the struggle against shiism in hamidian iraq a study in ottoman counter propaganda
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The Struggle against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter-Ṗropaganda
Author(s): Selim DeringilReviewed work(s):Source: Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Bd. 30, Nr. 1/4 (1990), pp. 45-62Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1571045 .
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Die Welt des Islams XXX (1990)
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SHIISM INHAMIDIAN IRAQ
A STUDY IN OTTOMAN COUNTER-PROPAGANDA
BY
SELIM DERINGIL
Istanbul, Bogazifi University
I. Introduction
Propaganda and counter-propaganda are essentially conceptswhich gained currency at the time of the two world wars and as
such are quintessentially modern and Western concepts. Yet, the
Ottoman state during the reign of Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909) had
made great use of this weapon, particularly as part of its newemphasis on unity based on the claim of the Ottoman Sultan to
universal Islamic leadership as the Caliph of Islam or Commander
of the Faithful (Emir-el-Muminin). With the loss of most of its
remaining Balkan possessions and their Christian populations as
the result of the disastrous war with Russia in 1877-78, the Empireunder Abdilhamid II retrenched ideologically on the basis of its
Islamic identity.' This, however, brought new
problems,because
now, any challenge to Ottoman legitimacy arising from an Islamic
context acquired new immediacy.
II. The OttomanIranian Rivalryfor theLoyalty of Arab Subjects
The claim of the Sultan to caesaropapist domination both as tem-
poral ruler and religious leader was founded on Sunni legitimation
through the Emir-el-Muminin's claim to being the
rightfulsuc-
cessor to the last Abbasid Caliph, who had allegedly transferred his
office to Sultan Selim I after the Egyptian campaign of the latter
(1517).
1Stephen Duguid, "The Hamidian Politics of Unity", Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol. IX, No. 2 (May 1973), pp. 139-155.
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46 SELiM DERiNGiL
The one major Islamic state which had never recognized this
claim was Shiite Iran. Both Safavid and Qajar rulers stand out as
unrelenting opponents of Ottoman legitimacy. As put by Lambton:
"In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the outbreak of conflictbetween the Safawidsand Ottomans the Ottoman Sultan and the SafawidShah each referred to himself as the sovereign of Islam. The conflictbetween them was expressedin terms of Shici-Sunnistrife. Polemic ragedbetween the two sides."2
The bone of contention were the Arab lands where the Ottomans
clearlyestablished an
early ascendancy.Yet in certain Shii-Sunni
frontier zones and in enclaves where Shiis or Sunnis lived as
minorities, the Iranian challenge continued. Salibi writes:
"The Ottoman Sultanate ... claimed legitimacy as the universal SunniteMoslem State and was recognized as such in the area wherever SunniteIslam predominated. The Persian monarchy ... was more of a Persiannational state; nevertheless, it also happened to be the principal ShiiteMoslem State in the world, and hence along with Shiites and other unor-thodox Moslems in the
region, challengedin
principlethe claim of the
Ottoman State to universal Moslem dominion."3
A major frontier zone between Sunni Ottoman influence and
Safavi/Qajar Shiism was Iraq. Traditionally the crucible of
Twelver Shiism from the ninth century onwards, it was from Iraqthat Shah Ismail Safavi invited major Shiite ulema after he made
Twelver Shiism the official state religion of Iran in 1501. As
indicated by Arjomand:"Shah Ismail invited Shaykh All al-Karaki al-CAmili .. to his empire to
propagateTwelver Shicism. al-Karakisettled in Arab Iraq and paid inter-mittent visits to the court of Ismail. He continued to supervisethe conver-sion of Iran to Shicism under Tahmasp." 4
With the increasing predominance of Twelver Shiism in Iran
from the 16th century onwards and the securing of Ottoman con-
trol overmajor
Shii centers oflearning
such asBagdad, Najaf,
2 Ann K. S. Lambton, StateandGovernmentnMedieval slam(Oxford UniversityPress, 1981), pp. 212-213.
3 Kamal Salibi, "Middle Eastern Parallels: Syria-Iraq-Arabia in Ottoman
times," MiddleEasternStudies15 (1979), p. 72.4 Said Amir Arjomand, TheShadowof Godand theHidden mam(University of
Chicago Press, 1984), p. 107.
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SELiM DERINGiL
Although Istanbul's power was greater from mid-centuryonwards as a result of the Tanzimat reforms and increased cen-
tralization, the area always remained a potential trouble spot.
