the south china sea/east sea dispute: a strategic choice analysis of the dispute between viet nam...

8/7/2019 The South China Sea/East Sea Dispute: A Strategic Choice Analysis of the Dispute Between Viet Nam and China Fro

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The South China Sea/East Sea

Dispute:A Strategic Choice Analysis of the Dispute between the Socialist

Republic of Vietnam and the Peoples Republic of China from a Periodof Escalating Tensions (2007-2009)

Craig Jeffries

University of California, San Diego

Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Affairs

Prepared at Trng i Hc H Ni (Hanoi University)December 2009


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1 The South China/East Sea Dispute: A Strategic Choice Analysis

IntroductionChina and Vietnam

The Sino-Vietnamese relationship is arguably the worlds most complex, and certainly

one that gives international relations scholars and security analysts the most trouble when

seeking to examine such ties. For example, casual observers most likely assume that relations

between the two Communist states are full-bodied and stable, due to the two States vast

similarities. Yet, most serious scholars would point out the 2,000 years of shared animosity

between the two neighbors, encompassing events such as the Chinese invasion and subsequent

thousand-year rule of Vietnam; the Chinese withdrawal of military aid to Vietnam during the

latters war with the United States; and the 1979 Chinese invasion of Northern Vietnamese

provincesBeijings response to Hanois role in toppling the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge in

Cambodia.

Still, 21st century world opinion regarding Sino-Vietnamese relations comes off rather

positive; with many describing the two states as vibrant Asian tigers, whose economies have

outpaced all others in the region while enjoying a big brother-little brother relationship, where

one supposedly learns from the other successful development strategiesBeijing presumably

plays the role of the teacher in this perceived bond. Yet, it is perhaps a justifiable conclusion tosuggest that the two are heading toward mutual success after a cursory examination of the two

states economic, political and social developments is conducted. However, there is at least one

issue that has the potential to derail such desires for joint peace and prosperity: both China and

Vietnam claim sovereignty over two archipelagoes in the South China Sea/East Sea (SCS/ES).1

Referred to internationally by their English names, the Spratly and Paracel Islands are claimed

both by China and Vietnam, as well as a number of other states, including: Brunei, Malaysia, the

Philippines and Taiwan. Even as the SCS/ES dispute is now seen by both Beijing and Hanoi as

the final outstanding bilateral dispute in their states long and turbulent relationship, the saliency

of the issue, evidenced by events documented in this paper, demonstrate its potential to derail

recent successes in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship.

1While most commonly referred to as the South China Sea (SCS), Vietnam objects to this labels and instead calls

the body of water the East Sea (ES). To maintain political neutrality, I reference the body of water as the SCS in

sections about China and as the ES in sections about Vietnam.


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Craig Jeffries 2

Briefing on Spratly and Paracel Archipelagoes:

Trng Sa/Nansha and Hong Sa/Xisha

Spratly

The Spratly archipelago, known as Trng Sa to the Vietnamese and Nansha to the

Chinese is a group of over 100 reefs, islet, atolls, and islands representing five square kilometers

of landmass and spread across 400,000 square kilometers in the SCS/ES. Although the Spratlys

are inhabited, the sea that lies around it is fertile fishing ground. Additionally, this area is seen as

potentially rich in oil and gas. Approximately 45 islands are occupied by small military

contingents from both China and Vietnam; Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan also maintain a

troop presence.2 Politically, China administers its occupied islands through the provincial

government on Hainan;3 while Vietnam oversees its occupied islands in the Spratly chain from

Khnh Ha province.4

Paracel

The much smaller Paracel archipelago, known as Hong Sa in Vietnamese and Xisha in

Chinese consists of only about 30 islets and reefs, covering a mere 15,000 square kilometers in

the SCS/ES. Though no inhabitants live on these islands, they are still claimed by China,

Vietnam and Taiwan. Yet, only China has military personnel on these islands. As with the

Spratlys, the Paracels are prime fishing grounds that also potentially hold underwater deposits of

oil and gas.

Historical Sketch of Bilateral SCS/ES Dispute

Both Hanoi and Beijing utilize vague and unreliable historical documentation to lay claim

to both archipelagoes. For instance, Hanoi puts forth the notion that their ancient maps, dating

back to the mid 17th

century prove their territorial sovereignty over islands offVietnams central

2Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: 2009,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

factbook/geos/pg.html

3Vietnam Protests Chinas Establishment of Authority on its Islands, Nhn Dn, 17 November 2009.

4Thanh Nin,Provincial House Confirms Sovereignty Over East Sea Islands, 19 December 2007
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pg.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pg.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pg.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pg.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pg.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pg.html


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coast described as Bi Ct Vng (or the Golden Sandbanks). The Vietnamese also point to texts

of this era, suggesting the L and Nguyn dynasties were commercially active in the East Sea.5

Chinas evidence is just as ambiguous; with Beijing citing Han (23-220 A.D.) and Ming

(1400sA.D.) dynastic records, describing Chinese occupation, and the conduct of commercial

activities on islands throughout the South China Sea.6

The 20th

century saw various periods of documented violence in the SCS/ES. Early on in

the century, France, Vietnams colonial poweroccupied most of the Spratlys, and all of the

Paracels in 1933, losing control to the Japanese in 1941 as a result of World War Two.

Following the First Indochina War, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), then in power

in Hanoi and allied with communist Peoples Republic of China (PRC), relinquished all claims

to both archipelagoes, sending formal correspondence recognizing the formers sovereignty inthe SCS/ES in 1956. Consequently, the Chinese were able to take control over the entirely of the

Paracels that year. However, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) based in Saigon remained adamant

of its claim of sovereignty over both archipelagoes. Tensions rose further between the RVN and

the PRC in 1968 with the discovery of oil, climaxing in 1974 with battle of the Paracels, a clash

that effectively ended all Vietnamese presence on these islands. Today, China continues to

occupy all islands in the Paracel archipelago.7

When Vietnam was unified in 1976, the Communist government in Hanoi reasserted its

sovereign claim over the two archipelagoes. Two incidents during this period show the renewed

intensity of the dispute between the two Communist states: first, was the 1988 sinking of a

Vietnamese transport ship by a Chinese naval vessel off of Johnsons reef in the Spratlys; and

second was the 1992 oil exploration row between both states and a pair of U.S. energy firms

5Kelly, Todd C., Vietnamese Claims to the Truong Sa Archipelago [Ed. Spratly Islands], Explorations in SoutheastAsian Studies, Vol.3, Fall 1999

6Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, Historical Evidence To Support China's Sovere ignty

over Nansha Islands, 17 November 2000.

7Kelly, Todd C., Vietnamese Claims to the Truong Sa Archipelago [Ed. Spratly Islands], Explorations in Southeast

Asian Studies, Vol.3, Fall 1999


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Craig Jeffries 4

cooperating with each on separate, but overlapping exploration contracts in the disputed waters.8

While no military clashes ensued, a war of words between Beijing and Hanoi highlighted the

deterioration of relations between the once allies.

Analyzing actions, Gauging Preferences and Predicting Outcomes

using the Strategic Choice Approach

This paper will attempt to analyze the evolution of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship with

regard to the SCS/ES dispute. Utilizing the strategic choice approach (also known as rational

choice theory), this paper will showusing recent developments from 2007 to 2009the extent

of whichboth China and Vietnams capabilities and resolve influence each is actions, beliefs,

perceptions, and overall strategy concerning the disputed maritime claims. Finally, this paper

will gauge the likeliness of certain outcomes to the SCS/ES dispute, concluding with brief policy

recommendations.

Before this can be done, however; an introduction of the strategic choice approach is in

order. The strategic choice approach is a way of understanding events by extracting and

analyzing its most important features: the players, the preferences and strategies involved.

