E N E R A L Marshall scowled as he got out of the car that had brought him from the airport at Pisa to General Clark’s lieadquar-

teis near Florence. Clark had disregarded a message the Chief of Staff had sent him a short time before In announcing his proposed vis i t -on the way back from Yalta to the United States-Marshall had stipulated: “Do not meet me at the airport. I will come to your headquarters. No honors.” When the Army Group commander had attempted to argue these points, the Chief of Staff had reiterated: “Don’t meet me. No honors repeat no honors.” Marshall’s orders should have settled the matter, but Clark, in keeping with the title of his postwar book, took a “calculated risk.” When Marshall reached the headquarters, there was a large honor guard to greet him. Ready for his inspection were representatives of all the nationalities then under the 15th Army Group, which Clark had commanded since the previous November.2

Clark owed his escape from Marshall’s legendary, though rarely un- leashed, wrath to recent statements by Representative Clare Boothe Luce, Republican of Connecticut, that had upset War Department officials. On her return from a visit to the Italian theaterwith other members of the Mouse Committee on Military Affairs, Mrs. Luce had declared that morale was extremely low in Italy because operations there were receiving little attention in the American press. To her embarrassment and to the dismay of Stimson and Marshall the press overemphasized the “forgotten front” routine.

These reports, Marshall declared later, “hit morale a dreadful blow-a really dreadful blow-and some of the corps commanders told me they didn’t know what to do about their troops. They had gotten obsessed with the fact that we had forgotten them entirely. Well, of course, the semi- amusing part of this was the troops in the Southwest Pacific [earlier] had exactly that same feeling about the troops in Africa. All the writing was about the troops in Africa and the troops in Sicily, and they felt they were

,

536

The Faltering Axis 537 being ignored. Now they were into the fighting, and the troops in Italy were obsessed with the idea that they were forgotten. And this thing just rattled back and forth. . . . The battle to maintain morale under those conditions was very hard and it was quite amazing that we got through that as well as we did. But I think the battle in Italy, where they were told we had forgotten those divisions . . . was one of the hardest of all- was one of the most absurd . . . challenges that [we] could have got- ten.” 3

Counterattacking, Marshall wrote into Roosevelt’s 1945 State of the Union message to Congress a special tribute to the fighting men in Italy and directed commanders in that theater to circulate the statement widely.4

General Marshall and the War Department were further disconcerted a few weeks later when British Field Marshal Alexander invited Mrs. Luce to visit his troops at the Italian front. Since the War Department had just turned down Representative Everett Dirksen’s request to visit the front there, Republican leader Joe Martin inquired bluntly why Dirksen was being excluded and Mrs. Luce admitted, and he threatened to attack the Army and administration on the House floor for playing politics. A War Department spokesman explained that Mrs Luce was a guest of the Brit- ish and that the Army had nothing to do with the invitation. Policy on visits to fighting fronts by congressmen who were not members of the mili- tary affairs committees, he added, was a Joint Chiefs of Staff decision. Martin retorted: “Come on now, everybody knows who runs the Joint Chiefs of Staff .” 5

Marshall’s visit to Italy, intended to show the troops that the Chief of Staff remembered them and had their ,contributions vividly in mind, gave Clark his chance to parade representatives of the various units under his command. Ranged before Marshall’s still somewhat disapproving gaze were soldiers from the United States, Scotland, Wales, Ireland, India, Brazil, Canada, South Africa, Poland, Italy (partisans as well as regu- lars), and nurses and women auxiliaries from the U.S., South Africa, Can- ada, and India. Of the groups that had served under Clark only the French and the Nisei, who had fought with great distinction, were miss- ing. They had been shifted to the south of France the previous summer and now were fighting in Western Europe.6

The visitor’s glacial displeasure melted as he reviewed the polyglot forces. Clark breathed easier when the Chief of Staff admitted that he was glad that the General had ignored his instructions.

Clark’s demonstration succeeded because i t emphasized the united effort being made to defeat the Axis. After a hard winter the Allied forces were making headway again. Stalin had made clear to Marshall at Yalta that the Russians were moving toward Central Europe. On the day that the Chief of Staff came to Clark’s headquarters, Eisenhower’s forces were launching their attack toward the Roer.

538 Organizer of Victory Halfway around the world the first convoy from Ledo-led by Major

General Lewis Pick over the famous Ledo Road from India to China, won and built at great cost-had reached Kunming. And elements of Krue- ger’s Sixth Army captured Manila after two weeks of bitter fighting. Mac- Arthur’s announcement had reached Yalta at a luncheon meeting of For- eign Ministers on February 5, and, the official record reports, “Mr. Molotov immediately proposed a toast to the victory of the Allied armies.” Soon afterward Marshall drafted a message to MacArthur for Roosevelt’s signature. He wrote: “Congratulations to you personally and to your commanders and troops on the liberation of Manila. ,This is an historical moment in the re-establishment of freedom and decency in the Far East, and the celerity of movement and economy of force involved in this victory add immeasurably to our appreciation of your success. Please give the men of the guerrilla forces my thanks and congratulations on their gallant contribution to the campaign and especially for the years of suffering they have endured in preparation for this moment.” *

After years of holding actions, of disasters, and disheartening setbacks, the Allies now moved confidently toward victory. Roadblocks still re- mained. The manpower situation in the U.S. forces in Europe was not completely solved, severe winter weather interfered with plans for attack on the western front and particularly in Italy, and in the Italian theater there was also the persistent morale problem.

Another problem in Italy especially disturbed Marshall: the perform- ance of the 92d Division, made up of Negro enlisted men and Negro and white officers. He reluctantly described the division as untrustworthy under fire shortly after it had gone into the line.9

Writing Eisenhower to request the shift of the veteran Japanese- American 442 Infantry Regiment from France back to Italy to help re- trieve the situation along the 92d Division front, General Marshall ex- plained that the division, holding twenty-two miles on the Fifth Army left front in a final tryout during a three-day offensive, had been heavily sup- ported by air and tanks. I t had met little opposition on most parts of the front, “but the Infantry literally dissolved each night abandoning equip- ment and even clothing in some cases.” He said that the artillery, engi- neers, and other divisional troops appeared excellent, and the command and staff were superior. “But as matters now stand, the division itself is not only of little value but weakens the front by necessitating the putting of other divisions in the rear to provide the necessary security against a local German thrust through to Leghorn and supply lines, divisions that should otherwise be disposed in the center of the army.” 10

Marshall’s criticisms of the division reflected his great disappointment after the high hopes he had held for it. A strong advocate of protection Qf

rights of black troops from his days as senior instructor of the 33d Division in Illinois and as the head of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, he had pressed hard for equable treatment for Negroes as Chief of the Staff of the

The Faltering Axis 539 Army. Just as he had taken special pains to see that the 93d Division and other Negro units in the Pacific had special training and preparation be- fore going into action in that theater, he insisted that the gzd Division be completely readied for its assignment in Italy. Since he had taken this course despite considerable reluctance among Army commanders to use Negro troops in combat roles, the poor performance of the unit not only angered him but made him fear that opposition to further use of black troops in combat would be strengthened.11

