A publication by King’s College London Think Tank Society - London’s first student-led policy institute

THESPECTRUM

Edition 02 | August 2012

‘Made possible by donations to the King’s College London Annual Fund’

Edition 02

August 2012

A publication by King’s College London Think Tank Society - London’s first student-led policy institute

Table of Contents

About the KCL Think Tank

A note from the Founder

A note from the President

Editor’s note

01 | Defense and Diplomacy

Pakistan: Perpetrator or Victim of Terror? 1

Would a Nuclear Iran Destabilise the Middle East? 5

How to Avoid another Mistake in Iran 9

Is Terrorism a Continued Cause for the War in Afghanistan? 12

An Evaluation of contest’s Prevent Strategy 17

Is the Threat of CBRN Terrorism Overblown or Underestimated in the UK? 21

Negotiating the Internet: Diplomacy, Security and Governance in the Information Age 24

Strategic Defence: the People’s Republic of China’s Stance in the South China Sea 27

02 | Business and Economics

Social Entrepreneurship: A solution to Many Problems? 33

The International Arms Trade and the UK’s role 38

03 | Energy and Environment

The World on Our Plate – The Impact of Our Current Food Culture 42

East Africa’s Famine: How Did We Let it Happen? 47

04 | Healthcare

The Challenge ‘Global Health’ Poses to Health Systems Strengthening in Conflict-Affected Countries 51

05 | Current Affairs

National Service: The Solution to the Root Problem of the London Riots 61

Acknowledgements

The Spectrum | edition 02

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The views and opinions expressed in the articles that form this publication are those of their respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the KCL Think Tank. The authors of the articles retain full rights of their writings, and are free to disseminate them as they see fit, including but not limited to reproductions in print and Web-sites. The KCL Think Tank does not endorse, warrant, or otherwise take responsibility for the contents of the articles.

The Spectrum | edition 02

About the KCL Think Tank

The King’s College London Think Tank is a unique student society and the first student led policy institute

in London. The society was founded in late 2010 in the wake of the student protests as a way of giving students another means of getting their voices heard by using the skills and subject knowledge that we

learn at KCL practically. Students from all disciplines are invited to come and contribute to problem solving

on a wide variety of issues such as foreign policy, energy and environment, business and finance, immigration, defense, healthcare, education, crime and many other areas of public policy.

The recommendations we generate will be published in a journal at the end of each academic year. Our discussions will be supplemented by presentations from guest speakers throughout the year. The best

thing about the society is that every public policy issue has a wide variety of different aspects, meaning

that medics are just as important as historians and engineers can provide as much insight as lawyers.

The past year has seen a series of high profile speakers, the publication of a journal and the offering of

internship and work placement opportunities at leading think tanks in London. Be sure to join the mailing list at http://www.kingsthinktank.com to get updates in your inbox about our exciting events and how you

can get involved in a fascinating project that will not only let your voice be heard but will also provide a

great addition to your CV.

The Spectrum | edition 02 i

The first student-led policy institute in LondonFounded in 2011, KCL Think Tank is the first fully student-led, independent policy institute in London. As one of the

very first and most successful student think tanks in Europe, KCL Think Tank now counts seven independent policy centres, several hundreds of members and a highly successful academic journal, The Spectrum, that was

downloaded over 2000 times in 2011 alone.

A note from the Founder

Dear all,

A year and a half after the KCL Think Tank was founded, it gives me great pleasure to present another

edition of The Spectrum. This journal is the culmination of a year of conferences, seminars and research and I very much hope that you will find it both interesting and eye-opening.

I would first like to thank all those who have made this possible. To begin with, of course, those who have contributed articles to the journal. Their contributions make the KCL Think Tank what it is. Next, I would

like to thank those who have made the printing of this journal possible; the King’s College London Annual

Fund and Pinsent Masons. Furthermore, the hard work of the KCL Think Tank’s committee must be acknowledged; bringing almost fifty distinguished speakers to King’s and organizing forty events and

seminars is no small feat.

Finally, I would like to thank all those who came and spoke at our events. These events have not only

provided the impetus for the articles in this journal, but have also served to bring current affairs to a wider

audience of students. We have been honoured to welcome a wide variety of academics, researchers, ambassadors, government representatives, politicians, activists, doctors and scientists.

The King’s College London Think Tank Society has big plans for the coming year, with new policy centres and even more events. As a founding member of CampusPolicy, the new international association of

student think tanks, the KCL Think Tank’s influence will only grow over the coming years. The huge

reception that it has received over the past two years has shown that student think tanks are in the process of redefining student politics for our generation.

Benedict Counsell

KCL Think Tank Founding President 2010-2012

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A note from the President

Dear reader,

In the wake of the 2010 student riots, a group of idealistic and driven King’s students took it upon

themselves to found the KCL Think Tank. They did so with a grand ideal in mind: to create an open forum

for debate and reflection, through which students could actively contribute to solving the issues with which our society grapples. It is only fair to say, however, that all of us involved with the KCL Think Tank had

never imagined that a student-led policy institute would be so well-received, and that so many students from such a wide variety of backgrounds would get involved.

This society is driven by its members, and thus only exists because of all those that write policy

recommendations for The Spectrum, attend our events or write to their MPs to ask specific and well-informed questions about pieces of upcoming legislation. For us as a committee, it is humbling and

inspiring to witness just how much this generation of students wants to make a difference for the better. We can only express our greatest gratitude for the efforts that all of you have made.

Exactly a year and a half after the KCL Think Tank’s first event, we are now running 5 to 6 events per

month, organized across 5 policy centers. Over 2000 students have granted us their support by becoming members of the KCL Think Tank. We have had the great honor to receive some of Britain’s finest minds

and most influential policy-makers. Our members have had thought-provoking discussions with diplomats, CEOs, directors of think tanks, journalists, campaigners and academics. By contributing their visionary

ideas for a different tomorrow to this publication, our members can pride themselves on re-invigorating one

of Britain’s most outstanding traditions: the celebration of independent thinking and innovation.

I firmly believe that this is only the beginning of the exciting journey ahead for student think tanks. Within

King’s, over 30 committee members have worked tirelessly to lay a solid foundation upon which our policy institute can flourish for the decades to come. As student-led think tanks are now being founded across

Europe, it is becoming ever more apparent that their legacy will also go beyond the confines of our alma

mater. In a changing world, the policy process itself will inevitably have to change. In light of the overwhelming challenges that our societies face, politics will have to mutate into an ‘incubator of

innovation’. Students offer exactly the creativity and original thinking that is needed to address the demographic, legal and economic challenges of the 21st century. Policy recommendations such as those

included in this journal should and will provide an impetus to new forms of thinking that yield new solutions.

In 2012-’13 we are expanding from 5 to 7 policy centers, which will each be holding between 3 and 5 events. This means that our members will be tackling societal challenges in areas as far and wide as

Business/Economics, Current Affairs, Defence/Diplomacy, Education, Energy/Environment, Healthcare and Law. As such, the year ahead shapes up to be ‘une année de grand cru’ for the KCL Think Tank - and I

sincerely hope that you too will be a part of it!

Sebastiaan Debrouwere KCL Think Tank President 2012-2013

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Editor ’s note

The KCL Think Tank Society is like a spark that spread into a wildfire.

From just a handful of students with an idea, it flourished into a fully constituted society with more than

hundreds of members, regular events with wonderful speakers and engaged students who contributed by writing policy recommendations. This has been an amazing journey.

I want to start off by thanking all those who made this project possible: first, the talented students who

have taken the time and energy to write policy recommendations for this journal, and without whom it would not have existed. I want to thank my team of amazing editors who have spent so much effort in

making sure the Spectrum looked perfect. It wasn’t easy, but we made it. I would also like to thank the King’s College Annual Fund and Pinsent Masons, whose contributions made the printing of this journal

possible. The success of this year would not have been what it was without the incredibly devoted and

hard working members of the committee, who ensured that events were organized with speakers on different topics. Finally, I want to thank all the speakers who joined our events.

The purpose of The Spectrum is to serve as a forum where students can learn, debate and reflect on worldwide issues in different spheres. Through these articles, they express their own views and offer some

recommendations to address those matters. As such, I have to stress the fact that the policy

recommendations below have not been altered, as our think tank has no political or ideological affiliation.

This year, the journal’s focus was mainly on defense and diplomacy, at both national and international

levels. With the tumult of events that has occurred this past year, it is amazing to see so many students getting involved in those debates and trying to suggest solution to those issues. These articles are not only

extensive on the topics that they address, but they also show the level of deep reflection students engaged

in, and the desire to make their voices heard, which is what the Think Tank Society is all about. I feel truly honored to have had the opportunity to work with such inspiring minds.

My hope is that the Think Tank Society will continue to strive in this direction, gaining in impact and influence. After all that has happened this year, it is becoming increasingly important that we continue to

engage in debates on topics such as those addressed below, and find solutions to these issues. This is

what we wish to achieve.

I hope you will find this collection of policy recommendations both interesting and eye-opening, and that it

might lead you to reflect on those matters. Thank you for taking the time to read this compilation, and I hope you enjoy it as much as I did.

Juliette Vix

KCL Think Tank Society Editor in Chief 2011-2012

The Spectrum | edition 02 iv

01 | Defense and Diplomacy

Pakistan: Perpetrator or Victim of Terror?Camille Maubert

The decay in US-Pakistan relations has now become common knowledge. Every recent crisis has had a

detrimental impact on the ‘artificial’ cooperation between the two countries, and widened the gap of

mistrust and mutual defiance. The shift in American rhetoric highlights the fractures in the friendship. Pakistan has been demoted from a ‘key partner’ and an ‘indispensable’ ally in the war against terrorism, to

a ‘traitor’ and a ‘double player’ whose brinkmanship is responsible for the current stalemate in Afghanistan. It is difficult to objectively determine whether Pakistan’s inability to tackle its homegrown transnational

terrorism is the result of incapacity, negligence or unwillingness. Yet such unilateral and uncompromising

condemnation of Pakistan is misleading in that it doesn’t account for the geopolitical realities with which Pakistan is confronted. Indeed, Pakistan is a direct neighbor of Afghanistan, and as such has to bear the

consequences of the conflict’s shock-waves. Therefore, before sentencing Pakistan, one ought to place the policies in a wider context; one that is shaped by an extremely complex regional environment.

Bilateral ties between Pakistan and the US are too often viewed through the single prism of the Afghan conflict and the

unconditional commitment demanded by the US. This approach, however, ignores critical elements such as Kashmir, poor

governance, political instability, and weak institutions – these shape Pakistan’s foreign policy and restrict its capacity to

respond proactively. Given its geographical position, the spread of Pakistan’s Pashtun minority across the uncontrolled

Pakistan-Afghanistan border allows the Taliban to operate in both countries, and Pakistan simply cannot afford to be

squeezed between a potentially unfriendly Afghanistan and a hostile India. Therefore, like it or not, it is in Pakistan’s national

interest to preserve good relationships with the Taliban - all the more given the increased probability of the latter’s being

included in any peace settlement and becoming a permanent feature of Afghan political life.

As a result, Pakistan is both a perpetrator and a victim of terror. It is a perpetrator in the sense that its laissez-faire attitude

regarding the Taliban’s infiltration and use of Pakistani territory as a safe haven allows the protraction of regional instability.

Yet it is also the victim of its own negligence, as shown by the steady increase of terrorist activity inside the country and the

mounting pressure from China to tackle Islamic militancy more proactively.1

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1 Lieven, 2011

Diverging Strategies

The heart of the crisis lies in a deep-rooted divergence in policy between Pakistan and the United States. This is not to say

that they have incompatible agendas. There is little doubt that both states share the same end goal: a secure Afghanistan

and a stable region. Yet they disagree over how to reach this outcome, and over the causes of the problems within the area.

For the Americans, the reason for the International Security Assistance Force’s (NATO’s operational body in Afghanistan)

failure in defeating the Taliban lies in Pakistan. There seems to be a consensus among the US military and policy-makers that

safe havens within Pakistan’s Western provinces - left deliberately under-ruled - are the source of the Taliban’s constant

reinvigorated power.2 On the other hand, Pakistan claims that the problem lies in Afghanistan itself - in tribal and ethnic

divisions, American power politics, and Karzai’s corrupt government. For Pakistan, sanctuaries are a consequence, not a

cause, of the insurgency. Although this looks like wishful thinking, it is true that the United States’ deeply revisionist agenda,

protracted presence and hazardous strategy in Afghanistan have helped strengthen the insurgency from the inside. Indeed,

because the American presence is being perceived as an occupation, it induces rejection from the population.3

Additionally, there seems to be some inconsistency between the American official discourse of ‘ongoing progress’, and the

reality on the ground which is far more complex. This reflects divisions within the American administration and army. While

some administrative figures push for a political settlement and negotiations with the Taliban, others (including the military)

seem to associate reconciliation with defeat. On the one hand the US clings to the idea of military victory by escalating the

conflict and urging Pakistan to harden its policy toward the Taliban. On the other hand, Obama has started a process of

reconciliation whereby the US exhorts Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table.4 Such conflicting demands not

only damage the relationship by creating a cooperation deficit, but they also refrain and compromise the whole exit process

of ISAF from Afghanistan. As long as the US doesn’t settle for one policy Pakistan will not take the risk of losing its leverage

on the Taliban, and the much needed political space for negotiation will not be created.

'Shake Hands With the Devil': An Alliance of Strategic Necessity

When analyzing the current escalation of tensions, one has to bear in mind that both the US and Pakistan are subject to

intense domestic pressure. Upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012 have resulted in the crystallization of

discourses whereby decision makers cautiously stand their ground in order not to lose votes. Indeed, while Pakistani leaders

cannot appear to be pushed around by the US, Obama must be seen as a strong leader asserting authority over a rogue

Pakistan. These domestic priorities create a situation in which parties strengthen their arguments to conquer votes, but do

not translate them into policies for fear of losing votes.

Yet behind its hyperbolic rhetoric the US does not have much room for maneuver. Obama’s cautiously distancing himself

from General Mac Mullen’s recent comments, which openly accused Pakistan of complicity with the Haqqani terrorist

network, shows how limited the US is vis-à-vis Pakistan. Indeed, while Mac Mullen was merely expressing a widespread

American view concerning the Inter-Services Intelligence - Pakistan’s secret service - allegedly helping the Taliban by

providing them with safe havens and funding,5 the divulge of this view by a high army official was controversial. This event

further strained US-Pakistan relations, which the United States cannot afford. ISAF’s mission is, to a large extent, reliant on

air bases and supply routes coming from Pakistan for the conduct of America’s war6, and the closing of some of these key

logistical structures would have disastrous effects on the military campaign.

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2 Cornwell, 2011

3 Euronews, 2011

4 Dombay, 2011

5 Northam, 2011

6 Radin, 2011

The one leverage that the US has over Pakistan is the billions in military aid that is being poured into the coffers of the state-

and the pockets of its leaders.7 This rent is critically needed by Pakistan to keep its crumbling economy afloat, provide basic

public services and maintain its arm8 Nevertheless, the US urgently needs to stop lecturing Pakistan on its behavior and

considering its politico-military establishment to be amateurish, because Pakistan might turn its back on the West.9 In fact,

should the US continue with its intransigent stance and decide to end its military aid to Pakistan, one can safely assume that

China would fill in with more cash and fewer political demands.10 Therefore, if the US genuinely values a regional peace

settlement – in which Pakistan will have to be included – it needs to restore an acceptable level of tension with its ally. This

will in turn create the political space that is needed for negotiations with the Taliban to start. Until then, the cracks in the two

countries’ relationship will encourage spoilers to exploit these breaches and increase instability in the region.

2014

2014 is, in many aspects, a political deadline. It is the date at which Afghan forces will be ready to take control of their

country, according to reports produced by the American Department of Defense and ISAF which emphasized the successes

of the counterinsurgency. In that context the United States’ critical stance toward Pakistan may well serve as a means of

saving face during its exit process. By putting the blame on Pakistan the US creates a narrative which presents it as the

victim of spoilers, thereby justifying its exit strategy and avoiding responsibility for post-2014 troubles. The shift in the

American discourse on Pakistan can also be understood in relation to its grand strategy. While the assassination of Bin

Laden should have led to a decrease in military activity, the recent escalation of drone attacks and special operations across

the Pakistani border suggests a different story. Indeed, the framing of the conflict as ‘AfPak’ is based on the assumption that

Afghanistan cannot be secure as long as Pakistan’s homegrown terrorism is not tackled. As D. Markey from the Council of

Foreign Relations claims, “if Pakistan does not end its ties with the Haqqani network, the US will expand its unilateral actions

to destroy that network, whether Pakistan likes it or not.”11 This suggests that, through the framing of Pakistan as an enemy

unable or unwilling to control its periphery, the US is taking ownership of its national security issues. Pakistan being

perceived as an irresponsible neighbor provides justification for the 20,000 troops that will possibly remain in Afghanistan

after 2014; and Haqqani becoming the new face of the War on Terror may also legitimize an American intervention against its

host – Pakistan. The recent NATO attacks on Pakistani soil and the strong rhetoric used by Western, Pakistani and Chinese

politicians indicates that one should not take 2014 for granted.

The Spectrum | edition 02 3

7 Perkovich, 2011

8 Lodhi, 2011

9 Escobar, 2011

10 Ibid.

11 Northam, 2011

Bibliography

Cornwell, Susan.“Pakistan safe havens challenge US Afghan effort.” Reuters. Last modified October 28, 2011. http://

www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/28/us-usa-afghanistan- idUSTRE79R5O520111028.

Escobar, Pepe. “Do the China Pakistan pipeline shuffle.” Al Jazeera. Last modified May 27, 2011. http://www.aljazeera.com/

indepth/opinion/2011/05/2011527104451497291.html.

Euronews. Afghans Protest Against US Occupation. Last modified October 6, 2011. http:// www.euronews.com/

2011/10/06/afghans-protest-against-us-occupation/.

Dombay, Daniel. “Obama presses for Afghan Taliban talks.” Financial Times. Last modified May 22, 2011. http://

www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d92fa222-846c-11e0- afcb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1paIngO3o.

Kronstadt, K. Alan. “Pakistan-US Relations.” Congressional Research Service. Last modified July 1, 2009. http://

fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/68795.pdf.

Lieven, Anatol. “China is Key to America’s Endgame.” New York Times. Last modified May 25, 2011. http://

www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/opinion/26iht-edlieven26.html.

Lodhi, Maleeha. “Lecture at Kings College University.” Paper presented at King's College London November 14, 2011.

Northam, Jackie. “Fragile US-Pakistan Relations on Downward Spiral.” npr. Last modified September 26, 2011. http://

www.npr.org/2011/09/26/140791165/fragile-u-s-pakistan-relations-on- downward-spiral.

Perkovich, George. “Changing the Direction of US-Pakistan relations.” Los Angeles Times. Last modified September 19,

2011. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/19/opinion/la-oe-perkovich- pakistan-20110919.

Radin, C.J. “Analysis: The US-Pakistan Relationship and the Critical Factor of Supply.” The Long War Journal. Last modified

December 4, 2011. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/us_pakistani_relatio.php.

The Spectrum | edition 02 4

Would a Nuclear Iran Destabilise the Middle East?Philip Lewis

The Middle East’s strategic system provides a complex and unstable environment of unresolved political

disputes.1 This instability and complexity are compounded when examining nuclear weapons in the

region due to the limited geographic space between states and the concentration of rival populations.2 This proximity has two consequences. First, it makes containing a nuclear strike within one country almost

impossible and would inevitably draw in other states into a nuclear conflict. Second, it may force nuclear powers to launch their weapons only when they have a warning of an attack rather than an attack itself.3

Both of which lower the threshold within the region for the outbreak of nuclear war. Iran becoming nuclear

would thus increase the possibility of the vulnerabilities of the region’s strategic system being exposed.

At the outset, a nuclear Iran would only be opposed by Israel in a superficially similar binary as the Cold War. Nevertheless,

this would be destabilising as Israel has a strategic culture of prevention and pre-emption and believes that a nuclear Iran

poses an existential threat to its existence.4 By allowing Iran to gain a nuclear weapon Israel’s nuclear and military strategy

would have to alter. The Israeli image of an irrational Iran, its strategy of military superiority and military over diplomatic

means, and Israel’s own image in the region would all have to change if a nuclear Iran came into being.5 A nuclear Iran would

undermine Israel’s strategic norms, particularly the Begin Doctrine whereby it is Israeli policy to prevent other Middle Eastern

states gaining nuclear weapons. It is thus not only Iran’s actions that will destabilise the region but also the reactions of its

neighbours including Israel that will generate a new untested and unplanned for strategic dynamic within an already unstable

region with nuclear weapons now in play.

