the supreme court, 2010 term
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The Supreme Court, 2010 Term. William M. Jay July 2011. The Supreme Court, 2009 Term. Overview of the Court’s work and workload this Term Significant decisions Questions on any and all aspects of the Term. Raw Numbers. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
The Supreme Court,2010 Term
William M. JayJuly 2011
The Supreme Court, 2009 Term
I. Overview of the Court’s work and workload this Term
II. Significant decisionsIII. Questions on any and all aspects of the
Term
Raw Numbers• 77 cert petitions granted for merits hearing, plus
1 appeal and 1 original case
• 78 oral arguments
• 75 decisions after briefing and argument• Two split 4-4; two dismissed without opinion
• 48% unanimous• 20% 5-4 or 5-3• 31 recusals (28 Kagan, 2 Sotomayor, 1 Chief)
Source: ScotusBlog
Transitions
• Justice Kagan replaces Justice Stevens
Transitions
• Justice Kagan replaces Justice Stevens– Less track record than Justice Sotomayor on
many of the issues on the Court’s docket
Transitions
• Justice Kagan replaces Justice Stevens– Less track record than Justice Sotomayor on
many of the issues on the Court’s docket– A fourth law professor
Transitions
• Justice Kagan replaces Justice Stevens– Less track record than Justice Sotomayor on
many of the issues on the Court’s docket– A fourth law professor– Experience in the Executive Branch
Transitions
• Justice Kagan replaces Justice Stevens– Less track record than Justice Sotomayor on
many of the issues on the Court’s docket– A fourth law professor– Experience in the Executive Branch– Experience at the lectern
Transitions
• Justice Kagan replaces Justice Stevens– Less track record than Justice Sotomayor on
many of the issues on the Court’s docket– A fourth law professor– Experience in the Executive Branch– Experience at the lectern– 40 years younger than her predecessor
Transitions
• Justice Kagan replaces Justice Stevens– Less track record than Justice Sotomayor on
many of the issues on the Court’s docket– A fourth law professor– Experience in the Executive Branch– Experience at the lectern– 40 years younger than her predecessor
• Retirement…
Transitions
• Justice Kagan replaces Justice Stevens– Less track record than Justice Sotomayor on
many of the issues on the Court’s docket– A fourth law professor– Experience in the Executive Branch– Experience at the lectern– 40 years younger than her predecessor
• Retirement… of the Court librarian
Some Illustrative Cases
• Four free-speech cases• Ariz. Free Enterprise • Sorrell v. IMS Health • Snyder v. Phelps • Brown v. EMA
Some Illustrative Cases
• Four free-speech cases• Ariz. Free Enterprise • Sorrell v. IMS Health • Snyder v. Phelps • Brown v. EMA
• PreemptionChamber of Commerce v. Whiting
Some Illustrative Cases
• Four free-speech cases• Ariz. Free Enterprise • Sorrell v. IMS Health • Snyder v. Phelps • Brown v. EMA
• PreemptionChamber of Commerce v. Whiting
• Important criminal caseDavis v. United States
Some Illustrative Cases
• Four free-speech cases• Ariz. Free Enterprise • Sorrell v. IMS Health • Snyder v. Phelps • Brown v. EMA
• PreemptionChamber of Commerce v. Whiting
• Important criminal caseDavis v. United States
• Cases about the role of the courts
Arizona Free Enterprise Fund’sFreedom Club PAC v. Bennett
• Arizona offers public financing to qualifying candidates for state office– Initial lump sum (varies by office) (“X”)– Matching funds based on opponents’
fundraising or spending above X– Matching funds based on independent
groups’ spending on the election– Absolute cap: 3X
Arizona Free Enterprise
• Plaintiffs– Candidates who faced publicly funded
opponents– Independent groups who advertised against
publicly funded candidates or in favor of their opponents
• Plaintiffs alleged they had been chilled in their fundraising or spending
Arizona Free Enterprise• Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
– First Amendment protects unlimited spending– Public financing is constitutional
• Davis v. FEC (2008)– “Millionaire’s Amendment” to McCain-Feingold
• Self-funded candidate spends $350,000• Opponents’ contribution limits triple:
from $2300 to $6900 per donor• Opponents can accept coordinated contributions
from parties
Arizona Free Enterprise
