the theory of the unity of god in al-juwaynī's al-irshād

7/27/2019 The theory of the unity of God in al-Juwayn's al-Irshd

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THE THEORY OF THE UNITY OF GODIN AL-rowAYNI's AJARSHAD

byAbdc1 HakimAjhar

A thesis submitted tothe Faculty ofGraduate Studies and Researchin partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree ofMaster of Ans

Institute of Ts1arnic StudicsMcGillUniversityMontreal,Canada

June 1995


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iiABSTRAcrAUTIIOR:'l'ITLE:DEPARTMENT:DEGREE:

Ahdel Hakim AjharThe Theory of the Unity of Gnd in al-Juwayn's al-IrshiidMcGiIl University - Institute of !slamic StudiesMaster of Arts

The conception of the unity of God in al-Juwayn. one of the latest thinkers inthe carly Islamie kaliim. is the subject of this thesis. AI-Juwayn. though an Ash'aritethinker was quite open to Mu'tazilite thought. particularly that of Ab Hashim alJubbli'i. He was also inlluenced by the philosophers.

With al-Juw


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dirrerent concepts. particularly in his hook .1I-''Aqi


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iv

RESUME

AUTEUR:TITER:

Abdel Hakim AjharLa Thorie de l'Unicit de Dieu selon ('al-lrslJad

DEPARTEMENT: Institut des Etudes Islamiques, Universit McGiIlDIPLOME: Matrise s Ans

La conception de l'unicit de Dieu selon al-Juwayni, le dernier penseur du dbutde la priode du kalam Islamique est le sujet de ce mmoire. Malgr qu'il fut un penseurAsh'arite, al-Juwayni tait rceptif la pense Mu'tazilite, plus paniculirement celled'Ab Hiishim al-Jubb'i. De plus, il tait influenc par les philosophes.

Avec al-Juwayni, la thorie de l'unicit de Dieu selon le kalam a atteint sonapoge. Ce qui veut dire que la thorie de l'unicit de Dieu tait base sur desfondements pistmologiques spcifiques pendant la premire poque du ka/iim. Elle vas'arroger sa forme et par consquant, la thorie sera rceptive la possibilit d'tablir unenouvelle approche de l'unicit de Dieu dans le sens ontologique.

Le premier chapitre se concentre sur le long dbat historique concernant l'unicitde Dieu. Il prsente plusieurs aspects de la pense d'alJuwayni et retrace comment celuici a adopt cenains thmes Mu'tazilite de l'cole de B ~ r a partir d'lments Ash'arites.

Le second chapitre analyse la thorie d'al-Juwayni ce sujet et dmontre sacontribution dans son livre aJ-Irshifd la notion d'unicit de Dieu.

Le troisime chapitre termine ce mmoire en mettant en lumire les possibilits


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dgages par al-Juwayni dans l 'approche de l 'unici t de Dicu selon diffrents a n ~ l c sontologiques. En fait, de telles possibilits ont m e r ~ e au sein de la pense d'al-Juwaymlorsque celui-ci a commenc utiliser diffrents concepts: particulirement dans son IivrcIll-'Aqidah al-Nir-iimiyah, Ainsi, aprs qu'il et prouv dans son Ill-/rslwd que Dieu cstl 'existence mme, al-Juwayni va gnralement viter d'utiliscr Ics termes d'atomes ctd'acc ident. A la place, il voyait l 'univers comme tant de deux sortcs, soit l'Eu'cncessaire et les tres possibles. Dans ce contexte, les attributs de Dieu en Hmt qu',\spectsde Son Essence pourraienjouer un rle ontologique diffrcnt, compris d.ms le tcrme IlItakh$i$ .


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TRANSLITBRATION

The Arabie to English transliteration system used in this thesis follows that of thelnstitute of Islamic studies. Il must be noted that hllmzah in the initial position is omited.and simply appcars in the forms of a,i,u, according to its vocalization.

t = , 'ain!> = ' bamzab? = dbt:=ghut' = ,

- = c.g Hishim, al-]uwaynI, Saljllk.b = toP = Qo =qb' =CS = YC J = tho = h IF .IDIIlbtJrsbe =I.t


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Acknowledgments

It is hard to express in a few words. the v:lluable effort of support ami fullparticipation 1 have received from Sausan. my wife. or more precisely illY partner inall things. To her 1 owe my e v e r l a ~ t i n g gratitude.

1would Iike to thank Professor U. Turgay. Director of Institute of Islamic Studies forproviding me with a fellowship for the academic year 1993-94; special thanks tllProfessor E. Ormsby. my teacher weil as my adviser; Professor 1. Boullata forgiving me sorne of his vaIuable time; Professor H. Landolt. and M. Estahlmi.

My greatthanks go also to the staff atthe Institute of Islamic Studies Iibrary for theirassistance. especially S. Ferahian and W. St. T h o m a ~ .

The secretary of lnstitute V. Masse cannot be forgotten, thanks to her and to theeditors of this thesis Richard Cooper. Elizabeth Abbot, and Sh. Nanji in the computerlab.

My friends deserve a1so my thanks for their constant care and help. And specialgratitude must he admitted for a Httle guy, my son Manar. who was understanding of theimportance of his calm during my work on this thesis. He waited till 1had finished mywork to start his demands and even cry.


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Abstraet TABLEOFCONTENTS........................................................................................ '" iivi

Resume ivTranslitcration vAcknowlcdgmcnts vii

Introduction- 1Chaptcr I- The Historieal Devclopment of the Problem 13

1.1- The Attempts at Creating One Method for Determiningail Beings 14

1. 2- Other Aspects of the Problem 211. 3- The Logical Aspect 231. 4- New Strategy in the Mu'tazilite School 30

Chaptcr ll AIJuwayni's Theory in K. aJ-Irshiid 45II. 1- The Theory of States (AQwiil) 49II. 2- What it is Necessary to Say of God 52II. 3- The Essential Attributes 57II. 4- The Truth of Similarity and Difference 58II. 5- The Negative Essential Attributes 64II. 6- The Affirmation of Knowing the Attributes of Ma'iini 66II.7-The Attributes that Necessitat their Qualifications 69II. 8-The Benefit of UsingMa'iini 74II. 9- TheMeaning ofGod's Names 75II. 10-The Traditional Attributes (aJ-$iliir aJkhabaryah) 77

Conclusion 83Select Biblography 91


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Introduction

. ;


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2ln dealing with the history of the Ash'arite ka/m, two thinkers reecive most of

the atlention, Ahu all;lasan alAsh'ari (d. 324/946), the founder of this sehool, andAhu 1:lamid alGhazali (d. 5051111), who is considered most often as the great exponentof his school against many others, philosophers, Mu'tazilites and Balinites. Thiscommon understanding was in fact imposed by certain historical circumstanees ducto the political and religiou\ clements. AbO all;lasan alAsh'ari appeared in a veryanxious moment in Islamie history when there was connict hetween the Mu'tazilites,who had fallen l'rom power but had not disappearcd l'rom the cultural and religiouspresence, and the l;Ianbalites, the orthodox Muslims, who were resisting, bothreligiously and politically their opponents' atlempts to summon.

Although alAsh'ari's thought ean he traced baek in many points to theprevious tradition, his importance cornes l'rom his effort to formulate these issuesinto one coherent theory. The theory of mll'iini, for instance, whereby the additionaland etemaJ attributes of Gad are different from His essenCe as weil as from each other,is to he found in his predecessor Ibn Kulliib (d. 240/862) who was the lirst creatorof such theory. t The notion of uncreatedness (ghayr makhlq) of the Holy Qur'iin ClIOaJso he found as one of the Ibn Kulliib's views, as weil as Al;1mad Ibn I;IanbaJ.

With respect to the theory of how to interpret the arnbiguous passages in theQur'iin coneeming those passages which extemaJly, ?ahiran, Iiken Gad in sorne way toHis creatures, alAsh'ari also adopted the view of Anas Ibn Miilik, the lirst to helieve thatthese passages must he taken as they arc without asking how (bilikllyf). AlAsh'ari a1s0recognized the issue of the possibility of the vision of Gad, which was pronounced byaJI;Iiirith b. Asad aJMul;tasibi (d. 243/665) in his book aJTllwahum.2

Il is needless to seek here for the sources of aJl the issues that aJAsh'arimentioned. The conclusion we arc Irying to arrive at is that the great position aJAsh'ari holds in Islarnic history is to he found. lirst, in his capacity to create abaJanced view, taking into account bath revelation and the reason, with sorne


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inclination towards the former; and secondly, in his uhility 10 rcfute und criticil.ehis opponents ut u time in which u speciul son of person, polilieully und rcligiouslyspeaking wus needed.

Ab I;\iimid ul-Ghuzali cume inlo view in Islumic hblOly us u grcut Ash'urileIhinker when he fuced two fronts Ihat bec ume dangerous l'rom Ihe Sunni-Suljukstate's point of view, Ihe Ismu'iIiles and the philosophers. AI-Ghuzlili's llehievemenlcan bc found in his reeslablishing the Sunni doclrine Ihal wus the ideology of theSaljk stale, and in his criticism of the Balinites and philosophers. But l'rom udifferent point of view al-Ghuziili did not present a syslemutie and coherent theory,rather he offers many theories--whlch mostly contradict each other--in different fieldsin the context of his evolving refutation of other groups. As Ibn Sab'in notesdescribing al-Ghaziili: "He is mixture combining the contraries, and confusionundermines people's hearts. Sometimes he is a mystic, at another he is a philosopher,the third an Ash'arite, the fourth a jurist, and the fifth time he is confusing" 3.

