the social and ethical implications - uni- · pdf fileclimate change anthropogenic ......

GeoenGineerinG the Climate:

the SoCial and ethiCal impliCationSby AdAm Corner And niCk Pidgeon

“The acceptability of geoengineering will be

determined as much by social, legal, and political

issues as by scientific and technical factors”1

Preventing dangerous Climate Change Anthropogenic climate change isnow a global political priority, andgovernments across theworld are de-vising policies aimed at mitigatinggreenhousegasemissionsfromhumanactivities.Thisupsurgeinpoliticalac-tivity reflects the increasing scientificconsensus that the effect of unmiti-gated climate change for human andnon-human systems will be over-whelmingly negative.2 The effects ofacceleratedclimaticchangearealreadybeing observed at the polar ice caps.3With the United Nations negotiationsin December 2009 in Copenhagen afocal point for policymakers every-where,discussionnolongercentersonwhether climate change should betackled,buthow. Typically,policiesareaimedatpre-ventingwhatthe1992UnitedNationsFramework Convention on ClimateChange(UNFCCC)referredtoasdan-gerousanthropogenicinterferencewiththeclimatesystem.Althoughtherearesignificantdifficultiesindefiningwhatconstitutes “dangerous” climatechange,4astronginternationalconsen-sushasemergedthatsaysthatprevent-ing a rise in global temperatures ofmore than two degreesCelsius abovepre-industrialrevolutionlevelsiscriti-cal(correspondingtoalevelofcarbondioxide in theatmosphereofapproxi-mately450partspermillion).Beyondthislevel,feedbackloopsintheclimatesystem become increasingly likely—and the threat of relatively rapid andcatastrophic changes becomes signifi-cantlygreater. Unfortunately, the increasing atten-tion paid tomitigating dangerous cli-matechangehasnotpreventedacon-tinuing rise in global greenhouse gasemissions. In fact, emissions are in-creasing more rapidly than even theworst case scenario modeled by theIntergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange(IPCC),andpredictionsaboutthe likelyeffectsof anthropogenic in-fluence on the climate have becomeincreasinglysevere.5Theglobalpopu-lationcontinuestorise(particularlyinemergingeconomiessuchasChinaandIndia),alongwiththeper-capitaemis-sionsofmanymillionsofpeople.

Itremainstobeseenwhetherglobaltemperatures will exceed the two-de-grees limit. But some anthropogenicclimate change has already occurred(global temperatures have risen byaround0.74degreesCelsiusinthelast100years)andbecauseoftheinertiaintheclimatesystem,afurtherwarmingofapproximately0.6degreesCelsiusisinevitable.6 Thus, the window for ef-fectivelymitigating against a two-de-greerise inglobal temperatures isex-tremely narrow, and many prominentmembers of the climate science com-munityhavebeguntoquestionwhetherpreventing a rise in global tempera-tures of this magnitude (or evengreater)ispossibleusingexistingmiti-gationapproaches.7Scientistsandpoli-cymakersareincreasinglyaskingwhatwillhappenifthetwo-degrees“guard-rail” is breached, particularly if tem-peratureincreasesinexcessoftwode-grees lead to positive feedback loopsand furtheraccelerateclimatechange.Areexistingmitigationandadaptationpoliciesenoughtopreventcatastrophicchangesintheclimatefromoccurring?In this context, geoengineering theearth’sclimatehasstartedtobeconsid-ered as a serious candidate for bothmitigatingagainstandadaptingtodan-gerousclimatechange.

geoengineeringGeoengineeringreferstotheintentionalmanipulation of the earth’s climate tocounteract anthropogenic climatechangeoritswarmingeffects.8Mostofthe technology implicated in geoengi-neeringproposalshasyet tobedevel-oped,letalonefieldtested.Somegeo-engineeringproposalsmayyetturnoutto be littlemore than imaginative sci-ence fiction—fornow,geoengineeringis at a pre-research and developmentphase, with no major research initia-tivesyetundertaken.Butgeoengineer-ing is beginning to be taken seriouslybyscientistsaroundtheworld, includ-ingtheAmericanMeteorologicalSoci-etyandtheUK’sRoyalSociety.9 In themost comprehensive reviewofgeoengineeringsciencetodate,theRoyal Society identified two distinctapproaches: carbon dioxide removal(CDR)techniques,whichremoveCO2fromtheatmosphere,andsolarradia-

tion management (SRM) techniques,which reflect a small percentage ofthe sun’s light and heat back intospace.10CDRtechniquesincludepro-posals to imitate trees’ sequestrationof carbon dioxide from the atmo-spherebyusinggiant chemicalventsto“scrub”theatmosphere(analogousto the carbon capture and storagetechniquescurrentlybeingdevelopedfor use on coal-fired power stations)and plans to “fertilize” the oceans byusingparticlesofironsulphatetostim-ulatealgalblooms (whichabsorbcar-bondioxide).Althoughnot strictly anengineeringintervention,majorglobalreforestationcouldalsobeviewedasalong-term method for CDR. By con-trast,SRMtechniquesincludesugges-tions for the placement of trillions oftiny “sunshades” in orbit around theearth to deflect a percentage of solarradiation,andtheenhancementofma-rinecloudalbedousingparticlesofseasalt to deflect sunlight. (See Sidebar,“Proposed Approaches to Geoengi-neering”forfurthertechnicaldetailongeoengineeringproposals.) TheRoyalSocietyreportincludedapreliminaryassessmentofthetechnicalfeasibilityandsafetyofspecificgeoen-gineeringproposals.Theuncertaintiesare considerable, and the potentialrisksvaryenormouslyacrossdifferentproposals—from concerns that SRMtechniques would do nothing to pre-vent ocean acidification to fears thatocean fertilization techniques wouldhave unpredictable (and undesirable)ecologicalsideeffects.Moregenerally,therearesignificantconcernsaboutthemaskingeffectsof somegeoengineer-ing approaches. In particular, SRMtechniquesdonotaddresstheunderly-ingcausesofclimatechange(i.e., thebuild up of greenhouse gases), andwere such a program to unexpectedlyfail, a rapid acceleration of warmingmightthenensue.Figure1(reproducedfrom theRoyal Society report) repre-sents an initial attempt to evaluate anumberofgeoengineering techniques.Accordingto theSociety’sanalysis, itis clear that there is substantial varia-tionintheestimatesofthecost,effec-tiveness, timeliness, and risk of puta-tivegeoengineeringapproaches.Akeyconsiderationisthatmanyoftherisksofgeoengineeringareatpresenthighly

