepersonnel,everyheadofeverymilitarydistrict,and almost every divisional commander. The Red Army was brought to its knees.24 In thecircumstancesStalinneededbreathingspacetorebuild.TheGermanapproachwasagodsend.Hitler, on the other hand, was playing for higher stakes. He was desperate to gain access to

resources thatwereessential ifGermanywas tobuildapositionofstrengthandpower in the longterm.TheproblemwasthatGermanywaspoorlylocatedgeographicallytogainaccesstotheAtlanticandtotradewiththeAmericas,AfricaandAsia;Hitlerthereforesethissightsontheeast.BehindhisdecisiontoreconcilewiththeSovietUnionwastheideathatthiswouldgivehimaccesstohisveryownSilkRoad.

Afterthepacthadbeensigned,therefore,HitlersummonedhisgeneralstohisAlpinechaletsothathecouldaddress themonwhathadbeenagreedandwhatheplanned.Leaningon thegrandpiano,hetalked at length about himself.TheGermanpeoplewere lucky tohavehim,hedeclared, aman inwhom they had total confidence.But now, hewent on, itwas time to seize themoment. ‘We havenothing to lose,’ he said to his senior officers; Germany can survive for only a few years in itscurrenteconomiccondition;‘wehavenootherchoice’,hetoldthegenerals.25Analliancewith theSovietUnionwouldnotonlyallowtherecoveryof lands takenawayby the

Treaty of Versailles; it would guarantee Germany’s future. Everything hinged on Germany’ssuccess – and it was vital to remember this at all times. ‘Close your hearts to pity,’ he said. ‘Actbrutally. Eighty million people must obtain what is their right. Their existence must be madesecure.’26HewastalkingabouttheinvasionofPoland,butalsoaboutthenewdawnthatwouldresultfromtherapprochementwiththeSovietUnion.ForHitler,comingtotermswithStalindidmorethanoffer the chance to raise the stakes further in his game of political brinkmanship; it offered theprospect of resources. Although he had talked often about Lebensraum, or living space, for theGerman people since he first rose to prominence, what was at stake, he told his generals, wereconcreteprizes:grain,cattle,coal,leadandzinc.Germany,atlast,couldbefree.27Notallthoselisteningwereconvinced.Hitlersaidthatthewarwouldtakesixweeks;itwouldtake

morelikesixyears,mutteredGeneralvonReichenau.28NorwasGeneralLiebmannimpressed.Thespeech, he said,was boastful, brash and ‘downright repulsive’.Hitlerwas amanwho had lost allsenseofresponsibility.Yet–astheleadingmodernauthorityonNaziGermanynotes–noonespoke

outagainsthim.29HitlerwasconvincedthathehadfoundawaytoprotectGermany’sfuture.Oneparticularareaof

weaknesswastheinadequacyofdomesticagriculture.Asrecentresearchsuggests,thiswasasectorthathad sufferedduring the1930sas theGermanwarmachinebegan tobeassembled, consumingresources,timeandmoney.Infact,newlegislationactuallyservedtoreducetheamountofinvestmentin agriculture in this period.30 Germany remained heavily dependent on imports because homeproductiondidnotprovideenoughforself-sufficiency.31TalkingtoaseniordiplomatinDanziginAugust1939,Hitlerbroughtupthe topicof the impossiblestrain thathadbeenplacedonGermanyduringtheFirstWorldWar–oneofhis long-termrecurringthemes.Now,however,heclaimedtohave theanswer.WeneedUkraine, ‘so thatnoone isable to starveusagainas theydid in the lastwar ’.32Ukraine,orratherthefruitsofitsrichfertilesoil,wasdeliveredtohimwiththesigningofthenon-

aggressionpactin1939.ThemonthsthatfollowedRibbentrop’svisittotheRussiancapitalsawNaziand Soviet officials shuttling back and forth between Moscow and Berlin. The Germans wereconfident that the opening could be translated into an agreement, especially with regard to ‘allterritorialproblemsfromtheBlacktotheBalticSeas’,asRibbentroptoldMolotovinAugust1939.33More delicate discussions centred on trade terms and above all on volumes and prices for Sovietwheat, oil and other materials needed to sustain Germany’s invasion of Poland and its aftermath.StalinwasfuellingHitler ’swar.34The alliancegaveHitler the confidence and the promise of resources that enabledhim to attack

Poland,safeintheknowledgethathispositionintheeastwouldbesecurefollowinghisagreementwithStalin(‘IcanguaranteeonmywordofhonourthattheSovietUnionwillnotbetrayitspartner,’saidtheRussianleaderwhentheagreementwassigned).35Asoneofthemoreastuteseniorofficersrealised, though, agreeing to dismantle Poland made Germany more vulnerable – not less – bydragging the Soviet frontier dramatically westwards; it would be better, noted Franz Halder, toremain on good terms with Russia and focus on the British positions in theMiddle East and theMediterranean.36

On1September1939,barelyaweekafter thehistoric agreement,German troopspouredover thefrontier,scythingtheirwaythroughPolishdefences.AlongsidetheseizureofterritoryastheadvanceclosedonWarsawwastheaimofdecapitatingthePolishelite.AsHitlersawit,‘onlyanationwhoseupper levels are destroyed can be pushed into the ranks of slavery’.As such, officers and leadingfigureswere targeted – by thosewho knewwhat theywere looking for: fifteen of the twenty-fivecommanders of the squads instructed to seek out and annihilate ‘the upper levels of society’ haddoctorates,mostlyinlaworphilosophy.37The realignment ofGermany and the SovietUnion and the attack onPoland caughtBritain and

France cold. Although war was declared, neither country provided much meaningful military orlogisticalsupporttothePoles.TheRoyalAirForcedidundertakesomelimitedbombingoperations,butbyfar themostcommonpayloadscarriedbyaircraft that flewoverGermanterritorywerenotincendiary devices but leaflets whose aimswere rather hopeful, if not downright naive. ‘There isgood reason to believe that theGerman authorities feared the effect of our propaganda,’ read theminutesoftheveryfirstitemontheCabinetmeetingagendainearlySeptember1939.Thefactthat‘ouraircraftwereabletoflywithimpunityallovertheNorth-WestofGermany’wasboundtohave‘adepressingeffectonthemoraleoftheGermanpeople’.Droppingmoreleafletsinthefuturemightbeveryeffective,itwasagreed.38

Inthemeantime,panickedappraisalsfloodedbacktoLondonfromIndiaandCentralAsia–fortheagreementsignedbyMolotovandRibbentropdidnotjustprovideachannelofessentialsuppliesforGermanyandpavethewayforwarinEurope.TheministerinKabul,SirKerrFraser-Tytler,warnedthattherewasmuchspeculationlocallyaboutwhetherBritainwouldprovidemilitarysupportintheeventofaSovietinvasionofAfghanistan.39TheseconcernsweresharedbytheIndiaOffice,wheretheSecretaryofState released an alarmist document for theWarCabinet inLondon that painted anear hopeless picture of Indian defences, especially its anti-aircraft resources, which apparentlyamountedtonothingmorethanasinglebatteryconsistingofeightthree-inchguns.40AlthoughLondonwasscepticalaboutthedangerinCentralAsiaintheimmediateshortterm,itwas

recognisedthatGermany’salliancewiththeSovietUniondidposeathreattoBritishinterestsintheeast.Bythespringof1940,carefulconsiderationwasbeinggiventowhatseemedtobeaninevitableshowdown.AsareporttotheWarCabinetbytheChiefsofStaffentitled‘TheMilitaryImplicationsofHostilitieswithRussiain1940’explained,itwas‘unlikelythattheSovietGovernmentwouldloseanytimeintakingactionagainstIndiaandAfghanistan’,adevelopmentthatwouldcreate‘themaximumdiversion ofAllied strength’.41As another report set outwith chilling lucidity, therewere a greatmanyways inwhichGermanco-operationwithMoscowcouldbedeeplydetrimental to theAllies:Britain’soilinterestsinIranandIraqwerepotentiallyvulnerableandmightbelost,andworse,couldpasstotheenemy.42Therewassubstancetotheseconcerns.TheGermanshadbeenhighlyactiveacrosstheMiddleEast

andCentralAsiainthe1930s,withLufthansaestablishinganextensivenetworkofcommercialflightsacrosstheregion,andcompanieslikeSiemensandtheTodtorganisationmakingseriousinroadsintotheindustrialsectorsinIraq,IranandAfghanistan.Innumerableroadsandbridgeshadbeendesignedby German engineers, and built or their construction supervised by German technicians.TelecommunicationinfrastructurehadbeeninstalledbycompanieslikeTelefunken,whofoundtheirexpertise in great demand.43 These ties led to Germany being seen positively across the wholeregion–somethingthatwasenhancedbyperceptionsofHitlerintheIslamicworldasaleaderwhowasdecisiveandstoodupforwhathebelievedin.ThismessagewasreinforcedbythenestofagentscontrolledbytheAbwehr,Germanmilitaryintelligence,whohadbeenactivelybuildingcontactsandgatheringsupportacrosstheregionbetweentheeasternMediterraneanandtheHimalayas.44Indeed,byJanuary1940, therewereactivediscussionswithin theGermanHighCommandabout

howtheSovietsshouldbeencouragedtointerveneinCentralAsiaandIndia.PlanswerecirculatedbyGeneral Jodl, one of theWehrmacht’smost respected senior officers, regarding a jointGermano-Sovietpushinto theMiddleEast.Thiswould‘requirerelatively little’effort,butwouldat thesametime ‘create a trouble-spot threatening to England’.45 A separate, audacious plan to restore to theAfghan throne King Amanullah, who had taken up residence in Berlin after being deposed, waslikewise carefully developed.46 Then therewere efforts to foment trouble in strategically sensitiveregions.TheFaqīrof Ipi, a1930sversionofOsamabinLaden–anasceticpreacher,mysticalbutbloodthirsty,religiouslyconservativeyetsociallyrevolutionary–wasidentifiedasaperfectpartnertodestabilise theNorth-WestFrontier anddivertBritish attention and resources.Oneproblemwasfindinghim:hewashighlyelusiveandhadgiventheBritishtheslipcountlesstimes.Anotherwastofindhimunobtrusively:onemissionended indisasterwhen twoGermanagentswhomtheAbwehrthoughtwould be less conspicuous if disguised as leprosy expertswere killed andwounded in anambush set by theAfghan army.When contactwas finallymadewith him, theFaqīr ’s demands inreturnforhelpagainsttheBritishborderedontheabsurd.47Germanbridge-buildingelsewhereacrosstheregionhadbeennolessenergetic.ManyinIranand