Although al-Juwayni Iived in anxious times bctween two differcnt kinds ofstates, the Buwayhi and the Saljk. and though he was Iike ail the Ash'arites ut thattime subject to the inquisition (miPnal. most of his writings werc completed in astable political situation, after Alb Arsliin and his vizir N i ~ a m al-Mulk hadrcconsidered the Ash'arites and brought them to their high position.

AI-Juwayni occupied a very important role in the Saljk-Sunni state. Hewas. bcsides others Iike Ab al-Qasim al-Qushayri (d. 4bS/I072l. head of theeducation system instituted by N i ~ i i m al-Mulk. The importance of al-Juwaynicannot, therefore. bc sought chielly in his historical circurnstances nor in hisability to attack bis opponents. ln other words. the historical position of alJuwaynialone does not help us so much in our attempt to understand his importance athnkerIt might he said that because the most dominant method in the studies dealing with


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4the history of Islamic thought still relies either on analyzing such thought in termsof historical c i r ~ u m s t a n c e s or searching for the foreign clements that inOuenced thisthought, alJuwayni has not had a great attention from the scholars. Apart fromthese methods, which- in our view- arc not proper to discover the special structurethat any discourse trics to build. al-Juwayni should be studied in terms of hisposition in the carly kll/m's discourse. This is bccause. he represents the climacticpoint of this discourse in the Ash'arites' line. Thus, in analyzing the contribution ofal-Juwayni to the carly kIl/m with reference to the kIl/m discourse itself. notthrough historical or foreign elements, wc can arrive at a measure of his greatimportance.

Needless to say. when we talk about the kll/iim discourse in this study we meanthe metaphysics of the ka/am from its establishing by Ab a1Hudhayl a1'Alliif (d.235/857) to Ab a1-Ma'ii1i a1Juwayni. The metaphysics which is built on the sameepistemological basis, namely bcings and their attributes.

By the method of analyzing the discourse in terms of the discourse itself ismeant seeking for the way that the discourse builds and arranges itself according tocertain principles. The aim here is to disclose the consistencies, harmonies andcontradictions. as weil as the disparities, whatever they may be. that the discoursecontains. That is to say, every discoursephilosophically speaking--even though itsattempt to create its own coherent system still suffers from the contradictionsbctween the concepts within it, from the gaps and inequalities bctween its levels.4The development, evaluation or creation of a different system proceeds mostly fromthese sorts of disparities. which are not overcome in the available discourse that is thesubject of this criticism. In other words the criticism, whether i t cornes from theadherents of a particular discourse or from other fields of thinking, emerges from thedefects or disharmonies that this discourse a1lows to creep tbrough.

In elaborating the kalfm's thought according ta this type of analysis, we shall,


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6ku/iim_ God and His attribules represenl lhe firsl onlological principle lhal heslowsupon ail other heings lheir exislence.

ln lhe ku/iim, lhe issue of lhe unily of God was nol merely a religious issue,il was, slriclly speaking, an onlological and a logical one. Thal is 10 say, every kallnlheory aboullhe unily of God inevilably enlails a special underslanding of crealion, onone hand, and involves a definile lheory aboul lhe judgmenls (ulJkim) lhat can heasserted about God, on the other hand.

Ali the MuCtazilites, for instance, agreed that the attributes of God are directlydue to and hence identical with God's essence. They ail except for Ab aIHudhayl aI-cAllaf, said that these attributes are not macini, additional to or identical with God'sessence. Rather, ail propositions applicable to God are due to God's essence, ailpredicates in these propositions find their origin in God's essence. God knows andwills, by virtue of Himself. The theory of the unity of God according to the MuCtaziiitesrigorously relies on the absolute uni'v of God; they reject any other entities, whateverlhey may he, in association with the essence of God.Because of their helief that the selfattributes ( ~ j f i j t aJdhit) of God are identical withHis essence, the MuCtaziiites, therefore, were compelled to decide that the attribute ofwill is a created attribute, not an eternal one. This helief in generated will wasnecessary for the MuCtaziiites in order to justify the creation out of nothing. That is,inasmuch as the physical world is created in time, the will as the means of creationcannot he eternal. This is hecause the eternal attribute would necessarily entail eternalcreation as a result of God's action.

The MuCtaziiites, though they proved the absolute unity of God, were confusedabout the logical aspect of the unity of God until the coming of Ab Hashim alJubba'i(d. 321/943). The question was as follows: how can an additional predicate he putheside the subject (God) in the propositions. God is knowing. powerful, hearing...etc.7Different answers have becn advanced. as we shall sec in chapter one. to this question.


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7Only AbO Hshim under Ihe influence of Ihe Iheory of Ihe allrihulislS liS Prof. Wolfsonpoinls oul,S admiled Ihal Ihe allribules of God lire stliles (u!III'II/) differellt frolll Iheessence.

The Ash'ariles' conlinuily wilh Ihe prcvious Irlldilion represented hy Ihn Kulliih,who is considered as one of Ihe Ihree greal founders of the Ash':U"ile sehool, hclievedIhal Ihe allribules of God are ma'ilni, addilional 10 God's essence; Ihey .Ire ncilheridenlical with God's ,:.,sence nor olher than He. In Ihis way the t\sh'ariles prcserved Iheetemity of the allribute of will, and spcech in order to prove lliat the Holy Qur'iin is nolcreated. According to the Ash'ari tes, because of the ahsolule freedom of God,ontologically speaking, He can possess His will eternally and create Ihe physicalworld out of nothing in a chosen moment of time.

A1though the logical aspect was c1earer and more Iinguistically appropriale, theonlological aspect still suffered from a lack of conviclion. Although logically, ail thepredicates of God, such as being knowing, willing, hearing, powerful etc. arc derivedfrom the marifnj subsisting in God's essence, these mariini funclion as (ma$iidir) in amerely linguistic sense, as prcdicales in propositions about God. There is no problem,then, for the Ash'arites to admit addilional predicates to the subject (God).

After resorting for a long time to the theme of the etemity of God's will, alJuwayni provided this idea with a new philosophical interprelation. He maintains thateven the creation is generated by virtue of the eternal will; it is a result of aparticularization (takh$i$) of it. AI-Juwayni in this inventive conception gives anontologieal interpretation to the theory of marini. He holds that the mariini have twoaspects, one etemal and subsisting in God's essence, the other generated by its beingparticularizcd in the sensible world.6 The same can be applied to the attribute of speech.

On the logical side, al-JuwaynI insists that these marani are merely mentalcauses by which the propositions applied to God become possible; without these marinisuch propositions c?uld not he understood. The predicates of God, therefore, are caused


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8by ma'iini or 'ilal inherent in God's essence, Furthermore, these predicates or aW$fare states (alJwi/) that cannot be said to be existent or non-existent. But contrary tothe view of Ab Hashim, the inventor of the theory of states, these alJwil are known.One who knows the essence does not necessarily know the predicates of this esscnce; thepredicates arc hence known separately from the essence.

As it was for the predecessors of al-Juwayni, the problem is due to the way inwhich the attributes of God can be ascribed to Him by a convenient justification. Thestatements God is knowing, willing, an so forth need to be rightly vindicated. Thelogic of the mutnka/limn in general and the Ash'arites in particular was derivedfrom the grarnrnar of the Arabic language.

With reference to Arabic grammar, the controversy among the mutnkallimncentered on the question of whence the attributes (aw$iif) such as knowing, willing,powerful etc. were derived. For this reason we repeatedly read in the Ash'ariteliterature the statement directed against the Mu'tazilites challenging them to answerthe question of the' infinitive of God's aW$iif. Are these aW$f such as knowing,willing etc., due to the essence itself or to infinitives which inhere in the essence?For the Ash'arites, these aw$f must, according to the Arabic language, be derived fromdefinite mll$iiclir; knowing should he derived from the mll$dar knowledge, willingfrom will etc.

Though aI-Juwayni kept the fundamental belief of his SChOlll, which states thatthe predicates applied to God are derived from ma cani, he adopted Ab Hashim'stheory that these predicates are alJwiil. In addition to this point aI-Juwayni stronglyemphasizes that these maciini, which are mll$iidir of derivation, are "mental causes"(Ci/al Caq/iynh); they are mental existents (mawjdat dhihniynh), absolutely differentfrom the essences, which are real existents, mawjdiit f i a1-a'yiin. In this way aIJuwayni avoided two big problems. The flfSt is that by negation no real entity canpossibly he ascribcd te Gad save the mental entities (maciinll without which the


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predication to God wou Id be impossible. The second is in escaping the dilemnm ofthe predicates, i.e., whether or not these predicates arc different IlIv$iIf from God'sessence. Thus, in his adoption the theory of states, which presupposes that predicatesare neither existent nor non-existent, these predicates become aspects of God tlmt Ci\llbe known separately but do not exist apart from the essence. Besides his emphasis onthe a1,Iwii/ as additional aspects in the epistemological sense, al-Juwayni also insistsrepeatedly that without these a1)wii/ wc could not elaborate the sameness anddifferences among things. Chapter two explains this.

Al-Juwayni thus provided the Ash'arite school with some philosophicalmomentum by adopting certain Mu'tazilite themes and philosophical ideas such asthe necessarily Being (wiijib a/-wujd) for God to distinguish Him from possiblebeings which are known by the fore-knowledge of God.

In a/-Shiimi/ f i U$/ a/-din, al-Juwayn constantly mentions two names as hismain sources, Ab Ishaq al-Isfara'n. who was his teacher when he was young, and AbuBakr al-Baqilliin (d. 403/1025) who espoused the philosophy of atomism and when wasthe second major thinker in the Ash'arite school after ils founder al-Ash'ari. The implicitbut clear source for him in a/-Shiimi/ is the Mu'tazilite thinker Ab Hiishim al-JubbiPi.Though he embraced many of his ideas al-Juwayni argues with him on those mallerswhere he does not agree with him. In K. a/-Irshiid, an intensive and mature work, alJuwayni does not mention his sources from his school. Rather he declares more franklybis objections to the founder of the Ash'arite school.