After changes had been made to increase the combat efficiency of the division, commanded by Major General Edward N. Almond, the War Department arranged for Secrktary Stimson’s civilian aide on Negro affairs, Truman Gibson, Jr., to visit .Italy. After his trip Gibson issued a statement in which he blamed part of the difficulties on promotion policy in the division, on the large number of black troops from the two lowest categories of IQ scores, and on discrimination against Negro officers in the division. He was sharply attacked by some of the more militant Negro papers, which resented his remark on illiteracy in the division. He was also accused of being an “Uncle Tom” for agreeing in any way with any criticism of the fighting qualities of the troops.12

On his return from Italy General Marshall now had to grapple with the problems of winding up the war in Europe. It seemed likely that late spring would see the defeat of Germany. Since mid-1943 he had had mem- bers of his staff working on redeployment of units from the European Theater of Operations to the Pacific Now directives went out to Eisen- hower and McNarney to screen their units for men to go to the Pacific. Specific units were earmarked for later duty, and a search began for expe- rienced officers to lead units in the invasion of Japan. In light of Wash- ington’s great stress on the speedy redeployment of one or more armies from Europe within a few days after the war’s close there, Eisenhower’s decision of mid-April to stop at the Elbe is more understandable.

As the defeat of Germany neared, dozens of questions-attainment of unconditional surrender, partition of Germany, establishment of military government, arrangement of occupation zones aKd lines of demarcation between advance units of the Allies and the Russians, and growing ten- sion in relations with the Russians-became increasingly significant to the Chiefs of Staff and their political chiefs in Washington and London.

The story of the last three months in the European struggle, seen from Washington, consisted mainly of British efforts to have a larger share in the final victory, Churchill’s desire to establish the greatest advantage pos- sible over the Russians, and Western dismay-leading to stiffening atti- tudes toward the Russians-as Soviet suspicion and rudeness toward the Western Allies increased daily. At Yalta the Russians had served warning that they expected to make a hard peace with the Germans. Although acquiescing to a degree to Russian demands for reparations, Churchill favored moderation much more than he had in the past.

’

540 Organizer of Victory willing to discuss in principle the partition of Germany but was disposed to reduce Roosevelt’s proposal for dividing Germany into five or seven states to somewhat fewer and to postpone to a later date the Russian proposal on dismemberment.13

In purely military matters the Russian Army representatives at Yalta seemed interested in cooperating with the Allies on the final stages of the battle.14 Although General Alexei I. Antonov, First Deputy Chief of Staff, was reluctant to agree on specific liaison between Allied and Russian commanders on bombing arrangements, he expressed willingness to work closely with them on movement of ground troops, air operations in sup- port of ground forces, and details of operations.15

Meeting with Russian military representatives on February 5, both Marshall and Brooke asked for continued Soviet operations to aid the offensive in the West. Brooke said that the actual crossing of the Rhine presented the greatest problems for the Western Allies and expressed the hope that operations on the eastern front, which he recognized would be difficult because of thaw and mud, would be continued. Aware from Ei- senhower’s recent statements that he critically needed Russian assistance, General Marshall pointed out that the Western forces were threatened by their insufficient ground superiority. Although they had air superiority, bad weather might neutralize this power at any time. If an enemy thrust came at such a period, the lack of ground superiority could prove serious. “Another restriction arose from the fact that there were only a small number of favorable locations for crossing the Rhine. It was therefore most important to insure that the enemy could not concentrate strongly at the point of attack.” The Germans were operating behind the Rhine and the Siegfried Line and had freedom of maneuver, but, he concluded, they must not be allowed to concentrate against the Allies on the very narrow bridgehead available.10

Antonov replied that as Stalin had pointed out, “the Russians would continue the offensive in the East as long as the weather permitted.” While there might be interruptions because of the weather, “The Soviet Army would . . ’. take measures to make such interruptions as short as possible and would continue the offensive to the limit of their ability.” The Russians did not believe that the Germans could transfer large forces from the eastern front to the West, Antoiiov continued. The question was whether the Allies could prevent the Germans from shifting forces from the Italian front to the East.

Brooke made no effort to exaggerate the Allied potential in Italy. The Germans had certain advantages there because of terrain-notably a se- ries of rivers that made it possible for them to conduct rearguard actions while withdrawing forces gradually. The enemy would have to retreat through the Ljubljana Gap or the passes of the Alps. “The coast in the Bay of Venice,” he noted, “was not suitable for amphibious operations, and therefore outflanking operations in the Adriatic did not appear fruit-

The Faltering Axis 541 ful.” There liad been continuous offensive operations to drive tlie enemy out of the Apennine Line and into the valley of the Po, but winter weather and floods had brought operations almost to a standstill.17 Since the Allies could do no more than hold down the rate of withdrawal, they liad decided to switch five divisions to the western front.

Realizing that Brooke’s explanation was not satisfying Antonov, Gen- eral Marshall called attention to the importance of Allied airpower in Italy. Air Chief Marshal Portal divulged that there were a total of 14,000 U.S. and British aircraft on the western and Italian fronts. “Everything possible would be done,” he said, “as General Marshall liad stated, to bring the greatest possible air assistance to the vital points of attack in the land offensive. Such air assistance included tlie operations of a number of airborne divisions, for which the necessary transport was available.” Por- tal added that, so far as requirements of the land battle permitted, the strategic bomber forces would concentrate on the enemy’s oil supply. The Western Allies also proposed’to continue their attacks on railway commu- nications in order to stop troop movements, even though previous efforts had produced disappointing resul ts because the enemy repaired the facili- ties with relative ease. Since the Allies knew that the Germans intended to assemble a strong force of jet-propelled fighters during the year, they had decided to hit jet-fighter plants. “It was an agreed principle that when the land offensive began,” Portal said, “everything in the air that could contribute to its success should be so used.”

Still the Russians were not reassured. At this point General Marshall stressed that the British and American Chiefs had agreed to implement the request Antonov had made at the session the previous day-that air- power be employed to prevent the Germans from withdrawing from the western front only to turn east and fight the Russians. For this purpose the Allies would set rail junctions as primary targets Antonov had urged: “By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the- Western Front, from Nor- way, and from Italy In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.” 18

The exchange over Western Allied attacks to prevent movement of German forces from west to east was later to be subjected to close scrutiny by historians because of the British and American bombing on February 13/ 14 of the relatively undamaged baroque gem of Germany-Dresden- creating a fire storm and killing a large number of Germans.

General Marshall was brought into the controversy because of the mis- reading of a memorandum that credited him with an attempt-through misunderstanding or design-to excuse the bombing on the grounds that it had been requested by the Soviet Union. The raid in fact was not some improvised terrorist action or the result of a whim of a bomber com- mander, nor was it made a t Russian request. Rather it grew out o’f plans, some considered as early as the previous summer, for hastening the end of

542 Organizer of Victory

the war by attacks on certain key cities in central and eastern Germany and by strikes against vi tal communications centers.