III. Differences n Sunni and Shii Views of Kingship and Caliphate
The major doctrinal cleavages between Sunni and Shii state
theory are far too complex to be discussed here. But for the pur-
poses of understanding the basis of the legitimating ideology that
informed Ottoman counter-propaganda it is useful to mention
some of the salient differences, particularly as these are often men-
tioned in the documents which will be referred to below.
At the very heart of the understanding of the position of the
supreme head of State, the Caliph/Sultan or the Shah, lies the
union of political and religious authority in the former, and the
divorce of religious and temporal rule in the latter. As put by
Arjomand:
"It was not unusual for Sunni rulers to claim legitimacy by styling them-selves caliphsand imams. This was so because in Sunnism unlike Shicism,the de-facto depoliticization of the conception of imamate neveroccured. "9
The result of this was that the position of the Sunni and Shii ulema
in relation to the state also differed radically:
"In marked contrast to the Ottoman Empire, where the hierocracy was
firmly incorporated into the caesaropapist state while religious domina-tion over the masses rested largely with the Sufi shaykhs and dervishes,the Shi'ite hierocracy of Iran had somewhat tenuous and informal tieswith a weak central government while it firmly dominated the masses byits exclusive religious authority."
10
Thus the Ottoman ulema, even when in opposition to central
authority, generally remained a 'loyal opposition' whereas Shii
miuctehids ould and did pose a serious threat to central power. Thiswas a fact which was often noted by Abdilhamid II's officials.
9Ibid., p. 179.
10Ibid., p. 219.
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STRUGGLE AGAINST SHIISM
IV. The Hamidian Officials and the Struggleagainst Shiism in Iraq
Throughout the late 1890's and early 1900's we find repeatedreferences in the Ottoman archival documentation to the spread of
Shiism in Iraq. The emphasis on the importance of the danger
posed by this development indicated that just as Abdiilhamid II was
attempting to revitalize the credibility of his claim to supreme
religious leadership in his dominions, he perceived a threat to the
very basis of his rule. His officials clearly reflected this anxiety.In a report by the former ?ehbenderConsul) of Hoy and Selmas,
Ali Rlza Bey, an extensive history of the rise of Shiism and its useby the Safavids served as an introduction to the proposed measures
to counter the threat. The Consul stated that Shiism had become
a barrier between the Caliphate and the Muslims of the Far East,thus causing them to fall into Christian hands. The Safavids and
Qajars were said to have grafted pre-Islamic Persian practices onto
Shiism and to have forcibly converted the Iranian people:
"Whilethe Sublime Sultanate worked to devastate and throw back theangry flood of Christianity, and always tried to attach the Muslims of
India and China to the Supreme Caliphate, Shiism intervened like a vastuncrossable sea. This caused the Muslims of Khiva and Buharato fall intoRussian hands as it caused the Kashgar Muslims to come under the
Chinese, and the Indian Muslims under the English yoke. Thus millionsof Muslims are enslaved by the infidels. The memory of this treacherywillendure as long as human kind ..." 11
The root of the problem in Iraq was the
ignoranceof the local
population of nomads and bedouins (urban-i asair ve bedeviye),who
easily fell under the influence of Iranian ulema. The latter came to
the sacred shrines of Najaf, Kerbela, Kazlmiye, and Baghdad in
such great numbers that Sunni ulemaremained in the minority. Ali
Riza Bey then proceeded to underline the prestige of the mullahs
and their financial and institutional independence of the state:
"The easiest thing in Iran is to become rich by joining the ranks of the
mullahs ... Once a poor man has joined the learned profession and per-
1 Basbakanlik Arsivi, Yildlz Esas Evrakl: Klslm 14/Evrak 212/Zarf126/Karton 7 (hereafter referred to as BBA. Y.E.E.), "A report by Major AliRiza Bey. Officer attached to the Imperial General Staff and former Consul toHoy and Selmas" (no date). (Hoy and Selmas were north Iranian towns.)
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SELIM DERINGIL
formed the pilgrimage to the holy shrines on foot, there receiving a
diploma (icazet), n a few years he will be the owner of villages and farms' 12
Where preventive measures were concerned, the writer stressedthat because forty percent of Iraq was of the Shii persuasion it was
impossible to use force as this would incur the odium of the world
Islamic community. The one panacea therefore was education. The
state should send specially trained teachers and ulema to Iraq and
instill the virtues of Sunni Islam in primary schools. These instruc-
tors should be paid in full and should be graduates of the highest
schools in Istanbul, as locals were not to be trusted. Instruction inthe greatness of Islam and the great deeds of the three rightly
guided Caliphs would eventually cause an erosion of the differences
between Sunnism and Shiism. Thus, quietly and without drawing
attention, "His Imperial Majesty will accomplish more by educa-
tion than his illustrous ancestor Selim I did by the sword ...." 13
Though full of historical inaccuracies and at times naive in the
extreme, this report did define the difficulties facing the Ottoman
administration in Iraq, as well as take note of Iran as the only com-
petitor for universal Islamic leadership.
