the sÁmi parliament: territorial vs. non-territorial ... · panel 346: sami parliaments:...

THE SÁMI PARLIAMENT: TERRITORIAL VS. NON-TERRITORIA L AUTHORITY IN

NORWAY1

Torvald Falch, Sámediggi, Tromsø, Norway

Per Selle, University of Bergen, Norway

Kristin Strømsnes, University of Bergen, Norway

Paper to ECPR General Conference, Montreal 2015, 26-29 August

S29 – Indigenous Politics in Comparative Perspective

Panel 346: Sami Parliaments: Instruments of Self-determination?

1 An almost similar version of this article/paper will be published in a special issue of Ethnopolitics on Non-Territorial Autonomy, Ethnopolitics 15 (1), ed. John Coakley.

Falch, Selle and Strømsnes. ECPR, Montreal 2015. S29 – Indigenous Politics in Comparative Perspective

2

ABSTRACT. This article explores the case of the Sámi in the Nordic countries, with a specific focus on

the most extensive Sámi political system, that found in Norway. The Norwegian Sámi parliament is an

indigenous parliament in a unitary and ‘state-friendly’ society. As will be seen, that is not an easy

position to be in. While most of the Sámi are concentrated in the most northern part of Norway, the

Sámi language has a general protection by law. The language has a particularly strong protection

within the so called management area of the Sámi language (which includes 10 out of 428 Norwegian

municipalities). The territorial dimension and the strong emphasis upon the traditional Sámi settlement

areas are at the core of the Sámi political project. Even so, the Sámi parliament covers the whole of

Norway, and a Sámi can register to vote for the Sámi elections independently of where in Norway that

person is living. The Sámi are thus an indigenous people, for whom the development of a new public

space since the 1980s has as its core the question of ownership of land and water in the key Sámi

areas, while at the same time the jurisdiction of the Sámi parliament extends not only over the

traditional Sámi areas, but over the whole territory of Norway. The article discusses how this non-

territorial model came about and what it implies for the Sámi political project. What kind of boundaries

or limits concerning Sámi self-determination and self-rule do we see after 25 years of a Sámi

Parliament?

Introduction

Sámi ethnicity emerged over a large area in Fennoscandia (the Scandinavian Peninsula,

Finland and Russia) in the last thousand years BC. The Sámi enjoy historical continuity in the

use and habitation of this area where interaction—and with time, an increasing degree of

intertwining—with other ethnic groups has been prominent. Currently, Sámi reindeer

husbandry or herding takes place in most of this area. This traditional, nomadic Sámi

livelihood makes use of large areas and has contributed to maintaining a strong identity in

respect of territorial affiliation. The Sámi inhabited this area, largely dominating its resources,

long before modern state formation took place. They are recognised as an indigenous

people, where just such a territorial and resource dimension is a crucial, defining

characteristic distinguishing them from other minorities. Other ethnic minorities can of course

also have a historical territorial affiliation, but typically not in the same way as indigenous

peoples, who live in their own historical areas and are not a dominant group in any other

state. The planning and development of modern Sámi and indigenous policy is therefore

based on territorial and historical, as well as political, features and structures, and indigenous

people, according to international norms, have a right to self-determination. There will

therefore inevitably always be a territorial dimension in ethnic policy in respect of indigenous

peoples, regardless of whether they live in federal or unitary states.


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This article discusses the issue of non-territorial autonomy in the special case of the Sámi,

who live as a minority in four countries—Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. Since over

half of the Sámi population lives in Norway, where the Sámi political system is also most

developed, we focus on this case. The Sámediggi (the Sámi Parliament) in Norway, which

has received international attention, is an indigenous parliament within a unitary state. At the

opening of the third elected Sámediggi in 1997, King Harald V solemnly acknowledged, on

behalf of the Norwegian state, the significance of the Sámi role: ‘The state is established on

territory belonging to two peoples—Norwegian and Sámi.’ This statement expresses

recognition that the Sámi are a people, that they have a territorial attachment that precedes

the creation of modern states, and that Sámi history is intertwined with Norwegian history.

Thus, the statement summarises the complexity of the new Sámi policy that developed in

Norway, beginning in the mid-1980s.

