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12/12/16, 7:38 AMDestined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides’s Trap? - The Atlantic

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The Thucydides Trap: Are

the U.S. and China Headed

for War?In 12 of 16 past cases in which a rising power has confronted a rulingpower, the result has been bloodshed.

G R A H A M A L L I S O N | S E P 2 4 , 2 0 1 5 | G L O B A L

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When Barack Obama meets this week with Xi Jinping during the Chinesepresident’s first state visit to America, one item probably won’t be on theiragenda: the possibility that the United States and China could find themselves atwar in the next decade. In policy circles, this appears as unlikely as it would beunwise.

And yet 100 years on, World War I offers a sobering reminder of man’s capacityfor folly. When we say that war is “inconceivable,” is this a statement about whatis possible in the world—or only about what our limited minds can conceive? In1914, few could imagine slaughter on a scale that demanded a new category:world war. When war ended four years later, Europe lay in ruins: the kaiser gone,the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved, the Russian tsar overthrown by theBolsheviks, France bled for a generation, and England shorn of its youth andtreasure. A millennium in which Europe had been the political center of theworld came to a crashing halt.

The defining question about global order for this generation is whether Chinaand the United States can escape Thucydides’s Trap. The Greek historian’smetaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a rulingpower—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany didBritain a century ago. Most such contests have ended badly, often for bothnations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science andInternational Affairs has concluded after analyzing the historical record. In 12 of16 cases over the past 500 years, the result was war. When the parties avoided

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http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.1.first.html

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25760/thucydides_trap_project.html



R E L A T E D S T O R YR E L A T E D S T O R Y

The World According to ChinesePresident Xi Jinping

war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the partnot just of the challenger but also the challenged.

Based on the current trajectory, war between theUnited States and China in the decades ahead is not justpossible, but much more likely than recognized at themoment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, waris more likely than not. Moreover, currentunderestimations and misapprehensions of the hazardsinherent in the U.S.-China relationship contributegreatly to those hazards. A risk associated withThucydides’s Trap is that business as usual—not just anunexpected, extraordinary event—can trigger large-scale conflict. When a rising power is threatening todisplace a ruling power, standard crises that would

otherwise be contained, like the assassination of an archduke in 1914, caninitiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the partieswould otherwise have chosen.

War, however, is not inevitable. Four of the 16 cases in our review did not end inbloodshed. Those successes, as well as the failures, offer pertinent lessons fortoday’s world leaders. Escaping the Trap requires tremendous effort. As XiJinping himself said during a visit to Seattle on Tuesday, “There is no such thingas the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries timeand again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create suchtraps for themselves.”

* * *

More than 2,400 years ago, the Athenian historian Thucydides offered a

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powerful insight: “It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this inspired inSparta, that made war inevitable.” Others identified an array of contributingcauses of the Peloponnesian War. But Thucydides went to the heart of thematter, focusing on the inexorable, structural stress caused by a rapid shift in thebalance of power between two rivals. Note that Thucydides identified two keydrivers of this dynamic: the rising power’s growing entitlement, sense of itsimportance, and demand for greater say and sway, on the one hand, and thefear, insecurity, and determination to defend the status quo this engenders in theestablished power, on the other.

In the case about which he wrote in the fifth century B.C., Athens had emergedover a half century as a steeple of civilization, yielding advances in philosophy,history, drama, architecture, democracy, and naval prowess. This shockedSparta, which for a century had been the leading land power on the Peloponnesepeninsula. As Thucydides saw it, Athens’s position was understandable. As itsclout grew, so too did its self-confidence, its consciousness of past injustices, itssensitivity to instances of disrespect, and its insistence that previousarrangements be revised to reflect new realities of power. It was also natural,Thucydides explained, that Sparta interpreted the Athenian posture asunreasonable, ungrateful, and threatening to the system it had established—andwithin which Athens had flourished.

War between the U.S. and China is

more likely than recognized at the

moment. Indeed, judging by the

historical record, war is more likely




than not.

