iI" t 'S iJ

The study team consisted of MI. Mao Guanghua, DeputyHarbor Master, Shanghai Harbor SuperintendencyAdministration; Ms. Zeng Hui, Comprehensive PlanningDepartment, Ministry of Communications, Beijing; Mr. XuJunchi, Vice Chief of Division, Tianjing HarborSuperintendency Administration ( who served asinterpreter); Mr. Mo ai, Vice-Chief of Division, GuangzhouHarbor Superintendency Administration; Mr. Song Zhen,Maritime Safety Administration, Ministry ofCommunications, Beijing; and Mr. Han Shimin, Port ofDalian Harbor Superintendency Administration.

The group spent almost four weeks in the United States,but even that amount of time required compressedschedules and travel time in order to understand thewhole picture of how the United States merchant marineoperates. Their travels would include stops in New York;Washington, D.C.; Martinsburg, West Virginia; Clarksburg,Maryland; Yorktown, Virginia; a'1d San Francisco,California.

~ ~

Chief Warrant Officer David Umberger illutrates the areas of responsibilityof the U.S. Coast Guard's Vessel Traffic 5, rvice (VT5) New York.

Marine Licensing Procedures are ex plaine during a visit to the New YorkRegional Examination Center.

CDR Robert Abair, Chief, Rescue CoordinationCenter (RCC) New York, lectures on air, seaand technological assets available to rescuecontrollers.

AMVER's Rick Kenney explains systemoperations.

WorkingSessions onGovernors

Island

A ."'6r-P, ..... 1 II • .-'T'....

hi

A Station New York crew member expl, ins the operations of a typical small boal slation.

AroundNew York

Harbor

Chinese visitors strike a pose during (',eir visit tothe U.S. Merchant Marine Memorial loc lted inNew York harbor.

Group members Joined the festivities! the Asian·Pacific AmericanHeritage Luncheon on Governors Isla,d, an event which highlightsthe contributions of Aslan·Paciflc imn grants to American culture.traditions and the arts.

Capt Liu translates a warm greeting from Mr. Mao toRADM Douglas Teeson, Commander of the U.S. CoastGuard's Maintenance and Logistics Command,Atlantic.

tit

CAPT Uu and Mr. Mao are welcomed by the Rev. Jean Smith, Directorof Seafarers' Services at the Seamen's Church Institute. Rev. Smithoffered the services of the New York C Iy and Port Newark facilities toChinese crewmembers.

Swapping sea stories with an old timer!

Meeting With Industry!

..

CAPT William Douglas (second from Ie I) provided a tour of theInstltute's New York headquarters, to in dude a stop at Santa'sWorkshop, where volunteers knit scarv }s, caps and millens to bedistributed as gifts to mariners at sea c ler the Christmas holiday.

Mr. Mao takes acue from a retiredmariner in thelounge at theInstitute.

Mr. Paul Preus (center), Past President ( I the Maritime Association ofthe Port of New York/New Jersey, discus ied the history and mission ofthe 100·year old organization at Its New 'ark offices.

At a luncheon reception hosted by the MaritimeAssociation to welcome the delegation, Mr. Han (left)and Mr. Mao engage in a lively discussion in Chinesewith CAPT L.C. Wang, President of Hanover MarineCarriers, located in Weehawken, New Jersey.

_._------------~--~

Mr. Song Zhen gives a "thumbs up!" from thepilot's seal.

Chief Sherman explains rescue swimmerprocedures to an intent audience of Mr. Song(Left), and the interpreter, Mr. Xu.

Chief AviationSurvivalman JimSherman demonstratesequipment used byCoast Guard rescueswimmers. The visit toAir Station Brooklynwas hosted by theCommanding Officer,CDR Thomas King andhis wife, Karen, who isof Chinese descent,and assisted InInterpreting.

Safety On Land, Sea And Air!

All Aboard! An HH·65 Search and Rese Ie helicopter serves as a backdrop torecord the visit of the study team to the U.S. Coast Guard Air Station, locatedat Floyd Bennett Field, Brooklyn, New 'r .rk.

On board the tanker training vessel at It e State Universityof New York Maritime College, located Bi historic FortSchuyler in the Borough of the Bronx.

An opportune visit to the New York City Fire Department'sHazardous Materials Unit, which was training in marine oil spillcontainment procedures at the New York State MaritimeAcademy, ForI Schuyler.

Jrlr

All eyes are on the charts at FortSchuyler's Radar and Navigationclassroom.

CAPT Robert Safarik, External Affairs Officer of the U.S. Merchant MarineAcademy at Kings Point, New York describes the missions and course of studyat the federal Maritime School.

Back To School!

(Right) N,) visit toFort Schl '(Ierwould be completewithout a stop atthe schoel's newsimulato!

(Left) M! Zengtakes thEsimulato 's helm.

Accompanied by a graduating deck cade! the group pausedduring a tour of Fort Schuyler's diesel ms·;hinery controlpanel.

Chinese visitors muster on the symbolic memorialquarterdeck 01 the Administration Building at Kings Point.Graduating Midshipman Richard Hsu provided translation andthe benefit of his experience over four years of training for amerchant marine license.

A .J1\I~n DI II I I ~TIt.1 of.,

- _._------------------------....IIIIIIIlI _.JIII1 t_tll. r I

AMVER News Round-UpFirst 25-year Awards Presented To U.S. Ships

U. S. Coast Guard Captain of the Po rt of Houston, CAPTRichard E. Ford, presents the first c I three 25-Year AMVERparticipation awards to Mr. August' Gus" Elmer, President,SeaRlver Maritime, Inc. at a recepti( n at the companyheadquarters In Houston.

(Photos Courtesy SeaRiver Maritim " Inc.)

Mr. Andreas Deliglannis, Head of ~ hipping Relations,European Union Secllon, Greek M nistry of Merchant Marine,(left) Is welcomed by members of he Maritime Association ofthe Port of New York/New Jersey 1 I a reception following hisvisit to the AMVER Maritime Relat ons Office as part of anInternational maritime study grou

14 AMVER BULLETIN

CAPT. Ford and Mr. Elmer are joined by Ocean FleetManager Dwight Koops (left). SEARIVER BATON ROUGE,SAN FRANCISCO and PHILADELPHIA were 25-YearWinners. Mr. Elmer holds a 15-Year plaque for the SIRBENICIA.

YouthfulEnthusiasm!

Wide-eyed interest in AMVER expressed by students of theMaritime Studies Program of Williams College at MysticSeaport in Connecticut is infectious as AMVER's RickKenney responds to questions during their visit to theGovernors Island office.

World's Most Famous Survivor!

•

Poster for movie that Immortalized the world'smost famous disaster at sea set the scem forthe appearance by Its youngest survivor.

School children from New Jersey surround 83-year-old Millvina Dean, whoas a 9-week-old baby survived the sinking of the TITANIC in 1912. Mrs.Dean addressed the students while attending the fifth annual conventionof TItanic International Inc. of Freehold, a non-profit group devoted topromoting historical interest in the maritime tragedy.

A Pioneer's Daughter

(Photo courtesy of the Maritime Reporter)

First Russian Graduates!

AMVER's Rick Kenney poses with Gioia Marconi Braga,daughter of Guglielmo Marconi, the Inventor of the wirelessradio. Both were speakers at the 70th Annual Banquet ofthe Veteran Wireless Operators Association, Inc. (VWOA).Mrs. Braga recounted that the young Marconi childrenwould "make fun" of their father while he tested hisinventions!

