the unlucky country-afghanistan’s strategic significance and insecure future
TRANSCRIPT
The Unlucky Country 1
Afghanistan’s Strategic Significance and Insecure Future
Senior Research Seminar
Austin Shopbell
Dr. Leonardo Figueroa-Helland
13 DEC 2013
Abstract:
In approximately one year, the United States and the greater International Community will
remove all combat forces from the South Asian nation of Afghanistan; numerous guesses
surround the potential results of the withdrawal, but none have definitively painted a complete
picture. This report attempts to fill that gap. The author combines both the historical and
contemporary context with several political and international relations theories that collectively
provide the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the past, present, and future of
Afghanistan. Considered theories include: Neorealism, English School, Indigenous, Islamic, and
the regional geopolitical struggle. Collectively, the theories can be generally understood to
accept that peace and a sense of stability is possible in the long term, but will be very difficult to
achieve.
Keywords:
Afghanistan, Taliban, ISAF, Future, International Relations, Security Studies
1 Title refers to Hamid Karzai’s remarks in 2001 after learning of Massoud’s assassination; found in Coll, chapter “What an unlucky country…”
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“The Security Forces had to learn or suffer.” -John A. Nagl, referring to the British experience during the Malayan Emergency “The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.” -Sir William F. Butler, Charles George Gordon (1889) “…Another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin-war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by evading and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. Where there is a visible enemy to fight in open combat, the answer is not so difficult. Many serve, all applaud, and the tide of patriotism runs high. But when there is a long, slow struggle, with no immediately visible foe, your choice will seem hard indeed.”
-President John F. Kennedy, address to Westpoint graduates, 1961
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Table of Contents
Epigraphs…01 Maps Geographic…03 Ethnic Dispersion…04 ISAF Dispersion…05 Research Question…06 The Literature…08 The Answer…10 Literature Review…12 Part I: Afghanistan’s History Introduction and Early History…19 Durrani Empire…20 Anglo-Afghan Wars…21 Monarchy…25 PDPA and Conditions Leading to Invasion…26 Soviet War in Afghanistan…28 Chaos and Civil War in Afghanistan…32 The First Afghan War Was Over, the Second Had Begun…34 Taliban Control and Downfall…36 Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and Prelude to Invasion…38 Post September 11th and US Invasion…41 Part II: Battlespace Afghanistan Today Afghanistan Tribal Disposition and Social Composition…43 Status and Organization of Conflict…48 Bilateral Security Agreement…48 Afghanistan National Government…52 Afghan National Security Forces…54 The Enemy…56 Part III: The Future of Afghanistan Neorealist Theory…62 English School Theory…67 Indigenous Theory…70 Pashtun Economic…71 Central Asian…72 Islamic…76 Geopolitics…81 Appendixes A: Abbreviations…87 B: Definitions…88 C: Principal Characters…89 D: Civilian Casualties by Cause…90 E: ANSF /ISAF Operations…90 Bibliography…91
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Maps:
Geographic 2
2 Courtesy of: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AfghanistanTopographicalMap_full.jpg
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Maps:
Ethnic Dispersion 3
3 Courtesy of: http://www.afghan-‐network.net/maps/Afghanistan-‐Map.pdf
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Maps:
ISAF Dispersion 4
4 Courtesy of: NATO/ISAF, Key Facts and Figures
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Introduction, Research Question, Literature Review:
Introduction:
It isn’t yet light when the young girl, 12 years old and already in her seventh year of
classes, snatches her three pieces of paper and one pencil and disappears into the rural night air.
Her family is determined that she earn an education, so she will walk the three miles to spend
eight hours in the classroom-without eating-before walking the three miles home to chores and
homework. Waiting for her amongst the shadows are two men, both of whom wear black
turbans. Each cradles his Kalashnikov and feels the familiar wood warm under the rough skin;
the village mullah has announced that the girl will not attend school, and they are here to do his
work. This scenario-which occurs daily in Afghanistan-is the perfect example of the bifurcation
of the conflict occurring in Afghanistan today. The South Asian country is at a crossroads
between modernist and traditionalist forces, and the future perpetually suffers as a result. After
discussing the strategic, operational, and social context affecting contemporary Afghanistan, this
research identifies several theories that will likely inform the future of the country, its people, the
region, and the international community as a whole. Sadly, none of these philosophies promise a
beneficial future for the conflict-ridden nation. But by equipping the girl with the flashlight of
the potential future, she may be able to sense the dangerous men in her path and take a different-
albeit longer-path to school.
Research Question:
Following the devastating attacks of September 11th 2001 against US infrastructure and
civilians, American and NATO combat troops invaded Afghanistan, capturing Kabul exactly one
month and six days after the start of conventional US military operations in the country. In the 12
years since, the War in Afghanistan has been put on the backburner and the Taliban, who were
once thought to be all but eradicated, have been able to mount a complex and deadly resurrection.
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International Security Assistance Force combat troops are scheduled to leave the nation by late
2014, leaving a small garrison of trainers to assist the Afghan National Security Forces.
Generally, no one can say with confidence what will happen after the 2014 withdrawal date, and
speculations are extremely varying. Given this scenario, this research attempts to paint a useful
portrait of various possibilities for the future of Afghanistan.
Research into the future of Afghanistan is timely and has direct connotations for the
surrounding region. Neither the United States nor any other Allied force has committed to a
certain number of trainers remaining in the country following the withdrawal of combat troops.
As such, this report will supply policy makers with a basic framework of different potential
outcomes, as well as the most likely outcome. Afghanistan has historically been extremely
important for regional strategy; it is a key player in the India-Pakistan rivalry, shares a large land
border with Iran, and a smaller border with China. Separately and collectively, India, Iran, China,
Pakistan, the Central Asian states, and the Western powers each have interests in a “favorable”
Afghanistan and will seek to achieve these interests. Thus, there is a distinct possibility that
Afghanistan’s future will be informative of the future of the region. This research, then, adds to
the discourse on politics, geopolitics, and international relations in South Asia. Additionally, the
history of Western involvement in Afghanistan’s history of conflict-which is substantial but
mainly forgotten or ignored-has, to a large degree, informed and created conditions that exist to
this day, and was partially responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Under threat of repeating these past
mistakes with the same dire consequences, this research is a critical component for political,
social, military, and international relations study and analysis.
This research couples civilian-led scholarship with a military background; it is thus
intended to address several audiences concurrently. Principally, this report will propose a myriad
of potential outcomes to American policy makers in the intelligence, diplomatic, defense,
executive and legislative communities. These outcomes will allow the respective policy maker to
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adjust and tailor the operations of his/her organization to meet or avoid the listed potential
outcomes. Secondly, this report is being written as a document that will lend itself to casual
observation for non-policy makers; interested students and other individuals with little knowledge
of the situation in Afghanistan will hopefully enjoy reading the research while gaining an in-
depth, theoretical knowledge of the situation. The results of the study can be used to determine
future actions and end states in the prosecution of the War in Afghanistan. This report will help
to predict which direction Afghanistan will turn, allowing US policy makers to strategically
respond proactively rather than reactively.
The Literature:
The future of any country is obviously an incredibly important question with an infinite
number of aspects; as such it draws a wide range of speculation. As a warzone in which the
world’s most powerful country is engaged, Afghanistan draws even more speculation than other,
equally destitute nations. A global audience of governments, non-governmental agencies,
businesses, security analysts, religious scholars, human health and welfare specialists,
environmentalists, sociologists, and other experts have a significant stake in the future of the
country. Accordingly, each organization and interested party is actively attempting to assess the
country’s future. While the United States and Afghanistan recently made significant progress in
diplomatic discussions, there are still critical elements of a legal agreement allowing US troops to
stay in the country after 2014 that remain contentious. The agreement-and subsequent US
response- will specify the exact amount of remaining troops. Because this metric is so indicative
of the future, no professional organization has publicly released its opinion of Afghanistan’s
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future. Many suppositions exist, but each “guess” is dependent on the amount of ISAF forces that
will remain in the country. 5
While no official agreement regarding the future of Afghanistan has yet been released,
there are copious amounts of literature available that detail the country’s history and society, as
well as current security, political, economic, and religious indicators. Combining a historical-
cultural examination of Afghanistan’s past with current indicators of nation strength-a
comprehensive, accurate analysis of Afghanistan today-will allow researchers to better
understand future potential outcomes.
To accomplish this goal, the research seeks to understand each factor shaping
tomorrow’s Afghanistan by dividing the project into three sections. Section one will detail
Afghanistan’s history, culture and social context. Section two will focus on Afghanistan today,
conceptualizing the region as a commander would a battlespace. 6 This section will describe
relevant belligerents in the conflict, the status of the conflict as well as current operations, and an
in-depth look at the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Section three will
discuss several of the theoretical prospective scenarios that exist today. These scenarios include
neorealism, the English School, Indigenous perspective, an Islamic worldview, and finally a
discussion of the regional geopolitics.
5 This research will use the term “guess” as opposed to “theory” in order to portray the myriad of guesses as relatively un-‐founded, which they are. The future of Afghanistan is anybody’s guess: a truly analytic and balanced report that would expound a “theory” has yet to be released, as discussed in the “Literature Review” section of this document 6 “Battlespace,” according to Wikipedia’s synthesized definition from various DoD sources, comprises: “a unified military strategy to integrate and combine the armed forces for the military theater of operations…it includes the environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat pressure, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes enemy and friendly armed forces, infrastructure, weather, terrain,” and other non-‐combatant populations/forces. Because Afghanistan has been a battlefield for so long, and because of the integrated civil-‐military objectives inherent to a counterinsurgency, this term is appropriate to describe the situation in Afghanistan
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The Answer:
This study assumes several constants in order to retain relevancy. Principal amongst
these assumptions is that the US/ISAF combat mission will not be extended past the 2014
deadline. This is a relatively safe assumption to make due to several indicators; both heads of
state (Obama and Karzai) have expressed personal and political desire for an agreement to a
unilateral disengagement of combat forces. General political will internationally is also calling
for a return of US troops, and there seems to be little American Congressional or public pressure
to remain in combat. A second assumption made is the presence of some number of US/ISAF
advisory and/or counter-terror teams remaining in the country post-2014, coupled with substantial
amounts of foreign aid. This assumption, while still reasonable, is made with moderately more
risk. While the US and Afghanistan have recently experienced a significant diplomatic
breakthrough in the legal agreement allowing the presence of international advisory forces, the
most critical part of the framework (a Bilateral Security Agreement) was not part of the
breakthrough. The US has set an unofficial deadline for finalization of 31 OCT 2013, with
stipulations of pushing it as far back as APR 2014. 7 Should this agreement NOT be finalized, all
US/ISAF options (including all foreign aid) will be cut off from Afghanistan totally (with fairly
obvious connotations). While the risk of this occurrence is certainly not negligible (it did occur in
Iraq), it is unlikely. 8 Thirdly, the project assumes that the situation in Afghanistan will remain on
the general trajectory upon which it is currently tracking; international terrorist groups, such as al
Qaeda, will not make a sudden and unexplainable resurgence, Karzai will not totally cede power
to the Taliban, no foreign/regional power will physically intervene (beyond an escalation of
7 The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) is the legal framework that would allow the presence of troops and foreign aid to be used in Afghanistan; the most important element of the framework is the stipulation that guarantees American trial for servicemen/women accused of a criminal charge while deployed, for more, see “Bilateral Security Agreement” in Part II of this report 8 For a brief review of the consequences from pulling our troops from Iraq-‐which occurred in 2010: http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/22/us_could_ve_prevented_bloodletting_in_iraq_retired_gen_john_allen
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current covert activities) in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the US, amongst other
general remainders of the status quo.
An understanding of historical and current events, combined with a foundational-level
reading about the conflict and general situation in Afghanistan reveal several possible scenarios
regarding the most likely environment in the country post-2014. This report will analyze several
of these scenarios in different theoretical frameworks, including: neorealism, the English School,
Indigenous, Islamic worldview, and regional geopolitics. Neorealism cites tribal differences,
historical conflict, status of the conflict and regional dynamics to explain a likely descent into low
intensity civil war before a return to relatively rigid sectionalism and Pashtun dominance. The
indigenous theory uses both the Pashtun economic and the Central Asian theory, of which four
scenarios are considered possible, as an example to explain the Afghan future. Concurrently, the
theory applies possible outcomes that may result in a more peaceful and productive future. This
Islamic theory, while not considered indigenous to the case of Afghanistan, will likely play a role
due to the geographical location of the “Islamic world.” It describes three sects of Islamic
international thought, and describes a theory for Afghanistan by using the most modern
Islamization of Knowledge theory. Regional geopolitics concludes by citing the strategic
location of Afghanistan-in relation to Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and Russia-for natural
resources, international trade, and international terrorism.
This analysis of future affairs obviously begins in late 2014, with the diminished US
troop presence in the country. While elements from the occupation and prior history will be
considered and discussed in the research, they are not considered part of the research question;
this report does not analyze the factors from the 9/11 attacks to the current situation that put
Afghanistan into it’s current position as those factors are outside the scope of this research. This
report is geared to address roughly the next 10 years of Afghanistan’s future with an approximate
termination of analysis in 2024. The report has implications for post-2024, but does not attempt
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to seriously consider the environment after that time. It is also mainly limited to Afghanistan; the
report discusses the relationships between regional states and players in the conflict, but does not
attempt to address threats to the region outside of Afghanistan.
Literature Review
The available literature pertinent to my research question is, essentially, endless.
Scholars, politicians, governments, warfighters, economists, journalists; all manner of individuals
have a stake in Afghanistan's future. Accordingly, each individual organization releases its own
form of analysis regarding its stake in the country, bringing with it the organization’s inherent
biases, strengths, and weaknesses. Due to the wide variety of available sources, this report will
focus on scholarly documents, research articles and journals, defense analysis, intelligence
reporting, and regional experts; this literature review generally discusses some of the most
valuable resources in order that they’ll appear in the research.
For a detailed understanding of the indigenous perspective of history during the times of
the first modern Western incursions into Afghanistan during the 19th Century, this research
utilizes Bijan Omrani’s Afghanistan and the Search for Unity. Omrani, an English-trained
researcher of Central Asian decent, describes an in-depth analysis of both successful and failed
methods used by Afghan leadership during the first interactions with the West. The essay begins
with the goal of analyzing three different leaders of Afghanistan and their governance, while
attempting to allow the reader to draw his/her own connections from the past to the present.
Rather than explicitly describing the authors take on how the past informs the future, that job is
left to the reader, after being given Omrani’s detailed examples. Specifically relevant for this
research, Omrani’s analysis of both Abdur Rahman and King Amanullah were used almost
singularly for the comparison of leadership styles (both of which were considered ultimate
failures).
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Unquestionably one of the most important time periods in Afghanistan’s modern history
is the Soviet invasion and subsequent US/Saudi/Pakistani support for mujahedin elements. For
the purpose of understanding this time period, the report utilizes Ghost Wars: The Secret History
of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion until September 10th, 2001 by
Steve Coll. The book does an excellent job illustrating the American proxy war-fought against the
Soviets and through the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence-during the 1980’s. Additionally, the
book describes the rise of the Taliban, life under their rule, and the civil war that continued
amongst the mujahedin factions following the Soviet demise. The research extensively utilizes
Coll’s analysis of this time period in its description of this segment of Afghanistan’s history.
Additionally, the conditions found in 1991-1994, before the Taliban gained any type of influence,
can serve as an analysis of a potential outcome following the American withdrawal. Coll’s work
has served as a major inspiration and source of knowledge throughout my interest in the area.
Because of this, central tenets and passages of this work are prominently utilized throughout the
research.
Understanding the civilian analysis on current civil and military operations in
Afghanistan is crucial for a balanced understanding of the battlespace assessment. The research
relies on a myriad of reports to accomplish this objective, but Congressional Research Service
reports are utilized most heavily due to their reliability, ease-of-access, and objectivity of
analysis. Specifically, two CRS reports are prominently featured: “Afghanistan: Politics,
Elections, and Government Performance” and “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security,
and U.S. Policy,” both written by Kenneth Katzman in early August 2013. Collectively, these
two reports provide an accurate and (seemingly) unbiased examination of the current state of
affairs in Afghanistan, finding major problems ranging from social, to governmental, to
economic, and to overall security. The Afghan government is hopelessly corrupt, with efforts at
limiting the corruption considered either nonexistent or a complete failure (perhaps an indication
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of the status of the government itself). A mining industry is being set up to bolster the
independent states economy, but is significantly hindered by bureaucratic backlog and the
pervasive corruption. Official figures detailing the Afghan National Security Forces (National
Army and Police) are promising and appear on track for transfer from US support (they officially
lead all offensive operations in the country and are responsible for security in Kabul), but these
figures may be deceiving. ANSF suffer from serious recruitment/retention issues, and are
illiterate-literally and figuratively. CRS reports are made for Congressional scrutiny, in order to
give law/policymakers better understanding of the subject area; as such, the reports are lean on
recommendation or inference and heavy on factual and statistical data. Both reports are crucial to
understanding contemporary Afghanistan, and are utilized extensively to describe the on-the-
ground situation.
The United States is both the most powerful entity and most important determinant in the
Afghanistan equation. Accordingly, battlespace assessment reports from the Department of
Defense-the organization charged with prosecution of the security assistance mission-are
invaluable for understanding the current state of military and security affairs in Afghanistan. To
this end, the report utilizes “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan” reports to
gain an in-depth US and ISAF military perspective on the conflict. The most current report at the
writing of this proposal, released in July 2013, paints a hopeful yet sobering picture of the
progress toward stability, ultimately contending that without significant international support the
Western-engineered government apparatus will quickly fall and that the Afghan government
remains dependent on outside support. Due to the nature of the time-intensive conflict, the
insurgency will NOT be defeated under the US timeframe for withdrawal of combat troops, and
the government will not be strong enough to support itself without substantial outside assistance.
A significant indicator of the validity and true representation of the Afghan government will be
the April 2014 elections and whether Karzai will allow the democratic process to continue
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uncontested. The report does not discuss potential outcomes were this to occur as it is considered
outside the scope of the report. The article also acknowledges significant gains in social
development, counterinsurgency metrics, and counterinsurgent narrative; these gains are tenuous
at best and depend on the post-2014 ISAF troop presence.
Understanding the historical and ethnic background that comprises modern-day
Afghanistan is critically important for understanding the current operational and hospitable
environment found in Afghanistan today, which is so obviously instrumental in the nation’s
future. Central to this element of the research is Amin Tarzi’s “Political Struggles over the
Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands.” The essay’s analysis of the current importance of the Durand
Line, remnants of British colonial control, and of the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan
(Pashtun) are invaluable in understanding an indigenous philosophy that will outlast both radical-
Islamist and Western influence. While touching on the modern history of Afghanistan, the article
significantly paints a picture of the influence the Afghan-Pakistan diplomatic situation will have
on any future Afghanistan, and provides both an impetus and recommendation for change.