In another report (laiha) prepared by a former Shaikh-ul-Islam,
Huiseyin Hfisnui Efendi, the emphasis was on the crucial role of the
Sunni medresesn Bagdad and the appointment of competent ulema
to Iraq to debate with their Shii counterparts. These men would
also be trained in the art of "explaining the doctrinal fragility of
Shiism to thepeople." Interestingly enough, however, they
were to
avoid getting drawn into polemic by the Shiis and "secretly report
to the authorities those among them whose activities were harmful
to the interests of the state." This was, according to Hiiseyin
Hiisnui, the "moral duty of the ulema," who would under no cir-
cumstances disclose their official nature but pose as simple
travellers. What seems to have been proposed, therefore, was a sort
of religious secret service. The "moral duty of the ulema" also
clearly indicates in this case the closely interwoven nature of stateulema relations in this particular context.14
12 Ibid.13 Ibid.14 B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/454/126/9 (no date): "Views on the preservation of Sun-
nism and forbidding of Shiism in Bagdad. By former Shaikh-ul-Islam HiiseyinHusnui."
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STRUGGLE AGAINST SHIISM
By contrast, the independence of the Shii mictehid was the focal
point of an unsigned and undated memorandum. This writer gave
a remarkably accurate (and this time not at all naive) descriptionof the strategic importance of the mictehid in Iranian society,
stating:
"(Because) they seek no official appointment (mansab) nd have no fearof dismissal (azl), [(they are difficult to control).] They have great influ-
ence among the people and as the common folk see them as the
viceregents of the Imamtheir influence is a thousand times greater thanthat of the Shah .... Within twenty-four hours and with their merest
gesture they can cause the people to rise against the Shah ....'15
The Ottoman official was obviously well informed; in his recent
work, Arjomand cites a French traveller as saying that a powerful
miictehid ould "gather the people behind him like another Orpheus.... "16 The anonymous author then went into great detail about
how the Ottoman state should 'turn' the influence exercised bythese men, and how this should be possible as most of them were
Arabs and Ottomansubjects.
The other measures heproposedwere the granting of munificent largesse to the holy shrines of
Kerbela and Najaf, "as had been done in the time of Sultan
Abdiilmecid. ' 17
The Ottoman-Qajar struggle for credibility in the eyes of the
Iraqi population was very evident in a report compiled by the
Ottoman Ambassador to Tehran, Ali Galip Bey, dated 15 August1894. The Ambassador proposed the following measures: First, the
controlling of the movements of various Iranian pilgrims to the holyshrines and the prevention of their circulation among the popula-tion as well as the restriction of the time they should be allowed to
spend in the holy places. Second, the appointment of official ulema
to counter Shii propaganda by inculcating Sunnism and obedience
to the Caliph. Third, the expulsion of Shii mictehidsand students,
ahunds, who spread seditious ideas. Fourth, the inculcation of the
idea that it wasowing
to the OttomanCaliph
that Shii men of
learning could come to the holy shrines of Najaf, Kerbela and
15B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/88-1lb/88/12 (no date).
16Arjomand, op. cit., p. 186; Arjomand is citing from Rafael Du Mans, Estat
de la Perse en 1660, ed. Schefer (Paris, 1890).17 B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/88-116/88/12 (no date).
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SELiM DERiNGIL
Kazimiye and that Shii Ottoman subjects could flourish and
prosper. Fifth, the making redundant of the Iranian middlemen
who supposedly expedited the business of Shii merchants inOttoman dominions by speeding up the bureaucratic process, thus
undermining the credibility of Iranian propaganda which claimed
that the Shah was the sole protector of Shii interests.18
It is interesting that none of the documents dealing with
measures to stop the spread of Shiism among the Iraqi populationmake any reference to military action.