Theorists in this field point out that all players are equal in that they are rational; yet the goals

they seek to maximize are not identical, as theirpreferences are different.9

Still, when

analyzing a state-to-state conflict, where central governments hold significant poweras is the

case in this examinationthe sole preference of these actors is to maintain political power.

Thus, in order to preserve this power these actors will pursue a strategy based upon: 1) the

actions available to them; and 2) the beliefs they have about their opponent. The actions

available to an actor depend on how powerful they are relative to their opponent. While their

beliefs are based on the how they feel their opponent will react to any such action they pursue.

Of course, it is not always easy to discern what the other side is thinking, thus any

rational actor will study all available information they have regarding their opponent,

8Energy Information Administration (EIA): United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE), South China Sea

Territorial Issues, December 2009.

9Walter, Barbara F.,Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict,International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4,

Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 137- 153.


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including intelligence gathering, historical actions and diplomatic and political signals sent out.

Once an actor is able to secure this information, they can then attempt to determine what the

other side is trying to maximize, what preferences it has, and ultimately what strategies they

are likely to employ. With this knowledge, the actor can then adjust their own strategy to

secure their preference.

However, even superior knowledge about your opponent may not be enough to alter their

behavior. To do this effectively, an actor must also be relatively more powerful than their

opponent. An actors power, according to rational choice strategists is the sum of its

capabilities (amount of raw materials, size of population, technological sophistication, military

size/quality, and strength of national leadership) and resolve (the willingness of the leadership

to follow through with threats). Additionally, relative power determines the amount of strategic

tools available to a given actor.

The strategic choice approach dictates that actors have three broad mechanisms for

influencing other international actors. The first, available to all international actors, whether

weak or strong, is persuasion.This tool involves campaigning for a course of action by

appealing to sentiments, shared values, ethics, and morals; and by providing informationboth

of the rewards and consequences of acting in favor or against. In short, this is diplomacy.

Still, simply persuading an opponent to change its behavior is seldom effective. Thus,

actors with a relative power advantage can typically employ a second set of tools in the form of

offering rewards. Examples of reward inducements are: offering entry into international

organizations, bilateral free-trade agreements, increased foreign direct investment, as well as

military cooperation. If neither persuasion, nor reward inducements effectively alter anothers

behavior, then the truly powerful actor can utilize a third tool: punishment, coercing the

weaker actor to relent and change course. Punitive actions range from economic sanctions to

military action.

Having discussed the basic principles of the strategic choice approach, it can now be

applied to the SCS/ES dispute to identify the players, determine their preferences and understand

their strategies. Looking at primary evidence from the foreign affairs ministries of China and

Vietnam, as well as news material from state-owned media outlets, the following two sections


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placate the aforementioned societal groups. The party-state does this in several ways and

employs different approaches for each of the groups. Regarding its SCS maritime claims, the

CCP has courted the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) by increasing the amount and

frequency of military exercises in the SCSs disputed waters, as well as building naval facilities

on several disputed islands, constructing a submarine base on the southern Chinese island of

Hainan, and most importantly increased the PLANs budget.

Similarly, the CCP has sought to placate Chinas growing business sector by

demonstrating its commitment to ensuring that Chinese businesses have the resources it needs to

continue Chinas breakneck economic growth, while also guaranteeing that sea lanes vital to the

economys export-driven industries remain stable. Lastly and perhaps most salientgiven the

sheer size of this groupis the CCPs attempt in maintaining favor over the general public.

Lately, the party-state has been ensuring its citizens that the countrys current prosperity,

economic growth and rapidly improving international image will be sustained well into the

future. These sorts of promises please the Chinese people not only because they are aimed at

improving their lives, but also because the average Chinese citizen is extremely nationalistic and

any message that highlights the grandeur of the Chinese state or its culture is met with immense

passion. Therefore, the CCP sees the SCS maritime dispute as an issue that can help it maintain

political power, as it is a strongly nationalistic issue and a potential source of immense economic

benefits.

What are the CCPs preferences for a possible outcome to the SCS dispute?

Now that the CCP has been identified as the primary actor, and that it seeks to use the

SCS dispute to bolster its political legitimacy, an examination of the specific preferences

regarding outcomes it would like to see come from the SCS dispute with Vietnam can be

conducted. Due to space limitations and for the sake of clarity, only four preferences are listed;

by doing so, each is meant to be as diverse as possible. Chinas preferences, from most favoredto least favored are:

1) Since the CCP claims nearly all of the islands in the SCS, clearly its most preferred outcome

would be to achieve internationally-recognized de-jure sovereignty over all of its claims;

which, most recently include around 80 percent of the disputed waters. Additionally, China


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Craig Jeffries 8

would prefer to achieve this with the absence of military action and without losing face

domestically and internationally.

2) If the CCP cannot achieve its first preference, which seems very likely, Beijing would have to

settle for some sort of bilateral recognition of its maritime claims with the other parties in

the disputemost crucially with Vietnam. In this scenario, China would have to make some

concessions to Vietnam; perhaps entering into a joint development agreement. For China,

however; it would be more advantageous to conclude numerous bilateral deals rather than

entering into a single multilateral deal with all the SCS claimants; reasons for which will be

discussed later.

3) In the event that the CCP is unable to obtain recognition for its SCS claims under international

law, Beijing would most likely be forced to accept a multilateral deal with all other claimants

in the SCS. However, Beijing would most likely insist on a joint exploration pact, where it could

reap the economic benefits, even though it would lose significant political sovereignty over areas

in which it currently controls.

4) The least favored outcome for would look something like an acceptance of a limited

military skirmish with Vietnam, if it meant the outright de-facto control over its disputed

maritime claims. Of course, this outcome would incur great costs to the CCPboth

internationally and domestically. Also, to occupy the very large territory that it claims, Beijing

would be required to conduct a rather ambitious and potential costly military confrontation.

Thus, a truly successful military confrontation would require the deployment of several PLAN

vessels, and perhaps involve nuclear submarines. All in all, this option seems quite risky and

could prove to be very costly for the CCP, making them vulnerable both to U.S. retaliation

and/or the relinquishment of power domestically.

What are the CCPs Capabilities?

Having looked at the preferences for outcomes in the SCS, an examination of the Chinese

capabilities that drive those preferences must now be conducted. When analyzing capabilities

using the strategic choice approach, one must look at each actors relative power in regard to its

opponent. As such, the following seeks to lay out the capabilities available to the CCP in both

absolute terms, but more importantly, how they stack up relative to those of Vietnam.


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Military

Much has been written about the rapidly developing military capabilities at the CCPs

disposal. One striking feature is that the Beijing directs the worlds second biggest military in

terms of expenditures at $84.9 billion in 2008a figure that is growing larger year by year, analarming trend to most outside of China.13 These capital expenditures undertaken to modernize

the military are bolstered by the worlds largest standing fighting force at about 2.2 million

men.14 Particularly worrisome for regional neighbors, especially Vietnam, is the overt expansion

and modernization of the PLAN, coupled with a desire by Beijing to build a truly blue-water

navy, capable of exerting Chinese military influence throughout the region. No doubt, China sees

this endeavor as a means to consolidate its claims in the SCS. Finally, China wields the ultimate

military deterrent: nuclear weaponry. Such weapons, transported and placed into submarines

seem to give the CCP an overwhelming military advantage in any SCS dispute with the

Vietnamese.

Economic

A great deal has been said about Chinas economic transformation and rapid development

over the last decade. What is known is that Beijing is now the third biggest economy in world

soon to pass Japan to take second position. While the Chinese economy is nowhere near the size

of the United States, Beijing does hold the worlds largest share of foreign reserves, currently at

$2.27 trillion, a fact that shows the strength of Chinas economic capabilities, and the potential

damage it could cause rivals.15

Again, even though Vietnams economic growth has in recent

years kept pace with its northern neighbor, it is China who has the relative economic advantage;

for if Beijing so chose, it could use this advantage to either reward or punish Vietnam in an

attempt to influence the latters behavior with respect to the SCS dispute.