IraqweretakenwithHitler ’sdynamismandhisrhetoric.Therewasanaturaloverlap,forexample,

between thedeepanti-Semitismof theNazi regimeand thatof some leading Islamic scholars.TheGrandMuftiofJerusalem,Mu ammadal- usaynī,hadwelcomedtheriseofamanhelaterreferredtoas‘al- ajjMu ammadHitler ’.TheGermanleader ’santi-SemiticviewsweregristtothemillofamanhappytocallforthedeathofJews,whomhereferredtoas‘scumandgerms’.48AdmirationforGermanyacrosstheregionwentmuchfurther.Somescholarshavepointedoutthe

similarities between the ideology that Hitler imposed on Germany in the 1930s and a similarprogrammeadoptedinPersiaof‘purification’ofthePersianlanguageandcustoms,andaconsciousefforttoharkback–astheNazisdid–toasemi-mythicalgoldenage.Indeed,thedecisiontochangethe name of Persia formally to Iran was supposedly the result of Teheran’s diplomats in BerlinimpressingontheShahtheimportanceoftheideaof‘Aryanism’–andthesharedetymologicalandpseudo-historicalheritagethatIran’snewidentitycouldeasilyreference.49ThefoundationoftheBa’ath(‘renaissance’)partyinIraqlikewiseowedmuchtoNazipropaganda

andtotheideaofrebirth.50AndthentherewasthetellingexchangebetweenHitlerandtheenvoyofthe Saudi king. ‘We view theArabswith thewarmest sympathy for three reasons,’ Hitler told theenvoyin1939.‘First,wedonotpursueanyterritorialaspirationsinArablands.Second,wehavethesameenemies.Andthird,webothfightagainsttheJews.IwillnotrestuntiltheverylastofthemhasleftGermany.’51Not surprisingly, therefore, one plan after anotherwas developed inLondon andParis to try to

containtheGermansandtheSoviets.TheChiefoftheFrenchGeneralStaff,ClaudeGamelin,askedforplanstobedrawnuptobuildupastronghold,ideallyintheBalkans,thatcouldputpressureonGermany from the rear if need be.52 The ideawas taken seriously, endorsed by the FrenchPrimeMinister,theporcineEdouardDaladier,beforefallingoutoffavour.Itwasreplacedbyanaudaciousplan to launchanattackonScandinavia thatwasdesigned tocutGerman suppliesofSwedish ironore–whichreceivedenthusiasticbackingfromWinstonChurchill,nowFirstLordoftheAdmiralty.‘Nothingwould bemore deadly . . . than to stop for three or even sixmonths this import’,wroteChurchill.Britain ‘shouldviolateNorwegianneutrality’ andmineNorway’s coastalwaters.TakingthesestepswouldthreatenGermany’s‘war-makingcapacityand...thelifeofthecountry’.53CripplingGermany’ssupplychainwasatthecentreofallthediscussions.Eventually,inthespring

of1940,attentionturnedtoBaku.TheheadoftheFrenchAirForce,GeneralVuillemin,championedaplanbywhichAlliedforcescouldusebases in theMiddleEast tostrikeat facilities,primarily inSovietAzerbaijan.Squadronsoperating fromBritishbases in Iraqand fromFrenchbases inSyriacould,itwasclaimed,reduceoilproductionintheCaucasusbyhalfoverthecourseoftwotothreemonths.According to the firstdraftof theplan, thiswouldhave ‘decisive repercussionsonRussiaandGermany’. Subsequent versions promised even rosier projections: fewer attack groupswoulddeliversimilargainsbutoveraquickertimeframe.54TheresultsofabombardmentoftheCaucasuswouldbedramatic,Britishstrategistsagreed:there

would be an immediate disruption of ‘the industrial and agricultural economies of Russia whichwould be incrementally paralysed and prevented fromworking. Itwill eliminate all the hopes thatGermany had of rationally organising Russian production for its benefit and will, from thisviewpoint,haveadecisiveinfluenceontheoutcomeofthewar.’FrenchandBritishplannersbecameconvinced that destroying Russian oil facilities was the best way to remove the threat posed byGermany.55SuchplansforjointactionwerescupperedwhenHitlerlaunchedalightningattackonFrance.To

many, theGermanassault looked likeaworkof tacticalgenius,catching thedefendersbysurprisethroughaseriesofdazzlingoperations,meticulouslyplannedinadvanceandexpertlyexecutedbyanarmy thatwasbattle-hardenedandhadextensive experienceofoccupying foreign lands. In fact, as

recentresearchshows,thesuccessinFranceowedagreatdealtochance.Morethanonce,Hitlerlosthis nerve, instructing troops to hold position, only to find that orders did not reach groupcommanders until after they had moved miles ahead of where they should have stopped. HeinzGuderian, a dashing Prussian-born tank commander, was even relieved of his position forinsubordinationafterhekeptonadvancing–eventhoughtheordertoholdhispositionhadprobablynever reachedhim.During thisperiod,Hitlerhimselfbecamesofearful thathis forceswerebeingcaughtinanon-existenttrapthathecameclosetoanervousbreakdown.56Therapidadvancewastheill-deservedprizeforagamblerwhohadbeatentheodds.TheageofempireforwesternEuropehadcometoanendwiththeFirstWorldWar.Now,rather

than slowly fading away, Germany was about to deliver a body blow. As the Royal Air Forceprepared to take to theskiesfor theBattleofBritain, loudvoices trumpeted theendofanera.TheGermanminister inKabul was busy predicting that by the end of the summerHitler would be inLondon.InpreparationfortheBritishEmpire’sfinalcollapse,concreteproposalswereputtoleadingfigures in theAfghangovernment: if thecountryabandoned theneutralstance ithadadoptedat thestartofthewar,Germanypromisedtocedealargechunkofnorth-westernIndiaaswellastheportofKarachi when these fell into its lap. It was a tempting offer. Even the British envoy in KabulrecognisedthattheBritishship‘lookedlikesinking’,andtakingthechancethatit‘mightstayafloat’neededcourageandfaith.TakingstepslikecuttingfreightcostsforAfghancottoncropstomakesurethe localeconomydidnotcollapsewas thesmallestof tokengestures–andasignofhow limitedBritain’soptionswere.Atthiscrucialmoment,theAfghansheldfirm–oratleasttheywavered,notthrowingtheirlotinwithGermanystraightaway.57Bythesummerof1940,Britainanditsempirewerehangingonfordearlife.Thestrokeofapen

inthesmallhoursinMoscowtheprevioussummersealinganagreementbetweenNaziGermanyandCommunistSovietUnionhadmadetheworldlookverydifferent,veryquickly.Thefuturelaywithanew series of connections thatwould linkBerlin through the SovietUnion deep intoAsia and theIndian subcontinent, one thatwould re-route trade and resources away fromwesternEurope to itscentre.

Thisreorientation,however,dependedoncontinuedandconsistentsupportfromtheSovietUnion.AlthoughgoodsandmaterialsflowedthroughtoGermanyinthemonthsthatfollowedtheinvasionofPoland,theydidnotalwaysdososmoothly.Negotiationsweretense,particularlywhenitcametowheat and oil – two resources that were in particular demand. Stalin oversawmatters personally,deciding whether the Germans should be allowed to take delivery of a requested consignment of800,000 tons of oil or only a much smaller amount, and on what terms. Discussing individualshipments was fraught and time consuming, and a source of near-constant anxiety for Germanplanners.58Notsurprisingly, theGermanForeignOfficerecognisedhowfragile thestateofaffairswasand

produced reports underlining the dangers of over-dependence onMoscow. If forwhatever reasonsomething went wrong – change of leadership, obstinacy or simple commercial disagreement –Germanywouldbeexposed.ThiswasthesinglebiggestthreattoHitler ’sastonishingrunofmilitarysuccessinEurope.59

ItwasthissenseofuneaseanduncertaintythatledtothedecisionthatwastocostthelivesofmillionsofGermansoldiers,millionsofRussians–andmillionsofJews:theinvasionoftheSovietUnion.Intypicalfashion,whenHitlerannouncedhislatestventureattheendofJuly1940,hedresseditupinterms of an ideological battle. It was time to seize the chance, he told General Jodl, to eliminateBolshevism.60Infact,whatwasatstakewererawmaterials,andaboveall,food.Overthecourseofthesecondhalfof1940andearly1941,itwasnotjustthemilitarywhowereset

toworkonthelogisticsofaninvasion,buteconomicplannerstoo.TheywereledbyHerbertBacke,anagriculturalspecialistwhohadjoinedtheNazipartyintheearly1920sandrosesteadilythroughthe ranks,becomingaprotégéofRichardDarré,ReichsministerofFoodandAgriculture.Backe’sslavish devotion to the Nazi cause, coupled with his expertise in farming, led to his becomingincreasinglyinfluentialinthereformsofthe1930sthatregulatedpricesandsetlimitsonbothimportandexportmarkets.61BackewasobsessedwiththeideathatRussiamightbethesolutiontoGermany’sproblems.Asthe

RussianEmpire had expanded, the steppes had been slowly transformed from a home to nomadicpastoraliststoaperfectbreadbasket,fielduponfieldofcerealsstretchingoutacrossflatplainsasfarastheeyecouldsee.Thesoilwasextraordinarilyfertile,especiallyintheareaswheretheearthwasdarkfromtherichnessofitsminerals.ScientificexpeditionssenttoexploretheregionbytheRussianAcademyofScienceswaxedlyricalaboutthebeltthatstretchedfromtheBlackSeadeepintoCentralAsia, reportingexcitedly thatconditionswere ideallysuited tohighlyproductive large-scalearablefarming.62Agriculture in southern Russia and Ukraine had grown at ferocious speed before the 1917

Revolution, boosted by growing domestic demand, rising exports and scientific research into thebest-quality wheat and how tomaximise yields from lands that had been grazed formillennia bynomads and their livestock.63 No one knew the potential of the steppes, which had expandedproductionsoquicklyinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,betterthanHerbertBacke:hisareaofexpertise,and the topicofhisdoctoraldissertation,wasRussiangrain.64A small,wirymanwhoworeglassesanddressedsmartly,Backeledteamsthatproducedsuccessivedraftsofwhatthe aims and objectives of an invasion should be. As he stressed to Hitler, Ukraine was the key:control of the rich agricultural plains that ran across the north of the Black Sea and on past theCaspianwould ‘liberate us from every economic pressure’.65Germanywould be ‘invincible’ if itcouldtakethepartsoftheSovietUnionthatheld‘immenseriches’.66Gonewouldbethedependenceon the USSR’s goodwill and its whimsical leadership; the effects of the British blockade of the