The main, if not the only, danger, in this regard, of a nuclear Iran would thus be the impact it would have on its non-nuclear

neighbours. A number of states have explored nuclear weapons in the past and there are a large number presently exploring

or intending to explore civilian nuclear energy.6 The most likely candidate to attempt to gain nuclear weapons is Saudi

Arabia, who would see a nuclear Iran as a direct challenge to its prestige and authority. Saudi Arabia has already taken some

steps in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability and there is some confusion surrounding quite what took place when then-

Crown Prince Abdullah travelled to Pakistan in October 2003.7 If Saudi Arabia was to gain nuclear weapons this could lead

to a spiral of regional nuclear weapons acquisition. The Gulf States would also then have the unenviable position of being

between a nuclear Iran and a nuclear Saudi Arabia who would be working to enhance their political and military domination

of the Persian Gulf.

The Spectrum | edition 02 5

1 Sayigh, 1993, 179 & 202

2 Ibid. 182

3 Edelman et al., 2011, 72

4 Ibid. 68

5 Adamsky, 2011, 159

6 Fitzpatrick, 2008, 72; Edelman et al., 2011, 69

7 Russell, 2005, 32-33

Although the Gulf States have the financial means to acquire nuclear weapons they may find it difficult to find a willing

provider due to the US’s reaction.8 Nevertheless, states such as the UAE who are acutely threatened by Iran and have an

ongoing territorial dispute with it, or Qatar, which has asserted itself strongly on the global diplomatic stage during the Arab

Spring, may feel that in response to a multipolar nuclear Middle East they must follow the trend. In this light, it is difficult to

see Egypt with its historic role and continued aspirations for regional pre-eminence not considering building on its previous

nuclear work. Whilst, the other regional power, Turkey, is increasingly coming into conflict with Iran over its policies on Syria

and Iraq.

The Middle East, furthermore, has a history of arms races where states have competed to achieve strategic superiority and

have used weapons of mass destruction as a legitimate means of warfare.9 The region’s multiple and diverse actors is

contrary to the pattern of superpower confrontation that marked the Cold War, undermining the game theory assumptions of

mutually assured destruction. If a nuclear Iran caused regional proliferation it would raise the instability inherent within the

Middle Eastern system, which is already characterised by political dispute, military conflict and arms races in a limited

geographic space that places states within easy striking distance of each other, to a new plateau at which its own

destruction was now squarely on the table.

The threat of nuclear proliferation may force the US to offer an extended nuclear deterrence umbrella across the region so as

to convince states not to follow Iran. This, however, has no guarantee that it will succeed and it would be difficult to project

conceptually and operationally. Conceptually, the US would struggle to offer a full-scale nuclear deterrent to Arab States who

perceive Israel as much as a threat as Iran. For Arab States therefore any US nuclear deterrent would from the beginning be

flawed and incomplete. Operationally, there is, first, little agreement on what this extended deterrence and its consequent

containment would entail and it is has been ruled out as a policy that is being planned for by President Obama.10 Second, if

three successive US Presidents have said that a nuclear Iran is a major US security threat but have allowed that outcome to

take place it is unclear how confident regional leaders will be in the US’s commitment to extended deterrence on their

behalf.11 Finally, the very act of providing extended deterrence will bind the US to the Middle Eastern strategic system more

strongly. 12 This will not only raise the risks and costs of a long term US presence there but also enhance the possibilities of

confrontation with Iran through the necessity of its more active, open and direct opposition to its drive for regional hegemony.

With its belligerent rhetoric and eschatological and millennial ideology some are convinced that Iran would welcome a

nuclear conflict or at least be prone to considerable risk taking.13 Nevertheless, Iran’s historical record suggests its leaders

are rational actors. In its foreign policy Iran has generally tried to avoid direct conflict. This does not mean that underneath its

nuclear umbrella Iran will not feel emboldened to act more aggressively. The fear within the region will be that Iran will feel a

degree of insulation from retaliatory attack that will translate into an aggressive foreign policy. Nevertheless, this fear requires

Iran to successfully leverage its nuclear weapons for strategic advantage which other nuclear states have found exceptionally

difficult to manage.

According to the US Energy Information Administration 17 million barrels of oil passed through the Strait every day in 2011,

which is equivalent to around 35% of all seaborne traded oil.14 There are thus fears that Iran would be able to disrupt the

Strait and cause vast disruption to the world economy through utilising its stockpiles of mines, torpedoes, rockets, anti-ship

The Spectrum | edition 02 6

8 Russell, 2005, 34-35

9 Sayigh, 1993, 185-88, 194-95

10 Lindsay and Takeyh, 2010, 43; Rubin, 2010, 163-66; Obama, 2012

11 Edelman et al., 2011, 76

12 Eisenstadt, 1999, 134

13 Rubin, 2010, 164

14 IISS, 2012, 1

missiles, submarines and fast attack craft.15 This is, however, far from the case. First, Iran is completely reliant on the Strait

for the export of its own oil supplies, which constitute around 70% of its revenue.16 Any disruption of the flow of traffic in the

Strait would seriously damage Iran’s already fragile economy that has suffered under years of sanctions that are becoming

increasingly harsher. Second, although Iran may be able to close the Strait for a period of time this would be a short period.

The US Fifth Fleet is based in the Strait and is far more capable than any force Iran has, which was apparent during the July

1987-December 1988 Tanker War and a similar outcome would be expected today.17 Additionally, at present the sanctions

against Iran have increased the oil price to around a ten-month high.18 It appears that the markets are pricing in, to an

extent, the impact of an increasingly unstable regional environment and the possibility of oil supply disruption.

A similar analysis is apparent with the argument that a nuclear Iran would strengthen Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran has

undoubtedly given substantial financial, training, logistical and military support to both.19 Hezbollah has also expressed

loyalty to the Iranian Supreme Leader.20 It is, however, highly unlikely that Iran would ever pass a nuclear device to either, as

it would leave its destiny’s in other’s hands. Furthermore, the popular uprising in Syria has seriously impaired Iran’s ability to

resupply Hezbollah in Lebanon and has led Hamas to depart from its Damascus base and place itself in opposition to the

Syrian regime, which it has openly acknowledged has displeased Iran. Hezbollah also has considerable autonomy from Iran

with significant disagreements in a growing process of Lebanonisation of the organisation.21 The growing distance between

Hamas and Iran and the problems Iran faces due to the situation in Syria in supporting Hezbollah mean that Iran’s desire and

ability to strengthen both has been significantly reduced.

The Spectrum | edition 02 7

15 Ibid. 2

16 IISS, 2012, 1

17 Ibid. 2

18 Gardner, 2012

19 El Husseini, 2010, 809-10, 93-94

20 Ibid. 809

21 Ibid. 807

Bibliography

Edelman, Eric S.; Kreinevch, Andrew F.; Montgomery, Evan Braden. “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of

Containment.” Foreign Affairs 90:1 (2011) 66-81.

Eisenstadt, Michael. “Living with a Nuclear Iran?” Survival 41:3 (1999) 124-48. El Husseini, Rola. “Hezbollah and the Axis of

Refusal: Hamas, Iran Syria.” Third World Quarterly,

31:5 (2010) 803-815.

Fitzpatrick, Mark. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis. Abingdon: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008.

Gardner, Timothy. “Western Sanctions Tighten Squeeze on Iran Oil Exports.” Reuters. Last modified March 1, 2012. http://

uk.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/uk-iran-oil- idUKTRE8200D620120301.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s Disruptive Military Options” IISS Strategic Comments

18:3 (2012) 1-3.

Kaye, Dalia Dassa and Wehrey, Frederic M. “A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbours.” Survival: Global Politics and

Strategy 49:2 (2007) 111-128.

Lindsay, James M. and Takeyh, Ray. “After Iran Gets the Bomb: Containment and Its Complications.” Foreign Affairs 89:2

(2010) 33-49.

Rubin, Barry. “The Right Kind of Containment.” Foreign Affairs 89:4 (2010) 163-166.

Russell, Richard L. “Arab Security Responses to a Nuclear-Ready Iran.” In Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, edited by

Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson. Strategic Studies Institute (2005) www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/

display.cfm?pubid=629.

Sayigh, Yezid. “Middle Eastern Stability and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” In

Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East: Tackling the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological

Capabilities, edited by Efraim Karsh, Martin S Navias and Philip Sabin. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Obama, Barack. “Transcript of Obama’s AIPAC Speech.” Politico. Last modified March 3, 2012. Available at http://

www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73588.html.

The Spectrum | edition 02 8

How to Avoid another Mistake in Iran

Alireza Shams Lahijani

The issue of Iran’s nuclear program is once again dominating the news. Iranian officials faced

representatives of five permanent members of United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P-5+1) in Istanbul to discuss the future of Iran’s nuclear program. Both sides agreed to continue negotiations to find

a resolution on May 2 in Baghdad, which is a breakthrough.

Ever since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran that toppled a Western ally, the United States has pursued policies mainly

focused at containment and regime change while Europe initially sought constructive dialogue but in recent years was

persuaded by Americans to join in efforts of pressuring Iran.

If the West wants to control Iran, it must rethink its strategy and understand its relationship with Iran for last thirty years that

strengthened roots of mistrust that were created with memories of coup, historical interferences, hostage crisis, covert

operations, contradictory moves and empty promises. Iran is negotiating with America, China, France, Germany, Russia and

the United Kingdom but there is no doubt that the destiny of any negotiation is upon Iran. Reaching any deal with Iran needs

confidence building measures from both sides and the deal must not be simplified to a nuclear program but it must embrace

a comprehensive approach to counter political and strategic differences.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Iranian administration issued a condolence and the Iranian public was among the few - if not the

only - Middle Eastern nation that held a public ceremony mourning the death of the people. Then Iran assisted the US and

its allies in attacking against Afghanistan and managing Afghanistan after the war1 without receiving any conciliatory signs

from the US and instead being labeled as an axis of evil alongside Iraq and North Korea.2 Iranian officials - with the exception

of the Supreme Leader - were surprised by this move. After 2002, Iran briefly cooperated with the US in Iraq and cooperated

with the International Atomic Energy Agency by opening up its civil and military facilities to inspection and implementing

additional protocols.

When Barack Obama took office in America, there was renewed hope for engagement and diplomacy with Iran. He called

upon Iran to unclench its fist and Iran’s Leader responded by saying verbal change is not enough3 and asked for conciliatory

actions such as removal of sanctions. Now, with three years of Obama in office, Iran has faced more sanctions to weaken

the Islamic Republic and force it to negotiate. The tone of the Obama administration changed from one seeking diplomacy to

The Spectrum | edition 02 9

1 There are various accounts for this particular incident of cooperation; the Bush administration’s special envoy for Afghani-

stan gives a unique insight on how Iran facilitated government formation in Afghanistan: James, 2010, 149-62

2 Bush, 2002

3 Khamenei, 2012

one calling for weakening the Iranian regime and being a bystander in terror of Iranian nuclear scientists conducted by

Israel4.

Which Policy to Use for Iran?

There is no magic formula that can undo past mistakes, erase memories of mistrust, and be applied to normalize Iran. There

is one underlying symptom that can be diagnosed for failure of every single policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that is

lack of confidence on both sides. Any policy on Iran needs to clearly understand Iranian leadership, its agenda and goals.

For years, Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei has been consistent on the nuclear program and being against a nuclear weapon. As

recent as February, he made Iran’s intention clear in a major foreign policy speech: “The Iranian nation has never pursued

and will never pursue nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the decision makers in the countries opposing us know well

that Iran is not after nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the

possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and

dangerous.”5 Also it must be noted that Western and Israeli intelligence communities are in disagreement over Iran’s so

called weapon program. Iran’s Leader believes that the West is looking for excuses to challenge Iran and weaken it, and its

nuclear civil program is an excuse.

For confidence building, United States and its allies must accept existence of Iran as a regional power and stop fantasying

about regime change in Iran. Unlike what has been portrayed in alarmist media, Iran is a rational actor. Iran always stated

interest in comprehensive talks and long term cooperation on areas such as security, while West wanted a discussion limited

to nuclear program.

The threat of war against Iran should stop. Some might argue for the success of any strike on Iran for destroying facilities

and infrastructure, but it has been widely doubted given the geography of Iran and location of its facilities. Moreover, the

Western intelligence community cannot predict the extent or nature of Iran’s retaliation: would it be limited to the Middle East

or will it be extended to other regions? But there is no doubt that any attack on Iran will have profound impact on future of

Middle East. Those supporting an attack against Iran must think twice: Iran is not Iraq. From an economic perspective, the

direct and indirect costs of war is not something America or any other country wants to inherit in the current economic

climate. From a theoretical perspective, the threat of war might be counterproductive as it has been hypothesized “if a

country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests”6 and of

course the success of military operations cannot be guaranteed. Also there is a misconception that an attack on Iran might

be welcomed by Iranians but the West must notice that with deep religious and nationalistic roots within the Iranian society,

any attack would strengthen national and religious passion to combat.

Iran is threatened by the US and more pressure on Iran would lead Iran to maintain some sort of deterrence that is in

contradiction with the desired outcome of an American and European strategy7.

The West must change its agenda on Iran. Rather than defining its policy on Iran with coercive elements, it must pursue a

more cooperative policy with priority on the nuclear issue and including bilateral, international and regional issues. In shaping

such a policy, the West must understand its wrong perceptions about Iranian society and the Iranian elite. While there are

certain criticisms within the Iranian society, and political cleavages, the Iranian nuclear issue is regarded as a source of pride

and a symbol of Iranian development since the Islamic Revolution - maybe among the few issues that all political factions are

The Spectrum | edition 02 10

4 From 2007, attacks were conducted in Iran which killed five Iranian nuclear scientists and possibly a military sight. Two

officials from the Obama administration revealed the administration awareness of the assassination campaign directed by

Israel: Richard and Windrem, 2012

5 Press TV, 2012

6 Betts et al, 2012

7 Ibid.

in consensus with each other about. For the last thirty years, Iran faced sanctions and did not back down. And sanctions will

not force Iran to abandon its nuclear program.

Another important factor in policy design on Iran is to acknowledge its regional power. Any engagement from the US with

Iran would not be welcomed by Arab allies in the region, namely Saudi Arabia due to historical and geopolitical issues that

Iran is perceived as a threat. This very issue has been proven by recent moves from Iran.

Just two days before the P-5+1 meeting in Istanbul, Iran’s President symbolically traveled to the Island of Abu Musa that has

been disputed by the UAE.8 With the trip Iran signaled its dominance in the Persian Gulf and its neighbors cannot confront

Iran without foreign support – Iran established its dominance without making any direct move against the United States.

These policies must be accompanied by a paradigm shift that can lead to the gaining of trust for both sides. Recent

sanctions and pressures have proved to escalate the situation into war-talk without any benefits. Rather than combating

each other, both sides should manage contradictions not just for the sake of their relationships but for broader regional and

international security.

Bibliography

Betts, Richard K.; Sagan, Scott; Waltz, Kenneth. “A nuclear Iran: Promoting stability or courting disaster?”Journal of

International Affairs 60:2 (2007)

Bush, George W. State Of The Union Address. Transcript from speech delivered January 29, 2002. http://

stateoftheunionaddress.org/2002-george-w-bush.

Dobbins, James. "Negotiating with Iran: Reflections from Personal Experience." The Washington Quarterly 33:1 (2010).

149-62.

Engel, Richard, and Robert Windrem. "Israel teams with terror group to kill Iran's nuclear scientists, U.S. officials tell NBC

News." Rock Center, NBC. Last modified Febuary 9, 2012. http://rockcenter.msnbc.msn.com/_news/

2012/02/08/10354553-israel-teams-with-terror-group-to-kill-irans-nuclear-scientists-us-officials-tell-nbc-news.

Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali. Supreme Leader’s Speech in Mashhad. Transcript of speech delivered March 21, 2009. http://

english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1076&Itemid=4.

PressTv. Iran will never seek nuclear weapons: Leader. Last modified February 22, 2012. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/

228014.html.

The Spectrum | edition 02 11

8 Abu Musa is an island with an area of only about 13 square kilometers, part of an Iranian Southern province with a popula-

tion of less than 2,000 in a strategic position in the Persian Gulf at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. Three years after the

establishment of the UAE, UAE disputed ownership of this island among two others. This dispute has been the source of

tension between Iran and its Arab neighbors but after Ahmadinejad’s visit, this tension was heightened followed by Iranian

military commanders’ rhetoric against UAE. There are about 3,000 Iranian troops on the island.

Is Terrorism a Continued Cause for the War in Afghanistan?

Steve Townsley

Countering the threat of terrorism continues to be used as justification for the on-going UK military

operation in Afghanistan. We are approaching the 11th anniversary of the conflict, one which has cost over 400 British lives and an estimated 12,500 – 14,700 civilian lives,1 as well as in excess of £20billion. The

question now has to be asked: how relevant is terrorism as a cause for the war in Afghanistan? The original purpose for the UK contribution to the US-led post 9/11 intervention in Afghanistan was, to

paraphrase Tony Blair, about bringing Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders to justice and eliminating the

terrorist threat they posed.2 Counter-terrorism and protecting UK National Security were central factors in the decision to deploy troops. The plan was simple: destroy al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and remove the

Taliban from power.

However if we fast forward ten years to the present, we can see that while the justification remains the same, the mission

has evolved into a full counter-insurgency campaign.3 Prime Minister David Cameron said in June 2010 that “we are there

because the Afghans are not yet ready to keep their own country safe and to keep terrorists and terrorist training camps out

of their country.”4 The statements from both Prime Ministers show the gradual development of the Afghanistan war from

counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency, which demonstrates how the justifications for the war have experienced ‘mission

creep’.5 This article will argue that countering the threat of terrorism is no longer a cause for UK involvement in the war in

Afghanistan. It will justify this firstly through two claims: that al-Qaeda has been disrupted and has dispersed from

Afghanistan, and that our actions in Afghanistan will not defeat the Al-Qaeda ideology that is so vital to the organisation.

Secondly, this article will question if it is possible to contain the threat of terrorism without having a large presence in

Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda Have Been Disrupted and Dispersed

It is important, when considering our continued mission in Afghanistan, to understand that the original reason for the

deployment was to deny terrorists the use of safe havens. These are defined in the US Country Reports on Terrorism 2010

as “ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds,

communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will,

or both.”6 Some of the perpetrators of 9/11 were known to have trained in Afghanistan, as were several other high profile

The Spectrum | edition 02 12

1 Crawford, 2011, 1

2 Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011, 76.

3 US doctrine describes COIN countering an insurgency, which is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a

constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02).

4 Collins, 2010

5 Mission creep is defined by the US military as the expansion of a mission beyond its original goals, often after initial suc-

cesses.

6 U.S. Department of State, 2009, 1

terrorists.7 The Taliban were embroiled in this as they gave sanctuary to Al-Qaeda, which made them a legitimate target at

the time.

The war in Afghanistan is no longer deterring al-Qaeda based terrorism. This is predominantly because although the groups’

presence in the country has diminished significantly, and they have simply relocated to other parts of the world. This was

recognised in the UK Foreign Affairs Committee’s 2011 report The UK’s Foreign Policy Approach to Afghanistan and

Pakistan. The report claimed that the original justification for the continued presence in Afghanistan, which was in the

interests of national security, may have already been achieved.8 The report also cites a speech in September 2010 by the

Director General of the Security Service,9 Jonathan Evans, who when referring to the threat from al-Qaeda only mentioned

the tribal areas of Pakistan.10 In October 2009 the US National Security Advisor James Jones said that the “'maximum

estimate' of al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan itself was less than 100 and there were no Al-Qaeda bases there.”11 Lastly, the

UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, recognised in its July 2011 review that the majority of terrorist plots against the

UK have emanated from Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia,12 but not Afghanistan. Certainly the US Army soldier Nidal Malik

Hasan,13 who shot and killed 13 people at the Fort Hood army base in the United States, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,

the Detroit underwear bomber,14 were both radicalised by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – the Yemen based Al-Qaeda

franchise – and had no connections to Afghanistan.

