The United Nations Security Council Dear Delegates, My name is Paolo Zacharia Ciavarella, and I am pleased to welcome you to the 2010 University of Victoria Model United Nations Conference. I have been selected as the director of this year’s United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and it will be my responsibility to ensure that our committee sessions are both organized and productive. It will be your responsibility to adopt the role of the most powerful principal organ in the United Nations, and to strategically address current threats to international peace and security. This year, VicMUN’s theme will be International Legal Doctrine. This theme is highly relevant to the UNSC, as the committee is charged with both the enforcement of international law and development of legal frameworks in which international stability can be properly maintained. Specifically, the topics we will discuss at VicMUN 2010 are as follows: Topic I: The Self-Determination of Kosovo Topic II: The Legal Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Within VicMUN, you will be required to understand both the issues at hand and the perspectives of your designated Member State, to the extent that you will be able to engage in diplomatic debate and discussion as well as to negotiate solutions compatible with your state’s foreign policy. Your committee will first begin by setting our agenda for the conference, wherein each of you will have the opportunity to prioritize our topics in alignment with your state’s interests and its perceived importance of each topic in international discourse. You will then proceed to discuss these topics in the form of both moderated and unmoderated structures of debate, followed by the drafting of your position and proposals for each topic in the form of resolutions, which, if passed, are considered to have become international law. In order for the conference to be both informative and effective, each delegate must be confident in their ability to discuss and explore each topic from the position of their state. As a result, delegates will be responsible for researching into both topics and writing a Position Paper that indicates your state’s foreign policy concerning each issue. These papers should be approximately two pages typed in Times New Roman font size 10-12, and should outline your state’s history in both topics, its position or stance on the issues, and its policy recommendations to resolve them. To help prepare you for this task, this background guide has been prepared to provide an introduction into the functions and format of the Security Council, as well as to introduce you to both topic areas and their relation to this committee. Each topic’s section will also

contain areas in which to begin your research, databases for information, and points of inquiry for you to contemplate when writing your position paper. If you have any questions about the topics, the committee, research, the conference, the United Nations, or Model United Nations in general, do not hesitate to contact me. Also, if you are puzzled by something during the conference, do not be afraid to ask questions. This may be the first MUN conference much of your committee attends, so if you do feel confused it is likely that there are at least two other delegates who feel the same. I am excited to meet each of you, and will attempt to make your experience at this conference both educational and enjoyable. Until the conference, Paolo Zacharia Ciavarella Security Council Director vicmun2010unsc@gmail.com

About the Security Council

In both principle and practice, the United Nations Security Council is arguably the most powerful inter-governmental organization in the world. Whether seen as the paramount authority in the international community or as a symbol of foreign imperialism, the Security Council is charged with the ultimate responsibility of international peace and security. This section is intended to provide you with a better understanding of your committee, as well as how to secure your state’s interests within this unique institution. Formation: The Security Council was initially conceived at the San Francisco Conference on 26 June 1945, and became formally integrated into international law through the United Nations Charter.1 Its function is to ensure peace and security both within the international community and within domestic issues of international concern.2 It is therefore provided with fairly broad authority due to the importance of its role. Structure: The Security Council is comprised of both primary committees that fulfil its general responsibility, and numerous subsidiary bodies designed to focus on specific matters of international peace and security. There are currently three standing, or permanent, committees: the Security Council Committee of Experts, the committee that undertakes deliberation and legislation on international issues within the jurisdiction of the Council; the Security Council Committee on Admission of New Members, and the Security Council Committee on Council meetings away from Headquarters.3 The first committee encompasses the substance of the Council, whereas the latter two carry out logistical work necessary for the former to function most efficiently.

1 Security Council Affairs Division, “UN Security Council: Background,” United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html (accessed August 20, 2010). 2 Ibid. 3 Security Council Affairs Division, “UN Security Council: Structure,” United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_structure.html (accessed August 20, 2010).