13

Figure and ranking fromStockholm International Peace Research Institute,SIPRI Yearbook 2009, pg. 182,accessed at:http://www.sipri.org/yearbook on 15 December 2009.

14Estimated figure as of 2006, of which 255,000 was naval personnel. Cordesman, Anthony H. and Martin Kleiber,

Center for Strategic and International Studies,The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006: Overview of

Major Powers, 26 June 2006, p24

15Poon, Terence and Li Liu, (Dow Jones Newswire), China: To Keep Way Of Managing Forex Reserves, 4

December 2009.
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook%20on%2015%20December%202009http://www.sipri.org/yearbook%20on%2015%20December%202009http://www.sipri.org/yearbook%20on%2015%20December%202009http://www.sipri.org/yearbook%20on%2015%20December%202009


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Craig Jeffries 10

Diplomatic

As a veto-wielding permanent member on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),

Beijing has the ability to shield itself from international sanction. Additionally, being an

influential player in international bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as well as a prominent observer within the Association

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Beijing is well-placed to fend off any diplomatic attacks

directed from Hanoi regarding the SCS dispute.

What is the Strength of the CCPsResolve Surrounding the SCS dispute?

While identifying Chinas capabilities and how those capabilities could be used to

provide an advantage in the SCS dispute appears to be a straightforward exercise, the task of

discerning the level of the CCPs resolve is much tougher; and one that cannot be accomplished

from a simple quantification of the core elements of the state. Rather, a more thorough

examination is required to assess the risk-calculations taken by Beijing with regard to the

particular strategies pursued in the SCS. In order to do this, scrutiny must be paid to the tools and

mechanisms employed by China. Consequently, the following examination will look closely at

actions taken by the CCP from the years 2007 to 2009. The conclusion of this section will

address the strategic shifts taken by Beijing during the three years under examination, and what

that demonstrates about its resolve, as well as the actions likely to be taken by the CCP in the

future.

Strategic Mechanisms Employed by the CCP (2007-2009)

As noted, strategic choice analysis pays particular attention to the types of mechanisms

(or tools) used by one actor in hopes of altering anothers behavior. Here, atten tion is paid to

three types of strategic tools: 1) Persuasion; 2) Reward inducements (e.g. economic incentives,

cooperation and engagement); and lastly 3) Punishmentboth economically and military. Asnoted, Beijings enjoys an overall power advantage relative to Hanoi ; due primarily to the

aggregation of its capabilities. Therefore, the CCP is able to effectively utilize all three types of

strategic tools. In addition to focusing on the strategic tools employed, it also important to

identify where they are aimed; specifically, whether it is at a domestic-political audience, the

diplomatic arena, economic forums, or rather militarily strategies.


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2007

In 2007, five events were observed that shed some light on the types of strategies

employed by Beijing; and more interesting provides an opportunity to study the resolve of the

CCP with regard to the SCS dispute with Vietnam. Of the five events, four were seen as seekingto persuade, whereas one was identified as punitive.

Two particular strategies pursued by the CCP throughout 2007 are continuations of much

older strategies, dating back to ASEANs Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South

China Sea (DOC) in 2002. The first is Beijings desire to develop the PLAN into the regions

preeminent naval force, capable of forward deployment throughout the region. As such, the CCP

has year-by-year increased its military budget, while not hiding its desire to field a blue-water

navy, equipped with at least one aircraft carrier.16 This military strategy, seeking to add to the

CCPs already advantageous set of military capabilities, is clearly aimed at securing a chokehold

on sea lanes in the SCS, as well as establishing a permanent Chinese presence on the two

disputed archipelagoes. Secondly, 2007 saw the Beijing continue its diplomatic policy of

pushing for bilateral negotiations with each of the concerned ASEAN members in the SCS

dispute. China favors this bilateral approach to an ASEAN-China negotiation because it allows it

to play each state off with each other. In other words, a bilateral negotiation including only China

and Vietnam, would allow the former to exert its relative power advantage; whereas an ASEANnegotiation would see Vietnam gain bargaining power relative to China.

In January 2007, the CCP, keeping with the values and commitments of 2002s DOC,

sent its coast guard into the Paracel islands to rescue a group of Vietnamese fisherman, whose

boat sank off the disputed archipelago.17 This event demonstrates that at this stage in the dispute,

China was interested in maintaining cordial diplomatic relations with Vietnam, in hopes of

persuading the latter to accept its maritime claims. However, the CCP appeared to shift strategy

16According to Wu Huayang, deputy political commissar of the Navy, quoted in the China Daily on 3 March 2009:

building an aircraft carrier is the will of the people and is necessary for the development of our navy, as well as

being a symbol of China's position in the world.

17Chinese Coast Guard Rescue Vietnamese Fishermen, Thanh Nin, 14 January 2007.


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Craig Jeffries 12

later that year, as in November it conducted military exercises throughout the Paracel islands.18

This action shows that even though Beijing ultimately desires a peaceful resolution, it still felt it

needed to demonstrate to Hanoi that its military capabilities alone were sufficient enough to

secure what it sought in the SCS.

At the end of the 2007, the CCP, shifting its focus inward in an attempt to win over its

domestic constituents appointed administrative control over the disputed archipelagoes.19 This

strategy was almost certainly taken by Beijing in an effort to tap into the nationalistic tenacities

of the Chinese people by demonstrating that the CCP leadership was committed to protecting the

interests of the Chinese people.

2008

In 2008, ten events relating to Chinese SCS maritime claims were observed. Of the ten

events, five were seen as seeking to persuade, two identified as reward inducing, and three as

punitive. It must be remembered that 2008the year China hosted the Olympicswas to be the

time when China would officially be elevated to world player status. As such, one could

predict that Beijing would act more aggressively; curtaining any developments in the SCS that

would cause it to lose face either internationally or domestically.

As such, one policy that Beijing continued in 2008 was its efforts to split its ASEAN

SCS rivals by seeking to bilaterally engage with each, thus ensuring it maintained the relative

bargaining advantage. Specifically, early on in the year, China pushed the idea of the Pan-

Tonkin Gulf Cooperation onto other SCS disputants. The ideaoriginating from the ASEAN-

China Free Trade Agreement discussionswas put forth by the southern Chinese province of

Guangxi, and sought to promote cooperation in fisheries, maritime energy, environment

regulation and tourism. Having eventually won the support of the CCP leadership, Beijing

subsequently floated the idea to other ASEAN states, with most of them voicing lukewarm

approval, while Vietnam rejected it outright.20

Even though China was not able to secure

18Vietnam Protests Chinese Military Exercise in Hong Sa, Thanh Nin, 25 November 2007.

19Vietnam Affirms Sovereignty Over East Seas Archipelagoes, Thanh Nin, 4 December 2007.


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Vietnams approval for the Pan-Tonkin plan, it did engage with its southern neighbor during

the 2nd

Vietnam-China Guiding Steering Committee for Bilateral Cooperation. Begun in

2006, this mechanism was set up by the two states in order to develop a long-term strategy for

bilateral cooperation covering a broad set of issuesincluding the maritime dispute. As such, it

should be seenas a reward inducing action by Beijing because it provides Hanoi with a forum to

extract economic and cooperative agreements with his northern neighbor. For example, the 2nd

meeting in Beijing resulted in a joint-statement, stressing that any resolution to the SCS dispute

would be handled properly and fairly.21

In March of 2008, signaling the CCPs strong desire to play off its smaller rivals in the

SCS dispute, foreign minister Yang Jiechi openly pushed for a joint-exploration pact with

Vietnam and other claimants.22

This economic strategy, seeking to persuade Vietnam and

others to give up their unilateral claims in return for joint prosperity actually hinted that China

may not truly believe it could achieve its favored preference of internationally recognized de-jure

sovereignty over its SCS claims, but may be willing to settle for something less to avoid a costly

military confrontation.