These factors considered, there is a strong argument that al-Qaeda attacks are no longer planned from Afghanistan. The

hypothesis that Al-Qaeda no longer operates in Afghanistan makes sense, as it is likely that military action against them

would have had the effect of squeezing them out of the country. Indeed, it was very telling that Osama Bin Laden was

eventually located in Pakistan, and that the head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, is also believed to be in Northern Pakistan. We

can see further evidence of this theory with investigation of the London 7/7 bombers. Bruce Hoffman highlights how none of

the bombers had ever fought in a contemporary Muslim conflict, nor had they received any training in Afghanistan.15 Both

the ringleaders travelled to Pakistan to conduct training, and then recruited extra members for their cell from inside the UK.16

The 7/7 attacks show that using terrorism as a cause for war can even be counterproductive, as one of the bombers,

Shehzad Tanweer, listed the presence of British forces in Afghanistan as a motivation for his attack.17 These factors

contribute to the argument that terrorism is no longer a continued cause for the war in Afghanistan.

War in Afghanistan Will Not Tackle the Ideology

Fighting in Afghanistan will not defeat the terrorist ideology. The business model of al-Qaeda was resilient enough to survive

the war against it in Afghanistan. This resilience was noted in a 2012 RAND report on the status of al-Qaeda, which

explained that “whether al Qaeda is in its third decade or third century matters little to its leaders, who see the current

conflict as the continuation of centuries of armed struggle between believers and infidels, and who expect it to transcend

The Spectrum | edition 02 13

7 The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, 225

8 Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011, 77

9 Also known as MI5.

10 Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011, 77

11 Ibid.

12 Home Office, 2011, 48

13 Ibid. 25

14 Ibid. 29

15 Hoffman, 2007, 425

16 Ibid.

17 The Guardian, 2006

their lifetimes.”18 Furthermore, the report explains that although their central leadership has been “pummelled”,19 al-Qaeda is

now more dependent on its affiliates and its ability to radicalise and recruit members to conduct attacks on its behalf.20

These affiliates were recognised in the 2011 review of the UK’s counter-terrorism CONTEST strategy, which named groups

such as 'Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula', based in Yemen, and al-Shabab based in Somalia.21 Such groups continue to

spread Jihadist propaganda, thus ensuring a continuation of al-Qaeda based radicalisation. This raises the question: how

can al-Qaeda continue to communicate internally, as well as reach out to new members, if they are deprived of the safe

haven of Afghanistan? The internet offers a moderately secure platform for this activity, and provides these groups with a

vast array of resources.22 One example of this online radicalisation is the 'al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula' publication

Inspire which, as well as spreading the jihadist message in a “colourful, professionally produced online magazine”,23 provides

advice on bomb making. It is through online sources such as Inspire that lone-wolf24 terrorism can spawn, with individuals

becoming self-radicalised through reading such material.25 This threat has been recognised in the UK, following incidents

such as the attempted murder of the MP Stephen Timms in May 2010, where the motive was revenge for his voting in favour

of the Iraq war. The perpetrator – Roshonara Choudhry, a student from King’s College London26 - had had no contact with

other terrorists, and had in effect been self-radicalised.27 These collective points considered, it could be argued that the war

in Afghanistan cannot defeat terrorist ideology as it does not address its root causes, such as the historic continuation of

armed struggle; thus it is difficult to justify the continued cause of the war as being about defeating terrorism.

We Can Contain Terrorism Through Other Methods

If terrorism is not a cause for war in Afghanistan what should be done? The UK CONTEST strategy outlines the four pillars of

UK counter-terrorism as Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare.28 Under the Pursue pillar – which is the most relevant when

referring to the war in Afghanistan – the UK is encouraged to work further with “other countries and multilateral organisations

to enable us to better tackle the threats we face at their source”.29 This could be realised by sharing of intelligence with allies

in order to effect disruptions of terrorist cells overseas. Indeed the US has experienced considerable success with their

campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, as well as the assassination of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan

(notwithstanding accusations of collateral damage and the killing of innocent civilians). One particular example of this was the

killing, in September 2011, of Anwar an-Awlaki, the head of 'Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula'. President Obama

described the death as “a major blow to al-Qaeda's most active operational affiliate [given that an-Awlaki took] the lead in

planning and directing efforts to murder innocent Americans”.30 If the UK could contribute to, or conduct its own targeted

strikes, either using aircraft or Special Forces, then it could mitigate the need for troops to be in Afghanistan in the numbers

The Spectrum | edition 02 14

18 Jenkins, 2012, 9

19 Ibid. 10

20 Hoffman, 2007, 10

21 Home Office, 2011, 10

22 Ibid. 34

23 Torok, 2010, 57

24 A lone-wolf is described by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence as an “individual

pursuing [...] terrorist goals alone, either driven by personal reasons or their belief that they are part of an ideological group”.

25 Torok, 2010, 57

26 The Guardian, 2010

27 Pamtucci, 2011, 18

28 Home Office, 2011, 10

29 Ibid. 46

30 Obama, 2011

which they are today. Of course it is important that Afghanistan does not return to being a failed state and a terrorist safe

haven once troops withdraw in 2014, but this risk could potentially be reduced by properly training and equipping the Afghan

National Security Forces (ANSF). (This is easier said than done, and the several examples of ANSF infiltrating the Taliban and

turning their weapons on British forces are a case in point.) However if this were successful then it would enable them to

conduct the majority of counter-terrorism work on the UK's behalf.

A further example of this Pursue strand of CONTEST is the UK government investing in “developing the capability and

capacity of our overseas partners”.31 While it is unclear what this actually entails, it is likely to include the training and

equipping of friendly states where those terrorists groups that target UK interests are active. There is evidence that the UK is

implementing this strategy in Pakistan; however in June 2011 the British team of military advisors who were training the

Pakistan border police (presumably in counter-terrorism) were expelled as a consequence of the Bin Laden raid.32 Although

the success of this strand of counter-terrorism is difficult to measure, and there is no data publicly available, the question has

to be asked: if the UK's forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan, could they be more effective in countering the threat of

terrorism by conducting this type of overseas training? It is strategies such as these that suggest our presence in

Afghanistan is no longer required, as they suggest the possiblity that the objective of disrupting terrorism can be

accomplished through other means.

Conclusion

This article has argued that terrorism is not a continued cause for the war in Afghanistan through three points. Firstly, al-

Qaeda have been disrupted and dispersed from the country. This analysis has been reiterated by the Foreign Affairs

Committee and several high profile counter-terrorism practitioners. Al-Qaeda has continued to operate from other countries

which are either fragile or failed states, and they have had moderate success in persisting with their Fatwa against the West.

Secondly, the British operation in Afghanistan will not destroy the terrorist ideology. Al-Qaeda consider the current conflict to

be hundreds of years old, and merely removing them from Afghanistan – although it has damaged the organisation – will not

stop it from spreading its propaganda, continuing attacks, and furthering its cause. They are already continuing this through

online radicalisation, which is feeding and enabling lone-wolf terrorism. Lastly, it is possible to contain terrorism through other

means and the Pursue pillar of the UK’s CONTEST strategy advocates working with multilateral organisations to tackle

terrorism. The US has demonstrated a level of success with their drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere, and the UK has

deployed teams in Pakistan to assist in the training of their border guards. All these factors considered, terrorism is not a

continued cause for British involvement in the war in Afghanistan. The sooner this is realised by policy makers, the sooner

we can stop the increasing death toll and suffering experienced on all sides, and learn a valuable lesson for the future.

The Spectrum | edition 02 15

31 Home Office, 2011, 48

32 Woods and Walsh, 2011

Bibliography

Crawford, Neta. Civilian Death and Injury in Afghanistan, 2001-2011. Boston University, 2011.

Hoffman, Bruce. “From the War on Terror to Global Counterinsurgency.” Current History 105:695 (2007). http://

www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=440.

Home Office. CONTEST - The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. London: Home Office, 2011.

Foreign Affairs Committee. “The UK’s Foreign Policy Approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Parliament UK. Accessed

February 2011. http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/

inquiries1/parliament-2010/afghanistan-and-pakistan/.

Jenkins, Brian. “Al-Qaeda in its Third Decade – Irreversible Decline or Imminent Victory?” RAND Corporation. Last modified

2012. www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP362.pdf.

Pamtucci, Raffaello. “A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists.” The International Centre

for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Last modified March 2011. http://icsr.info/publications/papers/

1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_Pantucci.pdf.

Obama, Barack. “President Obama Welcomes New Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” The White House Blog. Last

modified September 30, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/09/30/president-obama-welcomes-new-chairman-

joint-chiefs-staff.

The 9/11 Commission Report. “2004 Report.” The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the US. Last modified

2004. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm.

Collins, Nick. “David Cameron's tribute to British soldiers in Afghanistan.” The Daily Telegraph. Last modified June 21, 2010.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/7843118/David-Camerons-tribute-to-British-soldiers-in-

Afghanistan.html.

Woods, Chris and Walsh, Declan. “Pakistan expels British trainers of anti-Taliban soldiers.” The Guardian. Last modified June

26, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/26/pakistan-expels-trainers-anti-taliban-soldiers.

The Guardian. Roshonara Choudhry: Police interview extract. Last modified November 3, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/

uk/2010/nov/03/roshonara-choudhry-police-interview.

The Guardian. Video of London bomber released. Last modified July 6, 2006. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/jul/06/

july7.uksecurity1.

Torok, Robyn. “'Make a Bomb in your Mums Kitchen': Cyber Recruiting and Socialisation of ‘White Moors’ and Home Grown

Jihadists.” Australian Counter Terrorism Conference. Last modified 2010. http://ro.ecu.edu.au/act/.

U.S. Department of State.“Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens and Tactics and Tools for Disrupting or Eliminating Safe Havens.”

Country Reports on Terrorism. Last modified August 5, 2010. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140891.htm.

The Spectrum | edition 02 16

An Evaluation of CONTEST’S Prevent Strategy

Kathryn Hale

The Prevent arm of the Home Office’s 2006 and 2009 CONTEST strategies has been subject to intense

criticism by scholars, who have argued that the strategy has been counterproductive; for example, its aims have not been clear, and it has singled out Muslim communities (see Thomas, 2010; Stevens, 2011; and

Gutowski, 2011). The latest 2011 CONTEST strategy has attempted to address such concerns; this essay will consider the limits of Prevent’s approach to combating the pathways into terrorism with regard to

terrorist motivation, and will also explore some of the issues raised in regards to its understanding of

certain issues. This essay will then suggest some improvements that would render the strategy more effective in countering terrorism.

CONTEST’s Prevent strategy focuses on what is, essentially, a re-education initiative implemented in a variety of ways.

Extremist ideas will be challenged through open debate; through using theologians and communities to explain why

extremist texts justifying terrorism are wrong; and through working to counter the claims made in extremist propaganda

about British foreign policy as well as police departments.1 Central to this is the importance of a successful integration

strategy that empowers communities to mobilise against terrorist ideology by marginalising and isolating extremists.2 The

implicit assumption behind these initiatives is that individuals become radicalised and progress into terrorist activity because

they are misguided and that, as such, education is key to de-radicalisation. This is problematic, and arguably does not reach

the root cause of individual extremist beliefs. The use of theologians in the CONTEST strategy implies that jihadist terrorism

is primarily religiously motivated, rather than being a political activity expressed within the narrative framework of religion.

While some individuals will inevitably be drawn towards terrorist activity purely through an extremist interpretation of the

Koran, it would be mistaken to ignore politics when considering why many individuals are drawn towards terrorism. However,

CONTEST does not address the political incentives for terrorism, instead arguing that radicals exploit “real or perceived”

grievances, such as “the perception of our foreign policy, the experience of Islamophobia and a broader view that the west is

at war with Islam.”3

There are issues with this strategy at the community level. It seems to be assumed that Muslim communities do not share

the same grievances as those radicalised. Such grievances may take the forms of social, political and economic

marginalisation or prejudice, or outrage at British foreign policy. In this context, it might not be appropriate to encourage

communities to argue that the aims of terrorist groups are distinct from, and not beneficial to, its constituents, and to

marginalise the groups on this basis. A second issue is the assumption that terrorism is a community problem, and is related

to integration issues. Biographical evidence of the July 2005 London bombers suggests that these individuals were not

inadequately integrated.4 Despite Prevent’s promise that it does not view communities as in need of being convinced that

terrorism is wrong,5 this perspective nonetheless implicitly implies that Muslim communities have a duty to root out terrorists-

more of a duty, perhaps, than other communities or movements whose fringes espouse radical ideologies, such as

environmental or animal rights groups, or right-wing extremists.

The Spectrum | edition 02 17

1 Home Office, 2011, 59-61

2 Ibid. 60-62

3 Ibid. 60

4 Brighton, 2007, 2 and Githens-Mazer, 2008, 554

5 Home Office, 2011, 60

The international elements of Prevent are also problematic. According to the CONTEST publication, Prevent will be

“implemented in conjunction with communities here and overseas, who are often better able than the Government to

disprove the claims made by terrorists and to challenge their views.”6 This implies that terrorist narrative is provably false;

however, the undeniable suffering of Muslims- and many others- around the world would suggest otherwise. Furthermore

this strategy will not be successful unless the Government chooses which voices from those international communities are

used, in order to ensure that extremist ideologies are not inadvertently propounded. However, this then ultimately becomes a

top-down rather than grass-roots influence on societies, which contradicts the community “empowerment and mobilisation”

motif central to Prevent.

Such issues need to be addressed at both community and Government levels. Context is of crucial importance, and

therefore CONTEST is correct to emphasise the need for community involvement in preventing terrorism. Local authorities

are best placed to observe community dynamics and tensions; these can then be communicated to the Government so that

common trends can be identified. Promoting integration is an important element in this process. More important, however, is

identifying ethnic and religious tensions present in community relations as well as on a wider national scale in general.7 Laws

addressing freedom and equality of religion are related to these issues; the contradictions within these laws need to be

addressed in order to help dispel the perception that Muslims are given preferential treatment over other religious believers.8

On a related note, it is essential that the police demonstrate the same vigilance in cracking down on right wing extremist

groups as they do on nonviolent Islamist radical groups; the perception that nonviolent Islamist groups are targeted while

intolerant right wing groups are given more freedom may solidify the narrative that the West is against Islam.

The above recommendations range from the local to the Government level. It is also important for the Government to

employ a different strategy to counter extremist narratives. It is not enough to attempt to simply disprove terrorist narrative

on issues such as foreign policy and the West’s alleged 'war' against Islam. Prevent’s strategy is to challenge ideas

conducive to terrorism by ensuring such ideas and narratives are subject to open debate;9 while this is important, more

progress might be made if the Government actually engaged with the grievances embedded in such ideologies. This would

comprise actions such as acknowledging responsibility for the suffering for which British policies and actions are responsible,

recognising past mistakes and endeavouring to adapt future policy accordingly. This may address the grievances of those

vulnerable to radicalisation, and undermine the legitimacy of terrorist ideology by demonstrating that the British Government

is not persecuting Muslims. It is hoped that this step would also encourage disaffected individuals to choose to work within

legal parameters to have their voices heard, and to have an effect on the future.

As demonstrated by this discussion, an understanding of why and how individuals become involved in terrorist activity is

foundational to counterterrorist efforts. A wealth of research has been conducted on the issue by terrorism studies scholars,

which have yielded a number of relevant results which could be incorporated into policy. For example, F.M. Moghaddam

illustrates the importance of the perception of available options and social mobility on an individual’s progression towards

terrorism.10 Different counterterrorism and de-radicalisation strategies must be employed at each level of what he refers to as

'the staircase from terrorism'; for the current purposes, however, his recommendations for disaffected individuals vulnerable

to radicalisation are most relevant. Moghaddam argues that the ground floor, which the majority of Muslims inhabit, should

be the focus of preventative programmes that encourage democratic participation in order to increase trust in Government

The Spectrum | edition 02 18

6 Home Office, 2011, 62

7 There are numerous examples to illustrate this point, from the demands to have the veil banned, to petitions against the

construction of mosques, and a general strong anti-immigration sentiment. Such sentiments are, to an extent, also mani-

fested in the popularity of the English Defence League and British National Party. Although by no means representative of

general opinion in Britain, consider the recent arrest of a woman for a racially aggravated public order offence after she was

videotaped verbally abusing passengers on a tram (Bowater, 2011).

8 For an example of this tension, see Wynne-Jones (2011).

9 Home Office, 2011, 59

10 Moghaddam, 2005

decision-making procedures.11 Improvements in education will also help increase perceptions of social mobility.12 This is

particularly salient given Ofsted’s recent report highlighting continuing concern that “the more deprived the family a child

comes from, the more likely they are to attend an inadequate school,”13 as well as the Sutton Trust’s disclosure that the

significant difference in the quality of teaching in Britain will have a major impact on a student’s future earnings.14 Given the

impact this will have on social mobility, it is clear that the educational element of a preventative counterterrorism strategy

cannot simply focus on educating individuals about why terrorism is wrong.

Conclusion

This essay has endeavoured to demonstrate that the 2011 CONTEST strategy is limited because it does not address the

grievances that facilitate pathways into terrorism. Such oversights may affect the success of the strategy as a whole, and it is

hoped that the recommendations within this piece will provide some directions for further research. Addressing the

grievances of populations will help to delegitimise the appeal of terrorist causes and encourage individuals to become more

satisfied citizens, participating in British life rather than harbouring resentment against it.

The Spectrum | edition 02 19

11 Moghaddam, 2009, 303

12 Moghaddam, 2006, 302

13 Ofsted, 2011

14 The Sutton Trust, 2011, 5

Bibliography

Bowater, Donna. “Woman arrested over racist rant on tram,” The Telegraph. Accessed November 28, 2011. http://

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8921283/Woman-arrested-over-racist-rant-on-tram.html.

Brighton, Shane. “British Muslims, multiculturalism and UK foreign policy: 'integration' and 'cohesion' in and beyond the

state.” International Affairs 83:1 (2007): 1-17.

Githens-Mazer, Jonathan. “Islamic Radicalisation among North Africans in Britain.” British Journal of Politics and International

Relations 10:4 (2008) 550-570.

Gutowski, S. “Secularism and the Politics of Risk: Britain’s Prevent Agenda, 2005-2009.” International Relations 25:3 (2011)

346-362.

Home Office. CONTEST 3- The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. London: Home Office, 2011.

Moghaddam, Fathali M. “De-Radicalization and the Staircase from Terrorism.” In The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary

Perspectives, edited by David Canter. Chichester; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

Ofsted. Press release: Raising ambition and tackling failure- The Annual Report of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of

Education, Children’s Services and Skills 2010/11. Accessed November 28, 2011. http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/news/raising-

ambition-and-tackling-failure-annual-report-of-her-majesty%E2%80%99s-chief-inspector-of-education-ch?

news=18213Quote

Stevens, D. “Reasons to be Fearful, One, Two, Three: The 'Preventing Violence Extremism' Agenda.” British Journal of

Politics and International Relations 13:2 (2011) 165-188.

Sutton Trust, The. Improving the impact of teachers on pupil achievement in the UK – interim findings. Accessed November

28, 2011. http://www.suttontrust.com/public/documents/1teachers-impact-report-final.pdf.

Thomas, Paul. “Failed and Friendless: The UK’s 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Programme” British Journal of Politics and

International Relations 12:3 (2010) 442-458.

Wynne-Jones, Jonathon. “Christian worker losers her job after being 'targeted' by Islamic extremists.” The Telegraph.

Accessed November 28, 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8917675/Christian-worker-loses-her-job-after-

being-targeted-by-Islamic-extremists.html .

The Spectrum | edition 02 20

Is the Threat of CBRN Terrorism Overblown or Underestimated in the UK?

William Eastment

A credible chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack has not been attributed to a terrorist

cell in the UK since the foiled Wood Green ricin attack of 2002. Of the groups identified in the UK’s 2011 CONTEST strategy for combating terrorism, Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda inspired attacks are of main concern

to the UK’s Security Services.1 With the deaths of Osama Bin Laden and Anwar Al-Awlaki and, Al-Qaeda’s diminishing influence in Afghanistan and the Middle East, some analysts have declared the threat from Al-

Qaeda as significantly reduced.2 Recent foiled attacks on Western targets attributed to Al-Qaeda and its

offshoots have been marked out by their growing amateurish nature3, and as evidence of the increased successes of intelligence operations by both MI5 and MI6 in preventing many attacks and plots before

their implementation.4

It would appear, then, logical to assume that even a crude chemical attack using widely available formulas would be beyond

the capabilities of Al-Qaeda. However, to underestimate the possibility of an attack of this nature would not be wise simply

due to the numbers of casualties and levels of fear associated with such an attack. Matthew Bunn, Harvard Professor and

former adviser to the OSTP (Office of Science and Technology Policy) has put forward the case that the risk of any given

event should be calculated as the likelihood multiplied by the consequences. Since the consequences of any CBRN attack

would be unacceptably high, both in terms of lives lost and damage to the economy through cleanup, quarantine and loss of

business for potentially weeks, then the risk should be considered high even if the likelihood remains low.5 Yet in opposition

to this is the argument that overplaying the threat from such sources can reduce the efficiency of intelligence and defence

staff in pursuing more likely terrorist attacks, the likes of which have already been seen to be favoured by Al-Qaeda and its

affiliates. Furthermore if policy makers appear too preoccupied with the CBRN threat then it may appear that an attack of

this nature is the only thing required for terrorists to be taken seriously.6 The purpose of this paper is therefore to decide how

easy it would be for a large (or small) organisation to carry out an attack of this nature, whether the UK’s main terrorist

adversaries would be interested in such an attack and finally, how this threat should be dealt with.