On August 1, 1944, as the Allied breakout from Normandy was getting under way and the invasion into the heart of France was about to begin, Portal, as Chief of the Air Staff, prepared a memorandum outlining the potential for a shattering attack against German morale by making a mas- sive air strike against Berlin at a time when the ground offensive was going strongly against the Reich. He also stated that “Immense destruc- tion could be produced if the entire attack was concentrated on a single big town other than Berlin and the effect would be especially greater if the town was one hitherto relatively undamaged.” Portal had long advo- cated bombing specific strategic targets to weaken the German war effort rather than the area-bombing program favored by Air Chief Marshal Harris of the Bomber Command. T h e Britisli Chiefs of Staff approved Portal’s initial suggestion on August 5 and asked General Eisenhower to have a plan prepared for an attack on Berlin along tlie lines suggested. In their autliori tative history of Bri tisli strategic bombing Webster and Frankland commented on this action: “Though this did not take place until February, 1945, and though, as will also be presently seen, the Anglo- American desire to assist tlie Russian land campaign had by that time added a powerful motive for the selection of that particular time, it is necessary now to grasp the full implications of this air staff memorandum which may be regarded, indirectly, as the title deed of that controversial opera tion.”

For months the various air chiefs had disagreed over the proper priori- ties for targets and the types of bombing that should be employed. Gen- eral Spaatz had pushed continually for attacks against oil targets, Air Chief Marshal Harris wanted increased area bombing, Air Chief Marshal Tedder of SHAEF preferred attacks on communications. Air Chief Mar- shal Portal, who leaned more toward the Tedder and Spaatz views than to Harris’s, found himself confronting a powerful opponent. Harris had the backing of Churchill and was popular with the general public Thus in the fall of 1944 when Portal proposed a new directive reiterating basically the old priori ties, Harris reminded him that the Bomber Command

, claimed the virtual destruction of forty-five of the sixty leading German cities in the past one and one-half years. The destruction of ten re- maining important cities, including Dresden and Munich, and increased strikes on Berlin and Hanover would complete most of the plan.

The German attack in the Ardennes in mid-December raised Allied fears of renewed enemy air activities. In mid-January 1945 the air chiefs proposed that in addition to the priorities on oil and communications, attacks on German jet-aircraft production and on air-training and air- operational facilities also be assigned priority.

Meanwhile the success of a Russian offensive opened on January 12, 1945, led members of the British Air Staff and the Joint Intelligence

-

The Faltering Axis 543 Committee to study means of aiding the Soviet advance. In a report of January 25 the latter group suggested that the earlier proposal for morale- shattering attacks on Berlin should now be considered in the light of the assistance that they would render to the Russian advance westward. Bombardments that forced massive departures of refugees from Berlin would create great confusion and “interfere with the orderly movement of troops to the front and hamper the German military and administrative machine.” This would not only aid the Russians but might have a “polit- ical value in demonstrating to the Russians . . . a desire on the part of the British and Americans to assist them in the present battle.” Attacks on marshaling yards and communications, the report noted, should “now be considered in addition to destroying the transfer of forces eastwards.”

On the day the intelligence report was issued, Portal’s Deputy, Air Marshal Bottomley, discussed i t with Harris The Bomber Command Chief now suggested that the main attacks be concentrated on Chemnitz, Leipzig, and Dresden,, which, like Berlin, housed great numbers of refu- gees from the East and were key points in the German communications network through which troops might pass to the eastern front.

As usuaI Prime Minister CIiurcliiIl was searching out new opportunities to hit the enemy. On the evening the report appeared he asked the Secre- tary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, what plans the Royal Air Force had €or hitting the retreating Germans. Cautiously Sinclair replied that there might be opportunities to bomb Berlin and other large cities, such as Leipzig, Dresden, and Chemni tz-repeating almost the exact lan- guage of the report regarding the military importance of these cities.

To this Churchill replied that he had not asked about attacks to harry the German retreat but whether Berlin and other cities in eastern Ger- many “should not now be considered especially attractive targets.” Two months later he was to question the bombing of German cities “simply for increasing the terror, speaking particularly of Dresden,” but at the mo- ment he was speaking as Harris would have liked him to have done.19

The British air historians believe that Churchill’s note was a key factor in persuading Bottomley to inform Harris that Portal was in favor of one big attack on Berlin and related operations against Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, “and any other cities where a severe blitz will not only cause confusion in the evacuation from the East but will also hamper the move- ment of troops from the West.” Harris needed no urging, but Bottomley requested that-subject to overriding claims of oil and other approved targets-as soon as moon and weather factors were right, “you will under- take such attacks with the particular objects of exploiting the confused conditions which are likely to exist in the above mentioned cities during the successful Russian advance.” Churchill was informed of this proposal.

Thus as the Combined Chiefs of Staff were proceeding to Malta for preliminary talks before going to Yalta, a directive was being hammered out for the attack on major cities in eastern Germany. After talks among

544 ‘&galfliZeff Of ViCtOHp. ,

Portal, Bottomley, and Spaatz and the latter two and Tedder, it was agreed on January 31 that first priority would still be given to oil targets but that second priority would go to the bombing of Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, and associated cities for the reasons Bottomley had stressed.

Although these priorities were not reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Yalta, they were accepted by the British Chiefs of Staff. Portal suggested that Bottomley get Spaatz’s views and that if he approved, they issue a revised directive. No new directive was issued, but within the framework set forth in the January 12 directive, planning for bombing of communications went forward.’

It was in this context that General Antonov at Yalta asked the Western representatives for bombings of rail centers to block the transfer of Ger- man troops from the western front to the eastern-citing as particular targets Berlin and Leipzig.20

At Yalta Marshall had already discussed with American representatives plans for hitting German communications. To a member of the U.S. Stra- tegic Air Forces he “indicated general concurrence, but real concern that the Russians be notified of these attacks in accordance with present liai- son procedure.’’ He also referred to a proposed plan to use fighters to launch attacks all over Germany and was told that numerous enemy cities would be hit under Operation CLARION, when the situation was ripe. He then suggested that among the targets they should hit Munich “because it would show the people that are being evacuated to Munich that there is no hope.” Aware of these various plans, Marshall informed Antonov of the thousand-bomber attack on Berlin that had been made on February 3 and a similar attack that was to be made against Leipzig. Obviously Dres- den was not specifically in his mind, but clearly he was attempting to assure Antonov with these and other statements about current bombings that the Western Allies were bringing full pressure to bear to meet his request for a paralysis of German communications.21

On February 8, 1945, Eisenhower’s air staff-on the basis of recommen- dations of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee-notified the RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. Strategic Air Forces that Dresden was among the targets slated to be hit because of their importance to the movement of military forces PO the eastern front. In accordance with Mar- shall’s wishes and established procedure Moscow was notified on the same day of this decision and specifically informed on February 12 that, weather permitting, U.S. air forces would attack the Dresden marshaling yards on February 13. Weather conditions did not permit, and the Soviet authorities were informed that the attack would be made the following day.22

Almost at once, as soon as the widespread damage on Dresden became known, there were questions about the necessity of the raid in the British press and in Parliament. British critics, who had already sharply attacked the bombings of cities, reacted sharply when a briefing officer at S

The Faltering Axis 545 indicated that the attack was part of sa new terror-raid policy being adopted by the Allies. In Washington, General Arnold’s Deputy, Briga- dier General Barney Giles, asked Spaat7 i f a new policy had been insti- tuted contrary to War Department knowledge and was told that he was acting under the previous directives. SHAEF made clear that the briefing officer’s statement was incorrect.