Four students from the Russian Federation became the firststudents from the former Soviet Union to attend andgraduate from a United States Service Academy when theyjoined the 219 members of the Class of 1995 of the U.S.Merchant Marine Academy In ceremonies at Kings Point,New York. (From Left to Right): Dmitri Bezroukov, AlexeyMironov, Konstantin Vassiliev, and Sergey Apanovich.

(Photo courtesy U.S. Merchant Marine Academy.)

AMVER BULLETIN 15

_.. ]l!ittil 1F1I

ILIIBALDOUder en 10 Costo

419696514269

BARRANQUllLA

NewsFrom The

U.S.EmbassyBOGOTA,

COLOMBIA

SUSCRIPCIONES

i. A que obedece su visita a Barr ,"quilla?

- Vengo aca dentro de un progl ama deviajes para ver al sector privado, I eunirmecon eI Gobernador, con el Alcalde para tenercontact y tambien darle unos nas quepartlcipan en un sistema mundial que selIana AMVER (Sistema Automatizlldo deAslstencla Mutua de Rescate). Ese sistemaes que sl hay un barco, por ejemplo, que estazozobrando en alta mar se contaclan a losbuques que estan en la vecindad {van aayudarlo. Hay muchos barcos coiombianosque partlclpan en eso; es un gran servlcio ala humanldad.

AMVER Award winners pose folloVling ceremony held in Barranquilla. From leftto right: Consul General Marvin Brown of Barranquilla j Dr. Gabriel MartinezAparicio, Director of Agramar; Dr. Imesto Suarez Flores, Legal Advisor, AgromarjU.S. Ambassador Myles R. R. Frechette; Dr. Juan Manuel Ruiseco Guitierrez,Tranmarltlma Carlbe; Captain Fern, ,ndo Preciado, Rio Atraco; Antonio FelfleMontalvo, Director, Tranmaritlma Cuibe; and CDR Robert McCarthy, UnitedStates Coast Guard.

Ukranian merchant seaman Oleksandr T, anov embraces Rescue Swimmer Tech Sgt James Doherty of the 106th Air RescueGroup, New York Air National Guard, to S lOW his appreciation for the pararescueman's assistance in storm-tossed waters toprepare the 240-pound survivor for hoist 0 a hovering helicopter. Taranov was one of only two survivors from the crew of 31aboard the sunken bulk carrier SALVADC HE ALLENDE. A flotilla of 41 AMVER ships from 18 nations converged on an area 750miles off the coast of Nova Scotia over a .ix-day period to search for survivors.

Is there room in that chopper for one mor ? The burly crewman ishoisted up to safety.

(Photos courtesy SIKORSKY LIFELINE Ml GAZINE)

The second survivor of the ALLENDE was rescued from40-foot seas in 50-knot winds by the Japanese tankerMIV TORUNGEN, earning the AMVER ship the 1994International Rescue At Sea Award, sponsored byL10yds of London Press. The presentation was made atthe "Night of Heroes" awards dinner in New York City byTransit Police Officer Denfield Otto, hero of a subwaybombing, to the Economic Consul from the JapaneseConsulate in New York, Mr. Masami Otani, representingthe ship's owners. (USCG Photo)

AMVER BULLETIN 17

'-----------------------~~!!!!!!!!!!!!-!!2 .I.IUI.1P1

False Alerts!Threatening The Maritime SAR System

Based on a papaer presented to theSafety At Sea and MaritimeElectronics Conference in Baltimore,Maryland during April 1995.

By Mr. Dan LemonU. S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Sear tl and Rescue Division.Washington, D.C.

Last summer the U. S. Coast ( uard received a 406 MHzEPIRB alert from a ship of an I sian flag state 200 milesfrom the Federated States of Mic onesia. (An EPIRB is anEmergency Position - Indicating :,adio Beacon, usually designed to float free and send a distr,ss alert when a ship sinks. i

The response effort involved a p Ivately charLered aircratiwhich cost the Government of F dau S1500 US, a fishinFvessel, and another ship. Also, a ( oasL Guard C-130 aircratldiverted from another SAR casco lying 8.9 hours, and consuming 5880 gallons of fuel. The vessel refused Lo communicate with any of the units resp',nding. When the C-UOdropped a message onto the vessl asking iL Lo tum off LheEPIRB, it complied, but turned I back on as soon as Lheaircraft was out of sight. Over H I) hours of rescue coordination center (RCC) time was co ,sumed just planning andcoordinating response to this appwnLly deliberaLe false alen

In October, we received a Digit. I Selective Calling (DSCIalert from a vessel in distress in F: Jssia's SAR region. BOLhthe United States and Japan work d wiLh RCC VladivoSLokfor about 24 hours before the ve' cl was IdenLified and de­termined to not be in distress.

Until recently, RCC's were reas lllably sure Lhat most callsfor help were genuine, since most ( ! these calls were by voice.Therefore, the seareh and rescue (SAR) sysLem would re­spond as quickly as iteould to pro Ide assisLance, ofLen plac­ing the lives of SAR personnel at isk in the process. !-1ow­ever, the ability to promptly resp m] when every minuLe is

18 AMVER BULLETIN

ofLen criLical is sometimes undermined by the number of dailyfalse distress signals now received.

RCC's can no longer assume thaL a cry for help is real,especially wiLh automated non-voice alerts. This tends toaffecL principles under which rescuers have operated for hun­dreds of years. While GMDSS offers benefiLs of techno­logical advancemenLs, we have been naive in designing thesystem, and need LO act quickly La geL iL on a course for suc­ees.s.

WhaL IS a false aiert'l A false alert is any distress alertLransmined for any reason when a real distress siLuaLion doesnOL aCLually ex is!. MOSL such alerts are inadvertenL, and canusually be Lraced to equipment problems or human error. Afew, however, are hoax calls, which are made easier byGMDSS equipmelll thaL is not properly registered. Manyarc from non-G MDSS sources, especially in the 121.5 MHzfrequency band.

The Lotal number of GMDSS alerts can tax the ability ofresc lie services La respond by taking time and attention awayfrom real emergencies. Though the SAR sysLem aLtempLsto treat every alert as genuine until it is known to be other­Wise, the perceived urgency of each call tends to wane asalerts Lurn oUL La be false over and over again.

False alerts obstruct efficient and effective SAR services.GMDSS was developed to provide, among other Lhings, es­senLial communication clements of a global SAR system.However, wiLh a recent typical false alert rate of around 90%for satellite EPIRB alerts, and poor reliability of non ­Gi\IDSS alerting sysLems, the interesLs of neither the SARSV',lelll nor mariners are well served.

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False alerts

Cause delays which may cost Ii es and prolong Of

worsen human suffering

- Adversely affect seafarer safet}

- Waste limited resources

- Erode confidence of both seafal.'rs and SARpersonnel

Divert SAR facilities, making Hl'm less availableshould a real distress situation; rise

- Congest and drive up the costs, l' communications

One typical case involved a phon( :all reporting that anaircraft had heard an alert on 121.5 M !z. Afterdispatchinga boat and helicopter to the scene, the dicopter determinedthe position of the signal source, ant the boat located [hevessel tied up with its EPIRB energize( nside a locked cabin.The owner had to be located to deactlIte the EPIRB. Sur­face and air assets, as well as RCC PI ~onnel, spent over 5hours on this case. Such cases are, numerous that theyhurt our readiness to respond.