How Easy is it to Make a CBRN Weapon for a Terrorist Group?

There are ample resources on the internet for any determined terrorist to make a Chemical Weapon and only a Bachelors

level degree in Chemistry is needed to succeed. There is no specialist equipment or large scale production costs. In practice

it is not that simple. The marginally successful chemical attack by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995 had a team of nearly 300 engineers

who produced up to 30 litres of Sarin Nerve gas. Yet, whilst the attacks on the Tokyo Subway killed 5 people, they had not

nearly the devastating impact that the group had hoped for. The determination to make large quantities of chemical agent

The Spectrum | edition 02 21

1 Home Office, 2010

2 Brandon, 2011

3 The foiled Christmas Day bombings of 2009 are a notable example of this, as is apparent by the BBC's coverage:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8433151.stm

4 Again, not the BBC's coverage of the Cargo Bombing attempt: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11703355

5 Bunn and Martin, 2010, 166-200

6 Ibid.

reduced its quality and subsequent potency.7 There appears to be a negative correlation between the amount produced and

its quality. For many terrorist groups, in terms of destructiveness per dollar it may be more economical to focus on

conventional explosives in a volatile environment such as an enclosed tube or airplane. As for Biological and Nuclear

weapons the same trend occurs. The more agent you produce the less potent or powerful it becomes.8

Do Terrorist Groups See CBRN Weapons as a Useful Alternative to Traditional Means of Terror?

It must first be noted that terrorist organisations have a wide array of incentives and motives, many of which cannot be

served by CBRN weapons. Due to the indiscriminate nature of these weapons, it becomes impossible to use them in

discriminate ways such as the targeting of a certain company or individual or of military and government facilities. The only

plausible use is to cause mass casualties and to break the political will of the established regime.9 For the purposes of this

section I shall focus primarily on Al-Qaeda (and Al-Qaeda inspired attacks), as they have been determined as the most likely

threat to the UK and, in closing, compare their motives to smaller groups who may have more incentive to use CBRN

weapons for different purposes to Al-Qaeda.

It is clear that the acquisition of CBRN weapons is of importance to Al-Qaeda and its offshoots. The instructions on how to

make homemade poisons are widely cited in the Encyclopaedia of Jihad and the Mujahedeen Poisons Cookbook, for any

inspired individual to make use of. Copies of both appear online regularly. Al-Qaida itself has been found in possession of

plans for a “Nagasaki-Style Bomb” as well as base agents for a variety of Chemical and Biological Weapons,10 yet no

delivery mechanisms were ever discovered. It appears that whilst CBRN provides an alternative to conventional means, Al-

Qaida does not have the capability to weaponise these base agents to a level that could inflict more damage than

conventional weapons. Indeed, much of the literature that is so “widely available” is fraught with errors.11

Indeed, as a point of comparison, the only successful mass casualty CBRN attack was that by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995

which, compared to other mass causality attacks, killed fewer people than similar attacks by conventional means. Aum

Shinrikyo was fascinated by the idea of poisons and toxins and pursued a programme to develop these capabilities akin to

that of a nation-state.12 There is a trend that those seeking to develop CBRN capabilities tend to have a fascination with the

idea of poisoning and/or infection and pursue this goal as their only end. If Aum Shinrikyo could only muster such minimal

success with the resources it has, it shows how large a task it would be for a group such as Al-Qaeda who have such

multifarious goals relating to global jihad, none of which show any fascination with chemical or biological agents beyond their

ability to kill a large amount of people. So far evidence has shown that conventional means of terror are still the most

economical way to kill large amounts of people.

However, with recent plots increasingly being foiled by greater intelligence successes and increased public vigilance, terrorist

groups may reach the conclusion that conventional means of inflicting mass-casualty attacks are no longer as effective by

conventional methods and this is where policy issues come in to play.

Policy Implications

The difficulty in policy making in regards to CBRN Terrorism lies in the interpretation of the aforementioned formula, ‘risk=

likelihood x consequences’. Since the consequences of a successful CBRN attack are so high the risk is always likely to be

high too. Yet if one follows this formula too rigidly there is a danger of inordinately spending money on what is most difficult

The Spectrum | edition 02 22

7 Cole, 2011

8 Cole, 2011. 34-64

9 Ibid. 65-88

10 Ibid. 60-63

11 Stein, 2005

12 Tu, 2001, 78 and Parachini, 2001, 389- 406

to handle, not on what is most likely,13 at the expense of more likely attacks with smaller consequences. This produces a

quandary for policy makers. The implications of a CBRN attack to national infrastructure are far greater than isolated

bombings. Should monetary and structural resources therefore be reflective of this higher risk? At the moment, when most

evidence outlined above points to the paucity of a reliable alternative to conventional means for a terrorist group, it would

appear foolish to follow this suggestion.

Conclusion

The UK currently faces a substantial threat of a terrorist attack according to the most recent JTAC assessment. This

assessment does not discriminate between a conventional or non-conventional attack and nor should it. Whilst there is a

difference between conventional and non-conventional attacks, to prioritise the risk of one over the other sends too clear a

signal of how best to target UK infrastructure. Despite the perceived ‘risk’ to national infrastructure being higher than an

attack by conventional means, to guide policy too closely on this perceived risk makes the UK seem more vulnerable and

preoccupied with the threat. Whilst CBRN remains a significant threat it should not be treated as more or less of a risk than a

conventional attack for both practical reasons, and so as not to invite this very attack upon ourselves by revealing unique

fears or weaknesses. Terrorism as a whole should be seen as a risk and CBRN as one element of this risk.

Bibliography

Brandon, James. “Terrorism in 2011: Extremism at home and abroad.” Talk delivered to the Kings College Think Tank

Society, London October 24, 2011.

Bunn, Matthew and Martin, Susan. “Is Nuclear Terrorism a Real Threat?” Debating Nuclear Terrorism and Counterterrorism:

Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, edited by Stuart Gottlieb, 166- 200. Washington: CQ Press,

2009.

Cole, Benjamin. The Changing Face of Terrorism: How Real is the Threat from Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons?

Cambridge: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2011.

Home Office, The. “The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Combating International Terrorism: Annual Report 2010,”

Statewatch.org. Last modified March, 2010. http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/apr/uk-nss-contest-annual-

report-2010.pdf.

Parachini, John V. “Comparing Motives and Outcomes of Mass Casualty Terrorism Involving Conventional and

Unconventional Weapons.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24:5 (2001). 389-406.

Stein, Jeff. “Chemist Derides Qaeda Germwar Skills Touted by Manual.” GlobalSecurity.org. Last modified August 8, 2005.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050808-qaeda-germwar.htm.

Tu, Anthony T. “Anatomy of Aum Shinrikyo’s Organization and Terrorist Attacks with Chemical and Biological Weapons”

Archives of Toxicology, Kinetics and Xenobiotic Metabolism 7:3 (2001). 45-84.

The Spectrum | edition 02 23

13 Parachini, 2001, 395

Negotiating the Internet: Diplomacy, Security and Governance in the Information

Age

Tim Stevens

Since the release by WikiLeaks of US diplomatic ‘cables’ beginning in the autumn of 2010 many claims have been made as to the long-term effects of such unauthorised disclosures on the practice of

international diplomacy. It is argued that the ability of WikiLeaks to obtain and publish documents

revealing the inner workings of a diplomatic corps irrevocably changes the way in which diplomats can and should conduct their affairs in future. No longer, perhaps, can national secrets be truly secret when the

Internet and those committed to radical transparency combine to expose international diplomatic arcana to the global gaze1.

Whatever the long-term effects of the Internet on diplomatic process, less attention has been granted to the Internet as an

object of diplomacy, rather than as an external and disruptive influence on the experience and practice of diplomacy as per

WikiLeaks. Specifically, the relationships between ‘cyberspace’, security and governance have become the focus of

diplomatic negotiations at the highest levels. These discussions revolve around concepts like ‘cyber security’, ‘cyber war’,

‘cyber espionage’ and ‘cyber crime’, and aim to mitigate threats to national and international security by those seeking to

exploit the vulnerabilities created bysocietal dependence on cyberspace.

One of the more concerted efforts at present is the explicit attempt by the US and its allies to pursue the development of

international norms of cyberspace behaviour. One recent example is that of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

whose November 2011 London Conference on Cyberspace “launched a focused and inclusive dialogue to help guide the

behaviour of all in cyberspace”2. This path—actually established well before the London conference—is in part a diplomatic

one, in which ‘like-minded nations’ can be persuaded to develop a normative regime in which one another’s sovereignty is

respected, the established ‘laws of armed conflict’ are applied in conditions of ‘cyber warfare’, cyber criminals are pursued

with collective vigour, and in which an ‘open’ Internet is held to be of paramount importance to the pursuit of economic and

social vitality, as well as being demonstrative of Western liberal and democratic values. By these measures is it hoped that

individual and collective security can be enhanced without recourse to international treaty mechanisms 3.

Despite occasional claims that such actions constitute something awkwardly termed ‘cyber diplomacy’, the negotiations

thus entered into are nothing but old-fashioned diplomacy conducted with respect to sociotechnical systems of rather more

recent origin. No clumsy linguistic sleight-of-hand is required to describe the ancient art of massaging the balance of power

in one’s national interests, even if the topics on the table are often slippery and somewhat elusive by virtue of their novelty

and technical complexity.As with all diplomacy, negotiation, albeit only one of the suite of potential diplomatic functions, is

necessary because not all parties agree on any given issue4.

Although, for example, the Cold War might long be over, there remains a degree of mutual suspicion between the US and

Russia that keeps diplomatic relations between the two on cyber security issues very much cooler than between the US and

The Spectrum | edition 02 24

1 Page and Spence, 2011, 234-243

2 Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2011

3 Stevens, 2012a, 148-170

4 Bull, 1977, 170-172

her Anglophone allies, or between Russia and her Asian allies in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and amongst the

non-aligned countries of the United Nations. Sharp boundaries can be identified between these various communities as to

what, for instance, constitute the appropriate norms of state behaviour, both in domestic and foreign policy terms. Broadly

caricatured, the US and its strategic allies are committed to free trade and information exchange, whilst also not wishing to

sign international treaties that would hinder their abilities to pursue national security interests in and through the Internet5.

Conversely, Asian and other rivals of the US draw more directly on internal security concerns, often linked to the perceived

negative effects of Western cultural influences on domestic populations, and desire international agreements that would

preserve their rights to determine what measures they take with respect to the Internet within their sovereign boundaries6.

Such disagreements are played out in a variety of international fora, such as the United Nations International

Telecommunication Union, and are unlikely to be resolved any time soon.

The differences between these perspectives, however, need not be over-dramatized. On one level, such divisive rhetoric

tends to become self-sustaining and reify the very impasse diplomacy should be seeking to resolve. Equally important is the

observation that in terms of the systemic relationships between diplomacy and ‘cyberspace’, the disagreements between

international rivals on these and similar issues are far less significant than are the points on which all state parties agree. At

the heart of all state actions with respect to the governance and regulation of the Internet is the assumption that this is an

environment in which states should and must intervene.

States should intervene, so the argument runs, because this is an environment in which political gains may be made in the

national interest. Similarly, states must intervene because not to do so would be a derogation of the responsibility to protect

and promote the interests of the citizens to whom governments are responsible. In effect, cyberspace has become an

environment in which the exercise of state power is normalised, even as the long-term effects of this process, fuelled by this

double imperative, are not yet clear. That said, there is little doubt that as we are witnessing the infiltration of information

technologies into every part of human life, so too can we trace the complementary movement of state politics into those

same environments. Where technology goes, there politics follow. This process is assisted by a standard narrative in which

cyberspace is presented as a ‘domain’ over which dominion must be sought and through which national interests may be

pursued. All the traditional levers of state power—diplomatic, informational, military, economic—are brought to bear in

pursuit of those interests7.

Diplomats do not have an easy task ahead of them. Aside from the ideological differences between parties to high-level bi-

and multi-lateral discussions, the role of the diplomat itself may be subtly changing. At the beginning of the 17th century, the

English diplomat Sir Henry Wotton is recorded as saying that an ambassador is “an honest man, sent to lie abroad for the

good of his country”8. How one views the integrity of individual diplomats in the shadow of WikiLeaks is a matter of personal

interpretation but in general terms this formulation may require some slight alteration. Given the interconnectedness and

interdependence of contemporary information systems and the reliance of societies and economies upon them, it may be

that diplomats will be required to act in the interests of all countries rather than just their own. To aim for an open and free

Internet, for example, is illogical—not to mention undeliverable—if purely national interests are put ahead of the collective

good. This is not to suggest that national interests, particularly expressed as concerns over security, be demoted but that

they can best be pursued within a positive-sum framework of mutually supportive aims and intentions. Whilst this may not

be a new idea it will require new loci and modalities of networked cooperation9.

Evidently, it will also require careful disaggregation of the security issues involved. All threats are not equal and nor should all

responses be considered through the lens of national security. Diplomats often seem either ill-at-ease or glib when

The Spectrum | edition 02 25

5 White House, 2011

6 Anderson, 2011

7 Betz and Stevens, 2011

8 Walton, 1796, 151

9 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 194-227

confronted publicly about cyber security concerns. This is not because they are not capable and committed individuals but

because the sheer range of issues germane to cyber security and allied fields like Internet governance—much of which is

highly technical—is, frankly, beyond most individuals to comprehend fully. Diplomats will likely require increasingly

specialised assistance in order to fulfil their roles, a need for which the growing epistemic community of cyber security

professionals will doubtless be well placed to satisfy10.

Information technologies pose significant challenges to diplomacy. Not only can they directly affect the ways in which

diplomats operate but they have become a new field of diplomatic responsibility through the emergence of the global

Internet and the cyberspaces thus enabled. This is clearly seen in contemporary discussions about global cyber security

and Internet governance, for which traditional diplomatic talents will be as greatly in demand as they have ever been in order

to resolve satisfactorily. These complex sociotechnical and transnational issues require that national interests are pursued in

tandem with those in the common weal. How far such aspirations can be realised depends upon a wide range of state and

non-state actors but at the inter-state level it will, as ever, be diplomats that shoulder the burdens of avoiding conflict and

negotiating mutually acceptable courses of action.

Bibliography

Anderson, Nate. “Russia, China, Tajikistan propose UN ‘code of conduct’ for the net.” Wired. Last modified September 21,

2011. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011-09/21/code-of-conduct.

Betz, David J. and Stevens, Tim. Cyberspace and the State. London: Routledge. 2011.

Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977.

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette. “Varieties of cooperation: Government networks in international security.” In Networked Politics:

Agency, Power, and Governance, edited by Miles Kahler. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Conference on Cyberspace. Last modified 2011. http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/

london-conference-cyberspace/

Page, Mark & Spence, JE. “Open secrets questionably arrived at: the impact of Wikileaks on diplomacy.” Defence Studies

11:2 (2011). 234-243.

Stevens, Tim; “A cyberwar of ideas? Deterrence and norms in cyberspace.” Contemporary Security Policy 33:1

(2012a) 148-170.

“Norms, epistemic communities and the global cyber security assemblage.” e-International Relations. Last modified March

27, 2012b. http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/27/norms-epistemic-communities-and-the-global-cyber-security-assemblage/

Walton, Izaak. The Lives. York: Wilson, Spence & Mawman, 1796.

White House, The. International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World.

Washington, DC: White House, 2011.

The Spectrum | edition 02 26

10 Stevens, 2012b

Strategic Defence: the People’s Republic of China’s Stance in the South China

Sea

Lars G. Backstrom

The South China Sea has recently come into the spotlight as a geopolitical hotspot because of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) tremendous economic growth in recent years. The PRC’s economical

and political heartland is the SE coastal plain, where 41% of the population lives, 70% of GDP is

generated, and 90% of its exports originate. This has made the PRC dependent on long and potentially vulnerable Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs), and has created an economic heartland in the south

east coastal plane of the PRC that is potentially vulnerable to strikes from Taiwan and the sea. To defend its SLOCs and heartland, the PRC is in the process of expanding and modernising the People’s Liberation

Army Navy (PLAN). The PLAN has adopted a doctrine of forward defence with a tactical offense; therefore,

other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries bordering the South China Sea have begun upgrading their naval forces and forming defensive alliances. A conflict could damage the regional

economy and could involve the US, because of its wish to protect the freedom of the seas and its desire to back up allies.

The Economic Growth and Importance of the PRC

Since 2000 the PRC’s GDP has increased six-fold, see chart 1. In 2010 its GDP was second only to the US and by 2030 its

GDP will be the world’s largest.1

The PRC is a major regional and global trader, see chart 2. This increase in the PRC’s economy corresponds to an increase

in energy consumption, as shown in charts 3 and 4.

The Spectrum | edition 02 27

1 Tung, 2010, 2; World Bank, 2012

The Spectrum | edition 02 28

The PRC’s main source of energy is domestic coal, but its share is projected to decrease from 70% to 55% by 2030. Its

dependency on oil will remain static at around 18%.2 Most of this oil demand is met by foreign imports, and by 2030 this

dependency is projected to be around 80%.3 At present around 60% of the PRC’s oil imports come from the Middle East,

and 30% from Africa.4 90% of this oil passes through the Malacca Strait.5

To secure its oil supply the PRC is developing diplomatic, cultural, and economic ties with oil producing nations in Africa and

the Middle East6, and nations along its SLOCs in the Indian Ocean7. To achieve full control of its energy supply the PRC has

also embarked on an extensive ship construction programme8. The PRC’s apparent aggressive claims on the Spratly Islands

in the South China Sea can partly be seen as a way to secure a source of energy without long and vulnerable SLOCs, since

the PRC believes the region to be rich in hydrocarbons.9

The Strategic Problem of the PRC and how the PRC Intends to Solve it

The PRC’s SLOCs pass through the choke points of the Malacca and Taiwan Straits and past its regional rival, India.10 The

Spratly Islands also dominate the SLOCs passing through the South China Sea.11 SLOCs are historically very sensitive for

Asian countries because, by controlling them, the western powers dominated Qing China and South East Asia during the

nineteenth century. The strategic position of the PRC is shown in map 1.

Map 1. The PRC is hemmed in by the two Island Chains. The First Island Chain runs from the Japanese Archipelago via

Taiwan to the Indonesian Archipelago. The definition of Second Island Chain is not as clearly defined, but it stretches

between the Japanese Archipelago to the Marshall Islands. Apparent from the map is the choke point of the Malacca Strait

and the importance of India for the PRC’s SLOCs (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007)

The Spectrum | edition 02 29

2 BP, 2012, 47 & 78

3 Ibid.

4 Obi, 2010, 182

5 Garofano, 2008, 172

6 Obi, 2010, 182-186; Shaw, 2010, 15; Aning, 2010, 146; Kaplan, 2010, 242

7 Prabhakar, 2006, 52; Kaplan, 2010, 24

8 Wood, 2011, 9

9 GlobalSecurity.org, 2011a

10 Green and Shearer, 2012, 179-180

11 Buszynski, 2012, 146

It then becomes apparent that the strategic problem for the PRC is essentially maritime, which puts the focus on the PLAN.

The PLAN has in recent years undergone a rapid expansion and modernisation.12 However, it is important to remember that

the PRC lacks a real maritime tradition and the PLAN lacks experience with modern naval operations and logistics. Its sailors

suffer from poor training, education, and seamanship.13 It is also possible that the totalitarian political system of the PRC will

stifle the individual initiative necessary among commanders of ships and fleets for long distance operations. The PLAN is

attempting to remedy some of these shortcomings by participating in anti-piracy operations in the waters outside Somalia.14

Despite its long coastline the PRC possesses only a few harbours capable of providing bases for the PLAN.15 The PRC has

established a naval base at Sanya on Hainan Island capable of basing the PRC’s growing arsenal of nuclear submarines to

ease the situation. This base opens up the South China Sea for PLAN operations. However, the Sanya base is potentially

vulnerable from the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea,16 see map 2.