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uncertain (effectively “unknown un-knowns”), making them particularlydifficult to analyze through conven-tionalriskassessmenttechniques. TheRoyalSocietyemphasizedthatnoneofthecurrentproposalsforgeo-engineering should currently be con-sideredasacceptablepolicyresponsesto climate change. However, despitedistancing itself from the applicationof geoengineering techniques, theRoyalSocietyrecommendedthat£10million be invested annually into re-search on their technical feasibilityand safetyover thenext10years (intheUK).Asaresult,theUKResearchCouncilsplan tospend£3milliononsome preliminary research from late2010onward.Thus,despitetheobvi-ouswarinesswithwhichgeoengineer-ing proposals are treated by somemembers of the scientific commu-nity,11 research into the technicalfea-sibilityandphysicalrisksofgeoengi-neeringispoisedtobegin. The considerable uncertainty sur-roundinggeoengineering isofcoursenotconfinedtoquestionsoftechnicalrisk and feasibility. The prospect ofcoordinated and large-scale attemptstoengineertheclimateraisesahostofchallenging legal, ethical, and socialquestions.Oneofthekeyrecommen-dations in the Royal Society reportwas that a process of dialogue andengagement to explore public andcivil society attitudes, concerns, anduncertainties about geoengineeringshouldbegin immediately. In thefol-lowing section, we identify some ofthe social and ethical questions thatgeoengineering proposals may raise.We then identify some methods bywhichpublicresponsestotheseques-tions might be elicited. Finally, andechoing the Royal Society’s senti-ments, we suggest that beginning aprocessoflegitimateandparticipativepublic engagement is essential forpolicymakers who are consideringproposals for geoengineering the cli-mate.Asanissuepotentiallyaffectingcitizens of countries around theglobe—both richandpoor—dialogueabout theprospectofengineeringtheearth’sclimateshouldnotbeconfinedtotechnicalorpoliticalelites,norforthat matter solely to the citizens ofindustrializedWesternnations.

The Royal Society has identified two broad types of geo-engineering proposals. Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) techniques remove CO2 from the atmosphere, while solar radiation management (SRM) techniques reflect a small percentage of the sun’s light and heat back into space.

CDR TeChniques

Chemical air capture and carbon sequestration: there are a number of proposals to imitate trees’ sequestration of carbon dioxide from the atmo-sphere by using giant chemical vents to “scrub” the atmosphere. more conventional carbon capture and storage (CCS) techniques are currently being developed for use on coal-fired power stations. ocean fertilization: plans to “fertilize” the oceans by using particles of iron to stimulate algal blooms (which absorb carbon dioxide) have already attracted interest from commercial investors, but small scale experiments have thus far been unsuccessful. Biomass/biochar/biomass with carbon sequestration (BeCS): the use of biofuels as a substitute for fossil fuels might not seem to qualify as geoengineering, but the mass harvesting and sequestration of biomass would constitute a major climatic intervention. enhanced weathering: adding silicate materials to soil would enhance weathering processes which naturally sequester Co2, while increasing the levels of alkalinity in the ocean would have a similar effect. afforestation: large-scale ecosystem management at a local and global level could provide significant increases in carbon sinks such as forests. While few undesirable side effects would be expected, carbon stored in vegetation is not securely sequestered in the long term.

sRM TeChniques

Space-based reflectors: the placement of a fleet of artificial “sunshades” in orbit around the earth would deflect solar radiation. one suggestion is that a swarm of around 10 trillion extremely thin discs could be launched into space in stacks of a million, once every minute, for about 30 years. Stratospheric aerosols: Sulphate particles blasted into the strato-sphere would deflect sunlight. Based on the model of a volcano, rapid reductions could be achieved in earth-bound solar radiation, but there are serious concerns over unintended effects on the stratospheric ozone. enhanced surface albedo: human settlements could be made more reflective by painting them white, more reflective crop varieties and grass-land could be planted, and deserts could be covered with highly reflective materials. enhanced cloud albedo: the whitening of oceanic clouds could be achieved by spraying salt-rich sea water into the sky—sometimes referred to as “cloud seeding.”

Proposed Approaches to Geoengineering

The Social and ethical implications of geoengineering

intentional Manipulation of theGlobal Climate Perhaps themost fundamental ques-tion that geoengineering raises iswhethertheintentionalmanipulationofthe global climate is ethically accept-able.On theonehand, fewwoulddis-agree that a global temperature rise ofthree or four degrees (or even higher)willhavecatastrophicconsequencesforbothpeopleandecosystems,providingan ethical imperative for action if allotheroptionsarelikelytofail.Thereisalso a long history of anthropogenicmanipulation or modification of manyof the Earth’s systems (not just theglobalclimate).12Itisclearthathumanshave the capacity to geoengineer andhave done so intentionally on a smallscale and unintentionally on a largescaleonmanypreviousoccasions:An-

thropogenic interference in the globalclimate is precisely the problem thatgeoengineeringisdesignedtosolve. But the intentional large scale ma-nipulationoftheclimatehasnotprevi-ously been attempted. Thus, it is theintentionality of geoengineering pro-posalsthatdemarcatesthemfrompre-viousanthropogenicinterferenceintheglobal climate. This asymmetry be-tweenintendedandunintendedactsisclearly observed in law (most legalsystemsdistinguishcrimesonthebasisof intentionality),medicalethics(pas-sivevs.activeeuthanasia),andmilitaryconduct(theintentionalkillingofcivil-iansvs.“collateraldamage”ofwar).13 Some commentators have arguedthatthefactthathumanshavealreadycausedclimaticchangeispreciselythereason why an intentional effort toundo it should not be initiated.14 Onthisview,theunintendedconsequencesof current human interference in theclimate systemare apowerful indica-

tion that “meddling” with the globalclimate is inadvisable. Proponents ofgeoengineeringcounterthatevennon-geoengineering attempts at mitigationconstitute intentional interference inthe climate—as efforts to reduce thegreenhouse gas emissions of humanactivity are aimed at slowing down(and ultimately reversing) globalwarming.15But as several decades ofriskresearchhaveestablished,people’sperceptionsoftherisksassociatedwithscience and technology are filteredthrough social and cultural lenses.16Thismeansthat theprospectof large-scaletechnologicalmanipulationoftheatmosphere is likely to produce radi-callydifferentresponsesfromdifferentmembersofthepublic.Peoplewithop-posing cultural worldviews tend toperceiverisksandbenefitsverydiffer-ently.17Whilesomemayfindthepros-pectoflarge-scaleengineeringprojectsworrisome,otherswillviewprogramsaimed at changing their consumption


Figure reproduced with full permission from the royal Society. Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty (Science policy Centre report 10/09, 2009, p. 49). each of the geoengineering techniques is described in the Sidebar, “proposed approaches to Geoengineering.”

an additional dimension on which geoengineering techniques vary is reversibility. While increasing urban surface albedo could quickly be undone, reversing ocean fertilization programs would be more difficult. the degree to which any particular geoengineeing tech-nique could be halted and reversed might be a critical determinant of how people perceive them.

