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The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization Muli Ben-Yehuda Michael D. Day Zvi Dubitzky Michael Factor Nadav Har’El Abel Gordon Anthony Liguori Orit Wasserman Ben-Ami Yassour IBM Research – Haifa IBM Linux Technology Center Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 1 / 30

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Page 1: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

The Turtles Project:Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization

Muli Ben-Yehuda† Michael D. Day‡ Zvi Dubitzky† Michael Factor†

Nadav Har’El† Abel Gordon† Anthony Liguori‡ Orit Wasserman†

Ben-Ami Yassour†

†IBM Research – Haifa

‡IBM Linux Technology Center

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 1 / 30

Page 2: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

What is nested x86 virtualization?

Running multiple unmodifiedhypervisorsWith their associatedunmodified VM’sSimultaneouslyOn the x86 architectureWhich does not supportnesting in hardware. . .. . . but does support a singlelevel of virtualization Hardware

Hypervisor

GuestHypervisor

GuestOS

GuestOSGuestOS

GuestOS

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 2 / 30

Page 3: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Why?

Operating systems are already hypervisors (Windows 7 with XPmode, Linux/KVM)To be able to run other hypervisors in cloudsSecurity (e.g., hypervisor-level rootkits)Co-design of x86 hardware and system softwareTesting, demonstrating, debugging, live migration of hypervisors

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 3 / 30

Page 4: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Why?

Operating systems are already hypervisors (Windows 7 with XPmode, Linux/KVM)To be able to run other hypervisors in cloudsSecurity (e.g., hypervisor-level rootkits)Co-design of x86 hardware and system softwareTesting, demonstrating, debugging, live migration of hypervisors

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 3 / 30

Page 5: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Why?

Operating systems are already hypervisors (Windows 7 with XPmode, Linux/KVM)To be able to run other hypervisors in cloudsSecurity (e.g., hypervisor-level rootkits)Co-design of x86 hardware and system softwareTesting, demonstrating, debugging, live migration of hypervisors

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 3 / 30

Page 6: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Why?

Operating systems are already hypervisors (Windows 7 with XPmode, Linux/KVM)To be able to run other hypervisors in cloudsSecurity (e.g., hypervisor-level rootkits)Co-design of x86 hardware and system softwareTesting, demonstrating, debugging, live migration of hypervisors

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 3 / 30

Page 7: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Why?

Operating systems are already hypervisors (Windows 7 with XPmode, Linux/KVM)To be able to run other hypervisors in cloudsSecurity (e.g., hypervisor-level rootkits)Co-design of x86 hardware and system softwareTesting, demonstrating, debugging, live migration of hypervisors

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 3 / 30

Page 8: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Related work

First models for nested virtualization [PopekGoldberg74,BelpaireHsu75, LauerWyeth73]First implementation in the IBM z/VM; relies on architecturalsupport for nested virtualization (sie)Microkernels meet recursive VMs [FordHibler96]: assumes wecan modify software at all levelsx86 software based approaches (slow!) [Berghmans10]KVM [KivityKamay07] with AMD SVM [RoedelGraf09]Early Xen prototype [He09]Blue Pill rootkit hiding from other hypervisors [Rutkowska06]

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 4 / 30

Page 9: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Related work

First models for nested virtualization [PopekGoldberg74,BelpaireHsu75, LauerWyeth73]First implementation in the IBM z/VM; relies on architecturalsupport for nested virtualization (sie)Microkernels meet recursive VMs [FordHibler96]: assumes wecan modify software at all levelsx86 software based approaches (slow!) [Berghmans10]KVM [KivityKamay07] with AMD SVM [RoedelGraf09]Early Xen prototype [He09]Blue Pill rootkit hiding from other hypervisors [Rutkowska06]

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 4 / 30

Page 10: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Related work

First models for nested virtualization [PopekGoldberg74,BelpaireHsu75, LauerWyeth73]First implementation in the IBM z/VM; relies on architecturalsupport for nested virtualization (sie)Microkernels meet recursive VMs [FordHibler96]: assumes wecan modify software at all levelsx86 software based approaches (slow!) [Berghmans10]KVM [KivityKamay07] with AMD SVM [RoedelGraf09]Early Xen prototype [He09]Blue Pill rootkit hiding from other hypervisors [Rutkowska06]

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 4 / 30

Page 11: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Related work

First models for nested virtualization [PopekGoldberg74,BelpaireHsu75, LauerWyeth73]First implementation in the IBM z/VM; relies on architecturalsupport for nested virtualization (sie)Microkernels meet recursive VMs [FordHibler96]: assumes wecan modify software at all levelsx86 software based approaches (slow!) [Berghmans10]KVM [KivityKamay07] with AMD SVM [RoedelGraf09]Early Xen prototype [He09]Blue Pill rootkit hiding from other hypervisors [Rutkowska06]

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 4 / 30

Page 12: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Related work

First models for nested virtualization [PopekGoldberg74,BelpaireHsu75, LauerWyeth73]First implementation in the IBM z/VM; relies on architecturalsupport for nested virtualization (sie)Microkernels meet recursive VMs [FordHibler96]: assumes wecan modify software at all levelsx86 software based approaches (slow!) [Berghmans10]KVM [KivityKamay07] with AMD SVM [RoedelGraf09]Early Xen prototype [He09]Blue Pill rootkit hiding from other hypervisors [Rutkowska06]

