T h e U n p r e d i c t a b l e P a s t

Hitler and the HolocaustAlan Farmer assesses the personal responsibility of the Fijhrer

On 30 April 1945 Adolf Httlercommitted suicide in the bunkerbeneath the Chancellery in Berlin.From November 1945 until October1946 over a score of the chief Naziswho had escaped death in the last fewdays of the war faced trial atNuremberg for crimes againsthumanity. Let's for a moment suspenddisbelief. Let's suppose that Hitler hadnot taken his life but had instead beentaken alive by Russian troops in thelast days of the war. Let's suppose thathe too faced trial at Nuremberg.Leaving aside his responsibility forcausing the Second World War, whatwould his defence have been withregard to the Holocaust?

Hitler's DefenceHitler's defence lawyers would havehad a difficult task. They could nothave pleaded insanity: Hitler,consistently (and brutally) rational,was not mad. Nor could they put himin the witness box. Had they done so,he would most certainly haveincriminated himself. Far from denyingthe Holocaust, he would haveaccepted full responsibility for it. In hislast political testament in April 1945he claimed with pride that theextermination of the Jews was hislegacy to the world. What now seemstotally illogical and evii seemed toHitler logical and good.

Hitler's Actions: 1933-41However, some points could be madein Hitler's defence. Although he oftenspoke of 'eliminating' the Jews fromGermany, it is not totally clear what hemeant. Did 'elimination' mean massslaughter or simply mass deportation?And did Hitler have any clear ideasabout how 'elimination' was to beachieved? His actions between 1933and 1939 suggest that he was notintent on mass murder. While Jewshad been turned into panahs,

Hermann Goring, on trial at Nuremberg. He and ten other Nazi leaders were sentencedto hang, though Goring escaped the gallows by taking cyanide. Hitler had killed himselfon 30 April 1945 and so was spared the public humiliation of a trial.

relatively few had been killed by 1939.The policy of forcing German Jewsinto exile was an odd policy to adopt ifhe was set on genocide. It wouldsurely have made more sense to keepthem corralled.

Germany's military success in1939-40 resulted in a dramaticincrease in the number of Jews underNazi control. In the German-

controlled areas of Poland alone therewere some two million. The evidencesuggests that until 1941 Hitler did notenvisage - let alone order - anextermination programme. The forcedemigration of all German-controlledJews, whether to the GeneralGovernment or to Madagascar,remained the Final Solution until early1941. There is little basis for the claim

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Far from denying the Holocaust, he would have accepted full responsibility

for it. In his last political testament in April 1945 he claimed with pride that

the extermination of the Jews was his legacy to the world.

that such plans were simply designedto conceal the regime's genocidalintention. The Madagascar plan wastaken very seriously Hitler's speechesin public and private in 1939-40 giveno indication of any exterminationplans. Until 1941 all the leading Naziofficials concerned with the Jewishissue - Himmler, Heydrich, Frank andGoring - declared that a policy ofcompulsory emigration offered theonly real solution to the Jewishquestion.

Himmler in May 1940 acceptedthat deportation could be 'cruel andtragic'. But he went on to write that'the method [deportation] is still themildest and best, if one rejects theBolshevik method of physicalextermination of a people ... as un-German and impossible'. If Himmlerwas not thinking of extermination, it isunlikely that anyone else was. Hitlerand Himmler had a close andsympathetic relationship in theformulation and implementation ofracial policy. Thus to discover whatHitler was thinking, it is best to look atwhat Himmler was doing.

In 1939-40 Himmler was deeplyinvolved in a massive (but hastilyimprovised) plan to racially restructuremuch of eastern Europe. Nazi Jewishpolicy in Poland was part of thisdemographic project and did not yethave priority within it. Theresettlement of ethnic Germans fromthe USSR and the Baltic States was thecentrepiece of Nazi racial policy Polishpeasants (rather than urban Jews)were more likely to be moved to theGeneral Government toaccommodate incoming Germans. IfHitler was thinking in terms of massslaughter of all European Jewry in theyears 1939-41, why were GermanJews still encouraged to emigrate?