Disturbed by what he had read, Secretary Stimson apparently asked General Marshall, after his return from Yalta, for further information on the Dresden raids. The Chief of Staff’s office passed the request on to Arnold’s staff. General Spaatz’s headquarters in Europe replied to Wash- ington early in March, giving the number of missions and total tonnage of bombs dropped and noting that much greater tonnage had been dropped by British than by American bombers. Brigadier General Joseph Loutzenheiser of Arnold’s staff, who had been at Yalta, added a statement to the effect that Dresden was a communications center of major impor- tance “through which reinforcements pass to reach the Russian front.’’ 23

This memorandum was forwarded to General Marshall’s office, where a slightly different version was prepared. It opened with Loutzenheiser’s comment on Dresden’s importance as a communications center and then added that a press statement from London-given an incorrect date-in- dicated that Dresden, a “center of a railway network and a great indus- trial town, has become of the greatest value for conducting any defense the Germans may organize against Marshal Konev’s armies. Dresden is closely related with the German potentialities for launching a counterat- tack against the southern wing of the great Russian Bulge.” 2*

Neither Loutzenheiser’s memorandum nor that forwarded by Marshall did more than point out why Dresden was a proper target for communica- tions bombing. No mention was made of a Russian request. However the U.S. Air Forces official account of the incident (which was the only ac- count available for many years) gave some grounds for confusion by saying that “The Secretary of War had to be apprised of Dresden’s impor- tance as a transportation center and the Russian request for its neutrali- zation,” citing “Memo for Stimson for Marshall (drafted by Loutzenhei- ser), 6 Mar 45.” Had Marshall made such a statement, Stimson would probably have been satisfied. Instead he penciled a note on the memoran- dum reflecting his uneasiness about the ‘bombings: “I doubt this report makes the case any bet ter-on the face of it the British on February 13 bombed the city. While our bombing was said to be aimed at military objectives the results were practically unobserved. I think the city should be photographed carefully and the actual facts made known.” With Mar- shall’s approval his Secretary General Staff forwarded the message to Ar- nold’s office for the necessary action 25

Two weeks later finding that no reply had been obtained, Colonel Mc- Carthy reminded a member of Arnold’s staff that Marshall and the Secre- tary were still waiting. On April 7 when McCarthy queried Stimson’s

546 Organizer of Victory office on the subject, he was told that a reply-which in fact repeated information on the relative damage inflicted by the U.S. and British bombers and included photographs of the destruction-had been sent di- rectly from Spaatz’s headquarters to the Secretary of War. Apparently this was satisfactory.

Ten days later the third Allied attack on Dresden (a second had been delivered in March after the initial heavy strikes)-this time by U.S. Eighth Air Force planes against the marshaling yards-was made after suitable notice had been given to Moscow, and the targets, with the ex- ception of an objective in Prague, were accepted by Russian authorities.26

Churchill, who had earlier urged more punishing air strikes against the Germans, showed his uneasiness in late March in a memorandum to Portal that mentioned Dresden specifically and questioned the value of creating deserts in Germany. Portal, knowing that Churchill’s backing had helped Harris’s drive for expansion of area bombing, reminded the Prime Minister of his earlier views and got a toned-down memorandum in which Dresden was no longer mentioned.27

Oddly enough, there was little uneasiness or outcry over heavy bomb- ings of Berlin and Leipzig, which came just before Dresden. The protests over Dresden arose from several sources. The chief charges of inhumanity spring possibly from exaggerations in the reported death toll-sometimes estimated as high as 250,000, then knocked down to 135,000-a figure still widely accepted but apparently in light of recent disclosures about 100,-

ooo too high. In fact the losses there rank below those in Berlin and Ham. burg and in the prenuclear attacks on Japan.28 (The toll in Dresden was actually higher than it would normally have been because of the influx of refugees who had fled there from other bombed areas.) Also there was outrage at the destruction of the heart of a relatively undamaged city known for its beauty and apparently of minimal military importance. In the years since the city has become a symbol for Allied brutality and mindless destructiveness.

Although Dresden had no great industrial plants of key importance to the German military efforts, its marshaling yards and location on main highways were of great military importance for the movement of rein- forcements toward the East. In sober retrospect the question is not whether the bombing of Dresden was requested by the Russians, whether its destruction hastened the defeat of Germany, or even whether the at- tacks were necessary to bring victory. Certainly in mid-February the Ger- mans were still resisting stoutly and were inflicting losses on the Allied armies on both the eastern and western fronts. There remain, however, two questions: whether these bombing attacks represented the best use of strategic airpower and whether bombings of cities were ever justified. If the attacks in February 1945 on Berlin and Hamburg-which were feebly protested if at all-were justified, then the bombings of Dresden-on a military basis-also were.

The Faltering Axis 547 \ For the whole bombing policy in the last months of the war the heads of state and the Chiefs of Staff have to share the responsibility directly or indirectly. Churchill on the eve of Yalta was surely eager to see the Ger- mans harried further, and Roosevelt did not object. The Russians, for all their later propaganda about not wanting Dresden hit, plainly showed no mercy for the cities and citizens of the Reich. The Chiefs of Staff did not so much direct the specific bombing as leave the choice of targets in the hands of subordinates who found it difficult to stop the momentum of attacks on a hated enemy. Once the policy of bombing cities as a means of hastening German defeat was accepted, i t was difficult to maintain day-by- day control It was easy for airmen to demonstrate as late as the beginning of April that the bombing of cities through which key communications linked eastern and western Germany could aid the Russian offensive. A policy talked about in the summer and fall of 1944 as a means of hasten- ing the end of the war and changed to include assistance to the Russian advance gave signs at times of being an end in itself.

The Soviets at Yalta had finally approved the changed German zones of occupation. However they had been settled, so far as the Western Allies were concerned, in early December. In the light of this background, it is somewhat confusing to find General Eisenhower saying after the war that he always “felt that the Western Allies could probably have secured [at Yalta] an agreement to occupy more of Germany than we actually did” if tlle political heads had been convinced “as we were at SHAEF of the certainty of early victory in the West ”

Several things are wrong with this statement. The zones had in effect been settledtbefore the Allies had penetrated very far into Germany and at a time when the battle for the Reich had come to a complete halt, when the British were complaining bitterly of lost opportunities, and when advances in the Hurtgen Forest and on the Siegfried Line were reduced to inch-by-inch movements in the “bitter woods.” The agree- ments had been to all intents reached before the Ardennes counterattack. They had been decided before the Supreme Commander had told Gen- eral Marshall in mid-January, less than a month before Yalta, that the nature of his offensive in February or March depended on the scale of the Russian offensive.29

Quoting Eisenhower’s statement, Henry Luce in a well-known article in Life in 1961 declared that the Supreme Commander had sent Bedell Smith to Malta “to intercept them [Roosevelt and Churchill] and urge that the Soviet zone be restricted.”30 I t appears that Luce must have heard the General incorrectly, for Smith was sent to Malta specifically to discuss the coming offensive in the West. Before Marshall reached Malta, General Eisenhower had his own opportunity at Marseille to discuss the matter with him. In the minutes Eisenhower dictated of his conversation with the Chief of Staff, the zones were not mentioned. The point that impressed Marshall was Eisenhower’s cautious statement in mid-January

548 OkgmiZeff Of ViCtOffy

that he could not stage an early offensive unless the Russians attacked all along their front.