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 4 / 30

Page 13: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Related work

First models for nested virtualization [PopekGoldberg74,BelpaireHsu75, LauerWyeth73]First implementation in the IBM z/VM; relies on architecturalsupport for nested virtualization (sie)Microkernels meet recursive VMs [FordHibler96]: assumes wecan modify software at all levelsx86 software based approaches (slow!) [Berghmans10]KVM [KivityKamay07] with AMD SVM [RoedelGraf09]Early Xen prototype [He09]Blue Pill rootkit hiding from other hypervisors [Rutkowska06]

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 4 / 30

Page 14: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Related work

First models for nested virtualization [PopekGoldberg74,BelpaireHsu75, LauerWyeth73]First implementation in the IBM z/VM; relies on architecturalsupport for nested virtualization (sie)Microkernels meet recursive VMs [FordHibler96]: assumes wecan modify software at all levelsx86 software based approaches (slow!) [Berghmans10]KVM [KivityKamay07] with AMD SVM [RoedelGraf09]Early Xen prototype [He09]Blue Pill rootkit hiding from other hypervisors [Rutkowska06]

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 4 / 30

Page 15: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

What is the Turtles project?

Efficient nested virtualization for Intel x86 based on KVMRuns multiple guest hypervisors and VMs: KVM, VMware, Linux,Windows, . . .Code publicly available

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 5 / 30

Page 16: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

What is the Turtles project? (cont’)

Nested VMX virtualization for nested CPU virtualizationMulti-dimensional paging for nested MMU virtualizationMulti-level device assignment for nested I/O virtualizationMicro-optimizations to make it go fast

+ + =

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 6 / 30

Page 17: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

What is the Turtles project? (cont’)

Nested VMX virtualization for nested CPU virtualizationMulti-dimensional paging for nested MMU virtualizationMulti-level device assignment for nested I/O virtualizationMicro-optimizations to make it go fast

+ + =

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 6 / 30

Page 18: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

What is the Turtles project? (cont’)

Nested VMX virtualization for nested CPU virtualizationMulti-dimensional paging for nested MMU virtualizationMulti-level device assignment for nested I/O virtualizationMicro-optimizations to make it go fast

+ + =

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 6 / 30

Page 19: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

What is the Turtles project? (cont’)

Nested VMX virtualization for nested CPU virtualizationMulti-dimensional paging for nested MMU virtualizationMulti-level device assignment for nested I/O virtualizationMicro-optimizations to make it go fast

+ + =

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 6 / 30

Page 20: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Theory of nested CPU virtualization

Trap and emulate[PopekGoldberg74]⇒ it’s all about the trapsSingle-level (x86) vs. multi-level (e.g., z/VM)Single level ⇒ one hypervisor, many guestsTurtles approach: L0 multiplexes the hardware between L1 and L2,running both as guests of L0—without either being aware of it(Scheme generalized for n levels; Our focus is n=2)

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

Guest

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

Multiplexed on a single level Multiple logical levels

L0

L1

L2

L1

GuestL2

GuestL2

L0

GuestL2L2

Guest Hypervisor

GuestHypervisor GuestGuest

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 7 / 30

Page 21: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Theory of nested CPU virtualization

Trap and emulate[PopekGoldberg74]⇒ it’s all about the trapsSingle-level (x86) vs. multi-level (e.g., z/VM)Single level ⇒ one hypervisor, many guestsTurtles approach: L0 multiplexes the hardware between L1 and L2,running both as guests of L0—without either being aware of it(Scheme generalized for n levels; Our focus is n=2)

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

Guest

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

Multiplexed on a single level Multiple logical levels

L0

L1

L2

L1

GuestL2

GuestL2

L0

GuestL2L2

Guest Hypervisor

GuestHypervisor GuestGuest

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 7 / 30

Page 22: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Theory of nested CPU virtualization

Trap and emulate[PopekGoldberg74]⇒ it’s all about the trapsSingle-level (x86) vs. multi-level (e.g., z/VM)Single level ⇒ one hypervisor, many guestsTurtles approach: L0 multiplexes the hardware between L1 and L2,running both as guests of L0—without either being aware of it(Scheme generalized for n levels; Our focus is n=2)

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

Guest

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

Multiplexed on a single level Multiple logical levels

L0

L1

L2

L1

GuestL2

GuestL2

L0

GuestL2L2

Guest Hypervisor

GuestHypervisor GuestGuest

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 7 / 30

Page 23: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Theory of nested CPU virtualization

Trap and emulate[PopekGoldberg74]⇒ it’s all about the trapsSingle-level (x86) vs. multi-level (e.g., z/VM)Single level ⇒ one hypervisor, many guestsTurtles approach: L0 multiplexes the hardware between L1 and L2,running both as guests of L0—without either being aware of it(Scheme generalized for n levels; Our focus is n=2)

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

Guest

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

Multiplexed on a single level Multiple logical levels

L0

L1

L2

L1

GuestL2

GuestL2

L0

GuestL2L2

Guest Hypervisor

GuestHypervisor GuestGuest

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 7 / 30

Page 24: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Theory of nested CPU virtualization

Trap and emulate[PopekGoldberg74]⇒ it’s all about the trapsSingle-level (x86) vs. multi-level (e.g., z/VM)Single level ⇒ one hypervisor, many guestsTurtles approach: L0 multiplexes the hardware between L1 and L2,running both as guests of L0—without either being aware of it(Scheme generalized for n levels; Our focus is n=2)