Yet, the following month, satellite imagery displayed evidence of Chinas clandestine

construction of an underground submarine base in Sanya, Hainan province, demonstrating

that Beijing was indeed intent on strengthening its military capabilities so that in the event of a

military confrontation, there would be no doubt who would prevail. International security

analysts suggest that the base, when completed, could have the capacity to house nuclear

submarines and any future aircraft carrier the PLAN acquires.23

Indicative of the multiple strategies available to China, the CCP flexed its diplomatic

muscle in April, when Beijing hosted Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) General Secretary

20Li Mingjiang, Pan-Tonkin Gulf Economic Cooperation Scheme: Making a 'lake' of South China Sea, Straits Times

15 January 2008.

21The Second Meeting of the Guiding Committee for China-Vietnam Bilateral Cooperation Is Held, The Embassy

of the Peoples Republic of China in Lithuania, 24 January 2008.

22Yang, Jiechi, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meets the Press,Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Peoples Republic

of China, 3 March 2008.

23Secret Sanya - China's new nuclear naval base revealedJane's Information Group, 21 April 2008.


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Craig Jeffries 14

Nng c Manh. What resulted from that meeting was the following joint statement regarding

the SCS dispute:

The two sides agree to strictly abide by related common understanding of the two

countries leaders, to keep the situation in the [South China Sea] East Sea stable,continuously maintain negotiation mechanisms on sea issues, through peaceful

negotiations, persistently seek a basic and long-lasting solution that can be accepted by the

two sides while actively studying and debating cooperation issues for mutual development

in order to reach proper models and sectors.24

Even as diplomatic strategies seemed to be working for Beijing, on July 2, 2008, the

joint China-Philippines-Vietnam seismic study was allowed to expire.25 What this event

shows is the lack of resolve on the part of all partiesincluding Chinato ensure the initiative

continued. Interestingly, following the expiration of the joint project, Beijing demands that

foreign oil firms, BP and Exxon-Mobil sever cooperation with Vietnams state energy firm

Petro-Vietnam in the SCS or risk losing future Chinese business. Although, both firms rejected

Chinas threat, this action showed that the CCP was willing to use punitive economic threats to

have its way in the SCS.26

The following month, Beijing received high-ranking VCP cadres at the CCPs

International Liaison Departmentsignaling that Beijing continued to hold the attention of its

Vietnamese comrades.27

Another interesting development was the fact that Beijing allowed a

libelous article, describing a CCP-planned 31-day invasion of Vietnam, to remain on more

than four different websites during the month of September.28

The article stressed that

Vietnam was a major threat to China, and the only thing that stood in the way of the latters

24Vietnam, China issue joint statement Vietnam News Agency, 1 June 2008.

25Sutter, Robert and Chin-Hao Huang, China-Southeast Asian Relations: Small Advances, Troubles with Vietnam,Comparative Connections, October 2008.

26Torode, Greg, Diplomatic Balancing Act For Oil Exploration South China Morning Post, 23 August 2008.

27Sutter, Robert and Chin-Hao Huang, China-Southeast Asian Relations: Small Advances, Troubles with Vietnam,

Comparative Connections, October 2008.

28Ibid.


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domination over Southeast Asia. What is remarkable about this incident is not the articles

content itselfalmost certainly not a product of state officialsbut rather the fact that the CCP,

notoriously known for its strict policing of the internet, allowed the post to remain on numerous

websites for that length of time. It is this fact that many in Vietnam have pointed out, and why

this incident should be regarded as a punitive measure directed toward Hanoi. At the same time,

this event should also be seen as a tool used by the CCP to shore up domestic support by again

tapping into the nationalistic nature of various actors within China.

2009

In 2009, 12 SCS-related events were observed. Of these 12 events, five were seen as

seeking to persuade, with two identified as reward inducing, and five as punitive. The increase in

punitive actions may reflect Beijings increased capabilities as well as a sharpening of CCPsresolve regarding the SCS dispute. Yet, it would be a mistake to say that all of the actions taken

by Beijing in 2009 were unilaterally inspired, as will be addressed later, Hanoi raised the stakes

on its own in 2009most notably by submitting a unilateral claim to the United Nations

requesting an extension of its continental shelf; thus some of Chinas acts are retaliatory, and will

be identified as such.

As during the previous two years, in 2009, Beijing continued to pursue the strategy of

enhancing its naval capabilities in order to project its military power throughout the SCS.

Additionally, the CCP maintained the policy of seeking bilateral engagement with individual

ASEAN members to discuss and settle its maritime disputes. The year started with the Chinese

State Oceanic Administration calling for Chinese businesses and individuals to move to

uninhabited islands in the Paracels and the Spratlys in order to bolster Chinas sovereign

claims; a strategy that appears to be an attempt by Beijing to sustain and possibly strengthen

domestic support for its SCS policy.29

ThePLANs harassment in March of a U.S. naval vesselU.S.S. Impeccablesaid to be

in Chinese territorial waters off Hainan continues to show that Beijings military capabilities, as

well as its resolve to use it, were increasing.30

The incident also signals to Chinas regional foes

29Ministry Responds to East Sea Claims, Vietnam News Agency, 9 January 2009.


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Craig Jeffries 16

that Beijing is perhaps even willing to confront the United States in order to protect its perceived

maritime sovereignty. However, in an attempt to cool rising regional tensions, the CCP appeared

to shift strategy yet again, as in the following month, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao met with his

Vietnamese counterpart, Nguyn Tn Dng to say that the two sides should keep an eye on

long-term interests and the overall situation. Additionally, the two agreed that both sides should

limit actions perceived to be provocative in hopes that the two could enjoy the mutual benefits of

joint development in the SCS.31

This strong signal send to Hanoi, seems to be a careful attempt

by Beijing to lay out the risk, rewards and consequences for any Vietnamese action regarding the

SCS dispute.

However, Sino-Vietnamese ties began to seriously deteriorate in April and May of 2009.

Three incidents show the different strategies used by Beijing, with a further strengthening of

resolve, especially evident with regard to the use of its military superiority. First, Beijing,

responding to Vietnams unilateral submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits

to the Continental Shelf (UNCOLCS) to extend its continental shelf to incorporate both

archipelagoes, sends the UN a u-shaped map showing its own maritime claims in the SCS,

along with a diplomatic note, asking them to reject Vietnams claim .32 A second and more

troubling incident was the CCPs unilateral decision to impose a three-month fishing ban in

the SCS, effectively punishing the economic activities of Vietnamese fishermen at the height of

their fishing season.33 The third and final action by Beijing during this tense period was the

deployment of eight fishery and PLAN vessels from southern China to the SCS to enforce

the ban on fishing activities.34 Obviously, the deployment of Chinese vessels to enforce its ban

was response by Beijing to Hanois own raising of the stakes with regard to the latters UN

30Thayer, Carlyle, Recent Developments in the South China Sea, International Workshop on The South China Sea

Cooperation for Regional Security and Development 26-28 November 2009.

31Chinese Premier Meets with VN Counterpart, Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People s Republic of China, 17

April 2009.

32A copy of Chinas response and u-shaped map can be found at:

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm.


Cooperation for Regional Security and Development 26-28 November 2009.

34FM: South China Sea Fishing Ban Indisputable,Xinhua, 9 June 2009.
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnmhttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnmhttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm


18/38


submission; but what is particularly salient though is that this time, Beijing saw it less useful to

diplomatically engage with Hanoi, rather finding it easier to return to its position of superiority in

the SCS via punitive measures.