The first chapter of this study focuses on the heated historical controversyamong the MU'tazilites thernselves and later with the Ash'arites. A controversy whichalways left the door open for more evaluation and development in the kaliim discourse.this controversy in tbis chapter centers on two points: first, demonstrating the unity ofGo


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of inference of the invisible (a/-ghii'ib) from the visible ( I J / - . ~ h i i h i d ) . This was themajor point in thc criticism directed by the Ash'arites to the Mu'tazilites.

AnalY1.ing and describing the theory of al-Juwayni_ how he tried to overcomethe lacks in both schools, how he combined many i d e a ~ from different sourcesinlo one theory, and drove the ka/am discourse to ilS ultimate points_ is the subject ofthe second chapter.

Finally, the conclusion allempts to touch on both aspects of al-Juwayni'slhought, the completion and overcoming of the troublesome points in the ka/am ingeneral and in the Ash'arite school in particular, and how this allempt threw the ka/amdiscourse into a new crisis that couId only he resolved by creating a fundamentalshift in many aspects.


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I l

1 Ibn Ku\liib, Ab Sa'id alQa\liin (d.240/862) Iived in Ihe lime of Ihe Abbasl cllliph, IlIMIl'mun(191211/813833), and w.. . one of Ihe most imponanl figures in lhe hislory of lsIamic kll/illl, 10 whumore due mosl of the Ash'orile issues. He criticizcd the school of Johm b. ~ u f w i i n and Ihe Qiillirilcs. Ilewas conlemporary 10 alMu!)iisibl, and une of Ihe mllslers of Ihe Sufi Ill-Junllyd. Ihn Kullahmainlained thal lhe world is generated and has a beginning, and God is IInnsccndel1l nhovc 1111anlh",pomorphic qualilies and should hc described in the same way lhal Hc dcscribes lIi '"self. IhnKulliib believes in Ihe possibilily of lhe vision of God, Ilnd in Ihe uncrealedness of Ihe huiY Qur'an,Moreover, lhc Iheory of Ihc allribules of God os ma'ilni was hcld by Ibn Kullllb. Sec Ibn TllymiYllh,Minhiij ohl olsunnoh, cd. M.R. Slllim, (Clliro, 1385 hl, vol. 2, p. 251. Ilnd al-Subki, T"h"'I"' III-shiif'iyuh olkubrii, (Cairo, 1 3 ~ 4 hl, vol. 2, p.51. Ibn 'Asflkir, TI/hyin klldllih 1l1-IIIUll'lll, ell. Il . Qudsl,(Damascus, 1347hl, p.116. and al-Ash'ari, Moqiiliir ol.i.


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Chapter 1- The Historical Developmentof the problem


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Most reports dealing with the history of the kIIl1Im consider Jahm h. Safwall(d.128n46) lhe first lheologian to speak widely about the issue of the lInity ofGod. Thesame reports do nol mention, in regard 10 the same issue, the opinion of his contempomry

W ~ i 1 b. 'All' (13In48),the founder of the Mu'tazilite school, with lhe exception of al-Shahrastni who makes a very short stalement about W ~ i 1 ' s notion. According 10 alShahrastni:

W ~ i 1 negaled God's allributes, such as knowlcdge, power, will and Iife, hutthisrudimentary statement was undeveloped, so W ~ i 1 maintained his opposition 10those who believed in the reality of allributes, lhat he who posits a marna as anelemal attribute ~ i r u h , posits two gods. 1

Regardless of whether this short statement was really made by W ~ i l or is seenthrough the eyes of the later Mu'tazilite thinkers, it is not extensive enough in order tnfumish an approach to the emergence of the question of God's unity. By c o n t r a . ~ l , in thecase of Jahm b. 1;iafwn we have various detailed reports concerning the questionmentioned above. Thus, we read in almi/al of alShahrastani, the following p a . ~ s a g e :

Jahm believed that it is not pennilled to describe God in terms by which Hiscreatures can be described too. We cannot say,God is existent, living, knowing,witling , because these terms can be predicated upon bath God and man; howeverwe can say that God is creator, actor, powerful, because these terms can only hepredicated upon God 2

The point to be noticed, with respect to this beginning, is that the unity of Godhad been established upon bath positive and negative s t a t e m e n t ~ . In positive statements,the terms which belong only to Gad Hirnself can be applied, whereas negative terms areapplied in order to exalt Gad abave ail other beings, and to formulate the unity of God inan absolutely transcendent way.

This early allempt indicates that the unity of Gad may simultaneously realizetwo goals, to deprive Gad, on the one hand, of ail predicates that can possibly Iiken Him


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14

to other bcings, and, on the olher hand, 10 de termine God in some partieular predicatcsbelonging only 10 Him, by which God can be underslandable, especially bccause Jahmbclieves that truc bclief is 10 know GOd.3 Therefore, the point hcre is that, in his use ofpositive as weil as negative terms, Jahm inlended in a primitive way to predicate uponGod the allributes that olher bcings do not have, as weil as to determine God as havingHis own particular allributes by virtue of Himself, with no other being participatingwith Him in such allributes. This point will bc the basic ground upon which aillater mUlukallimn would base their efforts to create a proper formula conceming thequestion of the determination of God's unity .

ln addition to those beginnings which emerged with Jahm b. ~ a f w a n , the last halfof the second and the first half of the third century of the Hijroh are considered theformation pcriod of kaliim and a founding era in the history of Islamic theology. InIhat period we encounter the three great thinkers, Ab al-Hudhayl al-'Allaf (d.235/857), Mu'ammar b. 'Abbad (cl. 220/842), and Ibn Kullab (d. 240/862), whoseIhought inlluenced the whole following movement of the kaliim.

'Ibc attempts al creating one method for determining aIl beings:The Mu'tazilite Ab aI-Hudhayl aI-'Allar, (d. 235/857) is considered, according tomost available sources, the founder of the cosmological philosophy of the kaliim, thephilosophy upon which ail the mUlakallimn in the early period, Mu'tazilites andAsh'arites, depcnded, and the philosophy by which the kaliim formulated its ownview conceming the determination of being.

A central idea in the Qur'an is the concept of the oneness of God ( Taw{lid),which wa.s understood by the kaliim, and ontologically established by Ab al Hudhayl,a.s a means of purifying God from ail elements or conceptions that may disturbsuch absolute transcendental Unity.

Two significant points must he understood in relation to the view established by


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Abu al-Hudhayl: the concept of the unity of God. and the concept of a physical thingor body. For the former. Abu al-Hudhayl affirmed "w'tini as allrihutes of God. huthe identified such ma'iiIIi with God's esscnce:4 since, for Ahli al Hudhayl. Goll knowsby virtue of a knowledge. this knol"ledge is He. and the sUlnc hoilis truc for the rest ofaltributes.s ln dealing with the physicalthing. Ahu al-Hudlmyl eSlilhlished the kll/mll'satomie philosophy. whieh wouId constitue the cosmologieal altitude of ail mlllaJGlllimll1lin the carly period. Mu'tazilites and Ash'ari tes alike. Sueh philosophy regards thephysical world as a sum of things or bodies. each thing as composed of group ofatoms together with their accidents. Eaeh atom is considered as the ultimate constituentelement. and sueh an element is charaeterizcd. on one hand. as non-divisihle and. onthe other. as capable of receiving accidents. In other words. ail existents in Ihe contextof Abu al-Hudhayl's philosophy including God Himself. are trcated as hipartite: thething and its attributes or qualities.

Abu al-Hudhayl depieted the general view of the universe and elaborated theworld as the sum of things: every thing is constituled from an cssence wilh itsattributes. with respect to God. and from atoms with their accidents. with respect tophysical things.6 ln his philosophy. Abu al-Hudhayl although he also viewed the wholeof existence as separated units called things or beings. adduced two manners ofdetermination of these beings. God as the only perfect being is determined by and inHimself. nothing can affect His essence. nothing can grant Him His altributes. whilethe physical thing as a completely subordinate being is totally engendercd.

The qualities or accidents of physical thing are ail non-essential andconstantly changing by virtue of the other level of existence. Ail accidents includingthe akwan-composition. separation. motion and rest-are occasioned by virtue of thewill ofGoo;7 while the attributes ofGod are all essential. fixed and absolutely identifiedwith the essence.