Mediterranean and the North Sea would be massively reduced. This was the chance to provideGermanywithaccesstoalltheresourcesitneeded.ThisisexactlyhowHitlercametotalkaboutwhatwasatstakeaftertheattackeventuallygotunder

wayinthesummerof1941.AsGermantroopsmovedeastwithastonishingspeedinthefirstdaysoftheinvasion,theFührercouldbarelycontainhisexcitement.Germanywouldneverleavethesenewlyconquered lands, he asserted gleefully; theywould become ‘our India’, ‘our very ownGarden ofEden’.67JosephGoebbels,ReichsministerofPropaganda,alsohadlittledoubtthattheattackwasallabout

resources,especiallywheatandgrain.Inanarticlewrittenin1942,hedeclaredinhischaracteristicdeadpanandcallousmanner that thewarhadbeen started for ‘grain andbread, for awell-stockedbreakfast,lunchanddinnertable’.This,andnothingmore,wasGermany’swaraim,hewenton:thecaptureof‘thevastfieldsoftheeast[which]swaywithgoldenwheat,enough–morethanenough–tonourishourpeopleandallofEurope’.68There was an urgent reality behind comments like these, for Germany found itself running

increasingly shortof foodand supplies–with shipmentsofSovietgrain failing to reducechronicproblemsofsupply.InFebruary1941,forexample,GermanradiowasbroadcastingthattherewerefoodshortagesacrossEuropeasaresultoftradeblockadesbytheBritishthathadpreviouslybeendescribed as nothing less than ‘mental derangement’ – or ‘dementia Britannica’, as announcersreferredtoit.69Bythesummerof1941,GoebbelswasrecordinginhisdiarythatshopsinBerlinhadbare shelves; finding vegetables for sale was a rarity. This caused unstable prices and fuelled athrivingblackmarket,whichincreasedtheanxietiesofapopulationthat,whilenotyetrestless,wasstarting to ask preciselywhat the benefits of German expansion had been – a development whichmadeHitler ’spropagandachiefdecidedlynervous.70Asonelocalofficialputit,the‘overworkedandexhaustedmenandwomen’inhispartofGermany‘donotseewhythewarmustbecarriedonstillfurtherintoAsiaandAfrica’.Happierdayswerenowadistantmemory.71The solutionhadbeenprovidedbyBacke andhis cohort of analysts.Backehimself hadbeen at

painstonotethedeterioratingfoodsituationwithinGermanyinhisannualreportonsuppliesattheendof1940.Indeed,inameetingheldbystatesecretariesinJanuary1941withHermannGöringinhiscapacityasco-ordinatorofaFourYearPlan,hehadgonesofarastowarnthatitwouldnotbelongbeforemeatwouldhavetoberationed,astepthathadbeenrepeatedlyvetoedforfearoflosingsupportnotjustforthewarbutfortheNazis.72Backe’sproposalwasradical.WhiletheSovietUnionwasvastandvariedintermsofgeography

andclimate,itcouldbedividedbyacrudeline.Tothesouth,coveringUkraine,southernRussiaandtheCaucasus,werefieldsandresourcesthatformeda‘surplus’zone.Tothenorth,thatiscentralandnorthernRussia,BelarusandtheBaltics,therewasa‘deficit’zone.AsBackesawit,thoseononesideof the line produced food; those on the other side just consumed it. The answer to Germany’sproblems was to concentrate on taking the former – and to ignore the latter. The ‘surplus’ zoneshouldbecaptured,anditsproducedivertedtoGermany.The‘deficit’zonewastobecutoff;ifandhowitsurvivedwasoflittleconcern.ItslosswastobeGermany’sgain.

TherealityofwhatthismeantwasspeltoutatameetingthattookplaceinBerlinjustweeksbeforethe launchofOperationBarbarossa, thecodenamegiven to the invasionof theSovietUnion.On2May,plannersdiscussed theprioritiesandexpectedresultsof theattack: theGermanarmiesshouldstripwhattheycouldfromthelandtofeedthemselvesastheadvanceprogressed;thepromisedlandwasexpectedtostartproducingfromtheoutset.TheWehrmachtwastobesuppliedfromRussiafromthemomentGermansoldierscrossedthefrontier.

Theeffectonthoselivinginthe‘deficit’zonewasalsonotedatthemeeting.Theyweretobecutoffatastroke.Inoneofthemostchillingdocumentsinhistory,theminutessimplystate:‘asaresult,xmillionpeoplewilldoubtlesslystarve,ifthatwhichisnecessaryforusisextractedfromtheland’.73These deaths were the price to pay for Germany being able to feed itself. These millions werecollateraldamage,necessaryvictimsforGermansuccessandsurvival.Themeetingwentontoconsiderotherlogisticalmatterstoensurethingswentsmoothly.Themain

arteriesthatlinkedtheagriculturalplainstothetransportinfrastructureweretobesecuredtoenablematerials tobe shippedback toGermany.Careful considerationwasgiven towhat theagriculturalleaderswhowouldsupervisecollectionoftheharvestandfutureplantingshouldwear:greyishsilverarmstripeson theircivilianclothing.Asone leadingscholarputs it, themeetingwasacaseof themundanebeingmixedwiththemurderous.74In the threeweeks that followed, a concerted effortwasmade to quantify the numbers of likely

casualties, toput avalue to the ‘xmillion’whosedeathswere forecast in the ‘deficit’ zone.On23May,atwenty-pagereportwasissuedthatwasessentiallyanupdatedformoftheconclusionsthathadalreadybeenreached.The‘surplus’regionoftheSovietUnionwastobedetached,itsgrainandotheragricultural produce gathered and diverted to Germany. As discussed at the previous meeting inBerlin, the local population would suffer the consequences. These were now spelt out, with theprevious, open estimate of likely deaths given definition. ‘Many tens ofmillions of people in thisterritory will become superfluous and will die or must emigrate to Siberia,’ read this report.‘Attemptstorescuethepopulationtherefromdeaththroughstarvation...canonlybeattheexpenseoftheprovisioningofEurope.TheypreventthepossibilityofGermanyholdingouttilltheendofthewar.’75Theattackdidnotjustconcernvictoryinthewar.Itwasliterallyamatteroflifeanddeath.Althoughalistofattendeesatthe2Maymeetingdoesnotsurvive,Backe’sfingerprintsareallover

theagendaandtheconclusions.HewashighlyregardedbyHitler,moresothanthoseseniortohim,andasBacke’swifewroteinherdiary,theGermanleadersoughthisadviceaboveallothersduringbriefings to plan the invasion. Then therewas the revised introduction to his dissertation thatwasfinallypublishedinthesummerof1941.Russiahadfailedtouseitsresourcesproperly,hewrote;ifGermanyseizedthem,itwouldsurelyusethemmoreefficiently.76Butmosttellingofallwasashortnotehewroteon1June1941,threeweeksbeforetheinvasion.

TheRussians,hewrote,needednosympathyforwhat theywereabout toexperience. ‘TheRussianhas already endured poverty, hunger and frugality for centuries . . . Do not attempt to apply theGerman standard of living as [your yardstick] and to alter the Russian way of life.’ The Russianstomach, he went on, ‘is stretchable’. Pity for those who are to starve, therefore, would bemisplaced.77The clarity of his thought impressed others, asGoebbels observed in his diarywhilepreparationsfortheattackontheUSSRgatheredpace.Backe,hewrote,‘dominateshisdepartmentinamasterlymanner.Withhim,everythingthatispossibletogetdone,getsdone.’78Themomentousnessofwhatlayaheadwasnotlostonthoseinvolved.Therewillbefoodshortages

in the winter of 1941, Goebbels predicted in his diary, so severe that other famines will lookinsignificant by comparison.That is not our problem, he added,with the obvious inference that itwouldbeRussiansandnotGermanswhowouldsuffer.79AssumingthattheGermanswerelisteningascarefullytoSovietradiobroadcastsastheBritishwere,Goebbelswouldhavetakenheartfromthenewslessthanthreedaysbeforetheinvasionbeganthat‘incentralRussia,thefieldslooklikegreencarpets; in the south-east, thewheat is ripening’.Theharvestwas just starting, and it looked likeabumpercrop.80Aspreparationsfortheattackreachedtheirfinalstages,therankandfileofthearmy,aswellasthe

seniorofficers,hadwhatwasatstakesearedintotheirminds.AccordingtoFranzHalder,aBavarian

career soldierwho had risen inexorably through the ranks of theWehrmacht,Hitlerwas typicallyforthrightandcategorical.Thisisafighttothefinish,hetoldhisgeneralsinMarch1941.Forcemustbe used in Russia ‘in its most brutal form’. This was to be a ‘war of extermination’. ‘Troopcommandersmustknowthe issuesatstake.’Asfaras theSovietUnionwasconcerned,Hitlersaid,‘severitytodaymeanslenienceinthefuture’.81ThiswasallsetoutmorefullyinMay1941,bywhichtimeofficialGuidelinesfortheBehaviourof

Troops inRussia hadbeenprepared andwerebeing circulated to those takingpart in the invasion.These listed the threats thatwere tobeexpected from‘agitators’, ‘partisans’, ‘saboteurs’andJews,makingclear toGermansoldiers that theyweretotrustnooneandshownomercy.82Orderswerealso issued describing how the conquered territorieswere to be controlled.Collective punishmentwastobeusedintheeventofinsurrectionorresistance.ThosesuspectedofworkingagainstGermaninterestsweretobetriedonthespotandshotiffoundguilty,regardlessofwhethertheyweresoldiersorcivilians.83Finally,aseriesofdirectiveswasissued,amongthemtheso-called‘CommissarOrder ’thatgave

graphic warnings of what to expect: the enemy would be likely to behave in a manner thatcontravened the principles of international law and of humanity. Commissars – shorthand for theSovietpolitical elite– fought inways that couldonlybedescribedas ‘barbaric andAsiatic’.Theyweretobeshownnomercy.84