In view of Eisenhower’s emphasis on the need for coordinating the Western Allied and Russian attacks and his earlier request to Roosevelt and Churchill to arrange for SHAEF representatives to go to Moscow to find out Stalin’s offemive plans-they had been dispatched there in early January-it is not surprising that the Allied representatives at Yalta spoke not of what the Russians would give up but of what they could be persuaded to do to aid the advance in the West. Rather than begging the political leaders at Malta to stand firm against Stalin, Smith had said that timing was the main consideration: “As much as possible to occupy Ger- man forces should be accomplished while the Russian offensive is under- way.” Speaking of Rhine operations, he said, “If it becomes impossible to establish a firm bridgehead, it may be necessary to coordinate our opera- tions with the Russians in June.” In writing of this period in his volume, My Three Years zn Russta, Smith made no allusion to any effort on his part to protest the arrangement of zones. Smith also wrote that when Churchill mentioned to him near the end of the war his worry that the Allies would pull back from zones that had been promised to the Rus- sians, the British leader added: “two years ago if someone had told us that the Russian Army was approaching the Whine we would have been happy about it.” 31

Zones or no zones, by the end of the Yalta conference Prime Minister Churchill was intent on sending Allied troops into one or more of the key cities of Central Europe. If he had controlled the troops needed for this purpose or if he could have persuaded the United States to furnish the necessary troops, he almost certainly would have raced the Russians for Berlin and Prague. Because Marshall, Eisenhower, and Bradley opposed such a race, they were severely criticized in the United States and Europe years after the war. British leaders, such as Montgomery and Brooke, who at the time showed the same desire to take their troops into the German capital as Clark had shown in driving for Rome, have insisted that their chief interest was forestalling the Russians. How many ills, they later sug- gested, the Western Allies could have avoided by going to Berlin, Vienna, and Prague.

Churchill, for whom the Russian menace now represented almost as great a challenge as the splendid prospect of raising the British flag in the German capital, did not stress the Red problem to Washington until the closing months of the war. Careful not to drift too far away from t.he President and aware of Woosevelt’s desire to work closely with Stalin in the postwar era in the keeping of peace, the Prime Minister did not ham- mer home his point on Berlin at Malta and Yalta. His emphasis at these conferences was on a powerful single thrust on the northern flank by American and British forces commanded by Montgomery. Thus pre- sented, Churchill’s proposal aroused American opposition from the front-

550 Organizer of Victory line division commanders to the President. The only hope, admittedly small, of getting Roosevelt to agree to a race with the Russians to the capitals of Central Europe was to persuade him of an overpowering Soviet threat and the impossibility of working out postwar collaboration with the Soviet Union. Had the American leaders, blamed later for starting the cold war with the Russians, been intent on stopping the Soviet Union, they would have backed Churchill’s strategy.

But many factors weighed against the Prime Minister in the final three months of the war in Europe. At this point Churchill was caught in the mesh of British history; widespread American distrust of Britain’s impe- rialist designs (crusty American admirals and generals-conservative as any mustached British officer relaxing over past colonial victories in his London club-cast suspicious glances at the Empire’s world-wide poli- cies), was bolstered by Britain’s World War 11 negotiations over the Med- i terranean, which left even her stanch friends, such as Roosevelt and Marshall, feeling that they were being used to further British policy.

Churchill would also have had to convince the President and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that the establishment of, a Central European roadblock against a Russian advance was worth delaying the defeat of the Japanese in the Pacific. But he had frittered away his advantage in yearnings for Rhodes and Cos, which had no great relevance to stopping the Russians in Central Europe, by his insistence that “Alexander shall have his vic- tory,” and by agreements with Stalin on spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. His efforts at Christmas 1944 to forestall the Communists in Greece seemed too much like his earlier promonarchy stance in Italy to be reassuring.

The British plea at Malta for a thrust by Montgomery to Berlin seemed to Marshall and his Army colleagues less a hedge against Russian aggres- sion than a maneuver for a British-led, American-supported, expedition to plant the flag in the German capital. This suspicion was fed when Churchill spoke of a pressing need for Tedder’s services elsewhere and proposed that Alexander take his place in Eisenhower’s headquarters. To the Supreme Commander, who had once favored Alexander for the com- mand that Montgomery received, Churchill’s proposal seemed a transpar- ent effort to reinstate a British ground commander-in-chief in northwest Europe. Knowing that this idea was anathema to Marshall, Eisenhower opposed the suggestion vigorously.

Marshall had already pointed out that in the coming battles American forces, greater than ever before as new divisions were sent into the line from the United States and as units were transferred from Italy, could be expected to bear the major burden of Allied casualties thenceforth. They could be borne more easily if they occurred under American command.

The biting exchange between Marshall and Brooke at Malta should have settled the matter, but Churchill persisted. He revived the idea in

The Faltering Axis 551 March, although a prudent man would have abandoned it after the dis- cussion in February.

Not until March 2 when Montgomery, late a prime mover for the field command himself, informed Churchill that he had told Eisenhower the day before that the war was nearly won, and that he should leave Tedder and Alexander at their current posts, did Churchill admit final defeat.a2 The whole affair, endlessly revived under various guises, was exactly the sort of maneuver that made the Americans increasingly suspicious of the Prime Minister’s grand designs.

Churchill’s past also created doubts about his strategy for driving on Berlin, Vienna, and Prague in the spring of 1945. Just as the Americans fought grim ghosts of the Somme in arguing with him for a cross-Channel attack in 1942 and 1943, so did the Prime Minister face apparitions of World WaS I European and Middle Eastern misadventures in urging his Western Al1,ies to forestall the Red armies in Central Europe. Later the Prime Minister deplored the American blindness that lost the fruits of victory-an interpretation happily seized on by American critics of Roo- sevelt, Marshall, and Eisenhower. But in that final spring of, the war the President had no intention of keeping troops on the Rhine or the Danube or the North Sea for more than a year or two at most, and he was positive that the American public would clamor indignantly against lengthy and extended commitments in Europe. Knowing that the United States would have to bear the brunt of any showdown with the Russians, he preferred not to challenge them but to seek an understanding. The more he saw of reawakening British anti-Soviet policy, the more he insisted on dissociat- ing himself from it.

Marshall remembered well the resurgence of American isolationism within months after the end of World War I and the almost immediate revulsion against keeping a large military force in being. He believed that the same reactions would recur and favored a strategy leading to disen- gagement rather than further involvement Under these conditions the Supreme Commander followed a policy of doing only what was necessary to defeat the Germans. Thus he made minimum efforts to take areas as- signed to the Soviet Union for occupation since they would have to be evacuated at the close of fighting.