Thucydides chronicled objective changes in relative power, but he also focusedon perceptions of change among the leaders of Athens and Sparta—and how thisled each to strengthen alliances with other states in the hopes ofcounterbalancing the other. But entanglement runs both ways. (It was for thisreason that George Washington famously cautioned America to beware of“entangling alliances.”) When conflict broke out between the second-tier city-states of Corinth and Corcyra (now Corfu), Sparta felt it necessary to come toCorinth’s defense, which left Athens little choice but to back its ally. ThePeloponnesian War followed. When it ended 30 years later, Sparta was thenominal victor. But both states lay in ruin, leaving Greece vulnerable to thePersians.

* * *

Eight years before the outbreak of world war in Europe, Britain’s King EdwardVII asked his prime minister why the British government was becoming sounfriendly to his nephew Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Germany, rather than keeping itseye on America, which he saw as the greater challenge. The prime ministerinstructed the Foreign Office’s chief Germany watcher, Eyre Crowe, to write amemo answering the king’s question. Crowe delivered his memorandum on NewYear’s Day, 1907. The document is a gem in the annals of diplomacy.

The logic of Crowe’s analysis echoed Thucydides’s insight. And his centralquestion, as paraphrased by Henry Kissinger in On China, was the following: Didincreasing hostility between Britain and Germany stem more from Germancapabilities or German conduct? Crowe put it a bit differently: Did Germany’s

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp

http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/603_Percept%20Germ%20For%20Policy_107.pdf

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pursuit of “political hegemony and maritime ascendancy” pose an existentialthreat to “the independence of her neighbours and ultimately the existence ofEngland?”

Crowe’s answer was unambiguous: Capability was key. As Germany’s economysurpassed Britain’s, Germany would not only develop the strongest army on thecontinent. It would soon also “build as powerful a navy as she can afford.” Inother words, Kissinger writes, “once Germany achieved naval supremacy … thisin itself—regardless of German intentions—would be an objective threat toBritain, and incompatible with the existence of the British Empire.”

Three years after reading that memo, Edward VII died. Attendees at his funeral

The British Grand Fleet on its way to meet the Imperial German Navy’s fleet for the Battle of Jutland in1916 (AP)



included two “chief mourners”—Edward’s successor, George V, and Germany’sKaiser Wilhelm—along with Theodore Roosevelt representing the United States.At one point, Roosevelt (an avid student of naval power and leading champion ofthe buildup of the U.S. Navy) asked Wilhelm whether he would consider amoratorium in the German-British naval arms race. The kaiser replied thatGermany was unalterably committed to having a powerful navy. But as he wenton to explain, war between Germany and Britain was simply unthinkable,because “I was brought up in England, very largely; I feel myself partly anEnglishman. Next to Germany I care more for England than for any othercountry.” And then with emphasis: “I ADORE ENGLAND!”

However unimaginable conflict seems, however catastrophic the potentialconsequences for all actors, however deep the cultural empathy among leaders,even blood relatives, and however economically interdependent states may be—none of these factors is sufficient to prevent war, in 1914 or today.

In fact, in 12 of 16 cases over the last 500 years in which there was a rapid shiftin the relative power of a rising nation that threatened to displace a ruling state,the result was war. As the table below suggests, the struggle for mastery inEurope and Asia over the past half millennium offers a succession of variationson a common storyline.

Thucydides Case Studies

https://books.google.com/books?id=EU8FBkL0rLAC&pg=PA253&lpg=PA253&dq=I+was+brought+up+in+England,+very+largely;+I+feel+myself+partly+an+Englishman.+Next+to+Germany+I+care+more+for+England+than+for+any+other+country.%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=BHRD8eZMnG&sig=I#v=onepage&q=I%20was%20brought%20up%20in%20England%2C%20very%20largely%3B%20I%20feel%20myself%20partly%20an%20Englishman.%20Next%20to%20Germany%20I%20care%20more%20for%20England%20than%20for%20any%20other%20country.%E2%80%9D&f=false



(For summaries of these 16 cases and the methodology for selecting them, andfor a forum to register additions, subtractions, revisions, and disagreements withthe cases, please visit the Harvard Belfer Center’s Thucydides Trap Case File.For this first phase of the project, we at the Belfer Center identified “ruling” and“rising” powers by following the judgments of leading historical accounts,resisting the temptation to offer original or idiosyncratic interpretations ofevents. These histories use “rise” and “rule” according to their conventionaldefinitions, generally emphasizing rapid shifts in relative GDP and militarystrength. Most of the cases in this initial round of analysis come from post-Westphalian Europe.)

Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/24928/thucydides_trap_case_file.html

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/25782/thucydides_trap_methodology.html

http://belfercenter.org/ThucydidesCaseFile





When a rising, revolutionary France challenged Britain’s dominance of theoceans and the balance of power on the European continent, Britain destroyedNapoleon Bonaparte’s fleet in 1805 and later sent troops to the continent todefeat his armies in Spain and at Waterloo. As Otto von Bismarck sought to unifya quarrelsome assortment of rising German states, war with their commonadversary, France, proved an effective instrument to mobilize popular supportfor his mission. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, a rapidly modernizingJapanese economy and military establishment challenged Chinese and Russiandominance of East Asia, resulting in wars with both from which Japan emergedas the leading power in the region.

The preeminent geostrategic

challenge of this era is not violent

Islamic extremists or a resurgent

Russia. It is the impact of China’s

ascendance.

Each case is, of course, unique. Ongoing debate about the causes of the FirstWorld War reminds us that each is subject to competing interpretations. Thegreat international historian, Harvard’s Ernest May, taught that when attemptingto reason from history, we should be as sensitive to the differences as to thesimilarities among cases we compare. (Indeed, in his Historical Reasoning 101class, May would take a sheet of paper, draw a line down the middle of the page,label one column “Similar” and the other “Different,” and fill in the sheet with at

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/07/just-how-likely-is-another-world-war/375320/



least a half dozen of each.) Nonetheless, acknowledging many differences,Thucydides directs us to a powerful commonality.

* * *

The preeminent geostrategic challenge of this era is not violent Islamicextremists or a resurgent Russia. It is the impact that China’s ascendance willhave on the U.S.-led international order, which has provided unprecedentedgreat-power peace and prosperity for the past 70 years. As Singapore’s lateleader, Lee Kuan Yew, observed, “the size of China’s displacement of the worldbalance is such that the world must find a new balance. It is not possible topretend that this is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the historyof the world.” Everyone knows about the rise of China. Few of us realize itsmagnitude. Never before in history has a nation risen so far, so fast, on so manydimensions of power. To paraphrase former Czech President Vaclav Havel, allthis has happened so rapidly that we have not yet had time to be astonished.

My lecture on this topic at Harvard begins with a quiz that asks students tocompare China and the United States in 1980 with their rankings today. Thereader is invited to fill in the blanks.

Quiz: Fill in the Blanks

http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-of-us-china-relations/273657/



The answers for the first column: In 1980, China had 10 percent of America’sGDP as measured by purchasing power parity; 7 percent of its GDP at currentU.S.-dollar exchange rates; and 6 percent of its exports. The foreign currencyheld by China, meanwhile, was just one-sixth the size of America’s reserves. Theanswers for the second column: By 2014, those figures were 101 percent ofGDP; 60 percent at U.S.-dollar exchange rates; and 106 percent of exports.China’s reserves today are 28 times larger than America’s.

In a single generation, a nation that did not appear on any of the internationalleague tables has vaulted into the top ranks. In 1980, China’s economy wassmaller than that of the Netherlands. Last year, the increment of growth inChina’s GDP was roughly equal to the entire Dutch economy.

The second question in my quiz asks students: Could China become #1? In whatyear could China overtake the United States to become, say, the largest economyin the world, or primary engine of global growth, or biggest market for luxurygoods?

Could China Become #1?

Manufacturer:Exporter:Trading nation:

Harvard Belfer Center

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ppp.asp

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/24928/thucydides_trap_case_file.html



Saver:Holder of U.S. debt:Foreign-direct-investment destination:Energy consumer:Oil importer:Carbon emitter:Steel producer:Auto market:Smartphone market:E-commerce market:Luxury-goods market: Internet user:Fastest supercomputer:Holder of foreign reserves:Source of initial public offerings:Primary engine of global growth:Economy:

Most are stunned to learn that on each of these 20 indicators, China has alreadysurpassed the U.S.

Will China be able to sustain economic-growth rates several times those of theUnited States for another decade and beyond? If and as it does, are its currentleaders serious about displacing the U.S. as the predominant power in Asia? WillChina follow the path of Japan and Germany, and take its place as a responsiblestakeholder in the international order that America has built over the past sevendecades? The answer to these questions is obviously that no one knows.