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

Guest

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

Multiplexed on a single level Multiple logical levels

L0

L1

L2

L1

GuestL2

GuestL2

L0

GuestL2L2

Guest Hypervisor

GuestHypervisor GuestGuest

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 7 / 30

Page 25: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Nested VMX virtualization: flow

L0 runs L1 with VMCS0→1

L1 prepares VMCS1→2 andexecutes vmlaunchvmlaunch traps to L0

L0 merges VMCS’s:VMCS0→1 merged withVMCS1→2 is VMCS0→2

L0 launches L2

L2 causes a trapL0 handles trap itself orforwards it to L1

. . .eventually, L0 resumes L2

repeat

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

GuestOS

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCSMemoryTables

L0

L1 L2

1-2 State

0-2 State0-1 State

GuestHypervisor

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 8 / 30

Page 26: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Nested VMX virtualization: flow

L0 runs L1 with VMCS0→1

L1 prepares VMCS1→2 andexecutes vmlaunchvmlaunch traps to L0

L0 merges VMCS’s:VMCS0→1 merged withVMCS1→2 is VMCS0→2

L0 launches L2

L2 causes a trapL0 handles trap itself orforwards it to L1

. . .eventually, L0 resumes L2

repeat

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

GuestOS

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCSMemoryTables

L0

L1 L2

1-2 State

0-2 State0-1 State

GuestHypervisor

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 8 / 30

Page 27: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Nested VMX virtualization: flow

L0 runs L1 with VMCS0→1

L1 prepares VMCS1→2 andexecutes vmlaunchvmlaunch traps to L0

L0 merges VMCS’s:VMCS0→1 merged withVMCS1→2 is VMCS0→2

L0 launches L2

L2 causes a trapL0 handles trap itself orforwards it to L1

. . .eventually, L0 resumes L2

repeat

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

GuestOS

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCSMemoryTables

L0

L1 L2

1-2 State

0-2 State0-1 State

GuestHypervisor

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 8 / 30

Page 28: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Nested VMX virtualization: flow

L0 runs L1 with VMCS0→1

L1 prepares VMCS1→2 andexecutes vmlaunchvmlaunch traps to L0

L0 merges VMCS’s:VMCS0→1 merged withVMCS1→2 is VMCS0→2

L0 launches L2

L2 causes a trapL0 handles trap itself orforwards it to L1

. . .eventually, L0 resumes L2

repeat

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

GuestOS

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCSMemoryTables

L0

L1 L2

1-2 State

0-2 State0-1 State

GuestHypervisor

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 8 / 30

Page 29: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Nested VMX virtualization: flow

L0 runs L1 with VMCS0→1

L1 prepares VMCS1→2 andexecutes vmlaunchvmlaunch traps to L0

L0 merges VMCS’s:VMCS0→1 merged withVMCS1→2 is VMCS0→2

L0 launches L2

L2 causes a trapL0 handles trap itself orforwards it to L1

. . .eventually, L0 resumes L2

repeat

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

GuestOS

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCSMemoryTables

L0

L1 L2

1-2 State

0-2 State0-1 State

GuestHypervisor

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 8 / 30

Page 30: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Nested VMX virtualization: flow

L0 runs L1 with VMCS0→1

L1 prepares VMCS1→2 andexecutes vmlaunchvmlaunch traps to L0

L0 merges VMCS’s:VMCS0→1 merged withVMCS1→2 is VMCS0→2

L0 launches L2

L2 causes a trapL0 handles trap itself orforwards it to L1

. . .eventually, L0 resumes L2

repeat

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

GuestOS

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCSMemoryTables

L0

L1 L2

1-2 State

0-2 State0-1 State

GuestHypervisor

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 8 / 30

Page 31: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Nested VMX virtualization: flow

L0 runs L1 with VMCS0→1

L1 prepares VMCS1→2 andexecutes vmlaunchvmlaunch traps to L0

L0 merges VMCS’s:VMCS0→1 merged withVMCS1→2 is VMCS0→2

L0 launches L2

L2 causes a trapL0 handles trap itself orforwards it to L1

. . .eventually, L0 resumes L2

repeat

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

GuestOS

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCSMemoryTables

L0

L1 L2

1-2 State

0-2 State0-1 State

GuestHypervisor

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 8 / 30

Page 32: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Nested VMX virtualization: flow

L0 runs L1 with VMCS0→1

L1 prepares VMCS1→2 andexecutes vmlaunchvmlaunch traps to L0

L0 merges VMCS’s:VMCS0→1 merged withVMCS1→2 is VMCS0→2

L0 launches L2

L2 causes a trapL0 handles trap itself orforwards it to L1

. . .eventually, L0 resumes L2

repeat

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

GuestOS

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCSMemoryTables

L0

L1 L2

1-2 State

0-2 State0-1 State

GuestHypervisor

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 8 / 30

Page 33: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Nested VMX virtualization: flow

L0 runs L1 with VMCS0→1

L1 prepares VMCS1→2 andexecutes vmlaunchvmlaunch traps to L0

L0 merges VMCS’s:VMCS0→1 merged withVMCS1→2 is VMCS0→2

L0 launches L2

L2 causes a trapL0 handles trap itself orforwards it to L1

. . .eventually, L0 resumes L2

repeat

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

GuestOS

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCSMemoryTables

L0

L1 L2

1-2 State

0-2 State0-1 State

GuestHypervisor

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 8 / 30

Page 34: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Nested VMX virtualization: flow