20

TheRoadtoGenocide

Inthebuild-uptotheGermaninvasionoftheSovietUnion,themessagetotheofficersandthetroopswas consistent and remorseless: everything rested on taking thewheatfields of the south. Soldierswere told that theyshould imaginefoodeatenbySovietcitizenshadbeen tornfromthemouthsofGermanchildren.1SeniorcommanderstoldtheirmenthattheveryfutureofGermanyrestedontheirsuccess. As Colonel-General Erich Hoepner told his Panzer Group in an operational orderimmediatelybeforeBarbarossabegan,Russiahadtobecrushed–andcrushed‘withunprecedentedseverity.Everymilitaryactionmustinconceptionandexecutionbeledbytheironwillmercilesslyandtotallytoannihilatetheenemy.’2ContemptfortheSlavs,hatredofBolshevismandanti-Semitismranthroughtheveinsoftheofficercorps.Thesenowblended,asoneleadinghistorianputsit,‘astheideological yeast whose fermentation now easily converted the generals into accessories to massmurder ’.3Hitler,whileurgingtheimplementationofhorror,daydreamedaboutthefuture:theCrimeawould

beliketheRivieraforGermans,hereflected;howwonderfulitwouldbetolinkthepeninsulaintheBlackSeatothemotherlandwithamotorwaysothateveryGermancouldvisitintheirPeople’sCar(orVolkswagen).Hetooktowishingwhimsicallyhewasyoungersothathecouldseehowitwouldall turnout; itwas a shame,he thought, thathewouldmissouton a timeof intense excitement indecades to come.4 Himmler likewise contemplated a rosy view where ‘pearls of settlements’(Siedlungsperlen) would exist, peopled by colonisers, and ringed by villages that were home toGermanfarmers,reapingthecropsfromtherichblackearth.5Hitler and those closest tohimhad two templates for expandingGermany’s resourcebase.First

wastheBritishEmpire.Germanywouldstampitselfonenormousnewterritoriesintheeast,justasBritain had done in the Indian subcontinent.A small population ofGerman coloniserswould ruleRussia,justasafewBritishruledintheRaj.Europeancivilisationwouldtriumphoveraculturethatwassimplyinferior.TheBritishinIndiawereconstantlycitedbytheNazileadershipasamodelofhowlarge-scaledominationcouldbeaccomplishedbyfewpeople.6ButtherewasanothermodelthatHitlerregularlyreferredtoaswell,withwhichhesawparallels

andtowhichhelookedforinspiration:theUnitedStates.GermanyneededtodowhattheEuropeansettlersintheNewWorldhaddonetothenativeAmericans,HitlertoldAlfredRosenberg,thenewlyappointedReichsministerfortheOccupiedEasternTerritories:thelocalpopulationhadtobedrivenback–orexterminated.TheVolga,heproclaimed,wouldbeGermany’sMississippi,thatistosay,afrontier between the civilisedworld and the chaos beyond. The peopleswho had settled theGreatPlainsinAmericainthenineteenthcentury,hesaid,wouldsurelyflocktosettleintheeast.Germans,Dutch, Scandinavians and also, he predicted confidently, Americans themselves would find theirfutures and their rewards in a new landof opportunity.7A newworld orderwas going to emergethankstothefieldsofUkraineandsouthernRussiathatstretchedfarintotheeast.ItwastheendoftheAmericandream,Hitlerdeclared:‘Europe–andnolongerAmerica–willbethelandofunlimitedpossibilities.’8

HisexcitementwasnotjustbasedonprospectsheldbythebeltoflandabovetheBlackandCaspianSeas,forsignseverywherepointedtoadramaticshiftinGermany’sfavour.OnepartoftheGermanpincerwastravellingtowardstheheartoftheworldfromthenorth,whiletheotherwascomingfromthesouththroughNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEast.AsuccessionoflightningvictoriesinthedesertsofNorthAfricain1941hadbroughtRommelandtheAfrikaKorpswithinstrikingdistanceofEgyptand thus close to taking control of the critical Suez canal, just as Barbarossa got underway. ThecollapseofFrance,meanwhile,hadopeneduppossibilitiesfortheLuftwaffetousetheairbasesthattheFrenchhadestablished inSyria and theLevant after theFirstWorldWar settlements, to extendGermany’sreachfurtherstill.Thefateoftheworldhungbythemostslenderofthreads.Thekeyquestion,itseemed,turnedon

thetimingoftheinvasionoftheSovietUnionandwhetherStalincouldbetakenbysurprise.Itwascrucialtolaunchtheattackaftertheharvesthadbeensownbutbeforeitwascollected,sothatGermantroopscouldbenefitastheyadvancedintoRussia.NegotiationswithMoscowin1940hadalreadyledtoshipmentsfromtheSovietUniontoGermanyofamilliontonsofgrain,nearlythesameamountofpetroleumandconsiderablequantitiesofironoreandmanganese.OncedeliveryhadbeentakenofafurtherenormousconsignmentinMay1941,themomentwasnigh.9

AlarmedbyGermantroopsmassingintheeastintheearlysummerof1941,MarshalTimoshenko,CommissarofDefence,andGeneralGeorgiZhukovconfrontedStalinwithaproposal to launchapre-emptiveattack,followedbyanadvancethatwouldleadtoanassaultonWarsaw,northernPolandand part of Prussia.According to two closelymatching accounts, Stalin dismissed the plan out ofhand. ‘Haveyougonemad?’heapparentlyaskedangrily. ‘Doyouwant toprovoke theGermans?’ThenheturnedtoTimoshenko:‘Lookeveryone...Timoshenkoishealthyandhehasalargehead;buthisbrain isevidently tiny.’Then the threat: ‘Ifyouprovoke theGermanson theborder, ifyoumove forceswithout our permission, then bear inmind that headswill roll.’With that, he turned,walkedoutandslammedthedoorbehindhim.10ItwasnotthatStalindidnotbelieveHitlerwouldattack,justthathethoughthewouldnotdaretodo

soyet.Infact,thereasonwhyStalinhadpersonallyoverseentradewiththeNaziadministrationhadbeentokeepacloseeyeontheGermanswhiletheSovietarmywasrapidlyrebuiltandmodernised.Hewassoconfidenthestillheldallthecardsthatevenwhenintelligencereportswerereceivedfromagents in Berlin, Rome and even Tokyo – in addition to warnings and signs from embassies inMoscow – that an attack was imminent, he simply dismissed them.11 His scathing attitude wasperfectlysummedupbyhisreactiontoareportfromaspywithintheGermanairforceheadquartersjust five days before the invasion was launched. ‘You can tell your “source” . . . to go fuck hismother,’hescrawled.‘Thisisnota“source”,’hewrote,‘it’ssomeonespreadingdisinformation.’12NotallofthosearoundStalinwereasblaséastheSovietleader.Germantroopmovementsinearly

JuneledsometoarguethattheRedArmyshouldbemovedintodefensivepositions.‘Wehaveanon-aggressionpactwithGermany,’Stalinrepliedincredulously.‘GermanyistiedupwithwarintheWestandIamsurethatHitlerwillnotdaretocreateasecondfrontbyattackingtheSovietUnion.HitlerisnotsuchafoolandrealisesthattheSovietUnionisnotPolandorFrance,andnotevenEngland.’13By21 June, itwasobvious that something seriouswas afoot.Sweden’s ambassador toMoscow,

VilhelmAssarsson,thoughtthereweretwooptions:eitherhewasabouttohaveafront-rowseatatanepic confrontation between the ‘Third Reich and the Soviet Empire’ with extraordinarily wide-rangingconsequences,ortheGermanswereabouttoissueasetofdemandsregarding‘theUkraineand the Baku oilwells’. If the latter, he mused, he might just be witnessing ‘the greatest case ofblackmailinworldhistory’.14

Hours later, itbecameclear itwasnotagameofbluff.At3.45a.m.on22June1941,StalinwaswokenbyaphonecallfromGeneralZhukovwhotoldhimthatthefrontiershadbeenbreachedinallsectors and that the Soviet Union was under attack. At first, Stalin refused to believe what washappening,concluding that itwasagambitbyHitler, aimedat strong-arminga settlementof somekind, probably regarding trade.Only slowly did it dawn on him that thiswas a fight to the death.Numb from shock, he slumped into a catatonic state, leaving it to Molotov to make publicannouncements. ‘An act of treachery, unprecedented in the history of civilised nations, has takenplace,’Molotovannouncedgravelyonthetelevisionandontheradio.Buthavenodoubts:‘theenemywillbecrushedandvictorywillbeours’.TherewasnomentionofthefactthattheSovietUnionhadbeendancingwiththedevilandnowthetimehadcometopayup.15TheGermanadvancewasrelentlessanddevastating–eventhoughtheinvadingforcewasneither

aswellpreparednoraswellequippedashasoftenbeenpresumed.16Inamatterofdays,Minskhadfallenand400,000Sovietsoldierswereencircledandtrapped.Brest-Litovskwascutoff,itsdefendersquicklydeprivedofsuppliesbutnotalwaysofhope:asoneyoungsoldierscratchedintoawallon20July1941,‘Iamdying,butdonotsurrender.Farewellmotherland.’17Bythistime,Stalinhadbeguntounderstandthemagnitudeofwhatwashappening.On3July,he

gavearadiospeechthattalkedoftheGermaninvasionasamatterof‘lifeanddeathforthepeoplesof theUSSR’.He informed listeners that the invaderswanted to restore ‘tsarism’ and the ‘rule oflandlords’.Closertothemarkwashisclaimthattheattackersintendedtoobtain‘slaves’forGermanprincesandbarons.18Thiswasmoreorlesscorrect–aslongasprincesandbaronsmeantNazipartyofficialsandGermanindustrialists:itwouldnotbelongbeforeforcedlabourbecamecommonplacefor captured Soviet soldiers and the local population. In due course,more than 13million peoplewereusedtobuildroads,tofarmfieldsortoworkinfactoriesbothfortheNaziregimedirectlyandforprivateGermancompanies–manyofwhich remain inbusiness today.Slaveryhad returned toEurope.19Overthesummerof1941,theGermansseemedallbutunstoppable.BySeptember,Kievfellaftera

