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The Soviet Military Doctrine and its influence on the Egyptian Army while
preparing the Yom Kippur War 1973
Presented to the 8th Annual Baltic Military History Conference, hosted by the Baltic
Defenses College in Tartu, Estonia, March 2017.
By Bridger General (Res) Dr Dani Asher – Israel
The Six-Day War of 1967 inflicted a severe blow to Arab dignity and self-esteem.
During the coming six years the IDF maintained its hold on the Eastern bank of the
Suez Canal, not allowing the canal to be opened for shipping.
Egypt's president Sadat endeavored to break the stalemate and the state of stability.
Threats to renew the war on a full scale were met with hesitation on the part of the
various levels of command, as a result of the weakness, or perhaps the immaturity
of the military system.
Sadat, who had inherited from Nasser a military organization that was still
undergoing a process of reconstruction and only partly qualified to engage in a
full-scale military offensive, repeatedly reviewed options of various types.
Sadat's careful examination of the various systems finally gave rise, in late 1972, to
his later concept, based primarily on the employment of a limited-scale war as an
impetus intended to place the political process back on track.
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The consolidation of this decision necessitated the build-up of the "military
instrument", so that it may accomplish the tasks assigned to it. The Egyptian
military became a state-within-a-state, gaining the highest priority in terms of the
allocation of personnel, materiel and the president's attention.
Of this over-all strength, the Egyptians assembled their offensive task force, which
consisted of the two Field Army commands, commanding five reinforced infantry
divisions, two armored divisions, two mechanized infantry divisions and about
twenty four commando battalions.
Most crucial decision made by President Sadat was the decision to revert to the
"military option" - to activate his military forces on a massive scale. The military
operation, could, in fact, be rather limited and restricted as far as its objectives
were concerned.
While the breaking of the stalemate had been defined as the objective of the war,
President Sadat defined the contest between Egypt and Israel as “a direct
confrontation with the defense doctrine of Israel”.
The tasks of the war included: breaking the stalemate, inflicting the heaviest
possible casualties on the enemy and liberating the occupied territories stage by
stage, according to the capabilities and the opportunities.
The supreme echelon of the Egyptian Army acted according to the objective by
preparing the war plan, developing the combat doctrine required in order to
execute the plan, training and preparing the troops so that they would be able to
accomplish the tasks assigned to them.
The Israeli military superiority in such areas as domination of the skies,
maneuverability and the employment of armored elements, along with the
problems presented by the land obstacles - the Suez canal, the earth dike on its
Eastern side and the forts of the "Bar-Lev Line" - compelled the Egyptian planners
to provide effective solutions that would enable them to launch the war and
achieve such goals as to allow the political leadership to start the wheels of the
political system rolling so as to achieve Egypt's political goals.
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As of this stage, the commanders of the Egyptian military - the planners of the war
- embarked on an all-out effort to prepare their troops to accomplish their
battlefield functions and tasks.
(according to the Soviet Warfare Doctrine) Attack by a Field Army – Mission Depth
The need to come up with effective solutions to the problems facing them referred
the Egyptian planners to the Soviet theory of war. This theory had been born on the
European battlefields of World War II and became a model that was subsequently
emulated and adopted by almost 50% of the world’s militaries. These militaries
adopted relevant elements from the Soviet doctrine and adapted them to their
specific needs.
The Soviet theory had been adapted, through a carefully controlled process, to the
needs of the Egyptian Army on the eastern front. Soviet military advisors,
stationed in Egypt, played a major role in this adoption and adaptation process.
Despite the marked lack of sympathy displayed toward them by the Egyptians,
these advisors endeavored, at the various echelons, and eventually succeeded in
translating, adapting and assimilating the Soviet theory, which subsequently
provided the foundation for the operational plan of the war.
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In addition to assembling dedicated OrBat, making the necessary preparations for
the crossing of the Suez Canal and training the various units, they were also
required to plan the manner in which the forces will be employed.
IDF Defensive Deployment in the Suez Canal Theater - Translated Soviet document
In their strategic planning and particularly in their quest for solutions at the
operative and tactical levels, namely - the combat doctrines, the Egyptians had at
their disposal the Soviet military theory, which had been adopted by their military,
along with the acquisition of Eastern-bloc weapon systems, since the mid-1950's.
This doctrine, which is based on the extensive combat experience of the Red Army
and the best Soviet military philosophy, provided only a partial solution to the
unique problems faced by the Egyptian military planners.
The Soviet combat doctrine was translated and parts of it were rewritten. Its
various parameters were modified, streamlined and adjusted to the needs of the
Egyptian military on the Suez Canal front. This revised doctrine was studied and
assimilated by the commanders and troops of the Egyptian military during their
preparations for the war. The Egyptian troops acquired and assimilated its
principles and trained according to this refined doctrine.
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This doctrine also served as the basis for the preparation of the operational plan
executed by the Egyptian armed forces during the Yom-Kippur War. In coming to
devise their operational plan the Egyptian planners identified the problems
presented to them by the Israeli military system.
Apart from the problems at the strategic level, which should have been resolved
by the very act of going to war, the Egyptian planners were faced with various
operative-level problems. These problems, created by the Israeli defensive layout,
included: the air superiority enjoyed by the Israeli air force, the superior
maneuverability of the Israeli armored forces, the deliberate defensive layout with
its substantial rear-area reserves and the need to stay alert and ready to repel a
parallel Israeli counter offensive.
At the tactical level, too, the Egyptians were compelled to cope with such complex
issues as the obstacle presented by the Suez Canal, the earth dike on the eastern
bank of the canal, the liquid flame devices designed to set the canal ablaze, the
front-line forts and the superiority enjoyed by the IDF in terms of the number of
tanks, their survivability, mobility and firepower.