Sámi residing throughout the country may register in the electoral roll for Sámediggi

elections, participate in the elections and be represented in the institution that is the core of

the new Sámi public space, the Sámediggi. The electoral roll and other important

characteristics of non-territorial autonomy such as transferred authority and influence have,

as we shall see, a significant territorial dimension. The Sámi language enjoys general

protection under Norwegian law, which means that Sámi pupils are entitled to learn the Sámi

language no matter where in the country they live.1 At the same time, the language has

particularly strong protection within its own established administrative area, which includes

ten of the country’s 428 municipalities. In other words, there is also a strong territorial aspect

to the Sámi political project, and this is not just about language and cultural expression, but

about the intimate interaction that exists between language, culture and industry in the

context of an indigenous people. The development of a new Sámi political space since the

1980s has to a large extent been linked to the issue of ownership and use of land and water

in the Sámi areas. The adoption of the Finnmark Act in 2005 by the Norwegian parliament

must be understood as an expression of this. This Act involves a transfer of control of the

land and resource rights in the county where most of the Sámi live—Finnmark—to an

ownership body where the Sámediggi is given influence, at the same level as Finnmark

County Council, although the Sámi are clearly a minority in the county and also have the

right to vote at the county level. This must also be seen as recognition of the Sámi culture’s

territorial dimension.

In this article, we discuss how the model of indigenous authority developed in Norway, where

the Sámediggi has a non-territorial form, but significant territoriality in its expression and


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exercise. What does this model reveal about the Sámi political project? What form of Sámi

political control has evolved, and what limitations on Sámi authority do we see after 25 years

of a Sámi parliament? In other words, we will look at how Sámi authority has developed and

how it expresses itself in Norway today. Based on this, we propose a model for indigenous

authority which takes into account variations in the state’s governance systems, with

particular emphasis on how this might work in a unitary state like Norway. The model

simultaneously addresses indigenous authority, which is essentially non-territorial, and forms

of territoriality linked to specific matters for the exercise of self-governance. We start by

describing the ethnopolitical structure in Norway, before looking into the background to the

emergence of the Sámediggi, how this system is structured and works and on what basis it

adds to Sámi self-determination.

Ethnopolitical Structure

The Sámi in Norway live as a minority, and have done so since long before the Norwegian

national state was established (Paine, 2003). According to ILO Convention No. 169, ratified

by Norway , they are recognised as an indigenous people with the right to special protection

and to a high degree of influence over their own living conditions.2 Individual Sámi thus

belong to two overlapping public spheres and civil societies within the same national state, in

a form of multicultural citizenship (see Kymlicka, 1995). Although the Norwegian census

does not record ethnicity, it is clear that there is a high degree of intermingling between Sámi

and Norwegians and between Sámi and Kveeni (persons of Finnish decent in Northern

Norway).3

The Norwegian state’s approach to the Sámi is structured within the framework of the unitary

state. This is an important premise for the development and framing of Sámi authority in

Norway. Sámi policy has evolved within a large, strong state, and within what is often

described as a ‘state-friendly’ society (Kuhnle & Selle, 1990). Norway is characterised by

close ties between the government and various actors in civil society. There is a strong

tradition of NGOs advocating increased state responsibility regarding society and welfare.

The major social movements, such as religious, labour and temperance ones, have been of

a political nature, and have also argued for enhanced state responsibility within their own

fields of interest. This orientation has given NGOs a key position in the formation of public

policy; they are commonly affiliated to political parties, and participate in committees, panels

and hearings where policy is made. The Norwegian (and Nordic) political system

substantially incorporates public interests; NGOs have maintained a strong, independent

role, resulting in a peculiar mix of independence of and integration in the political system


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(Grendstad, Selle, Strømsnes & Bortne, 2006). This provides a framework within which the

Sámi and the state meet, although indigenous policy is also shaped by strong international

law norms.

A unitary state such as Norway implies not only a centralised power structure, but historically

rests on an ideological understanding that the state and the people are one (Fulsås, 1999).

From the late 1800s, an attempt was made to assimilate the Sámi into the national state’s

majority culture. In historical representations of the nation state, Sámi were as a rule

excluded, and to the extent that they were discussed, they were seen as a culturally isolated,

primitive and alien group from the east. Until the 1980s, the Sámi were rarely perceived as a

distinct, indigenous people, with their own political rights; rather, they were seen as Sámi-

speaking Norwegians.