At any given time, the Council will also comprise several Ad Hoc Committees. These temporary organizations are assigned specific issues that the Council feels warrant a separate committee in which the issue can be discussed in greater detail. At present there are three Ad Hoc Committees in operation: the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Committee, trusted with the review and distribution of compensation to Kuwaiti citizens for damages resulting from the Iraqi invasion and occupation of their country in 1991; the Counter-Terrorism Committee, aimed at investigating, proposing, and regulating counter-terror policies, as well as their potential restriction by and ramifications for international law and human rights; and the 1540 Committee, named after corresponding Security Council Resolution 1540, which aspires to restrict access to biological, chemical, and nuclear weaponry from non-state actors.4 The Security Council administers a myriad of Sanction Committees, responsible for overseeing the application of sanctions and general punishments to states currently involved in severe violations of international law and human rights. At present, Sanction Committees have been assigned to the following states: Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo the Islamic Republic of Iran, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and the Sudan. Two Sanction Committees have also been established to restrict non-state actors: Al Qaida and the Taliban, and those suspected of the 2005 bombings in Lebanon that resulted in the death of the death of twenty-three people including the former Lebanese Prime Minister.5 The Council has also formed several Working Groups, which are responsible for actively promoting peace and security within certain contexts. Those Working Groups now in operation are: Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, Security Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, Security Council Working Group on International Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism, Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, and Security Council Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, responsible for efficiency in the research and legislation on international matters.6 Furthermore, the Security Council also supervises International Tribunals, assembled to investigate recent Crimes Against Humanity and punish those responsible. Two International Tribunals are in session: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 4 Ibid; United Nations Compensation Commission Secretariat, “The Governing Council,” United Nations Compensation Committee, http://www.uncc.ch/governin.htm (accessed August 20, 2010); Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, “About the Counter-Terrorism Committee: Our Mandate,” United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/aboutus.html (accessed August 20, 2010); Department of Public Information, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004),” 1540 Committee: Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), http://www.un.org/sc/1540/index.shtml (accessed August 20, 2010). 5 Security Council Affairs Division, “UN Security Council: Structure,” United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_structure.html (accessed August 20, 2010); Department of Public Information, “1939 Sanctions Committee,” Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005), http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1636/index.shtml (accessed August 20, 2010). 6 Security Council Affairs Division, “UN Security Council: Structure,” United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_structure.html (accessed August 20, 2010).

Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda.7 The Security Council consists of five permanent members: China, France, Russia, The United Kingdom, and the United States of America; and ten non-permanent members elected for two year terms.8 Each member is represented on every committee, and is admitted one vote on each. Procedural votes require the support of nine member-states, whereas Substantive votes require the support of nine member-states including unanimous consent by the five permanent members.9 This ‘veto power’ remains highly controversial to emerging powers, such as Brazil and India, who argue that the veto power be extended to them; Islamic nations, who question the legitimacy of the Council due to the lack of an Islamic permanent member; and other actors in the international community who advocate that permanent membership reflects the post-second-world-war power distribution instead of the current model.10 Responsibilities: The Security Council is responsible for international peace and security in general, however more specifically the Council is meant to: enforce international law, provide a peaceful means to resolve disputes, prevent occurrences of armed conflict, and punish member-states which refuse to comply with Council or UN directives.11 Powers: In order to achieve the above, the UN Charter has authorized the Security Council to: enforce international peace and security within the parameters set by the ideals and jurisdiction of the United Nations, investigate hostile matters potentially threatening to the international community, advise peace treaty and cease fire negotiations, regulate armaments, locate potential threats to international peace and security and take appropriate countermeasures, encourage peaceful methods to suppress conflict, engage in or authorize military action when necessary, endorse the admission of applicants to the United Nations, appropriate political and military authority in areas of international concern, such as Kosovo; recommend Secretary-General appointees to the General Assembly, and elect the Justices of the International Court of Justice.12

7 Ibid. 8 Security Council Affairs Division, “UN Security Council: Members,” United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (accessed August 20, 2010). 9 Ibid. 10 Richard Falk, “False universalism and the geopolitics of exclusion: the case of Islam,” Third World Quarterly 18, no.1 (1997): 15-19. 11 Security Council Affairs Division, “UN Security Council: Background,” United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html (accessed August 20, 2010). 12 Security Council Affairs Division, “UN Security Council: Functions and Powers,” United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_functions.html (accessed August 20, 2010).

Topic I: Self-Determination of Kosovo

I want to emphasize the fact that the independence of Kosovo should and will be recognized.