Cases like this which involve a pro crly registered satel­lite EPIRB, however, can usually be fI ;olved simply with aphone call. So it is very important tha A.dministrations en­sure that GMDSS equipment aboard hips of their flag isproperly registered, and that registratio data is readi 11' avail­able to SAR personnel.

Most GMDSS false distress alert~ .lre caused by inad­equate equipment designs and by hum,! ! error. The problemis not confined to anyone GMDSS s ~tem. Inmarsat - A,Inmarsat - C, Digital Selective Calling DSC) and Cospas ­Sarsat EPIRBs are all causing trouble. lnmarsat - C and

satellite EPIRB systems have a greater proportion of falsealerts only because they have penetrated the GMDSS mar­ket more.

Inadvertent misuse of the equipment may be partly re­lated to equipment design. For example, distress alerts havebeen sent by the software of some Inmarsat - C terminalswithout the operator being aware. Sometimes this happenswhen an officer transfers to a ship with different equipmentthan has been used before. The user may accidently hit the"return" key at a time when it automatically sends an alert.The equipment may not pause to ask, "Are you sure youwant to send a distress alert')"

The LJ. S. Coast Guard received a DSC alert at one of itsstations in the northeastern United States. RCC Falmouthand RCC Fort de France also received the alert and inquiredabout its status; both had information that the vessel wassupposedly underway off the coast of France. The RescueSubcenter in San Juan contacted authorities in nearbyTrinadad and Tobago, who, after some time, found the shipin a dry clock. The signal, which was hard to trace becausethe eqUIpment was unproperly registered, had been accidentlytranSlTIlltet! during an equipment tcst.

Bumpy landings at airports inadvertently set off EPIRB's intails of commercial aircraft. Many false alerts occur at busymajor airports around the world.

One false alert was finally traced to uncommissionedequipment at the manufacturer's factory in France.

EPIRBS often are removed from mounting brackets andset on the deck. These two actions together typically acti­vate the EPIRB. But sometimes equipment seems to mal­lunction all by nsel f.

Scveralmtcrmittcnt Cospas - Sarsat alerts on 121.5 MHzwere tracked by alfcraft to a shipyard in Washington SUite.We also received relays of this signal from several high ny­ing aircraft. It turned out to be from a 406 MHz EPIRBproperly mounted aboard a fishing vessel and correctly setin the "armed" position. However, even after the EPIRBwas turned off, it continued to transmit, and had to have itsbattery removed to secure the signal. Water leakage into theunit apparently caused this malfunction. Feedback to themanufaclUrer resolved this problem.

AMVER BULLETIN 19

There have been many cases of:PIRB malfunction, butthey are becoming less frequent, m lStly due to feedback onproblems to equipment manufactUl:rs which resulted in de­sign improvements. During the thld quarter of 1994 (latestavailable statistics), the percentage of satellite EPIRB alertsthat were false fell by ten percenl We are optimistic thatthese improvements will continue lS SlepS are implementedto bring the situation under contn II. Similar national andglobal initiatives will be necessary ID reduce false alerts fromother GMDSS equipment. The 1·)94 distribution of alertsreceived for 406 MHz beacons is srlown below. The recordfor 121.5 MHz beacons is much \\ lrse.

CQspas· Sarsat 406 MHz Alert HistQry(Nature Qf alerts as percentage Qf tQtal)

1 OctQber· 30 September 1995All BCCs U.S. BCCs

Distress 9.4 10.4

Unknown 22.1 19.3

Nondistress: 68.5 70.2

BracketFailure 9.1 10.1

User Error 41.9 40.0

Beaconproblem 22.2 22.9

Testing 9.6 8.7

Other 17.3 17.5

lnmarsat - C false alerts apparen Iy sometimes result whenthe operator is distracted during: performance verificationtest. In the test phase, the operat· r may be asked to send J

test distress alert. The equipmenlvould not normally actually send such alerts. However, if he test time expires whilethe operator is distracted or called ., way during the test, whenthe test is resumed, a real alarm If Iy be transmitted creatingeven more confusion.

The Coast Guard AMVER s~\tem tracks about 13,000ships from over 130 countries v orldwide annually, about2700 on a typical day, which volur arily report their sail plansso they can be more easily used ,l assist other mariners indistress. While the masters of thee vessels are legally obli­gated to provide such assistance .vhen they can, and haveparticipated in saving over 700 ives worldwide in 1994,diverting them is costly to tt ~ir shipping companies.GMDSS false alarm problems u 'derstandably make shipsless inclined to participate in th, system, or to respond to

The cost of diverting an AMVER participating ship can rangefrom $15,000 to $30,000 per day!

calls for help. If faith in the system is lost, it will be veryhard (a restore.

When RCC Honolulu received an Inmarsat C alert in thePacific regarding an unspecified distress situation, it divertedtwo merchant ships to assist. Providing such assistance isvery costly for shipping companies. In this case, SingaporeRadio was later able to contact the vessel and determine thatit was safe in a Singapore port.

We devoted 5.7 hours of C - 130 aircraft. time, and 7 hoursof di version time for a merchant ship, responding to anlnmarsat C alert 350 miles east of Guam. The 9 digit lnmarsatC number was apparently invalid, and we were unable tocontact the ship or its owners. Not until the rescue unitsarrived on scene were we able to learn from the vessel that itwas not in distress, and that the alert had been due to humanerror. The flight time would have exceeded 20 hours had wenot bcen ahle to divert the aircraft during a return flight. Thiscase was IlJ the Central Pacific, with the vessel owners inHong Kong, and the Coast Earth Station involved in Austra­lIa. DJl"ferenllimc zones are another factor which hurts avail­abtlllj of pcople to vcrify information. This was anotherfalse alert case involving expensive diversion of a merchantShip, which proper equipment identity could have avoided.

Problems with responding to false alerts are compoundedwhen the ship which appears to be in distress fails to re­spond to attempts to contact it.

We do not know why ships do notanswer distress calls over GMDSS. Arethey securing their communication due tothe high number of urgent calls theyreceive? If so, this may be the worst effectof GMDSS false alerts, degrading GMDSScredibility and viability and reducing safetyat sea.

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crew resorted to activating an EPIRB. We responded withone Coast Guard and one Navy fixed-wing aircraft. Whenfinally contacted by the SAR facilities on scene, the masterrevealed the nature of the problem. Of course, the fixed ­wing aircraft we had dispatched could not do an evacuation.However. the resource Lime, including time spent by the RCC,whIch already totaled 59 hours for personnel, 19.7 hours forthe Coast Guard aircraft, and 1.6 hours for the Navy aircraft,cost over S1<),000 US. If the crew had used appropriate equip­ment to-:ontact us, delay in assisting the injured crew mem­ber.. and all this wasted cost, could have been avoided.

Another costly situation stems from tracking down alerts fromvessels with unregistered or misregistered equipment.