During the 1970s, however, a broad international research-based understanding of ethnicity

began to be widely accepted. It stressed the role of mobility, contact and interaction in

maintaining ethnic group identity, with cultural functions playing an important role, and

highlighted the reality that there can be continuity in ethnic boundaries even when these

cultural factors and other markers that signal such boundaries change. These social

boundaries often have a territorial counterpart (Barth, 1969). This analytical approach

resulted in the emergence of a broader political understanding of the Sámi as a separate

ethnic group with its own deep historical roots.

The Sámi are thus not a minority as a result of their own migration or overseas colonisation.

Instead, new settlements in the traditional Sámi areas came about by increasing immigration

of various population groups that established farming and fishing villages for commerce from

the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries onwards. The territorial borders between these groups

became more fragmented, and the interest of the emerging, modern state in these areas

increased. Colonisation and increasing trade dominance facilitated royal control over these

territories (Hansen & Olsen, 2004). From the late 1500s, central parts of the Sámi territory

(Finnmark) were subject to tax collection from the kings of Denmark-Norway, Sweden-

Finland and Russia (Pedersen, 1994). Thus there have been degrees of territorial

intertwining of ethnic groups in Northern Fennoscandia over several hundred years, where

territorial control has been linked to the way in which resources have been exploited and the

form that trade contracts have had.

The Sámi’s economic basis, resting on a combination of hunting, trapping and fishing, and

later reindeer husbandry and some agriculture, has meant an extensive use of large areas of


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land. The Sámi have never been numerous, and the assimilation policies they faced led in

some areas to a significant decrease in the number perceiving themselves as Sámi. The

traditional Sámi area, where reindeer husbandry is currently practised as the only exclusively

culture-specific Sámi industry, extends across much of Northern Fennoscandia.4

There are no recent, individual-based statistics on how many Sámi there are, and it is difficult

to carry out such assessments for both ethical and practical reasons. For the northernmost

areas of Norway, Sweden and Finland, the last surveys of Sámi affiliation were carried out

during the 1960s and early 1970s. There are several sources of error in these, but it is

believed that today there are between 50,000 and 100,000 Sámi, more than half of them

living in Norway (Pettersen, 2007; 2011; Berg-Nordlie, 2015). The Sámi are considered to

constitute a majority of the population, or a very large minority, in the five municipalities of

Kautokeino, Karasjok, Tana, Nesseby and Porsanger in Finnmark county, which are

therefore often seen as the core of the traditional Sámi territory (Selle et al., 2015). In recent

decades there have been large-scale demographic changes, with substantial emigration from

the strongest areas of Sámi settlement to the central areas of the region and the cities of the

north and south (Pettersen, 2011; Severeide, 2012). During the period from 1990 to 2010,

there has been a population decline of 16 per cent in the Sámi core areas—a striking figure

for a period during which Norway experienced a population growth of 15 per cent. An

urbanisation of the Sámi population is taking place, in combination with a significant ageing

of the population in the central areas of Sámi settlement. Although the demographic situation

is more positive in the two Sámi municipalities in which the Sámi are in a clear majority,

Karasjok and Kautokeino, these demographic changes are a great challenge for the overall

Sámi governing system (for discussion of the implications, see Selle, Semb, Strømsnes &

Nordø, 2015).

The Sámediggi

In 1989, the first direct election was held to a new institution in Norway, the Sámediggi. This

body was established by the Storting through the Act concerning the Sameting [the Sámi

Parliament] and other Sámi legal matters (The Sámi Act) in 1987, and through Section 110a

of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway in 1988.5 Since then, elections to the

Sámediggi have been held every fourth year, coinciding with elections to the Storting. The

establishment of the Sámediggi can be understood as a means of meeting three

simultaneous and partially overlapping challenges: first, to recognise the Sámi’s historical

presence as a separate ethnic group or people; second, to counteract the effects of a 150-


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year-long assimilation policy; and, third, to channel a potentially disruptive form of

ethnopolitical mobilisation into conventional activity within the Norwegian political system.