- Ibrahim Rugova History The region of Kosovo has a long and storied history. Serbian settlement of the region can be traced back to the 7th century, while Albanian roots in the region are disputed – either reaching back to the ancient Illyrians or emerging in the 11th Century. The modern history of Kosovo begins with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the Western Balkans led to the Battle of Kosovo in 1389,13 wherein a major faction of the Serbian military was defeated and the Ottomans were able to establish a hold on the region. When the Empire of the Greeks and Serbs disintegrated, growing religious ties with the Turks and the increasingly militarist nature of Serbian separatism led Albanians towards closer affiliation with the established authority, thus weakening relations with Serbians. Spanning from the 15th to the 19th centuries, Serbs began seeking to overthrow Ottoman rule and establish sovereignty over mediaeval Serbian territories.14 Methods of increased Serbian immigration as well as passive and active resistance eventually achieved a fairly autonomous status for Kosovo, though still under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire. In 1912, a Serbian force, aided by other independent Balkan nations, gained control of Kosovo during what is now referred to as the First Balkan War.15 While the Serbs of Kosovo celebrated unification with the Kingdom of Serbia, the war’s outcome created vast trepidation within the Albanian community, which had grown into the majority ethnicity under the security of Ottoman rule, with cultural and political claims of their own. It is important to note that the modern state of Albania was also created in the aftermath of the First Balkan War. Both as a result of territorial disputes and the Serbian perception that Albanians had betrayed them in favour of conquerors and flourished through the misfortune of Serbs,16 Albanians now found themselves subject to racial discrimination and treatment as unwanted war criminals inside what they considered to be their own home. However, these hostilities were soon displaced by broader concerns, as an even larger dispute between Serbia and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy became a catalyst for the First World War, the resolution of which saw Kosovo and Serbia joined into the larger republic of Yugoslavia.17 In 1974, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia granted the Albanian population near-autonomous recognition, despite its current status as a Serbian province.18 However, 13 “Kosovo: History, Bloody History,” BBC News (March 24, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo/110492.stm (accessed August 20, 2010). 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid; Central Intelligence Agency, “Kosovo: Introduction,” CIA – The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html (accessed August 20, 2010). 18 Ibid.

as Yugoslavia’s federal government became increasingly repressive and nonresponsive, more citizens began to associate their loyalties with regional nationalities as opposed to the state of Yugoslavia as a whole. Among Albanians, this nationalism increased support for a truly independent Kosovo, aided by growing sentiments that the federal government was too distant and repressive to effectively deal with the state’s current problems. However, these same factors were simultaneously increasing Serbian nationalism, leading to demands for Serbian independence and increased regional control over Serbian territory, leading to the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomous status in 1989.19 Albanian nationalists exploited this action to brandish the Serbian government as the repressive and ineffective Yugoslav government, while Serbian nationalists under the banner of Slobodan Milosevic exploited Serbian discontent to legitimate restrictive policies and to depict Kosovo separatism as a threat to Serbian culture.20 In the 1990s, the Albanian leader, Ibrahim Rugova, began a passive resistance campaign aimed at drawing international attention to the Albanian plight. However, with the collapse of the USSR and growing tensions in the Gulf, Rugova’s campaign proved ineffective and dissatisfied Albanians formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).21 While Albanian political leaders held referendums to legitimate independence, the KLA began to force the issue by actively attacking Serbia. In 1998, Serbia began a police action that transformed into an ethnic cleansing in which hundreds of thousands of Albanians were slaughtered or relocated.22 The event concluded with a NATO campaign that repelled the Serbian military after Milosevic’s refusal to withdraw. Succeeding the conflict, the UN Security Council created the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNIAMK) through Resolution 1244,23 hoping to assist the ultimately unsuccessful Kosovo-Serbia negotiations in the mid-2000s. Presuming that future negotiations would have a similar result, Kosovo declared its own independence in 2008,24 with the current Serbian government still adamantly opposed to a perceived threat to its cultural unity. Current Issue The Kosovo Albanian population is adamant the region rightfully belongs to their people, and that the international community acknowledge this claim. The Albanians attempt to illustrate rights to their independence through the fact that the gross majority of the region’s population supports this demand.25 As the will of the region, they can stipulate

19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 U.N. Security Council, 65th Session, [Summary Record], 6264th Meeting, 22 January 2010 (S/PV.6264), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N10/216/17/PDF/N1021617.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010); H.E. President Doctor Fatmir Sejdiu, “President Sejdui’s Annual Address to the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo,” speech, July 12, 2010.

that the territory already belongs to them, not Serbia, and thus it should not be returned to Serbian rule. There are several flaws in this argument however, as ethnic ownership does not necessitate self-determination. Moreover, Serbia attempts to counter this argument through the assertion of historical rights, claiming that, while Albanians control this region at current, Serbians can trace its own heritage back to the seventh century in the region.26 Kosovo Albanians also use the argument that they are the definition of a disenfranchised minority. Since the shift of regional control from the Ottomans to the Serbs, Kosovo Albanians have been subject to immense racial discrimination, culminating in the ethnic cleansing that provoked NATO involvement.27 As a result, Kosovo Albanians can easily argue that, as the Serbian government has not recognized its past human rights violations, there is nothing to suggest it can adequately protect or prevent violation of these rights in the future. Thus, Kosovo Albanians can argue that the only way human rights can be protected is to isolate them from a government that has already shown its disdain for their ethnicity, and that placing Kosovo back under Serbian control would itself be a human rights violation. Another argument for self-determination is that the Serbian state does not represent the interests of Kosovo Albanians. As the former province has a fundamentally different culture, religion, and ideology than other Serbian provinces, Kosovo can argue that it cannot attain a functioning form of democracy if overpowered by another nation.28 While this argument itself may not justify secession, the fact that disagreements between the two groups have had often-lethal conclusions since the 15th Century29 could indicate that a less radical solution is idealistic at best. Similarly, the republic argues that its independent government does accurately represent the will of the people and is much better suited to cater to the province’s interests.30 However, while this might be true of the 92% Albanian majority, the Kosovo Serb minority is adamantly opposed to self-