Figure 1. a preliminary evaluation of geoengineering techniques reviewed by the royal Society (2009)


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Some scientists have proposed carbon dioxide removal systems to address pollutants emitted by refineries such as this one.

morally unacceptable. While mitiga-tion through behavior change—forsomeclosertoanideaof“socialengi-neering”—and geoengineering mayboth technically constitute intentionalinterference with the climate, peopleareunlikelytoseethecommonality.18

ConsentIf agreementwere tobe reached thatclimate modification was a techni-callyviableandpoliticallyacceptableoption, whose agreement would besought? In the industrialized nations,thedemocratization (orotherwise)ofscience and technology is a topic ofcontinuing interest.As the large aca-demic literature on how to engagepeople with science demonstrates,how and whytoinvolvethepublicindecisionsabouttheappropriatenessoracceptability of novel scientific andtechnologicaldevelopmentscontinuesto generate debate.19 The U.S. Na-tional Research Council (in commonwithmanyothers)hasarguedthatitisbeneficialforexpertsandpolicymak-ers to involve citizens in discussionaboutthesocietalaspectsofemergingareas of science, technology, and theenvironment using appropriate ana-lytic-deliberativeprocessesattheear-liestpossiblestage.20Theprospectofcontrolling the global thermostat issomething that all citizenscould rea-sonably claim to have a legitimatestakein.Howwill thepublic’sviewsbeadequatelyrepresented? The issue of consent arguably hasmore profound implications interna-tionally. It is well documented thatsomeofthepoorestpartsoftheworld(e.g.,Bangladesh,sub-SaharanAfrica,and the Pacific Island states) will bedisproportionally affected by climatechange—both because of their re-source-limited capacity to cope withthe changing climate, and because oftheirlow-lyingordrought-pronegeog-raphy. Just as thecitizensofdevelop-ingcountriesdidlittletocontributetothe adverse effects of the climatechange that they now face, it seemsunlikelythat thepoorestpeopleinthepoorest countries will be adequatelyrepresented in decisions about geoen-gineering.21Yetperversely,anyadverseconsequences of geoengineering are

likelytobemoredifficulttoaddressinnations with limited financial re-sources.Recognizingthisconcern,theRoyal Society recommended that itwouldbeinadvisabletopursuegeoen-gineeringmethodsthatwouldhaveef-fectsextendingbeyondnationalbound-aries(e.g.,thedeploymentofsulphateaerosols) before appropriate gover-nancemechanismswere inplace.Thehistoryofinternationalclimatenegoti-ations is of course fraughtwith diffi-culties, suggesting that in practice,geo-governance mechanisms will bedifficulttodesignandimplement. A more mundane issue of consentarisesfromtheliteratureonpublicat-titudes towardsnuclearpower.Recentstudies in the UK have asked peopleabouttheirviewsonnuclearpower,inlight of the threat posed by climatechange. While outright support andstrongoppositiontonuclearpowerwas

evident, a significant proportion ofparticipantsoffereda“reluctantaccep-tance”—that is, they agreed that nu-clear power (as a potential source oflow-carbon energy) couldbe a neces-sary evil in the fight against climatechange.22A key conclusion of the re-searchwasthatthiswasaconditional,unstableattitudepositionwithconsid-erableambivalenceassociatedwiththeapparent support. In addition, partici-pants in qualitative discussion groupsexpressedresistancetothepre-framingof ‘nuclear vs. climate change’ ratherthan ‘nuclearvs.otherenergyoptionsthatmightfightclimatechange’.Geo-engineeringisbeingadvocatedinpre-cisely this way—as the lesser of twoevils. If a narrative of inevitability isused to framegeoengineeringwithoutfullyevaluatingitsmeritsagainstotherpolicy options first, what effect willthishaveonpublicacceptanceofit?23

Global security & LawResearch on geoengineering has itsroots in military strategies developedfor weather modification.24 Both theUnited States and Russia expressedsignificant interest (and invested sig-nificant funds) in researchingweathermodification for thepurposesofmili-tary conflict. However, concern overthistypeofresearchledtotheEnviron-mental Modification Convention(passedbytheUnitedNationsin1977),banning the use ofweathermodifica-tion for military or other hostile use.Some commentators have suggestedthat geoengineering proposals mightviolatethetermsofthistreaty.25 Whilegeoengineering’smilitaryhis-torydoesnotprecludebenevolentuses,it is clear that climate modificationschemes come with a potential forglobal conflict that should be takenseriously by policymakers. Conflictmightariseiftheworldviewsanationpursuing a climate modification pro-gramasplacingitsowninterestsabovethoseofothernations. It is evencon-ceivable that a wealthy individual orprivatecompanymightdevelopgeoen-gineering technologies. But even ifmultilateral agreement could bereached, the potential for conflictwouldremain.What if, in theprocessof improving the climate of its owncountry, a government inadvertentlyaffected the climateof another?Whatifonenationattributedachangeinitsclimatetothegeoengineeringprogram

of another, or even instigated a coun-ter-program (to add greenhouse gasestotheatmosphere)ifthegeoengineer-ingprogramofanothernationwasfelttoinadvertentlyaffectit?26 Picking apart the climatic effectsthat could be attributed to a rival na-tion’s geoengineering from thosewhich would have occurred naturallywould be extremely difficult. Thescopeforconflict—evenintheabsenceof intentional provocation—would besignificant. While similar disputesmight be envisioned over the unevendistribution of climatic changes fromunabated greenhouse gas emissions,the act of geoengineering might wellbe considered more problematic thandoingnothing.Finally,evenifconflictcould be avoided in the initiation ofgeoengineering proposals, significantquestions remain about whether theworld’snationscouldcreateandmain-tain the centuries of global politicalstabilitythatwouldberequiredtoman-agesuchindustrialprojectsonaglobalscale.AstheclimatescientistStephenSchneider succinctly puts it, “Justimagine ifweneeded todoall this in1900andthentherestofthe20thcen-turyunfoldedasitactuallydid!”27