But if anyone’s forecasts are worth heeding, it’s those of Lee Kuan Yew, theworld’s premier China watcher and a mentor to Chinese leaders since DengXiaoping. Before his death in March, the founder of Singapore put the odds ofChina continuing to grow at several times U.S. rates for the next decade andbeyond as “four chances in five.” On whether China’s leaders are serious aboutdisplacing the United States as the top power in Asia in the foreseeable future,Lee answered directly: “Of course. Why not … how could they not aspire to benumber one in Asia and in time the world?” And about accepting its place in aninternational order designed and led by America, he said absolutely not: “Chinawants to be China and accepted as such—not as an honorary member of theWest.”

* * *

Americans have a tendency to lecture others about why they should be “morelike us.” In urging China to follow the lead of the United States, should weAmericans be careful what we wish for?

As the United States emerged as the dominant power in the Western hemispherein the 1890s, how did it behave? Future President Theodore Rooseveltpersonified a nation supremely confident that the 100 years ahead would be anAmerican century. Over a decade that began in 1895 with the U.S. secretary ofstate declaring the United States “sovereign on this continent,” Americaliberated Cuba; threatened Britain and Germany with war to force them toaccept American positions on disputes in Venezuela and Canada; backed aninsurrection that split Colombia to create a new state of Panama (whichimmediately gave the U.S. concessions to build the Panama Canal); andattempted to overthrow the government of Mexico, which was supported by theUnited Kingdom and financed by London bankers. In the half century that

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followed, U.S. military forces intervened in “our hemisphere” on more than 30separate occasions to settle economic or territorial disputes in terms favorable toAmericans, or oust leaders they judged unacceptable.

For example, in 1902, when British and German ships attempted to impose anaval blockade to force Venezuela to pay its debts to them, Roosevelt warnedboth countries that he would “be obliged to interfere by force if necessary” ifthey did not withdraw their ships. The British and Germans were persuaded toretreat and to resolve their dispute in terms satisfactory to the U.S. at The Hague.The following year, when Colombia refused to lease the Panama Canal Zone tothe United States, America sponsored Panamanian secessionists, recognized the

Theodore Roosevelt with U.S. troops at the Panama Canal Zone in 1906 (Wikimedia)

https://books.google.com/books?id=DK86MQpYPKgC&pg=PT358&lpg=PT358&dq=Roosevelt+%E2%80%9Cbe+obliged+to+interfere+by+force+if+necessary%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=PFZflBNk5U&sig=wKKxCfATytyq3tjzerAoVPhVW6A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAmoVChMI4K_8ud-KyAIVxyYeCh1jkAZ#v=onepage&q=Roosevelt%20%E2%80%9Cbe%20obliged%20to%20interfere%20by%20force%20if%20necessary%E2%80%9D&f=false



new Panamanian government within hours of its declaration of independence,and sent the Marines to defend the new country. Roosevelt defended the U.S.intervention on the grounds that it was “justified in morals and thereforejustified in law.” Shortly thereafter, Panama granted the United States rights tothe Canal Zone “in perpetuity.”

* * *

When Deng Xiaoping initiated China’s fast march to the market in 1978, heannounced a policy known as “hide and bide.” What China needed most abroadwas stability and access to markets. The Chinese would thus “bide our time andhide our capabilities,” which Chinese military officers sometimes paraphrased asgetting strong before getting even.

With the arrival of China’s new paramount leader, Xi Jinping, the era of “hideand bide” is over. Nearly three years into his 10-year term, Xi has stunnedcolleagues at home and China watchers abroad with the speed at which he hasmoved and the audacity of his ambitions. Domestically, he has bypassed rule bya seven-man standing committee and instead consolidated power in his ownhands; ended flirtations with democratization by reasserting the CommunistParty’s monopoly on political power; and attempted to transform China’s engineof growth from an export-focused economy to one driven by domesticconsumption. Overseas, he has pursued a more active Chinese foreign policythat is increasingly assertive in advancing the country’s interests.

Never before in history has a nation

risen so far, so fast. In 1980, China’s

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economy was smaller than the

Netherlands’. Last year, the

increment of growth in China’s GDP

was equal to the Dutch economy.