• Davis v. FEC (2008)– Supreme Court holds, 5-4, that Millionaire’s
Amendment substantially burdened Davis’s exercise of his First Amendment right to fund his own campaign
– “Special and potentially significant burden”– Substantial burden → strict scrutiny– Leveling the playing field is not a compelling
(or valid) interest
Arizona Free Enterprise
• On the logic of Davis, district court strikes down Arizona matching-funds law
• Ninth Circuit disagrees and upholds the law– Matching funds create a disincentive like
disclosure requirements– Intermediate scrutiny– Anticorruption interest
Arizona Free Enterprise
5-4 for plaintiffs, per Chief Justice Roberts• Strict scrutiny applies
– Substantial burden, just like Davis• This subsidy is “in direct response to the political speech of
another, to allow the recipient to counter that speech”
– Worse than Davis, because no fundraising– Multiplier effect; effect on independent groups– Choice is “trigger matching funds, change your
message, or do not speak”– More speech only as a step to less speech
Arizona Free Enterprise
• Matching funds fail strict scrutiny– Leveling the playing field is “a dangerous
enterprise,” not a valid justification– Anticorruption interest is inadequate here
• Self-funders, independent groups pose no corruption risk
• Contribution limits already combat corruption• Encouraging participation in public financing is not a
sufficient justification given the burden it imposes
Arizona Free Enterprise
Justice Kagan dissents• Public financing is constitutional
– Matching funds are a way to find the “sweet spot”
• No substantial burden– “Except in a world gone topsy-turvy, additional
campaign speech and electoral competition is not a First Amendment injury”
– Content-neutral subsidy; plaintiffs’ chutzpah
Arizona Free Enterprise
Justice Kagan dissents• Davis is about a discriminatory restriction,
not a nondiscriminatory subsidy• Anticorruption interest
– Nobody relies on “leveling”; 1 interest suffices– Buckley said that lump-sum public financing
fights corruption by getting people to decline contributions; this is just a fine-tuning of the lump-sum program
Arizona Free Enterprise
• For public financing, what now?– Matching funds appear to be dead
(as most courts had held after Davis but before the Ninth Circuit decision in Arizona Free Enterprise)
– Buckley still says the presidential (lump-sum) public-financing program is constitutional
• No “separation of campaign and state,” yet– Multiplier-match for small contributions?
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
• Facts– Drug companies use “detailing”– Vermont statute regulates “prescriber-
identifying information.” Without consent:• Pharmacy can’t sell it (for marketing?)• Pharmacy can’t allow it to be used for marketing• Drug company can’t use it in marketing
– Drug companies and data miners both sue• Similar Maine and N.H. statutes upheld• Second Circuit strikes down Vermont’s
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
6-3 for plaintiffs, per Justice Kennedy• Heightened scrutiny
– Burdens disfavored speech (marketing) by disfavored speakers (drug companies)
– Not an incidental burden, like fair-housing laws that prohibit “Whites Only” signs
– Regulates speech, not just “access to information” or “beef jerky”
• It’s not the government’s information• The access restriction burdens speech
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
• Heightened scrutiny– The creation and dissemination of information
are speech– This content-based restriction is like a ban on
selling cookbooks, lab results, train schedules– Detailers can’t do their job (speech) without
this commodity (information); like banning a trade magazine from buying ink
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
• Heightened scrutiny… but what kind?– Restrictions on commercial speech get less
scrutiny than, e.g., restrictions on political speech
– But is a business’s disclosure or use of prescriber-identifying information always commercial?
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
• Heightened scrutiny… but what kind?– Restrictions on commercial speech get less
scrutiny than, e.g., restrictions on political speech
– But is a business’s disclosure or use of prescriber-identifying information always commercial?
• The Court doesn’t answer.