China continued to assert itself as it arrested Vietnamese fishing vesselsthroughout thesummer of 2009. Hanois protests fell on deaf ears, as Beijings insisted that it was within its

right to protect the fishery stocks in its own waters.35However, in September, drawing

on its preference to avoid a military confrontation, the CCP continued to push the idea of a

joint exploration pact with Vietnam and other claimantsideally bilaterally. A Chinese

envoy speaking in the Philippines stated that all parties in the SCS dispute should join hands in

development and refrain from taking provocative unilateral actions, thus signaling that China

was again willing to provide economic incentives to solve the maritime quarrel.36

In November, Beijing continued the now routine strategy of shoring up domestic support

for its SCS policy. This time, the CCP established village communities on several disputed

Paracel islands claimed by Vietnam;specifically, Ph Lm and o Cy.37 Finally, as Hanoi

hosted an International Workshop on the South China Sea, Beijing dispatched three vessels to

the disputed archipelagoes, as well as to the Tonkin Gulf.38 Surely, this action was meant to

remind Vietnam that no matter how much international support it could garner for its maritime

claims, Beijing still possesses a vastly superior military capable of nullify such diplomatic

achievements.

Discernable Strategic Shifts and Implications for Resolve

Observing Trends

With a clearer sense of the actions, strategies and tools employed by CCP during the last

three years regarding the SCS dispute with Vietnam, it is now possible to try and discern trend

35Ibid.

36China Proposes to Move on with Joint Development Formula in SCS,Xinhua, 22 September 2009.

37Vietnam Protests Chinas Establishment of Authority on its Islands, Nhn Dn, 17 November 2009.

38Hng Giang v MLoan, Phn i Trung Quc a tu n Hong Sa, Tui Tr, 28 Thng 11 2009.


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Craig Jeffries 18

patterns, and what those shifts signify for future Chinese policy in the SCS. Appendix A

quantifies the observed events and identifies the strategic tools used, as well as their intended

targets. Thus, with that knowledge, the following assessments can be made:

First, it is notable to point out that the percentage of actions perceived as being persuasivefell from 80 percent in 2007 to 42 percent in 2009. Admittedly, this conclusion is drawn from a

very small sample set of major events. Nonetheless, coupled with the rise in perceived punitive

actions taken by the CCP20 percent 2007 to 42 percent in 2009China is no doubt feeling

more comfortable using its military and economic advantage to punish its southern neighbor.

Looking now to the areas in which Beijing has directed SCS actions; one should be

reassured that, on average, Beijing has preferred to use diplomatic methods, as 40 percent of

their actions were identified as such, while economic measures ranked second with an average

use of 27 percent. Military actions ranked third, ahead of domestically-targeted political actions

with 20 and 13 percent respectively.

Future implications

There should be no doubt that the CCPbeing a rational actor, primarily seeking to

retain political powerdesires to achieve its goal of securing and strengthening its maritime

SCS claims via persuasive diplomatic behavior. Additionally, based on the evidence presented

here, it should be noted that Beijing is also willing to provide economic rewards to Vietnam,

specifically, in the form of joint exploration projects, an example being the Pan-Tonkin Gulf

Cooperation. Thus, one should be hopeful that additional reward inducements will continue to be

offered by Beijing to Hanoi.

Even though China has recently flexed its military muscle, displaying its increased naval

capabilities, and perhaps also signaling a greater resolve to use themboth to Hanoi and to a

domestic audienceit is not likely that the CCP will actually threaten military force to solve theSCS dispute. This is precisely because any military action taken by China to end the dispute

would be seen as unjust not only by regional players, but also to the wider international

community; something Beijing is not keen to let happened, evidenced by its carefully-managed

image during the 2008 Olympics.


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Craig Jeffries 20

conduct ES policy in an effort to please its domestic constituents: specifically, the small but

influential business lobby, and more broadly the whole of the Vietnamese populace. Similar to

the CCP, the VCP has chosen to pursue an ES policy that strikes at the nationalistic tendencies of

its citizens.

What are the VCPs preferences for a possible outcome to the ES dispute?

Now that the VCP has been identified as primary actor, and that it seeks to use the ES

dispute to bolster its political legitimacy, an examination of the specific preferences regarding

outcomes it would like to see result from the ES dispute with China can be made. Vietnams

preferences from most favored to least favored are:

1) Since the VCP claims nearly all of the islands in the ES, its most favored preference would be

similar to its Chinese opponent, in that it seeks internationally-recognized de jure sovereignty

over all of its claimsachieved peacefully, without losing face domestically nor internationally.

2) If the VCP cannot achieve its first preference, which, like China, appears unlikely; Hanoi will

likely have to settle for a multilateral agreement with all other parties in the dispute, which

recognizesmost of its claims. A multilateral settlement is preferred by Hanoi over a bilateral

deal with China because it gives Vietnam significantly greater bargaining power with respect to

China, as it will be harder for Beijing to push around a grouping of states. Additionally, in this

scenario, Vietnam would also be keen on reacquiring some of the islands in the Paracel

archipelago that it lost during the 1974 battle of the Paracels with China.

3) In the event that the VCP is neither able to secure internationally recognized de-jure

sovereignty for all of its ES claims, nor a multilateral agreement for sovereignty over partial

claims; Vietnam would consequently have to give in to Chinese diplomatic pressure and agree to

a bilateral understanding with Beijing over how to split up control of the disputed

archipelagoes. This scenario would most likely have to include the promise of joint-development in the areas of fisheries, sea patrols and most importantly, oil and natural gas

exploration for it to truly be a serious option for Hanoi.

4) The least favored preference for Hanoi would look something like a continuation of the

status quo, which means the absence of de-jure sovereignty for its ES claims and only limited


22/38


de-facto control in the Spratlys, with no control at all in the Paracels. A continuation of the status

quo would also mean that Vietnam would remain beholden to the punitive actions of its much

stronger northern neighbor. Additionally, since the VCP must soothe popular opinion, a

continuation of the status quo in the ESwhere Vietnamese fisherman are harassed, beaten and

arrestedwill cause great damage to the regimes reputation amongst an extremely nationalistic

population who view the ES dispute as the most important foreign policy issue for its country.

What are the VCPs Capabilities?

Military

Vietnam maintains a diminutive-sized military when compared to its northern neighbor,

with Hanoi spending only $1.3 billion on military expenditures in 2008.40 Relative to the Chinese

PLAN, Vietnams navy would require significant international assistance if it truly desired tomount a serious military challenge to China in the ES. What the lack in relative military

capabilities shows for Vietnams ES policy is that to achieve what it wants in the disputed

waters, it cannot rely on punitively-aimed military actions to be effective in altering Chinese

behavior.

Economic

With the worlds 58th biggest economy, measured in nominal GDP, and economic

growth second to only China in Asia, Vietnam is no doubt on its way towards enriching the lives

of its citizens.41 Yet, this economic growth, while impressive, is not enough to influence Chinese

ES policy. Hanoi does not, at this stageor perhaps never willbe able to influence Chinese

foreign policy via economic means, due to the sheer magnitude of the capabilities gap in this

area. This is not to say that Vietnam can never attempt to provide economic inducements to

China, or that the latter will not readily accept them; but rather, it should be noted that the

economic tools available to Hanoi relative to Beijings own does not allow one to conclude that

the use of such would be overwhelming effective.

40Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),

http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4.