For a broader, more operational sense of the conflict in Afghanistan (and elsewhere), this
report will utilize David Killcullen’s Counterinsurgency. Killcullen is an Australian infantry
company commander with actual combat experience in counterinsurgency, who is also a
revolutionary world-class thinker about insurgency/counterinsurgency philosophy. Killcullen
earned his doctorate from the University of New South Whales, is a US State Department
advisor, and was a principal architect of FM 3-24. 9 His argument for the recognition of a global
insurgency facing the West is important for policy makers (with strong influences from the
English School), but this study focuses on one comparatively small passage in the text. Killcullen
claims that a major stumbling block the US has created in Afghanistan is the American tendency
to build the government from the top down. Citing historical accounts from the time of
9 Field Manual 3-‐24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-‐33.5: Counterinsurgency
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Alexander the Great, Killcullen maintains that Afghanistan has always been a tribal society, from
which power started at the tribal level before being elevated to local, regional, and finally
“national” prominence. This analysis plainly describes a root cause of current governmental
instability in Afghanistan and supports the supposition that, without dominating the other tribes
through force, Afghanistan will remain leaderless.
Former militant, resident of Pakistan, and journalist/scholar Ahmad Rashid’s analysis of
the region is an indispensable resource for this project; any Western-based analysis of the Central
Asian region, especially including Pakistan and Afghanistan, would be totally incomplete without
his input. Following the September 11th attacks against the United States, his first text in his
trilogy on the region was required reading at the White House, Pentagon, and Central Intelligence
Agency (the text is Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia). In order
to keep this work as up-to-date as possible, the report utilizes other sources for learning about the
Taliban and conditions before 9/11. However, his trilogy’s final text: Pakistan on the Brink: The
Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan is an incredibly important resource used throughout
the research; it is the predominant source of the author’s understanding of the current and future
prospects for Afghanistan. Able to provide balanced, critical, and insightful perceptions of the
indigenous forces at play in the international system, Rashid also has an equally balanced and in-
depth understanding of the Western perspectives on those forces.
For a non-Western overview of international relations theories-and how they apply to
Afghanistan today-this report principally utilizes two separate sources that elucidate the Central
Asian and Islamic theory. Distant Futures and Alternative Presents for South Asia, written by
Indian scholar Sohail Inayatullah, admirably applies indigenous Indian theory to Pakistan, which
can relatively easily be conferred onto the case of Afghanistan for the purposes of this research.
Inayatullah’s task is not an easy one; the constant state of conflict between Pakistan and India
forces the reader to objectively determine the value of Inayatullah’s research and the amount of
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bias it contains. Distant Futures doesn’t attempt to justify any element of that conflict; rather, it
prescribes several non-Indian methods for stabilizing the region. Because of his objective take on
Pakistan, this paper is incredibly important to this research’s understanding of non-Western but
applicable theories for the future. In the same pursuit for the non-Western perspective, this
research relies upon International relations theory and the Islamic worldview written by
Afghanistan expert Shahrbanou Tadjbaksh. 10 The essay is an excellent resource for non-Muslims
to better understand the international concepts preached by the Islamic tradition, and her
discussion on the Islamization of Knowledge movement occurring in Islam today serves as an
extremely helpful metric for measuring the future of Afghanistan in a progressive yet traditional
manner.
A foundational survey of the literature reveals that Afghanistan faces many problems.
Much of the country’s history is of foreign domination and subsequent resistance, the nation is
deeply divided upon tribal lines, the Afghan government and it’s security apparatus is too corrupt
for functional control and the US military recognizes significant gains in the nation but admits the
tenuousness of each gain. From the start of the US invasion and subsequent reconstruction, the
international community-led by the US-followed a distinctly Western top-down approach rather
than distinctly Afghan bottom-up; indeed, the whole paradigm may have been flawed. The
United States, along with members of the International Security Assistance Force, have been in
the region for (almost exactly) 12 years with significant cost, but have seen few permanent
changes and are now poised to end combat operations in the country. One year from now, the
combat mission in Afghanistan will have ended and the Western-supported government will be in
charge of all security with severely limited US force application. Research articles and journals,
scholarly novels, defense analysis, and regional experts, combined with an
10 Tadjbaksh lives and researches in France, is of Iranian origin, and is a citizen of the United States, where she completed all of her higher education
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operational/battlespace awareness, lends itself to the analysis and conclusions for the resultant
theories.
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PART I: Afghanistan’s History: In the Shadows-
Introduction and Early History:
Afghanistan has had a long and storied past, unknown to most Westerners. The region
known today as “Afghanistan” and her people “Afghan’s,” has been of international strategic
importance since the dawn of time. Afghanistan is located barely over 1000 kilometers from
Mesopotamia, the “Cradle of Civilization,” and was thus the home of some of the world’s earliest
humans. Archaeologists have found evidence of early humans in Northern Afghanistan from as
long as 50,000 years ago, and many experts believe that these agricultural communities may have
been home to some of the earliest human attempts at farming. After 2,000 BCE, Indo-Europeans
began migrating into Central Asia, setting up some urban civilizations but relying mostly on
tribal, agrarian social structures. 11 Mesopotamia, the world’s first empire, met its downfall in
2005 BCE. It is possible that the Mesopotamian downfall was the work of “barbarians” coming
from Central Asia and specifically Afghanistan. 12
Afghanistan and Central Asia underwent several, successive empire and regime changes
before writing was introduced to the region at approximately 500 BCE. Undoubtedly influenced
by whichever ruler claimed sovereignty over these people, Afghans likely resisted complete
domination by further identifying with a tribal, local/community based power structure. In the 5th
Century BCE, the Greek scholar Herodotus found in Afghanistan a traditional tribe-based society,
similar to the one found today. Men came to power from the ground up; driven men accumulated
influence and power amongst his family and tribe before being elevated by his peers to a position
of local, and finally regional, importance. 13 Indeed, In 330 BCE, by the time Alexander the
Great marched into Central Asia in pursuit of the Persian king Darius, he found a tribal society
11 Schroder, Afghanistan 12 Boot, Invisible Armies, Book I Chapter IV. Author attributes downfall to tribes from Southwestern Iran, but surmises that due to close proximity, Afghan tribes may have participated as well 13 Killcullen, Counterinsurgency, describes Herodotus’ account of Deiokes, the first King of the Medes
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governed only remotely by regionalist rule. He found this area, a region and culture comprised of
modern-day Afghanistan, to be the most difficult and costly to subdue. 14
Following Alexander’s costly conquest of Central Asia, Afghanistan withstood different
waves of foreign rule, spawning mostly from the division of the Macedonian Empire following
Alexander’s death. Between the 3rd and 8th centuries AD, Afghanistan was a Buddhist state, ruled
by the Maurya Empire from modern-day India. Various rulers came and went, but Buddhism
remained in Afghanistan until the end of the 7th Century when the Umayyad Dynasty defeated the
Persian Sassanian empire. “The complete conversion of Afghanistan to Islam occurred during the
rule of the Gaznavids in the 11th Century.” 15 While under Islamic rule, Afghanistan was home to
significant conflicts over control of territory between the Shi’a Mughal Empire and the Sunni
Safavid Dynasty of Persia. Most native Afghanis, including an overwhelming number of the
dominant Pashtuns, fought against the Safavid army. Following the assassination of the Persian
Emperor, Safavid rule was weakened and a senior officer in the Persian army-Ahmad Shah
Durrani-formed a monarchy in Afghanistan.
Durrani Empire:
After seizing power in 1747 through a regional Loya Jirga, Ahmad Shah was able to
unite disparate Pashtun tribes with other ethnic minorities and formed a regional empire
encompassing much of modern-day Afghansitan, Pakistan, Iran and parts of India, thus forming
the first regional affiliation of tribes that would become known as “Afghanistan.” 16 A strong
ruler, Ahmad Shah’s empire lasted wholly until his death in 1772. Rule passed peacefully to his
14 Romey, The Forgotten Realm of Alexander 15 Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban…, Background pg 1 16 Tarzi and Lamb, Measuring Perceptions, page 3. Loya Jirga means “grand assembly” and is a traditional method for political activity and association; the Loya Jirga is a traditionally Pashtun undertaking but has been recently extended to include the other tribes, involving a large congregation of important individuals meeting to resolve major events, conflicts, and other important happenings, Jirga’s can last for very long periods of time as decisions can only be reached by the group and arguments can go on for days
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sons, who received “but nominal homage from the tribal chieftains.” 17 The sons spent much of
their rule quelling tribal uprisings, and moved the capital from Kandahar to Kabul within the first
generation for increased security. Taking advantage of significant contention amongst the
Durrani clan for control over territory as well as the empire, Dost Muhammad Khan advanced on
Kabul from Kashmir in 1826. After capturing the capital, he declared himself emir of the empire
and sought to retake lost terrain.
Anglo-Afghan Wars:
While in control, Dost Muhammad Khan faced a myriad of internal and external security
threats, presiding over the first Anglo-Afghan war. Seeking to retake lost territory, Persia
attacked several provinces-including Herat-in Afghanistan with Russian support. Fearing a
Russian takeover in the event of an Afghan defeat, Britain attempted to initiate diplomatic
discussions with the Afghan leader. Britain viewed Herat as a strategically imperative buffer
zone, keeping Russian hegemony from threatening English colonies in India. 18 The British
diplomat was accepted into the Afghan capital, but negotiations ultimately failed. Upon their
withdrawal, the British delegation saw evidence of Russian presence in Kabul itself. 19 Their
subsequent report sparked the First Anglo-Afghan War and the first Western war in Afghanistan
since the time of Alexander the Great. Eerily similar to both the Soviet Union and the American
invasions centuries later, the British invaded Afghanistan quickly and easily in April 1839,
installing a British-backed ruler in the capital within three months of invasion. The Afghans
rebelled against the foreign power and dictator, coalescing around Pashtun leader Dost
Mohammad Khan and gradually decreasing the territory effectively held by the British. After a
decisive British route of his troops in spring 1839, Dost Mohammad was forced to flee the region,
17 Encyclopedia Britannica 18 Ibid 19 The British reported the presence of a “Russian agent” in Kabul as their reason for termination of discussions and diplomatic withdrawal. It is likely that their subsequent reports and testimony to the Russian presence was exaggerated
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leaving several sons to unify the tribes as leaders of the low-intensity warfare. Ignorant of the
politico-security situation on the ground, the British decided to evacuate their Kabul garrison in
early January 1842; 4,500 soldiers (mostly Indian colonial troops) and 12,000 civilian followers
left the British lines. Smelling blood, the Afghan tribesmen fell upon the retreating British and
Indian colonial soldiers. 30 miles and one week later, only ONE Englishman made it back to
British-held India, along with roughly 40 Indian soldiers. 20
In response to the utter destruction of the army, Britain doubled down on its claims for
Afghanistan and sent in many more colonial troops from India. At the same time and under more
competent leadership, troops stationed in Kandahar and Peshawar reached Kabul by late summer
1842, killing and destroying as they moved through the countryside. 21 Unable to subdue the
restive populace, the commander of British troops in the region ordered all troops to be evacuated
before winter 1842. British troops briefly re-occupied Kabul, destroying the Grand Bazaar and
freeing several captives from the earlier British defeat. 22 Following this bloody conclusion to the
First Anglo-Afghan War-a resounding defeat for the British-Dost Mohammad returned to power.
The British occupation and brutal pillage of the country terrified the population and planted a
deep social hatred of foreign invasion and influence. 23
Dost Mohammad seized upon the comparably “unified” tribal Afghanistan following the
expulsion of the British. After re-establishing control of Kabul, he eventually took Kandahar (in
Southern Afghanistan) before extending his influence north. In 1855, Dost Mohammad ended his
feud with Britain and moved against the Persian army in the West. He captured Herat less than
20 Boot, Invisible Armies, scene immortalized by Thompson: “Remnants of an Army.” Cold, dehydration, and Afghan guerrillas had essentially annihilated the entire British column 21 Baxter, The First Anglo-‐Afghan War, 1997 22 The Bazaar, one of the most vibrant marketplaces of the region, was destroyed as retaliation for the destruction of the British column in the January 1842; as an interesting side note, the author read a 2011 report from a British military unit in Kabul which was shocked to find that some Afghans still hold today’s soldiers accountable for the destruction of the Bazaar 171 years ago 23 Ibid; the British invasion of Afghanistan may be responsible for a significant amount of distrust of foreigners-‐particularly amongst tribal Afghans-‐found in Afghanistan today
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one month before his death in June 1863. 24 Reign passed to his sons, with Afghanistan’s
territorial and governmental control remaining essentially static. However, in early summer
1878, tensions with Britain again boiled over, resulting in the Second Anglo-Afghan War.
Sher Ali Khan, Dost Mohammad’s son and ruler of Afghanistan, once again refused to
allow the British to set up a diplomatic mission in Kabul. Seeing that Russia was officially
communicating with the Afghan ruler, Britain again feared increasing Russian hegemony over
their “buffer” area for the Indian colonies; this time, they sent over 40,000 troops with superior
weaponry to forcefully assert British foreign policy. 25 Given their numerical and technological
superiority, the British quickly captured a significant amount of Afghan territory. During the
British invasion, Sher Ali Khan died peacefully in Mazar-i-Sharif and control of the Afghan
crown passed to his son. Sher Ali’s son, eager to prevent a total British takeover, signed an
agreement that ostensibly resulted in a pseudo-neutrality between the two powers, total British
control over all Afghan foreign policy, and the removal of all British forces from Afghan
territory. Although a formal English diplomatic delegation remained in Kabul, the Afghans
promptly killed the diplomat and his family; following their death the English Crown abandoned
its objective of maintaining a mission in the nation. 26
Of immense contemporary consequence, this time period saw the creation of
Afghanistan’s borders as they are recognized today. Most controversially-and most importantly-
was the Durand Line created in 1893 that separated British India (areas of which are now modern
day Pakistan) from Afghanistan. At the time, the Afghan emir thought of the line as a “temporary
concession of a nature similar to that which he had been obliged to make in order to secure
British recognition [for his right to rule domestic policy] in 1880.” 27 This seemingly arbitrary
24 Encyclopedia Britannica 25 The First Anglo-‐Afghan War consisted of an initial invasion force of only 21,000 troops, these numbers come from various British military documents 26 Boot, Invisible Armies, page 170 27 Tarzi, Political Struggles…, page 19, Tarzi argues that the emir believed his concession for British control of foreign policy AND his acceptance of the Durand Line as purely temporary stop-‐gap measures designed in order to alleviate British pressure
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border is a critical element of understanding the modern politics and social context of
Afghanistan. Consequently, it will be detailed and referred to in greater depth later in this
research.
Afghanistan became a virtual protectorate of British control for 40 years, until war-weary
England formally relinquished total control of Afghan foreign policy in August 1919. In 1880,
following the Second Anglo-Afghan War, control of the Afghan crown was taken by Abdur
Rahman Khan; known as the “Iron Amir,” Abdur Rahman was able to unify the tribes and bring a
sense of nationality previously unknown in Afghanistan. 28 Abdur Rahman modernized many
parts of the country through intense centralization and his “iron” punishments, installing for the
first time a chiefly religious right to rule. 29
…Within 20 years, at the end of his reign, the country was a unity, possessing a standing army, institutions of central and local government, a civil service, a tax collection system; the roads were safe, the tribes generally obedient, and the writ of government ran far more deeply into the lands of the tribes than had ever been the case before…He was the first to change the idea of kingship in Afghanistan…He saw that for centralized government, there had to be a single, strong leader. His means of changing the conception of kingship was by religion. Kingship came not from jirgas, he said, but from God. 30
Abdur Rahman’s example of total control over religion as a unifying and commanding
force over the disparate tribes remained following his death in 1901 for several decades. King
Amanullah, taking the throne in 1919 and immediately launching the Third Anglo-Afghan War,
which would finally rid Afghanistan of all British control, was the first to challenge this
traditionalist view of governance. 31 Amanullah possessed familial ties to Kabul’s “elite,” a
burgeoning group of intellectuals who favored Westernization and modernization for the country,
and was an ardent supporter of women’s rights. The King initiated serious attempts to distance
the hegemony of state over religion and in fact even attempted to completely isolate the two
28 Abdur Rahman was a grandson of Dost Mohammad, keeping control of the Afghan Crown in the Khan dynasty 29 Punishments described by Omrani as “tyranny” 30 Omrani, Afghanistan and the Search for Unity 31 Ibid
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institutions from each other; the national conscription army was severely cut in favor of social
and educational advancements; diplomatic missions from the world over were established in
Kabul, with varying foreign policies gaining prominence in Afghan politics; education was made
compulsory, with drastic improvements in women’s education, health, and social freedoms. 32
Facing a total reversal over their centuries-old way of life, the tribes rebelled. Lacking the strong
national army that had benefitted Abdur Rahman, King Amanullah was unable to put the
rebellion down and was forced to flee, abdicating his throne and moving in exile to Sweden in
early 1929. In his wake, the tribes descended into civil war, while the leader of the tribe that had
displaced Amanullah took nominal control in Kabul for several months.
Monarchy:
After the overthrow of central leadership, various tribal leaders took control and were
eventually displaced or assassinated. This period of turnover came to an abrupt end when 19 year
old Mohammad Zahir Shah assumed power and established a strong monarchy following the
assassination of his father. The ascendancy of the young King issued in a 40-year reign of
perpetual monarchy-one of the longest in Afghanistan’s history. The time period was marked by
an initial re-consolidation of centralization, with the National Government again gaining
influence over the tribes. Zahir Shah utilized tribal militias and grievances to pit the secular
tribes against each other, while the government improved general tribal life by accepting aid
projects from both the Soviet Union and the United States. 33 The Afghan government eased
traditionalist restrictions on women, promulgated a constitution and bicameral legislature, and
became increasingly internationally-focused. Interestingly, some older Afghans cite this time
period as one of Afghanistan’s best. Potentially hoping to limit the influence of the USSR on the
32 Ibid 33 Katzman, Post-‐Taliban …, pg 2, both Cold War powers attempted to mitigate the influence of the other through public works and infrastructure projects: the USSR built transportation infrastructure and Bagram Airfield (both of which it utilized extensively in the coming invasion), while USAID provided chiefly energy and agricultural reforms
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small but growing communist factions in his country at the time, Zahir Shah built significant
political and military-industrialist ties with the Soviet Union. 34
By the 1970’s, the Afghan government faced increasing internal and external threats in
addition to a very unstable, weak economy. One third of the legislature was chosen by the people
of Afghanistan; while this democratic “experiment” was hailed by the West, it also allowed the
political creation and nourishment of both right and left wing extremist groups. Students
attending chiefly Marxist institutions in Kabul created the communist People’s Democratic Party
of Afghanistan (PDPA) with Soviet guidance and support. Concurrently, religious scholars and
leaders from both Kabul and the tribes coalesced around a new, fanatical brand of Islam
emanating from the Middle East. In 1979, the deeply conservative Muslim cleric Ayatollah
Khomeini rose to power in Iran; his election and subsequent religious edicts spread into
Afghanistan across the porous Western land border, energizing Afghan populations with the
religious-political revival. 35
PDPA and Conditions Leading to Invasion:
Signaling the end of his rule, King Zahir Shah and his entire family traveled to Italy in
July 1973 for medical treatment. The King’s cousin and Prime Minister, Mohammad Daoud,
seized power in a nonviolent coup, receiving significant help and guidance from leftist military
officers, elements of the PDPA, and the KGB. 36 Daoud proclaimed himself the First President of
Afghanistan and promoted progressive politics and strong state-centric economic reforms while
engaging in nepotism and heavy-handed repression of dissent. At the time, the military was
highly influenced by the PDPA because “the military was the portion of the state apparatus where
the Soviet model of modernization was most influential.” 37 Indeed, the Soviet Union and its
34 Ibid, pg 2 35 Coll, Ghost Wars, pg 40 36 Ibid, pg 2 37 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, pg 104
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intelligence service, the KGB, had even established overt and covert political advisory units
within the Afghan army and throughout Kabul. 38 Daoud, who came to power with the help of the
PDPA and who considered himself a military ruler, was thus highly influenced by the Soviet
Union and communist ideology. During his tenure, the PDPA attempted large scale, rapid
modernization programs and split into two semi-rival factions: Khalq (“masses” faction) and
Parcham (“banner” faction). 39 The Khalq faction, which was composed of mostly the middle and
lower level Pashtun-dominated officer corps, drew significantly more recruitment amongst the
bulk of the Afghan army. Parcham consisted mostly of the urban, more-modernist middle and
upper classes amongst the Afghan population.