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
• Vermont statute fails intermediate (commercial-speech) scrutiny
• Protection of doctors’ privacy– Bogus because the information may be
disclosed to all but a narrow disfavored class– And although some content-based privacy
measures might be OK, here the content-discrimination has nothing to do with privacy
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
• Protection of doctors from harassment– So don’t let the drug rep into your office– “Many are those who must endure speech
they do not like, but that is a necessary cost of freedom”
• Protection of public health and fisc– Can’t be done by suppressing truthful, non-
misleading speech for fear people will listen
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
• What can the State do?– Fund its own counter-speech (“use generic
drugs, they’re cheaper and just as good”)– Regulate false and misleading speech (even
with content-based regulation)– Perhaps, regulate prescriber-identifying
information more tightly and evenhandedly
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
Justice Breyer dissents,joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan
• No heightened scrutiny– This is just economic regulation (Glickman)– No restriction on what you may or must say– Drugs are heavily regulated (gov’t info)– If laws like this one must survive heightened
scrutiny, then judges and not legislatures will be making economic policy (Lochner)
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
• His bottom line– Where the government directs the collection
or retention of certain information, regulations on what may be done with that information need not pass heightened scrutiny
– “Content-based” or “speaker-based” doesn’t matter in the context of economic regulation; that’s how governments choose and implement policy
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.
• Statute also survives heightened scrutiny– Letting detailers in the door, but restricting
their access to information, is a valid way to give doctors access to detailers’ information but still control prices and protect privacy
Snyder v. Phelps
• Facts– Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, USMC, was
killed in Iraq in the line of duty– Members of Westboro Baptist Church
protested his funeral• Protest occurred 1,000 feet from church• Funeral procession passed within 200 feet;
LCpl Snyder’s father Albert saw tops of signs• Albert Snyder later saw signs on news• “Epic” posted on Internet
Snyder v. Phelps
• Snyder sued Westboro, Phelpses under Maryland tort law– Prevailed on claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion– Won $2.9M compensatory, $2.1M punitive– Lost on defamation, publicity of private life
• Fourth Circuit invalidated award under First Amendment, ordered judgment for defendants as a matter of law
Snyder v. Phelps
8-1 for Phelpses, per Chief Justice Roberts• Speech was on a matter of public concern,
at least in its “overall thrust and dominant theme”– Not an attack on the family in guise of speech
• Peacefully, in the traditional public forum– “had the right to be where they were”– “It was what Westboro said that exposed it to
tort damages”
Snyder v. Phelps
• IIED tort is itself problematic– “Malleable” and “subjective” (Hustler)
• “Captive audience” doctrine doesn’t justify treating seclusion tort differently– Albert Snyder wasn’t a captive audience
• States have other regulatory options• “Our holding today is narrow.”
Snyder v. Phelps
Justice Alito dissents alone• Speech was mostly not on a matter of public
concern; the Snyders were private figures• Words can inflict injury; Phelpses “brutally
attacked Matthew Snyder”– “Neither classic ‘fighting words’ nor defamatory
statements are immunized when they occur in a public place, and there is no good reason to treat a verbal assault based on the conduct or character of a private figure like Matthew Snyder any differently.”
– “Special protection” at funerals?
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (EMA)
• Facts– California prohibits sale or rental of violent
video games to minors• VVGs involve “killing, maiming, dismembering, or
sexually assaulting an image of a human being”• Phrased like an obscenity statute:
– “appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors” – “patently offensive” to community standards for minors– lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
for minors”
Brown v. EMA
• Video-game industry brings First Amendment suit– District court in northern California grants
permanent injunction– Ninth Circuit affirms– Consistent with rulings in 7th and 8th Circuits,
other district courts• Supreme Court grants cert nonetheless
Brown v. EMA
7-2 for video-game manufacturers(but only 5 votes for Justice Scalia’s opinion)• Video games, in general, receive First
Amendment protection– “It is difficult to distinguish politics from
entertainment, and dangerous to try”• California’s statute is content-based
– So ordinarily strict scrutiny would apply
Brown v. EMA
• Court rejects California’s argument that video-game violence is unprotected speech, like obscenity– Obscenity is not “whatever a legislature finds
shocking”; it’s only depictions of sex– Restrictions on the sale of obscenity to minors
do not receive strict scrutiny (Ginsberg), but violent video games are not obscene
• Restrictions on sale to minors only in “relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances”
Brown v. EMA
• No tradition of denying First Amendment protection to depictions of violence– At a minimum, “a long … tradition of
proscription” is required • Stevens – crush videos• The First Amendment strikes the balance
– California concedes no tradition for adults– Court concludes no tradition for minors, either
Brown v. EMA
• Examples of gore in juvenile entertainment• Snow White, Cinderella, Hansel & Gretel• The Odyssey and the Inferno• Lord of the Flies
• Examples of failed censorship attempts• Dime novels and “penny dreadfuls”• Movies• Radio dramas• Comic books
Brown v. EMA
• Video games are not materially different• Cultural and intellectual difference, but no
constitutional difference, between reading Dante and playing Mortal Kombat
• Video games are “interactive,” but choose-your-own-adventure novels have existed since 1969
• And in some ways, “all literature is interactive”
• Yeah, some video games are disgusting• But disgust is not a valid basis for restricting
expression. That’s the point of free speech.