406 MH..z. SA TELl.JTE EPlRB REGISTRATlONAND IDEIiTlFlC..l.T1ON CARD

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The U. S. Coast Guard responded to an alert from unreg­istered GMDSS equipment centered in the Gulf of Mexico.A Falcon .Jet from Mobile spotted debris and an oil slick thaLcould havl: been associated with a marine casualty, bUL nopersons m the water. The aircraft dropped a raft with a strobelIght and an electronic marker buoy to help relocate the site,and returned lor fuel. We launched another jet from MobileeqUipped \\ tth heat sensors, two helicopters from Mobile,and a C IlO aircraft lrom the cast wast. We gaL a patrolboat underway from New Orleans, and two Navy vesselsuperating nearby were diverted to assist. The search contin­ued throughout Lhe night with negative results. The nextday, more debris was sighted, but determined not to be asso­ciated With any marine casualty. The oil slick could not berelocated. Finally, we learned that the EPIRB aboard a shipIf1 the area had been activated and turned off the night be­lore. Response to this false alert cost thousands of dollarsand hundreds of staff hours. which could have been avoidedhad the FP1R B been registered

---_._---------------------

Another problem arises when shil loard personnel arcunfamiliar with how to use GMDSS (' iuipment to call theSAR system for help. This is a traini g problem, and theresults can be costly. The following I ample involved anactual need for assistance, but the ml lOS used to call forhelp was misleading.

Not knowing how to usc the c; IDSS eqlJlpmel1l toarrange for medical evacuation of an jn Ired crewnll'rnber. a

Earlier in the year the U.S. Coast Gua I receIved a distresscall from a sailing vessel hundreds oi miles southwest ofLos Angeles. We knew that a GMDSS quipped cruise shipwas nearby, but could not get an ackno\ Iedgment from it byany means of communication, includir 'Inmarsat. Finally,we were able to contact a fishing veSSi I which was able tocontact the ship on Channel 16, and £Ii ll1ge for it to assistthe sailing vessel. It is unclear why the 'lip did not respond.

On November 26, 1994, RCC HOI Kong received analert from an EPIRB about 240 miles 01 ,hore. The call signwas used to identify the ship, and an lert was relayed toships in the vicinity via NAVTEX. Wh" 1 no one responded,an aircraft was launched, the vessel ' JS located, and welearned that the alert had resulted fron a test. The cost ofthat response was over $4,300 US. TI . ship had receivedthe NAVTEX relay of its own EPIRB £II rt, and was not evenaware of it! Was this a training pro ,em, an equipmentproblem, a compounded symptom of" I ) many false alerts.or just careless watchsumding ,

Unfamiliarity with different models of GM >SS equipment, orsending a real alert after test time expire, are causes of falsealerts.

A similar problem occurs when ( her vessels near anactual distress do not respond to calls film SAR authoritiesseeking to arrange assistance. We doot know why shipsdo not answer distress calls over GMDS \. Are they securingtheir communication due to the high m nber of urgent callsthey receive? If so, this may be the wo ,t effect of GMDS Sfalse alerts - degrading GMDSS credibl ty and viability andreducing safety at sea.

dMVI=R Rill I I=TIN ?1

When registration data is inacci rate, the alert is partlyfalse, and when registration data is at readily available, itbecomes more difficult to handle fal c alerts. System disci­pline needs to improve regarding I landatory registration,keeping registration data updated, ~ ld making registrationdata for GMDSS equipment readily/aiJable to RCCs on aninternational basis.

When we responded to one sate lite EPIRB alert in thePacific, none of the registered poim of contact were accu­rate, and we could not contact the sh p. We diverted anothership and launched an aircraft. Each, f thcse assets devoted acostly nine hours to the case. The FX was referred to andcontacted seven different alleged 0\\ lcrs of the ship, all withnegative results. When the aircra arrived on scene. welearned that the EPIRB had been tal'n from ilS hracket. hutthat the vessel was not in distress. With accurate reglstra·tion information, we could have c(' lacted the ship Withoutever having to launch.

Another time-consuming case in olved a false DSC alertfrom one vessel in the northern Pa Ific relayed by anothership using TELEX. Several internal onal phone calls to Nor­way and Japan were needed to ider :ify the vessel and con­firm that the alert had been sent ac. dently.

The High Costof SearctlJ andRescue!

Average U.S. Coast Guard Cutter: $ .974 Per Hour

The total cost of operating Coast Guard facilities for SARincludes personnel, fuel, maintenance, support, and depre­l iation. For patrol boats and CUllers, this rangcs from 5500to over $3,000 US per hour, depending on type and size.Each type of aircraft used for SAR cosLs about $4.000 USper hour of lise. A typical utility hoat used ncar shore costsover S300 per hour. One can imagine what it must actuall;cost a mL[chant ship to divert to IOvLstigaLL alLrts. mcludingprofit loss and rndirect costs. One company's cost to chartertypical tankships runs from $IS,GOO to S30,OeXl US per day

Although the following actual case did not involve a falsealert. I t can serve as a basis to consider the cumulati ve dIcclIf false alerts on the SAR system funding.

C-130 Fixed Wing Aircraft: $4,081 Per Hour

HH-65A Helicopter: $3,638 Per Hour

j ;sr:

A 406 MHz signal was received fn'n a beacon registeredon a tuna seiner 800 nautical miles N\ of American Samoa.A SafetyNet alert was issued. After Insuccessful attemptsto contact the vessel via radio, a dOll ,Ie-crewed C-130 air­craft was launched to investigate, at ived in darkness 7.5hours later, located the EPIRB and ~ veral strobe lights inthe water, deployed several rafts and marker buoy, and re­turned. At daybreak, all 19 crew mer bers, who were in thewater (some without life jackets), notl 0d the rafts and swamto them. They were rescued 34 hours fter the initial alert bya fishing vessel. The seiner had sunk Ifter being envelopedby an intense fire.

"If a substantive reductior I in the numberof false alerts is not achieved soon, thequality and efficiency of SA A organizationswill be jeopardized for nany years tocome."

Cost of a SAR response in high se, areas is nOl mconsc­quential. A single such response lik thc one above IS be­yond capabilities available to most R' C's. And even for thcUnited States, only a limited numberf such responses canbe carried out within operating bud,l ts. This could havebeen another typical inadvertent false iJert followed by lackof acknowledgment of attempts to (:1 Itact the vessel. Notonly is it cost prohibitive to routinel launch asscLs to rindout if distress alerts are real, but the alse alert problcm iscompounded by lack of readily avaIl ,ble registrauon data,

and inability to contact ships. It wou[, have been realistic atthe beginning of the above case to real e that the alert would

likely be false (as nearly every GMI S alcrt is now), and,for that reason, to abstain from laun, ling costly facilItics.Would that not have made 19 people iCllms of the overallfalse alert problem?

False alerts cost more than dollar: ,md resources. Falsealerts divert limited resources thatth( become unavailablcfor genuine distress calls. False alert affect morale. Falsealerts place the lives of SAR personn I at risk. False alertsundermine the SAR system's ability I( save lives and reducesuffering. Receiving too many false dem seems to erodeshipboard attention to messages rece cd. The system crc­ated to make the seas a safer place is I elf harmmg the SARsystem and the maritime community II/as developed to help.

Therefore, as some have discovere( we must:

- Change equipment that is appan ntly too complicatedto use or that makes it too easy to ina, Ivertently send alert..

- Do a much better job of training lleople involved withthe equipment

- Ensure that when false alerts are transmitted, SARpersonnel have the information they need readily avail­able to determine that the alert is false without having tolaunch limited and costly rescue facilities.

An excellent example of an equipment design change thatrcally works is two - condition EPIRB activation. After be­coming more know ledgeable about the causes of EPlRB falsealerts, II became evident that they could be greatly reducedby reqUlflng that, for a beacon to automatically activate, Itbe both Icmoved from its bracket ancl floating in water.