Despite a late start, Khalq seems to have overtaken Parcham by 1978. During 1975 and 1976, as Soviet interest in the PDPA increased, Parcham and Khalq competed for recognition by the international communist movement as the genuine Marxist-Leninist Party of Afghanistan. Instead they encountered pressure-presumably unwelcome-to unite. 40
While subscribing to his communist over-seers, Daoud followed the example of his disposed
predecessor; he continued to play the two powers off the other, gaining financial, agricultural, and
infrastructure aid and using it to strengthen his rule in a “precarious balancing act.” 41 By 1978,
however, Daoud “fell off his beam. He arrested communist leaders in Kabul after they staged a
noisy protest.” 42 With formal Soviet authorization, and active participation by members of the
KGB, the PDPA and Afghan military staged a coup on 27 APR 1978. Soviet KGB and Afghan
Army forces attacked the Presidential Palace; after a 12 hour firefight, the entire Daoud family
38 Coll, Ghost Wars, pg 39 39 Katzman, Post-‐Taliban Governance, Security, and US Polisy, pg 2, and Rubin, pg 104: according to Katzman, modernization included redistribution of land and inclusion of more women in government 40 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, pg 105 41 Coll, Ghost Wars, pg 39; Coll discusses Daoud only minimally, dedicating only six lines in his 700 page book to Daoud’s tenure, thus seemingly dismissing the impact Daoud had on the rise of communist rule in Afghanistan, while other sources-‐including Rubin-‐maintain that his rule was instrumental in the PDPA’s success. 42 Ibid; the PDPA was protesting the assassination of a senior liaison officer for Parcham, potentially at the hands of the Khalq
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(including women and children) were exterminated and by 30 APR 1978, Khalq leaders were in
nominal control of the country. 43
Seizing the initiative presented by the unrest, and objecting to the communist reforms that
were already taking place in the nation, the right-wing Islamist movement, calling themselves the
“mujahedin” and inspired by the Iranian example, launched a violent revolt in Herat in March
1979, hacking to death several dozen Russian political agents and their families. The Soviet Air
Force, flying out of Kabul, flew vengeance sorties against Herat and, by April 1979 had killed
20,000 civilians in Herat alone. 44 The Islamic rebellion and it’s mujahedin fighters gained steam,
revolting against the Leninist-style heavy-handed crackdown on dissent. Khalq and PDPA
leaders believed that Iran and Pakistan were covertly sending fighters and clerics into
Afghanistan and were helping foment the dissent, which was spreading throughout the
countryside. 45 Infighting within the Khalq led to the political assassination of the movement’s
leader, replaced by an unstable and even more aggressively-Leninist Hafizullah Amin. The
Soviet leadership became increasingly concerned about the PDPA longevity in the face of the
Islamic movement and found Amin intolerably hostile to USSR political and operational
objectives. Their desperation for a stable ally in Afghanistan would inspire a drastic move with
global ramifications: ramifications that still have a profound affect on the global political
dynamic.
Soviet War in Afghanistan:
“From the very first hours after cables from the US embassy in Kabul confirmed that a
Soviet invasion had begun, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter’s most determined cold warrior,
43 In June 2008, US forces found a mass grave outside Kabul containing the remains of the Daoud family and security forces 44 Ibid, pg 42 45 Ibid, pg 42; over the summer, the United States also made the first of many payments to the Islamic insurgents with the goal of challenging communist control over the country.
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wondered if this time the Soviets had overreached.” 46 The Soviet invasion began in textbook air-
assault fashion in the early morning hours of 25 DEC 1979 and ended as the bodies of Soviet
troops, strapped onto tanks and covered with snow, rumbled out of the Salang Highway on 15
FEB 1989. The literature regarding the Soviet War in Afghanistan is immense; any interested
party need only perform a rudimentary “Google” search for the time period in order to quickly
gain an enormous amount of information regarding the conflict. Because of the length, depth,
and scope of the invasion, and because the minute details of the occupation are not entirely
relevant to contemporary or future Afghanistan, This research will only briefly discuss the
overview of the conduct and after action review from the war. It will instead focus on the
belligerents of contemporary relevance and any lasting consequences of the war. 47
Following the Politburo’s decision to conventionally invade Afghanistan, covert Soviet
advance teams entered the country in early December 1979. A late night Christmas Eve airborne
operation dropped shock troops into Kabul, who quickly seized strategic objectives including the
airfield, various military installations, and the Presidential Palace; early Christmas morning, the
40th Army invaded with mechanized infantry, armor, and artillery units penetrating the nation
from two different approaches. Hafizullah Amin was promptly killed in a costly assault on his
residence and was replaced by the Soviet-installed Babrak Karmal, a Parcham leader who had
been exiled following Amin’s rise to power. Intended to quickly pacify the nation through a
“blitzkrieg,” the invasion and subsequent occupation of all major metropolitan areas not
surprisingly had the reverse effect; it spawned an increased sense of nationalism directed against
the foreign invader, and the mujahedin’s Islamic insurgency grew exponentially. 48
46 Ibid, pg 50; Brzezinksi was the United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter 47 For interested readers, Steve Coll’s previously cited Ghost Wars provides an excellent, in-‐depth analysis of the regional consequences and actions on during the Soviet War in Afghanistan; additionally, Ahmed Rashid’s trilogy: Taliban, Descent into Chaos, and Pakistan on the Brink, provides consistent reporting on the continued, regional impacts of the Soviet invasion 48 Ibid, pg 51; Coll describes the textbook invasion and subsequent insurgency/counterinsurgency throughout his text
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Throughout the conflict, both the United States and Saudi Arabia funded elements of the
mujahedin, with the United States funneling billions of dollars of aid, including advanced
weaponry, through the proxy services of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). 49
Importantly, and with significant future ramifications, the United States allowed the ISI total
control over fund dispersion and allotment. Answering a call for Jihad, or Holy War against the
foreign invader, Arabic fighters flocked to the South-Asian nation. The United States, ISI, and
various Afghan groups established sanctuaries in Pakistan, amongst the fiercely independent
Pashtun tribes, and in the mountainous North and North East regions of the nation. The status
and various resistance abilities of the mujahedin closely followed tribal lines; militaristic
Pashtuns mounted the most capable defense, while Tajiks and Uzbeks often had to re-learn
warfare lessons through trial-and-error. 50 Throughout the conflict, the vast majority of forces
battled the Soviets as guerrillas, only rarely-and usually with disastrous consequences-engaging
the Soviets with conventional tactics. 51 As the occupation wore on, mujahedin benefactors and
tactics advanced as well. “The elite [mujahedin groups] evolved from a nationalistic group based
on Afghan exclusivity to a non-statist Islamist group that felt as comfortable in Pakistan as they
did in Afghanistan.” 52 Many of these fighters would go on to form the backbone of the Pakistan-
controlled Taliban. Initially uncoordinated, the Afghans operated out of an estimated 4,000
kinetic origins of attack throughout the country: in response to the adaptive demands of an
insurgency, they eventually coalesced around a core group of major mujahedin commanders who
received support from the US, Saudi Arabia, and ISI, many of whom will be discussed later in the
report. 53
49 Barlett, The Oily Americans, Saudi Arabian intelligence matched many US funds dollar for dollar, combined with Saudi private citizens and Islamic charities also donating additional millions to the rebels 50 Roy, The Path to Victory and Chaos, the tribes and ethnicities will be discussed in great detail in following sections of this report 51 Guerrilla warfare is characterized by small, highly mobile and lightly armed fighters engaging the enemy in limited, low intensity warfare, typically utilizing “hit-‐and-‐run” tactics designed to maximize enemy casualties over a short period of time while minimizing unit casualties 52 Tarzi, Political Struggles Over…, pg 24 53 Roy, The Path to Victory and Chaos
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Throughout the occupation, Soviet forces concentrated their counterinsurgency (COIN)
operations amongst the centers of population, rarely venturing into the 80% of Afghanistan that
was considered rural and outside the Red Army’s reach. 54 When they did, they utilized mass-
force, scorched earth campaign tactics; these tactics resulted in the slaughter of more civilians
than fighters and destroyed local agrarian economies. Combined, the two factors resulted in the
quickly increasing radicalization of the rural Muslim population. Contrary to basic population-
centric COIN, Soviet forces remained highly separated from the Afghan urban population and
were seen as the invading and occupying force. 55 Realizing that they were losing the conflict, the
USSR installed the former head of the dreaded Afghan secret police, Mohammad Najibullah, as
the new President of Afghanistan. Najibullah’s command increased its control over the National
Army and spread its international presence, shooting down several Iranian aircraft and covertly
attacking targets inside Pakistan. Over the course of the conflict, the Soviets were unable to deny
sanctuary and supply routes from Pakistan into Afghanistan-vast quantities of financial aid,
communications equipment, and increasingly sophisticated weapons reached rebel groups. In
later years, the CIA even gave some mujahedin fighters Stinger surface-to-air/surface-to-surface
missiles; these shoulder-fired and highly portable weapon systems were able to negate the Soviet
heli-borne operations-the USSR’s greatest advantage-and seriously threatened air resupply
around major airfields. 56
Towards the later years of the conflict, the USSR was facing increasing financial and
political ruin; the costs of the Afghan War were unbearable in the face of a deteriorating
communist agenda across the Soviet bloc and even in Moscow itself. By the time of their
withdrawal, the USSR had lost approximately 14,453 personnel, 451 aircraft, numerous other
54 Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five…, page 127 55 Killcullen, Counterinsurgency, provides definitions and examples of doctrinally-‐sound COIN OPS 56 Coll, Ghost Wars, the utilization of the FIM-‐92 Stinger weapon system has been hailed as the most important escalation of the conflict and almost singularly responsible for the defeat of the Red Army, Coll acknowledges the important role these missiles played but disputes the contention that they essentially won the war
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vehicles, and had spent billions of dollars. 57 After attempting to consolidate the Afghan National
Government and reinforce Najibullah’s position, the Red Army completely left Afghanistan on
15 FEB 1989, spending a total of nine years, two months and three weeks in country.
Chaos and Civil War in Afghanistan:
As previously stated, the mujahedin coalesced around a core group of principal leaders
who were mostly favored by the Pakistani ISI to receive the military aid. Following the retreat of
the Red Army in early 1989, these forces turned against each other for control of Afghanistan
and, broadly, control of the regional Islamist movement. Afghanistan descended into a virtual
civil war with many combatants and a constantly changing number of fronts. Najibullah’s
government lasted much longer than the mujahedin, CIA, or KGB predicted; his army (receiving
continued financial and material aid from the USSR) held Kabul and other strategic population
centers. For three years, Najibullah successfully played the mujahedin against each other,
allowing the rebel infighting to weaken and further divide the movement, often directly along
tribal and even familial lines. 58
There were several principal commanders involved in the Afghan Civil War; the
following are some of the commanders who played the largest part in the future of Afghanistan,
and some are still active to this day. Directly north of Kabul, Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Tajik-
dominated Jamiat-e-Islami had developed a guerrilla army and functional society, successfully
defending the Panjshir Valley against Soviet occupation for the entire conflict with considerably
little outside support. Several ethnic minorities-including Uzbek commander Abdul Rashid
Dostum-eventually joined Massoud’s forces in the Panjshir and coalesced into the Northern
Alliance, which will be discussed in depth. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami was favored
57 These numbers were found on Wikipedia, with a citation from the American VFW that had expired: through separate sources I have confirmed that these numbers are relatively accurate but are not meant to be exact 58 Coll, Ghost Wars, the entire section regarding Najibullah’s government as well as strategic postures of mujahedin units comes from this work
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by ISI and was mostly composed of Pashtun Khalq forces. The group absconded into the
mountains, targeting threatening leadership networks while gaining territory against Najibullah’s
regime.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar…was moving systematically to wipe out his rivals in the Afghan resistance…as the Soviet Union soldiers pulled out, Hekmatyar and ISI had embarked on a concerted, clandestine plan to eliminate his rivals and establish his Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Islamic Party as the most powerful national force in Afghanistan. 59 Hekmatyar is still active in the Afghan battlespace to this day, maintaining closer ties to
Iran than to Pakistan. His group was widely condemned for significant brutality against civilians
during and after the Soviet invasion, although significant numbers of civilians were killed by all
sides. 60
The fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the fall of Afghanistan’s most important trade partner
and source of support. Without the economic lifeblood of the USSR, Najibullah’s communist
government was unable to maintain the high operational-tempo required for control of Kabul.
From the North, Massoud’s Northern Alliance-now in complete and conventional warfare against
Hekmatyar- descended upon the final remnants of the communist regime in Kabul. Hekmatyar’s
forces, numerically exceeding his Northern opponent’s, advanced from the south. While the rival
mujahedin factions encircled Kabul, internationally-renown Islamic leaders (including Usama bin
Laden) attempted to bring the two factions to an agreement that could prevent a continuance of
the civil war, already responsible for the deaths of so many civilians. The negotiations failed. In
a testament to the commander’s unconventional warfare aptitude and audacity, Massoud utilized
traditional Afghan fighting customs as a weakness: knowing that Hekmatyar and many other
mujahedin commanders would disengage all communications over night, the Tajik commander
utilized the communications blackout to exploit his opponent and moved many of his forces into
59 Ibid, pg 181 60 Five other commanders and parties were operational in the civil war; with the exception of Massoud, all were comprised of predominantly Sunni-‐Islamist Pashtun fighters, they are not principally involved in events that have created contemporary Afghanistan and will be discussed in section two of this report
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Kabul while Hekmatyars forces were either asleep or unable to communicate about the invasion.
Massoud entered Kabul, quickly overwhelmed Najibullah’s final defenses, and established
extremely advantageous fighting positions for his forces before Hekmatyar could even be woken
up. Within a week, Hekmatyar’s forces had been entirely routed from Kabul and were relegated
to haphazardly “lobbing” indirect fire onto the city, killing as many civilians as enemy forces, and
Najibullah had been placed under house arrest. 61
“The first Afghan war was over. The second had begun.” 62
Massive amounts of conventional and guerrilla fighting continued in Kabul and the
surrounding countryside for years. Hekmatyar’s Islamist forces, backed by Pakistan’s ISI,
controlled different parts of Kabul and different parts of the country on a daily basis. 63 The
Northern Alliance, which claimed sovereignty and established a government for Afghanistan
under Prime Minister Rabbani, controlled most of Kabul and the entire Northern parts of the
country. Tribal warlords again sprang up out of the chaos; the corrupt belligerents allowed
lawlessness, extortion, the drug trade, and violent crime to seize the rural parts of the country.
Abroad, “Islamist violence connected to Arab veterans of the Afghan jihad surged worldwide.” 64
Brutal violence in Afghanistan had reached levels that surpassed even the anti-Soviet resistance,
with everyday Afghan citizens forced to choose between two evils.
In 1994, therefore, people were generally highly supportive and enthusiastic when a
group of devout Muslims sporting black turbans rode into Kandahar on shiny new Toyota Hilux’s
in the spring and summer. These young men, who called themselves “Taliban” and followed a
devout form of Islam known as Deobandism, started out with small intentions, initially acting as a
61 Ibid, pgs 235-‐237 62 Ibid, pg 237 63 Pakistan was-‐and still is-‐intent on seeing a friendly government installed in its Western neighbor; regional interference in Afghan affairs has been a recurring theme throughout the country’s history and will be discussed later in the report 64 Ibid, pg 275, Coll cites different terrorist plots and attacks aimed at many different targets, including the United States
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type of business-security force that meted out vigilante justice against the corrupt and terrorizing
warlords in Kandahar. 65
The Taliban assembled their story so that Pashtuns could recognize it as a revival of old glory. The Taliban connected popular, rural Islamic values with a grassroots Durrani Pashtun tribal rising. They emerged at a moment when important wealthy Pashtun tribal leaders around Kandahar hungered for a unifying cause. The Taliban hinted that their militia would become a vehicle for the return to Afghanistan of King Zahir Shah from his exile in Rome. They preached for a reborn alliance of Islamic piety and Pashtun might. 66
As their movement gained influence, their moderate Islamist stance began to deteriorate. “But as
the months passed and their legend grew, they began to meet and appeal for backing from
powerful Durrani Pashtun traders and chieftains.” 67 The Taliban’s one-eyed Pashtun leader and
former mujahedin fighter, Mullah Omar, quickly gained a mystical reputation for merciless
justice and devout piety; his exploits ranged in extent from the capture and public torture of a
child rapist before hanging the offender from a tank barrel, to donning a cloak housed in the
Kandahar Madrassa that had purportedly belonged to the Prophet Mohammad himself. 68
Although relatively little is known about Mohammad Omar the man, it is believed that the first
Taliban were Afghan refugee’s living in Pakistan attending Madrassa (Taliban can be translated
to “student of Islam”) studying under Omar’s tutelage in the Frontier Provinces of Pakistan.