The Sámediggi is given an ambiguous role as an authority. In the Norwegian Sámi Act, a

duality was built into what the Sámediggi should be and how it derives its legitimacy. The

Sámediggi is at one and the same time a government executive agency and an independent

political body that is a policy maker and prime mover vis-à-vis the state (Odelsting

proposition no. 33 (1986-87), pp. 55 and 68). It derives its legitimacy from the law (the

constitution, the Norwegian Sámi Act, sectoral laws and international law) and from the Sámi

people through elections. Legitimacy through law is a hallmark of a state based on the rule of

law, but comes through political processes. That is why the Sámediggi indirectly also derives

its legitimacy from Norwegians and Norwegian society. The Sámediggi’s political impact

depends upon a high degree of credibility and support in Sámi as well as in Norwegian

society. The Sámi Act actually says nothing about the role of the Sámediggi in the governing

system, other than that it is nationwide, that it is elected by Sámi, and that its work extends

over all issues that it perceives as particularly affecting the Sámi. In this lies the inherent high

degree of dynamism in the development of the Sámediggi. Its role has been evolving against

the background of two tensions: between being a public authority and a democratically

elected policy maker, and between representing the Sámi people and being respected by

Norwegians.

With the establishment of the Sámediggi, Sámi ethnic mobilisation, against a background of

almost 150 years of government assimilation policy, was given a channel of contact with

government authorities—a channel established under pressure from the Sámi movement.

The emergence of the Sámediggi system created a new Sámi public space that over time

changed relations internally within Sámi society, and between Sámi and the state (Bjerkli &

Selle, 2015). In the rest of this section we consider four aspects of the Sámediggi: its political

background, its composition, its powers, and its place in the Norwegian system of multi-level

governance.

Political Background

The Norwegian Sámi Association (NSR), dating from the late 1960s, has played a crucial

role in the emergence of the new Sámi public space. The Sámi cultural and political

mobilisation of which it was a part occurred at a time of a gradual softening of the

government’s assimilation policy, the establishment of individual Sámi institutions, the

emergence of the welfare state and welfare society, and the appearance of a highly

educated younger generation who asked new questions with respect to existing policies and


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transformed the old organisational network. Overall, this provided a basis for a Sámi

resource mobilisation for cultural recognition and equality in a society that many Sámi

experienced as excluding them from participation and community (Oberschall, 1973). Sámi

identity was used to develop new positions and organisational patterns.

Recognition of the right to the Sámi’s traditional land and resource areas, and access to

these, were central to NSR’s efforts from the start. The Norwegian authorities’ plans from the

beginning of the 1970s for a large-scale hydroelectric development at the Alta-Kautokeino

watercourse, which runs through the core Sámi areas, offered a clear target for Sámi

mobilisation.6 Extensive and long-term protest against the decisions of the government and

the Storting in the period 1979-81, including hunger strike, occupation of the prime ministers’

office and blockade of construction site, makes this mobilisation, in which the use of police

force is unparalleled in peace-time in Norway, into one of the most extensive and important

civil disobedience events in Norway after WW2 (Strømsnes & Selle, 2014). This protest

highlighted the national and international consequences of the policies the state had

practised vis-à-vis the Sámi (Minde, 2003). Mobilisation and the spread of the Sámi

ethnopolitical movement occurred largely due to a sharp conflict with the state related to the

use of land and resources. This conflict raised the question of how the Sámi themselves

would relate to the state, as much as how the state would deal with the Sámi.

A split eventually occurred within NSR between those who wanted a form of directly elected

representative body for the Sámi and those more loyal to the government authorities, who

believed in pursuing interest representation on an equal basis with other citizens and

organisations within the established state system. Dissidents from NSR formed the

Norwegian Saami Association (SLF) in 1979 with the aim of ‘working according to the

Norwegian Constitution’s principles and showing respect and esteem for the King and his

government, the Storting and other public authorities in a democratic way’. The most

important objective for this group was to achieve the protection and development of the Sámi

language and culture in the context of society’s overall development (Stordahl, 1982).

This division was not one between supporters of Sámi territorial autonomy and those who

wanted to continue Sámi assimilation into the majority culture. Far from representing

completely different paths, these disagreements reflected alternative visions of the role of the

Sámi within the Norwegian social and political systems, and on the centrality of Sámi

ethnicity as a prerequisite to public participation. NSR was significantly more concerned with

securing Sámi collective land and resource rights than the breakaway SLF. NSR was also

increasingly outspoken about Sámi identity and political, cultural and economic rights. SLF,


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by contrast, focused more on the individual rights and interests of the Sámi population,

especially in the areas of language and education, which it sought to defend through

traditional organisational and institutional channels (Falch & Selle, 2015).