Abu al-Hudhayl's atomic philosophy though it was accepted in general by both


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16

Mu'ta1.ililes and Ash'arites was a1so subjecllo reformalion, modification and even hardcrilicism by bolh. Two major poinls in Ab al-Hudhayl's view would bc a subjecl ofwork for laler mutukul/imn. The firsl is Ihe relation bclween God's essence and Ilsaltribules, since Ab al-Hudhayl was influenced by Arislol1e who says Ihal God iswholly life and knowledge, elc. 5uch a belief in Ihe altribules as ma'iini and anidenlification of essence and ma'iini would open up a greal conlroversy amongsucceeding mutakaJJimn. The second point is to be found in the basic kaliim law,which is the inference of the invisible on the basis of the visible. (qiyis u/ghiPib 'ulii u/-.hiihid). That is, mutakallimn especially the Ash'arites, proceeding from thephilosophy of the thing, he Id the principle of the analogy the invisible level from thevisible one in order to deal, equally on the same principles, wilh ail bcings in exislence.ln other words, such a law allows us to understand and regard God by means of Ihe samefoundations on which other beings. the physical ones. can be regarded. On this basis theAsh'ariles criticized Ab al-Hudhayl's prescription of two methods in the determinationbcings: the determination of and by essence itself with respect to God. and thedetermination by means of something additional in regard to physical things. Thus thephilosophy of Ab al-Hudhayl was criticized as not bcing a systematic philosophy.8

Ab al-Hudhayl's great contemporary. Mu'arnmar b. 'Abbad (d. 220/842).altempted to provide a harmonized view of ail bcings in the universe. including GadHimself. on the basis of Ab aI-Hudhayl's atomic philosophy. He established a veryimportant and signilicant theory conceming the determination of bcing. Ab aIHudhaylhad struggled to balance two different relations bctween the thing and its qualities, thussacrilicimg a consistent altitude towards the universe. Mu'arnmar reformulated therelation between the two sides by means of a philosophically inventive theory in thehistory of thought. For Mu'arnmar. the accidents or (u/-akwun)-composition. separation.motion. rest and ail other accidents that determine being-occur by means of ma'iini. In apassage reported by aI-Ash'ari in aJ-Maqiilift we read the following:


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17

A body, when it is moved, is moved only on uecount of u ml/'ml, which is the[cause of the] motion. Were it not for this, there would he no reason for this body,rather than for another body, to he moved at the time at which it is moved rulherthan to have heen moved at some prior time. Since Ihis is so, it may similarly hereasoned with regard to the motion that, if lhere was no ml/'nii on accounl ofwhich it was the motion of the body moved, there would he no reuson for il to hethe motion of the body rather than the motion of some other body. And so thisma'na is a ma'nii of the motion of the body moved on account of still anothermarna, but there is no totality and sum 10 the ma'iin;; and they luke place nI nsingle time. The same holds true of blaek and white, lhal is of the fact thut il isthe black of one body rather than of anolher and it is the white of one rUlher thnnof another.9

From Ab al-l;Iusayn al-Khayyat (d. 280/902), the Mu'tazilite lhinker, we hnveanother report coneeming MU'ammar's theory of ma'iini. Al-Khayyal states that:

Mu'ammar supposed that if there were two bodies at rest, and one of them shouldstart to move rather than the other, that he, Mu'ammar, believes that a ma'mlshould abide in one and not in the other. Mu'ammar adds that if this is a eorrectjudgment, there is then certainly another marna, by which the former ma'niihas abided in the body and caused the motion, and that if some one asks, whatcauses the second ma 'na, my answer (Mu'ammar says) will he the same answerwhich was given in order to explain the first ma 'na, and so those ma'ni causeeuch other in an infinite way.lo

These ma'iini, as al-Shahrastiini explains are not the accidents. Rather ma'iin;cause the accidents, since every single accident abides in a substrate, and it abides bymarna which necessitates it.11 This reasoning, of course, led to a helief in successiveorder, or the daim in the causality, and Mu'ammar adds that motion differs from otheraccidents not by itself (la bidhariha), but by the marna which necessitates thedifference. Furthermore, the theory of ma'iini inte1Jrets difference and sameness inown particular terms. That is to say,

Two things which are mutually other (aJghayrayni) are mutually other by meansof a marna and the same holds true of two like things or two contrary things (aJli/(iini) or two different things (aJmukhraJilni). It can he said, therefore, that


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18

Mu'ammar and his followers mainlain lhal lhe ma'nii musl inevilably bc olherlhan anylhing cise, from whenee il follows lhal ils olherness from anylhing elseis due 10 a second ma'nii exisling by means of lhe firsl ma'nii. Now lhis secondmarnii musl inevilably bc eilher like anolher marnii or olher lhan il and differentfrom il. Bul ils likeness as weil as its olherness and difference is due to a thirdma 'm, existing by means of the second ma'nii.12What is quile readily seen from the above passages is that, a1though Mu'ammar

proceeds from the same kaliim tenets. namely, that the world is composed of substances(atoms) and accidents, he argues that accidents are nol the direct creation of God, sinceGad docs not create anything but bodies. 13 Accidents occur or are occasioned by meansof ma'iinf. which reflect the causes of accidents. Mu'ammar. then, held the same structurelhat was cosmologically established by Ab a1-Hudhayl. This structure was theoreticallybased on belief in the atomic view: that a thing consists of two levels, one of themrepresenting the active cause or deterrninant principle.14 while the other is caused anddetennined. This laUer cannot bc isolated by and in itself; it is a1ways dependent uponthe fonner. the detenninant principle. and must a1ways bc fonned according to action ofefficient cause. 'Abd al-Qiihir al-Baghdadi likewise insists that the mariini cause theaccidents. from outside the body. and we find in a1-Baghdadi the passage which reads:

AI-Ka'bi, in his trcatise, reports in the narne ofMu'arnmar that motion, accordingto him. differs from rest only by virtue of a marnii outside of it and in the sarneway rest differs from motion in vinue of a marnii outside of it, and these twomariini differ from two mariini other than themselves. This reasoning accordingto him. maygo on to infinity.ls

Mu'arnmar. in order to theorize upon the deterrnination of a thing in its particularbcing. replaced the direct creation by God of accidents, by an infinite chain of mariini,while maintaining the idea that accidents are pennanently caused by something else. Thissomething else as a cnuse is a1ways imminent with the accident as a caused thing, sincemarnii is onen tnken as lb l equivalent of the tenn "cause" (riIla).16


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19

There is no doubt thatthe relation between the two levels bccame with Mu'amllUir morcphilosophical and doser than wilh Ab al-Hudhayl. The poinl here is Ihnl Ihe Icrm 11111"1111nearly always means, in one sense or another, an inlrinsic, delerminant COlUSC uf somc rCOIIaspect of the being of Ihe subjecl. 17 Thus with Mu'ammar's theory, Ihe rCOII attcmpt 10define determination of bcing could take place and, furthermore, attcmpts 10 OIpprOilch 01being in its particular existence could be given new momentum.

Interestingly. we notice that Mu'ammar overcome Ab 1 I 1 - H u d h n y l ' . ~ dcfccl inregard to the issue (lf the determinalion of bcing. Mu'ammar systcmatically, for thc firsttime, applied '.lis theory of ma'ani, to all beings including God Himsclf. 1t is this whichgives his theory additional importance in the history of Islamic Ihoughl. We arc told IhnlMu'arnmar said:

God is knowing by virtue of knowledge, and His knowledge, belongs 10 Him byvirtue of a marna and this marna occurred in virtue of another marna, and thalgoes on in infinite succession, and the same holds true cuncerning ail of God'sattributes.18

This text helps us to realize the extent to which Mu'ammar's theory wouldinfluence the Ash'arite school on the issue of the unity ofGod.

Regardless of the adjustments made to Mu'arnmar's theory in the later ka/am,this theory, in its structure and ils way of understanding, thoroughly influenced the lattermutakaJlimn , Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites. And as we shall sec, the first usage ofMu'arnmar's theory would appear with the first opponent of the Mu'tazilites on Ihe issueofunity of Go


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20

here means, withoul beginning (qudim).19According 10 al-Ash'ari, who adopted Ibn Kullb's opinion, Ibn Kullb and his

followers said: "Thal God is uneeasing (lum yuzul), wilh His names and altributes,unceasing as knowing, powerful, living, seeing, hearing, generous, great. and havingmajesly". He further states that Ibn Kullb and his followers "altributed to God.knowledge, power. hearing. vision,life and speech."2a ln another text, alAsh'ari explainsIbn Kullb's theory of God's altributes as being of affirmed and superadded ma'iini; bysaying that Ibn Kullb considers ail these altributes as altributes of essence ($ifildhl). He docs not distinguish hetween an essenee's attributes and attributes of action($ifiil uPl). and aceording to him. the attributes of God are the same as His names. IbnKullb takes two attribules as heing identical with God's essence, namely existenceand thingness (aJ-shay'iyah). God is nol existent in vinue of existence, and He is a thingnot in the sense of having anything; other than these two altributes. existence.thingness. The rest of the altributes can neither be said to be identieal with God'sessence. nor not to he identical with His essence. The same also holds true conceming thealtributes themselves; these attributes cannot he said either to he identical with eachother, or not to he identical with each other.21

Ibn Kullb deals with matiini as heing applied to bath kinds of heings, God andbodies. This is also a systematic view. by which ail beings in existence, including GodHimself. are determined in the same manner. But while ma'nii is an equivalent toaltribute ($ifah) with respect to God, it is equivalent to accident ( 'aral) with respect tothe body. In the case of bodies. ma'iini subsisting in them are called. by Ibn Kullab.things. attributes ($ial) and accidents.22 For additional information conceming the termattribute. we rearl in aJ-Maqiiliit that the attribute according to Ibn Kullab "cannot hedescrihed or qualified (aJ-$ifah Iii t$aI). and cannot subsist in virtue of itself. rather itmust subsist in the essence (dhiit) ofGod.23 The theory of matiini. therefore. as aJreadystated. was reformulated with Ibn Kullab. The notion of the infinite causality ofma'iini


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21

is strietly avoided by him.Now. with Ab al-Hudhayl's atomie philosophy Ihal regards the thing as essence

and qualities, Mu'ammar's the ory of ma'ni, and Ibn Kullub's particular underslandingof that theory. we beeome aware of the major features that wholly form Ihe fUlurediscussion and development in the ka/linl .

Other aspects of the problem :The general features of this line of Ihinking, as given abave, which eoneern Ihe

unity of God or the determination of being, were not the sole line of thinking in theka/am, Indeed many attempts had been made in order propcrly to formulale a slanee,from whieh one couId draw an adequate view of the issue of unity of Gad .