Map 2. The South China Sea showing the strategic locations of the Paracel Island with regards to Hainan and the Spratly Islands with regards to the PRC SLOCs. Noticeable here is also Taiwan’s position to threaten the PRC heartland (U. S. Energy Information Administration, 2008)

The PLAN doctrine calls for an ‘off-shore’ strategic defense, but an operational offense in depth.17 The goal is to deny enemy

forces in case of a future conflict access to PRC waters, or waters the PRC considers vital to their survival, such as SLOCs.

Adding strength to that doctrine, the PRC is also developing advanced long range missiles like the DF-21C medium range

ballistic missile,18 the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile,19 and attack submarines20 that could be used as sea-based

platforms for the CH-10 land attack cruise missile.21

The Spectrum | edition 02 30

12 O’Rourke, 2012, 7-29

13 Yoshihara and Holmes, 2010, 216

14 Green and Shearer, 2012, 179

15 Buszynski ,2012, 146

16 Ibid. 151

17 GlobalSecurity.org, 2011b

18 Kristensen, 2010

19 DefenseTech, 2010

20 GlobalSecurity.org, 2012

21 GlobalSecurity.org, 2011c

The comparative weakness in logistics, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Air Defence capabilities of the PLAN is also an

indication that its primary role will not be convoy duty, but to threaten enemy forces, supply lines, and shore installations in a

possible conflict.22

Recommendations and Conclusion

The spectacular growth of the PRC economy has lead to new strategic challenges, as it is now dependent on long Sea

Lines of Communications for its trade and energy needs. Seen in this light the PRC modernisation and expansion of the

PLAN and its development of advanced missile systems have become not only tools for expansionist dreams, but also

necessary tools for an in-depth defence with a tactical offensive doctrine. However large the expansion of the PLAN, the

fundamental problems of the lack of experience and poor manpower quality will prevent it from being a serious challenger to

the US Navy. It is not then desirable for the US to become too involved, since it is not even a member of the ASEAN.

Therefore, the member states might take such involvement as expansionist attempts from the US.

However, the PRC stance, while not aggressive, is very assertive and must be met assertively. This means that the US

cannot abandon its allies or show weakness, but it cannot let itself be drawn into an arms race in the area, partly because it

is not an area of vital interest to the US, and partly because an arms race might drive the PRC to adopt a truly aggressive

stance. If the PRC feels threatened, this could possible provoke it to attempt a pre-emptive first-strike. The best policy for

the US in the South China Sea region would then be to ‘Speak softly, but carry a gun’ and as much as possible let the

ASEAN countries solve their issues among themselves.

Bibliography

Aning, Kwesi. “China and Africa: towards a new security relationship.” In The Rise of China & India in Africa, edited by Fantu

Cheru and Cyril Obi. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2010.

BP p.l.c. Energy Outlook 2030. BP: London, 2012.

Buszynski, Leszek. “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.—China Strategic Rivalry.” The Washington

Quarterly 35:3 (2012). 139-156.

DefenseTech. China's Carried Killer Ballistic Missiles are Operational. Last modified December 28, 2010. http://

defensetech.org/2010/12/28/chinas-carrier-killer-ballistic-missiles-are-operational/.

Garofano, John. “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Problems and Prospects.” In Asia Looks Seaward - Power and Maritime

Strategy, edited by Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008.

GlobalSecurity.org;

South China Sea Oil and Natural Gas. Last modified July 11, 2011a. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/

world/war/spratly-oil.htm.

People's Liberation Navy – Offshore Defense. Last modified July 11, 2011b. http://www.globalsecurity.org/

military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm.

DH-10/ CJ-10/ Land-Attack Cruise Missiles. Last modified July 24, 2011c. http://www.globalsecurity.org/

wmd/world/china/lacm.htm.

China's Future Route to Martime Dominance. Accessed 2012. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/

report/2004/chinasnavyroute.htm

The Spectrum | edition 02 31

22 Ji, 2006, 79-80

Green, Michael J. and Shearer, Andrew. “Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy.” The Washington Quarterly 35:3 (2012).

175-189.

Ji, You. “China’s Naval Strategy and Transformation.” In The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific, edited

by Lawrence W. Prabhakar, Joshua H. Ho, and Sam Bateman. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2006.

Kaplan, Robert D. “The Geography of Chinese Power - How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?” Foreign Affairs

89:3 (2010). 22-41.

Kristensen, Hans M. “DF-21C Missile Deploys to Central China.” FAS Strategic Security Blog. Last modified September 28,

2010. http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/09/df21c.php.

Obi, Cyril. “African oil in the energy security calculations of China and India.” In The Rise of China & India in Africa, edited by

Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2010.

Prabhakar, W. Lawrence. “Maritime Strategic Trends in the Asia-Pacific: Issues and Challenges.” In The Evolving Maritime

Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific, edited by Lawrence W. Prabhakar, Joshua H. Ho, and Sam Bateman. Singapore:

Institue of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2006.

O’Rourke, Ronald.“China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for

Congress.” In CRS Report for Congress RL33153. Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2012.

Shaw, Timothy M. “China, India and (South) Africa: what international relations in the second decade of the twenty-first

century?” In The Rise of China & India in Africa, edited by Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2010.

Tung, Chen-yuan, Mah, Amy T. and Wang, Guo-Chen. China economic world ranking report Issue 3. Taipei: National

Chengchi University, 2010.

Wood, Al. “Tanker Ownership in non OECD countries and the Rise of Government Owned Fleets.” In Institute for

International Economic Policy Working Paper Series, IIEP WP 2011 07. Washington: The George Washington University,

2011.

Yoshihara, Toshi and Holmes, James R. Red Star over the Pacific - China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime

Strategy. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010.

The Spectrum | edition 02 32

02 | Business and Economics

Social Entrepreneurship: A solution to Many Problems?

Christian Kolb

Uncertainty reigns when it comes to defining the concept of social entrepreneurship. In vain will one trawl

through academic commentary, and other sources of opinion, searching for a uniform definition of what this frequently used phrase truly encompasses. We can safely say however, that this 'third sector'1 has

undergone much change both in terms of its size and scope since the term came into widespread use in the 1980s and 1990s,2 and now provides multi-national support to people who often live at the margins of

society. After an account of the concept of 'social entrepreneurship', the author will dive into an analysis of

its positive impacts on social welfare, some relevant criticisms and a possible outlook for the future.

The Search for a Good Definition

Society's rapidly changing perception of the concept of social entrepreneurship complicates the search for a definition. This

leads to the common contention among academics that the term is ill-defined.3 The meaning of social entrepreneurship has

indeed changed with time, and it is far from similar to that which people used ten or twenty years ago. Today, the term is

much more widespread and common in ordinary language, so the concept is ripe for reconsideration.

The dominant economic system, which most of the developed and even most developing nations have now enshrined, is

capitalism. On the face of its principles, the phrase 'social entrepreneurship' almost appears to be an oxymoron. How can

social welfare and entrepreneurship, which is usually profit-driven and encapsulates the individual's desire to improve his

personal financial standing, be reconciled?

The Spectrum | edition 02 33

1 The other two being the private and the public sector.

2 Early promoters of this movement were Bill Drayton, founder of Ahoka: Innovators for the Public, Charles Leadbeater and

Michael Young.

3 Barendsen and Gardner, 2004, 43; Weerawardena and Sullivan Mort, 2006, 21

Social entrepreneurship is, in many regards, very similar to its profit-driven cousin because its foundation rests on the same

three elements:4

‣Entrepreneurial Context5

‣Entrepreneurial Characteristics 6

‣Entrepreneurial Outcome7

Having established these fundamental congruences, we now need to consider the possible differences between the two

concepts. For if there is not any significant difference, how can social entrepreneurship be the solution to many of the

problems which the other concept fails to solve? The notion that the most fundamental distinction lies within the motivation

for setting up a business is misconceived. Putting financial gain on one side of the scale and altruism on the other would not

constitute a fair reflection of the difference between the two. The motivation behind social entrepreneurship is better ascribed

to the that of self-realisation. That we are striving for pleasure and trying to avoid pain is most fundamental to our human

nature. It is precisely this prospect of pleasure in self-realisation that encourages entrepreneurs to take on the many risks and

hurdles involved in setting up a business.

The crucial distinction rests in the value proposition8 itself.9 The entrepreneur's value proposition is designed to create

financial profit by introducing a new product or service into a market which is already in the position to afford it. The value

proposition of a social entrepreneur stands in stark contrast. The value he is looking for may not even be quantifiable, but is

more "in the form of large-scale, transformational benefit that accrues either to a significant segment of society or to society

at large."10 The product is launched into a market which tends to be under-served and comprised of potential buyers who

are usually in a rather miserable financial position in which they lack the means to acquire the transformative benefits for

themselves. Samer Abu-Saifan's proposed definition is very accurate:

The social entrepreneur is a mission-driven individual who uses a set of entrepreneurial behaviours to deliver a social

value to the less privileged, all through an entrepreneurially oriented entity that is financially independent, self-

sufficient, or sustainable.11

While this definition does not resolve every uncertainty that currently clings to the phrase 'social entrepreneurship', absolute

certainty is not necessary and in fact might be detrimental to its purpose. Flexibility is a characteristic of social

entrepreneurship that has contributed to its growth and success over the past decade. A balance needs to be struck

between defining the essential elements of this notion on the one hand, but on the other hand keeping it, to an extent,

ambiguous and adaptable to ensure that it can evolve over time.

The Spectrum | edition 02 34

4 Osberg and Martin, 2007, 34

5 This is usually a suboptimal equilibrium.

6 These include inspiration, creativity, direct action, courage and fortitude, all encouraging the entrepreneur to correct the

suboptimal equilibrium.

7 A successful entrepreneur creates a new stable equilibrium and "engineers a permanent shift from a lower-quality equilib-

rium to a higher-quality one." (supra, n 4)

8 See generally, Emerson, 2003, 35

9 Ibid. 4

10 Ibid.

11 Abu-Saifan, 2012, 22

Beneficial Impacts

Critics contend that there is no need for social entrepreneurship in virtue of the numerous welfare services and public goods

which are now provided by modern welfare systems.12 However, what these critics do not (fully) acknowledge is that the

welfare state, as currently in place, was designed in a completely different environment with different values underpinning it.

The post-second World War period was characterised by full employment,13 stable families and low female employment.14

Modern societies are now challenged by completely different issues, such as drug dependency and long term

unemployment. 15 Most welfare systems are ill-equipped in both tools and resources to deal with these problems.

In recent years, due to major upsets to economic and financial stability, states are attempting to cut costs wherever possible.

The welfare system, which often represents a very large proportion of state expenditure, is, of course, a major area in which

to undertake these cuts. The taxpayer does not make these cuts easier. In fact he opposes higher taxes, but on the other

hand views the suffering of the poor with discomfort. The author is not disputing that the cuts are necessary to ensure

sustainable growth and stability in the long-term, but is showing that relying merely on the state-welfare system will not

achieve a high degree of social welfare. Wide-ranging supplements to the public sector are needed, shaped by social

innovation and the determination to bring about change. This impact, it is argued, can be made by social entrepreneurs.

Improvements ought to be made on a professional level to distinguish social entrepreneurship from mere charitable work,

which is often vulnerable due to its dependence on external funding and sponsorships. Three arguments will illustrate my

point.

‣Social Capital

Far from merely creating tangible assets such as schools, community centres or hospitals, the investments of social

entrepreneurs create social capital.16 Similar to the notion of social entrepreneurship, there is not a uniform definition for the

term 'social capital'. Proposed definitions do, however, share the core idea that social networks are at the centre of its

importance, as expressed by Robert Putnam:

Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a university education (human capital) can increase productivity, so do

social contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups.17

Social entrepreneurs heavily rely on such relationships to gain access to different kinds of resources, which in turn further

develop the size of the social network, highlighting the importance of social capital for the successful social enterprise. The

dividend that both the community and the individual may derive from this capital is hardly financial, nor otherwise

quantifiable, but is simply "a stronger community, more able to look after itself, with stronger bonds of trust and

cooperation". 18 This feature of society has fallen more and more into oblivion, but can now be revitalised again with the

increasingly popular model of social entrepreneurship.

‣Efficiency

Projects launched by social entrepreneurs can increase efficiency in the provision of social benefits. The high level of

bureaucracy currently inflates the price of many welfare goods or services provided by state institutions. Social enterprises

The Spectrum | edition 02 35

12 Good examples include the UK, Germany and the Scandinavian countries, such as Norway or Finland

13 If there was unemployment, it was largely in the short-run.

14 See Leadbetter, 1997, 12-13

15 Ibid.

16 See generally Bankston and Zhou, 2002; Coleman, 1988

17 Putnam, 2000

18 Leadbetter, supra at ft 15

could offer equal services at a lower price through less administration costs, and additionally through highly committed staff

who have chosen to enter this profession themselves. The objection may be raised that this proposed increase in cost-

efficiency can only be achieved because social enterprises often employ unpaid, volunteering labour.19 However this proves

to be an untrue proposition in light of empirical evidence demonstrating that many such organisations already employ staff,

who are paid similar rates of salary as those in the private sector. We should be careful not to let this argument undermine

the higher productivity which comes from "greater commitment and flexibility rather than markedly lower pay."20

‣Employment

Many of these organisations create paid working opportunities, particularly for those who express a genuine interest in this

field. Simple economic analysis shows how lower levels of unemployment, even on a smaller scale, may have a positive

impact on the national economy as a whole. Critics tend to neglect this line of argument and rather focus on attacking the

benefits, which most certainly exist but are more difficult to measure. While it is conceded that one will have difficulty in

attaching a numerical value to, for instance, a higher level of skills among the people involved in these schemes, this does

not diminish the beneficial nature of the social enterprises at all. Higher skills again mean greater flexibility which then can be

translated into higher cost-efficiency and qualitatively better services. Surely no-one with a sound economic understanding is

going to dispute that such benefits, despite being difficult to quantify, will contribute to a more stable economic climate both

in the short and in the long run.

Criticism

We must not turn a blind eye on the objections that are raised against this concept, and fall too quickly into overwhelming

enthusiasm in light of its many positive impacts.

‣Reputation

There is the potential risk that some firms might take advantage of the valuable reputation that comes with the term "social

entrepreneurship" simply to boost their reputation. They may change their business model not to commit themselves to this

innovative idea, but rather to convey a better, more socially acceptable picture of themselves to potential buyers, or to satisfy

their stakeholders.

‣Problems with decentralisation21

If social enterprises were to provide most of our welfare services, there is the likelihood that, depending on the companies in

different areas, the level of welfare might vary on a geographical basis. Social enterprise start-ups may also occur more

frequently in wealthier areas, where people are more likely to possess the education and the funds necessary to realise such

enterprises. Higher entrepreneurial activity in one area will create advantages for this particular section of the community, but

the opposite might leave some parts at a great disadvantage. Moreover, there is the danger that services might become too

personalised22 and therefore lose the much-required impartiality. This almost inevitably increases the risk of discriminatory

treatments, or at least raises such allegations.

These objections are indeed valid. However, particularly regarding the second criticism, the author argues that such

problems will be unlikely to arise since it is not suggested that social entrepreneurship completely replace the state welfare

system, but shall supplement a minimum level of social welfare which would still be provided by a centralised system. To

reduce the risk of geographical dissimilarities, state-funded subsidies could be given to encourage new social enterprises in

areas in which only a few are in existence, or to encourage existing social entrepreneurs to expand into these areas. One-

time investments like these would very likely pay-off quickly. Furthermore, an independent commission could deal with

The Spectrum | edition 02 36

19 Compare Leadbetter, fn 15, at 23

20 Ibid.

21 Cook, Dodds and Mitchell, 2002

22 Ibid.

allegations of discrimination and hence resolve potential problems that critics currently see in implementing this concept on a

wider basis.

Conclusion

The author has sought to bring some clarity to the uncertainty that surrounds the concept of 'social entrepreneurship' and

attempted to give an insight into the positive impacts this concept could have on our welfare system. Innovation and reform

are what is needed to bring about improvements and to help to ensure that social welfare is achieved on a large scale. This

is not to say that the concept is completely flawless and can instantly be put into practice, but collaboration and

interdependence between the public sector, social entrepreneurs and society could ensure the reform of our current welfare

system, which the author believes is not equipped with the necessary tools and resources to withstand the numerous

challenges arising out of the economic crisis and structural changes within society.

Bibliography

Abu-Saifan, Samer. “Social Entrepreneurship: Definition and Boundaries.” Technology Innovation Management Review 22

(2012). http://www.timreview.ca/sites/default/files/article_PDF/Saifan_TIMReview_February2012_2.pdf.

Bankston, Carl L. and Zhou, Min. “Social Capital as Process: The Meanings and Problems of a Theoretical Metaphor.”

Sociological Inquiry 72: 2 (2002). 285-317.

Barendsen, Linn and Gardner, Howard. “Is the social entrepreneur a new type of leader?” Leader to Leader 34 (2004).

43-50.

Coleman, James S. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988). S95-S120.

Cook, Beth; Dodds, Chris; Mitchell, William. “The false premises of Social Entrepreneurship.” Centre of Full Employment and

Equity. Last modified March 1, 2002. http://apo.org.au/node/8782.

Emerson, Jed. “The Blended Value Proposition: Integrating Social and Financial Returns.” California Review Management

45:4 (2003). 33-52.

Leadbetter, Charles. “The rise of the social entrepreneur.” Demos. Last modified January 1, 1997. http://www.demos.co.uk/

publications/socialentrepreneur.

Osberg, Sally and Martin, Roger L. “Social Entrepreneurship: The Case for Definition.” Stanford Social Innovation Review 27

(2007). http://www.skollfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/2007SP_feature_martinosberg.pdf.

Putnam, Robert. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.

Weerawardena, Jay & Sullivan Mort, Gillian. “Investigating social entrepreneurship: A multidimensional model.” Journal of

World Business 41:1 (2006). 21-35.

The Spectrum | edition 02 37

The International Arms Trade and the UK’s role

Johanna Grusch

Since 2011, thousands of Syrian citizens have been killed and, despite seemingly endless efforts in peace negotiations, the fighting continues. When the international community pushed for a military intervention in

order to end the bloodshed, China and Russia vetoed the resolution in the United Nations Security

Council. The fact that both the regime and its opponents have vast amounts of weapons at their disposal renders the conflict even more difficult to resolve and extremely deadly. Over the last 10 years, Syria’s

imports of major weapons have increased by 580%1. Interestingly, 78% of these imports where provided by Russia2.

Not only in Syria, but all around the globe, the arms trade is big business. Throughout the last two decades arms exports

have reached approximately $60 billion worldwide3 - levels which are worryingly reminiscent of Cold War arms races. Ever

greater sophistication in technology produces highly advanced weaponry, ranging from machine guns, rifles, tanks and

armoured vehicles, to radar systems, fighter aircraft, helicopters and warships equipped with guided missiles. While

countries worldwide are recipients of these goods4, there is only a small number of producing countries which together

account for nearly 80% of arms exports5. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US has been in the leading position,

providing 30% of arms exports. Russia follows with 24% and also Germany, France, the UK and China, whose arms

production has risen considerably over the last decade, hold a significant share of arms exports 6.

While some of these countries already have high standards of controls, the international trade is still a patchwork of

regulations with numerous loopholes and a large amount of grey area. The problem with international arms trade is not the

illegal transfer of dangerous goods but the fact that most of the arms sales, even to undemocratic and oppressive regimes,

are in fact legal. Because of this, over 150 members of the United Nations voted for the establishment of stronger

international arms trade standards (only one nation, Zimbabwe, voted against). In July 2012, a UN Conference will meet in

order to draft an Arms Trade Treaty, which will establish international criteria for the licensing of arms exports. However,

drafting a treaty text and convincing countries to sign will not be enough. In the international context, where instruments for

law enforcements are very limited, designing effective rules and obligations will be a challenging task for the UN. Especially,

when the issue concerned is as explosive as the international arms trade.