NSR thus accommodates an understanding of the Sámi movement as something more than

an ordinary interest organisation. It signals new organisational strategies for strengthening

the Sámi as an ethnic group, emphasising Sámi connection to the land and resources. The

importance of having a Sámi representative body became increasingly central to the

organisation’s work. When tensions over the Alta-Kautokeino hydroelectic case were at their

height, NSR’s key demand was for an investigation into the possibility of a separate Sámi

representative body.7

For the government authorities, the conflict over the Alta-Kautokeino development forcefully

illustrated the loss of state control over the Sámi political arena; the electoral channel and

civil society organisations had failed to absorb the ethnopolitical dimension. For the state, an

acute need to integrate the Sámi movement arose. The Alta-Kautokeino case simultaneously

concerned the defining land rights interest of the Sámi movement and the securing of

economic development as one of the state’s core tasks (Falch & Selle, 2015). The conflict

level was so high and the parties’ mutual dependence so great that it forced the two sides to

come to an understanding on mechanisms for communication and interaction (Dryzek et al.,

2003). In keeping with classic Norwegian corporatism, a public committee—the Sámi Rights

Committee—was quickly established to study land rights and to explore the case for a Sámi

elected body. The Sámi Rights Committee’s first recommendation was made in 1984 and

suggested the creation of a directly elected representative body for the Sámi in Norway.8

When this proposal was translated into law in 1987-88, one of the most contentious and

enduring cases of political mobilisation in post-war Norway came to an end. In a very short

time the relationship between the Sámi and the state, and between Sámi and Norwegians,

changed in a fundamental way (Strømsnes & Selle, 2014).

Election and organisation

The Sámediggi is elected every four years, at the same time as Storting elections, by Sámi

who have registered in the Sámediggi electoral roll (unlike voting in Storting, county council

and municipal council elections, where registration is automatic). To qualify for inclusion in

the Sámediggi electoral roll, criteria related to self-identification and language use must be

met: each applicant must both declare self-identification as Sámi and have an objective link

with the Sámi community (by speaking Sámi as a domestic language, having a parent,


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grandparent or great-grandparent who did so, or having a parent who is or has been

registered in the Sámediggi’s electoral roll).9

The Sámediggi electorate has increased from 5,500 in 1989 to 15,000 in 2013.

Notwithstanding this increase, the electorate is still well below half of what is assumed to be

the number of Sámi over 18 years of age in Norway. Turnout at elections to the Sámediggi is

lower than for elections to the Storting, but higher than for county council and municipal

elections. At the 2013 elections, the turnout amounted to 66.9 per cent, a relatively low

number in a system where there is self-registration.10 The fact that the number on the

electoral roll has increased more than the number of votes cast suggests that the Sámediggi

not only has a political role, but also a cultural function as a marker of Sámi identity and

ethnicity.

Strictly speaking, ‘Sámediggi’ is a collective term for a political and administrative system.

The Sámediggi’s activities are organised according to parliamentary principles, so that today

it is made up of two bodies—the Plenary Assembly and the Council. The main body of the

Sámediggi is the elected Plenary Assembly. This consists of 39 representatives elected from

seven electoral districts which together cover the entire country, with numbers of seats

depending on the size of the electoral roll in the constituency. Its work is coordinated by a

plenary leadership that is responsible for planning and organising the work of the Plenary

Assembly. Three specialist committees (on planning and finance, on growth, care and

education, and on industry and culture) make recommendations to the Plenary Assembly on

matters referred to them. An election committee submits nominations for elections for the

plenary leadership and committees. A control committee exercises parliamentary and

governing control, and submits proposals to the Plenary Assembly in such cases. The

Sámediggi Council is a separate body and represents the executive authority of the

Sámediggi—it is the Sámediggi’s ‘government’, and consists of the president and at least

four council members appointed from among the elected representatives in the Plenary

Assembly. This body is not statutory, but was established according to the ground rules the

Sámediggi has itself adopted.11

The Sámediggi is today an organisation with seven full-time politicians, including the Council

and the Plenary Assembly leadership, in addition to group leaders for the largest plenary

groups who have the financing to work full time. The administration consists of about 150

employees in seven specialist divisions and a staff for the Plenary Assembly. It is organised

in such a way that policy and administration are integrated. The administration has a


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decentralised structure with offices in several places in traditional Sámi residence areas, and

its main office and parliament building in the Sámi core area of Karasjok municipality.