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The Egyptian planners addressed the primary military issues: the offensive, the
defensive, the fording of a wide water obstacle and the assembly of a massive
antitank layout.
At the operative level, the Egyptians kept their plan as simple as possible. The
main elements of this plan were the initiation of an offensive while executing a
complex operation involving the crossing of a water obstacle, destroying the Israeli
forces at the front line, establishing bridgeheads and deploying in a defensive
layout in order to repel the expected counterattacks of the Israeli forces.
In order to execute this offensive, the Egyptian land OrBat was organized in four
efforts. The two primary efforts, in the middle of the sector, consisted of the field
Army commands, which were assigned to bear the brunt of the offensive.
Based on these efforts, the Egyptian armed forces launched their attack. They
employed the majority of their infantry, commando and armored elements in a
complex operation, which began with the fording of a water obstacle (the Suez
canal) followed by the capturing and establishment of bridgehead, and culminated
in the establishment of a defensive layout reinforced by antitank weapons
concentrations, intended to repel the counterattacks launched by the IDF.
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The combat activities incorporated the Egyptian artillery, antitank and assault
engineers elements, as well as various types of logistic support elements. The
entire operation was executed in accordance with an operational plan whose roots
were deeply embedded in the Egyptian combat doctrine.
The Yom-Kippur War, or "The October War", was based primarily on the strategic
concept of an all out war limited in it’s dimentions. According to this concept,
the military operation, which constituted the first stage of a comprehensive
strategic plan, could be limited in its objectives.
The military echelon prepared the war plan, developed the combat doctrine
required for the execution thereof and trained and prepared the troops so that they
may be able to fulfill the tasks assigned to them.
The Egyptian planners faced such operative problems as the Israeli air superiority,
the superior maneuverability of the Israeli armored elements, the deliberate Israeli
defenses with strong reserve elements deployed at the rear of the front-line
fortifications, as well as the need to remain alert and ready to repel a simultaneous
Israeli counterattack.
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The continuous involvement with military theory and doctrine finally gave rise to
an extensively detailed plan in all matters pertaining to solutions at the tactical
level or even only at the techno-tactical level.
One of the most controversial issues involves the following question: "Did the
Egyptians really initiated an offensive on Yom-Kippur of 1973, or did they merely
initiate an aggressive move consisting of the fording of the canal and establishing
of bridgeheads on the Eastern bank, followed by an Egyptian defensive campaign
shifted to the Eastern side of the Suez canal?
A careful examination of the Egyptian offensive combat doctrine and a comparison
thereof with its Soviet parent, reveals an almost total similarity between the two.
The same theoretical literature used by the Egyptian planners at the general staff,
field army corps, divisional and brigade levels - was also used by the commanders
assigned to execute the plan.
Subsequently, as the Egyptian over-all operational plan for the "October war" was
being consolidated, the Egyptians mixed it into some sort of a “cocktail”. They
adjusted the theoretical and doctrinal solutions to the operational plan, whose
principles had been derive from the objectives of the war and the tasks assigned to
the commanders of the armed forces.
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The “cocktail” they concocted was not, in fact, a “net” plan of attack. The first
moves of the plan that evolved had, indeed, been derived from the offensive
theory, but they promptly evolved into defensive moves.
Only the act of crossing the canal and the initial establishment of the bridgeheads
may be regarded as purely offensive moves. As of this moment, the Egyptians
preferred – in their planning as well as in their execution – the defensive approach.
In fact, the Egyptian activity involved a sharp, rapid transition from the offensive
to the defensive, with the intention of using their defensive layout to repel the
enemy counterattacks and shatter, once and for all, the decisive superiority of the
Israeli armor.
The Egyptians strictly avoided entering into combat encounters under the
conditions sought or favored by the Israeli forces. They dictated their own terms,
as the Duke of Wellington had done in Spain - strategic offensive coupled with
tactical defensive.
The Egyptians relinquished the form of offensive preferred, theoretically and
doctrinally, by the Soviets, of “attack out of movement”. Instead, they opted for
“attack out of contact”.
But even so, they minimized the dimensions and scale of their offensive,
particularly with regard to the depth of their tasks. Each infantry division staged its
attack out of its defensive layouts, located to the west of the canal, leaped to ford
the Suez Canal and returned, as promptly as possible, to new defensive
dispositions reinforced by antitank units, layouts and reserves and heavily
defended by massive air-defense layouts, inside limited-size bridgeheads.
They employed their artillery layout to provide preparatory fire on a massive scale
and support the fording, attacking and defending elements. They incorporated their
engineering forces generally and the bridging units in particular in the fording
operation as well as in the preparatory activities and in the establishment and
consolidation of the bridgeheads. They received effective, successful backing from
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their various logistic support layouts during all of the stages of their combat
operations.
Major parts of the armored and mechanized infantry elements of the Egyptian
armed forces - out of the elements doctrinally intended to reinforce, maneuver and
advance to resume the development of the attack, were assigned, in advance, to
reinforce the infantry divisions at the bridgeheads.
As regards their remaining armored and mechanized infantry elements - the
Egyptians preferred to retain and deploy these elements to the West of the canal,
once again - possibly as reserve elements for the subsequent development of the
offensive, but first and foremost as a second Army echelon deployed in defensive
dispositions.
At the moment of truth, this "Egyptian doctrine", as it was implemented by the
Egyptian troops on the battlefield, based on the Soviet Military Doctrine, enabled
the Egyptian armed forces to crack the "foundations" of the concept consolidated
on the Israeli side and gain significant military achievements, followed, eventually,
by the political achievements accomplished by the Egyptians mainly after the war
of 1973.