On 22 June 1941 Hitler launchedOperation Barbarossa - the attack onthe USSR. He was now fighting thewar he had always wanted. Victory, aswell as giving him control of allEurope, would provide theopportunity to destroy 'JewishBolshevism' and win lebensraum for

the German master race. Defeat, onthe other hand, would mean disaster.Given the colossal stakes involved, thewar against the USSR was to bedifferent in kind from the war in thewest: it was to be a brutal war to thedeath.

While Operation Barbarossa wasthe prelude to the start of theHolocaust, exactly when, how and inwhat circumstances the Holocaustorder was given remains a mystery: nowritten order from Hitler has everbeen found. Did Hitler drift into theHolocaust rather than it being the finalphrase of a long-cherished plan? Wasthe killing initiated by Nazi authoritiesin occupied eastern Europe? Or didHitler set the objective - get rid ofJews - without specifying how thiswas to be achieved? Did Himmlertake him at his word and exceed hisorders?

A Weak Dictator?The defence might claim that Hitlerknew very little about the details ofthe Holocaust. While Nazi propagandagave the impression that Hitler was afar-seeing man of genius, brilliantlysteering the German ship of statetowards National Socialist goals, inreality he was not as exceptional asmost Germans were led to believe. Inmany respects he was a weak dictator.His preference for his home in Bavariainstead of Berlin, and his aversion tosystematic work in general andpaperwork in particular, meant thatdecision-making in Germany wasoften a chaotic process. Most of hisinvolvement in government took theform of face-to-face encounters withsubordinates: a decision was oftensimply a casual remark which thenbecame an 'Order of the Fuhrer'. Itwas impossible for one man to keepabreast of, let alone control,everything that was going on inGermany (and later most of Europe).Every day decisions had to be taken ona huge range of issues. Hitler couldnot know about, even less decideupon, more than a tiny fraction ofthese matters. Accordingly, it was not

always clear exactly what his will wason any given matter. The problems donot end there. When there were - asoften happened - competing views,Hitler found it difficult to make up hismind. The fact that he often did notget involved in matters or took refugebehind open-ended generalitiessometimes had a damaging effect onthe smooth running of government.

Historians Hans Mommsen andMartin Broszat suggest that NaziGermany bore more resemblance to afeudal than a modern twentieth-century state, with great Nazimagnates engaged in a ruthlesspower struggle to capture the 'king'(Hitler) who in turn maintained hisauthority by playing off one great lordagainst another. Hitler can be seen asan opportunist, responding to eventsrather than taking the initiative. Giventhat various power centres pursuedtheir own particular interests withoutreference - indeed often in opposition- to others, it is possible to claim thatthe Third Reich was characterised by'institutional anarchy', unique inmodern German history.

Broszat and Mommsen have thuscast doubt on the extent to which theNazi system was a product ofconscious intention on Hitler's part.Mommsen has even suggested thatthe anarchic system controlled Hitler,rather than he the system. In this'functionalist' view, many of the Naziregime's measures, rather than beingthe result of long-term planning, weresimply knee-jerk responses to thepressure of circumstance. Mommsensees an improvised 'process ofcumulative radicalisation' assubordinate organisations, vying witheach other to maintain or acquireresponsibilities, adopted the mostradical of the available alternatives onthe assumption that this reflectedHitler's will.

Were Others to Blame?Hitler's defence team would surelyhave argued that the Holocaust wasnot just Hitler's work. Himmler, headof the SS, was the real 'architect of

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Hitler and Himmler had a close and sympathetic relationship in theformulation and implementation of racial policy. Thus to discover whatHitler was thinking, it is best to look at what Himmler was doing.

genocide'. He, in turn, delegatedconsiderable authority in Jewishmatters in 1941-2 to ReinhardHeydrich, his nght-hand man. At theWannsee conference in January 1942it was Heydrich who formalised theadministrative arrangements for theHolocaust. The SS was a perfectinstrument for genocide. Its memberswere fanatical Nazis with a grosslydistorted sense of duty. The Germanarmy was also massively implicated inkillings in the USSR. German soldiersseem to have carried out horrendousmassacres with some enthusiasm.Many ordinary Germans - civilservants, railway workers, policemen -were involved in the 'machinery ofdestruaion'. Historian DanielGoldhagen has claimed that theGerman people were 'willingexecutioners' and not simply cogs in avast apparatus beyond their control.He believes that most Germanssupported the policy of mass murderand that as many as 500,000 Germanswere directly implicated in it.