The Roer proved to be a more difficult objective to win than the Rhine did later; swollen floods and stormy weather held up armor and infantry. Crossings were nevertheless forced all along the front in late February, and the Allied armies pushed forward to the Rhine. Strongly reinforced, Montgomery in the north prepared for a set-piece crossing of the German river. With elements of three armies led by two airborne divisions he prepared for a heavy blow. Before he could ready his attack for late March, the incredible happened. On March 8 armored units of the U.S. First Army, not daring to hope for an unblown bridge, surprised them-

552 selves and the Germans by seizing and crossing the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen-left intact through a combination of enemy delay, bad judg- ment, and poor explosives It was neither the ideal area nor in accord with the SMAEF plan, which gave the main show to Montgomery, but the U.S. commanders at all echelons applauded the build-up over the bridge. A few days later, on March 23, Patton was across the river to the south, jeering at Montgomery who was still intent on his careful preparations in the north. Not until the next day would the 2 1 Army Group commander’s beautifully planned and well-executed attack go off as scheduled. H t went according to the book and could be studied for those who wanted to see a book solution. But it came too late for Montgomery’s purposes.

The sensational Remagen crossing gave Marshall a needed shot in the arm at a time when he felt especially harassed by criticism at home. Only the day before in a somewhat weary letter to Eisenhower he had balanced against the good news problems on the home front:

Your people are certainly doing fine work and seem to be trembling on the verge of still greater things With your successes in Europe and Mac.4rthur’s successes in the Philippines the public is greatly encouraged; however, there is a terrific drive on against the use of 18-year-old men in combat which has been fulminated by a speech by Senator Taft on the floor of the Senate, citing the case of the son of a friend of his I was impressed yesterday with the difficulties of my position in the necessity of simultaneously answering attacks on the use of these young men and alleging the inadequacy of their training, and at the same t i h e answering several radios, one in particular from MacArthur emphat- ically protesting against the shortage in replacement, and further, meeting the appeal of some of the commanders against further conversions of their men to individual replacements. T h e combined circumstances could hardly present a

We are under attack of course for the inadequacy of our winter clothing and now for the charge that 75 per cent of our materiel is inferior to that of the Germans. They grant that the jeep and the Garand rifle are all right but everything else is all wrong. Making war in a democracy is not a bed of roses

He closed with some complaining of his own. A few days earlier he had protested because of what he felt was failure to publicize a spectacular action of the 3d Division. He had received in reply a long list of press releases on the 3d Division fighting. “My comment on this is that I am not much interested in the explanation. What H am interested in is the result and I go back to my usual comparison, that had it been a Marine Division every phase of a rather dramatic incident would have been spread throughout the United States. They get the result, we do not. Our tech- nique therefore must be faulty.” Might it not be good publicity, he prodded Eisenhower, to release some mention of Generals Collins and McLain and their work on the advance to Cologne and Dhseldorf? 33

The Supreme Commander patiently answered the complaints. He was working to improve public relations and to get publicity for the work of outstanding commanders. He noted that in trying to compete with the

1 more illogical pressure.

The Faltering Axis 553 Marines the Army had fifty divisions on the European front as compared with one or two Marine divisions in an island battle. As for the inferiority of weapons he replied: “It is my opinion that when we have the new T-26 in sufficient numbers, and especially when we get the even newer model that has tlie souped-up go mm. gun, our tank force will be superior in slugging power as well as in maneuverability and in numbers Our artil- lery, rifles, machine guns, airplanes (except for the jet airplane), and in general our clothing and equipage all outclass the enemy’s. The jeep, the large trucks and the ducks are far ahead of him The German 88 is a great all round gun and as a separate anti-tank weapon has caused LIS lots of trouble. But his artillery as a whole is far behind and the go mm. will match the 88.”

These careful reassurances were garnished with a little sprig of Eisen- hower’s graceful humor. “Misery loves company,” he declared. “Some- times when I get tired of trying to arrange the blankets smoothly over several prima donnas in the same bed I think that no one person in the world can have so many illogical problems I read about your struggles concerning the eighteen year old men in combat, and about the criticism of our equipment, and went right back to work with a grin.” 34

Eisenhower macle a heroic effort to improve publicity by issuing a mes- sage to his army group commanders. He made clear that in seeking to present more vivid accounts of the American soldier, “we must be careful as always that there is no implication of disparagement of our allies.” They were not fighting the war for headlines, “but proper publicity does have an effect on our troop efficiency. . . . Moreover, i t will have an en- during effect on the future of American defense forces. . . .” He had caught the Chief of Staff’s main point with his concluding statement: “General Marshall has frequently communicated with me on this general subject. He is vitally interested in i t not only because of its postwar effects but because of its influence on his current problems of manpower, equip- ment, deployment and so on.” 35 Pershing’s former aide remembered how ,

quickly the American public had forgotten all but a few battles and units of World War I, and he wanted to imprint the Army’s great work on the public’s postwar memory.

The hard knocks inflicted on Bradley and Hodges over the Ardennes attack prompted Marshall a few hours before Montgomery’s drive across the Rhine to send his compliments to Bradley and his subordinates. Prefacing his communication, which was channeled through Eisenhower, with the reservation, “If you think it wise, that is without offense to Devers’ group or to Simpson’s [Ninth] army, and as a possible antidote for an overdose of Montgomery which is now coming into this country,” he asked that Eisenhower send the following message to the 12th Army Group commander: “I am filled with admiration of your handling of the operations involved in the development of the Remagen bridgehead and the clearing of the Saar Basin. I want General Hodges and General Pat-

1

554 Organizer of Victory ton and their corps and division commanders to know that their great military successes of the past few weeks have registered a high point in American military achievement. Incidentally I am profoundly impressed with the remarkable logistic support of the Remagen bridgehead and the supply of Patton’s forces which made possible the rapidity of their bold advances.” 30

Eager to make full use of the recent jump in morale, the Chief of Staff -took another reading. As March neared its close, he noted that the 4th Armored Division was again carrying out a particularly brilliant opera- tion. He wondered if this might not be the proper time to cite it for its drive to the Rhine and south of the Moselle. Later “a number of divisions [will be] spearheading advances all along the front and serious resent- ment would be engendered” by such action. “An immediate citation would act as a spur to all. If you have the same view this is your authority to act.” 37

Eisenhower agreed. No less than Marshall, he recognized the impor- tance of spurring the pursui t against the Germans. With nearly two-thirds of the forces in the West under his direct command and with the supplies necessary to mount any final attacks in his firm control, the Supreme Commander by the end of March was in a position to develop the battle as he saw best with the full support of Marshall and the other U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The President stanchly backed his generals.38

The situation had changed remarkably in three weeks. On March 8 Eisenhower had told Marshall that Bradley was rushing troops to secure an adequate bridgehead “with the idea that this will constitute greatest possible threat as supporting effort for main attack.”39 By the end of the month his tone clearly implied that he and Bradley had other plans in mind for the remainder of the war.