Many were orphans of the Afghan violence, while many others were “Afghan Islamic clerics and
students, mostly of rural, Pashtun origin…former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with
conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries
(“madrassas”)…” 69 By November 1994 they had secured control of Kandahar and were quickly
expanding their territory. Sometime between the fall of Kandahar and early 1995, Pakistan’s ISI
became significantly involved in the Taliban movement. “Pakistan had all but invented the 65 According to Katzman: Post-‐Taliban…, pg 4 note 4, “The Deobandi school began in 1867 in a seminary in Uttar Pradesh, in British-‐controlled India, that was set up to train Islamic clerics and to counter the British educational model” 66 Ibid, pg 283, Coll apparently grasped much of his understanding of the Taliban from Ahmad Rashid’s Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia 67 Ibid, pg 285 68 Ibid, pg 283, and Katzman: Post-‐Taliban… pg 4 69 Katzman, Post-‐Taliban…, pg 4
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Taliban, the so-called Koranic Students.” 70 Attempting to use the Taliban as a vehicle to both
quell the turbulence and install a friendly regime in its neighboring country, the ISI and Pakistani
military supported the Taliban with “arms, ammunition, fuel, and military advisors…” 71
As the year progressed, fighting between Massoud and Hekmatyar continued in Kabul
while the Taliban continued their constant march north and west. By September 1995, the
Taliban ousted Massoud ally Ismail Khan from power in Herat Province and had captured
significant amounts of Hizb territory as well. Seeing that Hekmatyar could not overcome Jamiat
to take Kabul, and that the leader was despised by his own tribe-the Pashtuns-in addition to all
other ethnicities for his wanton use of artillery on civilian locations, Pakistan abandoned
Hekmatyar and shifted funds entirely to the Taliban. Caught between Massoud’s Kabul to the
North and the advancing Taliban from the South, Hekmatyar was forced to abandon his command
and ally with the Rabbani/Massoud government. Realizing the Taliban’s unstoppable momentum
and seeming popular appeal, Massoud, Rabbani, and several allies abandoned their Kabul
positions favorably in September 1996. 72 These forces went back to Massoud’s homeland and
familiar territory: the Panjshir Valley, where they formed the Northern Alliance and continued to
contest Kabul from the Taliban. The region, commanded militarily by Massoud and politically
by Rabbani, was the only part of Afghanistan that the Taliban failed to capture.
Taliban Control and Downfall:
The Taliban victoriously rode into Afghanistan’s capital on 27 SEP 1996. “Taliban
gunmen subsequently entered a U.N. facility in Kabul to seize Najibullah, his brother, and aides,
and then hanged them.” 73 They were castrated and tortured before being displayed from a traffic
light, signaling a new regime in Afghanistan’s history. After they captured Kabul, and while
70 Randall, Osama: The Makings…, pg 26 71 Giraldo, Terrorism Financing…, pg 96 72 Katzman, Post-‐Taliban…, pg 5, the fighters abandoning Kabul left essentially unopposed with most heavy weaponry, supplies, and personnel intact 73 Ibid, pg 5
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continuing to fight Massoud, the Taliban quickly became much more radical. They moved away
from their moderate, vigilante status, and lost both international and domestic support for their
increasingly strict adherence to Islamic customs. 74 Education for boys was slashed and, when it
occurred, tightly controlled by religious teachers. Television, dancing, music, and other
“immoral” elements of modern civilization (mostly components of Western culture) were banned
at the risk of severe physical punishment. Two gigantic Buddha statues, carved above Bamiyan
city during Afghanistan’s Maurya period, were destroyed on Mullah Omar’s orders as
representations of a false idol. 75 Particularly harsh and criticized for its stance on girls and
women, the Taliban forbade them from attending school or working outside the home, and it was
a crime to show any skin except hands, ankles, and (occasionally) eyes in public. Executions,
especially for women accused of adultery, were common and public, often occurring in the old
Afghan soccer stadium. While the Taliban controlled just about the only export-opium-it also
preached against the use of any type of alcohol or drug, and citizens caught using were severely
punished or killed. International Islamic terror organizations, including al Qaeda and others, were
granted protected access and given free reign throughout Afghanistan; this would be the Taliban’s
near-fatal mistake. 76
In early September 2001, two Arab journalists entered Northern Alliance lines. They had
been granted an interview with Massoud himself; a rare honor, and the two journalists had
excellent recommendations and credentials. They waited for the interview for several days before
finally being granted an audience with the Tajik commander on 09 SEP 2001. That morning, the
journalists set up their recording equipment, read their target a list of prepared questions, and
detonated a bomb that had been hidden in their camera. Massoud was unable to survive this
74 Ibid, pg 5 75 The demolition of these statues brought significant global condemnation; both Japan and Switzerland have since committed to rebuilding the statues, although the status of the repairs remains uncertain as the statues were completely destroyed 76 This section, detailing life under the Taliban, is formally derived from Katzman: Post-‐Taliban… page 5, and supplemented by the authors own understanding of Taliban rule from popular sources
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assassination attempt, the last of many. The Lion of the Panjshir was the most recent victim of
Usama bin Laden’s battle-proven international terrorist organization, al Qaeda. 77 Initially
unorganized and leaderless against the expected Taliban and al Qaeda offensive, Northern
Alliance units rallied around Uzbek General Dostum and were critical in the overthrow of the
Taliban in the following months.
Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and Prelude to Invasion 78
The goal of this research is not to highlight al Qaeda, Usama bin Laden (UBL) or other
international terrorist organizations as it is not intended to be counterterrorism or COIN research;
that being said, the Saudi radical-Islamist leader’s role in the status and context that Afghanistan
currently finds itself is impossible to ignore. Therefore, this section briefly addresses bin Laden’s
mid to late history and the justifications for his various attacks throughout the region and against
the West. Usama first entered the country that would host his planning for the 9/11 attacks in
May 1996, where he quickly formed a personal and professional bond with Mullah Omar and the
Taliban. Bin Laden had spent much of the Soviet invasion living in Pakistan, setting up supply
and training infrastructure for the mujahedin while gaining global renown as an international
Islamist figurehead and financier of jihad, more than an actual participant in the act itself. 79 No
evidence has yet surfaced to suggest that bin Laden or al Qaeda directly received any American
funds for the prosecution of the Soviet War. By the time that the Soviets had withdrawn from
Afghanistan, in early 1989, bin Laden and several other Arabic figures had formally created al
Qaeda.
77 Connections to al Qaeda and bin Laden, and a similar description of the assassination, is found in Coll, Ghost Wars, pgs 574-‐583 78 This section utilizes chiefly sources from the 9/11 Commission Report and Coll, Ghost Wars 79 He did directly fight Russian forces in one firefight in Paktia Province during the Battle of Jaji, which garnered significant credibility and admiration amongst other Arab fighters; his role in actual combat throughout the occupation and even in the battle itself was actually extremely limited
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Al Qaeda’s stated goals included “opposing non-Islamic governments with force and
violence;” although this and other operational goals certainly predisposed the group to anti-
Western activity, it was not until approximately 1992 that bin Laden became seriously and
aggressively anti-West. 80 Both al Qaeda and bin Laden are (were) devoutly Sunni entities,
targeting all non-Sunni’s for extermination. Bin Laden advocated, and al Qaeda utilized, a
violent form of Islamist international relations known as Qutbism. 81 After failing in his bid to
win a Saudi contract to wage war on the Kingdom’s behalf in the first Gulf War, and possibly
becoming embarrassed when the Royal Family turned instead to the “infidel” Americans, bin
Laden began to preach against his home nation, for which he was deported and sent into exile in
the Sudan in 1992. There are various accounts that may explain bin Laden’s relatively sudden
shift to aggressive anti-Western targeting.
According to an account later provided to the CIA by a source in Saudi intelligence, the Saudi officer assigned to carry out the expulsion assured bin Laden that this was being done for his own good. The officer blamed the Americans. The US government was planning to kill him, he told bin Laden, by this account, so the Royal Family would do him a favor and get him out of the kingdom for his own protection. 82
This misinformation (UBL had yet to be identified even as a threat), combined with the fact that
the West had been permitted into the Holy Lands of Saudi Arabia, and because of bin Laden’s
already anti-Western views, resulted in the issuance of a fatwa, or religious decree meant as law,
declaring war against the United States for its support of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and
Palestine, as well as it’s garrison in Saudi Arabia, in August of 1996. Before the fatwa had been
issued, however, CIA assets in Sudan had identified al Qaeda-and in particular the organization’s
leader- as a threat in 1994; by March 1996 the US had applied sufficient diplomatic pressure
80 PBS: Frontline, Background al Qaeda 81 For more information on Qutbism, consider Paul Berman 2003: Terror and Liberalism 82 Coll, Ghost Wars, pg 231
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(later targeting al Qaeda infrastructure with Tomahawk cruise missiles) to convince Sudan to
expel him. 83
He traveled to Jalalabad, outside of Taliban control, and set up radical Islamist operations
in his new home. There, he executed the August 1998 deadly attacks against the American
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, moved under Taliban protection outside Kandahar, and
escalated his involvement in foreign terrorist organizations while continuing to plan against
Western interests in the region. By early 1999, bin Laden had authorized Khalid Sheik
Mohammad to begin the preparations for the 9/11 attacks; additionally, bin Laden appointed
leadership for the undertaking, supplied the financial backing, and lent his training infrastructure
to the cause. In the following years, the hijackers entered the United States in waves and
continued refresher training for their mission. 84 Given the personal and professional closeness of
bin Laden and Mullah Omar, contrasted with the inherent need for secrecy, upper levels of the
Taliban leadership may or may not have known about the impending attack against American
civilians and infrastructure before the attack occurred. However, there is no denying that the
Taliban were aware of previous al Qaeda attacks on civilians and supported the same goals; the
two organizations shared training camps, supply infrastructure, and a common ideology. In any
case, Mullah Omar refused to hand bin Laden over to the American authorities after September
11th.
Following the US invasion, bin Laden initially retreated to the mountainous Afghanistan-
Pakistan border where he continued to command al Qaeda. In March 2002, American SOF units
wounded and almost captured bin Laden during Operation Anaconda; in a major set back and
embarrassment for US leadership, he and several other top al Qaeda leaders were able to slip
through the Northern Alliance/Afghan encirclement and, presumably, find refuge in Pakistan.
After this, he released a limited amount of guidance and operational support for al Qaeda and the
83 The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004 84 Ibid, 2004, there is almost zero evidence to suggest that bin Laden did not have a direct, active role in the planning for the attacks
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global radical Islamist movement before being forced into almost total secrecy in the face of the
largest manhunt in human history. Until “Geronimo’s” death in June 2011 during Operation
Neptune Spear, the terrorist leader served as more of an inspirational figure-head than active
operational commander, planner, or financier.
Post September 11th and US Invasion:
After the September 11th attacks the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden, now the
most wanted man in the world. 85 CIA officers landed amongst Northern Alliance lines in mid-
September 2001, followed soon after by US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha
(ODA) teams. Combined with American airpower, the CIA and ODA teams assisted the
Northern Alliance in significantly weakening Taliban communications, infrastructure, and
training capacities. After approximately three weeks of sustained aerial bombardment, the first
conventional American forces landed in Afghanistan on 07 OCT 2001. 86 On 13 NOV 2001,
Northern Alliance forces retook Kabul with almost zero resistance and Taliban fighters from
across the country consolidated in Kandahar, their political and spiritual homeland, before
retreating to the lawless border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. By 01 DEC 2001 US
forces were firmly in control of all major population centers and the Taliban had been decimated;
Mullah Omar was believed to have fled to Pakistan where he continued to command what little
remained of the Taliban.
The subsequent US invasion and current status of Afghanistan as a counterinsurgency
battlespace will be analyzed in Part Two of this report. Throughout its history, Afghanistan’s 85 Mullah Omar and bin Laden were personally and professionally close; however, traditional Pashtun tribal custom also dictated that a guest in a residence-‐as bin Laden was considered in Afghanistan-‐must be cared for and protected no matter the cost to the host. This same custom would be displayed to Navy Seal HM1 Luttrell during Operation Red Wings in June 2005. HM1 Luttrell was the sole survivor after his team was ambushed on the botched operation. Wounded, he stumbled upon an Afghan village; the Pashtun villagers protected him despite demands from the Taliban at the threat of the villagers lives, and returned the SEAL to American forces. This was chronicled in his novel Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Red Wings and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10 86 For more on the covert CIA role in leading the Northern Alliance over the Taliban in OCT 2001, consider reading First In: An Insiders Account of how the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan, written by the units CO Gary Schroen
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location has made it a location of seemingly constant conflict; from contributing fighters that
radicalized the downfall of the earliest empire, to its first interactions with Western influence and
Alexander the Great, to tribal divisions that coalesced into unified nationalism during the Anglo-
Afghan Wars, to the same nationalism exhibited during the anti-Soviet jihad and to the current
insurgency tearing apart the country, Afghanistan has seen more than it’s fair share of conflict.
Sadly, history has a way of repeating itself, especially when it is ignored and forgotten. The
history of Afghanistan, while bloody and depressing, may well inform its future.
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Part II: Battlespace Afghanistan Today: Contemporary Intuition
This section details the status of forces and occupation of Afghanistan found today. It
goes into further detail about the tribes and ethnicities that socially comprise Afghanistan, the
objectives and goals of the US/ISAF at this point in the conflict, provides a description and
analysis of the various security forces and their capabilities-including both insurgents and
counterinsurgents-and attempts to paint a perspective on the operational view of daily life in
Afghanistan. Beyond a brief discussion, the report will not attempt to provide an analysis of how
or why the theater looks the way it does, except for how those reasons affect contemporary and
future Afghanistan; the philosophical, tactical, and strategic reasons for the battlespace and
country as it appears today are too much to discuss in one report and are outside the scope of this
work. To gain a much more in-depth understanding of these reasons, consider reading Ahmed
Rashid’s Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, as it provides
a well-researched, in-depth, and regional take on the issues for consideration.
Afghan tribal disposition and social composition
Afghanistan is an Islamic nation and has been for hundreds of years; different leaders
have brought varying degrees of religiosity to their rule, but the Islamic tradition has influenced
each considerably. Officially, the country is considered 80% Sunni and 19% Shiite, while less
than 1% of the population are categorized as Hindu, Sikh, or “other.” Containing two official
languages (Dari and Pashtu) and 31.1 million individuals, it is home to four tribes that comprise
the indigenous and most dominant percentage of the country.87
The largest, most historically dominant, and arguably the most important ethnic group for
the future of Afghanistan are the Pashtuns. Comprising 42% of the nation, Pashtuns are
principally found in the South and South East regions of Afghanistan along the Durand Line with
87 CIA: The World Factbook, Afghanistan, numerical statistics-‐People and Society, 2013
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Pakistan. Regionally, approximately 43 million Pashtuns live in this area-considered their tribal
and ancestral homeland-with only 30.1% (13.0654 million) of them actually living in
Afghanistan. 88 The fact that the Durand Line split the two ethnic groups has been a significant
source of tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the former’s inception and has been a
major impetus for justifying Pakistani interference in Afghan affairs. Mostly because of this line,
“Afghanistan has set out to undermine Pakistan’s territorial integrity, and Pakistan has aimed at
thwarting Afghanistan’s political independence.” 89 Many Afghan Pashtuns consider themselves
the only true Afghan’s, and groups from both sides of the border desire an autonomous or semi-
autonomous region for their homeland (in the case of Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Provinces
this ideal has been informally achieved). This tension is the source of continued geopolitical
friction and will be addressed later in this report. Pashtuns are a rigidly male-dominated society;
the Taliban is a principally Pashtun organization and Pashtun values-especially regarding gender-
have permeated the group. The tribes are known for a shifting sense of leadership and a pseudo-
contradictory, highly organized conception of hierarchy. Socially, the structure is described as “a
segmentary lineage system. There is a hierarchy of social groupings starting at the local level,
then proceeding upward through various levels to an entire ethnic group. These relationships are
based on kinship….” 90
The hierarchy of identity and loyalty was expressed by a Pashtun politician in the 1970’s: “I have been a Pakistani for thirty years, a Muslim for fourteen hundred years, and a Pashtun for five thousand years…” Kinship and ethnic relations have always been more important than abstract concepts based on ideologies. This imposes intrinsic divisions on the Pashtun, and makes it difficult for them to unite. The classic way to overcome local barriers is to unite against an invader, as they are doing now. 91
This is true for leadership as well, and extends itself to the national fight against the Taliban.
Opportunity is chief in Pashtun culture: alliances will fall apart and vengeances will form after
88 Ibid, 2013, the remaining 29.7974 million living in Pakistan 89 Tarzi, Political Struggles Over the Afghanistan-‐Pakistan Borderlands, pg 27 90 Tainter, Pashtun Social Structure…, pg 1 91 Ibid, pg 3
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almost no provocation except that it benefits one party in the agreement. This tendency has made
both ISAF and Afghan National Government affiliations with Pashtun sects concurrently tenuous
and untrusting.
The second most populous-and arguably second most dominant-ethnic group comprising
Afghanistan is the Tajik people. Comprising 27% of the country, Tajiks inhabit mostly the
northern and western provinces of the country. Compared with their Pashtun counterparts, Tajiks
are considerably more modernist, less pre-disposed to radical Islam, and diametrically opposed to
the Taliban. 92 Tajiks are spread throughout Central Asia, and more Tajiks actually live in
Afghanistan than in Tajikistan (8.3986 million reside in Afghanistan while only 6.3201 million
reside in Tajikistan). 93 The majority of Tajiks in Afghanistan speak Dari and have Persian
(Iranian) roots; interestingly, the vast majority are followers of Sunni Islam.
The Tajiks have proven themselves significantly more receptive to joining the
government forces; they are slightly over-represented in the new Afghan National Army and have
held key strategic defense policy and leadership positions. 94 Ahmad Shah Massoud, an ethnic
Tajik, was among the most successful rebels in the anti-Soviet insurgency and the only leader to
defend territory against the Taliban (the largest percentage of forces comprising the Northern
Alliance are Tajik). Regionally, Tajiks are less-predisposed to radical Islam than Pashtuns; citing
their “nomadic tribal traditions,” many Tajiks reject strict adherence to Sharia (Islamic) law. 95
Although they recognize Islam as a unifying force, Tajik loyalties lie principally amongst their
92 Ibid, pg 4 93 CIA: The World Factbook, Afghanistan, and, Tajikistan, numerical statistics-‐People and Society, 2013 94 Katzman, Post-‐Taliban…, pg 30; Tajiks comprise approximately 33.3% of the ANA while only 27% of the nation 95 Collins, The Political Role of Clans…, pg 183; author cites studies conducted in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, but given the ethnic and geographic closeness of the groups of people, and the historical resistance to radicalization, this can additionally be applied to Afghan Tajiks
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clan and village; these loyalties lead many Tajiks to “express disdain for ‘calls for jihad’ and
skepticism of ‘Islam’s ability to solve political and economic problems.’” 96
Comprising the bulk of Afghanistan’s Shiite minority is the Dari-speaking Hazara ethnic
population. The approximately 10% of the Afghan population who identify themselves as Hazara
are scattered throughout Afghanistan, with their strongest concentration found in central and
eastern Afghanistan; significant populations are also found in Pakistan and Iran. Traditionally,
the Pashtun population of Afghanistan has considered the Hazara ethnicity to be less prestigious
and viewed the people with derision. Because of their significant participation in the Soviet
government of Afghanistan during the 1980’s, Human Rights Watch has identified substantial
Taliban oppression through massacres and attempted genocide against the Hazaras. 97
Additionally, simmering tensions from the post-Soviet civil war exist between the Hazaras and
the Tajiks; these tensions have sporadically boiled over throughout the previous decade.