Together with the realisation that the necessary military muscle
did not exist, the issue was seen clearly as one which was beyond
simple police repression. This attitude is very evident in an exten-
sive report prepared by a member of a well known Iraqi ulema
family, Alusizade Ahmet ?akir, and dated 26 August 1907. Ahmet
?akir stressed that the Shii ahundswho circulated among the tribal
population were financed by rich Iranians and the British, both of
whom had an interest in the extension of their influence in Iraq, so
the issue was "much more political than religious." Alusizade alsocalled for the institution of mobile medresesconsisting of trustworthySunni ulema who would travel with the Sunni nomads and preachthe Sunni word, reporting to the authorities any untoward events
that came to their attention. These mobile medreses hould be rein-
forced with mobile primary and secondary schools, thus ensuringthat the local population "would have the full benefit of the official
belief at an early age." As to the settled population, the emphasiswas again on the medreses.Specially selected Sunni pupils should be
sent to the major medresesn Iraq; Imam-i Azam, Seyyid Sultan Ali,
Shaikh Sandal, and Miinevvere-i Hatun should each receive
twenty such pupils, "while the special importance of Necef-i Esref
and Kerbela-i Mualla made it necessary to send them each twenty-five students. " The upgrading of Sunni learning would increase the
prestige of Sunnism in general among the population, "thus deal-
ing a terrible blow to Shiism." Alusizade also stressed that the banon Sunni-Shii marriage should be strictly enforced, and the Shii
passion plays should be banned as they "heightened the excitement
of the population."19
18 B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/1623/126/10.11 Safer 1312-15 August 1894.19 B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/257/126/8, 13 August 1323/26 August 1907.
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STRUGGLE AGAINST SHIISM
Religious uniformity was thus seen as a means by which nor-
mative standards of behaviour could be imposed on the population.
A particularly striking example of this line of thought is the docu-ment giving the views of Sfileyman Hiisnii Pasa, a distinguishedexile in Bagdad. Siileyman Pasa proposed that the state sponsor the
writing of a "Book of Beliefs" (Kitab-ul-Akdid)devoted specificallyto the rebuttal of the "heretical sects" (firak-i dalle) of Islam. The
ideas in this tract would then be used "to correct the beliefs of
heretics" through a "missionary society" consisting of highlytrained ulema who, after two to three years training, would be
awarded the title ddi-ul-hak-misyoner.This was especially necessaryas those adhering to the approved Sunni Hanefi branch were in a
minority even among the Sunnis of Iraq, and the population as a
whole consisted of twenty mezhebsspeaking one or more of four
languages (Kurdish, Turkish, Arabic, and Armenian). Twelver
Shiism was particularly rampant and the most influential mictehid
was the mictehid of Samarra, Mirza Hasan, the chief mictehid of the
Usuli, who according to the writer, "has more influence and powerthan the Shah of Iran ...." Siileyman Pasa then went into great
detail on Mirza Hasan's role in the abolition of the tobacco
monopoly in Iran and likened his position to that of the Pope as a
supragovernmental authority:
"As these men see all governments as usurpers, the restriction of theirinfluence is an inevitable necessity for the Sublime State. They are a bar-rier to
progressand
very dangerous.... 20
Silleyman Pasa's cure for the state's problems as regards
religious unorthodoxy was, as with other writers, 'proper' educa-
tion. If primary and secondary schooling could be brought back
into the Sunni Hanefi fold all would be saved:
"The spread of education will instill the love of religion (din), country(vatan), and nationality (milliyet),as well as strengthening the salutary
allegiance of the people to our Master the Caliph of all Muslims. Whilethe persistanceof ignorance will only increase and intensify disunity and
disintegration. 21
20B.B.A., Y.E.E., 14/1188/126/9, 9 Ramazan 1309/8 April 1892.
21 Ibid.
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SELiM DERiNGiL
In the passage above, one clearly hears a meshing of classical
Islamic and novel ideas of loyalty, loyalty to the "country" and
loyalty to the "Caliph" being mentioned in one breath. It is alsoworth noting that in an age when missionary activity was justanother facet of political power, an Ottoman official clearly
appreciated this potential. This was all the more remarkable as
Islam does not proseletyze, and Siileyman Pasa's vision of a 'mis-
sionary society' was clearly a borrowed concept.While Siileyman Pasa was concerned with the ideological
implications of the spread of Shiism, the defterdarof Bagdad,Mehmed Rifat Menemenlizade, was anxious to stress the
administrative difficulties. His appraisal of how the spread of
Shiism affected the Ottoman administrative apparatus in Iraqamounted to a description of how the Sublime State was having the
rug pulled out from under its feet. Menemenlizade stated that the
Iranian inspired ahunds and mictehids were very active among the
ranks of the Ottoman Sixth Army and the police force, "among
whom they spread the idea that it was condemnable by God to drawarms against the Shiis ...." Many members of these units had con-
verted to Shiism, which made them unreliable. In fact, the
behaviour of the converted Shii police force was "more like [thatof] a gang of brigands" as they harassed and robbed the Sunni
population; "the nomads fear the security forces more than theyfear the brigands."