41World Bank, World Development Indicators database, Gross Domestic Product, 7 October 2009.
http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4


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Craig Jeffries 22

Diplomatic

As a non veto-wielding non-permanent member on UNSC, Vietnam has been able to

build its reputation as a serious and committed player in international relations. Yet, with regard

to influencing China, this two-year assignmentset to expire next yeardoes nothing to alter

the balance of diplomatic power between the two communist states. With China holding veto

power and the right to vet the councils agenda, Hanoi is in no position to challenge Beijing

within this forum. The same can be said for other international organizations where the two

coexist. Still, there is one multilateral forum where Vietnam may have an edge over China: that

is ASEAN. Soon to take over rotating chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010, Vietnam will then be

able to chose whether to proceed with China-related negotiations or delay them for an entire

year, thus giving itself some, albeit temporary, bargaining leverage.

What is the Strength of the VCPs Resolve Surrounding the ES dispute?

As previous noted while examining the CCPs actions and beliefs, the task of assessing

an actors resolve is quite more difficult than identifying its capabilities. Nevertheless, the

following section will attempt to gauge the resolve of the VCP by observing actions it took from

2007 to 2009 regarding ES policy. The conclusion of this section will address the strategic shifts

in VCP policy regarding the ES during the three years under examination; and what any shifts

demonstrates about its resolve, and/or future ES policy.

Strategic Mechanisms Employed by the VCP (2007-2009)

Although, Vietnam can and does employ all three strategic tools (persuasion, reward

inducements, and punishment) to try to influence China, the effectiveness of each is determined

by the overall power equilibrium relative to Beijing. In other words, even though Hanoi has the

basic capabilities to send its naval vessels into the ES to patrol, Beijinghaving the far superior

navywould surely respond by sending its own, thus nullify the Vietnamese action. Thus, what

should be predicted in this three-year examination of VCP ES policy is the higher frequency in

the use of persuasive actions, coupled with the limited use of punitive measures. Additionally,

focusing on the target areas, one would likely predict that Hanoi would more often than not focus

on diplomatic mechanisms, due to the inferiority of its overall capabilities relative to Beijing.


24/38


2007

In 2007, seven events were observed. Of the seven events, six were seen as persuasive,

whereas one was identified as punitive. By analyzing these events, one should have a better

picture of not only the strategies that Hanoi sought to employ but also the potency of the VCPsresolve with regard to the ES issue.

Throughout 2007, Vietnams foreign ministry, responding to Chinese actions taken in the

ES, repeatedly stated that the dispute between the two communist states could and would be

solved peacefully under the guidelines of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea (UNCLS) and 2002 DOC. Thus, Hanoi routinely sent a clear signal to Beijing that it did not

want to risk war over the ES dispute.

Yet, the foreign ministry time and time again in 2007 stated that Vietnam had the

historical and legal evidence to back its claims of sovereign control for both the Spratly and

Paracel archipelagoes.In one such incident, Vietnamese foreign ministry spokesman, L Dng

said as much, while protesting Beijings construction of sovereign markers in the ES .42 The

reaffirmation of Vietnams possession of historical and legal evidence over its ES maritime

claims should be seen as an attempt by the VCP to appeal to its domestic constituents with the

purpose of maintaining their political allegiance.

Signifying the strength of the VCPs resolve in seeking to uphold peaceful relations with

its neighbor, the Vietnamese coast guard, in a tic-for-tac response, rescued 15 Chinese

fishermen off ofKhnh Ha provinces shoreline.43 This action was then followed up with a

goodwill trip to Beijing in April by Vietnamese National Assembly chairman Nguyn Ph

Trng; again showing Hanois resolve and commitment to a peaceful settlement. His visit

marked the tenth round of expert-level negotiations on the ES dispute between the two states.44

42L Dng, Vietnam once again reaffirms its sovereignty over Hong Sa and Trng Sa archipelagoes, B Ngoi

Giao, 28 December 2006.

43Chinese Coast Guard Rescue Vietnamese Fishermen, Thanh Nin, January 14, 2007.

44NA Chairman Trong leaves for officialvisit to China, Vietnam News Agency, 13 April 2007.


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Craig Jeffries 24

Yet, relations between the two states over the ES dispute began to deteriorate in

November, as a direct result of Beijing conducting military exercises throughout the Paracel

islands. Consequently, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyn Tn Dng met Chinese Premier

Wen Jiabao on the sidelines of the annual ASEAN summit to convey his concern over

escalating ES affairs.45

This diplomatic action signaled both that Hanoi recognized the

superiority of Chinese capabilitiesespecially militarily, and that its resolve in maintaining

peace with Beijing remained strong. What it also shows is how very few effective strategic tools

Vietnam has at its disposal for dealing with China.

What must have been a response to both the Chinese military exercises in the Paracels, as

well as Beijings appointment of administrative control of the disputed archipelagoes to Hainan;

Vietnam, in December, allowed yet condemned anti-China protests in Hanoi and Ho Chi

Minh City.46 This action or non-action shows that the VCP is more than willing to use the ES

dispute with China as a way to incite the nationalistic tendencies, as well as the historical

loathing of the Chinese by the Vietnamese people for its own political gain. Likewise, the

provincial resolutions by Khnh Ha and Nng, declaring political control over Trng

Sa (Spratly) and Hong Sa (Paracel) respectively, on the surface appeared to be a response to

the Chinese administrative appointment; yet, knowing that the VCP ultimately seeks to maintain

power, it must of calculated that these moves would additionally bolster its support amongst its

population.47

2008

In 2008, five incidents relating to Hanois ES policy were observed . Of the five events,

three were seen as seeking to persuade, while two were identified as reward inducing, and none

as punitive. The absence of a recorded punitive action show either that Hanois resolve in

maintaining peaceful relations with Beijing remained strong, or that the VCP recognized that

45PM meets Chinese counterpart on sideline of ASEAN Summit, B Ngoi Giao, 22 November 2007.

46Protests In Front Of Chinese Diplomatic Buildings in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City Sunday Were Unapproved By

Local Governments, Said L Dng Thanh Nin, 11 December 2007.

47Provincial House Confirms Sovereignty Over East Sea Islands, Thanh Nin, 19 December 2007.


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punitive measures will only cause itself harm thus be counterproductive. Of course, both

calculations could have been made, as the two are not mutually exclusive.

The Vietnamese foreign ministry sought to keep the ES issue on the publics radar, as it

consistently stated that Vietnam had the historical evidence to support its claim of

sovereignty over the two archipelagoes. The VCP thus, sought to continually signal to its

domestic public that it would not back down to China. Yet, on the diplomatic front, the VCP

began to use the very clichd Socialist motto of friendly neighborliness, fraternity and

comradeship developed with the CCP in discussing a way forward in the ES.48 Even though

such talk is in line with Hanois desire for a peaceful settlement, this sort of diplomatic banter,

emphasizing shared bonds and Socialist allegiance is most certainly unappealing to the truly

nationalist individuals in Vietnam, who wish for their leaders stand up to China. Yet, the VCP

most likely concluded that at the present time, a signal of friendly intentions to Beijing was more

pressing than an attempt to shore up domestic support.

Yet, even as Hanoi tried to soothe ties with Beijing, things turned sour again in 2008, as

Hanoi summoned senior Chinese diplomats twice in September to protest Beijings

allowance of an article outlining a Chinese invasion of Vietnam.49 In an attempt to further ease

tensions, another meeting between the two states prime ministers took place in October ,

where both sides again signaled their shared desired to reach a peaceful conclusion based on the

guidelines and principles enshrined in the UNCLS, the DOC andat Chinas insistence no

doubtthrough future joint development.50 Specifically, both sides engaged in what should be

identified as dual reward inducing actions, as the two states signed a cooperation agreement

on behalf of the two state-owned energy firms, CNOOC and Petro-Vietnam. In addition,

48L Dng,Vietnams policy of resolving all disputes in the Eastern Sea through peaceful negotiations, B Ngoi

Giao, 18 February 2008.

49Torode, Greg Vietnam Protests Over Chinese Invasion Plans; Beijing Dismisses Online Threats, South China

Morning Post, 5 September 2008.