Following the US invasion, Hazara’s have taken advantage of the increased educational
and modernist opportunities for advancement.
The Hazaras have historically been looked down upon by the Pashtuns, who have tended to employ Hazaras as domestic workers and other lower and lower middle class professions. Observers report that many Hazaras, including Hazara women, are earning degrees or pursuing training in information technology, medical, and other highly skilled professions and that they are becoming dominant in many of these higher paying sectors of the Afghan economy 98
These educational advancements will likely pave the way for future advancement and increased
economic prosperity for the modernizing Hazaras. Additionally, the Hazaras newly found
political prominence has altered the United States presence in the region; the Bilateral Security
Agreement that has yet to be signed but has been ratified by a national Loya Jirga (discussed later
in this section), calls for the maintaining of a US troop presence in central Afghanistan-amongst
96 Ibid, pg 183; quotations refer to Collins’ cited study of the population 97 In February 2001, Human Rights Watch released the report “Afghanistan: Massacre of Hazaras” 98 Katzman, Politics, Elections…, pg 3; author cites a 2010 New York Times article
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the core of the Hazara population-following the end of the official troop withdrawal in order to
protect the people should the Taliban again threaten the ethnicity with genocide. 99
Roughly equivalent in population size to the Hazaras (comprising approximately 9% of
the population) are the Uzbek ethnicities; this group is found principally along the Afghan-
Uzbekistan and Afghan-Turkmenistan border in the north and speak both Dari and Turkish.
Principally Sunni Muslim, the Uzbeks first gained a portion of national power in Afghanistan
during the Soviet invasion. Commander Abdul Rashid Dostum spent a significant amount of the
occupation fighting for the communist government of Afghanistan and with Soviet troops.
However, after seeing that the Soviets would lose the war, he switched sides and, with the Tajik
commander Massoud, formed the Northern Alliance, successfully withstanding Taliban control.
Partially explained by Dostum’s willingness to work with the Soviets, “many Uzbeks in
Afghanistan are leftwing and highly secular,” although they are underrepresented in the ANA. 100
The Uzbek social hierarchy is slightly larger than some of Afghanistan’s other tribes, making
large-scale political organization and impact more productive and easier. “They consider not
only their village, in which most inhabitants are somehow related…but usually several
neighboring villages, linked by marital alliances, to be part of that clan.” 101 Similar to the Tajiks
and Hazaras, Uzbeks oppose and have been targeted by the Taliban over the past two decades.
While Uzbeks are more conducive to working with Western and Afghan National Government
forces, some of the most intense fighting of the US occupation of Afghanistan has been in areas
populated relatively heavily by Uzbeks, and their loyalties, like the Pashtuns, have switched
relatively quickly in previous engagements. 102
99 Diplonews, Afghanistan, US Launch…, 15 NOV 2012 100 Ibid, pg 4, Uzbeks comprise approximately 6.3% of the security forces 101 Collins, The Political Role of Clans…, pg 176 102 For example, Mazar-‐i-‐Sharif (fourth largest city in Afghanistan) was the location of one of the most violent and conventional conflicts in the Afghan War
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Status and Organization of Conflict
The United States and 48 member countries still operate throughout Afghanistan and the
surrounding region, although this number is increasingly shrinking. Collectively, these nations
operate under a mostly singular command, known as the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF). The military commander is General Joseph F. Dunford Jr (United States Marine Corps),
and the senior civilian representative is Ambassador Maurits R. Jochems (Netherlands).
Although this number changes daily, ISAF a has total strength of 86,834 personnel, with the US
contributing three quarters of the force. 103 For purposes of organization, the nation of
Afghanistan has been divided into six administrative regional commands: Regional Command
(RC) North, RC West, RC South, RC Southwest, RC East, and RC Capital. The United States is
the lead nation of RC’s Southwest, South, and East; Germany is the lead nation in RC North;
Italy is lead nation in RC West; and Turkey is lead nation in RC Capital. Afghan National Army
and Security Forces are divided between each RC, considered under command of the respective
RC lead nation, operate with ISAF forces in a trainee-capacity, and contribute an additional
187,000 troops throughout the country. 104 Although due consideration will be accorded to each
contributing nation in ISAF, this report will focus on the American contribution insofar as ISAF
is discussed, as the US is the highest contributor of personnel to Afghanistan, is in control of the
mission, and was the driving force behind the initial invasion and subsequent occupation.
Bilateral Security Agreement
The lynchpin of the continuation of the ISAF force remaining in Afghanistan following
the 2014 deadline is an internationally understood legal agreement between the United States and
Afghanistan known as a bilateral security agreement (BSA). The BSA, as a corollary to the
broader and significantly more general strategic partnership agreement, stipulates the exact
103 NATO/ISAF, ISAF: Key Facts and Figures, data current from 01 OCT 2013 104 Ibid, 2013
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abilities and restrictions on the foreign troop presence after 2014. Negotiations for the terms of
the agreement began on 15 NOV 2012 and were scheduled to last no more than one year.
Specifically, the talks attempted to resolve major issues of friction between the two countries,
including; conditions for the training, advisory, and assistance role of US troops; the right of US
troops charged with crimes in Afghanistan to be tried in American courts; enhanced pledges of
American support in the event of a violation of Afghan sovereignty (especially against Pakistan);
and specific roles for various forms of kinetic warfare, including drone strikes, SOF High Value
Target acquisition/aggressive counterterrorism warfare, and the use of light infantry units in
searching and seizing Afghan homes. 105 Both sides entered the negotiations with several key
assumptions, including:
…Full respect for Afghan sovereignty and Afghan national interests, including advancing the cause of peace and security across Afghanistan, strengthening the capacity and capabilities of Afghan national security forces so that they can independently provide security for the Afghan people and defend the country against external threats, and pursuing both countries’ shared goal of eliminating trans-national terrorism. 106
Additionally, negotiations began with shared assumptions that the United States does not seek a
permanent troop presence in Afghanistan, or a presence that is considered threatening by
Afghanistan’s neighbors. 107
Given the recent nature of the Afghan-US relationship, it should perhaps be no surprise
that the one-year deadline has come and passed without an official BSA being signed by both
parties. In June 2013, negotiations faltered and President Karzai suspended the process all
together after learning that the United States favored a potential settlement with the Taliban, but
had not requested the Afghan president’s opinion on the matter. For much of the year, the
framework of the BSA remained unresolved. In mid-October 2013, the United States Secretary
105 David Zucchino, Los Angeles Times, 15 NOV 2012: http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/15/world/la-‐fg-‐us-‐afghan-‐talks-‐20121115 106 Diplonews, Afghanistan, US Launch…, 15 NOV 2012 107 Ibid, 2012
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of State John Kerry and Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that they had reached a
tenuous agreement for the BSA, and that the agreement would be contingent on Afghanistan’s
citizen approval through the democratic deliberations of a 2,500-person loya jirga. The BSA was
sent to the Loya Jirga in mid-November and had been ratified with “overwhelming approval”
from the national delegation within four days, with strong recommendations that Karzai sign the
document before the first of the year. 108 Unfortunately, President Karzai backtracked-ignoring
the Loya Jirga-and refused to sign the document until after the next presidential elections (in
April 2014), while concurrently and informally adding several more contingencies to the
document. 109 If the document is not signed, the ISAF will end and the highest probable outcome
is that the entire American force deployment will end, along with a vast amount of its political
and infrastructure civilian operations for lack of security.
Amongst the American delegation, the general consensus is that Karzai has over judged
the American commitment to staying in Afghanistan and is holding the negotiations hostage upon
this belief, while in reality (publically) the Obama Administration does not view Afghanistan as a
“vital strategic interest.” 110 Generally, Afghans (especially those in cities) do not want the
Americans to leave and believe that their country will once again descend into civil war upon
their departure. 111 The loya jirga specifically is intent on keeping the American troops in the
country in order to remain in power and influence. Despite the drama, the BSA will likely be
signed in time for the Americans to renew their commitment with adequate time to plan for the
future troop presence. To prevent Karzai from losing too much face, they will make more minor
concessions, but Karzai will not get the majority of his new, emotionally-driven demands.
108 “Overwhelming approval” according to official statement from US ambassador to Afghanistan 109 The main contingency is that US forces will no longer be allowed to enter houses in Afghanistan, and if this contingency is violated Karzai will nullify the agreement; although the BSA contains significantly curtailed conditions for the search and seizure of personal properties by ISAF forces, it does not deny total authorization 110 Rob Nordland, New York Times, 24 NOV 2013: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/afghan-‐council-‐approves-‐us-‐security-‐pact.html?_r=0 111 Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink…, pg 16
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Although the BSA has not been signed, the draft document waiting Karzai’s signature has
been released. Officially titled the “Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement between the
United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” the document maintains its
initial agreements (including respect for sovereignty, non-permanent Western presence, and intent
to further the indigenous security capabilities of Afghanistan’s National Security Forces). From
there, the BSA prevents US forces from conducting direct action against the insurgents.
However, it does allow the use of extremely specific direct action by American special operations
against mutually-agreed counter terrorism targets. 112 Additionally, US forces may be required to
assist the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in counter-IED operations, which will
continue to put American forces at risk and, in the likely event of ambush, into kinetic battle.
Importantly, the agreement also guarantees the right to American trial for crimes committed by
servicemen/women in Afghanistan. The BSA transfers the entire security responsibility of the
counter insurgency onto the ANSF, freeing American troops from providing protection for the
populace and the government, while placing the US into a posture dictated by the battlespace
requirements (METT-TCM) on nine locations across the country. 113 Current weapon shipments
between the US and Afghanistan (the latter was recently approved for enhanced arms deals when
it was designated a non-NATO ally) will continue, as well as the current personnel exchange
program utilized by the military, diplomatic, and intelligence communities. In the event of
foreign aggression, the United States is not formally committed to using its military to intervene
in a breach of sovereignty, but intervening with kinetic force is considered possible and probable.
Only under extremely curtailed circumstances may US troops enter Afghan homes (troops may
enter homes only when the failure to do so will likely result in the loss of life to American or
Afghan troops or civilians) and can never enter mosques. There are no obviously apparent
112 Direct action, as a military term, means kinetic combat, closing with and destroying the enemy through the use of small/crew-‐served weapons; American Special Operations may still be used outside of the wire as a raid/strike force against terrorist targets that threaten the state or American interests (this is the only ability of US forces to engage targets), including al Qaeda and other terrorist groups 113 METT-‐TC: Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops available,-‐ Time, Civilian considerations, Media
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geostrategic or economic advantages to either party in the BSA, beyond what this report has
discussed. 114
Afghanistan National Government
An incredibly important element of Afghanistan’s future is the ability of the government
to govern. After the extremely successful US invasion, American military and political leaders
falsely believed that their job had finished, and US foreign policy capacity was already switching
to Iraq. 115 The December 2001 Bonn Agreement, complemented by Western-dominated loya
jirgas, resulted in the framework for the government of Afghanistan as it appears today. After a
brief stint as interim President, Burhanuddin Rabbani turned over official control of the country
to Hamid Karzai in December of 2001. In Afghanistan’s first elections following the American
invasion, Karzai was elected President and a national constitution was ratified. The Constitution
outlined a divided system of government, with one president and two vice presidents serving in
the executive capacity, a bicameral assembly serving as parliament, and a national judiciary. The
Constitution was ratified with systems that strongly favor the likelihood of continued Pashtun
presidency, as they are the most populace ethnicity, and the National Assembly parliament would
serve as the minority tribe’s system of representation. Each branch is assisted by a small (and
failing) bureaucracy; the most important tool of the bureaucracy for all three branches of
government is the General Administrative Office, which is “taking on a policymaking role by
helping the National Assembly draft laws and advising Karzai on what legislation to sign or
veto.” 116 The president, who is term-limited to two, five-year terms (Karzai is term limited in the
next presidential election in April 2014), serves as commander in chief of the armed forces, head
of state, and has broad powers to appoint high-ranking officials. Karzai has interpreted these 114 US DoS, Afghan MFA, Security and Defense Cooperation Agreement …, NOV 2013 115 Much commentary has been penned about the reasons the West abandoned Afghanistan as a geostrategic priority in favor of Iraq, and all of it is significantly too long for analysis here; suffice it to say that military leaders (who controlled the Bush foreign policy) were enamored with the World War Two tenet of terrain as the key center of gravity in any conflict 116 Katzman, Politics, Elections, and…, pg 8
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privileges to include appointing “not only cabinet ministers but also members of the Supreme
Court, judges, provincial governors and district governors, local security chiefs, and members of
supposedly independent commissions…” 117 The Karzai administration is anything but on good
terms with the American’s: “he frequently told top US officials that of the three ‘main enemies’
he faced-the United States, the international government, and the Taliban-he would side first with
the Taliban.” 118 The National Assembly has some power to curtail these appointments and
political alliances, and has executed that power recently with limited success. It is the nation’s
pre-eminent government institution for non-Pashtuns and, as the branch charged with the creation
and ratification of laws, has passed legislation to protect the rights of the minority ethnicities. It
is divided into several committees and sub-categories-similar to the American legislature.
Unfortunately, the distinctly Western top-down approach seeded many of the problems
seen today in Afghanistan. In his brief discussion of the current state of the Taliban, prominent
counterinsurgency theorist David Killcullen cites a historical account of power accumulation in
the time of Alexander the Great; Deiokes, the first King of the Medes (a tribal confederation on
the Western edge of today’s Afghanistan) gained his power at the smallest level before working
his way up to regional, and finally monarchical control.
Now, what Herodotus is describing here is a member of a local elite…using the delivery of justice-dispute resolution, mediation, settling of disputes among the community-as a means to acquire local legitimacy and political power from the bottom up in a traditional society, one where people live ‘in scattered villages without any central authority…’ Deiokes is starting to successfully transition…into the formal authority, the rule of law, and the political structure of the state. 119
In tribal societies, such as Afghanistan, groups have always come to power at the tribal
level before working their way to the national. He summarizes, “local nonstate actors [gain]
117 Ibid, pg 7 118 Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink…, pg 95 119 Killcullen, Counterinsurgency, pg 148-‐149; author references account from Herodotus of Halicarnassus
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influence through the local exercise of law and order…and then translating that influence into
formal political authority through processes of state formation from the bottom up.” 120
Afghan National Security Forces
A critical component of ISAF’s counterinsurgency policy is the handover of all security
responsibilities to Afghan security forces: this necessarily entails adequate and capable security
forces, and is a critical metric for the sustainability of the Afghan National Government into the
future. Local military/police forces as well as US SF-advised neighborhood watch programs
augment the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which is comprised of the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). 121 Officially, the ANA “leads”
80-90% of all combat operations, and conducts some of these operations completely free of ISAF
support.122 However, this is a point of significant contention and one that this research is not
adequately able to judge. As such, this report will summarize the official capacities of the ANSF
as they appear on paper, before analyzing a critique of these capabilities as well as a summation
of the problems inherent with this type of research.
Already in overall control for security of the capital, the Afghan National Army is in the
process of taking control for every facet of the counterinsurgency, including the
politico/development component of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. For the first time, it is
being led by more ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras than Pashtuns, as recruitment efforts have struggled
to overcome the fear of retribution many Pashtuns feel should they join the ANSF. The ANA
receives substantial and continued military training and arms shipment deals with the United
States and the greater international community, including Great Britain, Germany, and Russia.
ANA equipment capacity is set up according to a limited autonomous combat operational
120 Ibid, pg 149; brackets replace “gaining” 121 Local units are similar in organization/intent to American national guard military units and county/city police forces 122 Katzman, Post-‐Taliban Governance…, pg 32
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capability paradigm known as “Shoot, Move, Communicate.” Under this paradigm, the ANA is
equipped according to the needs of a light infantry unit: (against Hamid Karzai’s objections) the
ANA is not equipped with battle tanks or other offensive armored vehicles. Rather, it is designed
to “enable them to operate autonomously, including operation and sustainment of a combined
arms force.” 123 As such, the withdrawal of Western troops will result in gaps in Afghan medical
evacuation, close air support, direct/indirect fire abilities, and intelligence gathering. By the time
of the withdrawal, the Afghan Air Force is scheduled to possess and adequately maintain
approximately 140 principally Russian-built Mi-series gunship, attack, and transport helicopters.
124 The Air Force lacks a sizable fixed-wing attack aircraft inventory, which could lead to
diminished abilities for close air support and resupply.
Assuming that the previously-discussed Bilateral Security Agreement is signed in a
timely fashion, the ISAF combat mission will not officially end until late 2014, and Western
troops will continue to augment ANSF units in combat engagements and operations until that
time. Currently, the ANSF is “shouldering the majority of the burden of fighting the insurgency,
[and]…has exceeded expectations in its ability to take over the counterinsurgency from ISAF,
although progress was uneven in some…areas.” 125 Throughout 2013, the ANSF has been the
lead organization in 87% of all operations, and Afghan special operations/commando units have
led 86% of all counter terrorism direct action missions. 126 The ANA is particularly adept at
battalion level infantry operations, given the extensive military experience of the soldiers.
Communications between the units in combined arms operations have improved, but missing
logistical, leadership, and support enablers continue to limit the ability of the ANA. The lack of
trust between the ethnicities, corruption, absenteeism, and criminality amongst the Afghan
123 US DoD, Report on Progress Toward…, pg 70 124 Katzman, Post-‐Taliban Governance…, pg 33 125 US DoD, Report on Progress Toward…, pg 48 126 Ibid, pg 48; reference Appendix E “ANSF/ISAF Operations”
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National Army will continue to plague the force for many years, though it is not the greatest
threat facing the forces.
This information, which comes mostly from the American military or government-related
academies (including the Congressional Research Service), takes a decidedly optimistic view of
the situation, especially when compared to almost all popular reporting going on in Afghanistan
today. Many of these reports hold that while the ANSF may officially lead operations, the
Afghan leadership apparatus is rarely able to overcome setbacks, and the imperative for mission
success forces ISAF leadership to step in. Additionally, the ethnic tensions native to the military
recruitment scheme will exasperate the counterinsurgency, as “the new Afghan Army cannot
defeat the Taliban without more Pashtuns in its units, and Pashtuns are unlikely to be recruited as
long as they are intimidated by the Taliban.” 127 While there is no question that unit training and
readiness has improved drastically over the last several years, the endemic corruption,
criminality, penetration by the enemy, support and structural limitations of the ANA, ethnic
tensions, and quality of the soldiers raises serious questions of the unit’s effectiveness. This past
year has been the first instance of significant ANSF combat operations, and only then with
significant US intervention. In the end, an unbiased source of information will only come from
spending time studying the Afghan National Security Forces in person, and seeing first-hand the
ability of the government to wage war in the most general sense of the term.