Hitler's anti-Jewish views were byno means unique to him. Arguably hewas the product rather than thecreator of an anti-Semitic society. Anti-Semitism pervaded many aspects ofGerman life in the late nineteenth andearly twentieth centuries. One of themain reasons for Hitler's politicalsuccess was that Germans - of everyclass, age, region, religion and gender- accepted his anti-Semitic messageeither fully or in part. Not all Hitler'ssupporters were vehemently anti-Semitic: few believed that Hitler would'eliminate' all Germany's Jews. Butmost of the 44 per cent who votedNazi in March 1933 expected - andmany hoped - that he would takesome action against the Jews. After1941, most Germans suspected thatsomething terrible was happening toJews: most were indifferent to theirfate.

Not just Germans were involved inthe Holocaust. Anti-Semitism was aEuropean phenomenon. Indigenouspopulations - Poles, Ukrainians,Lithuanians, Estonians, Rumanians,

This aerial photograph allows us to identify some of the features of the Auschwitz deathcamp.

Hungarians, Slovaks, Croatsparticipated in the killing. In WesternEurope, the Germans found a host ofcollaborators. Pope Pius XII, whoprobably knew about the Holocaust,said nothing in condemnation.Responsibility for the Holocaust wasthus not Hitler's alone.

The Context of WarThe defence team would, finally, haveplaced the Holocaust in the context ofthe Second World War. Russianscommitted terrible atrocities onGerman soldiers and (later) civilians.British leaders allowed the bombing ofGerman towns at night, aware thatthe main casualties were certain to bewomen and children. The Britishbelieved (rightly or wrongly) thatbombing would help win the war.There was also an underlyingassumption that the only goodGerman was a dead one. Morally, thisis not far removed from the case thatHitler might have made for theHolocaust. Hitler believed (wrongly)that the Holocaust would helpGermany win the war.

The Prosecution CaseIn truth, the prosecution could easilyhave countered the defencearguments. There can be no doubtthat racism and anti-Semitism were atthe very core of Hitler's ideology In thesame way that Marx believed classstruggle was the motive force behindthe historical process so Hitler believedit was race struggle. In particular, hesaw a permanent struggle betweenthe Aryan race and internationalJewry. The Aryans were potentially thefittest people on earth and upon theirsurvival the existence of the planetdepended. The Jews, on the otherhand, were the ultimate adversary -'parasites', 'leeches' and'bloodsuckers' - who aimed todominate the world themselves. Jews,in Hitler's view, undermined a people'scapacity for struggle, weakened andsubverted its racial purity andcorrupted its positive qualities. He heldthe Jews responsible for all Germany'smisfortunes and blamed them for(what he regarded as) a host ofdangerous ideas - capitalism,internationalism, liberal democracyand, particularly Marxism.

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Hitler's anti-Jewish views were by no means unique to him.Arguably, he was the product rather than the creator of an anti-Semitic society.

Hitler's GoalsWhile Hitler had little interest in manyaspects of domestic policy, hedetermined the main strands of anti-Jewish policy For much of the period1933-9 Hitler showed that he wasprepared to be pragmatic, takingaccount of internal and externalpressures, in pursuing his ends.However, belief in certain principlesand skill at tactical manoeuvring areby no means mutually exclusive. By1939 Hitler's anti-Semitic goals hadbeen systematically pursued andrapidly achieved. (For example, bySeptember 1939 some 70 per cent ofGermany's Jews had been driven toemigrate.) Precisely where Hitler's anti-Jewish policy was leading by 1939 is asubject of much debate. However, in aspeech to the Reichstag in January1939, he warned: 'If the internationalJewish financiers in and outsideEurope should succeed in plungingthe nation once more into a worldwar, then the result will not be theBolshevising of the earth, and thus thevictory of Jewry, but the annihilationof the Jewish race in Europe'. The factthat Hitler expressed such violentintentions cannot be taken as proofthat he was set on genocide.Nevertheless, he was set on war - awar for lebensraum. He may not havewanted war with Britain and Francebut he certainly hoped for a war withthe USSR. Such a war was certain toput Jews in great danger. Given thathe blamed the Jews for Germany'sdefeat in the First World War, it madesense, by his logic, to deal with themharshly, if only to ensure that lightningdidn't strike twice.