It was in this strong flush of elation over victory infusing Eisenhower and his generals, and fully shared by Marshall and his Washington associ- ates that the last vital decisions of the war in Europe were made. The unexpected developments on the central front had allowed a new ap- proach. Aware of Marshall’s great pride in the American forces and.his fierce support of Bradley, Hodges, and Patton, Eisenhower moved more certainly than at any time during the war to exercise full command of Western Allied troops in the field. He was soon to come into collision with the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff. But Washington saw to it that his plans were not denied.

The change was obvious in Eisenhower’s happy report to Marshall on March 26: “Naturally I am immensely pleased that the campaign west of the Rhine that Bradley and I planned last summer and insisted upon as a necessary preliminary to a deep penetration east of the Rhine, has been carried out so closely in accordance with conception. . . . I hope that this does not sound boastful, but I must admit to a great satisfaction that the things that Bradley and I have believed in from the beginning and have

I

The Faltering Axis 555 carried out in the face of some opposition both from within and without, have matured so splendidly ” 40

The unexpected crossing ended Montgomery’s hope for a grand finale on his northern front. Tlie disposition of troops, if nothing else, opened the way to Leipzig instead of to Berlin. Montgomery’s road to the Ger- man capital lay over a low area crisscrossed by rivers sufficiently broad and difficult to permit hard-core SS units to make last-ditch stands. Tlie Canadian Army was sorely beset in Holland, wliere flooded areas helped tlie desperate Nazis.

Montgomery’s longed-for drive on Berlin required tlie continued control of at least one American army, U.S. supplies, and the close cooperation of another American army. The decision went against the British Field Mar- shal. In his capacity as commander of U.S. forces in Europe, Eisenhower shifted Simpson’s Ninth Army back to Bradley and gave the 12th Army Group commander tlie mission of driving for Leipzig and tlie Elbe. Tliese arrangements were made in Europe, but they were in line with Washing- ton’s thinking and had Marshall’s complete approbation.

In late March, perturbed by Montgomery’s order stressing tlie drive ‘ toward Berlin as tlie main Allied effort in the West, Eisenhower took the

step of informing Stalin directly that lie planned to drive toward Dres- den and Leipzig He explained that lie wanted to encircle and destroy tlie Ruhr and to link up with the Russian forces Taking a clear sight along Bradley’s main front, lie added that the best axis would be Erfurt-Leipzig- Dresden, with Regensburg-Linz as the secondary line of advance.41

Such a strategy would mean tlie end of further important gains by Field Marshal Montgomery. Just as American thinking had been influenced by the current drives of Bradley’s armies and the natural lines of advance toward the East, so the 2 1 Army Group commander must have combined ruminations on tlie political importance of Berlin with his strong desire to lead the attack on the German capital. Even without Montgomery’s prompting tlie British Chiefs of Staff buzzed angrily over Eisenhower’s message, protesting to Marshall that they must make tlie main thrust across the open plains of northern Germany to take Berlin. They would open German ports, cut German communications to Holland, end the U- boat war, and liberate Swedish and Norwegian shipping 4 2

I t was Churchill who saw the weakness of the British case. He had learned well by now what Marshall would say to such arguments, and with words that sounded almost like a paraphrase of the American posi- tion, he lectured the British commanders. The Americans would insist that they should not go off on tangents. It was important that they stick to the main issues. Grimly he set forth the facts of life for tlie British Chiefs of Staff. While agreeing that they should present their views to the U.S. Chiefs, lie said, “I hope however we shall realise that we have only a quarter of the forces invading Germany, and that the situation has thus changed remarkably from the days of June 1944. . . .” He saw that one of

556 Organizer of Victory the chief criticisms of the Eisenhower position was that “we might be condemned to an almost static role in the north and virtually prevented from crossing the Elbe until an altogether later stage in the operations has been reached. All prospect also of the British entering Berlin with the Americans is ruled out.” He conceded what Montgomery had not been willing to do before-that if resistance was practically collapsing, there was no reason why the advances “should not take place on a broader front than hitherto. This is a point on which the Supreme Commander must have the final word.” 43

Despite his admonitions to his Chiefs, Churchill that same day con- tinued to dispute Eisenhower over Berlin, writing him: “. . . H do not consider myself that Berlin has yet lost its military and certainly not its political significance. The fall of Berlin would have a profound psychol- ogical effect on German resistance in every part of the Reich. . . . The idea that the capture of Dresden and junction with the Russians there would be a superior gain does not commend itself to me. . . . But while Berlin remains under the German flag it cannot, in my opinion, fail to be the most’decisive point in Germany.”

Although Churchill would not entirely relinquish any stand, he saw that the Supreme Commander held all the cards. Continuing his lecture to the British Chiefs, he pointed out: “It must be remembered that Eisen- hower’s credit with them [the U.S. Chiefs] stands very high. He may claim to have correctly estimated so far the resisting strength of the enemy and to have established by deeds (I) the ‘closing’ of the Rhine along its whole length, (b) the power to make the double advance instead of stak- ing all on the northern advance. . . . These events, combined‘with the continual arrival of American reinforcements, have greatly enhanced General Eisenhower’s power and prestige, and the Americans will feel that, as the victorious Supreme Commander, he has a right, and indeed a vital need, to try to elicit from the Russians their views as to the best point for making contact by the armies of the West and of the East.” He had correctly read Marshall’s views.

As usual, when he felt that the gambit might work, Churchill mingled some wheedling with words of praise. Later he would argue with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and then Roosevelt, but for the moment he told \Eisen- hower that he feared that if the main axis of advance was shifted to the south and the Ninth Army withdrawn from 2 1 Army Group, “the offen- sive role which was assigned to him [Montgomery] may peter out.” Now he took a different tack on Berlin: he did not understand why Eisenhower felt that there was virtue in not crossing the Elbe. “If the enemy’s resist- ance should weaken, as you evidently expect and which may well be ful- filled, why should we not cross the Elbe and advance as far eastward as possible?” This move, he declared, had an important political bearing, as the Russian army of the south seemed certain to enter Vienna and over- run Austria. “If we deliberately leave Berlin to them, even if it should be

The Faltering Axis 557 in our grasp, the double event may strengthen their conviction, already apparent, that they have done everything.” 44

The decision in April to turn the main attack toward Leipzig resulted to a great extent from Eisenhower’s desire to give Bradley and Patton their chance, now that U.S. forces constituted the greater part of the troops on the western front. Marshall fully backed this desire.

On April 2 Marshall sent the President a War Department study of the situation in Europe. The report, if anything slightly pessimistic, said that Allied forces should reach the Elbe River between Magdeburg and Halle by April 20, and Stuttgart and Nuremberg should be in Allied hands by April 2 0 and Munich by May 1. The British were expected to advance more slowly in the north.

The Russians, if the Western Allied view proved correct, would be able to begin their general offensive by April I O and by May 1 be in contact with American forces along the Elbe and Saale, south of Berlin. It was assumed that by May 1 no cohesive enemy front would exist, although pockets of resistance would undoubtedly remain.