The Sámediggi’s overall budget in 2015 amounted to NOK425m (about USD57m) assigned

as outline budgets from seven ministries. Even if the total national allocation for Sámi

purposes has been rather stable over the last 10-15 years, the Sámediggi’s share of the

allocation for Sámi purposes has increased,. Today, about half of the allocations for Sámi

purposes go through the Sámediggi system. The increase in the Sámediggi’s budget arises

substantially from transfers to the Sámediggi of schemes that the state previously managed.

The Sámediggi therefore largely continues earlier schemes established without its

participation (Fjellheim, 2008), but it can still put its stamp on such schemes.

Self-governance

There has been a significant expansion of the tasks assigned to the Sámediggi since it was

established in 1989. Grant and funding responsibilities were for the most part transferred to it

in two stages. The first round of transfers was in 1993, when the Sámediggi took over Sámi

language funds for municipalities and county councils in the area of Sámi language

management. In 1993, the Sámediggi was also given authority over the financial subsidies

for children’s upbringing and education in the Sámi language. Moreover, the Sámediggi took

over the Norwegian Cultural Council’s reserves for Sámi culture, as well as grants for Sámi

publishing operations, artists’ organisations and artists’ centres. The second round was in

2002, when the Sámediggi took over the management of schemes for artists’ stipends,

exhibition fees, Sámi museums, heritage sites, municipal bookmobiles and Sámi theatre and

festivals. In the same year, it also took over Sámi toponymy services. Aside from the transfer

of funding responsibilities, the Sámediggi has acquired direct responsibility in certain areas.

For example, when it relocated to the new Sámediggi building in 2000, it took responsibility

for a special Sámi library which also became the Sámediggi’s administration library.

The Sámediggi may have found the transfer of tasks and financial grants management a

double-edged sword. On one side, it has made the Sámediggi more relevant and central in

the Sámi public space. On the other, the Sámediggi has felt its legitimacy being put to the

test. This is because, first, the Sámediggi has no influence over the size of the budget that it

administers. Second, Sámi institutions and organisations which previously received grants

directly from the national budget and from ministries have seen their budgets stagnate

relative to comparable Norwegian institutions, and have blamed the Sámediggi for this. The

Sámediggi itself is blaming the ministries for not allocating enough money, but important

parts of the Sámi electorate and many Sámi institutions see this as an expression of


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Sámediggi’s lack of strength, putting pressure on its legitimacy. Third, the Sámediggi’s

administrative capacity is largely tied up in financial and grant management, rather than

leaving space for professional political development, weakening its policy role (Selle, 2011).

For this reason, the Sámediggi has been more reluctant since 2002 to take responsibility for

previously established schemes in the Sámi domain (Fjellheim, 2008; Falch & Selle, 2015).

The financial support schemes that the Sámediggi manages have in varying degrees a

territorially and individually based impact. The Sámediggi itself has adopted a business

grants scheme that includes 21 entire municipalities and parts of 10 more. Its scope and

extent has been gradually extended in recent years. In the cultural area, there are no

territorial or individually based ethnic criteria for grants, which are given in a discretionary

manner to projects understood as part of Sámi culture. For operational grants to practitioners

of duodji (Sámi traditional crafts), there is a requirement that the applicant meet the criteria

for registration in the Sámediggi’s electoral roll.

Aside from taking over funding and grants responsibility for Sámi purposes, the Sámediggi

has also in some respects been given the authority to administer legislation. In 1994 it

assumed responsibility for Sámi cultural heritage management which, however, is delegated

by regulation and not transferred to the Sámediggi by law. In practice, this means that the

Sámediggi in its cultural heritage management is responsible to the ministry. In principle this

authority is non-territorial, since the Sámediggi manages Sámi cultural heritage no matter

where it is found in Norway. In practice, however, it is limited to the territories in which the

Sámi currently practice reindeer husbandry and historically have exploited other resources.