26 U.N. Security Council, 65th Session, [Summary Record], 6264th Meeting, 22 January 2010 (S/PV.6264), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N10/216/17/PDF/N1021617.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 27 Ibid.; U.N. Security Council, 64th Session, [Summary Record], 6202th Meeting, 15 October 2009 (S/PV.6202), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N10/216/17/PDF/N1021617.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 28 U.N. Security Council, 65th Session, [Summary Record], 6264th Meeting, 22 January 2010 (S/PV.6264), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N10/216/17/PDF/N1021617.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010); U.N. Security Council, 64th Session, [Summary Record], 6202th Meeting, 15 October 2009 (S/PV.6202), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N10/216/17/PDF/N1021617.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010); H.E. President Doctor Fatmir Sejdiu, “President Sejdui’s Annual Address to the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo,” speech, July 12, 2010; H.E. President Doctor Fatmir Sejdiu, “President Sejdiu’s Speech at the Ceremony Marking the 4th of July, the United States Independence Day,” speech, July 2, 2010. 29 “Kosovo: History, Bloody History,” BBC News (March 24, 1999); Central Intelligence Agency, “Kosovo: Introduction,” CIA – The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html (accessed August 20, 2010). 30 President Doctor Fatmir Sejdiu, “President Sejdui’s Annual Address to the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo,” speech, July 12, 2010; H.E. President Doctor Fatmir Sejdiu, “President Sejdiu’s Speech at the Ceremony Marking the 4th of July, the United States Independence Day,” speech, July 2, 2010.

determination and refuses to acknowledge the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, or the government.31 As such, it becomes difficult for a state to advocate minority rights when their own minority is claiming the existence of majority tyranny. Serbia is just as insistent in this matter, arguing that Kosovo is more a rouge province than a separate state. Although the government recognizes the UNIAMK,32 it still claims that Kosovo should rightfully return to Serbian control.33 The argument is both based on claims of sovereignty and Kosovo’s alleged disregard for international law.34 Serbia claims that, as a sovereign and legitimate state, its own right of self-determination and sovereignty should be respected.35 As a result, the state argues that any decision related to the internal composition of Serbia should not be dictated by the international community without the consent of the government or the majority of the population. Moreover, it claims that the violation of Serbian human rights,36 by depriving them of their cultural heritage, or forcing them to choose between their home and their country in the case of Kosovo Serbs, far outweighs the violations against Kosovo Albanians by refusing to grant them Serbian territory. However, this argument can be challenged by the fact that issues of self-determination are a matter of international law, not under sovereign jurisdiction. Moreover, as sovereignty entails a necessity to protect one’s citizens, it could be argued that Serbia lost its sovereign rights to Kosovo when it launched a military assault against the province. Also, when considering the extent of inter-ethnic violence and bilateral terrorist attacks during the 1990s, it could even be argued that Serbia’s sovereignty is better served with a separate Kosovo than a united one. Furthermore, it is skeptical that Serbian arguments are based solely in principle and not self-interest, as the arguments made by Kosovo can often mirror those made by Serbian nationalists before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, whereas connections can be found

31 Government of the Republic of Serbia, “Government Committed to Peaceful Solution for Kosovo-Metohija Issue,” Serbian Government, August 20, 2010, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=68226 (accessed August 20, 2010). 32 U.N. Security Council, 65th Session, [Summary Record], 6264th Meeting, 22 January 2010 (S/PV.6264), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N10/216/17/PDF/N1021617.pdf?OpenElement. 33 Government of the Republic of Serbia, “Limitation of freedom of movement in Kosovo-Metohija impermissible,” Serbian Government, August 19, 2010, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=68195 (accessed August 20, 2010). 34 Ibid. 35 U.N. Security Council, 65th Session, [Summary Record], 6264th Meeting, 22 January 2010 (S/PV.6264), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N10/216/17/PDF/N1021617.pdf?OpenElement; U.N. Security Council, 64th Session, [Summary Record], 6202nd Meeting, 15 October 2009 (S/PV.6202), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N10/216/17/PDF/N1021617.pdf?OpenElement. 36 Government of the Republic of Serbia, “Government Committed to Peaceful Solution for Kosovo-Metohija Issue,” Serbian Government, August 20, 2010, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=68226 (accessed August 20, 2010); Government of the Republic of Serbia, “Limitation of freedom of movement in Kosovo-Metohija impermissible,” Serbian Government, August 19, 2010, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=68195 (accessed August 20, 2010).