Meanwhile the mictehids and ahunds
"work to furtherthe darkest ignorance of the population in order to roband milk them as is their custom, because (they know) that forthe popula-tion to be enlightened means that they will obey no other than their
rightful ruler .... 22
As a result of all the Iranian money being poured into Najaf,
Kerbela, Kazlmiye and Samarra, these "had become virtually Ira-
nian towns."
As to preventive measures, Menemenlizade also placed the onuson education, particularly primary schooling. These had increas-
ingly fallen into the hands of Shiis. This situation was to be
22 B.B.A. trade Meclis-i Mahsus, No. 5537; Gurre-i Recep 1309/31 January1892, Mehmed Rifat Menemenlizade to Palace Secretariat.
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STRUGGLE AGAINST SHIISM
amended by the appointment of teachers from Istanbul. Similarly,Sunni students in prestigious medresesike Kerbela should have their
scholarships increased. Many Sunni mosques were without prayerleaders (Imam) and Qur'an readers (vaciz) because of lack of funds.
The necessary funding for these institutions was to come from the
tax levied on Shii burials at the holy places. This "funerary tax"
(defniyerisumu) should be left for local use to improve the condition
of Sunni centres of learning. Also, a Sunni preacher should be
attached to each batallion of the Sixth Army in order to work
toward the return of Ottoman effectives to Sunnism.23
The lack of concrete power to enforce policy is evident through-out the Ottoman documentation. The minutes of the Ottoman
Cabinet meeting dated 1June 1891 openly stated that it was impos-sible to use force to prevent the nomads from drifting over to
Iranian territory and that they should be encouraged to remain in
Ottoman lands by just treatment.24
Those ulema that did get sent out to Iraq were afflicted with the
classic complaint of the Hamidian official: non-payment of salaries.A memorandum by a former Shaikh-ul-Islam, Mehmed Cemaled-
din Efendi, dated 3 August 1905, gave a summary of the perform-ance of specially appointed Sunni teachers. Five such teachers had
been sent out in 1905 from Istanbul with monthly salaries of 2,000kurus. They had failed in their mission because they were not giventhe necessary support by local officials and had failed to receive
their salaries regularly. The new teachers to be sent out should
receive at least 5,000 kurussalary each, should speak fluent Arabic
and be familiar with the customs and habits of the local population.Most importantly, they should be of a very high standard of learn-
ing as they would be expected to inspect schools and medreseswhile
submitting their teachers to examination. Mehmed Cemaleddin
implied throughout his memo that those previously sent had been
thoroughly lacking on this score.25
Money, or lack of it, was the major obstacle to the proposedreforms in Iraq as elsewhere. The Ottoman centre was reluctant to
23 Ibid.24 B.B.A. Irade Meclis-i Mahsus, 5441, 22 ?evval 1308/1 June 1891.25 B.B.A. Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi, 272681, 1 Cemaziyelahir 1323/3 August
1905; Bab-i Fetva, No. 56.
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SELIM DERiNGIL
relinquish its hold on the tax on Shii funerals, as this was farmed
out to tax farmers (miiltezim)and yielded revenue. The figure givenin the Cabinet minutes of 1 June 1891 was 200,000 kurusyearly,after the cost of collection had been deducted.26 A telegram received
directly at the Ylldlz Palace on 10 November 1891 spoke of a
Seyyid Mahmud from Najaf, who was offering to bid 1000 liras
more than the present rate for the right to collect this tax.27
On the other hand there seemed to be no shortage of money at
the Shii end. The report of the Ottoman Commission for the
reform of Iraq dated 23 January 1907 stated that money sent from
Shiis in foreign lands to the holy shrines and religious institutionshad made them rich while the Sunni equivalents languished in vari-
ous states of disrepair. Pious donations from foreign Shii sources
were being spent lavishly on the local poor and on Shii students, of
whom there were five to six thousand who were thus able to studyin great material comfort. In contrast, the Sunni medreseswere full
of evaders of military service who had no interest in learning, and
those who did have, numbered no more than two to three hundred.