siege thatsawmore thanhalfamillionSovietsoldierscaptured.Afewweeks later, the threebattlegroups that acted as spears plunging into the heart of Russia had reached Kalinin, Tula andBorodino – where Napoleon’s invasion had faltered in 1812. Still the Germans continued to cutthroughthedefences.ByOctober,Moscowwasteetering.SuchwastheanxietythatplansweremadetoevacuatetheleadershiptoKuibyshev,oldSamara,morethan600milestotheeastofMoscowonabendoftheVolgaasitflowstowardstheCaspian.Lenin’sbodywasremovedfromRedSquareandput intostorage.PreparationsweremadeforStalin to leave thecity,onlyfor theRussian leader tochangehismindat the lastminuteanddecide tostay:accordingtosomereports,his train’senginewasrunningandhisbodyguardswereontheplatformreadytogo.20ByNovember,Rostov-on-Don had fallen, the final point before theCaucasus.At the end of the

month, the 3rd and 4th Panzergruppe were within twenty miles of Moscow. On 1 December, areconnaissanceunitofmotorcyclistswasjustfivemilesfromthecapital.21Hitlerwaseuphoric.Theplan todecapitate theSovietUnionbyknockingoutLeningrad andMoscow in thenorthhadbeencentraltosecuringthe‘surplus’zoneinthesouthinthelongterm,andtheplanseemedtobeontrack.Twomonthsafter theattackhadstarted,as theRussianlineswerebeingrolledback,hespokewithexcitementaboutthefuture.‘TheUkraine,andthentheVolgabasin,willonedaybethegranariesofEurope.Weshallreapmuchmorethanwhatactuallygrowsfromthesoil,’hesaidinAugust1941.‘IfonedaySwedendeclines to supplyuswithanymore iron,’hewenton, ‘that’s alright.We’llget itfromRussia.’22Inthemeantime,constructionandtechnicalteamsmovedeastwardsbehindthearmy.InSeptember

1941, a convoyof thenewlycreatedSonderkommandoR (SpecialCommandRussia) setout fromBerlin for Ukraine, with the aim of establishing a workable infrastructure in newly conqueredterritories.Madeupof fieldkitchens,mobileoffices, repair shopsandpolice transmitters inmorethan a hundred vehicles, its job was to enable what one historian has called ‘the most radicalcolonisationcampaigninthehistoryofEuropeanconquestandempirebuilding’.23WhentheyreachedOdessa,ontheBlackSea,theofficersincharge–amotleycollectionofunder-

achievers,draft-dodgersandmisfits–setaboutoccupyingthefinestresidencesfortheirheadquartersandbusiedthemselveswithestablishingthesortsofinstitutionsthatboretheunequivocalstatementoflong-termplans:libraries,recordcollections,lecturehallsandcinemastoshowtriumphalistGermanfilms.24The invasionseemed tohavebeenanunmitigatedsuccess.Almost theentireareaearmarked for

sending resources back to Germany had been conquered in less than six months. Leningrad andMoscowhadnotyetfallen,butitseemedamatteroftimebeforebothsurrendered.Elsewheretoothesigns seemed promising. Although an uprising in Iraq had been put down by a hastily assembledBritishforcethatrequisitionedbusesfromthestreetsofHaifaanddroveeasttosuppresstherevolt,thereseemedtobegroundsforthinkingthatGermany’snewfriendsintheoil-richlandssouthoftheCaspianSeawouldsooncomegood.25

BythetimeoftheinvasionoftheSovietUnion,HitlerhadalreadygivenhisformalblessingtotheideaofArab independence, andhadwritten to theGrandMufti of Jerusalem to express solidarity,praisingtheArabsasanancientcivilisationandasonethathadcommonenemieswithGermanyintheBritishandtheJews.26ThecultivationoftiesintheMuslimworldwentsofarthatoneGermanacademicpennedasycophanticeulogythatamongotherthingspraisedSaudiArabiaas‘TheThirdReichinWahhabistyle’.27FromBritain’spointofview,then,thingslookeddesperate.DisasterhadbeenavoidedinIraqbya

hair ’sbreadth,notedGeneralWavell, commander-in-chief in India, and itwasvital that stepsweretakentoprotectIran,whereitwastouchandgowhetherGermaninfluencemightbeextended.‘Itisessential to thedefenceof India’, hewrote toPrimeMinisterWinstonChurchill in the summerof1941,‘thatGermansshouldbeclearedoutofIrannow.Failuretodosowill leadtoarepetitionofeventswhichinIraqwereonlyjustcounteredintime.’28WavellwasrighttobeconcernedaboutIran,whereGermanpropagandahadbeenrelentlesssince

the start of the war. In the summer of 1941, reported one American correspondent, bookstalls inTeheranwere coveredwith copies of themagazine Signal, one ofGoebbels’smouthpieces,whilecinemasshowingfilmslikeSiegimWesten(VictoryintheWest)thatcelebratedGermanvictoriesinFranceandwesternEuropeinepicstylewerepacked.29Hitler ’s attack on the Soviet Union was also rapturously received in Iran. According to some

reports, crowds gathered in Sepah Square in central Teheran to cheer news of the fall to theWehrmachtofoneSovietcityafteranother.30Theproblemwasthat‘IraniansgenerallyaredelightedattheGermanattackontheirancientenemyRussia,’asSirReaderBullard,theBritishambassador,informedLondoninthedaysfollowingtheinvasion.31Pro-Germansympathieswerewidespreadinthearmyandinthebazaar,declaredthedistinguished

PersianscholarAnnLambton,afterbeingaskedforherviewsonthedevelopingsituation.Feelingsran particularly high among ‘younger officials [who] tend to be pro-German and to hope for aGermanvictory’.32TheBritishmilitaryattachéheldmuchthesameopinion,contrastingthepositivelocal impression ofGermanywith the negative views aboutBritain. ‘There is as yet only a small

number [ofpeople]whowouldbeatall likely to support theBritishcause if theGermanswere toreach Persia, whereas it may be anticipated that the Germans would find considerable activesupport.’33ThisviewwassharedbytheGermanambassadorinTeheran,ErwinEttel,whoreportedtoBerlin that a British attackwould face ‘resolutemilitary resistance’, andwould result in the ShahappealingformallyforhelpfromGermany.34The anxiety that Iran might throw its lot in with Hitler was exacerbated by the knowledge that

resistance was crumbling as the Germans advanced east. Such was their progress that GeneralAuchinleck, until recently commander-in-chief, India and now appointed to head Middle EastCommand,wasbriefedthatHitler ’stroopswouldreachtheCaucasusbythemiddleofAugust1941.35FromBritain’spointofview,thiswasadisaster.TheGermanswereindesperateneedofoil.Iftheytookcontrolof thesupplies inBakuandtheCaucasus, thatwouldbebadenough.Whatwasworse,notedLeopoldAmery,SecretaryofStateforIndia,wasthattheywouldthenbe‘prettyclose’totheoilfieldsinIranandIraqandwoulddoubtlessmake‘everykindofmischief’.36 Inotherwords,notonlydiditlookasthoughGermanycouldfindasolutionforitsAchillesheelofnothavingreliableaccess to oil to fuel its ships, planes, tanks and other vehicles, but itmight compromise Britain’sabilitytosustainthewareffort.Itwasvital,GeneralAuchinleckconcluded,todevelopaplan–namedOperation Countenance – to defend the belt stretching from Palestine to Basra and to the Iranianoilfields.37Iran’simportancewasmagnifiedbyitsstrategiclocation.AlthoughStalinhadpreviouslycutadeal

withHitlerin1939,theGermaninvasionoftheSovietUniontwoyearslaterhadturnedthelatterintoanunlikelyallyfortheBritishandtheirfriends.ItwasannouncedinWashington,therefore,that‘theGovernment of the United States has decided to give all economic assistance practicable for thepurpose of strengthening the Soviet Union in its struggle against armed aggression’.38 This wascoupledwithprivateassurancesgiventoStalinbytheAmericanambassadorinMoscowthattheUSwas determined ‘“all out” to beat Hitler ’ and was prepared to do whatever it took to make thishappen.39TheproblemwashowtogetarmamentsandmatérieltotheSovietUnion.Shippingtoportsinthe

ArcticCirclewaslogisticallydifficultand,inthemiddleofwinter,treacherous.Thelackofsuitableharbours,otherthanVladivostokintheeast,meanwhile,wasnolessproblematic,notleastbecauseofJapan’sdominanceinthispartofthePacific.Thesolutionwasobvious:totakecontrolofIran.ThiswouldpreventlocalGermanagentsandsympathisersgainingafootholdatacrucialmoment,wouldbetterenabletheprotectionofnaturalresourcestheAlliescouldillaffordtoloseandwouldprovidethebestchanceofco-ordinatingeffortstohinderandhalttherelentlessdriveeastoftheWehrmacht.WhilethissuitedtheAllies’warends,italsopromisedlonger-termrewardsfortheBritishandthe

Sovietsrespectively;occupyingthecountrywouldgiveeachwhattheyhadlongcovetedintermsofpolitical influence,economicresourcesandstrategicvalue.Excitingopportunitieshadbeen thrownupbyHitler ’sdecisiontoturnonhisformerallyinMoscow.InJuly1941,TeheranwasoccupiedbyBritish troops,whoweresoon joinedbySoviet soldiers.