Was Hitler Weak?Was Hitler really a weak dictator? Thespirit of the Third Reich was embodiedin his remark that there could be onlyone will in Germany his own, and thatall others had to be subservient to it.He rejected the notion of reaching acollective decision through anythingresembling a democratic process.Decision-making in the Third Reich

Bodies being burned towards the edge of Auschwitz.

was thus inspired by his personalwhim rather than by administrativeprocedures. In theory and in practice.Hitler's will in the Third Reich was law.He did not - and couid not - concernhimself with everything. However, inthose areas he considered vital, hetook the strategic decisions:subordinates simply hammered outthe details.

Convinced that he was chosen byProvidence to lead the Germans intheir struggle for national existence,Hitler did not lack firmness of purpose.Sometimes he took a long time tomake a decision but when he did hispersonal orders cut quickly throughthe administrative jungle. Given thatinstitutional conflict is endemic in

virtually all government systems, itmay be that the functionalists haveexaggerated 'institutional anarchy' inthe Third Reich. In reality, there wasnot always confrontation between theParty and the state civil service andbetween the mass of specialist Naziorganisations. The bureaucrats in allthe camps often held similar views.Moreover, the men who staffed boththe Party and state machineryconducted their business, for the mostpart, in line with tested German habitsof order and obedience to authority.Nazi rule was not always chaotic.Indeed, 'institutional anarchy' doesnot fit the remarkable successes of theThird Reich in various areas, not leastthe conquest of most of Europe.

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Most likely, an elated Hitler, confident ofvictory over the USSR, gave the fatefulnod to Himmler in July 1941.

Some of the dead found at Belsen concentration camp when it was liberated in April 1945.

The Start of the HolocaustOperation Barbarossa provided Hitlerwith both opportunity and thejustification to solve the Jewishproblem once and for all. Given theapocalyptic nature of the struggle, itmade sense (by Hitler's standards) toexterminate Russian Jews and then togo a stage further and order the killingof all European Jews. Hitler had shownno mercy to mentally and physicallyhandicapped Germans. He gave awritten order for the euthanasiaprogramme in 1939 - the Nazis' firstattempt at systematic mass murder.Given that he regarded the Jews asmore dangerous than the Germanhandicapped, he was unlikely to find ithard to give a genocidal order

Precisely when Hitler gave theorder to commence the Holocaustremains a mystery. While there is somecircumstantial evidence that he hadmade the fateful decision to

exterminate all European Jews byJanuary 1941, it is far more likely thatthe decision was taken after thelaunch of Operation Barbarossa. Butwhen? Most likely, an elated Hitler,confident of victory over the USSR,gave the fateful nod to Himmler in July1941. Apparently master of all ofEurope, he no longer had to worryabout world opinion. Both Himmlerand Heydrich were in close proximityto his headquarters from 15 to 20 JulyHere was an opportunity for Hitler tohave confided new orders. Certainlyevents now began to gathermomentum. In late July Hitlercommitted two SS brigades (over11,000 men) to assist theoverburdened Einsatzgruppen. Thiswas only the start of the build-up. Bythe end of 1941 there were some60,000 men in Einsatzgruppen onSoviet territory - sufficient manpowerto kill on a massive scale. In August1941 Himmlertravelled through much

of the Eastern Territories. The fact thathe issued personal instructionsprobably explains why differentEinsatzgruppen leaders learned of thenew turn in policy at different times.

Whatever the precise time-scale,there is no doubt that by late August1941 the killing of Jews in the USSRwas on a different scale. In June/Julymost of the victims were men - shotindividually by firing squad. By August,hundreds at a time were forced to liein or kneel at the edge of a trenchbefore being shot in the back of thehead. Moreover, Jewish women andchildren were now routinelymassacred. By September 1941 themass slaughter of Russian Jews waswell underway.

However, it is not certain that thesurge of killings in the USSR meantthat Hitler had yet decided to kill all ofEurope's Jews. It may be that thisdecision came later - either inSeptember, October or even as late as

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German - indeed European - anti-Semitism may have been anecessary condition for the Holocaust but it was not a sufficient one.

It was Hitler who made the difference.