Thus Twelver Shiism had "spread to the point where one can talk
of invasion." 28
The lack of financial support for Sunni students and institutions
was also the central theme of a memorandum prepared by former
Shaikh-ul-Islam Mehmed Cemaleddin, dated 4 February 1908.
The writer stated that the reason for the delapidation of Sunni
medreses nd primary schools was that the vakf revenues which were
supposed to support them had been expropriated. Stipends paid toSunni students were insufficient and forced them to seek work in
order to pay for food, thus detracting time from study.29
V. Examples of Propagandaand Counter-propaganda
Apart from the examples above, which give the views of
Ottoman officials, it is possible to infer from the documentation
26 B.B.A. Irade Meclis-i Mahsus, 5441, 22 Sevval 1308/1 June 1891.27 B.B.A. Irade Dahiliye, 98190, 6 Rebiyiilahir 1309/10 November 1891;
YllddzPalace Imperial Secretariat, No. 1624.28 B.B.A. Bab-i Ali EvrakOdasl, 272681; Report of the Ottoman Commission
for the reform of Iraq, 10 Kanun-i Sani 1323/23 January 1907.29 Ibid. Memorandum from former Shaikh-ul-Islam, Mehmed Cemaleddin
Efendi to Prime-Minister, 23 Muharrem 1326/4 February 1908; Bab-i Fetva,Daire-i Mesihat Mektubi Kalemi, aded 142.
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STRUGGLE AGAINST SHIISM
concrete events which give an idea of the Ottoman-Iranian tug-of-war for credibility (or maybe even just visibility) in the eyes of the
localpopulation.
Animperial
irade dated 3 December 1891 noted
that the leader of the Caf tribe, an Osman Bey, had been awarded
a ceremonial sword by the Iranians. The vilayetof Mosul was asked
for its views on this issue, and it replied that although the personin question was known as untrustworthy, there was no harm in his
being allowed to accept the gift.30 That such a small event should
have been passed on directly to the Palace suggests that anyencroachment by Iran, real or imagined, on the sympathies of the
Ottoman population was being watched very closely.There were also instances where Sunnis from Iran took refuge in
Ottoman dominions. An iradedated 2 October 1891 noted that two
representatives of a Sunni village in Iran had secretly crossed over
to Ottoman territory and had presented themselves to the mutasarrnfof Hakkari. They complained that the Iranian government was
interfering with their religious beliefs and requested to be allowed
to settle in thevilayets
of Bitlis orDiyarbekir.
It isinteresting
that
the governor of Van, who forwarded the request, recommended
that they be accepted as they were sedentary farmers and Sunnis
(presumably as opposed to nomadic Shiis, which would have made
them less desirable).3'The Ottomans were also careful to maintain the shrines of the
leading Shii Imams. An iradedated 8 February 1890 noted that the
shrine of Imam Hiiseyin in Kerbela was in need of repair as "the
present state (of disrepair) is not in keeping with the glory and
prestige of the Caliph .... 32
Ottoman sensitivity regarding the defence of their claim to pro-tect the holy centres of Shiism is observable in an event which was
registered at the Sublime Porte on 10 March 1907. The death of the
Shah of Iran was announced from the minarets of the mosque at
the Shrine of Imam Musa-el-Kazlm at Kazlmiye by the Shii
30 B.B.A. irade Dahiliye, 98330, 29 Rebiyiilahir 1309/3 December 1891; YlldlzPalace Imperial Secretariat, No. 2429.
31 B.B.A. irade Dahiliye, 97596, 26 Safer 1309/2 October 1891; Yildiz Palace
Imperial Secretariat, No. 460.32 B.B.A. trade Meclis-i Mahsus, 4687, 26 Cemaziyelahir 1307/8 February
1890. Examples of the granting of moneys for the repairof this or that Shii shrineoccur frequently in the Ottoman documents.