The line of thought established by the aforementioned thinkers represenls Ihemore philosophieal attempt. and the more aeeepted one. whieh beeame laler on Ihesubjeet of thorouhgoing discussion among Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites.Regardless of the standpoints expressed by anthropomorphists (a/-mushabbihal. and bythose who believed that God is a body (a/-mujassimahl, sueh as Hisham b. al-l:Iakam,our eoneem here is to trace the major direction of thought that widely dominated IheIslamie kaliim and had ils outeome in aI-Juwayni's formulations.

There is no doubt that the B ~ r i a n sehool of the Mu'tazilites played the main rolein this partieular line's development. but apart from this line of thinking. we Iind withinthe Mu'tazilite school many points of view taken in order to realizc the true unity ofGad.

A I - N ~ and J;>irir expressed an attitude whieh ean be ealled "negation bymeans of affirmation" mcaning that ail God's esscntial attributes must be negated. Godis knowing. willing. powerful, in virtue of Himself, but if positive attributes suehknowledge and power are attributed to God. it is only to negate the opposite attributessueh as ignorance or powerlessness. because these attributes are not allowed to be


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22applied to GOd.24 Sorne of the Mu'tazilites argued, however, that God has attributes suchas knowledge and power, "J these attributes arc not predicated upon His essence, butrather upon their objects, the object known and willed (a/ma'1m wa/ maqdr). Sorne ofthem considered that any kind of attribution to God whether, positive or negative, isdelinitely wrong, and by contrast they refused to say either that God is knowing, willing,or living, or that God is ignorant, powerless, or dead.2s But a11 of them were inagreement on the fact that the truc unity of God must be understood in terms of thenegation of any additional or positive attributes. They admitted that God can be orshould be described in terms of other positive attributes, because God deserves theseattributes in virtue of Himself, not in virtue of ($iat) or ma'iini superadded to Hisessence.

The previous points of view, particularly those of Ab a1-Hudhayl, Mu'ammarand Ibn Ku11iib, on the determination of being either by means of itself or through ma'iinisuperadded to il, and the issue of the determination of being in general and the unity ofGod in particular, awaited new discussion and new contributions, especially by Ab 'Alial Jubbii'i, who theorized the Mu'tazilites' position and gave it a more philosophicalslant, and Ab a1'l;Iassan a1-Ash'ari. who reacted against his master Ab 'Ali and leanedtowards Ibn Ku11iib's theory. That is to say. a1-Ash'ari. who established the secondmajor school next to the MU'tazilites in the Islamic kaliim. fo11owed Ibn Ku11ab's stand,though with sorne adaptation.

The efforts of the mutakallimn fo11owing these threc thinkers would be centredupon formulating a coherent and systematic view of being to actualize the kaliim'sfavorite law, "the analogy from the visible to the transcendental world" (qiyiis al-ghi'ib'alii alshiihid). This meant that the ka/iim's endeavor should be to achieve the rules bywhich a coherent picturc of the determination of being could be realized while keepingat the same time the unity of God absolutely transcendental and pure. Therefore, inorder to solve such a difficull question according 10 the kaliim's way of thinking,


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23Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites wouId fight with as weil as influence ellch llther; thisconflict and influence wou Id be manifested in the constant contributions presented by thegreat thinkers from both schools. The debate about the above question WIlS Illllilllyamong the Ash'arites and the MU'tazilites, and in our dealing with the signifiClllltthinkers of the kil/am, especially in the B a ~ r i a n branch, we meet Abu 'Ali ul-Jubbll'i.Ab 'Ali al-Jubbii' (d. 303/913), WIlS one of the grelltest musters in the B I I ~ r i l \ nMu'tazilite school, and it was to him the presidency of this school went, lifter Abu 111-Hudhayl al-'Alliif.26 AIJubbii' systematized what was implicit in his predecessllrs'efforts, by reformulating many aspects of the Mu'tazilites' doctrine, particullirlyconceming the issue of the unity of God .

First, with Ab 'Ali, the formula of how the attributes belong to God's essence isexpressed in a different way from that of Ab al-Hudhayl. God, according to Ab 'Ali,deserves His attributes (knowing, powerful, living, existent) $ifilll/-dhiil for Himself.27This formula means that God deserves to be described as knowing, willing, living andexistent not by means of mll'iini superadded to His essence, and not in terms of sayingthat God's attributes are God Himself as weil; rather God by His very nature deservesthese attributes.

In fact this change in the formula does not present a perfect solution to thespecific relation between the essence and its attributes. We can find similar s t a t e m e n l ~ inscattered Mu'tazilite writings which indicate that the main problem of how the allributescan be predicated of God's essence was still difficult to solve. Do these attributesreflect or identify the essence itself'? Or are they parts of this essence, or do they reflectsorne things additional to the essence? If the former is the case, then the essence, besidesthe fact that il is not independent, is also presupposed to be plural or to containplurality; if the latter is the case, the attributes indicate something else existing eternallybeside God, and God in this case is lacking other entities outside of Himself to bedetermined.


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The l o ~ c a l aspec! in a l - J u b b i i ~ i ' 8 view:AI-Jubbii'i gives the follow ing description ofGod knowing:

The meaning of one's describing God as knowing (ma'nii alwa$fi liJJiihi biunnuhu 'iilimun) is (a): the assertion of His reality (ilhbiilUhu); (b) : that He iscontrary to whatever cannot know, that he who says that He is ignorant states afalse proposition; (c): an indication that therc arc things that He knoWS.28

The Mu'tazilites' view as depicted by al-Jubbii'i is based on two major categories,whereby the being can he detennined. These two main categories are the being itselfand the quality that helongs to it. The thing as either essence (al-dhiil) or thing (shay'LGod is called a thing as welUs treated as the basic unit in the whole of the kaliim'sphilosophy; the universe is nothing else than things (ashiyiP), essences (dhawiil), eachessence having its own qualities or attributes that make it different and distinguishablefrom other things.29

For the quality or the prcdicate of the subject (the thing), the dilemma that wasfaced by the thrce previous thinkers concerning the way in which the unity of Godmust he detennined naturally led the mulakalJimn to another question, this lime aboutthe logical aspect. In all the attempts prcsented by the three theologians, the attributesof Go


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an underslanding. lnslead. he slaled Ihal Ihe allribules arc absolulety subordimllc 10essence ilself. since the allribules of God arc affirmed. in order 10 express cilhcr Ihcassertion (ithbiit) of the essence of God. or to express thc "posilivc" ncglllillltcharacterislic of God (1I/-slI/b) as knowing and nol ignorant. BUI ahhough Ihis lInswcrthe queslions: What are Ihese altribules? How do Ihey belong to God's esscncc? Do thcyrepresent something additional 10 the essence or Ihey arc the esscnce itsclf" Thcquestion slill awaited a more thorough and logically rigorous answer.

ln order 10 approaeh Ihe logical aspect of the problem. wc have to dent briel1ywilh the Iinguislie and logieal sources that were available 10 the mutllkllllimun II I thattime. and to show the degree of influence that these sources had upon them.

The first major account Ihat we can deal with is to be fourd in at-Ftirahi'sexplication of the definition of the ealegory of quality. al-Fariibi (d. 339/950) stales Ihat"The whole account in responce to the question. How is the thing? is properly staled interms of the response to the question. what is the thing?" These queslions aim todetermine a thing as distinguished from other things by means of its qualities. Thus. bythese questions. the formula of the thing is elicited. this formula is divided into twocategories:

These qualities are used either in terms of the external formulas of the thing. orin terms of knowing the formula of the essence of the thing; and. then. theformulas that express the essence of things. when they arc taken in terms of theresponse to the question what is the thing. indicate what makes the thingdistinguishable in its essence frorn other things; and the formulas that express theexternal aspect of the thing indicate what distinguishes the thing in its slates(I$wiilihl) from other things. Distinguishing a thing in its essence from anotherthing is like distinguishing the palm as such from the c1ass .... and distingusihingone thing from another in its states is Iike distinguishing Zayd from 'Amr. in sofar as Zayd is a good man and 'Amr is a bad man.30

As long as these qualities express two aspects of a thing. the essential qualitiesexpress the formulas by which the thing is distinguished in vinue of its essence fromthe other things. while the external qualities express the formula by which the thing is


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26dislinguished from olher lhings in virtue of ils slales (aQwaJihi). Eisewhere al-Farabiexplains lhal lhese qualilies which answer lhe queslion of what is the thing or how it isare the same as the differentiae and property. That is to say, the differentiae express thecssential quality of the thing, and the property expresses the thing in its slatc which isoUlside the essence of the thing. The properties are also of two kinds: those which areabsolute predicates, permanently inherent in the thing, such as 'laughing' for 'man'; andnon-absolute predicates, which are not absolutely inherent in the thing such as the'engineer' for 'man'.31

The purpose of citing the texts mentioned above is to show that God's attributesaccording to the Mu'tazilites cannot easily be subsumed under the previous Aristotelianlerms. Professor Wolfson argues that the attributes of God in the Islarnic kalam arenothing other than properties in the Aristotelian sense.32

The properties, according to Aristotelian logic explained by al-Farabi, alwaysbelong to an external aspect of the being in bath the case of the absolute inherence andthat of the non-absolute inherence. In the Aristotelian sense properties are the states ofthings and do not represent the essence of thing. Property is defined by Aristotle as "apredicate which does not signify the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thingalone".33 The Mu'tazilites, however, consider the attributes of God as belonging to theessence of God (b i dhatihi or li nafsihl). The Mu'tazilites in general and aI-Jubba'i inparticular believed that God's attributes must essentially issue from and be manifestedby the very essence of God, though at the sarne time these attributes must notconstitute this essence, because of the absolutely pure unity of God. Therefore thequestion of attributes cannot be understood in terms of borrowed philosophical elements,but only in terms of the kaliim's context.