Differences were put to one side in order to promote mutual interests in a region of profoundstrategicandeconomicimportance.TherewasmuchcelebrationwhenBritishandSoviettroopsmetat Qazvin, in the north of the country, where they swapped stories and cigarettes. The foreigncorrespondentswhometupwiththeSovietarmysoonfoundthemselvesbeingtreatedtovodkaandtoastingthealliancebydrinkingtothehealthofStalin,thenChurchill,thenMolotov,thenRoosevelt,and then the same again in the same order. ‘At the end of thirty toasts in neat vodka,’ wrote oneAmerican journalistwhowas present, ‘half the correspondentswere under the table.TheRussianscontinueddrinking.’40

WhentheShahditheredoverissuinganultimatumtoexpelGermancitizenswithimmediateeffect,the British began to broadcast reports over the radio on the newBBC Persian Radio Service that(falsely)accusedtheShahofremovingthecrownjewelsfromthecapital,ofusingforcedlabourinhis own business interests and of using Teheran’s water supply to irrigate his private gardens –criticismsthatalreadycirculatedwidelyaccordingtoReaderBullardinhismemoirs.41TheShahprevaricated in the faceofBritishdemands,complaining toPresidentRoosevelt about

‘acts of aggression’ and decrying the threat to ‘international justice and the right of peoples toliberty’. Thiswas all verywell, replied the President, but the Shah should bear inmind that ‘it iscertainthatmovementsofconquestbyGermanywillcontinueandwillextendbeyondEuropetoAsia,Africa and even theAmericas’. Persia, in otherwords, was dicingwith disaster by contemplatinggoodrelationswithHitler.42Intheend,theBritishtookmattersintotheirownhandsandforcedtheabdication ofRezaKhan,whowas by now considered a liability, and his replacement by his son,MohammedReza,animmaculatelyturned-outplayboywithaloveforFrenchcrimenovels,fastcarsandevenfasterwomen.43To many Iranians, such outside interference was intolerable. In November 1941, mobs were

gatheringtoshout‘LongLiveHitler!’and‘DownwiththeRussiansandtheBritish!’, toshowtheirdisgustforhowthefateofthecountrywasbeingdecidedbysoldierswhowereseenasanoccupyingforce.44 Thiswas not Iran’swar; the disputes andmilitary conflict of the SecondWorldWar hadnothing to do with inhabitants of towns like Teheran and Isfahan, who looked on agog as theircountrywascaughtupinthestrugglebetweenEuropeanpowers.Theseviewscountedfornothing.With the situation in Iranbrought forcefullyundercontrol, stepswerealso takenagainstFrench

installationsinSyriafollowingthefallofFranceduetofearsthattheycouldbeusedagainstBritainand its allies in the Middle East. A hastily deployed Hurricane squadron was sent from RAFHabbaniyah,oneoftheairfieldstheBritishretainedinIraqaftertheendoftheFirstWorldWar, tostrafethebasesoftheVichyFrench.Amongthoseflyingintheraidsinthesecondhalfof1941wasayoung fighterpilotwho later recalled coming in low to catch aSunday-morningcocktail partyofFrenchairmenand‘abunchofgirlsinbrightlycoloureddresses’infullswing.Glasses,bottlesandhighheels fleweverywhere as theBritish fighters attackedandall tookcover. Itwas ‘wonderfullycomical’,wrotethepilotofoneoftheHurricanes–acertainRoaldDahl.45

ThenewscomingintoBerlinaroundthistimeseemedunremittinglygood.WiththeSovietUnionindirestraits,andbreakthroughsseeminglyimminentinPersia,IraqandSyria,therewaseveryreasontothinkthatGermanywasonthebrinkofaseriesofconquests tocomparewith thoseof thegreatarmiesofIslamintheseventhcenturyortheMongolforcesofGenghisKhanandhisheirs.Successwaswithintouchingdistance.Thereality,however,wasratherdifferent.DramaticastheGermanadvancesappeared,bothinthe

SovietUnionandelsewhere,theywerebesetbyproblems.Foronething,battlefieldlossesduringtheadvance east greatly exceeded the number of reserves being sent out to replace them. Althoughspectacularvictoriesledtohugenumbersofprisonersbeingtaken,thesewereoftenachievedatgreatcost.AccordingtoGeneralHalder ’sownestimates,theWehrmachtlostover10percentofitsmeninthefirsttwomonthsoffightingafterthestartoftheinvasion–ormorethan400,000soldiers.BythemiddleofSeptember,thishadrisentomorethan500,000men,deadorwounded.46Thegallopingsurgeforwardalsoputanalmostunbearablestrainonsupplylines.Lackofclean

waterwasanissuealmostfromtheoutset,whichin turnledtooutbreaksofcholeraanddysentery.EvenbeforetheendofAugust, itwasbecomingcleartothemoreastutethat thepicturewasnotasrosy as it seemed: shortages of basicmaterials like razor blades, toothpaste, toothbrushes,writing

paper,needlesandthreadwerenotablefromthefirstdaysoftheinvasion.47Endlessraininthelatesummer soakedmenandequipmentalike. ‘There isnochanceat all todry theblankets,bootsandclothesproperly,’wroteonesoldierhome.48NewsofconditionsreachedGoebbels,whoremarkedinhisdiary thatnervesofsteelwereneeded toovercomethedifficulties. Induecourse,hewrote, thecurrenthardships‘willseemlikefondmemories’.49Prospects in theNearEastandinCentralAsia likewiseflatteredtodeceive.Forall theoptimism

earlierintheyear,Germanyhadlittletoshowforthepopularenthusiasmthatsupposedlypromisedto link North Africa to Syria, Iraq to Afghanistan. The prospect of establishing a meaningfulpresence,letalonetakingcontrol,seemedtobeanillusionratherthansomethingofsubstance.Andso,inspiteofextraordinaryterritorialgains,theGermanHighCommandsetabouttryingto

shore up morale just as Moscow was teetering. At the start of October 1941 Field Marshal vonReichenau,commanderofthepartofArmyGroupSouththathadadvancedintothe‘surplus’zone,issuedanordertotrytoinjectsomegritbackintohissoldiers.Eachman,hestatedsolemnly,wasa‘standard-bearerofanationalideal,andtheavengerofallthebestialitiesperpetratedontheGermanpeoples’.50Thiswasallwellandgood;butasmenstuffednewspapersintotheirbootstofightoffthecold,itwashardtoseewhateffectstrongwordscouldhaveonaforcewhosemembersfrozetodeathifwoundedandwhoseskinstucktotheicybuttsoftheirrifles.51Asbitingwintertookhold,suchthatbread had to be chopped with axes, Hitler told the Danish Foreign Minister with disdain: ‘If theGermanpeoplearenolongerstrongenoughandreadytosacrificetheirownblood...theyshouldperish.’52 Chemical stimulants – like Pervitin, a metamphetamine that was distributed in largequantities to troopsservingon thebitterlycoldeasternfront–weremorehelpful thanpep talks ingivingsuccour.53Serioussupplyproblemsalsocharacterisedtheinvasion.Ithadbeenestimatedthatthebattlegroup

closinginonMoscowwouldneedtwenty-sevendeliveriesoffuelbytraineachday;inNovember,itreceived three – in the course of the whole month.54 American economists monitoring the warfocusedonpreciselythisissueinreportsentitled‘TheGermanMilitaryandEconomicPosition’and‘TheGermanSupplyProblemontheEasternFront’.Theycalculatedthateach200milesofadvancewouldrequireanadditional35,000freightcars,orareductionof10,000tonsindailydeliveriestothefrontline.Thespeedoftheadvancewasprovingtobeamajorproblem.55Keepingthefrontlinesuppliedfromtherearwasbadenough.Buttherewasamorepressingissue.

TheguidingprinciplebehindtheinvasionhadbeentheamputationoftherichlandsofUkraineandofsouthernRussia–theso-called‘surplus’zone.EvenwhengrainshipmentswerebeingdeliveredfromtheSovietUnionbeforetheinvasionstarted,theeffectsofthewaronfoodsuppliesanddietswerefarmore marked in Germany than they had been, for example, in Great Britain. Rather than beingboostedbygainsintheeast,dailycalorieconsumption,alreadyreducedbytheendof1940,begantoplummetfurther.56Infact,theamountsofgrainshippedbacktoGermanyafterOperationBarbarossagotunderwayweremuchlowerthanhadbeenimportedfromtheSovietUnionin1939–41.57German radiobroadcasts attempted toboostmorale–andprovideassurances.Germanyused to

haveplentifulreservesofgrain,onenewsreportstatedinNovember1941;‘nowinwartime,wehavetodowithoutthiskindofluxury’.Buttherewasgoodnews,thebulletinwenton.TherewasnoneedtofeartheshortagesandproblemsoftheFirstWorldWar.Unliketheperiodbetween1914and1918,‘theGermanpeoplecanrelyontheirfoodcontrolauthorities’.58This was fighting talk, for in fact it was becoming clear that the idea of taking control of an

apparently bottomless pool of resources in the east had been an illusion. The army that had beeninstructedtofeeditselffromthelandwasunabletodoso,barelysurvivingandresortingtorustling

livestock. Far fromboosting the agricultural situation at home,meanwhile, the promised lands onwhichHitlerandthosearoundhimhadsettheirhopesturnedouttobeadrain.TheSoviets’scorched-earthpoliciesrobbedthelandofmuchofitswealth.MeanwhilewithintheWehrmachtconfusedandcontradictorymilitarypriorities–therewasconstanttensionoverwhethermen,tanks,resourcesandfuel should be diverted to the centre, to the north or to the south – sowed seeds thatwould provedeadly. American estimatesmade in the spring of 1942 about likely crop yields in the conqueredterritoriesof theSovietUnion’ssouthpaintedapessimisticpictureof the likelyharvest inUkraineandsouthernRussia.Atmost,thereportsuggested,two-thirdsofpre-invasionyieldswerepossible.Eventhatwouldbedoingwell.59Forall theterritorialgainsachieved,therefore,thecampaignintheeasthadfailedtodelivernot

onlywhat had been promised butwhatwas needed. Just two days after the invasion of the SovietUnion, Backe had presented his projections regarding wheat requirements as part of a four-yeareconomicplan.Germanywasfacingadeficitof2.5milliontonsperyear.TheWehrmachtneededtoresolvethis–andtosecuremillionsoftonsofoil-bearingseeds,andmillionsofheadofcattleandpigs–forGermanytoeat.60ThiswasonereasonwhyHitlerinstructedhisgeneralsto‘razeMoscowandLeningrad to theground’:hewanted to ‘preventpeople remaining therewhomwewould thenhavetofeedinthewinter ’.61