between current Serbian arguments and those made by the Yugoslav government in opposition to Serbian secession.37 Recently, the Serbian government has also invoked international law, claiming that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence violated the existing international legal framework.38 Serbia claims that, as the declaration was made without the consent of both parties, and as it marked an abandonment of the UN-initiated negotiations, it violated existing legal codes and should therefore be considered illegitimate.39 Serbia argues that any action must be made through the consent of the United Nations, and as the UN has thus far not approved complete autonomy for Kosovo, nor have a majority of member states recognized the Republic of Kosovo, such a declaration is an illegitimate attempt to circumvent the standard protocols for attaining legal self determination.40 To this end, Serbia has introduced a resolution to the General Assembly Sixth Committee calling for the International Court of Justice to review the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.41 The Role of the Security Council The Security Council has primarily been involved in maintaining stability within the region through the establishment of international authorities, as well as attempts to draft international law beneficial to the peaceful address of grievances. Security Council involvement in Kosovo can be traced back to Resolution 855 (1993), which took the form of an appeal to Serbia and Montenegro to “reconsider their refusal to allow the continuation of the activities of the [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)] in Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina.”42 Prior to this resolution, the CSCE were involved in mediating disputes between secessionist factions and the federal government, as well as enacting “preventative diplomacy” through which the Security Council hoped further violence could be negated and issues of self-determination could be decided through negotiation and not force of arms.43

37 Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1997), 82-94. 38 Government of the Republic of Serbia, “Serbia does not recognize unilateral proclamation of Kosovo independence,” Serbian Government, August 9, 2010, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=68059 (accessed August 20, 2010). 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 U.N. Security Council, 48th Session, “Resolution 855 (1993) on the refusal of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to allow the CSCE special missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina” (S/RES/855), 9 August 2010, (Online Record) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/441/84/IMG/N9344184.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 43 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “About the Commission: the Work of the Commission,” Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: U.S. Helsinki Commission, http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=AboutCommission.WorkOfCommission (accessed August 20, 2010).

The next major involvement of the Security Council occurred in the midst of the 1998 Serbian military action against Kosovo. The Security Council immediately issued Resolution 1160, condemning the actions of the Serbian government as both excessive and abhorrent, while demanding the immediate cessation of hostilities between both the Serbian military and the KLA.44 This resolution also established a special committee within the Security Council to monitor security in Kosovo and take measures towards both facilitating dialogue and progress in establishing at least a degree of self-determination in Kosovo.45 Succeeding 1160 was Resolution 1203, which served to address the ramifications of the 1998 incident. It condemned acts of violence committed by all factions, however also demanded the Serbian government comply in full with international investigations.46 The resolution also created a tribunal through which to assess the situation and determine what violations of international law and human rights occurred. In reference to Kosovo, it dictated that any future self-determination movements must comply with nonviolent protest if they are to engender the support of the international community.47 In 1999, the Security Council passed Resolution 1244, already discussed above, which established the UNIAMK.48 However, it also demilitarized the KLA and entrenched an international presence in every aspect of peace and security in Kosovo. This transfer to international authority would seem to indicate an effort to provide framework for future self-determination, while limiting antagonism with Serbia.49 Most recently, Resolution 1345 (2001) was passed in response to escalating hostilities, promoting increased peacekeeping by both the UN and neighboring member states, as well as creating an objective system through which any extremism is to be eradicated regardless of source.50 The perambulatory clauses seem to stress the principles outlined in the Kosovo Constitution, suggesting an attempt to project Kosovo as a secular and internationally comprised state, as opposed to the expansionist warmonger perceived by Serbia.51 The resolution also seems to represent an effort to place the self-determination of Kosovo as inevitable under international law, while providing an air of legitimacy in order to prevent militarist opposition from Serbia.