Brown v. EMA
• So strict scrutiny applies• Statute flunks strict scrutiny
– “Wildly underinclusive”• No greater effect on kids than Bugs Bunny, Road
Runner, Sonic the Hedgehog, or a picture of a gun• California does not restrict Saturday-morning
cartoons or pictures of guns• Underinclusiveness suggests pretext, censorship• And California lets kids have the games with adult
approval (even aunt or uncle)
Brown v. EMA
• Statute flunks strict scrutiny– Also overinclusive
• Some parents would let their kids have the games, but California prohibits selling those kids the games directly
• This is “only in support of what the State thinks parents ought to want”
– So although both ends (reduce youth violence, help parents) are legitimate, the statute doesn’t properly further them
Brown v. EMA
Justice Alito concurs in the judgment, joined by the Chief Justice
• Statute is invalid because it’s vague• Community standards of decency are well
established in the area of obscenity, but not in the area of depictions of violence
Brown v. EMA
• But Justice Alito disagrees with the Court’s analysis– Violent video games are different from the
other media that the Court has confronted• Realism approaching virtual reality• Player has unprecedented ability to participate• “In some of these games, the violence is
astounding.” And there may be “no antisocial theme too base” – ethnic cleansing, Columbine, Virginia Tech, JFK assassination, rape
Brown v. EMA
• But Justice Alito disagrees with the Court’s analysis– Violent video games are different from the
other media that the Court has confronted– So the Court should not dismiss so easily the
possibility that playing violent video games affects “at least some minors” in a way different from reading a book, listening to the radio, or watching a movie
Brown v. EMA
Justices Thomas and Breyer each dissent• Justice Thomas: no right to speak directly
to minors– Relies on the original public understanding of
the freedom of speech– “Speech to minor children bypassing their
parents” is unprotected speech• The founding generation believed parents had total
authority over their children, even what they read
Brown v. EMA
Justices Thomas and Breyer each dissent• Justice Breyer: California had a sufficient
basis to take action to protect minors– Strict scrutiny applies, but keep in mind that
the speech involved is speech to minors • “What sense does it make to forbid selling to a 13-
year-old boy a magazine with an image of a nude woman, while protecting a sale to that 13-year-old of an interactive video game in which he … binds and gags the woman, then tortures and kills her?”
Brown v. EMA– Scientific opinion is divided, but there is
evidence that video games affect children– The Court should defer to an elected
legislature’s resolution of this scientific debate– Majority’s remarkable footnote rejoinder
• Because scientists are divided, State can’t prevail
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan
• Voting on city council is not speech• So punishment for conflict of interest
doesn’t violate First Amendment
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
• Arizona regulates employment of aliens– One provision provides for revocation of any
“licenses” held by a business that knowingly employs an unauthorized alien
• Even articles of incorporation and the like– Another requires every employer in Arizona to
use E-Verify• Business, civil rights groups sue• Ninth Circuit upholds the statute
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
• Federal law forbids employers from hiring unauthorized aliens– Sanctions in federal tribunals– Corresponding civil-rights protections
• Federal law preempts any state or local law imposing sanctions on employers except for “licensing and similar laws”
• Federal law makes E-Verify “voluntary”
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
5-3 for Arizona, per Chief Justice Roberts• Text says “licensing”; Arizona’s law affects
only things that meet common definitions of “license”; Q.E.D.