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SELiM DERiNGIL
religious officials of the Ottoman State. The Ministry of the
Interior took a very serious view of this and asked that they be
severely punished. The Sultan, however, no doubt wisely orderedthat "the matter be closed with a scolding."33
The shrine of Musa-el-Kazlm seems to have gotten more than its
share of attention. It was reported in an irade dated 9 September1893 that Yahya Nusret Pasa, Imperial ADC and Chief Inspectorof the Sixth Army, had forbidden the recital of ceremonial prayersto the Sultan at the Shrine of Musa-el-Kazlm. The keeper of the
keys of the Shrine (kiliddar)had reported the event to the Governor
of Bagdad, recording his profound dismay, "as an Ottoman son of
an Ottoman" ("Osmanli oglu Osmanli bulundugumuz iCin ...").The Governor of Bagdad, Hasan Refik Pasa, protested Nusret
Pasa's behaviour, saying that this performance had "even offended
the Iranians." The Governor also wrote to the kiliddar, pacifyingand complimenting him while instructing him to continue the
ceremonial prayers five times a day as was customary. The
Imperial irade determined that Yahya Nusret Pasa would berebuked for his behaviour.34
A very clear example of the conception of education as prop-
aganda is illustrated by the Sultan's move to bring Shii children to
Istanbul. Although it is well known that Abdiilhamid aimed to
assimilate the Arab elite through education in his famous mekteb-i
asiret or "tribal school", the attempt mentioned below involves
children of modest background. Thus, a letter from the Governor
of Bagdad dated 30 October 1891, stated that in keeping with the
Sultan's instructions, ten Shii children were being sent to Istanbul
from Bagdad and Kerbela. Yet the Governor had seen fit to include
two Sunni children, "to set the minds of the Shiis at rest and show
that these children were going to Istanbul to study as the result of
33 B.B.A. Bab-i Ali EvrakOdasi, 225715, 24 Muharrem 1325/10 March 1907.
Ministryof
Interior,No. 4886. See also Cole and
Momen, "Mafia, Mob andShiism in Iraq", p. 121: The authors point out that one of the reasons why Shii
religious scholarsfought against the establishment of Ottoman control in Karbalawas their objection to the Ottoman Sultan's name being mentioned in the Fridayprayer.
34 B.B.A. Irade Hususi, 162, 26 Safer 1311/9 September 1893. This remainsa puzzling episode; at the time of writing I had been unable as yet to determine
why Nusret Pasa acted as he did.
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STRUGGLE AGAINST SHIISM
the Sultan's generosity ...." As the families who volunteered were
poor, six of the children had to have clothes made at the state's
expense and the Sultan paid for their transport and the fees of theirtravel chaperones. The Sultan's view of the matter was:
"Since so much money has been spent [on these children] it is importantthat the necessary benefits be derived from their education. The trainingof those among them who are Shii should ensure that they abandon thissect and become Hanefi, in order to enable them to convert their coun-
trymen to the Hanefi sect upon their return .... 35
VI. Some ConcludingComments
Just as Ottoman officials were proposing the curtailing of Shii
passion plays (tazieh) in Iraq, we read in a surprising source that
they were being performed in the very heart of the Ottoman capitalitself. What was in fact a guide book for the 19th century traveller
describes the ceremony in the typically lurid terms of the orien-
talist:
"On the 10th Muharrem the Persians at Constantinople commemoratethe martyrdom of Hussein, the son of Ali. The ceremony takes place inthe court of the ValidehKhanand commences soon after sunset. In thelurid glare of numberless torches pass by the mourners beating theirbreasts or chanting Persian dirges; the white robed martyrs; the whitehorse of Hussein with its blood spattered saddle, to which is attached awhite dove, emblematic of the martyr's pure soul; and the fanatics whoafter the manner of the priestsof Baal, shout and cut themselves until the
blood runs down and stains their white shirtsa crimson hue. It is a strangeweird spectacle, not to be witnessed by those who have weak nerves, ordread heat and a crush ... A special enclosure is reserved for the PersianAmbassador who represents the Shah .... 36
There was also a considerable Iranian community in Istanbul,
consisting mostly of merchants whose newspaper the "Ahtar" was
35 B.B.A. tradeDahiliye, 98525,
28Cemaziyelewel
1309/31 December 1891.The irade ncludes the list of names of the children. The two Sunnis are markedwith a sin which appears above their names. See also BBA trade Dahiliye 98993,19 Cemaziyelahir 1309/21January 1891: The Sultan gave 200 lirasout of his own
purse to pay for theirbedding when they got to Istanbul. He furtherallocated 5000kurusmonthly for their food, servants, and private tutors.
36Murray's Hand Book, Constantinople, Brusa and the Troad (John Murray,
London, 1893), Section 1, p. 13.