L0 runs L1 with VMCS0→1

L1 prepares VMCS1→2 andexecutes vmlaunchvmlaunch traps to L0

L0 merges VMCS’s:VMCS0→1 merged withVMCS1→2 is VMCS0→2

L0 launches L2

L2 causes a trapL0 handles trap itself orforwards it to L1

. . .eventually, L0 resumes L2

repeat

Hardware

Host Hypervisor

GuestOS

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCS

MemoryTables

VMCSMemoryTables

L0

L1 L2

1-2 State

0-2 State0-1 State

GuestHypervisor

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 8 / 30

Page 35: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Exit multiplication makes angry turtle angry

To handle a single L2 exit, L1 does many things: read and writethe VMCS, disable interrupts, . . .Those operations can trap, leading to exit multiplicationExit multiplication: a single L2 exit can cause 40-50 L1 exits!Optimize: make a single exit fast and reduce frequency of exits

……

L0

L1

L2

L3

Two Levels

Three LevelsSingle Level

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 9 / 30

Page 36: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Exit multiplication makes angry turtle angry

To handle a single L2 exit, L1 does many things: read and writethe VMCS, disable interrupts, . . .Those operations can trap, leading to exit multiplicationExit multiplication: a single L2 exit can cause 40-50 L1 exits!Optimize: make a single exit fast and reduce frequency of exits

……

L0

L1

L2

L3

Two Levels

Three LevelsSingle Level

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 9 / 30

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Exit multiplication makes angry turtle angry

To handle a single L2 exit, L1 does many things: read and writethe VMCS, disable interrupts, . . .Those operations can trap, leading to exit multiplicationExit multiplication: a single L2 exit can cause 40-50 L1 exits!Optimize: make a single exit fast and reduce frequency of exits

……

L0

L1

L2

L3

Two Levels

Three LevelsSingle Level

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 9 / 30

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Exit multiplication makes angry turtle angry

To handle a single L2 exit, L1 does many things: read and writethe VMCS, disable interrupts, . . .Those operations can trap, leading to exit multiplicationExit multiplication: a single L2 exit can cause 40-50 L1 exits!Optimize: make a single exit fast and reduce frequency of exits

……

L0

L1

L2

L3

Two Levels

Three LevelsSingle Level

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 9 / 30

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Introduction to x86 MMU virtualization

x86 does page table walks in hardwareMMU has one currently active hardware page tableBare metal ⇒ only needs one logical translation,(virtual → physical)Virtualization ⇒ needs two logical translations

1 Guest page table: (guest virt→ guest phys)2 Host page table: (guest phys→ host phys)

. . . but MMU only knows to walk a single table!

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 10 / 30

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Introduction to x86 MMU virtualization

x86 does page table walks in hardwareMMU has one currently active hardware page tableBare metal ⇒ only needs one logical translation,(virtual → physical)Virtualization ⇒ needs two logical translations

1 Guest page table: (guest virt→ guest phys)2 Host page table: (guest phys→ host phys)

. . . but MMU only knows to walk a single table!

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 10 / 30

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Introduction to x86 MMU virtualization

x86 does page table walks in hardwareMMU has one currently active hardware page tableBare metal ⇒ only needs one logical translation,(virtual → physical)Virtualization ⇒ needs two logical translations

1 Guest page table: (guest virt→ guest phys)2 Host page table: (guest phys→ host phys)

. . . but MMU only knows to walk a single table!

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 10 / 30

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Introduction to x86 MMU virtualization

x86 does page table walks in hardwareMMU has one currently active hardware page tableBare metal ⇒ only needs one logical translation,(virtual → physical)Virtualization ⇒ needs two logical translations

1 Guest page table: (guest virt→ guest phys)2 Host page table: (guest phys→ host phys)

. . . but MMU only knows to walk a single table!

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 10 / 30

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Introduction to x86 MMU virtualization

x86 does page table walks in hardwareMMU has one currently active hardware page tableBare metal ⇒ only needs one logical translation,(virtual → physical)Virtualization ⇒ needs two logical translations

1 Guest page table: (guest virt→ guest phys)2 Host page table: (guest phys→ host phys)

. . . but MMU only knows to walk a single table!

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 10 / 30

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Software MMU virtualization: shadow paging

Guest virtual

Guest physical

Host physical

SPT

GV->GP

GP->HP

Two logical translations compressed onto the shadow pagetable [DevineBugnion02]Unmodified guest OS updates its own tableHypervisor traps OS page table updatesHypervisor propagates updates to the hardware tableMMU walks the tableProblem: traps are expensive

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 11 / 30

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Software MMU virtualization: shadow paging

Guest virtual

Guest physical

Host physical

SPT

GV->GP

GP->HP

Two logical translations compressed onto the shadow pagetable [DevineBugnion02]Unmodified guest OS updates its own tableHypervisor traps OS page table updatesHypervisor propagates updates to the hardware tableMMU walks the tableProblem: traps are expensive

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 11 / 30

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Software MMU virtualization: shadow paging

Guest virtual

Guest physical

Host physical

SPT

GV->GP

GP->HP

Two logical translations compressed onto the shadow pagetable [DevineBugnion02]Unmodified guest OS updates its own tableHypervisor traps OS page table updatesHypervisor propagates updates to the hardware tableMMU walks the tableProblem: traps are expensive

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 11 / 30

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Software MMU virtualization: shadow paging