Selling arms is not only economically profitable but also a highly influential political tool. While the arms transfer’s share in the

global economy remains comparatively small, its political impact is tremendous: arms deals strengthen and create military

alliances, impact state behaviour, economic stability and development7. Military capacities are a crucial part of every

The Spectrum | edition 02 38

1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012

2 Ibid.

3 Grimmett, 2008, CRS-4

4 The bigger part of arms exports goes to developing countries, see: Ibid.

5 Holtom et al, 2012

6 Ibid.

7 Stohl and Grillot, 2009

country’s power and national security considerations. Governments which are the biggest customers of the arms industry

are also essential for subsidising arms production. Following the tradition of realpolitik, five of the six biggest arms exporters

– US, UK, France, Russia and China – also constitute the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Unfortunately, power and national security considerations often outweigh human security risks. Economic advantages and

profits derived from the weapons industry are fundamentally built on conflicts and political tensions. The arms business is an

inherently deadly one. The lack of international regulations and the quest for profits brings ever more sophisticated weapons

into the hands of corrupt, oppressive regimes and terrorist groups. Far too often, arms transfers go unchecked, undermine

the efforts of humanitarian peace-keeping organisations and result in countless civilian deaths. Even liberal democratic

countries, whose aim is the promotion of peace and democracy, although sometimes indirectly, are guilty of providing

weapons to conflict zones and thus further intensify oppression and killings. UK arms, as the Campaign Against Arms Trade

states, were used in order to fight the Arab Spring in Libya and Bahrain, in Israeli attacks on Gaza in 2009, by the Indonesian

military in East Timor and by Argentina in the Falkland Wars8. Out of the sixteen countries, which were identified as locations

of major armed conflict in 2009, the UK sold weapons to twelve9. Moreover, despite the fact that inimical relations and

armed conflicts between India and Pakistan continue to bring shockingly high levels of violence to the region, the UK

supplies both countries with weapons10. The Financial Times cited UK industry officials stating that the “regional tension

between the nuclear-armed neighbors is a unique selling opportunity”11 and even high ranking politicians were accused of

working in the interests of arms producing companies in peace negotiations12.

The ease with which arms can be brought into areas of tension may be economically profitable for the arms industry and

also some politicians, but it also makes conflicts more likely, more deadly and more difficult to resolve. Evidence of British

arms used in bloody conflicts around the globe led to a call for stricter controls of arms exports. UK politicians, together with

numerous NGOs, have been at the forefront of fighting for an arms trade treaty. But the strengthening of regulations is very

difficult since political ties between the UK’s biggest arms companies and the government considerably influence arms

control and export limitations. BAE Systems, which produces for example military aircraft, defence electronics and land

warfare systems, is a major actor influencing British politics. In 2006, when Serious Fraud Office investigations due to major

corruption allegations threatened an Al-Yamamah deal, a multi-billion pound sale of Eurofighter Typhoons to Saudi Arabia,

the government suddenly discontinued all investigations. Prime Minister Tony Blair justified this decision in terms of national

security concerns13. In 2010, BAE Systems PLC was sentenced to $400 million criminal fine because of corruption and

violations of the Arms Export Control Act14. But BAE Systems deals are not the only cases of corruption. In fact, the arms

trade is considered one of the most corrupt businesses in the world15. The US Department of Commerce estimated that

50% of all bribes are paid for defence contracts16.

However, despite major cases of corruption, UK arms exports already have very high standards in comparison to other

countries. Companies have to apply for export licences at the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, which

approves or refuses applications according to the Consolidated EU and National Export Licensing Criteria. The respect for

The Spectrum | edition 02 39

8 Campaign Against Arms Trade, 2011

9 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010; Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2010, HC 202

10 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012

11 Financial Times, 2002

12 Ibid.

13 BBC News, 2006

14 US Department of Justice, 2010

15 Courtney et al, 2002

16 Ibid.

fundamental freedoms and human rights in destination countries is one of the mandatory criteria17. But as soon as arms are

exported, they are only subject to a patchwork of other national arrangements which were often set up during the Cold War

in order to impede military advantages for the enemy. Today, the lack of international regulations in the arms trade is a

serious issue which has to be addressed as soon as possible.

Although this is widely acknowledged, the dangers of UK arms trade are still underestimated and even ignored by those who

argue for the need of the arms industry to grow and globalise. Accordingly, arms exports are essential tools in order to meet

challenges of the financial crisis, employment shortages and national security concerns. However, economic profits based

on arms exports to conflict zones should raise major moral questions. Moreover, since the arms exports constitute only

1.5% of British exports18, the industry’s ability to boost the economy and create jobs is highly overstated. In fact, the industry

and its jobs are reliant on state subsidies. As an editor of the Financial Times stated, “you can have as many arms export

jobs as you are prepared to waste public money subsidising”19. Both subsidies and skilled workers which are currently

employed by the arms industry could be used for tackling other major security concerns. For instance, the development of

renewable energy technologies would not only create jobs and bring economic advantages but it would also further British

energy security and promote environmental protection. Thus, stricter controls on the arms trade would neither harm the

British economy, nor employment rates or national security. In fact, global security would be significantly enhanced.

Consequently, in July 2012, the international community has to draft a treaty, which standardizes and regulates the

international arms trade. Since international law enforcement architectures are limited, an arms trade treaty also has to

include rules and obligations which ensure that all members comply. International criteria which prohibit arms transfers to

countries where weapons undermine peace, stability and human rights, have to be established. In order to fill loopholes and

colour grey areas, an international arms trade treaty has to include all weapons, transactions and trainings. Instead of further

legalising the arms trade, the UN has to put strong and effective restrictions on buyers and sellers. In addition to this, market

as complex and dangerous as the global arms market has to be more transparent and its actors held accountable. The UN

recognizes the right of every nation to arm and defend itself but in order to fulfil its main purpose - “to maintain international

peace and security”20 - stricter arms trade regulations are imperative.

The character of war is changing. In contrast to former wars, more and more conflicts take place within states, rather than

between. Arms are no longer provided by national industries but part of globalised markets. In addition to this, weapons

become more deadly and sophisticated and result in an increasingly high proportion of civilian deaths. As past experiences

have shown, more weapons do not automatically increase security. In fact, uncontrolled flows of arms intensify conflicts and

undermine peace-keeping efforts. Due to a lack of control, economic and human developments are reversed, political

systems destabilised and people killed. With the globalisation of the arms trade, national or regional regulations are no longer

effective and far from sufficient.

The Spectrum | edition 02 40

17 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2010, HC 202

18 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2010, HC 202

19 Beattie, 2010

20 UN, 1945

Bibliography

BBC News. Blair defends Saudi probe ruling. Last updated December 15, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/

politics/6182125.stm.

Beattie, Alan. “Promoting exports full of risk for world economy.” The Financial Times. Last updated August 20, 2010. http://

www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2b8b272e-a4b4-11df-8c9f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1rnyST7gc.

Campaign Against Arms Trade. Introduction to the Arms Trade: The Impact of the Arms Trade. Last modified August 2,

2011. http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/introduction/impact-conflict.php.

Courtney, Catherine; Cockcroft Laurence; Murray, David. “Corruption in the Official Arms Trade: Policy Research Paper 001.”

Transparency International UK (2002). http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/2002-publications/23-corruption-in-the-

official-arms-trade.

Department for Business Innovation & Skills. Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 2009. London: The Stationary

Office Limited, 2010.

Financial Times. Quoted in “The Arms Trade is Big Business.” Global Issues. Date of original article February 27, 2002.

http://www.globalissues.org/article/74/the-arms-trade-is-big-business.

Grimmett, Richard F. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 2000-2007. Washington DC: Congressional

Research Service, 2008.

Holtom, Paul; Bromley, Mark; Wezeman, Pieter D; Wezeman, Siemon T. “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2011.”

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2011). http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=443.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute;

SIPRI

Yearbook 2010. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Press Release 2012. Last modified March 19, 2012. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/measuring/

embargo_press_release_2012.

Stohl, Rachel. and Grillot, Suzette. The International Arms Trade. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009.

UN, The. “Charter of the United Nations.” The Un.org. Date of original document June 26, 1945. http://www.un.org/en/

documents/charter/intro.shtml.

US Department of Justice. BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine. Last updated

March 1, 2010. http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html.

The Spectrum | edition 02 41

03 | Energy and Environment

The World on Our Plate – The Impact of Our Current Food Culture

Tamara Dimova

Food’s impacts range from health concerns to environmental problems. Environmental issues linked to

food cover a broad field, extending from the agricultural to energy sectors. This paper examines the environmental and health impacts of food by explaining Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) and carbon footprint,

then assessing food’s impact on the environment and health, and what constitutes a healthier and sustainable diet. We explore packaging and resource depletion, two contributors to foods’ environmental

impact. We turn to climate change (CC), a threat to food production, health and energy, and suggest CC

mitigation policy action for European policy.

LCA is an environmental accounting framework that examines products’ environmental impact from production to their

selling1 and it has gained importance in agro-food production2. LCA is useful for producers to improve their product’s

environmental performance, for consumers to responsibly choose what to buy, and for policy-makers to form long-term food

strategies.3 Carbon footprint is a measure that calculates the total set of Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions caused by a

product4. Wiedmann and Minx define carbon footprint as “a measure of the exclusive total amount of CO2 emissions that is

directly or indirectly caused by an activity or is accumulated over the life stages of the product”.5 The measure can be

calculated in two ways, one of which uses the LCA framework.

Food’s Environmental and Health Impacts

This section focuses on food’s impact on environmental degradation and health. Food production depletes resources,

degrades land and air quality, and generates vast amounts of waste.6 Certain foods, e.g. livestock, have a greater

environmental impact than others. Livestock and dairy products have the highest environmental impacts as they require a lot

of resources (e.g. land). This requirement and the nature of livestock translates into major contributions to CC, water and air

pollution, land degradation, and biodiversity loss.7 Additionally, increased meat and dairy consumption can have diverse

The Spectrum | edition 02 42

1 Pelletier, 2008; Vazquez-Rowe et al., in press

2 Cellura, et al., 2012

3 Ibid.

4 Pathak, et al., 2010

5 Wieldmann and Minx, 2008, 4

6 Cellura, et al., 2012

7 Pelletier, 2008; Virtanen, et al., 2011; McMichael, et al., 2007

negative health effects, e.g. increased risk of cardio-vascular diseases.8 Conversely, vegetables have lower GHG emissions

and carbon footprint as well as contain less fat, meaning they are healthier.9 These differences are further amplified by the

diets that people have as people in high-income countries consume more meat, whereas people in low-income countries

consume more vegetables10.

A traditional part of nutritional diets has been insects. They contain high contents of protein, carbohydrates, lipids, and

vitamins.11 Insects also have a low environmental impact, requiring little land and other resources to grow and mature.

Considering the high prices of meat, prevalent poverty, growing populations, and number of malnourished people in

developing countries,12 eating more insects could be a potential solution to improving people’s nutrition in the developing

world as well as reducing their diet’s environmental impact.13

The environmental impact of food extends beyond the production of the food itself. The impact is also influenced by

packaging, transport, etc. Cellura, et al. found that packaging and design account for the highest environmental impact in

terms of waste generation during food production. Packaging and design do not influence the product’s nutritional value and

can be easily re-designed to use environmentally degradable materials or less packaging.14 Economic incentives in the form

of policies could stimulate action to reduce the environmental impact of food packaging.

Most estimates concerning the environmental impact of food products have been made using LCA and the carbon footprint.

However, problems arise due to the incomplete nature of these measures. For example, Ridoutt, et al. conducted a LCA to

estimate the impact of agriculture on freshwater availability. Despite concluding that agriculture threatens freshwater

availability, they conducted an incomplete water LCA. For complete LCAs and to be able to assess the overall environmental

impact of agriculture on resource depletion (freshwater availability here), experiments, results and statistics should be based

on an extensive database of individual cases of food.15 Such exercises would allow for more rigorous and scientifically

accurate assessment of the impact of food on resource depletion.

Climate Change (CC)

This section focuses on the two-fold relationship between CC and food: 1. food and agricultural production contribute

considerably to CC, and 2. CC will negatively impact food yields.16

CC involves rising temperatures and global circulation system changes that will perturb human-made systems like markets,

economies, countries, and populations. The food sector adds to CC by increasing the atmospheric GHG emissions. These

emissions include CO2 from fuel combustion, CH4 from animal husbandry and rice cultivation, and N2O from the turnover of

nitrogen in soil. 17 These impacts have mostly been measured through the carbon footprint and LCA.

The repercussions of the changes that global warming will cause on human-made systems are worrying. These

environmental changes will disrupt the food sector by altering the conditions, in which we grow food. The rising

The Spectrum | edition 02 43

8 McMichael, et al., 2007

9 Pathak, et al., 2010

10 Ibid.

11 Premalatha, et al., 2011

12 FAO, 2011

13 Premalatha, et al., 2011

14 Cellura, et al., 2012

15 Ridoutt, et al., 2012

16 McMichael, et al., 2007

17 Kramer, et al., 1999

temperatures will cause water shortages, soil exhaustion, biodiversity loss, and droughts.18 The changes will be

accompanied by physical hazards, more frequent extreme events, air quality problems, and altered patterns of infectious

disease transmission. All of these will reduce agricultural yields, ultimately raising food security concerns.19 These concerns

are aggravated by worsening living conditions, which will also give rise to health problems.20

Before addressing mitigation and adaptation measures however, we need to consider two key contributors to CC from the

food sector – international trade and energy. With open trade between nations, food travels across the globe every day.

Food transport majorly contributes to foods’ GHG emissions.21 Considering that food production constitutes a large part of

developing countries’ GDP, countries prioritise the economy over the environment, posing problems for long-term food

production and security. International trade here portrays the complex relationship between the economy and the

environment, where one prospers at the cost of the other.

Energy is another contributor to high food emissions. Traditionally, food has been produced with a reliance on non-renewable

energy resources.22 Fossil fuels play a key role in the food’s environmental impact. Considering the depletion of non-

renewable energy resources, traditional food production needs to be altered. Reducing food’s environmental impact needs

to integrate energy efficiency into food production.23

Climate Change Mitigation

Problem Existing Policy to Improve Policy Recommendation

Incomplete and inaccurate coverage of

indicators (LCA, carbon footprint as

well as others)

EU 2020 target 2. Invest in R&D Further development of the indicators

and specialisation

Resource depletion in food production EU 2020 target 2. Invest in R&D Develop more efficient production

strategies to minimise waste and

resource useFuel combustion for food production EU 2020 target 3. Climate change and

renewable energy

Replace with renewable energy

sources; reduce emissionsClimate change worsening living

conditions and posing concerns for

food insecurity

EU 2020 target 3. Climate change and

renewable energy

Change cropping rotations; instigate

climate change adaptive farming

techniquesPackaging EU 2020 target 3. Climate change and

renewable energy

Use recycled materials for packaging,

less packaging, and biodegradable

materials - reduce emissionsMeat production and consumption:

High environmental impact, Health

risks, Climate change contribution

EU 2020 target 4. Education and

awareness

CAP subsidies for alternative sources

of protein

Restrict livestock production

Stimulate vegetable consumption

In developing countries, encourage

traditional sources of protein such as

insects

Table 1. Problems, Corresponding Policies, and Recommendations for Policy Direction.Table 1. Problems, Corresponding Policies, and Recommendations for Policy Direction.Table 1. Problems, Corresponding Policies, and Recommendations for Policy Direction.

The Spectrum | edition 02 44

18 McMichael and Lindgren, 2011

19 Jankowska, et al., 2012

20 McMichael, et al., 2011

21 Virtanen, et al., 2011

22 McMichael, et al., 2007

23 Cellura, et al., 2012

The EU 2020 has a target commitment to 10% of transport energy to be renewable. For this to happen, further research into

national potential modelling is required.24 The European Commission responded to this emphasis by increasing the research

funding by 45% between 2012 and 2020, from €55 to €80 billion.25 We summarise these and other suggestions in the Table

1 (see above).

Although the policy suggestions (Table 1) to the problems outlined above seem simplistic, they could enhance food’s

environmental performance and provide better understanding of the relationship between the environment, health and food.

Conclusion

In sum, the food sector degrades the environment considerably. We use only LCA and the carbon footprint, which provide a

general idea of the impact of food products. Modernised diets portray problems with unhealthy eating, such as processed

foods, and high contents of fats and sugars. While developed countries experience obesity, people in the developing world

lack nutrients like proteins as a result of the high prices of foods. Further, packaging and resource depletion contribute to

food’s environmental impact. CC aggravates some of these problems by threatening food security and human health. The

European Commission could implement various policies to improve elements from the outlined situation.

Bibliography

Cellura, Maurizio; Longo, Sonial; Mistretta, Marina.“Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) of protected crops: an Italian case study.”

Journal of Cleaner Production 28 (2012). 56-62.

European Commission (EUROPA). Food Safety. Last modified 2012. http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/sustainability/

index_en.htm.

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation). “World Food and Agriculture in Review.” The State of Food and Agriculture

2010-2011 (2011). http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i2050e/i2050e00.htm

Jankowska, M Marta; Lopez-Carr, David; Funk, Chris; Husak, Gregory J.; Chafe, Zoe A. “Climate change and human health:

Spatial modelling of water availability, malnutrition and livelihoods in Mali, Africa”. Applied Geography 33 (2012). 4-15.

Kramer, Klass Jan; Moll, Henry C.; Nonhebel, Sanderine; Wilting, Harry C. “Greenhouse gas emissions related to Dutch food

consumption.” Energy Policy 27 (1999). 203–216.

McCarthy, Mark; Aitsi-Selmi, Amina; Banati, Diana; Frewer, Lynn; Hirani, Vasant; Lobstein, Tim; McKenna, Brian; Mulla,

Zenab; Rabozzi, Giulia; Sfetcu, Raluca; Newton, Rachel. “Research for food and health for Europe: themes, needs and

proposals.” Health Research Policy and Systems 9 (2011). 37-51.

Macilwain, Colin. “Europe lines up hefty science-funding hike.” Nature 475 (2011). 14-15.

McMichael, Anthony J and Lindgren, E. “Climate change: present and future risks to health, and necessary responses.”

Journal of Internal Medicine 270:5 (2011). 401-413.

McMichael, Anthony J; Powles, John W.; Butler, Colin D.; Uauy, Ricardo.“Food, livestock production, energy, climate

change, and health.” Lancet 370 (270).1253-63.

Pathak, H.; Jain, N.; Bhatia, A.; Patel, J.; Aggarwal, PK. “Carbon footprints of Indian food items.” Agriculture, Ecosystems,

and Environment 139: (2010). 66-73.

Pelletier, N. “Environmental performance in the US broiler poultry sector: Life cycle energy use and greenhouse gas, ozone

depleting, acidifying, and eutrophying emissions.” Agricultural Systems 98 (2008). 67-73.

The Spectrum | edition 02 45

24 Smyth, et al., 2010

25 Macilwain, 2011

Premalatha, M.; Abbasi, Tasneem; Abbasi, Tabassum; Abbasi. SA. “Energy-efficient food production to reduce global

warming and ecodegradation: the use of edible insects.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 15 (2011).

4357-4360.

Ridoutt, Bradley G.; Sanguansri, Peerasak; Freer, Michael; Harper, Gregory S. “Water footprint of livestock: comparison of six

geographically defined beef production systems.” International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment 17 (2012). 165-175.

Smyth, BM.; Gallachoir, BO; Korres, NE.; Murphy, JD. “Can we meet targets for biofuels and renewable energy in transport

given the constraints imposed by policy in agriculture and energy?” Journal of Cleaner Production 18 (2010). 1671-1685.

Tukker, Arnold; Bausch-Goldbohm, Sandra; de Koning, Arnold; Verhejden, Marieke; Kleijn, René; Wolf, Oliver; Pérez

Domínguez, Ignacio; Rueda-Cantuche, Jose. “Environmental impacts of changes to healthier diets in Europe.” Ecological

Economics 70 (2011) 1776-1788.

Vazquez-Rowe, Ian;, Moreira, Ma Teresa; Feijoo. Gumersindo. “Inclusion of discard assessment indicators in fisheries life

cycle assessment studies. Expanding the use of fishery-specific impact categories.” International Journal of Life Cycle

Assessment (2012). doi: 10.1007/s11367-012-0395-x

Virtanen, Yrjö; Kurppa, Sirpa; Saarinen, Merja; Mäenpää, Ilmo; Mäkelä, Johanna; Grönroos, Juha. “Carbon footprint of food

– approaches from national input-output statistics and LCA of a food portion.” Journal of Cleaner Production 19 (2011).

1849-1856.

Wiedmann, Thomas and Minx, Jan. “A Definition of 'Carbon Footprint'.” Ecological Economics Research Trends, edited by

C.C. Pertsova 1-11. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2008.

The Spectrum | edition 02 46

East Africa’s Famine: How Did We Let it Happen?