There was much debate on whether the Nazis would set up a National Redoubt in southern Germany. However there was more definite agree- ment on this topic than generally believed. The April 2 study that Mar- shall had forwarded to the President concluded: “The many rumors as to German preparations for the defense of the ‘Alpine Redoubt’ are believed to lack substance. No reliable information has reached the War Depart- ment of unduly large storage of supplies in the ‘redoubt area’ and there are no indications that any fortifications are being constructed in Bavaria or Austria to prevent an Allied ingress into the ‘redoubt area’ from the north. . . .” Although several pockets might be established, including some in Bavaria, the report continued: “If Hitler is true to the character he has shown in past crises, he will make his exit bravely and dramatically and thus remain a psychological force for his enemies to reckon with for decades.” 45

The War Department was prophetic about Hitler’s end. But the intel- ligence experts were not sending out similar prophecies about the ap- proaching end of Franklin Roosevelt’s life Three weeks before Hitler and Mussolini he would pass from the scene suddenly at Warm Springs, Geor- gia.

General Marshall had left his office on April 12 and was sitting on the porch of Quarters One when Colonel McCarthy drove from the Pentagon, to tell him that the President was dead. Mrs. Roosevelt’s first thought had been of Harry S. Truman and after that of her children. Her messages to her four sons in uniform--“Daddy slept away. He would expect you to carry on and finish your jobs,”-sent to the Pentagon for transmittal, were the first announcement McCarthy had of the President’s passing.46

Hurrying to the White House, General Marshall offered his condolences and assistance to the widow. Mrs. Roosevelt asked him to assume respon-

. 558 Organizer of Victory

sibility for all details of the journey north from Warm Springs, the funeral service at the White House, and the final trip to Hyde Park. At once the great machinery of the Pentagon was put into action. From Fort Benning two thousand men were ordered to Warm Springs, guards of honor were to be placed along the route tlie train would take northward, thousands more were to line the streets in Washington as the President’s body was borne from Union Station to the White House. General Marshall put his chief orderly, Sergeant Powder, in charge of the bearers of the coffin, and it was the tall sergeant who walked behind the caisson.47

Next day as the train started northward from Warm Springs, General Marshall joined the other Chiefs of Staff (with General Barney Giles rep- resenting General Arnold, who was in Europe) and Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal for the first meeting of the service chiefs with the new Com- mander-in-Chief. President Truman explained at the outset that he was completely satisfied with the way the war was going and that he wanted them to go on as before. At Stimson’s suggesti,on Marshall and King gave short summaries of the current war situation. Then the group left the President to grapple wtili the myriad problems that had suddenly become his.48

8 The new Chief Executive was a familiar figure to the service chiefs, particularly to Stimson and Marshall, who were, of course, fully aware of his work in the Senate as chairman of tlie special committee on the con- duct of the war. Truman respected Marshall for his candor and leader- ship, according him a trust in his judgment that the Chief of Staff later said that lie found almost frightening.

Roosevelt’s successor impressed Stimson as “a man who is willing and anxious to leain and to do his best but who was necessarily laboring under the terrific handicap of coming into such an office where the threads of information were so multitudinous that only long previous familiarity could allow him to control them.” Stimson knew that Truman had first learned of the atomic bomb from his own briefing a few hours before; it would be more than a week before James Byrnes could bring him up to date on the notes he had taken at Yalta. Still carefully locked up in Leahy’s safe were the secret provisions of talks between the President and Stalin at Yalta. A few days away was the conference at San Francisco that would launch the United Nations Organization; some three weeks away was the end of the war in Europe, a victory that would bring so many trials for those in authority.

Some of these problems were discussed by Stimson and Marshall as they rode back from their first official meeting with the new President. The Secretary of War felt some reassurance. Marshall was cautious: “We shall not know what he is really like until the pressure really begins to be felt.” He had not yet heard two slogans that the new occupant of the White House would inscribe in history: “If you can’t take the heat, stay out of the kitchen” and “The buck stops here.” This was the kind of reaction to

The Faltering Axis 559 pressure that Marshall and Stimson and their colleagues wanted. Within ten days they would be convinced of the staying power of the man from Missouri.

As the machinery of government readjusted to the sudden change in direction, the final ceremonies were being prepared for the fallen Com- mander-in-Chief. On the morning of the fourteenth tlie new President and his family, accompanied by members of the Cabinet, the Supreme Court, leaders of Congress, and the Chiefs of Staff met the dead Presi- dent’s train as it arrived from Georgia. A procession started from the rail- way station at io A.M. Preceded by the Marine Band and a squadron of forty-eight scout cars, an armed escort, consisting of a battalion of field artillery, a battalion of infantry, a battalion of Marines, a battalion of sailors, and a composite battalion of WACS, WAVES, and female Ma- rines, marched from Union Station down to Constitution Avenue and headed for 15th Street, where they would turn to go to the White House. Following them were the horse-drawn caisson and the limousines with members of the family, the presidential party, and high government offi- cials.49

At 4 P.M. in the East Room three hundred mourners heard Bishop Angus Dun of tlie National Cathedral, assisted by the pastors of St. Thomas and St. John’s, conduct the simple service requested by Mrs. Roosevelt. The President’s body remained in the East Room of the White House, guarded by four enlisted men, until time for the io A Mdeparture for Hyde Park. Truman and members of his family, Mrs. Roosevelt and her family, and a number of friends went northward on two special trains. Stimson, Marshall, King and Giles decided instead to fly to Stewart Field near West Point, where they would spend the evening as the guests of the superintendent of the Military Academy, Major General Francis B. Wilby.50

The Chiefs of Staff were still at West Point as the train, which had traveled from New York City along the east bank of the Hudson, passed across the river. They then drove rapidly along the Hudson through Cornwall and Newburgh before crossing to Poughkeepsie and Hyde Park. There they joined members of the presidential party, who came from the railway at the bottom of the bluff on which Roosevelt’s home stood. At the graveside in the rose garden of the estate, they waited as the caisson, escorted by cadets, wound its way up the hill. The dirgelike funeral march was heard as cannons fired the last twenty-one-gun salute for the dead President.

All the arrangements had gone perfectly, but when the eight servicemen moved from the caisson to the grave, it seemed, that they would be unable to support the weight of the heavy bronze casket Two men in uniform standing nearby, one of them Sergeant Powder, sprang forward to steady the coffin as it was being placed in the grave. The elderly rector of St. James Episcopal Church of Hyde Park, where the Roosevelts had wor-

560 Organizer of Victory shiped, read the service for the dead as the young cadets stood silent and erect. Then came the traditional three volleys and tlie sounds of Taps.51

Another long trip still lay ahead for the President and his family, Mrs. Roosevelt and her daughter and son, and other members of the funeral party, who started back to Washington by train shortly after the graveside service. Knowing that developments in Europe and the Pacific would not wait, tlie Chiefs of Staff flew back shortly afterward. There was no time for lingering thoughts of the leader who had fallen; too many problems awaited solution. On the afternoon after Roosevelt’s death urgent calls had come from Europe in connection with proper procedures to be fol- lowed as German collapse approached. Growing difficulties with the Rus- sians were clearly evident as the enemies of Hitler closed in from east and west.52