Guest virtual

Guest physical

Host physical

SPT

GV->GP

GP->HP

Two logical translations compressed onto the shadow pagetable [DevineBugnion02]Unmodified guest OS updates its own tableHypervisor traps OS page table updatesHypervisor propagates updates to the hardware tableMMU walks the tableProblem: traps are expensive

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 11 / 30

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Software MMU virtualization: shadow paging

Guest virtual

Guest physical

Host physical

SPT

GV->GP

GP->HP

Two logical translations compressed onto the shadow pagetable [DevineBugnion02]Unmodified guest OS updates its own tableHypervisor traps OS page table updatesHypervisor propagates updates to the hardware tableMMU walks the tableProblem: traps are expensive

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 11 / 30

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Software MMU virtualization: shadow paging

Guest virtual

Guest physical

Host physical

SPT

GV->GP

GP->HP

Two logical translations compressed onto the shadow pagetable [DevineBugnion02]Unmodified guest OS updates its own tableHypervisor traps OS page table updatesHypervisor propagates updates to the hardware tableMMU walks the tableProblem: traps are expensive

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 11 / 30

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Hardware MMU virtualization: Extended Page Tables

Guest virtual

Guest physical

Host physical

GPTGV->GP

GP->HP

EPT

Two-dimensional paging: guest owns GPT, hypervisor ownsEPT [BhargavaSerebrin08]Unmodified guest OS updates GPTHypervisor updates EPT table controlling (guest phys→ hostphys) translationsMMU walks both tables

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 12 / 30

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Hardware MMU virtualization: Extended Page Tables

Guest virtual

Guest physical

Host physical

GPTGV->GP

GP->HP

EPT

Two-dimensional paging: guest owns GPT, hypervisor ownsEPT [BhargavaSerebrin08]Unmodified guest OS updates GPTHypervisor updates EPT table controlling (guest phys→ hostphys) translationsMMU walks both tables

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 12 / 30

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Hardware MMU virtualization: Extended Page Tables

Guest virtual

Guest physical

Host physical

GPTGV->GP

GP->HP

EPT

Two-dimensional paging: guest owns GPT, hypervisor ownsEPT [BhargavaSerebrin08]Unmodified guest OS updates GPTHypervisor updates EPT table controlling (guest phys→ hostphys) translationsMMU walks both tables

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 12 / 30

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Hardware MMU virtualization: Extended Page Tables

Guest virtual

Guest physical

Host physical

GPTGV->GP

GP->HP

EPT

Two-dimensional paging: guest owns GPT, hypervisor ownsEPT [BhargavaSerebrin08]Unmodified guest OS updates GPTHypervisor updates EPT table controlling (guest phys→ hostphys) translationsMMU walks both tables

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 12 / 30

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Nested MMU virt. via multi-dimensional paging

Three logical translations: L2 virt → phys, L2 → L1, L1 → L0

Only two tables in hardware with EPT:virt → phys and guest physical→ host physicalL0 compresses three logical translations onto two hardware tables

SPT12

L2 virtual

L2 physical

L1 physical

L0 physical

GPT

L2 virtual

L2 physical

L1 physical

L0 physical

GPT

SPT02

Shadow on top of shadow

SPT12

EPT01

L2 virtual

L2 physical

L1 physical

L0 physical

GPT

EPT02

EPT12

Multi-dimensional paging

Shadow on top of EPT

EPT01

baseline better best

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 13 / 30

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Baseline: shadow-on-shadow

SPT12

L2 virtual

L2 physical

L1 physical

L0 physical

GPT

SPT02

Assume no EPT table; all hypervisors use shadow pagingUseful for old machines and as a baselineMaintaining shadow page tables is expensiveCompress: three logical translations⇒ one table in hardware

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 14 / 30

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Better: shadow-on-EPT

L2 virtual

L2 physical

L1 physical

L0 physical

SPT12

EPT01

GPT

Instead of one hardware table we have twoCompress: three logical translations⇒ two in hardwareSimple approach: L0 uses EPT, L1 uses shadow paging for L2

Every L2 page fault leads to multiple L1 exits

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 15 / 30

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Best: multi-dimensional pagingL2 virtual

L2 physical

L1 physical

L0 physical

GPT

EPT02

EPT12

EPT01

EPT table rarely changes; guest page table changes a lotAgain, compress three logical translations⇒ two in hardwareL0 emulates EPT for L1

L0 uses EPT0→1 and EPT1→2 to construct EPT0→2

End result: a lot less exits!Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 16 / 30

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Introduction to I/O virtualization

From the hypervisor’s perspective, what is I/O?

(1) PIO (2) MMIO (3) DMA (4) interruptsDevice emulation [Sugerman01]

GUEST

HOST

1

2

34

deviceemulation

driverdevice

driverdevice

Para-virtualized drivers [Barham03, Russell08]GUEST

HOST

driver

1

23

back−end

virtualdriver

front−end

virtualdevicedriver

Direct device assignment [Levasseur04,Yassour08]GUEST

HOST

devicedriver

Direct assignment best performing optionDirect assignment requires IOMMU for safe DMA bypass

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 17 / 30

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Introduction to I/O virtualization

From the hypervisor’s perspective, what is I/O?(1) PIO

(2) MMIO (3) DMA (4) interruptsDevice emulation [Sugerman01]

GUEST

HOST

1

2

34

deviceemulation

driverdevice

driverdevice

Para-virtualized drivers [Barham03, Russell08]GUEST

HOST

driver

1

23

back−end

virtualdriver

front−end

virtualdevicedriver

Direct device assignment [Levasseur04,Yassour08]GUEST

HOST

devicedriver

Direct assignment best performing optionDirect assignment requires IOMMU for safe DMA bypass