We arc optimistic that the trend towards growing num­bers or GMDSS false alerts can be turned around if all con­cerned do their part. DSC poses an awesome threat of wors­ening the future false alert situaLJon as it comes mto Wide­spread LIse, but work in the EPIRB area is showing signs orpaymg dividends. In view of sustained efforts to reduce( dast (,II;ml stalling and buclget. false alert reduction is anulgenl I!latter

11';1 -;ubstaI1livc reduction in the number or false alerts islIut adl!\'\ l'd soon, the quality and efficiency of SAR orga­Tlll.alIo!l' wili be .Icopardil.ed for many years to come.

Thl' International Maritime Organization and other orga­Illzatioll arc seeking to dissem inate information on problcms\.vhich have become evident to rescue service providers. Theyhupc to educate all persons and organizations involved, andgain knowledgeable cooperation in reducing false alerts.Vlanufaeturers, educators, users, communicators, rescue ser­'ilce proViders, admlOlstrations, and all others concerned,

need guidance Oil how to reduce false distress alerts. There­l(I[c, gUIdl'linc~-; ;lre under development to bring to the atten­

lI<ln ollc! 'uncenwd

GuidelinesFor Reducing False Distress Alerts:

test it without transmitting a false alert1. Administrations should

a. Inform shipowners and seafar rs about the implica­tions of the rising number of fals\ Jistress alerts

b. Make critically important prov .Ions for ships to prop­erly register all GMDSS cquipm nt, and to ensure thalthis registration data is readily <1\ dable to RCCs

c. Consider establishing or usin, national violation en­forcement measures to prosecute

.I. ReqUire that operators be appropriately certified for theInstalled equipment

2. Manufacturers. suppliers and installers should:

a Prmidc clew· and precise operational instructions that areeasy to understand (maintenance and operational instructionssh(;uld be separated. and should be delivered in English and/ur any other language deemed necessary)

(1) those who inadvertently ansmit a false distressalert without proper cancellation lr who fail to respondto a distress acknowledgment due ,l misuse or negligence

b. Ensure that supplier and installation personnel understandhow GMDSS works, and the consequences of transmitting alalse alert

(2) those who repeatedly trar mit false alertsc. Ensure that equipment is designed for distress alerting so:

(3) those who deliberately trlsmi[ false alertsi II It will not be possible to transmit an alert uninten­

lionally

d. Use the International Telecom !Iunications Union vio­lation reporting process for fal~ distress alerts, or forfailure to respond to a distress al rt relayed from shore ­to - ship

(2) the panel for emergency operation is separated fromthe one for normal operation, is partially fitted with a cover,and has switches classified by coloring

e. Ensure that ship personnel kr lW about how GMDSSoperates, the importance of avol ! ing false alerts, and thenecessary steps to be taken to pvent transmitting falsealerts

(3) there are standardized arrangements of operation pan­els and standard operation procedures

d. DeSIgn test features so that testing GMDSS equipmentwill not result in false distress alerts

f. Inform type approval author tics of false alert prob­lems to draw their attention to I )ting and alerting func­tions of radio equipment durin! the type approval pro­cess

e. Ensure that when any G MDSS equipment has been in­sta]jed, necessary Instructions are given to appropriate shippersonnel, specifically pointing out the operational proce­dures (log that the instructions have been given)

g. Urge companies installing ddio equipment to trainrelevant ship personnel to enste they become familiarwith operation of the installed ( luipment

r. Ensure that any distress alert activation is indicated visu­ally or acoustically, showing that the equipment is transmit­ling a distress alert, until manually deactivated

h. Investigate the cause when a ,iCcific model ofGMDSSequipment repeatedly tnmsmit: l1nwanted alerts, and in­form appropriate organizations tccordingly

g. Implement any appropriate technical and operational mea­surc.s to avoid unwanted transmission of alerts

h. Ensure that the EPIRB position on board, installations(includmg the release and activation mechanisms) and han­dling procedures preclude unwanted activations (design the

i. Ensure that surveyors and insl ,;ctors arc infonncd aboutGMDSS equipment, and partie larly how to operate and

-_-:...-_--====;;;;;;;;;;;;iiiiiiiiiijjjj;iiiiiiiiiijjjj;iiiiiiiiiijjjj;~

m

EPIRB .so that when it is out of its [mIl c~t It must also beimmersed in water to actIVate automallc. [y, when operated

manually, a two-step activation procedure houle! be required)

i, Consider EPIRB positions for new shl. at early stages ofship design and construction

3. Trainers and educators shOUi~

a. Ensure that maritime education cenl(' arc informed andteach about false alert problems and III lications to SAR,GMDSS, etc.

h, Install satellite EPIRBs carefully in accordance withmanufacturers' instructions and using qualified personnel.Sometimes satellite EPIRBs arc damaged or broken dueto improper handling or installation. They must be in­stalled in a proper location to float-free and automaticallyactivate if the ship sinks. Care must be taken that they arenot tampered with or accidentally activated. If the codingmust be changed or the batteries serviced, manufacturersrequirements must be strictly followed. There have beencases of attaching EPIRB Ianyards to the ship so the EPIRB

cannot !loat free - the lanyards are only to be used by sur­vivors for securing the EPIRB to a Iiferaft, lifeboat or per­son III thl' water

I!LI

j''I

b. Obtain and usc actual case histones s examples whenteaching

c. Emphasize the need to avoid false di 'ess alerts in allmaritime training and education

i. Not activate EPIRBs if assistance is already immedi­ately available (EPIRBs are intended to call for assistanceif the ship is unable to obtain help by other means, and toprovide position information and homing signals for SARunits)

4. Users and their employers sh,lll!!t

d. Ensure that no inadvertent transm iss I ,n of false dIstressalerts should occur when training on G1\)SS equipmellt

c. Give instruction dunng each aballdo ship dnll 011 howemergency equipment should be used I provide G MOSSfunctions

k. /\ !leI' elllergency usc, If possible, retrieve and deacti­vate Ihe FPIRB

m. 'lake measures, such as wrapping the EPIRB in tintoll, to preVICllt transmission of signals by EPIRBs duringshlprlll~!1l [0 the manufacturer for any reason.

D

J. Once an EPIRB is switched on, whether accidentally orintentionally, the ship should make every reasonable at­

tempt [0 communIcate with SAR authorities by otherIIIcans [0 ldvlse them of the sItuation

I. When an EPIRB is damaged and needs to be disposedof. or if a ship is sold for scrap or for any other reason asatellIte EPIRB will no longer be used, ensure that thesatellite EPJRB is made inoperable be removing its bat­tery I I' rXJssiblc and returning it to the manufacturer, or bydemolish in!, !

blc lor send mg CI

competent to op·a. Ensure that all ship persollnl'l respOidistress alert have been instruch:d and (l'

crate all radio equipment on the shIp

d Ensure that G MDSS equipment testin~ s only undertakenunder supervision of the person respons" c for communica­tions during distress alerts

b. Have the person(s) responsible for co Imunications dur­ing distress incidents give necessary ins! 'lctions and infor­mation to all crew members who shoul, know how to use

GMDSS equipment to send a dIstress ai, I

f. Ensure that encoded identities of satell Ie EPIRBS, whichare used by SAR personnel responding I. emergencies, areproperly registered in a database accessit '.' 24 hours per dayor automatically provided to SAR authof] I ,,'S (masters shouldconfirm that their EPIRBs have been re~ ,tcred with 'Llch adatabase to help SAR services Identify li ship In the eventof distress and rapidly obtain other Info[l Itioll!O hell' themrespond appropriatel y)

g. Immediately update EPIRB, Inmarsal md DSC regIstra­tion data and, if necessary, reprogram th GMOSS code, ifthe ship's ownership, name, nag, or ,! lilar lIlformationchanges

H ...:....