Distraction from Mitigation and the Lure of “Techno-Fixes”The commercial potential of geoengi-neering has already attracted interestfromprivate investors,28but initial re-searchintogeoengineeringwillalmost

certainly be initiated by government-funded research councils. Geoengi-neering proposals will compete withothermitigationandadaptationstrate-gies for research investment, whichwill raise questions about the alloca-tionofsparsegovernmentresources.29Infact,somepressuregroupsthathavepreviously been vocal opponents ofstringent political action to reducegreenhouse gases (such as the CatoInstituteintheUnitedStates)havein-dicated their support for geoengineer-ing as a “cost effective” method oftackling climate change.30 Advocatesarguethatthecostofgeoengineering—intermsofgrossdomesticproduct—issubstantiallylessthanothermitigationoptions (although theETCGrouphasdubbedgeoengineeringthe“BigMac”ofclimatechangeresponses—fast,un-healthy, and deceptively cheap in theshort term).31 This suggests that asawareness of geoengineering’s poten-tial grows, some powerful economicand ideological interests will lobbystrongly for it. At a political level,therefore, geoengineering might beconsidered a dangerous distraction(withmomentumofitsown)fromthetaskofmitigation throughmore tradi-tional methods of emissions reduc-tions.TheRoyalSocietyreferstothisas a “moral hazard” argument—thephenomenonwherebypeoplewhofeel“insured” against a risk may takegreater risks (i.e., mitigate less) thanthey would otherwise be prepared to


Tree seedlings being grown for a reforestation project in Africa.

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take.32 Of course, whether geoengi-neering will suppress individual andgroupincentivesforaction(oralterna-tivelygalvanizesomesectionsofsoci-ety) is an empirical issue, pointing totheneedforquitesubtlesocialresearchon geoengineering’s impact on atti-tudestoclimatechange,aswellasbe-havioralintentionsandresponses. Geoengineeringalsodoesnothingtochallenge the systems of productionandconsumptionthatmightbeconsid-ered unsustainable for reasons otherthanthegreenhousegasemissionsas-sociated with them. For example, theUK Energy Research Center recentlywarned that conventional oil suppliescould peak by 2020 if current con-sumptiontrendscontinue.33Whilepro-posals for capturing carbon dioxideandstoringitundergroundcanmitigatelevels of CO2 in the atmosphere, oilreserves will continue to be depletedforaslongasfossilfuelscontinuetobeburned. Similarly, increasing numbersofcommentatorsandeconomistshavequestionedwhetherthegloballydomi-nanteconomicmodelofconsumption-based growth can deliver a truly sus-tainable society, given that thedecoupling of economic growth andenergy use is typically relative, notabsolute.34 To what extent will thepromise of geoengineering detract at-tentionfromthecriticalneedtoestab-lishmoresustainableconsumptionandproductionpatternsacrosstheglobe? AstheclimatescientistMikeHulmehas observed, questions such as theseshed light on the deep ideological di-vides that run through debates aboutclimatechangeandhowto“solve”it.35For groups and individuals who seeclimate change as the symptom of asocialandeconomicorderthatisinher-ently unsustainable, geoengineeringrepresentstheworstkindoftechno-fix.Thesepeoplemaydesiresocialchangeindependent from concern about cli-mate change—and are thus likely toviewproposalsthatdonotaddressex-istinginequalitiesbetweennationsandpeoples with suspicion. Conversely,those who place faith in the humancapacityforfindingtechnologicalsolu-tionstoenvironmentalandotherprob-lemsmightwellseegeoengineeringasa genuine opportunity rather than a

threat.Here,deeplyheldandculturallyingrained narratives regarding humandominance over (or conversely inter-connectedness with) nature are likelytoplayarole. As knowledge of geoengineeringproposals proliferates, the metaphorsthat emerge in the public discourse(andhowtheyrelatetodifferentunder-lying political and environmental ide-ologies) will be telling. The recentlycompleted European nanotechnologyproject DEEPEN36 found that amongdiscussiongroupsintheUKandPortu-gal, five key narratives characterizedparticipants’responsestonanotechnol-ogy:1)“becarefulwhatyouwishfor”;2)“openingPandora’sbox”;3)“mess-ingwithnature”;4)“keptinthedark”;and5)“therichgetricherandthepoorget poorer.” Interestingly, the techno-scientificvisionoftechnologyasdriv-

ing inexorably forward and bringinginevitable socialbenefits tended toberejected. These narratives resonatewith the sortsof responses thatmightbe expected towards geoengineering,and suggest that thereare clearparal-lelsbetweenthesetwoemergingareasof science and technology (a themethat we develop in more detail be-low).36

unintended Consequences Concerns about whether scientistsand engineers have the capacity tosafelymitigate the unintended techni-calandenvironmentalconsequencesofgeoengineeringwillplayacentralrolein the debate. But the issue of unin-tended consequences also has a num-berofsocialdimensions.Forexample,historyshowsus thatcomplex techni-cal and environmental systems oftenfail because of unanticipated interac-

tions between their component parts,while the processes of societal over-sighttypicallyareinsufficientlysensi-tivetoemergingwarningsigns.37Inananalysisthatbroadlysupportspursuinggeoengineeringresearch,JamesLove-lockquestionedwhetherhumansociet-iesare sufficiently talented to takeontheroleofpermanently regulating theglobal thermostat: “Consider whatmight happen if we start by using astratospheric aerosol to ameliorateglobal heating; even if it succeeds, itwouldnotbe longbeforewe face theadditionalproblemofoceanacidifica-tion. This would need another medi-cine, and so on. We could find our-selves in a Kafka-like world fromwhichthereisnoescape.”38 Lovelock’s “Kafka-like world” ispurposefully dramatic. But the notionthatembarkingonacourseofgeoengi-

neeringcouldresult inperpetual tech-nological “treatments” for the climatesystemisonethatshouldbetakenseri-ously.Asidefromthemoralquestionsitraisesaboutwhatthissortofsocietyandglobalenvironmentwouldbelike,anincreasinglytechnologicallysophis-ticated future may not be somethingthat can be taken for granted. Rapidtechnologicalprogresssincetheindus-trial revolution has been inextricablylinkedtotheavailabilityofcheapandplentiful fossil fuels.Will a post-car-bonenergyfuturebesimilarlycatalyticindrivingtechnologicalinnovation? Theethicalandsocialquestionswehave identified arenot intended to beanexhaustivelist,andneitheraretheypredictions about the likely trajectoryof public and ethical opinion towardsgeoengineering. Inevitably, in focus-singon thedisputes thatgeoengineer-ingmightraise,wehavenotdiscussed