44 U.N. Security Council, 48th Session, “Resolution 1160 (1998) on the imposition of an arms embargo against Yugoslavia” (S/RES/1160), 31 March 1998, (Online Record) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/090/23/PDF/N9809023.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 45 Ibid. 46 U.N. Security Council, 48th Session, “Resolution 1203 (1998) on agreements for the verification of compliance with the provisions of resolution 1199 (1998) on the situation in Kosovo, Yugoslavia,” (S/RES/1203), 24 October 1998, (Online Record) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/321/21/PDF/N9832121.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 47 Ibid. 48 U.N. Security Council, 49th Session, “Resolution 1244 (1999) on the deployment on international civil and security presences in Kosovo,” (S/RES/1244), 10 June 1999, (Online Record) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 49 Ibid. 50 U.N. Security Council, 51st Session, “Resolution 1345 (2001) on the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” (S/RES/1345), 21 March 2001, (Online Record) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/298/89/PDF/N0129889.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 51 Ibid.

Points of Discussion While both Serbia and Kosovo claim to have exhausted diplomatic recourse, neither faction has shown a particular willingness to compromise or concede. As such, any resolutions must determine whether future negotiations have the potential to succeed, or if an explicit decision by the Security Council would better resolve this matter. Furthermore, Serbia has invoked its right of sovereignty over the issue, asserting that the fulfillment of Kosovo’s request is akin to violating Serbia’s autonomy. Thus, any decision reached by this Council must adequately address both protections of state sovereignty and the criteria for self-determination that already exist within international law. Moreover, this Council must also address whether the rights of states or nations are paramount, and the extent to which state authority can supersede minority rights without losing legitimacy. On this note, the self-determination of Kosovo is not occurring inside a vacuum. Although the Kosovo Declaration of Independence states that any decision by the United Nations shall not be used as a precedent, there is nothing to prevent other separatist movements from adapting these debates to their own situation. As such, this Council must be aware that any decision made in reference to Kosovo has the potential to become a precedent in future self-determination cases. Starting Points for Research

1. Has your state already recognized Kosovo as a sovereign entity? 2. Has your state entered into an alliance with either faction? Is there any ethnic,

historic or religious affiliation to either faction? 3. Is your state politically, socially, militarily, or economically affected by conflict

within the Balkans? Moreover, what decision does your state think will generate the most peace or least conflict?

4. Is your state a member of NATO? Has your state been directly or indirectly involved in the Kosovo-Serbia conflict?

5. Is your state a member of the EU? If so, does your state support either faction’s application for membership?

6. Does your state prioritize collective rights or individual rights? 7. Does your state typically support claims of sovereignty, or international

intervention? 8. Has your state been historically involved with self-determination movements?

Did your state evolve through a self-determination movement? 9. Does a self-determination or separatist movement currently exist within your

state? If so, what is your state’s policy concerning this movement? How will the resolutions passed here impact the claims of movements within your state?

Topic II: The Legal Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.

-Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Current Issue While the foundations for international law have existed since the first treaties, it was only at the 1945-6 Nuremburg Trials that the international community began holding individuals accountable for actions that are considered criminal regardless of regional laws or protections. Although courts already existed for settling disputes between states, a court for internationally trying individuals did not exist outside of specific tribunals until the Rome Statute of 17 July 1998.52 This created the International Criminal Court, designed to ensure the most heinous crimes against humanity do not go unpunished. While supporters claim the ICC is a herald of international unity and accountability, opponents brandish the court as an undue violation of sovereignty or a partisan instrument of European foreign policy. Currently one hundred thirteen member states have become signatories of the Rome Statute, thus recognizing the authority of the ICC,53 while others have ratified the statute but not agreed to its jurisdiction. Arguments for the ICC are primarily that it is both a political and moral necessity. Member states defend the court as a logical and inevitable mechanism of international law. States assert that adherence to international law cannot be ensured without the guarantee of repercussions.54 As a result, while other organizations are charged with ending a crime against humanity, the ICC is presented as the only organization able to prevent said crimes from continuing. Furthermore, beyond crimes against humanity, if the United Nations is able to try international crimes, it may also gain more legitimacy in the eyes of both member states and populations.55 This may generate more trust in the capacity of the United Nations, as well as encourage greater adherence within other policy areas. On this vein, the court could allow for more specific and assertive policies, not having to rely on the voluntary acceptance of its members. Furthermore, the court is argued to be the only forum truly capable of trying these

52 International Criminal Court, “About the Court,” ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (accessed August 20, 2010). 53 International Criminal Court, “ICC At a Glance,” ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (accessed August 20, 2010). 54 U.N. General Assembly Plenary Committee, 64th Session, [Summary Record], 29th Plenary Meeting, 29 October 2009 (A/64/PV.29), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/583/45/PDF/N0958345.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 55 Ibid; U.N. General Assembly Plenary Committee, 63rd Session, [Summary Record], 35th Plenary Committee, 31 October 2008 (A/63/PV.35), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/583/47/PDF/N0858347.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010).