50China-Vietnam Joint Statement Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Peoples Republic of China, 9 January 2009.


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Craig Jeffries 26

Beijing and Hanoi set up a hotline where the two capitals could communicate quickly in an

attempt to diffuse any escalating situation in the disputed waters.51

2009

In 2009, ten events were observed; where seven were identified as seeking to persuade,

two were seen as reward inducing, and one as punitive. More fascinating than the overall

increased volume of Vietnamese actions, was Hanois first unilateral punitive action regarding

the ES dispute; as in April, Vietnam filed two submissionsone jointly with Malaysiato

the United Nations Commission on the Limits to the Continental Shelf, requesting that it be

allowed to extend its continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile limit to incorporate all of the

Paracels and part of the Spratlys.52

53

This action is described as punitive because it is an effort

by Hanoi to circumvent the influence of Beijing by seeking international recognition for its

maritime claims; thus causing the latter to lose diplomatic face by having to aggressively

respond, as it did by sending its own correspondence to the UN maritime body, protesting the

Vietnamese action as a breach in its sovereignty, and recommending that the UN not consider the

submission.54Overall, Hanois UN submission signals to both its domestic and international

audiences that while not looking for war, it maintains committed to securing de-jure sovereignty

over its ES claims.

Yet, even as Hanoi seemed to be stepping up pressurealbeit diplomaticallyon

Beijing, Prime Minister Dng reiterated Vietnams policy of seeking a peaceful outcome to

the dispute in April, suggesting that the Sino-Vietnamese maritime dispute could be resolved

51Vietnam, China vow to deepen cooperation, Vietnam News Agency, 27 October 2008.

52A copy of Vietnam and Malaysias joint proposal can be found at:

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm.

53A copy of Vietnams partial proposal can be found at:

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_vnm_37_2009.htm.

54A copy of Vietnams reply to Chinas reply and u-shaped map can be found at:

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_

09/vnm_chn_2009re_mys.
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submissionhttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submissionhttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submissionhttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission


28/38


peacefully, just as the Tonkin gulf and land border demarcations have shown.55 However, in the

face of increasing tensions between the two states due to Beijings unilateral three-month fishing

ban, and most likely out of fear of losing public support on the issue, the VCP in April appoints

an administer to govern the Paracels, even though it has no physical presence on the

archipelago.56

The following month, foreign ministry spokesman L Dng, bluntly responding to

Chinas unilateral fishing ban in the ES, states that any activity in the ES or within Vietnams

exclusive economic zone would be seen as a violation of its sovereignty , thus signaling to both

the Vietnamese domestic audience, as well as to China, that its resolve remains firm, and that it

will not be bullied.57 A particular event involving the arrest and alleged maltreatment of

Vietnamese fisherman by Chinese military personnel stationed on the disputed islands prompted

Vietnam to send a diplomatic note to the Chinese embassy in Hanoi, demanding that they

look into the incident and punish those responsible.58

This rather weak response clearly

demonstrates the lack of effective tools available to the Vietnamese to hit back at a blatantly

aggressive Chinese action.

Yet, the current inability for Vietnam to meaningful hurt China may be about to change,

as in October, Vietnam unveiled its goals for its 2010 ASEAN chairmanship. On the agenda

were a multitude of projects relating to China, such as the ASEAN-China Free-Trade Area, the

strengthening of the DOC and the continued development of the ASEAN-China Strategic

Partnership.59 Vietnam, with the ability to control the ASEAN agenda will enjoy a rare moment,

where it will have the capacity to either reward or punish China in an effort to influence the

latters behavior on ES policy.

55Torode, Greg Hanoi Hopeful Over Maritime Row with Beijing; Disputes Can Be Solved, Says PM, South China

Morning Post, 20 April 2009.

56

China Says Vietnams Appointment of Official in Xisha islands illegal,Xinhua, 28 April 2009.

57L Dng, Concerning the Fishing Ban by China, B Ngoi Giao, 26 May 2009

58Vietnams reaction to inhumane acts by Chinese Armed officers toward Vietnamese Fisherman, B Ngoi Giao,21 October 2009.

59Deputy PM: Vietnam to successfully assume ASEAN Chair, Vietnam News Agency, 25 October 2009


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Craig Jeffries 28

However, doing what it could until 2010, Hanoi continued to send diplomatic notes to

protest actions taken by Beijing in the ES, as it did in November, voicing its disapproval over

the Chinese establishment of district-level administration on Hainan for both the Paracel and

Spratly archipelagoes.60

However, Hanoi did demonstrate that it could still offer reward

inducements to Beijing, as it finalized the land demarcation and border management

agreement with its northern neighbor, shortening the latters long list of pending land border

issues.61

This agreement also makes clear that both sides are willing to engage with other, and

that with time, both states are able to solve tough bilateral issues.

Even with the VCP realizing that it could achieve diplomatic victories via engagement in

other areas, it sustained its commitment to employing unilateral initiatives for it maritime claims;

an example of which was Hanoi hosting numerous international scholars and experts

assembled to provide recommendations on the ES dispute.62 The international workshop on

the East Sea dispute as it was called, no doubt was an attempt by Vietnam to strengthen its

claims through the support of international experts and to counter the vast strategic capabilities

of China.

In a similar, yet more noticeable vain to shore up international support, Hanoi sent its

defense minister, Phng Quang Thanh to Washington, D.C. in December to meet his U.S.

counterpart, as well as other prominent American politicians to discuss strengthening military,

as well as political ties.63

As both the U.S. and Vietnam fret about Chinas military buildup, this

action should be seen as mutually beneficial to both Washington and Hanoi, as it is clearly

intended to enhance Vietnams military capabilities, in the form of a military partnership with

60

Vietnam Protests Chinas Establishment of Authority on its Islands, Nhn Dn, 17 November 2009.61

Major Accords End Vietnam-China Land Border Negotiations, Nhn Dn, 19 November 2009.

62Hng Giang, B mc hi tho quct t v bin ng, Tui Tr, 28 Thng 11 2009.

63Bowen, Ernest, Vietnamese Minister of Defense General Phung Quang Thanh, Center for Strategic and

International Studies, 14 December 2009.


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the regions preeminent naval forcethe United States; and to add another U.S. ally in the

region should hostilities ever break out between the U.S. and China.

Discernable Strategic Shifts and Implications for Resolve

Observing Trends

Having now scrutinized actions taken by Hanoi, both unilaterally, and in response to

Chinese actions, it is now possible to try to discern trend patterns, and how those shifts could

affect future Vietnamese policy in the ES. Appendix B quantifies the observed events and

identifies the tools used, as well as their intended targets. Thus, the following assessments can be

made:

Since it is known that Hanoi possesses far fewer capabilities to effectively alter the

behavior of Beijing via reward inducements or punitive actions, it is no surprise that throughout

the three years under examination, Vietnam used persuasive methods 73 percent of the time.

Additionally, focusing on areas in which Hanoi directed ES actions, it is again no surprise

to see that Vietnamrelatively the weaker actor in the disputeused diplomacy 58 percent of

time. Demonstrating the importance of nationalism in this dispute, the VCP sought to influence

its domestic audience 35 percent of the time. Finally, again showing the relative weakness of

Hanoi, actions regarded as being directed at economic targets counted for a mere eight percent,

while the VCP did not once utilize its military during the three years under examination.

Future implications

Recognizing that it is at a several capability disadvantage relative to its Chinese

opponent, Vietnam has been attempting to influence China the only way it can: through

diplomatic channels, trying to demonstrate both to the Chinese, as well as others, the virtues of

the Vietnamese position regarding its disputed ES claims. Playing up the two states shared

historical values, cultures and ideologies, Hanoi has been tryingmostly unsuccessfullyto win

over Beijing. However, since both states have competing interests in the ES dispute, it is not

likely that Hanoi can secure what it desires through persuasive means alone. Yet, Vietnam does

not have the capability to effectively threaten China with military action, nor does it have the


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Craig Jeffries 30

economic weight to impose unilateral sanctions. Thus, if the VCP is to achieve some sort of

victory here, it will be from a combination of persuasive and reward inducing actions.