While the Western press is seized by the storyline of “China’s economicslowdown,” few pause to note that China’s lower growth rate remains more thanthree times that of the United States. Many observers outside China have missedthe great divergence between China’s economic performance and that of itscompetitors over the seven years since the financial crisis of 2008 and GreatRecession. That shock caused virtually all other major economies to falter anddecline. China never missed a year of growth, sustaining an average growth rateexceeding 8 percent. Indeed, since the financial crisis, nearly 40 percent of allgrowth in the global economy has occurred in just one country: China. The chartbelow illustrates China’s growth compared to growth among its peers in theBRICS group of emerging economies, advanced economies, and the world. Froma common index of 100 in 2007, the divergence is dramatic.

GDP, 2007 — 2015



Today, China has displaced the United States as the world’s largest economymeasured in terms of the amount of goods and services a citizen can buy in hisown country (purchasing power parity).

What Xi Jinping calls the “China Dream” expresses the deepest aspirations ofhundreds of millions of Chinese, who wish to be not only rich but also powerful.At the core of China’s civilizational creed is the belief—or conceit—that China isthe center of the universe. In the oft-repeated narrative, a century of Chineseweakness led to exploitation and national humiliation by Western colonialistsand Japan. In Beijing’s view, China is now being restored to its rightful place,where its power commands recognition of and respect for China’s core interests.

Harvard Belfer Center / IMF World Economic Outlook




Last November, in a seminal meeting of the entire Chinese political and foreign-policy establishment, including the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army,Xi provided a comprehensive overview of his vision of China’s role in the world.The display of self-confidence bordered on hubris. Xi began by offering anessentially Hegelian conception of the major historical trends towardmultipolarity (i.e. not U.S. unipolarity) and the transformation of theinternational system (i.e. not the current U.S.-led system). In his words, arejuvenated Chinese nation will build a “new type of international relations”through a “protracted” struggle over the nature of the international order. In theend, he assured his audience that “the growing trend toward a multipolar worldwill not change.”

Given objective trends, realists see an irresistible force approaching animmovable object. They ask which is less likely: China demanding a lesser role inthe East and South China Seas than the United States did in the Caribbean orAtlantic in the early 20th century, or the U.S. sharing with China thepredominance in the Western Pacific that America has enjoyed since World WarII?

And yet in four of the 16 cases that the Belfer Center team analyzed, similarrivalries did not end in war. If leaders in the United States and China letstructural factors drive these two great nations to war, they will not be able tohide behind a cloak of inevitability. Those who don’t learn from past successesand failures to find a better way forward will have no one to blame butthemselves.

A woodblock painting depicts the First Sino-Japanese War. (Toyohara Chikanobu / Wikimedia)

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/30/c_133822694_4.htm




At this point, the established script for discussion of policy challenges calls for apivot to a new strategy (or at least slogan), with a short to-do list that promisespeaceful and prosperous relations with China. Shoehorning this challenge intothat template would demonstrate only one thing: a failure to understand thecentral point I’m trying to make. What strategists need most at the moment isnot a new strategy, but a long pause for reflection. If the tectonic shift caused byChina’s rise poses a challenge of genuinely Thucydidean proportions,declarations about “rebalancing,” or revitalizing “engage and hedge,” orpresidential hopefuls’ calls for more “muscular” or “robust” variants of thesame, amount to little more than aspirin treating cancer. Future historians willcompare such assertions to the reveries of British, German, and Russian leadersas they sleepwalked into 1914.

Actors dressed as Red Army soldiers mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, in Beijing.(Kim Kyung-Hoon / Reuters)



The rise of a 5,000-year-old civilization with 1.3 billion people is not a problemto be fixed. It is a condition—a chronic condition that will have to be managedover a generation. Success will require not just a new slogan, more frequentsummits of presidents, and additional meetings of departmental workinggroups. Managing this relationship without war will demand sustained attention,week by week, at the highest level in both countries. It will entail a depth ofmutual understanding not seen since the Henry Kissinger-Zhou Enlaiconversations in the 1970s. Most significantly, it will mean more radical changesin attitudes and actions, by leaders and publics alike, than anyone has yetimagined.

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A B O U T T H E A U T H O RA B O U T T H E A U T H O R

GRAHAM ALLISON is the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at theHarvard Kennedy School, and a co-director of the Center's Applied History Project.

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the thucydides trap: are the u.s. and china headed for war? · thucydides explained, that sparta...

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