crimes.56 As the individual charged is usually a government official, the alternatives are to justify a tribunal each time a crime is committed, or even allow the state in question to try its own representative. Opponents of the ICC typically invoke concepts of personal interest to member states, imperialism and sovereignty. Firstly, some opponents claim that the ICC is more interested in promoting partisan ideology then protecting citizens in the international community.57 These states often argue that the ICC is used as an extension of Western powers, claiming that the body responsible for creating international law, the United Nations, is largely controlled by ‘western’ states through dominance in the Permanent Five.58 Furthermore, these states cite that the majority of ICC is situated in Africa,59 using this to bolster the argument that this court has become a form of neocolonialism used to control the ideology and power of the ‘Third World.’60 Thus, these states argue that the charges brought against their citizens are illegitimate due to regional biases inside a paternalist system. As such, criticism falls not just on the ICC, but also on the concept of international law itself. Member states that oppose the ICC also raise concerns regarding the ICC’s ramifications for sovereignty.61 These arguments conform to the theory that, as politics and societies becomes increasingly internationalist, states become less able to maintain internal authority. As such, if adherence to the ICC is universally enforced, states will begin to lose the ability to develop their own policies.62 These states add that not all cases brought to the ICC will concern genocide, as many will involve issues of subjective moralities.63 These states argue that, if a state has not condoned an international law, that law is not truly universal, and that coercing adherence to these laws sacrifices the principle in which said laws were created. The Role of the Security Council Despite previously mentioned allegations that the Security Council has become the partisan puppet of the International Criminal Court, the Council has produced relatively

56 Ibid; U.N. General Assembly Plenary Committee, 64th Session, [Summary Record], 29th Plenary Meeting, 29 October 2009 (A/64/PV.29), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/583/45/PDF/N0958345.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 57 Ibid; U.N. General Assembly Plenary Committee, 63rd Session, [Summary Record], 35th Plenary Committee, 31 October 2008 (A/63/PV.35), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/583/47/PDF/N0858347.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 58 Ibid; U.N. General Assembly Plenary Committee, 64th Session, [Summary Record], 29th Plenary Meeting, 29 October 2009 (A/64/PV.29), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/583/45/PDF/N0958345.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 U.N. General Assembly Plenary Committee, 63rd Session, [Summary Record], 35th Plenary Committee, 31 October 2008 (A/63/PV.35), Official Record (Online Record), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/583/47/PDF/N0858347.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid.

few resolutions directly related to the ICC. As the enforcer of international peace and security, the Security Council has primarily focused its attention on the legitimacy and authority of the ICC in the international community, outlining the boundary between sovereign rights and international law. Aside from resolutions directly pertaining to the ICC, the Security Council has also established precedents for international hearings and accountability through its creation of the ICTY and the Council’s own investigations into human rights violations of displaced Palestinians.64 In 2002, Security Council Resolution 1422 was passed; stipulating that adherence to the ICC was to be enforced solely on a voluntary basis.65 While recognizing the benefit to the international community provided by the ICC, the Council also acknowledged the importance sovereignty holds for both individual and collective peace and security.66 The Council also acknowledged that, in order for international law to become legitimate, said laws must also respect the freedom of member-states to willingly oblige or refuse according to their own principles, as opposed to coercing obedience.67 The resolution also dictated that any ICC cases involving non-signatories would be immediately delayed for twelve months, unless given express permission by the Security Council to proceed.68 It is possible this clause was included to either bide time until broader support for the Rome Stature materialized, or to forestall international incidents until a proper framework of jurisdiction could be incorporated into international law. 1422 also includes a supplementary clause, which allows this period to be extended if the Security Council deemed it necessary. This clause was enacted the following year through Resolution 1487, which reiterated both the perambulatory and operative clauses of 1422, while extending the moratorium on non-signatory cases another twelve months.69 These two resolutions seem to indicate the prioritization of state sovereignty, giving credence to a realist interpretation of international politics, favoring individual security and self-sufficiency over a more liberal conception of international accountability and universal code. Moreover, the fact that members of the Permanent Five have not yet signed the Roman Statute is also likely to have been a factor in the decision of the council. Interestingly, the 2005 Security Council Resolution 1593 seemed to indicate a shift in priorities. This resolution was drafted in reference to the crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan, a mass killing in which the federal Sudanese government has been implicated as a sponsor and supplier of Northern militias waging against the region’s separatist