Havingpredictedthatmillionswoulddiefromfoodshortagesandfamine,theGermansnowbegantoidentifythosewhoshouldsuffer.FirstinlinewereRussianprisoners.Thereisnoneedtofeedthem,wroteGöringdismissively;itisnotasthoughweareboundbyanyinternationalobligations.62On16September1941,hegavetheordertowithdrawfoodsuppliesfrom‘non-working’prisonersofwar–thatis,thosewhoweretooweakortooinjuredtoactasslavelabour.Amonthlater,afterrationsfor‘working’ captives had already been reduced, they were lowered once again.63 The effect wasdevastating:byFebruary1942,some2million(ofatotalof3.3million)Sovietprisonersweredead,mostlyasaresultofstarvation.64To quicken the process further still, new techniques were devised to eliminate the number of

mouths that needed feeding. Prisoners of warwere gathered by the hundred so that the effects ofpesticidesthathadbeenusedtofumigatePolisharmybarrackscouldbetestedonthem.Experimentswere also carried out on the impact of carbon monoxide poisoning, using vans that had pipesconnected to their own exhausts. These tests – which took place in the autumn of 1941 – wereconductedinlocationsthatweresoontogainnotorietyforusingthesametechniquesonamassivescale:AuschwitzandSachsenhausen.65Themassmurdersthatbeganjustweeksafterthestartoftheinvasionwereasickeningresponseto

thefailureoftheGermanattackandtheabjectinadequaciesoftheeconomicandstrategicplans.ThegreatgranariesofUkraineandsouthernRussiahadnotgeneratedwhathadbeenexpectedof them.Andtherewasanimmediatepricetopay:notthedeportationoremigrationofthelocalpopulation,asHitlerhadmentioned in conversation.With toomanypeople andnot enough food, therewere twoobvious targetswhohadbeendemonised inallwalksofGerman life, in themediaand inpopularconsciousness:RussiansandJews.Theportrayalof theSlavsasraciallyinferior,erratic,withacapacityforsufferingandviolence

hadbeenconsistentlydevelopedbefore thewar.Althoughthevitriolhadbeen toneddownafter theMolotov–Ribbentropagreementwassignedin1939,itstartedupagainaftertheinvasion.Ashasbeenforcefullyargued,thisplayeddirectlyintothegenocideofRussiansthatstartedinthelatesummerof1941.66Anti-Semitism was even more heavily ingrained in Germany before the war. According to the

deposed Kaiser, the Weimar Republic had been ‘prepared by the Jews, made by the Jews andmaintainedbyJewishpay’.Jewswerelikemosquitoes,hewrotein1925,‘anuisancethathumankindmustgetridofsomewayorother...Ibelievethebestthingwouldbegas!’67Suchattitudeswerenotunusual.EventsliketheKristallnacht,whichsawco-ordinatedviolenceagainstJewsonthenightof9–10November1938,wereculminationsofpoisonous rhetoric that routinelydismissed theJewishpopulationas‘aparasite[that]feedsonthefleshandproductivityandworkofothernations’.68Risingfearsofwhatsuchtalk–andaction–wouldbringhadalreadypromptedsometoconsider

makingnewalliances. In themid-1930s,DavidBen-Gurion, later thefirstPrimeMinisterof Israel,tried to reach an agreement with leading Arabs in Palestine to enable greater levels of Jewishemigration. This came to nothing,with amission led by a supposedArabmoderate being sent toBerlintoagreetermsonhowtheNaziregimewouldinsteadsupportArabplanstoundermineBritishinterestsintheMiddleEast.69Beforetheendofthefirstmonthofthewar,inSeptember1939,aplanhadbeenagreedtoresettle

all Jews inPoland.To startwith, at least, the plan seems to have been to gather the population enmasse to facilitate their removal fromGerman territory by forcible emigration. Indeed, elaborateplansweredevelopedinthelate1930stodeportGermanJewstoMadagascar,ahare-brainedschemeseemingly based on the popular (but misguided) conviction of many late nineteenth- and earlytwentieth-centurygeographersandanthropologiststhatthenativeMalagasypopulationofthisislandinthesouth-westIndianOceantracedtheiroriginstotheJews.70There had been discussions in Nazi Germany about deporting Jews elsewhere too. In fact, and

perversely,HitlerhadbeenchampioningthecreationofaJewishstateinPalestineforthebestpartoftwodecades.Inthespringof1938,hespokeinsupportofapolicyofemigrationofGermanJewstotheMiddleEastandtheformationofanewstatetobetheirhome.71Indeed,inthelate1930s,ahigh-levelmission,ledbyAdolfEichmann,hadevenbeensenttomeetwithZionistagentsinPalestinetodiscusshowanaccommodationcouldbereachedthatwouldsolvewhatwasoftencalled‘theJewishquestion’onceandforall.Withconsiderableirony,Eichmann–whowaslaterexecutedinIsraelforcrimesagainsthumanity–foundhimselfdiscussinghowtoboostemigrationofJewsfromGermanytoPalestine,somethingwhichseemedintheinterestsbothoftheanti-SemiticNazileadershipandoftheleadershipoftheJewishcommunityinandaroundJerusalem.72Although the discussions did not result in agreement, the Germans continued to be seen as

potentiallyusefulpartners–evenafterthestartofthewar.Intheautumnof1940,AvrahamStern,thecreator of amovement called the Lehi,which became known to the authorities in Palestine as theSternGang andwhosemembers included the future PrimeMinisterYitzhak Shamir aswell otherfounding fathers of modern Israel, sent a message to a senior German diplomat in Beirut with aradicalproposal. ‘Commoninterestscouldexist,’ itbegan,betweenGermanyandthe‘truenationalaspirationsoftheJewishpeople’,whomStern(andothers)purportedtorepresent.If‘aspirationsoftheIsraelifreedommovementarerecognised’,itwenton,Sternofferedto‘activelytakepartinthewarontheGermanside’.IftheJewscouldbeliberatedthroughthecreationofastate,Hitlerwouldsurelybenefit:apartfrom‘strengthen[ingthe]futureGermanpositionofpowerintheMiddleEast’,itwould also ‘extraordinarily strengthen the moral basis’ of the Third Reich ‘in the eyes of allhumanity’.73Thiswasbluster.Infact,Sternwasbeingpragmatic–eventhoughthehopesheplacedinallying

withGermanywerenotsharedbyallwithinhisownorganisation.‘AllwewantoftheGermans’,hesaidshortlyafterwardstoexplainhisstance,istobringJewishrecruitstoPalestine.Indoingso,‘thewaragainsttheBritishtoliberatethehomelandwillbeginhere.TheJewswillattainastate,andtheGermanswill,incidentally,beridofanimportantBritishbaseintheMiddleEast,andalsosolvethe

JewishquestioninEurope...’Itseemedlogical–andhorrific:leadingJewishfigureswereactivelyproposingcollaborationwiththegreatestanti-Semiteofalltime,negotiatingwiththeperpetratorsoftheHolocausthardlytwelvemonthsbeforegenocidebegan.74AsfarasHitlerwasconcerned,whereJewsweredeportedtowasunimportant,suchwasthepower

ofhisanti-Semitism.Palestinewasjustonelocationamongmanythatwereconsidered,withlocationsdeepinsideRussiaalsodiscussedseriously.‘ItdoesnotmatterwhereonesendstheJews,’Hitlertoldthe Croatian military commander Slavko Kvaternik in 1941. Either Siberia orMadagascar woulddo.75Facedwith chronic problems in Russia, this casual attitude now hardened into somethingmore

formalandmoreruthlessasitdawnedonNaziplannersthatthefactthatJewshadbeengatheredincampsmeant thatmassmurdercouldbeaccomplishedwithlittledifficulty.76Facedwithadrainonresourcesthatwerealreadyscarce,itwasashortjumpforasystemicallyanti-Semiticregimetostarttolooktomurderonamassivescale.JewswerealreadyincampsinPoland;theywereareadyandeasytargetatatimewhentheNazileadershipwererealisingthatthereweremillionsofmouthstoomanytofeed.‘Thereisadangerthiswinter ’,wroteAdolfEichmannasearlyasthemiddleofJuly1941,‘thatthe

Jews can no longer all be fed. It is to be seriously consideredwhether themost humane solutionmight not be to finish off those Jews not capable of labour by some sort of fast-workingpreparation.’77Theelderly, theinfirm,womenandchildrenandthose‘notcapableof labour ’weredismissedasexpendable:theywerethefirststepinreplacingthe‘xmillion’whosedeathshadbeensocarefullyforecastbeforetheinvasionoftheSovietUnion.Sobegana chainof eventswhose scale andhorrorwereunprecedented, the shipmentofhuman

beingslikelivestocktoholdingpenswheretheycouldbedividedintothosewhowouldworkasslavelabourandthosewhoselivesweredeemedtobethepricetopayforthesurvivalofothers:southernRussia, Ukraine and the western steppe became the cause of genocide. The failure of the land togeneratewheatintheanticipatedquantitieswasadirectcauseoftheHolocaust.In Paris, where the police had been carrying out secret registrations of Jewish and non-Jewish

foreignerssincethelate1930s,theprocessofdeportationwassimplyaquestionofrattlingthroughthe card index that was handed to the German occupiers and then sending guards to detain entirefamiliesfortransportationtocampsintheeast,mainlyinPoland.78TheregistrationofJewsinotheroccupiedcountries,suchastheNetherlands,aspartofthebroadprogrammeofinstitutionalisedNazianti-Semitism alsomade the process of deporting those now identified as surplus to requirementsdistressinglyeasy.79HavingattackedtheSovietUnionwiththoughtsofsurpluszones,thoughtsnowrevolvedaroundsurpluspopulations–andhowtodealwiththem.Asthehopesofwhat the invasionwouldbringwere thwarted, theNazieliteconcludedthat there

wasone solution forGermany’sproblems. In agrotesquemirroringof themeeting thathad takenplaceinBerlinon2May1941,anothermeetingtookplacelessthaneightmonthslaterinWannsee,aleafy suburb of Berlin. Once again, the question revolved around the issue of the deaths ofunquantifiable millions. The name given to the conclusions reached on the frosty morning of 20January1942sendsshiversdownthespine.In theeyesof itsmakers, thegenocideof theJewswassimplyaresponsetoaproblem.TheHolocaustwasthe‘FinalSolution’.80

Beforelong,tanks,aircraft,armamentsandsupplieswereontheirwaytoMoscowfromLondonandWashington as the fightback against Germany began to gather pace. These were networks, traderoutes and communication channels that had functioned since thedaysof antiquity through the so-calledPersianCorridor,stretchinginlandfromtheGulfportsofĀbādān,Basra,Bushihrandothers,

throughtheinteriortoTeheranviaArakandQom,andeventuallythroughtheCaucasustoreachtheSovietUnion.RouteswerealsoopenedupthroughtheRussianFarEastacrossintoCentralAsia.81Russia’s old commercial connections with Great Britain were again activated, despite the

challenges involved: Arctic convoys taking provisions and resources to Murmansk and northernRussiahadbeentreacherousenoughintheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies.DoingsowithinrangeofU-boatsandheavilyarmouredcruiserslikeTirpitzandBismarck,whichtreatedtheNorthSeacoastofNorwayas their stampingground, required tremendous resilienceandbravery.Sometimes, lessthan half the number of ships that set outmade it to their destination and back – andmany of theservicemenwho travelled this route were not givenmedals for their service or their bravery fordecadesaftertheendofthewar.82SlowlybutsurelythetideturnedasGermanforcesweresqueezedoutofthecentreoftheworld.