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 17 / 30

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Introduction to I/O virtualization

From the hypervisor’s perspective, what is I/O?(1) PIO (2) MMIO

(3) DMA (4) interruptsDevice emulation [Sugerman01]

GUEST

HOST

1

2

34

deviceemulation

driverdevice

driverdevice

Para-virtualized drivers [Barham03, Russell08]GUEST

HOST

driver

1

23

back−end

virtualdriver

front−end

virtualdevicedriver

Direct device assignment [Levasseur04,Yassour08]GUEST

HOST

devicedriver

Direct assignment best performing optionDirect assignment requires IOMMU for safe DMA bypass

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 17 / 30

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Introduction to I/O virtualization

From the hypervisor’s perspective, what is I/O?(1) PIO (2) MMIO (3) DMA

(4) interruptsDevice emulation [Sugerman01]

GUEST

HOST

1

2

34

deviceemulation

driverdevice

driverdevice

Para-virtualized drivers [Barham03, Russell08]GUEST

HOST

driver

1

23

back−end

virtualdriver

front−end

virtualdevicedriver

Direct device assignment [Levasseur04,Yassour08]GUEST

HOST

devicedriver

Direct assignment best performing optionDirect assignment requires IOMMU for safe DMA bypass

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 17 / 30

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Introduction to I/O virtualization

From the hypervisor’s perspective, what is I/O?(1) PIO (2) MMIO (3) DMA (4) interrupts

Device emulation [Sugerman01]GUEST

HOST

1

2

34

deviceemulation

driverdevice

driverdevice

Para-virtualized drivers [Barham03, Russell08]GUEST

HOST

driver

1

23

back−end

virtualdriver

front−end

virtualdevicedriver

Direct device assignment [Levasseur04,Yassour08]GUEST

HOST

devicedriver

Direct assignment best performing optionDirect assignment requires IOMMU for safe DMA bypass

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 17 / 30

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Introduction to I/O virtualization

From the hypervisor’s perspective, what is I/O?(1) PIO (2) MMIO (3) DMA (4) interruptsDevice emulation [Sugerman01]

GUEST

HOST

1

2

34

deviceemulation

driverdevice

driverdevice

Para-virtualized drivers [Barham03, Russell08]GUEST

HOST

driver

1

23

back−end

virtualdriver

front−end

virtualdevicedriver

Direct device assignment [Levasseur04,Yassour08]GUEST

HOST

devicedriver

Direct assignment best performing optionDirect assignment requires IOMMU for safe DMA bypass

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 17 / 30

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Introduction to I/O virtualization

From the hypervisor’s perspective, what is I/O?(1) PIO (2) MMIO (3) DMA (4) interruptsDevice emulation [Sugerman01]

GUEST

HOST

1

2

34

deviceemulation

driverdevice

driverdevice

Para-virtualized drivers [Barham03, Russell08]GUEST

HOST

driver

1

23

back−end

virtualdriver

front−end

virtualdevicedriver

Direct device assignment [Levasseur04,Yassour08]GUEST

HOST

devicedriver

Direct assignment best performing optionDirect assignment requires IOMMU for safe DMA bypass

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 17 / 30

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Introduction to I/O virtualization

From the hypervisor’s perspective, what is I/O?(1) PIO (2) MMIO (3) DMA (4) interruptsDevice emulation [Sugerman01]

GUEST

HOST

1

2

34

deviceemulation

driverdevice

driverdevice

Para-virtualized drivers [Barham03, Russell08]GUEST

HOST

driver

1

23

back−end

virtualdriver

front−end

virtualdevicedriver

Direct device assignment [Levasseur04,Yassour08]GUEST

HOST

devicedriver

Direct assignment best performing optionDirect assignment requires IOMMU for safe DMA bypass

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 17 / 30

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Introduction to I/O virtualization

From the hypervisor’s perspective, what is I/O?(1) PIO (2) MMIO (3) DMA (4) interruptsDevice emulation [Sugerman01]

GUEST

HOST

1

2

34

deviceemulation

driverdevice

driverdevice

Para-virtualized drivers [Barham03, Russell08]GUEST

HOST

driver

1

23

back−end

virtualdriver

front−end

virtualdevicedriver

Direct device assignment [Levasseur04,Yassour08]GUEST

HOST

devicedriver

Direct assignment best performing option

Direct assignment requires IOMMU for safe DMA bypass

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 17 / 30

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Introduction to I/O virtualization

From the hypervisor’s perspective, what is I/O?(1) PIO (2) MMIO (3) DMA (4) interruptsDevice emulation [Sugerman01]

GUEST

HOST

1

2

34

deviceemulation

driverdevice

driverdevice

Para-virtualized drivers [Barham03, Russell08]GUEST

HOST

driver

1

23

back−end

virtualdriver

front−end

virtualdevicedriver

Direct device assignment [Levasseur04,Yassour08]GUEST

HOST

devicedriver

Direct assignment best performing optionDirect assignment requires IOMMU for safe DMA bypass

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 17 / 30

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Multi-level device assignment

With nested 3x3 options for I/O virtualization (L2 ⇔ L1 ⇔ L0)Multi-level device assignment means giving an L2 guest directaccess to L0’s devices, safely bypassing both L0 and L1