While proposals for capturing carbon dioxide and storing it underground can

mitigate levels of Co2 in the atmosphere, oil reserves will continue to be depleted

for as long as fossil fuels continue to be burned.

indetailthebenefitsthatproponentsofgeoengineering research foresee. Theworst effects of geoengineering maypaleincomparisontothethreatsposedby insufficiently mitigated climatechange.And, if at some critical junc-ture in the future the survival of thehumanracedependedonourabilitytogeoengineeraclimatesolution,propo-nentsofgeoengineeringresearcharguethat it would be better if we had al-readydonethefundamentalresearch.39 Thepromiseofabenignlycontrolledclimatemaybeappealingtosome,al-though most see geoengineering as acontingencyplan—abackupincaseall

elsefails.Butevenproponentsofgeo-engineering research urge caution inpursuingsucharadicalagendabecausethesocialandethicalissuesatstakearesubstantial.Inthenextsection,weout-linesomepossiblemethodsforbegin-ningaprocessofupstreamengagementwithmembersofthepublic.Bydraw-ingonrelevantpublicengagementre-search on another emerging area ofscience—nanotechnology—weseektoidentify ways to establish a dialoguewith society at large that may, if ap-proachedopen-mindedly,provideale-gitimatemethodforaddressingbroaderquestionsaboutgeoengineering.

involving Citizens early in debate: The Challenge of Upstream Public engagement “Public engagement” is typicallypoorly specified.40 From purely com-municative projects aimed at improv-ing lay knowledge in some way, toconsultation processes that might bemore accurately described as marketresearch, to large-scale analytic-delib-erative processes involving both layandexpertparticipants–theconceptofpublicengagementisbroadandnego-tiable.Debateoverthebestwaytoin-volvemembers of the public in deci-sionsrelatedtoscienceandtechnologyhas taken place for over a decade.41Early discussions centered around thedeficit model of science communica-tion, which assumed that the publichadadeficitofknowledgethatneededto be addressed through engagement.But the deficit hypothesis has beendiscredited by both theoretical ad-vances and empirical data. From atheoretical perspective, assuming adeficitofknowledge isnotconduciveto establishing a genuinely participa-tory interaction between scientists,communicators, and the broader pub-lic.Andfromanempiricalperspective,studies have consistently shown thatpeople’sperceptionandacceptanceofscienceandtechnologyisnotstraight-forwardlyattributable to their levelofknowledgeabout it.42The rejectionofthedeficitmodelof sciencecommuni-cationhasbeenaccompaniedbyacon-certedeffort todevelopmoredelibera-tive public engagement mechanisms,andtomovetheiruse“upstream”intheresearch and development process. Atechnology is upstream if significantresearch and development has not yetbegun, public controversy about thetopic is not currently present, and en-trenched attitudes or social representa-tions have not yet been established(criteria that seem to fit geoengineer-ing’s current position). Upstream en-gagementmeansencouragingthepublictoplayanactive role indeliberatingascientificortechnologicalissuethrough-out the entire process of scientific re-search and development, and particu-larly before significant commercialrealizationhastakenplace.43


DiReCT PubLiC enGAGeMenTCitizens’ juries, panels, focus groups, and deliberative workshops can allow significant ethical concerns to be identified and “desired futures” to be discussed. We argue that an international process of direct engagement with the public on geoengineering should be initiated immediately—ideally prior to the commencement of a physical research program.

sCenARio AnALysis wiTh sTAkehoLDeRsidentifying different directions that a new technology might take can help to identify significant uncertainties. mapping out some possible trajectories for geoengineering might permit some of the ethical is-sues we identify to come to the forefront.

DeCision AnALyTiC MeThoDsdecision analytic methods consist of working with stakeholders or the public to identify the frames and values that are ultimately neces-sary for characterizing risks. Geoengineering is likely to be framed using an initial narrative of necessity or inevitability. What effect will this have on judgments? Can alternative decision structures be iden-tified?

MuLTisTAGe MeThoDsmultistage methods combine different approaches to framing and risk assessment in a sequence of linked activities, often with different groups of stakeholders and the public, and at different times. it seems likely that multistage and multi-audience methods will be necessary to establish a legitimate process of interna-tional engagement on geoengineering.

some Approaches to upstream engagement


Successful upstream engagementrequiresfindingnewwaysoflisteningtoandvaluingdiverseformsofpublicknowledge and social intelligence,andinvolvingthepublicinmorefun-damentalquestionsaboutthepaceanddirection of science and technology(and the wider values that informthis).Manyauthorshave issuedcallsfor the social scientific (as well astechnical)aspectsofnewtechnologiesto be addressed early and simultane-ously, rather than simply allocatingthe impacts or societal effects of anewtechnologytothesocialsciencestoassesspost hoc.44Onthisview,so-cialandethicalassessmentsofanewtechnologymustoccurinrealtimeinordertoaddressdeepersocialandpo-litical questions about purpose, own-ership, control, and responsibility:Whatisadevelopmentfor,whatistheneed, who owns it, and whowill beresponsibleifthingsgowrong?Allofthesequestionsseemespeciallyperti-nent for any futureproposals togeo-engineertheclimate. Interest in upstream engagement inEurope canbepartly attributed to thewidelyheldperceptionthatpublicen-gagement over genetically modifiedorganisms(GMOs)cametoolate,andresulted in something of a backlash.45ThelessonslearnedandtheapproachesusedinprojectssuchastheBritishGMNationpublicdebatein2003havein-formedmuchoftheresearchandprac-tice in Europe that has followed it.46Butmostofthediscussionovermeth-ods of upstream engagement has re-lated tocurrentlyupstreamtopics (forexample, nanotechnology, hydrogenenergy technologies, and syntheticbi-ology). Tee Rogers-Hayden and NickPidgeonhavereferredtonanotechnol-ogy—the manufacture of nanoscalestructuresanddevicesthathavenovelchemicalandelectricalproperties—asthetestcaseforupstreamengagement.A number of engagement mecha-nisms,andtheirpotentialforupstreamengagement on geoengineering areoutlined in the Sidebar, “Some Ap-proachestoUpstreamEngagement.”47Severalmethodsemergeaspromisingwaystodevelopanupstreamdialoguewiththepublic,andwefocushereon

theuseofcitizens’juriesanddelibera-tiveworkshops.48 Citizens’juriesareaforumforpub-lic debate and discussion, and arebasedonthemodelofalegaljury(andare related to the “consensus confer-ence” models used in Australia andScandinavian countries).49 They aresemi-structured and participatory ses-sions,wherearepresentativegroupofthepublicisaskedtoconsideraseriesof questions relating to a particulartopic. The jury has the opportunity toquestion “witnesses” (experts in thefield)andareaskedtoreacha“verdict.”Inthisway,thesessionsareguidedbythe concerns and interests of the par-ticipants,ratherthansolelydeterminedby the researcher. NanoJuryUK (heldinWestYorkshire over fiveweeks inthe summer of 2005) proved to be ausefulmethod to elicit public evalua-tions of nanotechnology—somethingthat isscientificallycomplex,difficultto visualize, and difficult to representpsychologically.50 Although partici-pantsinitiallystruggledwiththetopic,itsultimatesuccesssuggeststhatitisamethodology that might conceivablyleadtosubstantivepublicengagementwith the social and ethical questionsthatgeoengineeringraises. In addition to citizens’ juries, up-stream deliberative workshops havebeen trialled using members of the