• Text imposes no requirement that there be a federal adjudication first; Arizona has adequately adopted federal standards
• E-Verify is good; more is better
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment• He doesn’t believe in implied “purposes
and objectives” preemption
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
Justice Breyer dissents, joined by Justice Ginsburg
• In context, license means an employment-related license; it doesn’t mean articles of incorporation (“business death penalty”)
• E-Verify is supposed to be voluntary
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
Justice Sotomayor dissents• Read the “licensing” savings clause
against the backdrop of other federal law• State may impose licensing sanctions only
once a federal tribunal has found that an employer knowingly hired someone the federal government agrees is an unauthorized alien
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
Contrast with other recent preemption cases• Williamson (Justice Breyer)
– Motor vehicle safety standards) – Role of the agency)
• PLIVA (Justice Thomas) – Generic drug labeling– 5-4, with 4 votes to dispense with
presumption against preemption
Davis v. United States
• Facts– Davis was arrested, he was handcuffed, and
his car was searched incident to the arrest– Under 11th Circuit precedent, based on New
York v. Belton, the search was permissible– While his appeal was pending, Court decides
Arizona v. Gant, which disapproves 11th Circuit precedent on vehicle searches
– 11th Circuit okays search based on good faith
Davis v. United States
7-2 for prosecution, per Justice Alito• Deterrence is the “sole purpose” of the
exclusionary rule; no deterrent value, no suppression
• Knock-and-announce • Reliance on database• Reliance on state law • Reliance on warrant
• Here, officers acted in accordance with “binding circuit law”—“nonculpable, innocent”
Davis v. United States
• Retroactivity doctrine– Gant applies to Davis’s case as a potential
ground for relief, but that doesn’t mean he’s entitled to relief
• Court’s role in developing 4th Amendment law– Deterrence trumps– And the law will still develop
Davis v. United States
Justice Sotomayor concurs in the judgment• Here, circuit law was very clear. Maybe a
different rule would apply if the search had been in reliance on unsettled precedent.
Davis v. United States
Justice Breyer dissents, joined by Justice Ginsburg
• Gant applies to Davis, under the rules governing retroactivity
• Therefore, Davis and those like him need a remedy for the unconstitutional search
Davis v. United States
• “Good faith” is a misnomer and good-faith exceptions are few; we regularly suppress even when the officer acts in “good faith”
• That’s because suppression is the often only remedy for an unreasonable search. In these cases, no suppression, no Fourth Amendment protection at all.
Cases about the Court’s role
• Standing• “Lawmaking”• Article III judicial power• What unites these concepts?
– To what extent does the Court preserve its own ability to interpret the law? And in what areas does it step back in favor of other branches, or no one?
Cases about the Court’s role
• Standing– Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn
• $500 tax credit for contributions to STOs• 5-4, no taxpayer standing, per Justice Kennedy• Rule against taxpayer standing is based on
principle that matters of public concern, in which the plaintiff’s grievance is shared with millions of others, should be resolved through the political process
• Establishment Clause exception for spending• “Three pence only”
Cases about the Court’s role
• Standing– Bond v. United States
• Claim that the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act exceeds federal power
• Third Circuit holds that only a State can raise a Tenth Amendment claim
• “Federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power”
• In a proper case, an individual can make that claim as well as a State – provided she has the ordinary elements of Article III standing
Cases about the Court’s role
• “Lawmaking”– American Electric Power v. Connecticut
• Claim that greenhouse-gas emissions violate the federal common law of nuisance
• Court unanimously holds that the Clean Air Act has displaced any such judge-made law
– NASA v. Nelson• Background checks at Jet Propulsion Lab• Whatever right to informational privacy may exist,
these background checks don’t violate it
Cases about the Court’s role
• Article III judicial power– Stern v. Marshall
• Did a bankruptcy court have power to enter final judgment on a state-law counterclaim by the bankrupt (Anna Nicole Smith) against her stepson?
• 5-4, per Chief Justice Roberts: No, under Article III of the Constitution. Congress may not withdraw from life-tenured Article III judges “any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or in admiralty”
• Dissenters see threat to administrative adjudication
Themes?
• A cautious Term in constitutional cases outside the First Amendment context
• Incremental decisions• Some broad statutory and rule
interpretation holdings
Other Highlights• Confrontation: manhunts
and crime labs• Procedural barriers to
postconviction DNA claims
• Police-created exigent circumstances
• Detention of a material witness
• Prison overcrowding
• Wal-Mart class action• Unconscionability of
arbitration clauses• Petition Clause• Personal jurisdiction• Right to counsel in
civil contempt• State sovereign
immunity• Attorney fees for
§1983 defendants
CRIMINAL CIVIL
Questions or feedback?