(Photos courtesy of Groton Pacific C,rriers)

ACHILLELAUROMIRACLE!

The following excerpts are from theship's log of the Mercha'lt TankerHawaiian King, which rec:.ounts the dra­matic rescue of 976 passengers andcrew members from the;ruise ShipAchille Lauro.~ REMARKS

0400

0800

0850

0855

0930

1000

10mCloudy, slight, vibility good.

Cloudy, sea moc! rate, visibility good.

Received emerg, ICy telex from RCCStavanger Norw. i that passenger shipACHILLE LA. RO/IHHE caught firein positIon La!. ( -; 00 N Long. 052 20 E 1045

and needs assisL. ;ICC urgently

Ship position La 07 37 N Long. 05230 E change a c(me direct to 1110ACHILLE LAl RO and increasingspeed up to max num. Crew and ownerinfonned relativ, and commence --.....preparation for ~,rba eo eration. rying

,/" contact with A'bULLE LAURO butnegative on VHl Ch. 16, radio operator ,have continuing ontact on v.ireless 500 :

BiZ· .~'-------Located the AC) IILLE LAURO onthe ship's radar. Ne made contact alsowith another vc, cl named M/VBARDll procee mg to the distressarea for assistan<

A ••".-,... nlll I r""T"I".

All preparation was done by crew; bothlife boats released from davits. Nets,ropes, various ladders, stretchers, lifebuoys, first aid kits, etc. were put touse. We make contact with captain ofACHILLE LAURO on VHF Ch. 16 forthe beginning rescue operation.

Arrived in distress area and com­menced rescue operation. Thirteenlifeboats were in the water and manylife rafts t1oating. Weather conditionwas m(xlerate with a high South Westswell. Made a lee way on the portside for embarkation of passengers.

The first passengers were boarding theHAWAIIAN KING by port accommoda­tion ladder and other rigged ladders.

The survival operation was in progress onthe port side with life boats of theACHILLE LAURO.

The passengers were feeling relicf afterboarding Most were staying on deck andcrew accommodation.

One of 16 life boats has an old man whowas dead. My Second Officer used astretcher and prepared for taking in aftercompleted operation. The boat has beenfastened on the ship's rails. At this time.the M/V BARDU has arrived.

if r

14(X)

1700

1730

The weather has beCOI e worse with heavyswells making rescue ,perations di fficult.The boarding passeng 'rs have been givenfresh water, refreshml IltS and food by theSteward Department. '\11 members of thecrew of the HAWAIL\.N KING workinghard to make the emb.lrkation safe. Vari­ous movements have -een done by theengine.

Ninety Five per cent l t the ACHILLELAURO already emb Irked according toinformation of the Cn lse Director, Mrs.Nadi Eckhart.

Rescue operations con pleted. CAPT OrsiGiuseppe and crew bl .lrding toHAWAIIAN KING aid said that no pas­sengers or crew on the ..ClllLLE LAUROhad fallen into the sea Nine hundred andtwenty seven passeng,. rs and crew hadboarded the HAWAII \N KING safely.The other vessel, the l!V BARDU hadtaken 50 persons. Son ..: of the passengerswere injured. First all had been done bythe doctors of the AC IILLE LAUROAll medicines, includili ic" narcotiCS grantedand spent for help in ti: ,.: hospital. Duringoperation we have con! nuous contact withSTAVANGER and lall r with MRCCROME for informatiol and orders. Food,water, blankets, refres i ments, cigarettesgranted to the passeng rs. All survivorswere placed in crew's ,ccommodation,deck accommodation a Id half part of main 22mdeck. Three passengel were seriously in-

Jured and many more had minor injuries.For rescue operations, the crew used allmcans to savc the passengers. Cranes wereuscd for thc passengers who could notwalk. My contact with my owner advisedme to do anything for the good of thepassengers and crew of the ACHILLELAURO. A U.S. helicopter is on the wayto give further medical assistance, togetherwith more blankets and food.

Vessels MIV CHEVRON PERTH andM/V SKS SPIRIT arrived to render as-

Ie ~,

AMVER BULLETIN 27

ACHILLE LAURO

2300

0530

sistance. W made contact with a U.S.helicopter P and with assistance ship~

on CH. 16.

First helicop ~r dropped medical suppliesand necessa,,' items as described aboveKept contini ous contact with helicopterwhich madeegular drops until approximately 3 a.n . I December.

We discusse how to distribute passen­gers with tht number of vessels offeringassistance. 'Ie made contact with therescue vesse USS GETTYSBURG andUSS HALYBURTON. They offered to

transfer as m my of the ACHILLELAURO pa~ iengers with the use of thezodiak landil g craft. All the other ves­sels in the an a are willing to assist.Thought it w IS best for the ACHILLELAURO pas ,engers to use the lifeboatson the other .:,scue vessels since theweather cond lions and rough seas did notmake it easy or the elderly passengers.We made COl 'act with the following ad­ditional vessts: SKS SPIRIT, CHIOS,CHEVRON PERTH, LUCY, LIMAand BARBV The United States CoastGuard boardt 1 the HAWAIIAN KINGand undertool supervision of other as­sistance vesSl Is.

28 AMVER BULLETIN

t:

THE EVOLUTION OF AUTOMATED DISTRESS COMMUNICATIONS

::: ....

GMDSS:Article by Mike MalloyMalloy CommunicationsCorpus Christi, Texas

AWork In

Progress

Baok in 1904 at an interna"tional maritime conference, a stan­dard was adopted for signalling adistress calL That standard signalwas designated as COD. If a shipwere in distress, instead of callingfor help or whatever the radiosender felt like transmitting, he senta series of COD's followed by thecall sign and present position.

For some reason, the Germansdid not like the concept of CODThey then adopted the distress callof SOE. But the problem with thatdistress call was the letter E couldsometimes be misunderstood, dueto the fact that the letter E is justone "dit" in morse code. So in 1908.another meeting was held and thenow familiar "SOS" was established

This adoption of the new distresssignal paved the way in 1908 fo rthe Wireless Ship Act, which required U.S. passenger ships to carrywireless communications equip­ment at all times.