BritishandAmericanpublic.Usingthedeliberative workshop format, quasi-representative groups of the publicfrom the United Kingdom and theUnitedStateswereconvenedtodebatenanotechnology.51 The groups dis-cussedtherisksandbenefitsofspecificnanotechnology applications using acombinationofWorldCafédiscussionsessionsandwrittenmaterialstodrawon. Interestingly, a firm conclusion(echoing thefindingsof theDEEPENproject described earlier)was that thesocial trumped the technical in peo-ple’s discussion of risk—that is, dis-cussionsfocusedpredominantlyonthesocialandethicalimplicationsofnano-technology, rather than questions ofphysicalrisk(despitethegroupsbeingprovidedwithinformationaboutphysi-cal risks).A key question is whethersuchdeliberativeworkshopswillbeaneffectivemethodof upstreamengage-mentongeoengineering(wheresocialand ethical questions are likely to bepertinent).Theyseemtoprovideafo-rumforpreciselythetypeofnontech-nical concerns that traditional risk as-sessment approaches to analysisstruggletocapture. Our argument is that the upstreampublic engagement tools that havebeen developed for studying nano-technology may also be usefully ap-pliedtoassesspeople’sperceptionsof

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Reduced sea ice thickness is just one of the many signs of global climate change.

the social and ethical implicationsofgeoengineering.Itwillnotbeaneasychallenge to meet. Relocating publicdebate about geoengineering to anearlier point in its development willnotaddress thegenericdifficultiesofpublicengagement—whoshouldpar-ticipate, the efficacy of different ap-proaches,theclarificationofaimsandthe need to ensure the results of anyengagement exercise are taken onboardbydecision-makers, aswell asthemeansforlocatingdialoguewithinexisting modes of democratic andpublic representation. Equally, up-streamengagementbrings a rangeofuniqueissuesrelatingtothedesignofparticipatoryexercises.Inthecaseofnanotechnologies,theveryabsenceofproductsandeasyeverydayanalogiesthrough which people can interpretthesciencemeanstheyoftenstruggle(initiallyat least) togetagriponthetopic.Inturn,thismeansthatengage-ment mechanisms require at leastsome level of information provisionabouttheissue,raisingthequestionofhow this information is framed andpresentedbythedialogueorganizers. Many attempts at upstream publicengagementsufferfromtwoproblems:a profound ambivalence on behalf ofthe public, and a general cynicismabout whether the results of engage-ment exercises are taken seriously bydecision-makers and stakeholders.52Decision-makersmustbecarefulnottouseupstreampublicengagementasanopportunityto“getinearly”withpro-geoengineering public relations cam-paigns,butevenmoreimportantly,ev-eryeffortmustbemadetomakepublicengagement opportunities available toasmanypeople(andasmanydifferenttypesofpeople)aspossible. The recent World Wide Views onGlobalWarmingproject represents anattempt to pursue public engagementonaglobal scale.53Theprojectwasaglobal citizen consultation that tookplace on September 26, 2009 in 38countries, involving 4,400 citizens.Eachdeliberationincludedaround100participants, who were selected to bedemographicallyrepresentativefortheregion. Participants discussed and de-batedviewsonthepolicygoalsoftheUnitedNationsClimateChangeNego-

tiations in Copenhagen. While 4,400peoplestillrepresentatinyminorityoftheworldwide population, the projectsuggeststhatpublicparticipationproj-ects need not (and should not) be re-strictedtothecitizensofindustrialized,Westernnations.

Conclusion Researchintothetechnicalfeasibil-ity and safety of geoengineering ispoised tobegin,withguarded interestfrom research funders, governments,and academic bodies in the UnitedStatesandEurope.Wehavearguedthatit isessential thataprogramofsocialresearch and reflection be initiated aswell, prior to the physical program.The deliberative techniques that havebeen trialled in researchonnanotech-

nologyofferpotentialopportunitiesformeaningfulpublicengagement.54Evenunder conditions of high uncertaintythat characterize emerging technolo-gies such as geoengineering (some-thing the philosophers Jerry Ravetzand Silvio Funtowicz have termedpost-normal science),55 upstream de-liberative methods can play a criticalrole in allowing a broader range ofvoicestobeheardandinextendingthedialoguebetweenexpertsandsociety. Butwhileitisrelativelystraightfor-wardtoelicitviewsandopinionsfrommembers of the public, ensuring thatthese views are givenweight and le-gitimacybydecision-makers isama-jorundertaking.There is, therefore, asignificant challenge for public en-gagement researchers and policy-makerstodevelopagenuinelypartici-


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pative model of upstream publicengagement around geoengineeringthatdoesmorethansimplymovecon-sultationprocessestoanearlierphaseinthetechnology’sdevelopment.Pub-lic engagement must be initiated be-fore the scientific community beginstoinvestigatethepotentialofgeoengi-neering, precisely because the socialandethicalquestionsthatgeoengineer-ingraiseswillbemuchmoredifficultto address in a satisfactoryway oncelarge-scale research is underway. Ifexperimentsare tobeconductedwithgeoengineeringatthelevelrequiredtoadequatelyassessitsimpacts—thatis,real-world experiments with theworld’s climate—the opportunity toengage the public inmeaningful dia-logue may have already passed. Theneedforupstreamengagementongeo-engineeringis,therefore,pressing. Encouragingly, the Royal Societyreportincludedapreliminaryinvesti-gation of public attitudes towardsgeoengineering.56Focusgroupscom-posed of participants with differentenvironmental beliefs and behaviorsdiscussedpossiblerisks,benefits,anduncertainties of different geoengi-neering technologies. Perceptions ofgeoengineeringweregenerallynega-tive, with concern over vested com-mercial interests, environmental im-pact, and transparency of regulation(this can be contrasted with generalviews about nanotechnology, whichhavetendedtobebroadlypositive)57.However,therewasalsoasuggestionthat geoengineering proposals mightgalvanize (rather than distract from)mitigationstrategies—severalpartici-pants who were generally scepticaltowards climate change perceivedgovernment investment in geoengi-neering research as a reason for in-creasedpersonalengagement. Ofcourse,upstreamengagementongeoengineering isnot justaboutalert-ingthepublictorisksanddangerstheymight otherwise not be aware of; ad-dressing the ethical and social ques-tions that geoengineering raises mayactually increase the likelihood of atechnical program beginning. This isnot because upstream engagement of-fersanearlyopportunitytoallayfears,but because previous experiencewith