The Enemy
To date, 3,397 International Security Assistance Force members, an untold number of
Afghan National Security Force servicemen/women, and tens of thousands of Afghan civilians
have lost their lives since the United States entered Afghanistan in September and October 2001.
127 Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink…, pg 87
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128 The Taliban in Kabul and most major cities were quickly routed by the combination of
American airpower and indirect fire assets with Northern Alliance ground units, and throughout
the country Taliban units were either killed or forced to the Pakistan border by early December of
2001. Indicative of the Afghan perspectives of the radical-Islamist government, “once it became
clear that the Taliban would lose in 2001, every region of the country turned against them,
including the Pashtun south.” 129 Following the quick victory in Afghanistan, American military
and political attention was quickly pulled to Iraq, and the resultant security vacuum following the
transfer of combat power allowed the resurrection of tribal warlord’s, who were paid by the US to
take over security while the new Afghan National Government was being created. Taking
advantage of the initial confusion between the Afghan and Iraq invasions, Pakistan saw another
opportunity to install an Islamist government in its neighbor to the West, and the ISI began to
“revive the Taliban insurgency…” 130 This resurrection started slowly, and would eventually
“blowback” against the Pakistani state itself in the form of the Pakistani Taliban, which is now
that nations greatest threat. However, President Karzai saw the emerging threat and repeatedly
petitioned the Bush administration for attention to the problem; he received no serious response
from the Americans, and Pakistan continued to increase its support for the Taliban.
During 2001 to mid-2006, U.S. forces and Afghan troops fought relatively low levels of insurgent violence with focused combat operations mainly in the south and east where ethnic Pashtuns predominate…toward the end of this period, U.S. and partner commanders considered the insurgency mostly defeated and NATO/ISAF assumed lead responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan…the optimistic assessments proved misplaced when violence increased significantly in mid-2006.” 131
After 2006, the insurgency grew almost exponentially: by 2008, 40% of the country was off-
limits for civilian Western aid personnel, and by 2009 General Stanley McChrystal was the first
128 As of 09DEC2013, not all ISAF/ANSF fatalities were combat related, and accurate figures of ANSF/civilian deaths were kept only sporadically throughout the conflict; the vast majority of civilian deaths have been at the hands of the insurgency, reference Appendix D “Civilian Casualties by Cause” 129 Tainter, Pashtun Social Structure…, pg 4 130 Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink…., Pg 31 131 Katzman, Post-‐Taliban Governance…, pg 19
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American combatant commander to admit the counterinsurgency effort was failing, and that there
was a potential for mission failure should the initiative not be re-claimed from the Taliban. 132
Today, the Taliban are just one of a myriad of groups fighting against the National
Government and the ISAF. In addition to the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami are
active in the northern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, the Pakistani Taliban (while mainly
threatening the Pakistani government) have launched cross-border raids against ANSF and US
targets, and the Haqqani faction has proven to be particularly dangerous to forces operating in the
battlespace, and is purported to be protected by Pakistan’s ISI. Additionally, there are
unconfirmed reports that tribal organizations have set up informal, private security militias, and
may have had authorization to do so from the Afghan National Government. If these reports are
correct, these fighters-while envisioned by provincial authorities as a form of “friendly” guerrilla
warfighter-are just as likely to attack ISAF/Afghan National Government forces as the insurgents.
133 Overall, the insurgents continue to have a significant impact and element of control of the
population in RC-South West, around Helmand and Kandahar city; this metric can be deceiving,
however, as the areas of their greatest influence are widely rural and barely populated, suggesting
that the Taliban do not control the center of gravity in the COIN effort and are simply attacking
high-profile terrain-based targets. 134 The complexity of their attacks has increased drastically (the
seven month period from March to October 2012 saw a 20% rise in such attacks), but almost all
other metrics of attacks have decreased significantly. 135
Unquestionably, the “core insurgent faction in Afghanistan remains the Taliban,” and the
Taliban are also the most likely insurgent group to come to national power. 136 The movement is
132 Ibid, pg 20; Strategy Assessment and Recommendations 30AUG2009 133 Rashid and Katzman differ on this topic, and the author of this report was unable to confirm which scholar was correct; reference Katzman, Post-‐Taliban…, pg 35 and Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink…, pg 110 134 US DoD, Report on Progress Toward…, pg 25; only .5% of the population lives in the six most violent districts referenced in this report, leading to speculation that the Taliban do not control the people (the center of gravity) 135 Ibid, pg 23 136 Katzman, Post-‐Taliban Governance…, pg 13
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likely still headed by Mullah Omar, who (it is believed) remains in either Karachi or Quetta, in
Pakistan. It remains a chiefly Pashtun, deeply conservative and radically anti-Western
movement, and poor relations with all other minority tribes in the country. The movement has
already begun its shift away from kinetic operations, and has greatly attempted to limit civilian
collateral damage (a relatively new development in the conflict):
The guidance to avoid Afghan civilian casualties coincides with an increased focus by Taliban leaders on nonkinetic means of influencing the local population, such as leveraging teachers and Imams to indoctrinate students in Taliban precepts and improving relationships with influential local leaders and elders. 137
It has had recent mixed success in securing the support of the population. Several provinces,
including the Taliban’s symbolic homeland Kandahar, have seen significant revolts against the
Taliban occupation, which could be a sign that the Taliban are generally not accepted. The
Taliban are at least tacitly supported by senior elements of both the Iranian and Pakistani
governments; there is a general agreement amongst American policy makers that the Pakistani
military and/or ISI still fund some parts of the Taliban, and there is no doubt that they afford
senior leaders protection in the country. 138 Although the Taliban’s “shadow governments” were
largely displaced following the American troop surge in 2009, it is likely that some semblance of
Taliban governance exists even in “pacified” regions of the country, mostly through the
propagation of the Taliban’s “shadow courts” that promote Sharia Law and harsh justice. 139
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Jalaludin Haqqani formed the Haqqani
Network and, upon joining the mujahedin resistance, became a major recipient of American
military aid. The Haqqani Network is still operational in Afghanistan and considered “perhaps
the most potent threat to Afghan security;” before the US invasion Haqqani had joined the
137 US DoD, Report on Progress Toward…, pg 20 138 The majority of all Taliban leaders killed by the United States in the conflict, have been killed by drone strike in Pakistan 139 For the historical role of justice as power throughout tribal Afghanistan, reference “Afghan National Government” section of this report, or Killcullen: Counterinsurgency
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Taliban, though it has since split from that organization. 140 The Haqqani faction is considered
significantly more Arabic than the Taliban, and consequently closer to al Qaeda. The faction is a
favorite of the Pakistani ISI, which sees the network as a potential ally in the future Afghan
political economy, and senior American officials have described the organization as “the veritable
arm of the ISI.” 141 Because of this, it has aggressively targeted Indian interests in the nation, and
has received financial and lethal aid from the Pakistani government. In late November 2012, the
Haqqani Network announced that they would follow the lead of the Afghan Taliban in
negotiations with the Afghan government, and to date have not broken that declaration.
However, the United States has targeted the faction particularly aggressively in the last half of
2013: since July 4th 2013, the US has successfully killed three of the four top leaders of the
Haqqani network (all were killed in Pakistan). 142 Additionally, tribal Afghans have recently
broken many agreements with the Haqqani faction, even in Khost Province (the Haqqani familial
homeland). While it is diminishing, the future threat emanating from the Haqqani organization is
unclear and dependent on American counter terrorism operations in the region, which is outside
of the scope of this research.
Neither al Qaeda nor Gulbuddin Hekmatyar have a significant footprint in Afghanistan,
and neither is particularly threatening of ISAF/Afghan National Government interests at this
point. However, given the two groups’ historical involvement with the nation, their presence is
worth mentioning. Current estimates place the number of al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan to be
between 50-100 individuals, and most serve only in a support and logistics role. The Arab Spring
has proven to be a ‘mixed-bag’ for al Qaeda, providing serious problems and benefits for the
Arabic terrorist group, and has consequentially drawn the preponderance of the group’s
operational attention and future goals. Organizationally, it is a completely different group from
140 Katzman, Post-‐Taliban Governance…, pg 15 141 Ibid, pg 16; testimony from Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen 142 Courtesy of: http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/h/haqqani_network/index.html
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the one that attacked the US on September 11th, but retains much of its potential and intent for
anti-Western violence. Thus, its presence in the region (and in any region) is certainly worth
monitoring as it could very easily again use Afghanistan to threaten international interests. Allied
with the al Qaeda group that operates in Afghanistan is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami,
which is almost as insignificant on the battlespace. Hizb-e fighters infrequently conduct
operations against Western targets in Afghanistan, but more often clash with the Taliban for
control of territory. Amongst all insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, it is considered the
most amenable to a political power-sharing agreement with the Afghan National Government. 143
143 Katzman, Post-‐Taliban Governance…, pg 15
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Part III: The Future of Afghanistan: Flashlight for the People
After analyzing Afghanistan’s historical and contemporary contexts, the obvious next
question to evaluate concerns the future of the South Asian country. To elucidate different
possible outcomes for the country, this research will examine the theoretical interpretations of
Neorealism, the English School, Indigenous Theory, Islamic worldview, and the geopolitics of
the region. Each section contains a brief discussion of the theory and its relation to the research,
followed by the application of the theory to Afghanistan-given the former and current conditions
in the country-in order to paint a picture of the future. Additionally, it is important to reiterate
that each theory depends on the status of Western withdrawal and condition of Afghanistan in late
2014. While each theory will discuss specific conditions for its application, each theory assumes
(at a minimum) that some level of ISAF troops will remain in the country, the previously
discussed Bilateral Security Agreement will be ratified before 01 JAN 2014, and that no drastic
changes will occur on either “side” of the conflict in the following year.
Neo-realist Theory:
The United States is undoubtedly the most powerful actor in Afghanistan at this point. In
terms of military, economic, and infrastructural support systems, the United States has the
preponderance of capital and power amongst overt players in Afghanistan. 144 As such, its
dominant form of international relations philosophy, known as the Realist theory, is worth
considering and will play some role in any future Afghanistan. This theory can be understood to
trace its roots back to a previously mentioned philosopher; Thucydides’ classical account during
the fifth-century BCE of the Peloponnesian War between the Greek States takes a decidedly
realist view of the conflict. International relations, as a Western academic discipline, did not get
its official start until 1919 in Britain and the realist theory was one of the first that was understood 144 This statement is admittedly masochist and egotistical; however, analyzing Afghanistan from a Realist standpoint (as will be discussed further in the text), this assumption can only be proved correct
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and propagated as a means to avoid war. Since that time, realist theory has branched into several
different variations, including the classical and neo-realist. This paper examines only the neo-
realist theory, as it has become the dominant form of American-and indeed many other world
powers-international relations today. 145 Realism is broadly concerned with power accumulation
and balance in the international system, roles of the individuals in governance, and power
politics.
A positivist theory, neo-realism is itself divided into two perspectives on power:
offensive realism and defensive realism. 146 Again, in the interests of space and precision, this
paper will focus on defensive realism for two key reasons: the theories founding father, Kenneth
Waltz, is a defensive realist, and the balance of power between Afghanistan and the West is so
great that offensive realism can be considered to be redundant. “Defensive realists…maintain
that it is unwise for states to try to maximize their share of world power, because the system will
punish them if they attempt to gain too much power. The pursuit of hegemony…is especially
foolhardy.” 147 For an in-depth explanation of neo-realism and especially defensive realism, see
Waltz: Theory of International Politics.
Neo-realism has several tenets that set it apart from classical realism and describe the
international dynamic. Principally, neo-realists believe that great powers in the international
system act in an anarchic environment; there is no power greater than that of the state and thus no
regulation of the state. “Anarchy is an ordering principle; it simply means that there is no
centralized authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states.” 148 In this system, each actor is a
rational entity with the ultimate goal of state survival. “…Great powers are trapped in an iron
145 Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, “…the realist tradition reached it’s nadir in neorealism” pg 78 146 Positivist refers to any theory’s devotion to finding a “scientific method” for conducting social research and policy; according to classical theorist Morgenthau, realism is an empirical rather than normative paradigm (how power is utilized rather than of what it is constituted) 147 Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, pg 78; for a potential testament to the merits of defensive realism, a 2010 case study in International Relations Theories regarding the ability of China to rise peacefully (pgs 89-‐91) has much more closely followed the predictions of defensive as opposed to offensive realism 148 Ibid, pg 79
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cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to
survive…power is a means to an end and the ultimate end is survival.” 149 This anarchy, however,
is offset by a balance of power that is used by the international community to regulate each others
actions; if one nation over steps its bounds, the international community will be strong enough to
unite and, changing the balance of power, militarily defeat the offending nation as each nation
retains some offensive military capacity. Because of this “balancing” tendency of nations,
defensive realists believe that states will accumulate –in Waltz’s words-an appropriate amount of
power to “maintain their positions in the system.” 150 This fascination with power suppresses so-
called critical theories of power, including feminist and spiritual, these theories do not conform to
the dominant realist system (and in fact questions many of its underlying assumptions).
“Different accounts of power…are all seen as escapist, idealist and impractical since they do not
conform to the vision of the state planner…” 151 Generally, and importantly in the case of
Afghanistan, neo-realism takes a depressing view of international relations in which states
(especially those who consider themselves weak, at risk, or otherwise ill-favored by the
international system) will aggressively attempt to improve their power through improvements in
the security situation and military might.
The neo-realist scenario for the future of Afghanistan holds that some amount of Western
troops, between five and ten thousand and composed mostly of US but also other ISAF partners,
remain in Afghanistan. A very small amount of these troops, mostly SOF and Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC) elements, are utilized for direct action counter terrorism, while the
vast majority are conventional forces who act in a training capacity for the ANSF and local police
forces. The West still supplies billions of dollars annually in aid (until 2024), although much of it
is wasted on corruption or otherwise directly funneled to the Taliban. Infrastructure
149 Ibid, pg 78 150 Ibid, taken from Waltz Theory of International Politics, pg 82 151 Inayatollah, Distant Futures…, pg 54
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improvements are completely handled by the Afghan bureaucratic systems with extremely small
USAID and other development agency oversight. The diplomatic delegation support is
considerable and led by the Scandinavian countries with significant support from Great Britain
and the United States. Neither the US nor the Afghan government have a significant role in the
daily life of the mostly agricultural populace. The April 2014 election has gone as smoothly as
possible; Hamid Karzai is replaced by another Pashtun leader amid several relatively small
terrorist attacks directly preceding and on Election Day in many of the major cities, with little
actual voter turnout.
It is principally because of the neo-realist framework (especially that of the Pentagon and
other security apparatus’) that the US and other committed nations are aggressively pushing for
the maximum-possible amount of troops to stay in country. Given the professed frailty of the
ISAF gains made, corruption in the Afghan government, decreasing Western public support for
the war effort, and continued radical Islamic insurgency throughout the countryside, a neo-realist
view would likely hold that Afghanistan would be essentially unable to survive in the
international system, remaining economically and materially dependent on outside support.
Although the Western-engineered government will likely last for several years, the Taliban will
once again seize the momentum that it lost after the 2009 troop surge and, through both combat
and negotiations, will take back large portions of the rural countryside. The Afghan National
Army will remain in control for several years in most major cities, including Kabul but excluding
Kandahar. After several years of initial low-intensity and terrain/population-based warfare, an
uneasy peace will be achieved throughout the country. Eventually, external support for the
Taliban will dwindle after increasing American covert diplomatic, espionage, and SOF
interference with Pakistani and Saudi funding channels. When the Taliban begin to lose their
financial foundation, many of the non-Pashtun tribes (in conjunction with several more moderate
Pashtun families, potentially including the majority of the Durrani tribe) will rise against the
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Taliban, re-igniting guerrilla warfare. 152 They will likely be clandestinely assisted by many of the
regional actors, including (ironically) Pakistan and India, and potentially China, Russia, and Iran.
Once the rebelling tribes have gained enough power to seriously threaten the Taliban, the nominal
government of Afghanistan and the ANA will re-engage in combat with the Taliban, serving as
the fighters for the cumulative third stage of combat in the insurgency. 153 The Taliban will
eventually be defeated, but will not be defeated by a Western army so much as by the Afghans it
claims to represent.
This tribal momentum that results in the defeat of the Taliban will also consequentially
destroy the Afghan government in place today. Almost as soon as the Taliban have been
defeated, the government’s power will be superseded by tribal and familial organizations that will
initially serve as the insurgency’s organizational structure in the conflict with the Taliban.
Concurrently, the tribes will be connected with an increased sense of unification that will push the
tribes to form it’s own, semi indigenous form of government based around a strong leader,
independent tribes, and an agrarian economy. Afghanistan will eventually find its place in the
international system but will continue to possess only a minimum amount of power.
A significant element of the realist perspective on the future of Afghanistan depends on
the amount of both overt and covert foreign activity and influence in Afghanistan. As part one
clearly demonstrated, Afghanistan has a long and storied history of serving as a battle ground
between nations and outside powers; from conflicts between Persia and Macedonia, to Britain and
Russia, to Pakistan and India: Afghanistan has rarely been truly free of foreign interventions. The
realist perspective holds that this will not change: all of the surrounding states (and several world
powers) have a stake in the future of Afghanistan and will not passively allow an opportunity to 152 The Durrani tribe (also known as the Popalzai) is the family of President Hamid Karzai; they initially worked with the Taliban during the mid-‐1990’s before angering the Mullah Omar and fighting against them 153 Mao Tse-‐Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare: according to Mao, three phases of an insurgency exist: First, political work amongst the affected population to inspire future violence against the occupier; Second, guerrilla warfare with the objective of weakening the infrastructure and support for the occupier, and; Third, conventional war against the occupier
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advance those interests to pass. 154 Neo-realism holds that Pakistan and India will continue to
fight over Afghanistan for geographic control, Pakistan and Afghanistan will continue to contest
the Durand Line and territorial control over the Pashtun homeland, China will extract as many
natural resources from Afghanistan as possible, and Iran will continue to support groups it
believes will be most conducive to prominent Iranian positions. This international contention
over their homeland will have the effect of inspiring Afghans to identify increasingly closely to
their tribal and familial roots in order to protect their independent identity, resulting in inflamed
regionalism and decreased nationalism. However, the extremely high amount of competing
interests and possibilities for interference make it impossible to accurately guess the outcome of
the interference; beyond an assured promise of some level of interference, neo-realism cannot
predict who will gain the highest amount of power in the impending struggle.