Many similarities can be found between attribute in the kaliim's sense. andproperty in the Aristotelian sense. but they are not completely interchangeable. Propertyis a universal term belonging only to one species. inherent in it absolutely or not


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27absolutely. but in both ca,es not essentially. The main feature of a property is 10 heconvertible with the thing that it belongs to, that is, the proposition 'A man is u luughingbeing' is the same as the proposition: 'A laughing heing is mun'; or 'A mun is cupuhle oflearning grammar and science', is the same as, 'The heing who is cupuhle of leurninggrammar and science is man'; eonsequently, the subjeet and its predicahle propcrty ureinterchangeable.34 It is clear thatthis view was totally rejected hy the Mu'tazilites. Ahua1-Hudhayl, who posited the extreme position concerning God's allributes hy saying thulGod knows in virtue of knowledge. and that this knowledge is identical with GIllIHimself. rejected the idea that the knowledge is God Himself.3s According to themutakallimiin God as a subject in a proposition cannot he interchangeable with Hisattributes because God's essence neither absorbs nor is in any way constituted by Ilsattributes.

The second source available to the mutaka/limiin , besides the philosophicalworlcs, was the Arab grammarians' writings. Among them the question of the relationbetween the subject and its predicates was a subject of contention. Two standpointsconcerning that problem dealt with its logical-Iinguistic character. The discussion amongthe grammarians proceeded from their concern with establishing a the sentence orlinguistic proposition, such as 'Zayd is knowing'. In the grammarians' account we findtwo different points of view. One of them was stated by alMubarrad (d. 285/898)whosaid that the predicate is something other than the subject; while the other view w a . ~expressed by Sibawayh (d. 177n93) who believed in opposition to al-Mubarrad that thepredicate of a nominal proposition must be something identical with the subjecl. 36

In order fully to explore a1Jubbii'i's view of predicates we have to recite histheory of attributes and his classification of them. The attributes are:1. That which a thing is called by virtue of itself (li-nafsihl). that which names ordescribes the thing essentially and specifically as that which it is. This is expressed whenwe say that "the atom is an atom" or that "God is Etemal". God's essence, thus, is His


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28Eternity. He exists without beginning or end and His non-being is impossible. In thecase of contingent bcings, these predicates are true and valid even though the thing doesnot exist in actuality, since, each individual has its bcing as real object ofGod's knowingand power.2. That which a thing is called by virtue of some other entity whose actuality in being isthe cause ('illa) or referential basis (ma'na) of the judgment (Qukm) which affirms apredicate. These he divides into two classes: a) predicates which are true by virtue ofa "cause" which exists within the thing (Ii-'il/atin fihi), as when we say 'Zayd knows'asserting thus anna lahu 'i/man, and, (b) those which are true by virtue of a 'causewhich is not in him' (li 'iJJatin /ii fihI), as, e.g. 'Zayd is mentioned' (Zaydun madhkrun)asserting thus the existence of a statement or other kind of utterance .3. That which a thing is called "by way of stating that it has reality in bcing" (ikhbiirnn'an ithbiitihi), as when it is termed ka'in (bcing), mawjd (existent), and the like.4. That which a thing is called by virtue of its coming to be after not having been (Ji.hudthihi), e.g. hiidith, mUQdath (temporally, contingent), or because of its being existentit is the act (fi'l) of an agent, as when it is termed mnP/ (made) or mnkhJq (created).S. That which is called simply by way of distinguishing classes of beings, as when we saythat a particular motion is an accident ('arn/) or that black is a colour.6. That which is called simply because it can be spoken of and a true statement madeconcerning it, that it is a being (shay',thing). This is the ultimate and most universalcategory, embracing ail beings, the real and the possible. 37With aIJubbli'i, the Mu'tazilite's school in ilS B ~ r i a n branch had, for many reasons,reached an impasse.

The philosophy of the Mu'tazilites concerning the deterrnination of being was stillsuffering, first, from lack its of success in depicting the deterrnination of being in asystematic manner, and in positing the most generai principles by which a being at thevisible and invisible levels can he deterrnined; and secondly, in delineating an adequate


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stance towards the presentation of the absolute purity and transccndcnce of God.AI-Jubbii'i's philosophy proceeding from its own foundations. as mentioned

earHer. was unable to solve these problems. Inherent problems in IWO major poinlscontinued to challengc al-Jubbi'i as wcll as thc MU'taziiite school. The firsl one isrelated to the nature of the relation between God's essence and Ils predicales: the secondis Iinked to the first. for the determination of being was still treated as being rudicallydifferent at the invisible and the visible levels. AI-Jubbii'i differentiates in Ihe contingentworld between the being as the ground of ma'ni. and the ma'iini as entities existingbeside their objects; while, with respect to God. he removes the intermediate entiliesma'iini and allows only the direct relation between the subject which is God Himself andthe act of description.

ln order to justify such differentiation. al-Jubbii'i discusses propositions such asGod is knowing, God is powerful, God is existent, etc. in terms of distinguishing betwecnthe language which is the subjective expression and the being which is an objectivcentity. He held that the act of attributing is the altribule ( a J - w a ~ f huwa a J - ~ ; f a h ) and Ihatthe naming is the name, or in other words thal the attributes of Gad do nol poinl toanything other than God; rather, they are merely our mode of speech.3B

The Ash'arites, as we shall see lalter, make a separalion between Ihe ~ ; l i l h(marni) and the act of description which is our stalement; therefore, our saying orproposition could be either true or false, but nevertheless the being would objectivclyexist with its attributes.39 By contrast, aI-Jubbii'i treats the sifah, the descriptive term. asa word within the convention of language; within the particular context of its use, itreflects the mind's grasp of the thing.40

With respect to the ontological aspect of aI-Jubba'i's theory concerning God'sattributes, we notice that the relation between God's essence and Its attributes isdemoralized. That is to say, in the case of God's being knowing, the predicate. in alJubbli'i's view is taken to assert only the reality of the subject in its simple identity with


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itself. 1\ followed that aljubbii'i was then unable to discuss ontologically the differencehetween heing knowing and being. as such. and how in the othemess that is indicated inthe statements. they are one in GOdAI Put another way. alJubb;'i did not present aspecific view by which God can bc maintained as a pure and simple essence and can bedetermined by means of His altributes. On the other hand. the Mu'tazilites' theory ingeneral. and al-Jubbii'i's in particular. implies the possibility of imputing plurality toGod's essence with statements such as:God is knowing in virtue of Himself (l i nafsihl). powerful in virtue of Himself ' etc.indicate that God's Essence is knowledge and power. because the reality of theknowledge is in virtue of bcing that by which the knower is knowing; and the reality ofthe power is in virtue of bcing that by which the powerful is powerful.42

Conceming the systematic view. al-Jubbii'i offers two manners of determiningbcing. The visible and sensible world is determined not by itself. but by something else.namely by ma'iini, e.g. 'Zayd is knowing in virtue of ma'ni, that is a specific knowledge,white God is determined by Himself, God is knowing in virtue of Himself (bi-dhiitihi).

Having adhered to this way of reasoning, the Mu'tazilites continued with the samemethod in their elaboration of topical notions from Ab a1-Hudhayl to al-Jubba'i (with ofcourse sorne shift of meaning in the vocabularies and sorne small shift in theelaboration).

New strategy in theMuCazilite school:With Ab Hashim (d. 321/933), son of alJubba'i, the Mu'tazilite school.

underwent a profound transformation in order to reform and overeome the defects in thesystem. That is, the framework of the Mu'tazilites' doctrine was inadequate forexhibiting a systematic view that would elaborate the two levels in the universe by thesarne principles of determination and a1so solve the dilemma of the relation bctwccn theessence of God and His a t t r i b u t ~ without denying that thcsc attributcs nccd to have sorne


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JI

form and realily.As we have seen, lhe Mu'lazilites in their emphasis on lhe deniul of attrib,ltes us

having some form and reulily Iimiled lhemsclves onlologicully 10 one uspecl ofexistence. This aspect is :he essence (uldh/) or the thing (ulslwy'). Such denial ofattribules led the Mu'tazililes 10 undersland God us mere essence, und 10 consider Ihedetermination of this essence as a Iinguislic matter, or mere human understunding Iryingto grasp what it cao l'rom lhis essence.43

The a c h i e v - ~ e n t of Ab Hshim, the resull of long debate bclween attribulislsand antiattributists, is expressed in the admission thal the attribules, corrcsponding 10 theview of the attributists, especially the theory proposed by Ibn Kullb,44 ure somelhingother than the subjeet. Ab Hshim called this kind of attribute, stale (I/), und it liesbehind the existent essence. It is not the essence itself, rather it is somelhing differl;nl;yet, corrcsponding to his own sehool. this (l/ does not represent an independent und reulexistence.