64 Security Council Affairs Division, “UN Security Council: Structure,” United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_structure.html (accessed August 20, 2010). 65 U.N. Security Council, 52nd Session, “Resolution 1422 (2002) on suspension 12 months of investigation or prosecution cases involving personnel from states not Parties to the Rome Statute the International Criminal Court,” (S/RES/1422), 12 July 2002, (Online Record) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/477/61/PDF/N0247761.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 U.N. Security Council, 53rd Session, “Resolution 1487 (2003) on extension for 12 months of suspension of investigation or prosecution cases involving personnel from States not parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” (S/RES/1487), 12 July 2003, (Online Record) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/394/51/PDF/N0339451.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010).

movement.70 1593 provides the ICC with the authorization necessary to begin investigations and prosecution of the case under international law, precipitating a warrant for the arrest of the Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir.71 The resolutions stipulates the full cooperation of both the Sudanese government and all relevant factions within the Darfur region, while also requesting that the African Union administrate regional ICC operations and assume control over logistical issues related to the case.72 ICC supporters could regard this resolution favorably. It indicates that although practical support for the ICC is not unanimous, member states still recognize the necessity of its role within such crises. This then increases the Court’s legitimacy, and could eventually aid in evolving a member state’s agreement in principle to an agreement in practice. However, 1593 has also become a source of arguments against the ICC. Opponents claim that as the ICC was authorized in part by non-signatories, this indicates a partisan bias in the court’s structure and application with the organization less concerned with international justice and more concerned with the propagation of individual foreign policies. Points of Discussion While the Council can provide special authorization to the ICC, without a more stable platform, the Court has found it near impossible to try cases within non-signatory member states, due to a lack of resources and cooperation by said government. As such, while any expansion of the ICC’s jurisdiction would need to justify superseding state sovereignty, to do otherwise one would have to justify allowing gross violations of international law to occur. Moreover, the Rome Statute states that the ICC will not investigate cases already in national courts. While this principle protects state’s prerogatives over internal affairs, there is a danger that cases will be heard by the administration involved in said violations. Thus, the Council will have to ask itself whether violations of international law can even be credibly examined by regional governments, as well as clarifying when a violation of nationally-protected human rights become a violation of internationally-protected human rights. Although one hundred eleven member states have signed the Rome Statute, several powerful states, such as the United States of America, have refused to become signatories. As such, supporters of the ICC must first convince P5 members to support the Court before its jurisdiction can be outlined. On this vein, as several current Security Council members are not yet signatories, the legitimacy of broadening or restricting ICC jurisdiction falls into scrutiny. 70 U.N. Security Council, 55th Session, “1593 (2005) referring the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,” (S/RES/1593), 31 March 2005, (Online Record) http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/292/73/PDF/N0529273.pdf?OpenElement (accessed August 20, 2010). 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid.

A court with the capacity to try international criminals would arguably benefit peace and security, however the debate surrounding the ICC largely concentrates on whether the ICC can adequately fit this role. Due to this, the Council will be required to address concerns that the codes this Court upholds are not truly international law but the foreign policy of major powers. Furthermore, aside from extreme cases of Crimes Against Humanity, the Council must also defend whether or not it can force sovereign states to comply with laws these government have not supported, or whether it can charge citizens with crimes their own state does not consider to be illegal. One of the United Nations most fundamental problems with attaining adherence is the essentially voluntary or unenforced nature of many policies and laws it generates. Therefore, as the committee charged with the conservation of peace and security, the Council must ask itself if it can expect these principles to be upheld if it lacks the means to try those responsible for endangering international security or violating human rights. More than that, the Council must also determine if international law can even truly exist without a Court to enforce it. Starting Points for Research

1. Is your state a signatory to the Rome Statue? Has your state agreed in principle with the Statute but not in practice with the ICC? Is your state opposed to both or either of the Statue or the ICC?

2. What is your state’s conventional policy concerning the adherence to international law? Does your state consider these laws to be universal, regional, voluntary, or illegitimate? Does this policy change when your state is accused of violating these laws?

3. To what degree does your state condone international intervention into other states? Do the arguments of your state seem to reflect a preference for sovereignty or internationalism?

4. Is there an individual or group in your state who is currently being investigated by the ICC? If so, how cooperative has your state been with this investigation? Has your state petitioned the ICC to accept a case?

5. What is your state’s policy concerning other international courts or tribunals? On what grounds does your state support or oppose these organizations? Does your state have a universal policy towards these organizations, or does it scrutinize each organization individually? If your state supports other courts or tribunals but opposes the ICC, what aspects of this court negatively differ from other courts?

6. Has your state a vested interest in creating a more strictly enforced international legal code, or would your state find it more advantageous to maintain a looser code?

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