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SELiM DERiNGiL
published in that city until its suspension by the Ottoman Govern-
ment in 1895.37
Thus it is difficult to talk in terms of Ottoman success in curtail-ing the activities of Shiis. But the whole issue of how the danger was
perceived and how reaction to it was conceived does highlight cer-
tain aspects of late Ottoman state/society relations. As Professor
Feroz Ahmad has rightly pointed out:
"The key to an understandingof the Ottoman state in the nineteenth cen-
tury seems to be its lack of a social base and its determination to createone."38
The conception of this 'social base' varied from time to time. The
Tanzimat conception of 'Osmanlilik' or the attempt to create
Ottoman citizens, Christian as well as Muslim, differed markedlyfrom the Hamidian conception of 'Osmanllllk', which put the
emphasis on Sunni Islam. The one continuous characteristic of
Ottoman statecraft which ran straight through the Tanzimat, the
Hamidian era, and the Young Turk period, however, was the
emphasis on social engineering. This was what set 19th centuryOttoman statecraft off from what had gone before:
"Thus state intervention was no longer designed to merely regulatesociety as in the past, its purpose was now broadly speaking social
engineering."39
In the previous conception of state/society relations, what had
been expected from the reayawas obedience. Now what seemed tobe expected was an active subscribing to a normative standard of
values. This normative standard was increasingly an amalgam of
old notions of loyalty to the Caliph and new migrant notions of
loyalty to the country (vatan) and/or nationality (milliyet), all of
which were given as cures to the state's ills by Siileyman Pasa.40
Also in the reference by an Ottoman religious functionary (a Shii
at that) to himself as "an Ottoman son of an Ottoman," the osten-
37 Hitoshi Suzuki, "Iranians in Istanbul and the Tobacco Protest," JournalofAsian andAfricanStudies(1986), pp. 143-175.
38 FerozAhmad, "The State and intervention in Turkey," TurcicaXVI (1984),p. 56.
39Ibid., p. 52.
40 See above, p. 53f.
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sible recognition and acceptance of state legitimation was in
evidence.41
The vehicle for the propounding of the state's legitimatingideology and thus the chief tool for use in its social engineering was
education. The striking recurrence in nearly all the documents
mentioned above of the need to impose uniform religious values
through primary and other education is the best illustration of this.
It is also significant that nearly all the documents mentioned above
also propose extensive economic reforms in Iraq to alleviate suffer-
ing and poverty, but in all of the documents found by this author,
economic reform always takes second place after education.
Nowhere is there any hint of repression through physical force.
What must be made clear, however, is that the educational pro-cess referred to above was really propaganda and counter-
propaganda. The ulema sent out to Iraq were expected to educate
the population about the ills of Shiism, and they were expected to
report seditious Shii elements, which was seen as their "moral
duty". The normative ideology as expressed in the "Book ofBeliefs" was a far cry from the traditional Ottoman toleration of
religious diversity. The "social base" that Feroz Ahmad mentions
was expected to be created through education. After all, the Sultan
himself openly declared as much over the issue of the Shii children
who were to be 'educated' in Istanbul.
In the final instance, Ottoman attempts at social engineeringwere a failure. However they prepared the ground for the
republican Turkish nation-building process, which succeeded.
Indeed, the geopolitical reality of the Middle East today derives
largely from its historical heritage of past concepts and conflicts.
The Iran-Iraq war can be seen as a modern conflagration stemmingfrom late 19th century tensions which simmered beneath the sur-
face. One cannot escape the feeling of deja-vu as one reads the
reports of Ottoman officials who seem to be conjuring up Imam
Khomeini when they speak of the miictehidswho can mobilise theIranian populace "with their merest gesture." The same feeling is
experienced when we read in a modern Turkish newspaper that the
41 See above, p. 58; even if the functionary in question was trying to please,his statement (even if insincere) illustrates that he knew what would be pleasingto the Ottoman authorities.
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Turkish Ministry of Education is taking great pains to select and
train "reliable" teachers to be sent to educate Turkish children liv-
ing in western Europe. These teachers receive instructions to reportall "subversive elements" to their superiors, in haunting similarityto their ancestors in Iraq.42 Even more strikingly, approximatelythree weeks after the completion of the first draft of this article, the
bloody confrontation in the Kaaba occured on 10 August 1987, pit-
ting Sunni against Shii.
The historical continuity of the Sunni-Shii conflict in Turkey
emerged recentlyin a
telling episodewhen the Vice President of the
ruling Motherland Party (ANAP), Eyiip Aslk, revealed that he was
a Naksibendi and declared: "The best guarantee against Kho-
meinism in Turkey are the tarikats. The tarikats are traditionally
against Shiism." The same official also stated: "Our struggle
against Khomeinism should be on the religious plane."43
42 Milliyet, 27 September 1987.
43 Milliyet, 12 January 1988, Cumhuriyet,2 January 1988. The tarikatsareofficially banned in Turkey.
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