Ab Hshim denies that these attributes are real entities. They are not lhings(ashyii'),4S which means that Ab Hshim is still faithful to the Mu'lazilites' heriluge.Rather they are mani festation l'rom the essence itself; for instance. the proposition' GmIis knowing' means that Gad is knowing in virtue of Himsclf ( l i dh/ihl). The attribute'knowledge' cannot be known as separate and independent l'rom the essence; rather, it isknown as predicated of the essence and issuing l'rom the essence. In this wuy AbuHshim affirmed states as attributes. These states cannot bc said either to bc existent ornot existent and can neither be said to be known nor to be unknown. This means lheyeannot be known as separated entities. but f'oIther as existing a10ng ""ith the essence. AbHshim says that reason apprehends the necessary difference between the thing suchin its purity and the tbing described and qualified by means of attributes. Therefore. onewho knows the essence (aJ-


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32space.46Il is apparenl thal Ab Hashim pioneered a differenl and new path between

allributists and antiallributists. Ab Hashim's new theory was both a denial of theextreme reality of allributes as conceived by the allributists and a denial of the extremenominal nature of allributes as conceived by Ihe antiallributists. Utilizing the oldKullabite formula, but changing Ihe lerm 'allribule' 10 'state', Ab Hashim says of slalesIhallhey arc "neilher God nor olher than God".47

ln facl, Ihis change in stralegy by Ab Hashim under Ihe influence of Iheallribulisls led naturally 10 dealing in a differenl way wilh Ihe queslion of Ihedelerminalion of bcing in general and Ihe transcendence of Gad in particular.Ab Hiishim allempled 10 reform his falher's bclief in Ihe difference bclween Ihe trulhs(a/-t1aqiPiq), on Ihe unseen level and in Ihe malerial world. The unily of Ihe t1aqii'iq isIhus partly reslored by Ab Hiishim in lerms of the proposilion (he is knowing) innahu


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33itself' (Ji-mii hUW.1 '1I/lIyhi fi nllf.iM, that whose actuality is entailed (muql"'/UII)by the aUribute of the essence when it exists, as, for eXllll1ple, Ihc nlom'soccupying space orGod's being living and knowing, etc.(3) Those attributes whose actuality is caused (mu'//) by lin entitntive cnuse (/i'iJJu, Jj-mu'nii), as, for example, Z,Jyd's being knowing or li hody's hcing inmotion.(4) Those attributes whose actuality is, or results direclly l'rom, thc lIclion of linagent or l'rom one of its stales which qualifies the performllnce of ils lICI. (5)These are lhosc which arc termed /iiJi-naf.ihi wa /a Ji. 'il/a .49

Although Abu Hshim's theory represents the demarcation poinl belween twostages of the ka/iim, and although this theory is considered as a the most importnnlanempt that had been made to systematize the Mu'tazililes' protracted efforts, il is slillllsubject of criticism in a number of respects. Thc first point of criticism is thlll whileAbu Hlishim sets forth in his classification of attributes as the most general rules andprinciples according to which a being can be determined, he offers different applicationsof these principles. For example the knowledge, Iife, will, power, and the vision ofGodbelong to the second kind of attribute, which is ( ~ i f i t naf.iyah) or the anributes of theessence. In the case of Zayd, they belong to the third kind of anribute, (Iii(ulma'niiwyah or ~ i f i t al-ma'iini). According to Abu Hiishim there are two kinds ofdetermination, necessary and possible determination. In the case of the former, theessence (aJ-dhiit) necessarily must be qualified by such and such an attribule, and theissue here is especially related to the seven essential aUributes, knowledge, living,hearing, seeing, power, will, elC.istence. God necessarily must have these aUributeswithout any kind of causes or ma 'iini causing them. As for the laUer-the possibledetermination-a being could have or could not have these attributes. (knowing) can be ornot be predicated ofZayd. This kind of determination is causcd by mll'iini, so by possibledetermination is meant the determination Ihat occurs as caused by ma'iini or olhereauses. It follows thal Ihe altribule of knowing, for inslance, is predicated of God asnecessary (bil parrah), while the same attribute may be predicated of Zayd as possible.The knowledge of Zayd is a possible attribute. Zayd may or may nol have il, bccausc for


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Zayd to be knowing he must possess the prepouderance of knowledge, but it isimpossible to apply this condition to G o d . ~ o Il could be said that these two kinds ofdeterminations. the necessary and possible, constitute a shi ft in meaning for the oldMu'itazilite bclier in the two kinds or attribution.

The second point or criticism that should be mentioned here is duc to the term'state' (/,Iii/). This tenn had been used in the Arabic translation of Aristotle, as weil as inthe Arabic grammar, to indicate what is contingent and changed. As quoted earlier, alFiiriibi's explication divided the category of quality (al-kayffyah) into two parts: thepennanent quality that bclongs essentially to the thing, and indicates the essence of thething and makes it distinguishable from others; and the contingent quality whichbelongs accidentally and extemally to the thing. The latter is called 'state' (/,Iii/). Forexample, Zayd dirfers from 'Amr because of his state of being a good man, while 'Amrdirfers from Zayd because of his state ofbeing a bad m a n . ~ 1

The grammarians as weil used the tenn J;l to indicate situations that areconstantly changing. The term /,Iiil in grammar... is used chiefly to denote the functionof several nominal fonns that occur in the accusative in a variety of situations. Thus. forexample, al-Mubarrad says: when you say Zayd came to me walking, you do not intendthat it he primarily understood that he was walking, but rath;:r you state the propositionthat his coming took place in this situation (/,Iil) and your statement does not indicatewhat was his situation (ma huwa fflu) before or after this moment (/,Jiil). The /,Iiil, thus, isthat wherein the act is performed (al maPlu ffhi). You state simply that his comingoccurred in the situation (/,Iiil) of walking . I t is the same with '1 passed Zayd laughing'and '1 met your brother r i d i n g ' . ~ 2

Ab Hiishim. in order to avoid the two extreme positions of the attributists and ofthe antiattributists employed the tenn /,laI. The motive that lies behind thisemployment is to be found in two respects. First, state is something that does not identifythe essence in the sense of Abii Hiishim's predecessors; rather it is a kind of


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35manifestation of the essence. Second, state is not an entity or thing, so (wulking ofZayd) is a kind of situation expressed or manifested by Zayd, but il is absolulely nol unentity in itself. Abu Hashim did not adopt the term /,JiiJ as defined in Logic andGrammar. He shifted its meaning and dealt with il as a kind of essenlial allribule, asissuing from the essence even if it does not renect Ihis essence. Allributes such usknowing, Iiving,etc., issue from the essence, butthey are different from the essence andcannot be said to be identical with the essence, since al-u/,Jwiil are something differenlfrom the subject upon which they are predicated.

The third point of criticism has its origin in the fact that the allempt stands on thepivotai point between keeping essence absolutely pure and t r a n s ~ e n d e n t on the one hand,and determined and ~ t t r i b u t e d on the other hand. Abu Hashim is creative in his emphasison the state as standing in the middle area between being an attribute and somethingdifferent from the essence, on the one hand, and being deprived from any kind ofthingness and beingness, on the other hand. He gocs far in his description of the state,describing it as not existent and not non-existent, not known and not unknown, notmentioned and not non-mentioned, not etemal and not generated.s3

In order to negate a/-/,liil as being an entity, Abu Hshim answered, when hewas asked whether he knew the /,laI or not. that he did not know the /,liIl because anyadmission as to the possibility of knowing al-/,liIl would lead to the admission that 11/-/,liil is an entity .S4Ab Hiishim's theory of attributes established a significant answer to a particularexistential question, which is very Islamic in ilS nature: How can a being be determinedwithout violating it and white conserving its specifie identity as it is7 However, AbuHshim maintained the states in an awkward position between being affirmed and notarfmned. fixed and not fixed, existent and not existent, known and unknown. This dualposition led aI-Juwayni to adjust the theory of states and to malte the attributes known.The available sourees indicate that the theory of states was rejected by aI-Jubbli'i.5S the


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father and teacher of Ab Hashim, weil as by Ab all:Iasan alAsh'ar (d. 321/935),the founder of the school of the Ash'arites. AI-Ash'ar, in contrast to al-Jubba''s as weilas 10 Ab Hashim's point of view, adopted the theory of Ibn Kullab, the theory whichcontends that the altribules of God are mll'iI subsisting in God's essence, since God isknowing by a knowledge, powerful by a power, living by a Iife, etc. These altributes areetemal and cannot he said to he identical with God Himself, nor to he other than He.56

In affirming that God's attributes are mll'iI, entities (llShyiP), alAsh'ar tried toapproach the problem of the relation between the essence and its attributes in a differentmanner. That is to say, alAsh'ar, in order to demonstrate the unity of God in Its veryspecifie identity Ils a transcendental essence, separated this Essence as such from itsaltributes. He deall with the essence Ils a pure unity subsisting independently in itself,and with attributes Ils distinct mll'iI subsisting not in themselves but in God's essence.

By reviewing aI-Ash'ar's arguments against the MU'tazilites, we can touch uponhow far he was concemed to prove that God's essence must be One and betranseendental. In his alIblinah aIAsh'ar argues against Ab al-Hudhayl. I f theknowledge of God is God Himself, can one say: "Oh knowledge of Gad, give me yourmerey"? Ab al-Hudhayl however refused to accept this argument.s7In his aJ-Lumll', alAsh'ari puts this argument in a diaiecticai manner by saying:

Gad necessarily must know either in virtue ofHimself (bi nafsihi), or in virtue ofknowledge separated from His essence. As a resull, if he knows in virtue ofHimself, His self, then, must be a knowledge. In this case, therefore, itmust either he said that the knowledge is knowing (hecause God isknowing); or it must he said, that this knowledge does not know, and thereforeGad does not knoW.5S

So apparently neither condition, according to aIAsh'ar, may properly be appliedto Gad. This led to his affirmation that Gad knows in virtue of knowledge, and it isimpossible that this knowledge be Gad Himself.Wc might presuppose that Gad is knowing, neither in virtue of Himself nor in virtue of


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knowledge. AlAsh'ari respond to this assertion by saying that if we allow Ihe previollsstatement, the result will he as follows: in the proposition "God is knowing", "knowing"as used here either does not indieate God Himself or does not indieate the atlrihllte Ill'knowledge as such. 59

The significance of the argument here is very clear. AI-Ash'ari atlempts tll c\arifythe distinction hetween the essence of God such, outside of any kind of mingling, andto remove l'rom it any possibility that might signify a sort of plurality in God's essence.and the attributes as superadded ma'iini.