The Titanic sank in 1912. Whilecalling for help, the ship's radio of­ficer sent both SOS and COD Evenafter all the meetings and conferences during this period of history,the SOS signal was not carved instone. As time passed, SOS on 500kHz became the standard. TheCommunications Act of 1934 laterrAnllirArl th::lt ::I r::lrlin nffir.Ar hA

placed on board any vessel above1600 tons, and the ship be equippedwith radio telegraph equipment

World War II was the real prov­ing ground for 500 kHz. CW and therole of the radio officer Many timesdunng this period of conflict manylives were saved by the herOIC ef­forts of the radio officer pounding outthe position and nature of distress.The radio officer was the last crewmember off the ship His job was tostay at his position until the very endto insure the message was sent andreceived

As time passed, more interna­tional meetings were held concern­ing safety on the high seas All com­munications were still based onmanually operated systems Forvessels above 1600 tons MorseCode sending and receiving sys­tems along with a Morse qualifiedradio operator were required Forships whose tonnage was between300 tons but less than 1600 tons,radiotelephone communicationssystems were required in order toguard the international voice dis­tress frequency of 2182 Mhz

In 1979, the International Mari­time Organization (IMO) met anddrafted a plan that would take ad­vantage of newer emerging tech­nologies. The meeting was in, ef­fect, the beginning of the end of ther::lrlin nffir.pr ::Inri Ihp snn kH7

distress frequency. Advances in theelectronics field, specifically in digi­tal electronics, had made automaticsignaling a standard, even back in1979 Aware of the fact that themaritime industry would not changeovernight and technology itself wasevolving, the IMO established a timetable for these changes beginningin the early 1990s with total compli­ance required by 1 February 1999.

As of the summer of 1995, radiotelegraph and automated signalling,commonly referred to as GMDSS(Global Maritime Distress SafetySystem) work side by side. The IMOrules allow ships even now whohave the proper GMDSS equipmentand two individuals on board withthe GMDSS operators license, tosail without the radio officer. Thus,all communication is now handledfrom the bridge by the officer onwatch.

In the United States, things arenot quite so simple. The Commu­nications Act of 1934 must beamended. Congress must changethe rules before the U.S. is able tofully comply with the GMDSS stat­utes. The recently passed Commu­nications Act of 1995 has little to dowith the maritime industry. Thethrust of the bill concerns itself withthe broadcast industry and tele­phone companies.

"'"-= ---'----------,----------------------_••••$.:•.•: ;

GMDSS LICENSING REQUIREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Author Mike Malloy, whostill sails as a ship's RadioOfficer, shows off a GMDSS

. ship's station. Automatedcommunications will be­come a worldwide maritimerequirement on 1 February,1999. When he's ashore,Mike provides GMDSS Ii·cense preparation training.

Due to this pending lar­riage, a blending of technologil sisabout to unfold. The problem is thecompeting industries are concelledthat another competitor may t wethe upper hand. Hopefully It 'seconflicts of interest will be resol ed

It is interesting to note in/er200 pages of text, the maritime ,or­tion of the bill that makes refere Iceto modifying the Communicatior A.ctof 1934 is only one paragraph k ng!

Due to the change in regulati! 11S,

maritime companies are now ree Jir­ing their deck officer to take resrm­sibility for communications on b( ·lrdtheir ships. The problem with 'lisrequirement is that deck officers Iretrained in the rigors of seaman~lipand maritime management. ~ owcommunications has been adde totheir duties.

Some deck officers view this Id­ditional responsibility as an anr !y­ance, while others have take agreat interest in expanding their r~p­

ertoire of skills.Other factors that complic lte

matters - computers and sate Iii!' ~s'

To operate under the GM DSS l ill­

brella, the communicator must beskilled not with Morse Code, lUtDOS and windows. Without knc NI­edge of these two fundamental ,p­erating procedures, a GMDSS cell­municator would be useless.

Satellites are strictly a function ofkeyboard manipulation. The stan­dard C system is DOS based Theability to communicate by satelliteis easy and instantaneous

Since technology in communica­tions has advanced so rapidly in re­cent years, emergency communica­tions can now be sent with the pressof one button. Ttlis signal will over­ride all other communication signalsand the ship in distress will be inimmediate contact with a shorebased station. Not only is the com­munication automatic, it also allowsthe exact positions, with the help ofequipment like GPS, to be trans­mitted at the same time the distressbutton is pushed

The deck officers that are nowresponsible for communicationsmust be trained and licensed to op­erate this so called "push button"communications system. The IMOallows each nation to develop theirown training regime

Here in the United States, theFederal CommUnications Commis­sion is responsible for designing andadministering the GMDSS License.A potential student must meet cer­tain prerequisites before helshe isable to take the GM DSS examina­tion. Any individual must have takenand passed Element 1 (the FCCcalls their test elements). Element1 is the Marine Radio Operator Per­mit and consists of 24 questionsconcerning basic rules and regula­tionc:

The exam also includes questionsconcerning operating procedures on2182 Mhz (MF) and 156.8 Mhz(VHF CH 16). Any commercial ex­amination (Radio Telegraph, RadioTelephone and now the GMDSS)requires Element 1 to be completed.A passing score of 75% or better isrequired to become certified

Completing Element 1, the lic­ensee may now move on to Element7, GMDSS/Operator. This exami­nation is composed of 76 questions,The thrust of this test concerns theoperation of a GMDSS station, bothunder normal communications andworst case scenario. There alsoquestions on SART, SITOR, DSC,and NAVTEX. The GMDSS/O li­cense authorizes an individual to op­erate any and all GM DSS equip­ment on board. This license doesnot grant the owner the ability toopen the equipment up and maketechnical adjustments

The GMDSS/M (Element 9) al­lows a technician to go inside andremove/replace components oralign a particular circuit. Element 9is a fifty question test with the bulkof the questions about digital elec-

j tronics. A student must know howto convert from hexadecimal to bi­nary and back again: and shouldbe able to recognize AND gates,NPN transistors and operationalamplifiers. It is exacting in natureand requires a certain degree oftechnical and mathematical ability.

tsnr

H.B, 3626103D CONGRESS2DSESSION

SEC.408 AUTOMATED SHIP DISTRESS AND SAFETY SYSTEMS

NOT WITHSTANDING ANY PROVISION OF THE COMMUNICATION ACT OF1934, A SHIP DOCUMENTED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATESOPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GLOBAL MARITIME DISTRESS ANDSAFETY SYSTEM PROVISION OF THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA CONVENTIONSHALL NOT BE REQUIRED TO BE EQUIPPED WITH A RADIO STATIONOPERATED BY ONE OR MORE RADIO OFFICERS OR OPERATORS.

(Colltilluedfrom previous page)

The student must also have a gen­eral radio telephone license (Ele­ments number 1 and 3, for a total Of100 questions) before sitting for element9. _

oj Some maritime companies re­quire their deck officers to take Ele­ment 9, making them responsible forelectronic maintenance. Expectingthe deck officer to perform repairswhile under way is pushing things abit too far. Most of them do not have

i a background in electronics and if

jasked, will state emphatically they.do not want to be responsible for therepair of thousands of dollars worth.

I

of equ ipm2!!L- ---'"-/--Ihe reader has probably noted

the stiff requirements placed uponthe U.S. deck officer. The maritimeacademies are just now developinga curriculum that will revolve aroundthe new GMDSS program. It placesa tremendous burden on the stu­dents who are already overloadedwith classes in a four year programThose willing to toil the additionalhours in pursuing the FCC GMDSSLicense (GMDSS/O) will increasetheir employability. A person withno experience who had a four yeardegree in Marine Management, acommission as a Third Mate, withthe GMDSS Operators License pre­sents a strong package to compa­nies who at present can be highlyselective in hiring due to the dwin­dling job market.

The last few pages have beenan overview of how GMDSS is tobe implemented in the UnitedStates. Most companies are con­fused or hesitant to begin any move­ment toward the GMDSS. GMDSSrequires ships to be fitted with newequipment and the removal of all theradio telegraph systems. GMDSSalso relieves the radio of guarding500 Khz. Needless to say, the mari­time unions are fighting to preventloss of jobs. However, the end is insight.