Particularity, Vietnam could offer its cooperation in securing transport routes, or lend its

support to the plethora of proposed ASEAN-China cooperative agreements. Most importantly, asHanoi takes over the ASEAN chairmanship in 2010, it will have the ability to set the agenda to

either favor or punish China by either implementing Chinese-related initiatives or postponing

them for a year. Lastly, Vietnam, as evidenced by Defense Minister Phng Quang Thanhs visit

to Washington this December, appears to be more aggressive in its pursue to strengthen its

military capabilities vis--vis China.

ConclusionThe Future of the Dispute

Any attempt to predict future outcomes regarding the SCS/ES dispute must first

recognize the vast capability advantage that Beijing possesses relative to Hanoi. With a military

far more advanced and with many more troops, China certainly will prevail in the event of a

naval confrontation with Vietnam. Additionally, the CCP, with a relative power advantage in

both economic and diplomatic capabilities is also able to shield itself from any attempt by Hanoi

to punish it within these areas. Furthermore, as both the CCP and VCP are rational actors withinone-party authoritarian states, strategic choice theory states that both actors primarily seek to

preserve political power; as such, neither actor will be very likely to risk war with the other over

this dispute for fear of losing power domestically. However, that is not to say that both states will

cease to publicly rebuke each other; as both Hanoi and Beijing, seeking to sustain public support

for their regimes will want to tap into the nationalistic tendencies of its respective citizens by

appearing to be protecting the sovereign interests of their respective states. It is also likely that

China will continue to increase its naval presence in the disputed waters for the reasons of

showing off its enhanced military capabilities to Vietnam and others, as well as to measure

American resolve in the region.

What this paper has shown through the examination of the capabilities, strategies and

preferences of both playersthe CCP and the VCPis that regardless of what each has said in

public, both are most likely willing to settle for something much lower than their first, or even


32/38


second preferences regarding an outcome in the SCS/ES dispute. Specifically, some sort of joint

governance and development pact will most likely be reached to resolve this dispute. The

question though then is: what type of agreement will be reached, and by whom? Also, will there

be numerous bilateral agreements between China and the other SCS claimants, or will there be

one multilateral deal to settle the dispute? Moreover, it is uncertain what role multilateral

organizations, such as the UN and ASEAN will play in its resolution. What is certain, however;

is Vietnams longing, and Chinas aversion to outside intervention, as this would shift each

actors relative bargaining power one way or the other.

Yet some scholars are not convinced that a negotiated agreement for partial sovereignty

will succeed. For example, Vietnam defense expert, Carlyle Thayer believes that although China

will most certainly continue to press Hanoi to accept a joint-exploration pact for the SCS, such a

policy will fail for the simple reason that Hanoi will not be able to sell such a deal to its own

citizens, due to the intense nationalism that has been attached to the issuemany times

exacerbated by the VCP themselves.64

Recognizing the lack of options available to Vietnam, stemming from its relative

weakness with China, Hanoi does not have much bargaining space. As such, the VCP

desperately needs to change the status quo, as current power dynamics in the SCS/ES leave

Vietnam vulnerable to future punitive actions by China similar to 2009s fishing ban. As noted,

Hanoi will hold the ASEAN chair in 2010, and will then have the capability to either reward or

punish Beijing. In all likelihood, VCP will chose the former policy route to keep from rising

tensions; that is of course, assuming China does not take a foolish action requiring Vietnam to

retaliate from within ASEAN. What is clear is that Beijing will lose some autonomy over its SCS

strategy during 2010, as its relations with ASEAN will be effectively controlled by Hanoi.

Recommendations

It is felt that both sides should resist the temptation to continue to use the SCS/ES dispute

as a tool to incite domestic nationalism for their own political gains. Rather, what is needed by


Cooperation for Regional Security and Development, Hanoi, 26-28 November 2009.


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Craig Jeffries 32

both China and Vietnam is a refocus on engagement that is more than just fluffy rhetoric and

empty gestures, but rather a serious and genuine dialogue, producing realistic goals and practical

solutions to the dispute. Furthermore, both states must continue to enhance and build upon the

DOC formula to ensure that is fair and equal to all sidesnot just Beijing and Hanoi.

Both states also need to agree not to take unilateral actions that risk escalation in the

SCS/ES, as well as punish citizens who undertake actions that seek to inflame the situation.

Finally, both China and Vietnam must be willing to utilize existing institutions and mechanisms

to solve the dispute, and refrain from creating overlapping conferences, dialogues, roundtables

and workshops that do nothing but seek to delay and hamper substantial progressand are seen

as nothing more than window dressing.

Specifically, Beijing needs to realize that in order for its neighbors to truly be convinced

of its peaceful rise, it needs to stop throwing its weight around, both diplomatic and militarily

with regard to the SCS dispute. The best way for China to do this would be for it to enter into a

multilateral dialogue with all SCS claimants.

Conversely, Hanoi must accept that its current maritime claims are unrealistic; and that

no matter how much international support it receives it will still be at the mercy of its more

powerful northern neighbor. Therefore, Vietnam first has to adjust its claims, followed by entry

into an authentic dialogue with both China and other claimants to discuss what steps are needed

to truly achieve the shared peace and prosperity in the ES, which all sides claim to want.


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Appendix A: Mechanisms employed be CCP

Year Persuasion Reward Punishment Total Domestic (Politics) Diplomatic Economic Military Total

2007 4 0 1 5 1 2 0 2 5

(%) 0.8 0 0.2 1 0.2 0.4 0 0.4 1

2008 5 2 3 10 1 5 5 1 12

(%) 0.50 0.20 0.3 1 0.08 0.42 0.42 0.08 1

2009 5 2 5 12 2 5 3 3 13

(%) 0.42 0.17 0.42 1 0.15 0.38 0.23 0.23 1

Total 14 4 9 27 4 12 8 6 30

(%) 0.52 0.15 0.33 1 0.13 0.40 0.27 0.20 1

*Some actions were identified as being directed at more than one target

Target Areas

China's use of strategic tools during SCS dispute (2007-2009)

Type of tools employed

Appendix B: Mechanisms employed by VCP

Year Persuasion Reward Punishment Total Domestic (Politics) Diplomatic Economic Military Total*

2007 6 0 1 7 4 5 0 0 9

(%) 0.86 0 0.14 1 0.44 0.56 0 0 1

2008 3 2 0 5 2 2 1 0 5(%) 0.6 0.4 0 1 0.4 0.4 0.2 0 1

2009 7 2 1 10 3 8 1 0 12

(%) 0.70 0.20 0.10 1 0.25 0.67 0.08 0 1

Total 16 4 2 22 9 15 2 0 26

(%) 0.73 0.18 0.09 1 0.35 0.58 0.08 0 1

*Some actions were identified as being dir ected at more than one target

Vietnam's use of strategic tools during SCS dispute (2007-2009)

Target AreasType of tools employed

Abstract:

This paper will attempt to analyze the evolution of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship with regard

to the South China Sea (SCS) /East Sea (ES) dispute. Utilizing the strategic choice approach this

paper showsusing recent developments from 2007 to 2009the extent of which both Chinaand Vietnams capabilities and resolve influence each states actions, beliefs, and perceptionsconcerning overlapping maritime claims. Finally, this paper will gauge the likeliness of certain

outcomes in the SCS/ES dispute, concluding with brief policy recommendations.


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Craig Jeffries 34

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