December 1941. By then, it had littleto do with the euphoria of victory Itmay be that Hitler finally decided ongenocide more out of a sense ofdesperation than of elation. BySeptember 1941 the Russiancampaign, which the Germans hadanticipated would last no more thanfour months, was far from over.German casualties continued tomount and Soviet guerrilla resistancewas increasing. It may be that Hitlerdecided that the Jews would have tofoot the bill for the spilling of so muchGerman blood.

While Hitler may have given twoextermination orders (one concerningRussian Jews in July 1941 and anotherlater in 1941 affecting the rest ofEuropean Jewry), it is also possiblethat Hitler was considering killing allJews in July 1941 and asked Himmlerto come up with a genocide 'feasibilitystudy'. After all, it was illogical to killRussian Jews and then transport PolishJews into the vacuum thus created.Given the gaps in the evidence, thedebate about whether the Holocaustdecision (or decisions) resulted fromthe euphoria of success or rather fromfear born of defeat looks set tocontinue. But the evidence suggeststhat the pieces of the Holocaust fellfinally into place between mid-September and mid-October 1941.

Just as with the euthanasiaprogramme. Hitler seems to havebeen anxious to avoid associatinghimself too closely with the Holocaust,presumably because he fearedalienating the German public. It ispossible that he authorised Himmlerto produce a solution to the Jewishquestion without enquiring too closelyinto what would be involved. Himmlerwas Hitler's most trusted servant. 'I donothing that the Fuhrer does notknow,' he boasted. Nothing so radicalas the Holocaust could have begunwithout Hitler's approval.

ConclusionHow might the judge have summedup the evidence? Although the

Holocaust was an enterprise to whichcountless people throughout Europecontributed, it was essentially aGerman enterprise. Hitler ledGermany His personality, leadershipstyle and ideological convictionsshaped the nature of the Third Reich.His fanatical anti-Semitism played acentral role in the evolution of NaziJewish policy He approved thecumulative intensification of Jewishpersecution and his attitude served asits legitimating authority While notalways personally concerned with thedetailed moves to achieve a 'solutionof the Jewish Question', he gavesignals that established priorities andgoals. His racist dogma was the criticalengine of the Nazi state.

German - indeed European - anti-Semitism may have been a necessarycondition for the Holocaust but it wasnot a sufficient one. It was Hitler whomade the difference. While heprobably did not always harbour theintention of literally exterminating theJews, extermination was always apossibility, especially in the event ofwar. And Hitler wanted war - the'father of all things' - the prerequisitefor the natural selection of the strongand the elimination of the weak.While he may not have wanted thewar he got in 1939, he certainly gotthe war he wanted in 1941. OperationBarbarossa was the key to theHolocaust. The war against the USSRgave him the opportunity ofdestroying 'Jewish Bolshevism' and hetook it with a vengeance. After 1941Jewish extermination could bedeclared a military necessity Once heresolved to kill all Russian Jews it wasbut a small step to decide to kill allJews.

The road to Auschwitz was notnecessarily very twisted. Itscompletion had to wait until theconditions were right. The momentthey were. Hitler commissioned hisarchitect-builders - Himmler andHeydrich - to design and construct theroad.

The court at Nuremberg would

surely have found Hitler guilty of oneof the most heinous crimes in worldhistory

Further ReadingD. Cesarani (ed). The Final Solution:Origins and Implementation(Routiedge, 1996)A. Farmer, Anti-Semitism and theHolocaust (Hodder & Stoughton,1998)

Nothing so

' radical as the

Holocaust could

have begun without

Hitler's approval

R. Hilberg, The Destructior) of theEuropean Jews {Holmes and Meier,1985)I. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis 1936-1945(Penguin, 2000)M. Marrus, The Holocaust in History(Penguin, 1989)J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism1919-1945: Foreign Policy. War andRacial Extermination: A Documentary/?eac/er(University of Exeter, 1988)

Issues to Debate• When, how and in whatcircumstances did Hitler give theHolocaust order(s)?• Who, Hitler apart, was to biamefor the Holocaust?• Is it fair to say, 'No Hitler, noHolocaust'?

Alan Farmer recently retired as Head of History

at St Martin's College, Lancaster. He has written

numerous books or> modern European, British

and American history, including Anti-Semitism

and the Holocaust (Hodder, 1998).

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