biotechnology has suggested, for ex-ample, that failing to effectively en-gagethepublicledtoGMfoodbecom-inganiconictopicforbroaderpoliticaldebateandcontroversy.58Engagementexercisesshouldnotaimtostymiere-searchor limitacademicfreedom,buttoenrichsocietaldebateandthedeci-sion-makingprocess.AgoodexampleofthisisarecentBritishdialoguewithmembersofthepublicabouttheuseofnanotechnologies in healthcare. Aswell as identifyingpositive andnega-tive perceptions of the role of nano-technologiesinhealth,theprocesspro-vided valuable input that aided thedevelopmentoftheresearchprogram.59 Upstreamengagementwiththepub-licmayalsosimplyleadtoneitherac-ceptance nor rejection. Some recentstudiesofpublicattitudestowardsnan-otechnology have suggested that peo-plewithopposingviewsofscienceandtechnology tend to polarize the moretheyknowabouttherisksandbenefitsof nanotechnology.60 Different ap-proaches to geoengineering may alsoraise different social and ethical is-sues—the question of internationalconsent is arguably less pressing forlocalisedsequestrationmethodsthanitis for the use of stratospheric aero-sols.61 But whatever the outcome ofinvolving the public in a discourseabout the questions that geoengineer-ingraises,beginningthisprocessattheearliestpossiblestageseemsessential.Genuinely upstream research and en-gagement asks not onlywhat the im-pacts of a particular new program oftechnological innovation will be, butwhether that program is desirable inthefirstplace. These concernsmake clear that up-streamengagement isunlikely tobeapanacea for deeply ingrained tensionsbetweenscienceandbroadersociety.Infact,thesignificantpracticalchallengesofimplementinganambitiousprogramofglobalupstreamengagementongeo-engineeringhighlighttheissuesassoci-ated with global risk assessment, en-gagement, and governance moregenerally.Asdemonstratedbyanalysesof the international riskgovernanceofnanotechnology,increasingtechnologi-calglobalizationisnotalwaysmatchedbyacorrespondingconvergenceofrisk

assessmentandgovernance.62Geoengi-neeringproposalswouldseemtospeakdirectly to the environmental cam-paignerGeorgeMonbiot’sconcernthateverything has been globalized—ex-ceptourconsent.63Anylegitimatepro-cessofpublicengagementongeoengi-neeringwillneedtofighthardtoreachasbroadagroupofcitizensaspossible(possiblyincludingmultistageandmul-timethod approaches—see Sidebar,“Some Approaches to Upstream En-gagement”). Initiating an internationalprogramof social andethical researchbeforemakingadecisionaboutwhetherto commence a technical program ongeoegineeringisonewaytoensurethatthisgoalisachieved. In assessing the potential for up-stream engagement in light of lessonslearned from the debates over GMfood,SheilaJasanoffhassuggestedthatthe “hidden normative presumptions”ofscienceneededtoberevealedinor-der for genuinely participatory publicengagement toensue.64Bybeingwill-ingtosubjectthecentraltenetofpost-Enlightenment science (a firmconvic-tion in the positive value of scientificandtechnologicalprogress)toanopen-ended debate involving a broad rangeofmembersofthepublic,Jasanoffpro-posesthatupstreamengagementcouldmitigateagainstadivisionbetweensci-ence and society. It is our hope that acomprehensive strategy of upstreampublic engagement on geoengineeringcanachieveasimilargoal.

AcknowledgementsPreparation of this article was sup-ported primarily through grants fromthe Economic and Social Research

engagement exercises should not aim to stymie research or

limit academic freedom, but to enrich

societal debate and the decision-making

process.

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10.RoyalSociety,note1;althoughseealsoS.H.Schneider, “Geoengineering: Could We or ShouldWeMake ItWork?”Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society(A)366(2008):3843–3862. 11.Membersofthe“scientificcommunity”areofcoursenomorelikelytospeakwithasinglevoiceongeoengineeringthanmembersofthepublic. 12. J. Lovelock, “AGeophysiologist’s ThoughtsonGeoengineering.”Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society (A)366(2008):3883–3890. 13.D.Jamieson,“EthicsandIntentionalClimateChange,”Climatic Change33(1999):323–336. 14. ETC Group, “Gambling with Gaia,” ETCGroupCommunique93(Ottawa:ETCGroup,2007) 15.J.Lovelock,note12. 16.N. Pidgeon,R. E.Kasperson, and P. Slovic,The Social Amplification of Risk (Cambridge, UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003). 17.M.Hulme,seenote4. 18.Ibid. 19.H.M.CollinsandR.Evans,Rethinking Exper-tise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007);A. Irwin and B. Wynne, Eds., Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology(Cambridge,MA:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1997); D. J. Fiorino, “Citizen Participationand Environmental Risk:A Survey of InstitutionalMechanisms,”Science, Technology & Human Values15 (1990): 226–243; R. Flynn, P. Bellaby, andM.Ricci, “The Limits ofUpstreamEngagement: Citi-zens’PanelsandDeliberationoverHydrogenEnergyTechnologies,” Paper presented at the Society forRiskAnalysisConference:Karlstad,Sweden,2009;G.RoweandL.Frewer,“ATypologyofPublicEn-gagementMechanisms,”Science, Technology & Hu-man Values30(2005):251–289. 20.T.DietzandP.C.Stern,Eds.,Public Partici-pation in Environmental Assessment and Decision Making(NationalResearchCouncil,NationalAcad-emies Press: Washington, DC, 2008); P. C. SternandH.V.Fineberg,Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (National Re-searchCouncilCommitteeonRiskCharacterization:Washington,DC,1996);M.Leach, I.Scoones,andB.Wynne,Eds.,Science and Citizens: Globalization and the Challenges of Engagement (London: ZedBooks,2005);R.Flynnetal,note19. 21.W.N.Adger, J. Paavola, S. Huq, andM. J.Mace, Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change (Massachusetts:MITPress,2006). 22.K.Bickerstaff,I.Lorenzoni,N.F.Pidgeon,W.Poortinga, and P. Simmons, “Re-Framing NuclearPower in the UK Energy Debate: Nuclear Power,ClimateChangeMitigationandRadioactiveWaste,”Public Understanding of Science 17 (2008): 145–169;N.F.Pidgeon,I.Lorenzoni,andW.Poortinga,“ClimateChangeorNuclearPower—NoThanks!AQuantitative Study of Public Perceptions and Risk