English School Theory
Despite its name, the English School theory has never been very English. Considered an
alternative and re-imagining of the Realist and Liberalist discourses, the English School began to
be crafted through the writings of Hadley Bull in the mid-20th Century. It was intended as a new
conceptualization of international relations discourse in the West, one that would not be restricted
to the realist and idealist paradigms. It was revived in the 1990’s, and has recently come back
into significant utility in dominant international relations discourse: “This sense of resurgent
paradigm was prompted in part by the recognition that it represented a distinct position that was
inhospitable to the rationalist assumptions underpinning both neorealism and neoliberalism.” 155
Although the English School attempts to be recognized by philosophers of science, it cannot be
understood as a positivist theory.
154 Specific details of the geopolitics of the region will be discussed in depth later in the section 155 Dunne, The English School, pg 138
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This theory has several tenets, designed to challenge and surpass the dominant realist and
liberalist paradigms. Among them, the English School argues that “the appropriate frame for IR
was not ‘interstate relations’ or the interactions of any other ‘units,’” as claimed by several other
theories. 156 Rather, the focus should be on the entire global political system, comprising states,
NGO’s, corporations, institutions, and the general human community. This system is designed to
“illuminate complex changes in world order. Such an interpretive understanding of theory is at
odds with the positivist pursuit…” 157 Along this same vein, the English School attempts to
delineate different concepts and identifying the boundaries of each one, based on historical and
normative schema. The ‘global political system’ must be analyzed with a multi-dimensional,
historical understanding that stresses the human element as it is critical to the diplomacy and
extension of human rights. 158 According to Barry Buzan, “The English School stands for the
convicton that ideas, rather than simply material capabilities, shape the conduct of international
politics, and therefore deserve analysis and critique.” 159 Additionally, all work is considered
biased by the values of the author, which has an impact on the politics of the international
community. Because of this, values should be stated and explored with critical scrutiny in order
to come as close as possible to “a position of detachment.” 160
The central problem in world politics was, according to Bull, how to construct a form of international society that was both orderly and just. His answer to the Weberian question ‘What shall we do, and how shall we live?’ was not to enter the realm of ideal theory with fictional assumptions and make-believe states. Unlike moral philosophers, Bull believed that the IR theorist doing normative inquiry needed to stay close to state practice. What mattered were not normative ideas per se but the ideas that practitioners believed in and sought to implement. This involves elaborating the context within which actors take decisions as well as understanding that in politics values are often irreconcilable and that terrible choices have to be made. 161
156 Ibid, pg 139 157 Ibid, pg 139; “global political system” also comes from the text 158 According to Dunne, the human element (this authors words) goes beyond the historical facts, and must include the “how and why” in a historical context 159 Buzan, From International to World…, 2004 160 Dunne, The English School, pg 138 161 Ibid, pg 140; author quotes Rawls (2005) and Wight (1991)
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Concisely, the English School “continues to offer an alternative way of studying IR which is
rooted in the history of current and past states systems, and guided by moral questions about the
adequacy of the current inter-state order.” 162
Importantly, the theory claims that the key identifier of an international society is that it is
comprised of a confederation of states bound by a common set of rules in their relationships
(namely, mutual respect for sovereignty). The society also is influenced by certain non-state
international actors, such as international NGO’s, powerful religions, and the superstructure of
the UN, and by the motivations that comprise them. This system can be described as an “inter-
state theory” as it “refers to the shared interests and values ‘linking all parts of the human
community.’” 163
This idea of an international society has some connotations for the future of Afghanistan,
as well as general commentary on the American invasion that may influence the future.
Principally, as a third-world and economically un-viable nation, Afghanistan can be considered at
the fringe of the international society. Because it is not a close ally and cultural exchange before
9/11 was minimal, the actual intervention was considered globally justified. “Had the attack
emanated from France, solidarism within ‘western’ international society would have demanded a
different approach.” 164 Because Afghanistan remains an unstable, economically weak, and
mostly easily-dominated entity in the international system, the English School theory holds that
the future for Afghanistan will continue to be more of the same. The current insurgency will
remain, as the execution of the American Global War on Terror has served as a rally cry for
solidarity and anti-Western revolution throughout the Islamic Umma, and this will not cease in
the near future. Regionally, overt foreign aggression will be minimal, as the nations comprising
ISAF (many of the most powerful actors in the international society) will force regional non-
162 Ibid, pg 140 163 Ibid, pg 148 164 Totten, The English School of…, pg 14
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aggression. However, the geopolitical stakes shared by many of Afghanistan’s neighbors will
compel those nations to maintain and/or increase their levels of covert involvement in
Afghanistan. Because of the continuing insurgency and pervasive covert influence on
Afghanistan, the English School Theory can be broadly understood to follow the Neorealist
theory’s perceptions for the future of the South Asian country.
Indigenous Theory
Because of the previously mentioned international conflict occurring in Afghanistan, and
the turbulent failed attempts at modernization (including King Amanullah and the current US
occupation), a specifically Afghan theory of international relations does not exist. Afghan
scholars who have attempted to propagate such a science have either been silenced by whatever
government happened to be in power or were supported and protected-and thus extremely
influenced-by an external power (such as the PDPA’s relations with the Soviet Union and current
scholarly relations with the United States and/or Islamism). In either case, conditions that
fostered a nationally indigenous theory have never existed. Fortunately, other regional/cultural
theories do exist that can be successfully applied to Afghanistan for analysis: these include
Pashtun, Central Asian, and Islamist. 165 The indigenous theory shares many assumptions for
consideration with the neo-realist theory. The United States leaves a small garrison of trainers
and potentially counter terror forces that does not really interact with the population, and the
impact of the nominal Afghan government on its citizens is relatively small, especially outside of
the cities. The ANA cedes rural parts of the country to tribal or Taliban control and various
international actors attempt to pull the government and its people in differing directions.
165 This work is purposefully leaving out the Arabic theory, which has a rich and detailed discourse on international relations: during a 19 FEB 2013 lecture at Westminster College, Pakistani human rights advocate Dr. Fouzia Saeed’s first point of address was that South Asians-‐including Afghans-‐are NOT Arabic; this point was stressed repeatedly throughout the lecture and in other academic sources, clearly showing that Arabic IR is anything but indigenous to Afghanistan
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Before analyzing each discourse and its relations to Afghanistan, however, it is important
to note the slightly tenuous nature of the term “indigenous.” This section attempts to highlight
the most localized, culturally-driven and accepted conception of the future; however, due to the
omnipresence of sources that have been influenced by the West or other parties through the
globalization of Western/non-native education, and due to this author’s failure to personally
spend time in the region, these indigenous sources may be slightly influenced by outside powers
and not completely representative of the native populace. These sources and interpretations
represent the highest level of understanding and accessibility of the representations for an
indigenous theory available in the United States.
Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group and historically most powerful tribe, the Pashtun
people found along the Afghan-Pakistan border, have their own unique system for interacting
with outsiders. In the mid-eighteenth century Ahmad Shah Durrani unified the country under his
Pashtun rule; since that time Afghanistan has been under almost continuous Durrani-Pashtun
domination. 166 Each ruler has used a different form of international relations when interacting
with non-Afghans, and the unique theory has differed according to the timeframe and personal
disposition of the ruler. Because no single theory exists, this report utilizes the Pashtun economic
method as a means for understanding their relations with non-Pashtuns or other outsiders. This
general economic philosophy can be extended as a basic conception of Pashtun international
relations.
The Pashtun culture stresses independence, self-reliance, and constant competition with
other men. “A Pashtun man may engage in economic relations with non-Pashtun without losing
his honor, but also considers it acceptable to cheat non-Pashtuns…because of the competition
166 During the post-‐Soviet civil war, Tajik Rabbani led the government in name only; his command did not extend outside of the capital city or the northern fortress formed to fight Taliban rule, he represents the only non-‐Pashtun ruler since Durrani (including in contemporary Afghanistan)
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within Pashtun society, Pashtun men look to establish friendships with outsiders.” 167 Because of
the stress placed on constantly competing for the better deal, in any relationship, serious questions
rise regarding the ability of the indigenous Pashtun system to give-and-take in the international
system.
The Central Asian theory is significantly more broad and regional than the specific
Pashtun theory. It originates in India and is intended to address many of the Central and South
Asian nations, including: Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India itself.
Depressingly, and in a testament to realism, the West has already significantly interfered in the
region with the political effect of permeating the local system with an almost patronage system of
neorealism. In Afghanistan specifically, there is a “deep pessimism” regarding the future
following 2014. 168 However, “fortunately, there are alternative visions for South Asia outside of
conventional categories [through the use of] various South Asian futurists.” 169
These visions comprise a myriad of options; from the democratization of political and
economic power, to a radically Buddhist ecological ethic, to critical traditionalism, and to
enhanced cultural-community strength, many scholars have posited many conceptions for the best
route forward. Generally, these can be synthesized into a prominently indigenous theory that
stresses ecological awareness and community similar to the vision Gandhi espoused: “a global
community of villages marked by full participation and the welfare of all.” 170 This tradition has
been applied to the case of Pakistan, which can also lend itself (with some changes) to
Afghanistan’s future.
167 Tainter, Pashtun Social Structure…, pg 1 168 Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink…, pg 17 169 Inayatollah, Distant Futures…, pg 57; brackets added for clarity to context and replaced “…as we show by summarizing the perspectives of…” 170 Ibid, pg 58; quotes A.T. Ariyaratne 1990
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The following four possibilities, and their definitions, come entirely from Sohail
Inayatullah, “Distant Futures and Alternative Presents for South Asia.” Quotations will be cited
with the page number.
The first potential regional future, and current trajectory of Pakistan, can be termed a
Disciplined Capitalist Society. “…The military and a strong centrist civil service create the
conditions for the development of a national bourgeoisie,” which may be critical in stemming
radicalization and other anti-state behavior. 171 Secondly, Islamic Socialism could spread across
the region, particularly in states-like Afghanistan-with a majority Muslim population. In such a
conception, an Islamist government provides welfare for its constituents through rigid state
control of the economy. This approach is similar (but not identical) to Afghanistan’s “Iron
Amir,” Abdur Rahman Khan. The Amir had total control over the economy and state apparatus’,
but also maintained control over the social and political life of his subjects, which the Islamic
Socialist discourse does not envision. Additionally, it differentiates from the PDPA and Soviet
controlled Afghan government during the 1970’s and 1980’s; the Afghan governments at that
time effectively pursued a Leninist-style communist direction, in which religion was mitigated
with the goal of eventual eradication. Third, Inayatullah describes a return to an entirely Islamic
state. This possibility is especially true in Pakistan but additionally shares connotations with
Afghanistan as well. Many radical groups, including the Taliban, desire this outcome but to the
extreme, desiring an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as it was when the Prophet walked the earth.
The search for perfection and its unattainability is the central problem of Islamic political theory. Muslims believe that they did have a perfect state and society, and to recover just that becomes the present task. Instead of rethinking the impossible ideal, or developing structures to balance one-man power, advice is given on how to tolerate tyranny. The result has been an overdeveloped (too much power) State and an underdeveloped civil society (not enough active participation). Modernity has added to this duality by making the cynicism even worse. 172
171 Ibid, pg 58; author quotes himself from 1992 172 Ibid, pg 59
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Finally, the fourth vision for the future is considered an End to Sovereignty. Regional and
international actors, including Pakistan, India, America, Iran, China, and many other foreign
influences sufficiently destroy and replace Afghanistan’s military, economy, culture, and
government with whatever interest suits the aggressor nation. This has been witnessed
throughout the various international conflicts in Afghanistan’s history and, to some extent, can be
said to be actively occurring now. In this event, the people of Afghanistan will sacrifice basic
human rights for the preservation of their culture.
Both Inayatullah and preeminent Afghanistan/Pakistan reporter Ahmed Rashid have
identified separate indigenous paths out of these four scenarios. According to Inayatullah, these
paths revolve around three elements of change. For Afghanistan, the successful Indigenous
theory is one that does not force unity, decreases centralization of power, and re-imagines the
discourse of identity and social purpose. 173 Throughout antiquity, Afghanistan has been a tribal
nation, and the tribal identity (for every ethnicity) is still the most important descriptor of both
identity and loyalty. Rather than attempting to force a national identity onto the nation of tribes,
the focus of change should be at the tribal level; attempting to accept the differences on a human
level between the tribes in order to improve relations, greatly unifying the people of Afghanistan
under a non-national banner. Occurring with this decentralization of national power, the impetus
for change occurs at the discourse level. Currently in Afghanistan (and the region), the dominant
discourse regarding the self involves a non-wavering belief in religion, independence,
competition, and inherent superiority. 174 Changing the discourse from “the other is the enemy” to
“we can achieve a beneficial future” is the only way to secure a peaceful, harmonious future for
Afghanistan.
173 Ibid, pg 59 174 Tainter, Pashtun Social Structure…, pg 1
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Concurrently, other regionally indigenous scholars envision a slightly different
conception of the future. Specifically in Afghanistan and Pakistan (as opposed to the broader
South Asian region), the dependent economy and current discourse of the war serve as the
greatest threats to future peace. In 2011, the World Bank identified 97% of Afghanistan’s
economy as reliant on international military spending. 175 Following 2014, the vast majority of
that spending will be withdrawn, leaving a major discrepancy. This economic dependence not
only makes Afghanistan a non-player in the international system, it also will spell continued
violence as people and tribes fight over resources for survival. Seeming to echo the regional
paradigm, Afghanistan and Pakistan both specifically share substantial problems with the
indigenous discourse. The Afghan-Taliban, Afghan-US/ISAF, and Afghan-Afghan discourse are
all fraught with suspicion, lack of communal cooperation, and constant in-fighting. Although two
parties in an arrangement seek the same end state, cooperation and mutual benefit is non-existent.
This can clearly be seen in the 2013 BSA fiasco; Karzai suspended all talks of the future for US
forces after learning that the United States and other international actors were conducting talks
with the Taliban…behind the Afghan National Government’s back.
Peace will have to be built layer upon layer, district upon district, and group by group, in the Afghan way rather than through grand conferences. Despite the violence, the faster all sides, including the US military, can develop confidence-building measures and act on them, the faster the process will develop. Providing an office for the Taliban negotiators would be a major step. But ultimately, with Western forces leaving Afghanistan and the weak Kabul government clearly unable to carry out its responsibilities, only an end to the violence and a political deal with the Talban can ensure the survival of the Afghan state. The future of Afghanistan and the region depends on whether that will be possible or renewed civil war will follow the Western withdrawal. 176
175 Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink…, pg 92; author cites a 2011 Los Angeles Times article describing the World Bank Report 176 Ibid, pg 136
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Islamic
Outside of the region, the dominant form of international relations (when not adhering to
the West’s IR, as in Iraq’s case) can be understood as the Islamic theory. 177 Although
Afghanistan is an Islamic nation and has been since the time of the Prophet, it is not found in the
Middle East and has its own South Asian and tribal theory of interactions with outsiders as
demonstrated by the indigenous perspective. However, Afghanistan has been a battleground for
Islamic forces and government’s since its conversion: Buddhist empires in modern-day India
fought pitched battles against the Persian and Arabic forces to the east, and Persia threatened
Afghanistan for several hundred years following Durrani’s unification of the tribes. Today, a
radical form of Islamism-which this paper considers an alien ideology-is alive in Afghanistan
through the Taliban, and the Islamic population equates to an Islamic government. Therefore,
while identifying Islamist international theory as “indigenous” would be a mistake, any research
on the countries future would be remiss without acknowledging the effects of the Islamic world
view on the South Asian country. As such, this paper discusses the various forms of Islamism
and Islamic political thought before concluding with an analysis of the Islamization of
Knowledge occurring in the Islamic world today.
Islam has long had a complex history with the West. From the earliest confrontations
between the two cultures and religions during the crusades to the dismantlement of the Islamic
Ottoman Empire following the conclusion of World War One, the two philosophies have long
seen the other as contradictory to itself. In Islamic jurisprudential theory, this divide between the
cultures has resulted in the bifurcation of the world into two spheres: Dar al Islam (abode of
Islam) and the Dar al Harb (abode of war). Dar al Islam’s relations with Dar al Harb have
resulted in three conclusions that represent the Islamic worldview: classical, which cites the
177 The American creation of Iraq’s government and subsequent foreign policy during reconstruction of the country has resulted in an extremely Western-‐ized version of international relations
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traditions and ideals of Muhammad’s words, actions and interpretations; defensive reactionary,
which has evolved as a spin-off to its encounters with the West and has resulted in a modernist
movement and a deeply conservative, anti-Western Islamism; and the postmodern, Islamization
of knowledge reconciliation, which attempts to accept certain ‘universalist’ scientific and
philosophical insights of the Dar al Harb and apply an Islamic tradition to them. 178
The classical understanding is the origin of the conceptual bifurcation of the world into
the two Dar’s. This understanding informed the historical expansion of the Islamic world, during
the conquests from modern-day India to Spain, which led to the need for an international relations
conception. The ultimate goal and justification for the domination of new territory is the
spreading of the Sharia law, increasing the Muslim population. 179 Thus, Classical Islamic
international relations can be read to promote peace. War is justified in order to bring peace and
(the Islamic conception of) the true path to the righteous life: “an alternative reading would
therefore establish that peace is not only the origin, but also the most important objective of
interstate interactions, and war is an exception that states may resort to only in cases of self-
defense.” 180
Two different approaches to Islamic international relations comprise the defensive
reactionary theory, and both were created as a direct response to the total domination and
penetration of the Islamic World, when the Ottoman Empire fell after World War One. While
the victorious powers divided the conquered land, Islamic scholars, culturists, and government
officials identified with either the Modernist or the Islamist response to the contact between
cultures. The Modernist reaction saw the only path to survival of the Islamic world as a path that
approved of adoption of many central tenets of European political and scientific thought; “the
survival of the Muslim Umma in the face of European ascendance required, in their views, a
178 Tadjbakhsh, International Relations Theory…, pg 176 179 Ibid, pg 178; author cites Mirbagheri (2006) 180 Ibid, pg 178
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recognition of the compatibility of Islam and reason.” 181 These scholars maintained that the
Islamic tradition actually encouraged the pursuit of knowledge and reason as a means to a
productive life. The Modernist reaction is considered not successful; however, it may be seeing a
resurgence in certain groups (including various political parties in Egypt) who have maintained
Islamic governance and international relations while becoming increasingly modern and
competitive in the international system. Conversely, the second reaction is the complete opposite
of the Modernist view. Known as the Islamist reaction, the conservative reaction has largely
eclipsed Modernism and calls for the complete avoidance of all Western culture and denial of
scientific beliefs. Islamists believe that the only way to ensure the survival of the Islamic
tradition is by “purifying [the Islamic tradition] from the corruption of foreign influence,
‘Westoxification…’” 182 Rather than the Abode of Islam and the Abode of War, most Islamists
view the world as the Abode of the Oppressed and the Abode of the Oppressor; these terms are
taken from the Qu’ran and paint the Western world as the explicit oppressor. Believing that
capitulation to any form of Western thought or culture “erodes divine authority, expresses and
accelerates Western power, and inhibits the establishment of a legitimate Islamic social system,”
it is important to note that Islamism cannot and should not be identified as identical to the
Western idea of “radical Islam.” 183 Although it closely resembles the rationalization of violence
against the West, Islamism does not explicitly advocate armed struggle through jihad, so much as
complete distance from Western culture and total avoidance of Western influence.