Foramoment,ithadlookedasthoughHitler ’sgamblewouldpayoff:alreadymasterofEuropeinall but name, his effort to open upCentralAsia from the north and from the south seemed to beworkingwhenhistroopsreachedthebanksoftheVolga.But,onebyone,thegainsslippedawayastheGermanarmywasrelentlesslyandbrutallydrivenbacktoBerlin.Hitlerplungedintodespairastherealisationofwhatwashappeningdawnedonhim.Aclassified

Britishreportrevealedthatinaspeechgivenon26April1942,despitetheapparentsuccessesintheeast, theGerman leaderwasbetrayingclear signsofparanoiaand fatalism, togetherwithgrowingevidenceofwhatwastermedaMessiahcomplex.83Fromapsychologicalperspective,Hitlerwasanastonishingrisk-taker,amanwhofittedtheprofileofacompulsivegambler.84Hisluckwasfinallystartingtorunout.Thetidebegantoturnduringthesummerof1942.RommelhadbeenhaltedatElAlamein,putting

paidtotheplansofMu ammadal- usaynī,whohadtoldtheinhabitantsofCairotopreparelistsofhomesandworkplacesofJewishresidentssotheycouldberoundedupandexterminatedingasvansdevelopedbyafanaticalGermanofficerwhohadbeenstationedlocally.85TheentryoftheUSintothewaralsotooktimetomakeadifference.Shockedintoactionbythe

JapaneseattackonPearlHarbor, theAmericansgearedupforwarontwofronts.Bythemiddleof1942,victoryattheepicbattleofMidwayenabledtheUStomoveontotheoffensiveinthePacific,while major troop deployments from the start of the following year in North Africa, Sicily andsouthernItalyandlaterelsewhereinEuropetoopromisedtoturnthecourseofthewar.86Then therewas thesituationatStalingrad. In thespringof1942,Hitlerhadapprovedaproposal

codenamedOperationBluethatinvolvedGermanforcesswingingthroughsouthernRussiatosecuretheoilfieldsintheCaucasusthathadbecomecentraltotheThirdReich’swarplanning.Theoffensivewas ambitious and risky – and victory depended on it, as senior generals and Hitler himselfrealised:‘ifIdonotgettotheoilofMaikopandGrozny,’theGermanleaderdeclared,‘thenImustendthewar ’.87Stalingradrepresentedamajorproblem.Itwasnotessentialtocapturethecity,despitetheprestige

associatedwith its name.Although it was an important industrial centre, its significance lay in itsstrategic location on a bend in theVolga: neutralisingStalingradwas vital to protect the gains theGermansenvisagedmakingintheCaucasus.Bytheautumnof1942,itwasclearthatthingshadgonebadlywrong.TheGermanoffensivehadbegunlate,andsoonranintotrouble.Manpower,ordnanceandincreasinglypreciousfuel–resourcesBerlincouldillaffordtospare–wereexpendedinhugequantitiesatStalingrad,whichwasbadenough.Worsewas thefact thatattentionwasdivertedawayfrom the campaign’s primary strategic goal: oil. SomewithinHitler ’s inner circle, such asAlbertSpeer,hadunderstoodwhatdelayswouldmean.Germanyhadtowinthewar‘bytheendofOctober,beforetheRussianwinterbegins,orwehavelostitonceandforall’.88

WhiletherewasstillmuchtodointermsofplanninghowtouprootGermantroopsfromtheeastandthewest,andhowtoco-ordinatethepincersthatwouldcloseinonBerlin,bytheendof1942thethoughtsofthenewAllies–Britain,theUSAandtheSovietUnion–wereturningtothefuture.WhentheleadersofthethreecountriesmetatTeheranin1943,atYaltainthespringof1945andfinallyatPotsdam a few months later, it was clear that the effort, expense and trauma of another massiveconfrontationhadexhaustedwesternEurope.Itwasalreadyobviousthatoldempireshadtobewounddown;itwassimplyamatterofhowbest

tomanagethisprocess.Inasignofthepervasivemoralfatigue,thequestionathandwashowtomaketheleastbaddecision–andeventhatwasnotdonesuccessfully.InOctober1944,Churchillreturnedhome from a visit to Moscow ‘refreshed and fortified’, he told Stalin, thanks to the ‘Russianhospitalitywhichisrenowned,excel[ing]itself’.MinutesrecordtheperformanceofRachmaninov’sThirdPianoConcerto, theopportunities forsome‘lightshopping’alongsideahostofconclusionsreachedduringthemeetings.Theydonotrecordthediscussionsaboutthefateofpost-warEurope,whichwereexcisedfromtheofficialreports.89Theterritorial integrityofPolandthat theHouseofCommonshadsworntoprotect in1939was

surrendered, its borders crudely alteredwhenWinstonChurchill decided themomentwas ‘apt forbusiness’ and used a blue pencil to mark a map that moved a third of the country into Germanterritory andgifted a third to theSovietUnion; he alsoproposeddivisions across scores of othercountriesincentralandeasternEuropethatmightbemutuallysatisfactory–suchasa90:10splitinRumania in favour of the USSR’s influence over that of Britain, and the opposite in the case ofGreece; in Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia, a 50:50 division would apply. Even Churchillrecognised that the ‘offhandmanner ’ in which the fates of ‘millions of people’ had been decidedmightbeconsidered‘rathercynical’.ThepriceofkeepingStalinsweetinvolvedthesacrificeofthefreedom of half of the continent of Europe. ‘Let us burn the paper ’, Churchill told the Sovietsupremo;‘No’,repliedStalin,‘youkeepit.’90Churchillrealisedthetruesituationtoolate.InhisfamousspeechatFulton,Missouriin1946that

warnedofanIronCurtainfallingacrossEurope,heobservedthat‘allthecapitalsoftheancientstatesofCentralandEasternEurope,Warsaw,Berlin,Prague,Vienna,Budapest,Belgrade,BucharestandSofia’,nowlaywithinthesphereoftheSovietUnion.91AllbutViennaandhalfofBerlinwouldstaythere. The SecondWorldWar had been fought to stop the dark shadow of tyranny falling acrossEurope;intheend,nothingcould,orwould,bedonetostoptheIronCurtaindescending.AndsoEuropewascleavedintwoattheendoftheSecondWorldWar.Thewesternhalfhadfought

bravelyandheroically;andfordecadesafterwardscongratulateditselfonitsachievementintakingon theevilofNazism,withoutpaying thepriceof recognising its role in itsgenesis.Norcould itsparemuchthoughtforthepartofthecontinentthathadbeensurrenderedinanewsetofpost-warsettlements. The defeat of Germany had resulted in chronic war fatigue, the exhaustion of theeconomies of Britain and France and the collapse of those of Holland, Belgium, Italy and theScandinaviancountries.Coupledwiththedislocationwasthefearnotonlyofanarmsracethatwaslikely to involve extensive research into nuclearweapons, but of direct confrontation.WithSoviettroops inEuropeenjoyinga4:1numericalsuperiorityover thoseof theotherAllies,supportedbyadvantagesintankdeployment,therewererealfearsthatfurtherhostilitiesmightbreakoutfollowingtheGerman surrender.As a result, Churchill ordered contingency plans to be drawn up thatwerebasedonahypothesisthatHitler ’sdefeatsimplymarkedtheendofachapter,ratherthananendpointinitself.Thenamegiventotheseplansconcealedthereasonwhytheyhadbeenpreparedinthefirstplace:OperationUnthinkablewaseminentlythinkableinthemindsofBritishplanners.92Theneedtoprepareforcontingencieswasfirmlybasedintherealityofafast-changingsituation

asGermanycrumbled.Stalinhadtakenupanincreasinglyuncompromisingposition,nodoubtdrivenbythesenseofbetrayalarisingoutofhiscatastrophicalliancewithHitlerin1939,butalsoasaresultoftheastonishingpricethattheSovietUnionhadhadtopay–aboveallatStalingradandLeningrad–to survive theGerman onslaught.93 FromMoscow’s point of view it became important to build asystemofbufferzonesandclientstates,aswellastocreateandreinforcethefearthatdirectactioncouldbetakeniftheSovietUnionfeltthreatened.Inthecircumstances,cripplingcountriestothewestbytargetingandevenremovingtheir industrialbaseswasalogicalsteptotake–aswasprovidingfinancialandlogisticalsupportfornascentCommunistparties.Ashistoryshows,attackisoftenthebestformofdefence.94OneresultofthiswasthatHitler ’soppressionwasdeemedworsethanthatofStalin.Thenarrative

ofthewarasatriumphovertyrannywasselective,singlingoutonepoliticalenemywhileglossingoverthefaultsandfailingsofrecentfriends.ManyincentralandeasternEuropewouldbegtodifferwith this story of the triumph of democracy, pointing out the price thatwas paid over subsequentdecadesbythosewhofoundthemselvesonthewrongsideofanarbitraryline.WesternEuropehaditshistorytoprotect,however,andthatmeantemphasisingsuccesses–andkeepingquietaboutmistakesandaboutdecisionsthatcouldbeexplainedasrealpolitik.This was typified by the European Union being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012: how

wonderfulthatEurope,whichhadbeenresponsibleforalmostcontinuouswarfarenotjustinitsowncontinentbutacross theworld forcenturies,hadmanaged toavoidconflict for severaldecades. Inlateantiquity,theequivalentwouldhavebeengivingtheprizetoRomeacenturyafteritssackbytheGoths,orperhapstotheCrusadersafterthelossofAcrefortoningdownanti-MuslimrhetoricintheChristianworld.Thesilenceoftheguns,perhaps,owedmoretotherealitythattherewasnothingleftto fight for than to the foresight of a succession of supposedly brilliant peace-makers in the latetwentiethandearlytwenty-firstcenturies,ortothewondersofanunwieldyinternationalorganisationofEuropeanstateswhoseaccountshavenotbeensignedoffbyitsownauditorsforyears.Anewworldhadstartedtoemergein1914asthesunbegantosetonwesternEurope.Theprocess

acceleratedwiththehostilitiesof1939–45,andcontinuedafter theyhadfinallyended.Thequestionnowwaswhowould control thegreat tradingnetworksofEurasia.And therewasgood reason toponderthiscarefully,forithadturnedoutthattherewasmoretothefertileearthandgoldensandsoftheheartoftheworldandtothewatersoftheCaspianSeathanmettheeye.