L1 hypervisor

physical device

L0 hypervisor

L2 device driver

MMIOs and PIOs

L0 IOMMUL1 IOMMU

Device DMA via platform IOMMU

How? L0 emulates an IOMMU for L1 [Amit10]L0 compresses multiple IOMMU translations onto the singlehardware IOMMU page tableL2 programs the device directlyDevice DMA’s into L2 memory space directly

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 18 / 30

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Multi-level device assignment

With nested 3x3 options for I/O virtualization (L2 ⇔ L1 ⇔ L0)Multi-level device assignment means giving an L2 guest directaccess to L0’s devices, safely bypassing both L0 and L1

L1 hypervisor

physical device

L0 hypervisor

L2 device driver

MMIOs and PIOs

L0 IOMMUL1 IOMMU

Device DMA via platform IOMMU

How? L0 emulates an IOMMU for L1 [Amit10]L0 compresses multiple IOMMU translations onto the singlehardware IOMMU page tableL2 programs the device directlyDevice DMA’s into L2 memory space directly

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 18 / 30

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Multi-level device assignment

With nested 3x3 options for I/O virtualization (L2 ⇔ L1 ⇔ L0)Multi-level device assignment means giving an L2 guest directaccess to L0’s devices, safely bypassing both L0 and L1

L1 hypervisor

physical device

L0 hypervisor

L2 device driver

MMIOs and PIOs

L0 IOMMUL1 IOMMU

Device DMA via platform IOMMU

How? L0 emulates an IOMMU for L1 [Amit10]L0 compresses multiple IOMMU translations onto the singlehardware IOMMU page tableL2 programs the device directlyDevice DMA’s into L2 memory space directly

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 18 / 30

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Multi-level device assignment

With nested 3x3 options for I/O virtualization (L2 ⇔ L1 ⇔ L0)Multi-level device assignment means giving an L2 guest directaccess to L0’s devices, safely bypassing both L0 and L1

L1 hypervisor

physical device

L0 hypervisor

L2 device driver

MMIOs and PIOs

L0 IOMMUL1 IOMMU

Device DMA via platform IOMMU

How? L0 emulates an IOMMU for L1 [Amit10]L0 compresses multiple IOMMU translations onto the singlehardware IOMMU page tableL2 programs the device directlyDevice DMA’s into L2 memory space directly

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 18 / 30

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Multi-level device assignment

With nested 3x3 options for I/O virtualization (L2 ⇔ L1 ⇔ L0)Multi-level device assignment means giving an L2 guest directaccess to L0’s devices, safely bypassing both L0 and L1

L1 hypervisor

physical device

L0 hypervisor

L2 device driver

MMIOs and PIOs

L0 IOMMUL1 IOMMU

Device DMA via platform IOMMU

How? L0 emulates an IOMMU for L1 [Amit10]L0 compresses multiple IOMMU translations onto the singlehardware IOMMU page tableL2 programs the device directlyDevice DMA’s into L2 memory space directly

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 18 / 30

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Multi-level device assignment

With nested 3x3 options for I/O virtualization (L2 ⇔ L1 ⇔ L0)Multi-level device assignment means giving an L2 guest directaccess to L0’s devices, safely bypassing both L0 and L1

L1 hypervisor

physical device

L0 hypervisor

L2 device driver

MMIOs and PIOs

L0 IOMMUL1 IOMMU

Device DMA via platform IOMMU

How? L0 emulates an IOMMU for L1 [Amit10]L0 compresses multiple IOMMU translations onto the singlehardware IOMMU page tableL2 programs the device directlyDevice DMA’s into L2 memory space directly

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 18 / 30

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Micro-optimizations

Goal: reduce world switch overheadsReduce cost of single exit by focus on VMCS merges:

Keep VMCS fields in processor encodingPartial updates instead of whole-sale copyingCopy multiple fields at onceSome optimizations not safe according to spec

Reduce frequency of exits—focus on vmread and vmwriteAvoid the exit multiplier effectLoads/stores vs. architected trapping instructionsBinary patching?

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 19 / 30

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Micro-optimizations

Goal: reduce world switch overheadsReduce cost of single exit by focus on VMCS merges:

Keep VMCS fields in processor encodingPartial updates instead of whole-sale copyingCopy multiple fields at onceSome optimizations not safe according to spec

Reduce frequency of exits—focus on vmread and vmwriteAvoid the exit multiplier effectLoads/stores vs. architected trapping instructionsBinary patching?

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 19 / 30

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Micro-optimizations

Goal: reduce world switch overheadsReduce cost of single exit by focus on VMCS merges:

Keep VMCS fields in processor encodingPartial updates instead of whole-sale copyingCopy multiple fields at onceSome optimizations not safe according to spec

Reduce frequency of exits—focus on vmread and vmwriteAvoid the exit multiplier effectLoads/stores vs. architected trapping instructionsBinary patching?

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 19 / 30

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Windows XP on KVM L1 on KVM L0

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 20 / 30

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Linux on VMware L1 on KVM L0

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 21 / 30

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Experimental Setup

Running Linux, Windows,KVM, VMware, SMP, . . .Macro workloads:

kernbenchSPECjbbnetperf

Multi-dimensional paging?Multi-level device assignment?KVM as L1 vs. VMware as L1?