Another argument raised by the Ash'arites against the Mu'tazilites' notion thal"Gad is knowing by virtue of His essence" is that such a proposition wouId lead us tllbelieve that God's attributes are identical with eaeh other since ail of thcm are idenlicalwith the essence. Il would lead us to believe as weil that "God is knowing by virlue ofHis will, and willing by virtue of His power",60 and so on.

In order to determine the types of attributes that bclong to God's essence, alAsh'ari divided the attributes into three classes:1. Those expressions ( a w ~ i i f , asmiP) which name or implicitly refer to the thing itself, thething's self (nafsuhu), tadullu 'ala naf.j a/ m a w ~ f . AlIihu mawjdun (God exists) oral/,Iarakatu 'ara(lun (this particular motion or, every motion is an accident) al-Ash'aritakes simply to mean jthbiitu nafsj a / - m a w ~ f ( t h e assertion of the existence of the entityis denoted by the subject term). Statements of this type refer to the self of the m a w ~ f .2. Those predicates which refer to a marna (pl. ma'anj). AI-Ash'ari seems to prefer thisterm to 'iJJa, although the two are synonymous in the context. These entities, whosebeing is implied by predicates of this class (the ma'iini or 'ila/), are frequently, and insome contexts normally, referred to as ~ j f a = ma'na= 'illa, "attributes".3. Those predicates whicb refer to and therefore assert the reality of an action performedby the subject. These kinds of predicates, in contrast with the ficst two, are generated(mu/,ldath). They are not eternal, and Gad can be described by one of these attributes


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as al-Jubbii'i set forth. Nothing can be mixed with God's Self. Ali attributes indicalc(tadu/lu) but are not identical with God Himself. The allributes of Ill/l'uni ( ~ i l i l tma'niiwiyah) indicate ma'jjni which are signified by the verbal noun or gcrund(ma,iidir) and thus are revealed as possessing an ontological position. As for the secondpart of the statement, al-Ash'ari a s s e r t ~ the reality of allributes. This assertion, however,does not mean that for him these allributes are separable from God's essence or are otherthan He.64 in terms of having an independent reality. They are eternal (qlldillWIJ) andadditional (zii'idah), but solely through being assoeiated with God's essence. They arenot other, beeause otherness (aJ-ghayriyah), according to al-Ash'ari's definition is thut"of every two existents, one of them possibly detaehed (mufiiriq) from the other; if thisdetaehment oceurs in nothingness, a/-'adam, existence,time or pluce."6' This definitionof othemess removes any possibility that the attributes are other than God's essence.

As a result we are led to conclude that God's attributes do not subsist in und hythemselves, but within God's essence. while God's essence subsists in itself. In otherwords, God's attributes are not essences (dhawiit) since the only Etemal essence is God

H i ~ e l f , 6 6 but they existentially subsist and associate with essence.By asserting the attributes as ma'iini, superadded to the object that they reside in, alAsh'ari succeeded in advancing systematic theory conceming the determinution (lf beingwhether this being is God Himself or the human being:

Against al-Jubba'. aI-Ashcar insists that. for any given expression. the /Jaqiqah isinvariant. That is. ciilim cannot be ~ i f i i t u narsin when used of God. and $ifiituma'nii when used of Zayd. The paraphrase of any given term is always the sumeand so its referent: the ithbiit is. in ail cases. either of the m a w ~ f a. such. of amacnii, orof an action ( /iC] ).67

The systematic view presented by aI-Ashcar, does not lead in any way to theconclusion that the two levels of existence. God and His attributes and the physicalworld. are the same; aI-Ashcar deliberately distinguishes between them. In Zayd the


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40~ i r u h or altrihute is a contingent entity. Il is an accident ('aruf), contingent both in itselfand its relation to the body which is Zayd. Il is, thus, a being dislnct from him and sostrictly speaking, "other th an he" (ghuyruhu). God's altributes, however, arc Eternal,neither contingent as such nor in rcspcctto His being.68But despite the systematic position, al-Ash'ari's point of view still suffered from manyweaknesses. For example: (a) AI-Ash'ari, in order ultimately to affirm the attributesas additional mu'iini ( ~ i f i t zii'iduh), insists that the attribute of everlasting (albaqii') isma'nii, and so God is everlasting by virtue of ma'niiwhich is baqii', this exaggeration

disaJlowed by his follower aJ-Juwayni. (b) AIAsh'ari did not propcrly answer thequestion of the kind of existence the attributes have since he treated these attributesas not subsisting in and by themselves. As they arc not essences (dhawiit), thestatements which can be applied to materiaJ substances as weil. Al-Ash'ari did notadduce a propcr answer concerning the nature of entity the attributes have. This factpushed aJAsh'ari's fol1owers (aIBiiqilliini and al-Juwayni) to adopt the theory of states(aQwiil) to negate any possibility of fixing the attributes as existents associate God'sessence. (c) The manner of treating the attributes of God in terms of indication (al-duliiluh) was also a subject of doubt. For that reason we notice the fol1owers of aI-Ash'ari hesitating to take the master's theory as it is.

These weaknesses in fact pushed and provoked al-Ash'ari's fol1owers toreform the master's theory and to he open to the opponents' arguments. AlJuwayni, in achieving such a reform, adopted sorne of the Mu'tazilites' terms, as weshal1 see.


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I.Abd alKarlm alShahm.'loni. K. nlmilnl w n l n i ~ I J / . vol. 1, cd. by M U ~ l I m l l l l , , 1 SIIYll IIIKiloni. (Beirul: Dar alMa'rifah. n.d J. p.80.2. alShahra'loni. Ibid. p. 90.3. Ab all;lllSan alAsh'ari. MnqlUiit nlis/iimiyln wnikhtiliif I J / m u ~ I J l l i n . cil. by lIellnlllRiller. (Islanbul. Weisbaden. 1929'33 J. p.279.4. alShahrastonl. nlMilnl. vol. 1. p. 50.5. alAsh'ari. Mnqif/iit. p. 188.6. Richard M. Frank. The Metnphysics ofCrented Being AL'L'on/ing ru Ab nl/Il1dhnyll'Alliff (Istanbul: Nederland HislorischArchaeologisch Inslitule in Hel Nabije Ooslen. 1966 J. p. 15.7. R. Frank. Ibid. pp. 16-23.8. Dy Ihe tenn systemalic which is expressed in Ihe law of inference of Ihe invisible from thevisible. is meant in the contexl of the knliim, the derivation of the judgemenl n l ' ~ u k m , Ihal is. accordingto the Ash'arites the true propositions thal are said of Gnd musl he bllSed upon Ihe same principles thalby means of which the propositions employcd of zayd. Therefore. in a.much a. the descriptions sllid

of zayd are derived from accidents which are mn'ifnl subsisiting in zayd, the same thing is 10 heapplicable of Gnd, thal Gnd's propositions such lIS, knowing, willing, powerful. musl he derived fmmma'iInl abiding essentially and etemally in Gnd's essence. Ihal are knowledge, will.9. aIAsh'ari, Maqiilift, p. 372. Sec also Harry H. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Knliim. p151.10. Ab all;lusayn alKhayyot. K. a l i n t i ~ , cd. and Irans. by A.N. Nader (Beirut: alMaklnbahalSharqiyah. 1957 J. p. 46.II . alShahrastlini, alMital, vol. 1. p.67.12. Fakhr aIDin aIRiizi, M u ~ ~ afkiir ni .mutnqaddim/n walmuta'akhkhirln. cd. hyTaha Sa'd (Cairo: MaktnbatalKulliyiil, 1323 h J. p.I44. And RA. Wolfson, The Phi/o.,ophy of the

Ka/iim. p. 156.13. aIShahrasllini, alMital. vol. 1. p. 66. And alAsh'ari, Mnqiiliit, p. 54g.14. R. M. Frank. "AIma'nif: Sorne Renections on the Technical Meanings of Ihe Tenn in IheKa/iim and ils Use in \he Physics of Mu'ammar." Journal of the American Oriental Socieaty, 87, (1967 J,pp. 248-59.15. 'Abd alQiihir alBaghdiidi. a/Farq bayn al/iraq. cd. by M u ~ a m m a d M. 'J\bd alI;lamid. (Cairo: Maklabal M u ~ a m m a d S u b a y ~ , n.d J. p. 153. And H.A. Wol/son. The Philosophy of\he Ka/iim. p. 154.16. 'Abd aIJabblir aIHamadhiInl. alMughnl fi abwiib altaw/,Jld wa7-'adl. 16 vols. cd. byAI,unad F. Abawlinl and Ibrilhlm Madkr. (Cairo: Wazliral aIThaqiifah. 1965 J. p. 253.17. R Frank. A/ma'na. p. 252.Ig. aIAsh'ari. Maqilift. p.488.19. 'Abd aIJabblir, SharIJ al'Il$OI alkhamsah. cd. by 'Abd alKarim 'Uthmlio. (Cairn:Maktabal Wahbah. 1965 J. p.183.20. aIAsh'arf. Maqilil. p. 546.


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21. alAshlar!, ihid, 546.22. lIiAshlar;, Ibid, p. 370.23. alAshluri, Ibid, p. 370.24. atAshluri. ibid, pp. 386-87.25. Majid Fakhry, A Hisrory of /sJamic Philosophy. "ans. by Kaml alYziji (Beirul:American University. 1947). p. 92.26. Ibn a l M u r t a ~ , rabaqiir aJmu"/aziJah. cd. S. Diwald (Beirut: n.d). pp. 80-85.27. 'Abd alJabbr, SharQ, p. 182. And aJMajm' fi aJmuQl bi'J/

the theory of the unity of god in al-juwaynī's al-irshād

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