Steven Forrest

In 2011 the world witnessed the first famine of the 21st century in the Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle

regions of Southern Somalia. Neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia and East Djibouti were also affected by widespread malnourishment and large parts of these countries were deemed to be at 'Emergency' and

'Crisis' food levels. It is estimated that in this crisis approximately 50-100,000 people died and a further 13.3 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in the region known as the Horn of Africa.1

The humanitarian crisis was due to a two season long drought and the absence of early rains in 2011,

which caused a decrease in food production; however, a history of conflict and delays in first sanctioning and then delivering international aid led to the subsequent famine. Early warning systems had predicted

food insecurity back in 2010, but aid was not delivered until people started to die and a humanitarian crisis was called. Previous responses by the international community to drought have been similarly slow, such

as in the Sahel (2005 and 2010) and Kenya (2005/6 and 2008/9). This article will explore the 2011 famine,

not only as being triggered by the prevailing drought conditions but also as a result of the underlying problems that previously existed in the areas. In doing this it will look at the difficulties faced in Somalia,

where a famine was officially declared, and those faced by politicians authorising aid donations, in particular the short-term nature of aid donations and the lack of funding for the enactment of long-term

disaster risk reduction measures.

Causes of Food Insecurity

Food security is “when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active

life”.2 Food insecurity exists when people do not have access to food and can then suffer from malnourishment.

In Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and East Djibouti food insecurity was primarily caused by the drought conditions from 2010. The

drought was caused by a La Nina event that resulted in a cooling of sea surface temperatures in the Pacific Ocean.3 This

event resulted in prolonged dry periods in the rainy season of East Africa. The additional failure of the March/May 2011 rains

led to widespread harvest failures. However, it was not the drought alone that caused the disaster. Disasters occur when

natural hazards, such as the drought, meet social systems.4

Thus, while the 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa was initiated by a drought causing a reduction in food production by

farmers, what ultimately caused the famine was the history of conflict that had resulted in inadequacies in governance and

an inability to deliver humanitarian aid.5 Whilst these factors were also partially responsible for the slow international aid

The Spectrum | edition 02 47

1 DFID, 2011

2 WHO, 2012

3 FEWS NET, 2010a

4 Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon and Davis, 2005

5 Sheeran, 2011

response, the international community could have done much more to prevent this humanitarian crisis from occurring. The

resulting disasters expose the underlying inequalities and injustices that exist in the affected areas.

Famines Do Not Occur in Functioning Democracies

This famous belief of Nobel Peace Prize winner Amartya Sen can be applied to Somalia. Large parts of the country have not

been under central government control since the Somali Civil War began in 1991 and those that are have been run by a

'Transitional Federal Government'. Different factions and groups govern geographical areas of Somalia and even the capital

Mogadishu is still only partially controlled by the government.

Aid delivery attempts by several international non-governmental organisations were hampered and often hijacked by the

Islamist militant group al-Shabab.6 The group, operating in the south of Somalia, initially restricted access and aid distribution

by the UN World Food Programme and other aid agencies in the areas that they control. Al-Shabab also disrupted relief

operations in nearby Kenyan refugee camps built for Somalis fleeing the southern areas. Their attacks killed several aid

workers and led to the evacuation of many others.7 The ongoing conflict between government forces and al-Shabab

militants also disrupted the efforts of charity organisations within Somalia’s capital city. A charity-run hospital in Mogadishu

was just one aid operation that closed due to the instability and subsequent staff deaths.8

A Slow International Response

The international community was slow to respond to warnings about the growing food insecurity in East Africa. The Famine

Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), funded by the US Agency for International Development, is designed to warn

of food security crises before they occur. FEWS NET predicted that the La Nina would negatively affect food security in East

Africa back in August 20109 and issued a ‘Food Security Alert’ for the area in November 2010.10 The latter alert predicted

poor harvests and suggested interventions to support those in the affected countries.

At the beginning of July 2011 only 51% of the US $1.293 billion requested had been raised.11 Significant international aid

contributions did not begin until June/July 2011 after both the major media networks and the UN had declared a famine.12

Many humanitarian and development agencies, including the Kenyan Red Cross, were also ignored in their appeals for aid

donations in the months leading up to the disaster.13

Oxfam and Save the Children published a report in 2012 analysing why the international community had been slow to

pledge aid donations to the affected countries. The reluctance to offer a faster and earlier response was primarily due to a

fear of uncertainty. Despite the early warnings there was a fear of taking action based on predictions that might then turn out

to be false. This could result in undermining farmer’s livelihoods by flooding their markets with food aid as well as causing

reputational damage to politicians were they to send aid to a country that didn't need it.

There is uncertainty, too, in the donor reports that take months to compile and do not accurately reflect the current situation

on the ground. There is also the distinction between scientists and policy makers. Scientists can form forecasts based on

the data that they have gathered, but they are still making predictions. Predictions carry levels of uncertainty. Policy makers

The Spectrum | edition 02 48

6 Day, 2011

7 Moszynski, 2011

8 Ibid.

9 FEWS NET, 2010a

10 FEWS NET, 2010b

11 Loewenberg, 2011a

12 Oxfam, 2012

13 Oniang'o, 2011

have to make the decision and the responsibility of the outcomes rests on their shoulders; they may therefore be reluctant to

make a decision without ‘hard’ evidence. This ‘fear of getting it wrong’ by politicians resulted in delayed aid responses.

In this humanitarian crisis the aid donations were a reactive response to the unfolding famine and widespread food insecurity

in the region. Donations and support did not increase until there was confirmed suffering and death. This in turn led to

increased media coverage that forced the international community into action. This short-term approach needs to be

changed; we should not wait until a humanitarian catastrophe has been declared before we deal with a crisis. This point, in

addition to the politicians' ‘fear of getting it wrong’, suggests the need for longer-term measures in order to prevent a

catastrophe from happening at all. Long-term measures can be implemented through disaster risk reduction.

Disaster Risk Reduction

As opposed to short-term emergency responses that are reactive, disaster risk reduction is proactive (Pelling, 2010).

Investment in long-term disaster risk reduction is crucial in order to reduce the impacts of future disasters such as this

famine.14 This can be in the form of building a more effective early warning system that is able to initiate action at an

international level. It can also involve measures to help farmers to reduce the impact of droughts on their livestock, crops and

income levels. It was not just a lack of food, but a lack of affordability of food as food prices had increased by more than

200% over the two seasons of drought.15 These price increases were compounded by the loss of income for farmers due to

poor harvests.

One example of effective disaster risk reduction is in Ethiopia, where Oxfam have strengthened the livelihoods of those in the

Guji zone through a small-scale irrigation project.16 The increased access to water has enabled people to increase food

production for themselves, even making surplus to sell. The project has consequently eliminated their previous reliance on

food aid and ensured that women, who in this region are the first to go hungry, were food secure. Disaster risk reduction is

cost-effective and, in strengthening people’s ability to survive and withstand the shocks caused by natural hazards, it is

reducing the impact of disasters as well as addressing underlying inequalities.

Conclusion

Approximately 50-100,000 people died and over 13.3 million people were affected by the 2011 humanitarian crisis in the

Horn of Africa. However, the drought was not the only causal factor, with the instability and violence in Somalia contributing

to the famine.

The slow international response, despite repeated warnings from famine early warning systems and non-governmental

organisations, allowed preventable suffering and deaths to occur. Uncertainty in the predictions and a fear of making wrong

decisions resulted in slow and late aid responses. Only when media coverage increased and a humanitarian crisis was

declared by the UN did aid donations increase. Media coverage has decreased dramatically since the peak of the

humanitarian crisis in 2011, despite there still being areas at 'Emergency' and 'Crisis' levels, and the famine itself only having

been officially declared ended in February 2012 (DFID, 2012).17

International donors may be suffering from the effects of the economic crisis, but if an opportunity to prevent the deaths of

thousands and suffering of millions arises then there exists a responsibility to do so. The mindset of donors needs to be

changed away from short-term emergency responses to long-term disaster risk reduction. This longer-term process will

enable communities to strengthen their own resilience to natural hazards and reduce their dependence on international food

aid. Whilst future droughts cannot be prevented, perhaps disaster risk reduction measures will mean that, next time, a

famine can.

The Spectrum | edition 02 49

14 Oxfam, 2011

15 Loewenberg, 2011b

16 Oxfam, 2011

17 DFIF, 2012

Bibliography

Day, Michael. “Charities criticise rich countries’ 'shameful' response to famine in Horn of Africa.” BMJ  343 (2011).

Accessed April 10, 2012. doi: 10.1136/bmj.d4799.

DFID. “Horn of Africa – UK response to the crisis.” UK Aid, Department for International Development (2012).  http://

www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/Horn-of-Africa-UK-aid-factsheet-28-Jan-2012.pdf.

FEWS NET. “EXECUTIVE BRIEF: La Niña and Food Security in East Africa August 2010.” US AID, Famine Early Warning

System Network (2010a).  http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADT163.pdf.

FEWS NET. “EAST AFRICA: Food Security Alert November 2, 2010.” US AID, Famine Early Warning System Network

(2010b).  http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/EA_Regional%20Alert%20Oct%202010_Final.pdf.

Loewenberg, Samuel. “Global food crisis takes heavy toll on east Africa.” The Lancet 378:9785 (2011a). 17-18.

Loewenberg, Samuel. “Humanitarian response inadequate in Horn of Africa crisis.” The Lancet 378:9791 (2011b) 555-558.

Oxfam. “Briefing on the Horn of Africa Drought 2011: Disaster Risk Reduction – fundamental to saving lives and reducing

poverty.” Relief Web (2011b). http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fullreport_132.pdf.

Oxfam (2012) “A Dangerous Delay: The cost of late response to early warnings in the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa.

Oxfam and Save the Children (2012) http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/a-dangerous-delay-the-cost-of-late-

response-to-early-warnings-in-the-2011-droug-203389.

Oniang’o, Ruth. “Our Children need to be saved from Hunger!” African Journal of Food, Agriculture, Nutrition and

Development, 11:4 (2011): Editorial.

Pelling, Mark. Adaptation to Climate Change: From resilience to transformation. Oxon: Routledge. 2011.

Moszynski, Peter. “Militant attacks are jeopardising famine relief in Horn of Africa.” BMJ 343 (2011). doi: 10.1136/bmj.d6729

Sheeran, Josette. “Preventing Famine.” Finance & Development (2011).  http://www.ieo-imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/

2011/12/pdf/sheeran.pdf.

WHO. “Glossary: Food Security.” World Health Organisation. Last accessed April 10, 2012. http://www.who.int/trade/

glossary/story028/en/.

Wisner, Ben; Blaikie, Piers; Cannon, Terry; and Davis, Ian. At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters 2nd

edition. Oxon: Routledge, 2005.

The Spectrum | edition 02 50

04 | Healthcare

The Challenge ‘Global Health’ Poses to Health Systems Strengthening in

Conflict-Affected Countries

Philip Lewis

The challenges facing health systems strengthening (HSS) in conflict-affected countries are multi-faceted and exceptional.1 They pose a huge development challenge with twenty-two of the thirty-four countries

furthest from reaching the Millennium Development Goals in or emerging from conflict and amongst a

series of appalling statistics comprise half of all children who die under 5 years in developing states despite only accounting for one-fifth of the total population.2 HSS’s importance has been recognised by the World

Health Organisation (WHO), which has developed a six building block framework comprising service delivery; the health workforce; information; medical products, vaccines and technologies; financing; and

leadership and governance.3 These building blocks, however, are problematic, particularly in conflict-

affected countries, because they are distinctly apolitical and lack context. Post-conflict countries are only very briefly mentioned in the WHO’s HSS Framework for Action published in 2007 and then only to

acknowledge that the WHO may act as a coordinator in such situations.4 This has led to a proliferation of alternative issues, priorities, and frameworks being developed although with no agreed indicators on how

to measure HSS.5 Rather than enter this definitional debate any further this essay will focus on the

contextual factors absent from the WHO’s HSS framework, which are vital for understanding the dynamics surrounding HSS in conflict-affected countries.6

Capacity

There are two interlinked aspects to health system capacity. These are the management, organisational and personnel

capacities in a Ministry of Health itself and those same capacities to provide service delivery across the country. In conflict-

affected countries it is almost uniformly the case that this capacity is at best severely diminished and often simply non-

The Spectrum | edition 02 51

1 Pavignani, 2005,165-71; Waldman, 2006, 6; Waters et al, 2007, 12; Kruk et al, 2010, 89-90; Pavignani, 2011, 662-63

2 DFID, 2010, 10; WDR, 2011, 1-2, 5-6; Zoellick, 2008, 68

3 WHO, 2007, 3

4 Ibid. 28-29

5 Balabanova, 2011, 270; GHLC, 2011b, 16; GHLC, 2011c, 341; Macrae, 1997, 183; Newbrander et al, 2011, 645, 651;

Newbrander, 2007, 14; Waters et al, 2007, 6; Percival and Sondorp, 2010, 3; USAID, 2009, 6

6 Balabanova, 2011, 298; GHLC, 2011b, 16-17; Waters et al, 2007, 2, 17; Newbrander et al, 2011, 658

existent.7 The limited capacity of the Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) in 2001 led to it implementing a Basic Package

of Health Services (BPHS). Through this the MoPH focused on managing and regulating health system financing whilst

NGOs were contracted for service delivery.8 This contracting enabled healthcare to be provided swiftly and widely to a

population that had some of the world’s worst health indices whilst allowing the government to focus the contracts on its

health priorities.9 Contracting despite its advantages early in the health system recovery process is far from being a panacea

for long-term HSS. Firstly, it is not necessarily the case that if a ministry has a limited capacity to provide health service

provision it will have a capacity to procure services from NGOs and that NGOs will be willing to take up these contracts as

has been highlighted in South Sudan.10

Secondly, although the BPHS is predicated on standardised priorities this does not mean it is delivered through standardised

contracts. In Afghanistan there has been a clear difference in the quality of NGOs contracted by various international

actors.11 Health contracting to NGOs in the early post-conflict stages of development is meant to act as an enabler and

multiplier of government, as has been the case in Bangladesh.12 It is, however, far from always being the case. NGOs short-

term contracts in Afghanistan have acted against the development of a long-term health system vision with contract

management and results measurement differences fragmenting the health system.13 Furthermore, health contracting has

political ramifications beyond the sector. In East Timor the perceived loss of sovereignty and legitimacy led to the

government focusing on repatriating service delivery within the public sector.14 In Afghanistan, health centres and health

workers have become targets for the insurgency.15 This underscores that the international complexion of health contracting

to external NGOs through funding from outside donors can actively support a corrosive slide in state legitimacy and capacity

in the face of ongoing conflict and the contest for power. In conflict-affected countries therefore analysing the health system’s

capacity in terms of its own inherent capabilities is important but insufficient to understand the challenges HSS faces. This is

because HSS occurs in an extraordinarily difficult and insecure environment where the health sector alone is not responsible

for its own deliverance. The main difficulty for HSS in conflict-affected countries is the security of the environment in which it

has to work. This has very little if anything to do with HSS or health system capacity but nevertheless is the essential

ingredient for success.

Contracting therefore has particular intrinsic technical and political difficulties in developing health system capacity.

Nevertheless, it is an attempt to work with the state and work to its priorities. This unfortunately is frequently not the case

with global health initiatives. Since 2000 a series of global health actors have been established to eradicate with

overwhelming funding the scourge of diseases such as AIDS. This is a laudable goal but for HSS it has had a distortionary

and adverse impact even when these actors purport to be supporting HSS.16 In Liberia, in a study in Nimba county, there

was a clear disparity in service provision of mental healthcare, Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI),

Emergency Obstetric Care (EmOC), HIV testing and Artemisinin Combination Therapy (ACT). Only 12%, 15% and 25% of

the population had access to mental healthcare, IMCI and EmOC respectively whilst HIV testing was available to more than

The Spectrum | edition 02 52

7 Lanjouw et al, 1999, 236; Cometto et al, 2010, 889; Shuey et al, 2003, 301; Macrae et al, 1996, 1098; Leather et al, 2006,

1120

8 Palmer et al, 2006, 719-720

9 Acerra et al, 2009, 78-79

10 Cometto et al, 2006, 900-902

11 Sabri et al, 2007, 2007

12 Koehlmoos et al, 2011, 59, 65-66

13 Sabri et al, 2007, 715-716

14 Alonso and Brugha, 2006, 211-212

15 Acerra et al, 2009, 79; PLoS Medicine Editors, 2011, 1

16 Macrae et al, 1996, 1103; GHLC, 2011a, 6; Marchal et al, 2009, 2-3; Rushton, 2011, 7

50% of the population and ACT, which tackles malaria, enjoyed 100% coverage. IMCI and EmOC are more complex and

expensive services than HIV testing or ACT whilst mental healthcare requires specialised diagnostic and counselling skills

along with the availability of psychopharmaceuticals and ongoing follow-up.17 This technical disparity, however, is not the full

picture. In 2004 the Global Fund gave more than $12 million over two years for malaria prevention and treatment. UNICEF,

WHO and USAID contributed $4 million in 2007 and the US President’s Malaria Initiative gave $12 million in 2008.

Additionally, from 2004-2008 the Global Fund, the Clinton Foundation, USAID and the UN Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS

gave around $30 million for HIV/AIDS control programmes. To put that into perspective Liberia’s Ministry of Health and Social

Welfare’s total budget in 2008 was $12 million.18 This overwhelming funding for two diseases at the top of global health

donors priorities does not, however, fit the priorities of Liberia’s North Central region that includes Nimba county which in a

2007 survey had a HIV infection prevalence rate of 0.5%, the lowest in the country.19 Global health actors priorities mean

that huge funding is directed at creating a distorted service provision instead of building capacity to deliver an equal and

equitable health system that would provide adequate funding to cover the extra costs of IMCI and EmOC and funding for

training health professionals in the use of these more complex services whilst focusing on mental healthcare as a priority.

This highlights that health system capacity building is frequently not the primary goal of international donors who finance the

overwhelming majority of health interventions in conflict-affected countries. The limited absorptive capacity of their ministry’s

of health enable donors to introduce and implement programmes that suit their political interests rather than aligning their

funding with national health strategies for holistic HSS that supports and is aligned with domestic capacity constraints. The

main challenge thus is less developing the capacity of the health system itself but rather ensuring that these political

concerns are aligned, harmonised and coordinated.

Coordination

In the abstract, coordination between donors, states, UN implementing agencies, bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies

and NGOs appears a technical exercise, albeit a large and complex one, of ensuring a common plan, implementing

procedures accordingly and measuring results to an agreed framework with extensive communication along the way. In

reality coordination faces immense challenges due to the political context in which it occurs. This is highlighted by the

dilemmas created by the relief to development continuum, which roughly follows the attempted war to peace transition of

conflict-affected countries. A country experiencing a civil war may receive humanitarian aid, which will be focused at the level

of the individual, is predicated on the greatest need and impartiality, and will mostly been provided by international NGOs

working independently.20 The problem comes when the war ends and a country begins the war to peace transition, thus in

the terminology of this essay it becomes a conflict-affected country, and requires development aid that is based on the

premise of building state capacity, which in a post-conflict environment may still be contested, not considered legitimate, or

simply not be there resulting in major coordination dilemmas.

The relief to development continuum raises two major challenges for HSS coordination. Firstly, relief and development are

financed through different models. Relief funding mechanisms disburse money far more quickly and with less accountability

and provide their funding directly to NGOs.21 In conflict-affected countries this means that donors often continue, due to

uncertain state legitimacy and weak capacity, to provide humanitarian aid rather than make the transition to development

funding with all the subsequent state and institutional building this entails.22 In South Sudan to overcome the difficulties in

transitioning from humanitarian to development-oriented financing a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was created in 2005 to

coordinate donor development funding through a single disbursing mechanism that was administered by the World Bank in

partnership with the Ministry of Health. As all donors apart from USAID agreed to use the MDTF as the main vehicle for

The Spectrum | edition 02 53

17 Kruk et al, 2010), 531-532

18 Ibid. 532

19 Ibid.

20 Macrae, 2001, 114

21 Waldman, 2006, 7; Newbrander et al, 2011, 647

22 Macrae, 2001, 170

reconstruction programmes donor coordination should not have been a major problem.23 The inherent difficulties, however,

of disbursing development funding in conflict-affected situations meant the MDTF was very slow in disbursing funds and was

ineffective in operationalising the health system recovery. This resulted in the previous bilateral humanitarian aid channels

prior to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement remaining the main financing modality of the health system three years

after the signing of the agreement.24 This delay in disbursing development funding meant that the fragmented and

uncoordinated humanitarian aid approach continued to dominate due to the far greater ease donors have in providing

project funding to actors such as NGOs rather than coordinating policy strategy and development funding with nascent

conflict-affected state ministries to HSS’s detriment. This continued humanitarian funding approach to what is fundamentally

a development task simultaneously de-funds and disenfranchises the state’s ability to coordinate health system recovery

whilst perpetuating transient, fragmented and unaccountable health interventions that undermine the HSS approach.