Succinctly, a third response to the West can be identified as a “postmodern response to
the globalization of ideas,” or reconciliation. 184 Rather than a mostly complete subservience to
the West (Modernism) or mostly complete avoidance of the West, Islamization of knowledge
emphasizes “the end purpose of a ‘good life’ in terms of morality and ethics for the Islamic good, 181 Ibid, pg 180 182 Ibid, pg 181; “Westoxification” is a term coined by Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran-‐a devout Islamist, brackets added for clarity 183 Ibid, pg 181 184 Ibid, pg 182
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and for introducing faith in addition to rationality and materialism as the principles of
knowledge.” 185 Reconciliation involves the conceptualization and accommodation of the global
community “within the general Muslim outlook.” 186 A strong example of this theory is the case
of Turkey, which has maintained its Islamic government, foreign policy, and traditions, while
becoming increasingly stable, economically prosperous, and competitive in the international
system.
Because this Islamization of knowledge movement is young (it only came about in the
last quarter of the 20th Century), and accepts some level of reconciliation with the West, it is a
worthy model of comparison to the case of Afghanistan. Again, this theory is applicable under
the auspices that the Bilateral Security Agreement will be ratified, Western forces will be
stationed throughout the country as trainers for the Afghan National Army, a new Pashtun
president will be inaugurated in April, and the Taliban will remain the greatest threat facing the
government and non-radicalized people of Afghanistan.
Conceptualizing this Islamization of knowledge in the case of Afghanistan, the only way
to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan will be through negotiations, de-radicalization
campaigns, and potentially the surrender of some terrain and population centers to the Taliban.
Following the withdrawal of all American combat troops from Afghanistan, the Afghan National
Government will remain weak, corrupt, and incompetent. Diplomatic, economic, and other forms
of government aid will be accepted but improvements to the Afghan government will be slow.
Economically, the government of Afghanistan will seek to expand it’s agricultural base; already
the most prolific source of income for the nation, Western technologies that increase crop yield
and irrigation techniques will be rapidly brought into the country and justified as simple
enhancements of the Abrahamic-era art of agriculture. Afghanistan will never be an economic
185 Ibid, pg 182 186 Abusulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory…, pg 91
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powerhouse, as it will be focused on agriculture and a small, Chinese dominated mining industry,
although it may become increasingly less dependent. The Afghan National Government will
likely stand for several years, although it will continue to lose credibility. Eventually, a more
representative and devout body of leaders will take control of the presidency, the National
Assembly, or both. They will de-centralize the government (similar to recommendations of the
Indigenous and Central Asian Theories), thus removing the ethnic justifications for corruption. 187
Subscribing to Islam’s belief in the benefits of welfare and providing for the citizens in their tribe
and representative area (and of the greater Umma), these leaders will assist an international
delegation charged with investigating and prosecuting corruption in the government. Although
these measures will not be totally effective and few individuals will actually be charged, the non-
Afghan delegation will decrease many of the rampant problems, thus improving legitimacy and
strength against the Taliban. Afghanistan will be a markedly more conservative force in the
international community; although it will maintain closer ties to the Arab bloc (particularly Saudi
Arabia), it will not espouse violent anti-Western ideals.
Insurgent groups will likely retake the initiative relatively quickly and be granted control
of some terrain and Pashtun population centers through negotiations. Violence will likely
diminish, as Afghan National Government efforts will switch from kinetic warfare (clashes will
continue to occur and will be executed for control and security of the population) to de-
radicalization campaigns. Western arms shipments and other technologies will be accepted and
utilized extensively by the military and government. Although they will barely maintain the
Afghan National Security Forces, they will play an important role later in the conflict as the
National Government and armed forces become stronger (though de-centralized). The Taliban
will continue to claim legitimacy, but will lose many justifications for their presence following
187 For example, under Pashtun law, it is considered honorable to cheat non-‐Pashtuns; making ethnicities chiefly responsible for their specific tribe, the justifications for corruption will be significantly reduced
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the withdrawal of Western combat troops. 188 Fewer Afghans will join the Taliban; combined
with an increasingly legitimate government, these factors will seriously threaten radical Islamic
justifications and abilities, and the Taliban will be forced to become significantly less violent/less
radical in order to survive. The most optimistic interpretation of the theory may hold that
eventually, the Taliban will entirely lose legitimacy and will be forced to join the National
Government of Afghanistan, although they will always remain the most conservative members of
the delegation. Additionally, the Islamization of Knowledge theory would likely hold that fewer
nations will engage in covert or overt breaches of Afghan sovereignty out of respect for an
increasingly legitimate Islamic government.
Geopolitical
Afghanistan has always been of significant importance in international geopolitics, as the
numerous battles for control of the country should make abundantly clear. Afghanistan has
served as a buffer zone between the Persian Empire and the Greek city-states, a nexus for trade
through the Silk Road, and most recently as a contested line of demarcation separating the lands
of conquered Christendom from the Islamic middle-east. While mostly lacking in natural
resources, Afghanistan shares a border with one of the world’s preeminent oil-producing nations
and continues to hold strategic potential for the transportation of that oil; to the North East,
Afghanistan shares a small border with a rising world power, and has significant responsibility in
the export and import of terrorism assets targeting that world power. It directly shares a border
with several nuclear-armed states, including China, Pakistan, and (potentially) Iran, and is
geographically close to two more: India and Russia. As such, the motivations, capabilities, and
potential for involvement from each nation must be addressed. A critical component for the
longevity of the Afghan National Government is the non-interference of these international
actors. Sadly, no legal protections from foreign aggression (overt or covert) have been decided:
188 In essence, they will be turned into “rebels without a cause”
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“A critical international conference in…2011, which was supposed to receive pledges of
noninterference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs by neighboring states…failed to achieve its
objectives.” 189
Principally among the countries with influence on Afghanistan is Pakistan. An accurate
dissemination of the potential and actual involvement (and their “justification”) is close to
impossible to conclude given the inherent secrecy of such actions and poor relations between the
United States and Pakistan. Another South Asian nation, Pakistan is a nuclear armed nation, with
a strong Suuni Islamic tradition and extensive record of involvement in Afghanistan’s affairs, for
two main reasons; first, the Pakistani state-and especially the military and intelligence services-
sees India as an omnipresent threat that is intent on the destruction of its northern neighbor, and;
Second, Pakistan and Afghanistan have long shared a territorial dispute over the Durand Line.
Pakistan favors an Afghan political settlement, but only on Pakistani terms and with significant
oversight. Since its partition with India, the two countries have been in a constant state of war,
and both still post troops staring each other down across the shared border. Pakistan has planned
and executed terrorist attacks against the Indian state through the use of proxy terror groups
(including the 2008 Mumbai attacks) for generations, and both states often commit gross human
rights violations in their competition for control of Kashmir. Pakistan has long been intent on
having a non-Indian ally to its West, and elements within the government continue to pursue that
goal. 190 It continues to fund many elements of the insurgency (although it confusingly faces its
own Islamist insurgency as a “blowback” result of its support for those groups), and explicitly
allows top terrorist/insurgent leaders to use Pakistan as a safe operational point of origin for their
attacks across the border. Secondly, in a testament to the continuing effects of colonialism, the
Durand Line separating the two countries continues to be a major source of friction. The line was 189 Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink…, pg 188 190 The instability of the Pakistani state is difficult to overlook: while it has a semi-‐functional nominal government, it has lost most of its legitimacy to lead amongst the population, and often appears to work against itself; this is especially true of the ISI, which is responsible for domestic assassination and terror programs, and can almost be considered a non-‐government entity due to its lack of oversight and control
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seemingly arbitrarily drawn through the Pashtun homeland, splitting familial, tribal, and clan
identities across two nationalities. The line has never been considered legitimate by either
Afghanistan or the Pashtun tribes (a huge reason both Afghanistan and Pakistan have had such
difficulty unifying the Pashtun population in this area). Unless the two countries can agree to a
mutually-beneficial respect for the line’s sovereignty, “…for the foreseeable future the pendulum
of affairs between Pakistan and Afghanistan most likely will remain in the zone of mistrust,
swinging between indirect conflict and periods of fake friendship.” 191 Given the extremely poor
relationship Pakistan has with the United States and Afghanistan at this time, it is highly likely
that the support for radical Islamist parties in Afghanistan will continue following the end of the
ISAF combat mission (there is no reason for Pakistan to cease its support for the groups), and the
territorial disputes will continue to act as the ‘elephant in the room’ between the nations and cast
serious problems on future negotiations.
On the other side of Pakistan’s support for an Islamist government in Afghanistan is
India, which has its own desires for a stable, non-Islamist and anti-Pakistan state. India is also a
nuclear-armed rising world power with significantly more international clout and economic
abilities than Pakistan. However, India and Afghanistan share separate ethnicities, religions, and
histories: India is comparably pro-West and the Muslim population is a very small minority.
Throughout the ISAF occupation, India has supported Afghan National Government stability and
ISAF goals for two reasons, security and economic, and has used similar methods to improve
each. Although the Indian government and military is not as obsessed with the threat from
Pakistan as the reverse, the Pakistani use of militants against Indian targets could expand should a
deeply-conservative, Islamist government takes control of Afghanistan as Pakistan desires. To
prevent the future use of Afghanistan in attacks against India, the Indian government has funded
significant infrastructure improvements, including student and military scholarship programs,
191 Tarzi, Political Struggles Over…, pg 19
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agricultural improvements, and road/energy construction projects. However, it has stayed out of
all regional cooperation programs led by the United States, demanding that any cooperation
agreement must not include Pakistan (which is not a reality for negotiations). Thus, “India’s
interests in Afghanistan [are] hardly benign but intended to keep Pakistan under pressure.” 192
Because the Indian government sees any talks capitulating to the Taliban-thereby increasing
Pakistani control in the region-they are generally not supportive of a political settlement. Indian
efforts appear to be working, as public opinion surveys routinely show that Afghans have a
positive view of India. 193 Additionally, India has entered into several comprehensive trade and
economic partnerships with Afghanistan; many infrastructure projects have the dual effect of
promoting political security (by assisting with the security of the populace) and expanding
economic viability in the future.
Of all Afghanistan’s neighbors, it has the most complex relationship with Iran, second
only to Pakistan. A Shiite nation, Iran has publically professed its support for the Suuni Afghan
National Government, while actively funding the insurgency with lethal aid. Not surprisingly, its
principal strategic goal in the country is the denial of the American presence. Thus, although it
has shied away from using its asymmetric military arm Hezbollah in the Afghan conflict, it has
armed the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islmai, and other insurgent groups with lethal aid and training as a
form of proxy war against the Americans. This dichotomy of foreign policy intent can be seen in
Iran’s political hopes for the future: although it is willing to fund the insurgency in order to bleed
American foreign policy, it does not support Afghan talks with the Taliban as (like India), it
believes talks will yield too much Pakistani influence. 194 Iran is intent on securing a substantial
role in any future government, and has made significant steps in that direction. Afghanistan’s
western provinces, (along the border with Iran) are the most economically developed and have
192 Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink…, pg 132; brackets replaced “were” and added to maintain context 193 US DoD, Report on Progress Toward…, pg 177 194 According to Rashid, Iran sees Pakistan as complicit in the Western invasion of the region, and has helped foment the anti-‐Pakistan Pakistani Taliban; thus, it supports a Taliban insurgency but not a Taliban government
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the highest level of infrastructure, mainly thanks to Iranian support. It has already donated more
than $500 million dollars to the reconstruction effort, particularly in the West and to the mostly
Shiite Hazara ethnicity, in efforts to foster pro-Iranian sentiment amongst the population. Ideally,
Iran favors a stable Afghanistan that cannot be economically influenced by foreign powers.
Using Afghanistan as a “transport” nexus for its energy reserves could open up vast new markets
through the creation of a pipeline across Afghanistan and into the Soviet-bloc nations to the north
of Afghanistan, China, and eventually to India. Serious problems with this goal, however, exist.
As long as the United States has any element of leverage in Afghanistan (which will be many
years), the pipeline will be highly contested and challenged in order to prevent Iran escaping
Western sanctions. Additionally, Russia has historically favored a monopoly on control for
almost all energy distribution between Europe and Asia, and a non-regulated Iranian pipeline will
face concurrent challenges from Russia and the West. 195 Finally, India would be unlikely to
invest in a pipeline that crosses Pakistani territory as the ability to regulate flow through the
pipeline would obviously give too much leverage in the conflict between the nations.
Although only sharing a 76 kilometer (47.2 mile) land border, China has a significant
stake in the future of the South Asian nation for economic and security reasons. While the
possibility of using Afghanistan to transport energy resources could be a boon for both China and
Iran, the realistic possibility of that occurring in the near future are slim to none. However, China
has taken a lead in increasing the viability of the small mineral and natural resources that
Afghanistan possesses: almost all of the infrastructure improvements in this sector during the past
decade have been conducted by China. It is considering the creation of a rail system throughout
Afghanistan designed with the principle purpose of transporting those natural resources, and has
accorded Afghanistan observer status to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization while expanding
195 Ballesteros-‐Martin, Geopolitical Analysis…, pg 12
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Afghanistan’s role in regional economic summits. 196 However, Afghanistan’s instability and lack
of security has the capacity to spread to China. Minority extremist groups gaining experience in
the War in Afghanistan have occasionally shifted to targeting Chinese interests. On the Chinese
side of the border, the small Muslim population has the potential for radicalization, and has
already conducted some low-profile attacks against local elements of the Chinese state. China
believes these attacks will only be stopped with a more stable Afghan ally. Regionally, its
foreign policy objectives are divided between India and Pakistan. China is quickly increasing
major economic agreements with India, but has given Pakistan its nuclear capacity and greatly
improved the “armor” component of the Pakistani land forces. 197 Over the last decade, China
appears to be drifting away from its military-to-military connection with its unstable friend
Pakistan to a much more stable economic relationship with India. Thus, in future conflicts
between India and Pakistan over Afghanistan, China’s role and support is unclear.
196 US DoD, Report on Progress Toward…, pg 178 197 Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink…, pg 195
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Appendix A: Abbreviations:
ANA: Afghan National Army
ANP: Afghan National Police
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces, comprising the military and National Police
BSA: Bilateral Security Agreement
COIN: Counterinsurgency
DoD: American Department of Defense, bureaucratic institution responsible for all asymmetric and conventional military forces, though not necessarily all unconventional: reference JSOC
IR: International Relations
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force, command for allied operations in Afghanistan
ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency
JSOC: Joint Special Operations Command: black-operations/guerrilla warfare units of the US military and intelligence apparatus, including CIA drone and HUMINT strike teams, DEVGRU, and Delta Force, commanded by both the Pentagon and intelligence agencies
KGB: Committee for State Security; Soviet intelligence and black operations command
ODA: Operational Detachment Alpha
PDPA: Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Soviet-backed communist party that arose in the 1970’s
SF: United States Army Special Forces, also known as Green Berets
SOF: Special Operations Forces, including Army SF and the 75th Ranger Regiment, Navy SEALs, Marine Special Operations Command and Force Reconnaissance, Air Force Combat Controllers and Pararescuemen, and/or elements of JSOC
UBL: Usama bin Laden
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Appendix B: Definitions:
Battlespace: Unified military strategy and term designed to integrate and combine armed forces in a particular theater of operations. Includes the environment, restrictions and advantages to combat pressure and mission completion, enemy and friendly unit dispersion, infrastructure, weather, terrain, etc.
Center of Gravity: Source of power that provides moral or physical strength in a conflict; central source of strength
Dar al Islam: In Islamic legal theory, the realm of Islam or the Islamic world
Dar al Harb: In Islamic legal theory, the realm of war; realm of non-Islamic governments
Fatwa: religious decree meant as law; can only be truly issued by a respected Islamic scholar or cleric
Hizb-e Islami: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s mujahedin movement during the anti-Soviet resistance, subsequent civil war, and Taliban occupation. The movement is active to this day.
Jamiat-e-Islami: Rabbani and Massoud’s political apparatus in Pakistan during the Soviet War, Afghan Civil War, and the Taliban occupation.
Jihad: Struggle to attain Godliness; interpreted by the West as Holy War
Khalq: One of two factions of the PDPA; first party to come to power following the assassination of Mohammad Daoud that was overthrown by the Soviet invasion.
Loya Jirga: Grand Assembly; traditional Afghan method of national political association.
Madrassa: Religious schools; those found around the Durand Line are widely accused of being centers for fanaticism.
Parcham: One of two factions of the PDPA; first party to come to control following the Soviet invasion in late 1979.
Umma: In Islamic thought, a nation or community with a shared social history
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Appendix C: Principal Characters (in order of appearance):
Ahmad Shah Durrani: Pashtun officer, created the first unified Afghanistan in mid- 18th century
Dost Muhammad Khan: First Amir of Afghanistan, took control several generations after Durrani
Abdur Rahman Khan: “Iron Amir,” strong nationalist and Islamist, total unification under stiff repression
King Amanullah Khan: Modernist president during World War I; sent into exhile
King Zahir Shah: Teenage King of Afghanistan, had longest reign of Afghanistan’s history, eventually exiled
Mohammad Daod: First President of Afghanistan, Parcham leader, deposed by Khalq and KGB just preceding Soviet invasion
Hafizullah Amin: First Khalq President of Afghanistan, took power following the Soviet invasion
Najibullah: Communist President of Afghanistan, deposed and arrested by mujahedin in 1994 and killed by Taliban in 1996
Ahmad Shah Massoud: Tajik military commander of Northern Alliance, successfully resisted Communist and Taliban rule, killed 09 SEP 2001
Abdul Rashid Dostum: Uzbek general who fought with the Soviets before switching sides and allying with the Northern Alliance
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: ISI favored Pashtun mujahedin commander Hizb-e-Islami
Burhanuddin Rabbani: Political leader of the Northern Alliance and nominal President following the overthrow of Najibullah, leader of political alliance advocating talks with the Taliban before his assassination in 2011
Mullah Mohammad Omar: Former mujahedin; founder and commander of the Afghan Taliban
Usama bin Laden: International terrorist, commander of al Qaeda, responsible for using Afghanistan as training and operational headquarters for the 9/11 attacks
General Joseph F. Dunford (USMC): Commander, International Security Assistance Force
Ambassador Maurits R. Jochems (NDL): Senior Civilian Representative to ISAF
Hamid Karzai: Current President of Afghanistan, ethnic Durrani Pashtun
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Appendix D: Civilian Casualties by Cause
Appendix E: ANSF and ISAF Operations
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