See paper for full experimentaldetails and more benchmarksand analysis

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 22 / 30

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Macro: SPECjbb and kernbench

kernbenchHost Guest Nested NestedDRW

Run time 324.3 355 406.3 391.5% overhead vs. host - 9.5 25.3 20.7% overhead vs. guest - - 14.5 10.3

SPECjbbHost Guest Nested NestedDRW

Score 90493 83599 77065 78347% degradation vs. host - 7.6 14.8 13.4% degradation vs. guest - - 7.8 6.3

Table: kernbench and SPECjbb results

Exit multiplication effect not as bad as we feared

Direct vmread and vmwrite (DRW) give an immediate boost

Take-away: each level of virtualization adds approximately the sameoverhead!

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 23 / 30

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Macro: multi-dimensional paging

Shadow on EPTMulti−dimensional paging

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

kernbench specjbb netperf

Impr

ovem

ent r

atio

Impact of multi-dimensional paging depends on rate of page faultsShadow-on-EPT: every L2 page fault causes L1 multiple exitsMulti-dimensional paging: only EPT violations cause L1 exitsEPT table rarely changes: #(EPT violations) << #(page faults)Multi-dimensional paging huge win for page-fault intensivekernbench

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 24 / 30

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Macro: multi-level device assignment

throughput (Mbps)%cpu

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1,000

nativesingle level guest

emulation

single level guest

virtio

single level guest

direct access

nested guest emulation / emulation

nested guest virtio / emulation

nested guest virtio / virtio

nested guest direct / virtio

nested guest direct / direct

0

20

40

60

80

100

throug

hput (M

bps)

% cpu

Benchmark: netperf TCP_STREAM (transmit)Multi-level device assignment best performing optionBut: native at 20%, multi-level device assignment at 60% (x3!)Interrupts considered harmful, cause exit multiplication

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 25 / 30

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Macro: multi-level device assignment (sans interrupts)

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

16 32 64 128 256 512

Thro

ughp

ut (M

bps)

Message size (netperf -m)

L0 (bare metal)L2 (direct/direct)L2 (direct/virtio)

What if we could deliver device interrupts directly to L2?Only 7% difference between native and nested guest!

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 26 / 30

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Micro: synthetic worst case CPUID loop

L1L0cpu mode switch

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

1. Single Level

Guest

2. Nested Guest

3. Nested Guest

optimizations 3.5.1

4. Nested Guest

optimizations 3.5.2

5. Nested Guest

optimizations 3.5.1 & 3.5.2

CPU

Cycle

s

CPUID running in a tight loop is not a real-world workload!Went from 30x worse to “only” 6x worseA nested exit is still expensive—minimize both single exitcost and frequency of exits

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 27 / 30

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Conclusions

Efficient nested x86virtualization is challenging butfeasibleA whole new ballpark openingup many excitingapplications—security, cloud,architecture, . . .Current overhead of 6-14%

Negligible for someworkloads, not yet for othersWork in progress—expect atmost 5% eventually

Code is availableWhy Turtles?It’s turtles all the way down

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 28 / 30

Page 86: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Conclusions

Efficient nested x86virtualization is challenging butfeasibleA whole new ballpark openingup many excitingapplications—security, cloud,architecture, . . .Current overhead of 6-14%

Negligible for someworkloads, not yet for othersWork in progress—expect atmost 5% eventually

Code is availableWhy Turtles?It’s turtles all the way down

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 28 / 30

Page 87: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Conclusions

Efficient nested x86virtualization is challenging butfeasibleA whole new ballpark openingup many excitingapplications—security, cloud,architecture, . . .Current overhead of 6-14%

Negligible for someworkloads, not yet for othersWork in progress—expect atmost 5% eventually

Code is availableWhy Turtles?It’s turtles all the way down

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 28 / 30

Page 88: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Conclusions

Efficient nested x86virtualization is challenging butfeasibleA whole new ballpark openingup many excitingapplications—security, cloud,architecture, . . .Current overhead of 6-14%

Negligible for someworkloads, not yet for othersWork in progress—expect atmost 5% eventually

Code is availableWhy Turtles?It’s turtles all the way down

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 28 / 30

Page 89: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Conclusions

Efficient nested x86virtualization is challenging butfeasibleA whole new ballpark openingup many excitingapplications—security, cloud,architecture, . . .Current overhead of 6-14%

Negligible for someworkloads, not yet for othersWork in progress—expect atmost 5% eventually

Code is availableWhy Turtles?It’s turtles all the way down

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 28 / 30

Page 90: The Turtles Project: Design and Implementation of Nested Virtualization · 2020. 8. 2. · mode, Linux/KVM) To be able to run other hypervisors inclouds Security (e.g., hypervisor-level

Conclusions

Efficient nested x86virtualization is challenging butfeasibleA whole new ballpark openingup many excitingapplications—security, cloud,architecture, . . .Current overhead of 6-14%

Negligible for someworkloads, not yet for othersWork in progress—expect atmost 5% eventually

Code is availableWhy Turtles?It’s turtles all the way down

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 28 / 30

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Questions?

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 29 / 30

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IBM Research – Haifa is hiring

© 2010 IBM Corporation

Systems Software Research in Haifa

Contributions to IBM products, cutting-edge research– Virtualization, Cloud Computing, Data Storage

Influencing European cloud research agenda– Consulting to European Commission, working through industrial groups, leading

projects

Papers, patents, image for IBM and Israel

We are Hiring!– Researchers and Engineers

Ben-Yehuda et al. (IBM Research) The Turtles Project: Nested Virtualization Technion Clubnet Oct 2010 30 / 30