Secondly, there is no agreement where along the continuum immediate post-conflict health system recovery aid exists and

whether it counts as relief, development or somewhere in between such as the interim rehabilitation aid that the UN

Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) provided between the Paris Peace Accords of 23 October 1991 and elections in

May 1993.25 This highlights that there is a tension between urgent humanitarian needs and long-term development or to

phrase it in a manner closer to its underlying political competition, it is a struggle between the humanitarian imperative versus

state legitimacy. The urgent needs of a population is a vital consideration but this stress too often lends itself to an

internationalising of health service provision and strategy whilst neglecting HSS, undermining the state’s ability to move on

from its conflict-marred past. This tension was clear in the lack of a coordinated HSS approach in Cambodia. HSS

coordination was the responsibility of UNTAC’s Rehabilitation Component (RC) working in collaboration with a Technical

Advisory Committee (TAC) composed of the four main Cambodian political factions. HSS coordination, however, was

undermined by major donors taking advantage of a loophole in the TAC’s mandate that exempted the work of NGOs from its

purview to work outside the formal UNTAC coordination regime. This lack of coordination between donors and between

donors and the state led to an unequal and inequitable distribution of funding and service provision. This led to a vast growth

in NGOs in Cambodia to which donors responded to by establishing a proliferation of ad hoc coordination bodies.26 By

acting outside the UNTAC HSS coordination mechanism they had established at the Paris Accords international donors

helped entrench transient and fragmented health programmes at the expense of long-term HSS. Donors believed, however,

this was necessary due to the political context of Cambodia post-peace but pre-elections. The vacuum of state legitimacy

combined with the tensions between the Cambodian political factions led donors to perceive no other major route to aid

coordination than through humanitarian channels to NGOs so as not legitimise and empower any political faction, particularly

the Cambodian People’s Party, which dominated the public administration with the inevitable consequence that HSS was

largely ignored due to the political context on the ground.

HSS coordination in conflict-affected countries faces multiple and reinforcing political challenges that undermine and

constrain its planning, development and implementation. It occurs in a complex political environment where health is often

the arena for multi-layered political struggle that inhibits effective coordination. Where donors do not align and coordinate

their objectives and funding with conflict-affected countries HSS is simply not possible. After all, to strengthen a state health

system coordinating with a state is required even if only at a most minimal level. The fundamental problem for HSS

coordination, however, is that the state is often not capable of even that minimal capacity to coordinate and the international

community often does not wish to coordinate with an entity that is often weakly legitimate and/or weakly capable. In that

context the challenge for HSS is immense.

The Politics of Health

The Spectrum | edition 02 54

23 Cometto et al, 2010, 890

24 Ibid. 896-897

25 Macrae, 1997, 187; Lanjouw, 1999, 232

26 Lanjouw et al, 1999, 232-235

The challenges faced by HSS as shown through the analytical lenses of capacity and coordination strongly emphasise the

importance of understanding that health in conflict-affected countries is both a political exercise and operates in a political

environment. This can be further underlined at national and international levels. From a national perspective, HSS is a

challenge for the state attempting to emerge from war to a more settled and peaceful society but is still marked by conflict.

The health system is however only one of many vital activities that the state is concerned with and security is usually the

overriding objective. In this jostling for priority HSS requires political commitment and judgement to be successful. Where

political commitment has been apparent such as in Bangladesh HSS has worked.27 Where it has been absent such as

Uganda from 1986-90 it has failed. Health was not a prominent political priority in early Ugandan rehabilitation plans where it

was assumed the health system would recover as part of the economic recovery process.28 This led to a lack of national

ownership and systemic government policy that enabled donors to implement uncoordinated health programmes that failed

to develop Uganda’s health system.29 Political judgement is also a vital determinant in health system recovery. In South

Sudan, a health assessment report that urged a focus on organising the management of health human resources before

strengthening the skills and increasing the numbers of workers was put aside for political reasons and was replaced by an

unrealistic plan calling for a dramatic increase in health workers despite the obvious weakness of the Ministry of Health to

manage and deliver the training required.30 This underlines that HSS occurs in a broad political context nationally alongside

competing priorities for recovery, in a complex insecure environment and is susceptible to the whims of political leaders who

may not conceive it as a priority or view it as a means for political advantage.

From an international perspective the starkest example of the use of health for political means is its subordination to the ends

of stabilisation in order to win hearts and minds as an element of force projection.31 The issue is less that healthcare is used

for political means but the manner in how it is used and for who’s political ends. There is no evidence that health

reconstruction through quick-impact projects gains or does not gain support for hearts and minds whilst it undoubtedly

further complicates the already complex development task of HSS and undermines the greater long-term policy of state-

building.32 This highlights the tension within a conflict-prone environment of attempting to satisfy short-term needs whilst

building a legitimate and effective state. In the long run the “strategic” use of healthcare only acts to undermine the broader

strategy of recovery by imposing an externally conceived and operated framework that is not responsive to domestic needs.

This leaves the country both reliant on and antagonistic to external support whilst creating an unequal and inequitable health

system, which the strategy of HSS - that international actors are rhetorically committed to - was meant to overcome.

Similarly the notion that a conflict affected country provides a window of opportunity for substantial and rapid health system

reform is problematic. 33 In Kosovo the WHO adopted such a mentality and the subsequent health system reform has been

considered to largely fail as it did not adequately consult domestic stakeholders or take into account the weak capacity to

undertake such reform.34 The destruction of a health system may be an opportunity for donors to pour in funding and

override the need to consult with domestic stakeholders but it is not an opportune moment to implement HSS. The

insecurity, poor infrastructure, weak capacity and economic instability that characterise conflict-affected countries means

that HSS, and any other essential reform, have not found an opportune moment but a moment of necessity. This is a crucial

distinction, which is frequently ignored to the cost of long-term sustainable HSS and development in general in conflict-

affected countries. The fact that it is ignored illustrates the underlying appeal within the international community of following

The Spectrum | edition 02 55

27 Koehlmoos, 2011, 58

28 Macrae et al, 1996, 1102

29 Ibid. 1103

30 Pavignani, 2011, 670-71

31 Rubenstein, 2009, 32; Waldman, 2006, 2-5; Newbrander et al, 2011, 650; Waters et al , 2007, 1; Kruk et al, 2010, 94

32 Rubenstein, 2009, 30; Goodhand and Sedra, 2010, 79; Rubenstein, 2011, 687

33 Newbrander et al, 2011, 643; Pavignani, 2011, 662-663

34 Shuey et al, 2003, 302-304; Percival and Sondorp, 2010, 13-14

template technical frameworks, such as the WHO’s health system building blocks framework, without consideration and any

understanding for the diverse and complex political contexts, interests, and actors that shape, drive, diminish, and neglect

HSS, and development generally, in conflict-affected countries. HSS is a political exercise operating in a political environment

that is greater than a narrow health system framework can envisage and thus why the challenges it faces are so

considerable and widespread.

Conclusion

The variety of conflict-affected contexts analysed in this essay belies the utility of a standard technical formula, which has no

context specificity and domestic and international political understanding. In policy terms, this means that HSS in conflict-

affected countries takes place in a dual operational environment that is contextually unique: the conflict itself and the health

system in the conflict-affected country. In such an environment a one-size-fits all policy template will simply not suffice.

The challenges HSS faces in conflict-affected countries can only be fully appreciated when it is considered fundamentally as

a political exercise with technical attributes. Contracting out health services may enable a state in the short-term to provide

healthcare to its population but at the risk of diminishing the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its

people as well as in the long-term developing an unsustainable fragmented health system that acts against the capacity of

the state to deliver HSS in the long run. The countervailing forces opposing HSS are considerable. The weak position

conflict-affected countries find themselves in enables a variety of domestic and international actors to impose and implant

their own priorities such as vertical disease programmes, however well meaning, that create a distortionary and inequitable

affect within the health sector undermining the state’s already weak capacity to implement HSS. The challenge for a

successful HSS policy therefore is not only the extraordinarily difficult political environment in which HSS occurs where the

success of a HSS programme relies ultimately on a broader governance and security framework, which is largely outside of

its control, for its support, effectiveness and eventual success but also that multiple competing actors along the relief to

development continuum frequently implement policies that circumvent and delegitimise the state, neglect domestic

stakeholders and emphasise short-term priorities to fit short-term funding cycles over effective coordination and long-term

development. This is corrosive to HSS, which is fundamentally slow and generational in nature.35

HSS in conflict-affected countries therefore is not a window of opportunity but a viscerally political environment both

internally and externally that is far from promising for delivering its goals. These difficult and complex environments require an

understanding beyond a narrow conception of health system reform that recognises that HSS occurs in a violent political

maelstrom and that it is engaged with a politically charged international community. An understanding of this dual political

context and the risks that it poses for HSS indicates the inadequacy of the WHO framework whilst highlighting the unique

and diverse nature of conflict-affected countries that face exceptional challenges that require context specific and distinctive

HSS initiatives that incorporate a broad political, socio-economic, security and cultural perspective to HSS within a wider

post-conflict development framework that aligns, harmonises and coordinates development funding, which is normally

external in origin, with domestic state and institutional capacity-building. HSS policy should thus be considered as a political

not a technical intervention. Policy frameworks such as that of the WHO’s only serve to depoliticise and decontextualise HSS

policy providing an abstract paradigm that can rarely engage with HSS normally and fails to do so completely in the complex

and intensely political environment of conflict-affected countries. In such an environment HSS policy must be grounded in an

broad appreciation of the conflict dynamics within which it is operating to be relevant to the people it is attempting to serve.

The Spectrum | edition 02 56

35 WDR, 2011, 10

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05 | Current Affairs

National Service: The Solution to the Root Problem of the London Riots

David Tan

The London riots that took place in the summer of 2011 were an unprecedented display of social disorder

that sparked public outrage in Britain. Many law abiding citizens were suddenly brought face to face with chaos and anarchy; in the words of the Prime Minster, we saw: “scenes of people looting, vandalising,

thieving, robbing, attacking police officers and even attacking fire crews in action.” These scenes were all witnessed in real life or through television news feeds. The cost of the damage was significant, but the

damage to the social fabric of the nation was even greater. In this paper, I will primarily address two

questions: what caused these riots, and what can be done to prevent them from happening again? In my answer to these questions, I will first provide a brief analysis of the situation. I will attempt to demonstrate

that these riots point to deep rooted structural problems within our society, namely the failure of social structures, institutions and contemporary culture to provide for the needs of certain groups of people. I will

demonstrate this by drawing primarily on concepts from the fields of psychology and criminology.

Thereafter, I will recommend the reintroduction of national service as a solution to this problem, and will attempt to justify this recommendation.

Towards a More Comprehensive Understanding

Since the riots, many people have attempted to answer the question of what their cause was. To this question, answers in

the media have included lack of respect, opportunism and alienation (The Guardian),1 the failure of policing (The Telegraph)2

as well as the nature of ‘black culture’ as proposed by Dr. David Starkey during a live discussion aired on the BBC.3 In my

view most of the points that have been made are, to differing extents, valid, and most of them point towards issues that

contributed to the outbreak of disorder as witnessed earlier in the year. However, these points in themselves are insufficient

to provide us with a comprehensive understanding of the situation that took place. In order to develop a better

understanding of the whole situation I will first start from the basic component of society, the individual, and develop my

theory from there by explaining how the factors that have been mentioned in the media fit into my framework, gradually

progressing towards the larger picture.

The basic building blocks to my theory are the following concepts: a revised version of Rational Choice Theory, Bounded

Rationality and Marslow’s hierarchy of needs. What this translates to is the thought that human beings have different levels of

needs, as displayed in Figure 1. Human beings are rational creatures and seek to satisfy their needs bounded by the

The Spectrum | edition 02 61

1 Addley, 2011

2 Riddell, 2011

3 Quinn, 2011

knowledge which they possess. Hence society, as we know it, is a perpetual conflict that takes place between the individual

and sectional groups in the pursuit of satisfying their needs.

Figure 1. Marslow’s hierarchy of needs

The problem concerning insufficient policing, according to the media, is that social institutions have failed to provide a

sufficient deterrent to the perpetrators of these acts of disorder. The cost to the perpetrators of satisfying their needs through

illegal means has not been high enough to deter them from doing so. On this subject, an article published by the BBC

suggests that social psychological perspectives, especially the concept of 'de-individuation' in crowd situations, are a

possible explanation for this.4 This explanation fits in well with my theory, as the literature on this subject suggests that

people in crowds who experience 'de-individuation' act in a manner whereby they perceive themselves to be under ‘a cloak

of anonymity.’ Thus, they believe that they are exempt from the consequences of their actions.5 This in itself is not a root

problem, however; issues of deviance find their root in many other problems. Sutherland's theory of 'differential association'

has been used quite often in explaining the causes of deviance. Sutherland’s theory suggests that criminality is something

that is learnt, and that the values and motives therein are transmitted socially from a group to a person.6

It is in the view of this that the issues of opportunism, alienation, lack of respect and Starkey’s points on ‘black culture’ find

their context in my own proposed theory.7 All these factors are related to the issue of culture, defined as “the social habits of

the community.”8 These habits are formed in view of the distributional issues concerning the resources that are required for

individual members of a community to attain and satisfy their needs. So, in my opinion the issue of opportunism stems from

the lack of realisation that the actions that one performs have an impact of those around her. This is thus a product of

culture, an individualistic culture that has perpetuated the notion of the self as the centre of everything, and from a society

that has failed to place sufficient deterrents on such self-centred behaviour. Similarly, the identification of a general lack of

respect is somewhat tied in with these factors concerning the issue of opportunism.

The idea of alienation relates to the idea of culture in a rather different way. Alienation in this context occurs when a person is

unable to relate to the established culture of her day. In this situation the established culture of the day can be generalised by

the consumerism of most post-industrial Western nations (including Britain), which function by the slogan 'I consume,

!

4 De Castella and McClatchey, 2011

5 Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, 421

6 Downes and Rock, 2007

7 The author of this article nor the KCL Think Tank Society support Starkey‘s claim that black culture encourages deviance.

8 Hogg and Vaughan, 2008, 605

therefore I am.' Christian Smith notes, in his research on emerging adults in the USA, that 50% to two thirds of emerging

adults said that their well-being can be measure by what they own.9 Furthermore, Pakulski suggests that class in

contemporary post-industrial societies is no longer differentiated along the lines of employment, but along the lines of

consumption.10 When we look at the data that has been reported in the media concerning the demographics of those who

have been charged for their actions during the riots, we find that 73% of the 1715 offenders were below the age of 25.11 Of

these, more than a third had been excluded from school; 30% were perpetual absentees from school; 1 in 10 achieved 5 or

more C grades at GCSE level, and 2/5 were recipients of free school meals. 35% of those over 25 were claiming benefits,

and, of all those convicted, 3/4 had received previous convictions or cautions.12 All of this, in general, points towards the

underclass of society, 13 which does not possess the means to participate fully in a post-industrial consumerist society, and is

hence unable to satisfy its needs according to the way in which the established culture prescribes.

The Policy Recommendation: Reintroduce National Service

It is in view of this analysis that I make the recommendation that Her Majesty’s government should reintroduce national

service. I refer to national service here as a year or two of military conscription, as opposed to the Prime Minister’s proposal

for a two month summer programme.14 In my view, national service is a solution to the root problems of the riots which we

have witnessed. It is an opportunity for British values and identity to be transmitted to the younger members of society. It is a

good way to provide a sense of belonging for young people who may look towards gangs to satisfy that need for belonging.

It is a way in which we can teach them a sense of respect for authority, and to encourage people who have been living in an

individualistic society to start thinking about the greater good of society and about the needs of one another. It is a way to

get the younger generation to understand that citizenship confers rights but at the same time requires them to fulfill their

duties to the country. It is a way to build an affinity that transcends traditional class boundaries. And finally, it is a way to

reduce the alienation of an underclass in a consumerist society by virtue of the fact that the military subjects all enlistees to

the same experience in basic training.

This policy is currently in use in quite a few Asian countries, for example the republic of Singapore, where national service is

mandatory for all male citizens. After completing their tertiary education, male citizens join one of the three services: the

military, the police, or the Civil Defense Force. Here, citizens undergo three to six months of basic training where they spend

prolonged periods of time away from their families. During this period, citizens learn the basic skills of the services, and more

importantly learn how to live together with one another in an environment that crosses class and racial boundaries. Due to

the regimented nature of the training citizens learn what it means to be responsible, and they generally do come to realize

that their individual actions have an impact upon the whole community. After this initial period, citizens move on to advanced

training, where the focus shifts to vocational skills (for example training in infantry leadership, or tactics for army officer cadet

trainees). The remaining period of national service is dedicated to giving citizens an opportunity to practice the vocational

skills that they have learnt. The scheme has gone a long way to create a sense of Singaporean identity amongst the males of

its multi-cultural society.

For the above policy recommendation to work in the UK, there are many details that will have to be looked at so as to ensure

that the programmes carried out ultimately achieve the aims that I have mentioned. The very real danger is that national

service, if not properly administered, could end up discriminating against the underclass and thereby perpetuating the

problem that Britain is currently facing. In terms of monetary concerns, it is my view that although military spending would

increase as a result of this policy, this would be compensated by resources being freed from other areas such as social

The Spectrum | edition 02 63

9 Smith, 2011, 72

10 Pakulski, 1996

11 Casciani, 2011

12 Johnson, 2011

13 The conviction of both a graduate and a social worker are considered by the author to be outliers in the sample.

14 Mulholland, 2011

housing, and the payment of unemployment benefits. The construction work that would be necessary to prepare facilities for

such a policy would provide a boost to the UK economy in this period of slow economic growth. Furthermore, the

reintroduction of national service will drive down the unemployment rate by the removal of a section of society from the

employment market.

Conclusion

To conclude, the root of the problem concerning the social disorder that was experienced by Britain during the London riots

stems from cultural issues concerning how individual needs are met within British society. My recommendation, in light of

this, is for Her Majesty’s government to reintroduce National Service. This will provide a means to impart British values and

identity to the next generation, as well as to provide a means of reducing the alienation that is currently experienced by the

underclass. This is, in my view, the way forward to a better tomorrow.

Bibliography

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9, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/09/london-riots-kids-parents-police.

Casciani, Dominic. “Analysis: The riots data so far,” BBC News. Last modified September 15, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/

news/uk-14931987.

De Castella, Tom. and McClatchey, Caroline. “UK riots: What turns people into looters?” BBC News. Last modified August 9,

2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-14463452.

Downes, David. and Rock, Paul. Understanding Deviance: A Guide to the Sociology of Crime and Rule-Breaking. Oxford:

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Hogg, Michael A. and Vaughan, Graham M.;

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www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/data-reveals-lives-of-young-rioters-2375212.html.

Riddell, Mary. “London riots: the underclass lashes out,” The Telegraph. Last modified August 8, 2011. http://

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/8630533/Riots-the-underclass-lashesout.html.

Mulholland, Hélène. “General election 2010: David Cameron outlines national service plans –backed by Michael Caine,” The

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Acknowledgements

KCL Think Tank Committee 2011-’12

Core CommitteeCore Committee

President – Ben Counsell Vice-President - Saskia Rotshuizen

Secretary – Georgina Fallows Think Tank Liason – Melanie Pinet

Journal Editor – Juliette Vix Policy Centre Editors - Anam Kidwai and Andrada Dobre

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Energy/Environment Policy CentreEnergy/Environment Policy Centre

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Business/Economics Policy CentreBusiness/Economics Policy Centre

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Defence/Diplomacy Policy CentreDefence/Diplomacy Policy Centre

President – Dara O’Toole J Events Organiser – Dina Zaher

Healthcare Policy CentreHealthcare Policy Centre

President – Gerardo Abreu Pederzini Events Organiser – Rosemary Grain

Current Affairs Policy CentreCurrent Affairs Policy Centre

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Contributors

Camille Maubert Philip Lewis Alireza Shams Lahijani

Steven Townsley Kathryn Hale William Eastment

Tim Stevens Lars Backstrom Christian Kolb

Johanna Grusch Tamara Dimova Steven Forrest

David Tan

The Spectrum | edition 02 65

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