You might be surprised to learnGMDSS does not consider voicecommunications on Ch. 16, (156.8MHz) and 2.182 MHz (USB) to bepart of the distress calling plan_ In1999, all emergency calls will be au­tomated. That is, on VHF, the guardfrequency for ships 300 tons andabove will be Ch. 70 (156.525 MHz)using Digital Select Call (DSC) asthe primary alerting tool. On Me­dium Frequency (MF) 21875 MHzwill be employed using DSC as thedistress alerting mechanism

One does not have to be a rocketscientist to see the potential difficultyin this system. For ships under 300tons (not covered by GMDSS) suchas recreational vessels whose own­ers are unsophisticated with radioequipment, voice communicationswill still be the primary alerting tool.

After 1999, the Coast Guard mayno longer guard Ch_ 16, or 2182MHz, nor will the ships at sea Asafety net that has been working formany years will suddenly disappear.Unless private industry picks up theslack, a large hole will exist At thispoint, there is no exact solution.

There are other problems withGMDSS. One problem is ttlat indi­viduals (deck officers) responsiblefor use of the equipment generallyhave had minimum training on howthings work, or why they work Aclassic example is with the DSC.There are numerous problems withusing the DSC for the initial alertingof a distress.

The DSC works exactly as it is sup­posed to_ The problem is the user.For example, a distress on DSCmay initially be sent on 16 Mhz,alerting individuals on the other sideof the world that they are in trouble.That action defeats the purpose ofthe DSC. The correct procedure isto start at 2187.5 Khz, and send asignal. After several attempts withno responses, the deck officershould advance up to 4 or 8 MHz.At some point, a reply will be re­ceived. Unfortunately, frequenciesare being picked at random, even ifthe ship is only 1500 miles from ashore based DSC station_

Another problem with the DSCis that deck officers are sending adistress message to alert otherships in lieu of a "test message".This is illegal. No one is enforcingthe law at this time though. The rea­son is there is so much misunder­standing about the GMDSS equip­ment and how it is to be used thatthe authorities are at present allow­ing mistakes to be made, in hopethe GM DSS training will reducethese errors to a minimum

In the past few pages, you haveread an overview of how GM DSS isprogressing. We have yet to reachau r goal of 100% compliance, whichwill be mandatory in 1999. TheGMDSS system is still evolving andis not a completed model. We havetime to learn how to use the latestadvances in technology and how itapplies to safety of life at sea.

DAMVFR Rlll I FTIN ~1

.:

Ship And SheepTo The Rescue!

From India:

On passage from Freemantl~ (West Australia) toAqaba, Jordan, our ship, the MIV E CORDERO, passedthrough the middle of the South Indian Ocean. Theweather was rough, with strong winds and a heavyswell, as is usual during the monoon season

At 2320 hours LMT, in posil on 1527'S latitude,091 20'E longitude, the officer a the watch, AmarpalSingh, received a MAYDAY call )n CH 16 VHF Hereplied immediately and learned he call was from the37-foot American Yacht SEE ME~· OW, with one personaboard.

The Master, CAPT Lionel Co,lho was called to thebridge, followed by the by the seex nd Officer, Ali Ashkar.The Captain then summoned ( hief Officer SelmonAlexander to organize the rescw

The EL CORDERO, a livesto k carrier, was loadedwith sheep and its high deck strL;ture made it difficultto maneuver the vessel in strong'Jinds and swells, butthe Captain and Chief Enginee Joshi Ramshankercarefully steered the vessel al" ngside the strickenyacht.

All deck arrangements werE done, and the crewwas standing by on deck to pn vide any assistancerequired. At 0118 hours, we sLccessfully recoveredthe 71-year old American, David ~Iark from the yachtAs he boarded, he was heard to ~ lV, "I'm all right now l"

Mr. Clark explained that he had sailed from the eastcoast of the United States through Panama, to Cocosand Madagascar Islands. His mast had broken in heavyweather and fallen into the sea. All the riggings werefouled around the boat, with the broken mast hittingthe boat's side. The boat was unstable and rollingheavily His fresh water tank washed away and he wasout of fuel.

Mr. Clark enjoyed his stay aboard EL CORDEROand the hospitality of CAPT Coelho, the Chileanstockman, and the all-Indian crew. It is important tomention that our vessel is an AMVER participant!

ALI ASHKARBombay, India

Old AMVERBULLETIN SparksResponse!

From Romania:

I am a Romanian Second Assistant EngineeringOfficer. 30 years old, with more than seven years ofexperience in deep sea navigation. After six years inthe Romanian merchant fleet, in the last few months Ihave been employed on a Cypress-flag, Greek-owned 'Ibulk carrier It is there that I recently found (forgotten IIn a drawer) an old issue, No. 3-82, of your AMVER IBULLETIN

For those of us who sail, sometimes on nothingmore than old rust buckets, it is moving to find out thatsomeone in this mercantile world is taking care of thesafety of navigation and in fact, of our lives!

I should like to express in this short letter, on thepart of all the officers and crew of the MIV IONIANCORAL. all of our esteem and appreciation for the staffin the so-noble mission of AMVERI God Bless You!

Obviously, I would be extremely glad if you wouldcondescend to put me on your regular mailing list.

Sorin C. CobzaruGalati, Romania

limn?

For The Information Of Radio Officers:

COMMUNICATIONS CHARTSTheAMVER BULLE 'IN supplies these radio frequencies for the convenience of our reader!. The frequencies aresubject to change. W,lle we make every errort to insure the timeliness of these listings, the AMVER BULLETINcannot guarantee the accuracy. All changes to or Inaccuracies found on these pages !hould be forwarded to the

address shown on the back cover of this magazine.

'---------

ATLANTIC AREA CHARTS·NOTE; ALLiQQ KHZ DISCONTINUED AS OF I AUG 1993

ALL COUNn~UOUSWAVE DlSCONTlNliED AS OF I APRIL 1995

NMF BOSION. MA.

SSI VOICE FREQUENCIES

(Carer Frequency Shown In Khz)

-- --_.-----.

SHl.f413< Khz620( Khz

824i <.hz

122, Khz

COAST4426 Khz6501 Khz8764 Khz

13089 Khz

TIMES2300 - 110024 HRS24 HRS

1100 - 2300

DH ITAL SELECT CALLINGlAs> i;ned frequency shown in Khz) I ALL nM I·:S)SHI COAST (SIMPLEX)218420631841,125 01681 5

NMN CHESAPEAKE. VA.SSI VOICE FREQUENCIES(Car "r Frequency Shown in Khz)

S!:!H~ COAST4\3< 4426

6201 6501824! 87641224 • 13089164:' •• 17314

NOTE: • Ah, ,monitored remotely from Miami 24 HRS_** On request from Chesapeake fron \1iami 24 HRS.

OIl' ECT PRINTING RAOIOTELETYPE(Ass ned Frequency Shown in Khz!

TIMES2300 - 1100

24 HRS24 HRS1100 - 2300OIR

NMG NEW ORLEANS. LA.

SEU '\LL 1097

S!!H~417'1626'18388124'1166li 5222', 5

COAST44126316842812592.51681') 5223895

TIMESOIR1100 - 230024 HRS24 llRS24 HRS2300 - 1100

SSIl VOICE FREQUENCIES(Can er Frequency Shown In Khz)

SHlie4134620C824U1224

(All times)

COAST44266501876413089