Framing inBritain,”Global Environmental Change18(2008):69–85. 23. Steve Gardiner has also noted that geoen-gineering is often presented as an “argument fromemergency,”withtheimplicationbeingthatnothing(i.e.,geoengineering)couldbeasbadasunmitigatedclimate change. S. Gardiner, Is Geoengineeringthe Lesser Evil? Accessed 02/10/09 http://environmentalresearchweb.org/cws/article/opinion/27600(accessed2ndOctober2009). 24.J.R.Fleming,note8;ETCGroup,note14;A.Robock,“20ReasonsWhyGeoengineeringMayBeaBadIdea,”Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists64,no.2(2008):14–18;S.Weart,The Discovery of Global Warming, http://aip.org/history/climate (accessed20thJuly2009). 25.M.C.MacCracken,“Geoengineering:WorthyofCautiousEvaluation,”Climatic Change77(2006):235–243. 26.J.J.Blackstocketal.,note9;D.G.Victor,“OntheRegulationofGeoengineering”,Oxford Review of Economic Policy24,No.2(2008):322–336. 27.S.H.Schneider,note10,p.3857. 28.TheETCGroup(seenote14)reportsthatthefollowingironfertilizationresearchwassupportedbyprivate investors:P.W.Boyd,T. Jickells,C.S.Law,S.Blain,E.A.Boyle,K.O.Buesseleretal. “AMe-soscalePhytoplanktonBloominthePolarSouthernOceanStimulatedbyIronFertilization,”Nature407(2000):695–702. 29.D.Jameison,note12. 30.A.Steffen,“GeoengineeringandtheNewCli-mate Denialism,” http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/009784.html(accessed20October2009). 31. B. Lomborg, “Global Warming’s Cheap Ef-fective Solution,” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/lomborg43/English (accessed 20 Octo-ber2009);J.E.Bickell&L.Lane,An Analysis of Cli-mate Engineering as a Response to Climate Change(Copenhagen Consensus Centre: Denmark, 2009);ETCGroup,“TheEmperor’sNewClimate:Geoengi-neeringas21stCenturyFairytale,”ETCGroupSpe-cialReport(Ottawa:ETCGroup,August2009). 32.TheRoyalSociety,note1,p.37. 33.S.Sorrell,J.Speirs,R.Bentley,A.Brandt,andR.Miller,An Assessment of the Evidence for a Near-Term Peak in Global Oil Production (London:UKEnergyResearchCentre,2009). 34. T. Jackson,Prosperity Without growth? The Transition to a Sustainable Economy (London:Sustainable Development Commission, 2009); N.PidgeonandC.Butler. “RiskAnalysis andClimateChange,”Environmental Politics 18, no. 5 (2009):670–688. 35.M.Hulme,note4. 36. S. Davies, P. Macnaghten, andM. Kearnes,Reconfiguring Responsibility: Lessons for Public Policy, Part I of the report on Deepening Debate


notES

Council (RES-066-27-00013) toNickPidgeon, and from the U.S. NationalScience Foundation (Grant No.0531184) to theCentre forNanotech-nology inSociety,UniversityofCali-fornia,SantaBarbara.Additionalsup-portwasprovidedby theLeverhulmeTrust(F/00407/AG)totheProgramonUnderstanding Risk. The authorswouldliketothankMikeHulme,SteveRayner, Tim Kruger, Tim O’Riordan,

ChristopherBunting,andAnthonyLei-serowitzforhelpfulcommentsonear-lierdraftsofthisarticle,andtheedito-rialteamatEnvironment.

ADAMCORNERisaresearchassociateintheSchoolof Psychology at Cardiff University. His researchlooksathowpeopleevaluatescientificargumentsandevidence, thecommunicationof climatechange, andthepublicunderstandingofemergingareasofscience.Hemaybecontactedatcorneraj@cardiff.ac.uk.

NICKPIDGEON is a professor at the School ofPsychology, Cardiff University, and Director oftheUnderstandingRiskresearchgroupatCardiff(www.understanding-risk.org). He conducts in-terdisciplinary researchon issuesat the interfaceofsociety,publicpolicy,technology,[email protected].


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54.T.Rogers-Hayden&N.Pidgeon,note43. 55. S. O. Funtowicz and J. R. Ravetz, “ThreeTypes of Risk Assessment and the Emergence ofPost-NormalScience,” inS.KrimskyandD.Gold-ing, Eds., Social Theories of Risk (Westport, CT:Praeger,1992). 56.TheRoyalSociety,note1,p.60. 57.T.Satterfield,M.Kandlikar,C.E.H.Beaudrie,J. Conti, and B. H. H. Harthorn, “Anticipating thePerceivedRiskofNanotechnologies,”Nature Nano-technology4no.6(2009):752–758. 58.M.Kearnesetal.,note45. 59. Engineering and Physical SciencesResearchCouncil,Nanotechnologies for the Targeted Delivery of Therapeutic Agents & Nanotechnologies for Diag-nostics: Summary of Public Consultation Findings (Swindon:EPSRC,2008). 60.D.M.Kahanetal.,note42. 61. Personal communication from Tim Kruger,DirectorofOxfordGeoengineeringResearch. 62.O.Renn&M.Rocco.Nanotechnology Risk Governance,InternationalRiskGovernanceCouncilWhitePaperNo.2,(Geneva:InternationalRiskGov-ernanceCouncil,2006);RoyalSociety&TheRoyalAcademyofEngineering,note43. 63.G.Monbiot,The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order(NewYork:HarperPerrenial,2004). 64.S.Jasanoff,“‘LetThemEatCake’:GMFoodsand the Democratic Imagination,” In M. Leach, I.Scoones,andB.Wynne,Eds.,Science and Citizens: Globalization and the Challenges of Engagement (London:ZedBooks,2005). 65.All information derived from techniques re-viewedbytheRoyalSociety,note1. 66.TheapproachesareadaptedfromBox7.4 intheRoyal Society&Royal Society ofEngineeringreportonnanotechnology(p.65),note43.

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