A major strengthening of Sámi power and authority occurred in 2005 when the Storting

adopted a new law on legal matters and management of land and resources in the county of

Finnmark (the Finnmark Act). The law changed the framework conditions for indigenous

influence and implied recognition of accrued Sámi rights to land and resources. It established

a landowning body called the Finnmark Estate, a commission for mapping land rights and a

court for ruling on disputes concerning the commission’s reports. The Act, the content of

which was largely determined by Sámi activism, was adopted after consultations between

the Sámediggi and the Storting’s Standing Committee on Justice (Hernes, 2008).

The Finnmark Estate, has extensive decision making power over land and resources; its

board comprises three representatives of the Sámediggi and three of Finnmark County

Council. Legally, it is a private law body that protects Sámi ownership of land in Finnmark;

politically, it is a governing agency that exercises a form of shared rule between the minority


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group of Sámis and Norwegians over a defined territory. It is a unique body that results from

an attempt to recognise Sámi culture’s territorial dimension without discriminating against

other ethnic populations living in the area. Even so, the Finnmark Estate has been criticised

locally and at the county level, as has the Sámediggi, and people’s general trust in these

institutions is still rather low (Josefsen, Selle & Søreng 2015). Even so, these institutions

have a legitimate position at the various politic-administrative levels. Both institutions operate

in very complex surroundings and face significant challenges (Selle et al., 2015).

Management of land and resource rights entails far more than questions relating to

ownership and usage rights. Public authorities have considerable capacity to regulate the

use of areas that are privately owned through the Planning and Building Act and a series of

special laws. Since the entry into force of the new planning provisions of the Planning and

Building Act in 2009, the Sámediggi has the authority to raise objections to all land use plans

and regional plans and, if its concerns about the impact on Sámi culture or commercial

activity are not adequately addressed, to refer these to the ministry.12 This entails large

capacity challenges. An objection means that land use plans will not be approved before an

agreement is reached or the matter is finally decided in the ministry. The preamble to the Act

defines the Sámediggi’s authority as extending over the traditional Sámi area, which is

specifically described and corresponds to the reindeer grazing area. The new Minerals Act of

2010 has provisions requiring evaluation and weighting with respect to Sámi culture,

commercial activity and social life in respect of mineral activities. These provisions, however,

have a territorial limitation restricted to Finnmark county. This does not cover all of the

traditional Sámi area, as, for example, the Planning and Building Act does, and is one of the

reasons that the Sámediggi did not give its consent to this Act (Falch & Selle, 2015).13

The Sámediggi’s mandate under the Sámi Act’s language rules is to work for the protection

and development of the various Sámi languages (see note 1). Specifically, this involves

determining terminology and implementing measures to strengthen Sámi language. In 2015

the Sámediggi had financial instruments totalling NOK79m (about USD11m) dedicated to

measures aiming to strengthen the language. According to the Sámi Act, Sámi and

Norwegian are languages of equal worth and status, but the Act specifically limits this to an

administrative district which currently represents 10 municipalities.

In 1998, the Sámediggi was also given authority by the Act on Education to issue regulations

on curricula for training in the Sámi language in primary and both lower and upper secondary

schools, as well as in special Sámi subjects, such as duodji (traditional crafts) and reindeer

husbandry in upper secondary school training. In subjects such as history and social studies,


14

the Sámediggi may only prepare draft curricula in collaboration with the ministry, and it is the

ministry that approves them. Within the Sámi language administrative area, everyone has a

right to learn the language and to train in it. In these areas there are therefore both schools

and classes that carry out all teaching in Sámi, and schools and classes that implement all

teaching in Norwegian. All children have the right to learn the Sámi language, no matter

where their residence or how few the number of children requiring it, but for Sámi to be used

as a general teaching language outside the Sámi administrative area, more than ten pupils in

a municipality must demand it. According to the Kindergarten Act (2005), municipalities in the

Sámi administrative area are responsible for providing a kindergarten programme in the

Sámi language and culture. However, this right depends also on an individual ethnic

criterion, since it is a requirement that the parents must qualify for registration on the

Sámediggi election roll.14

The right to operate reindeer husbandry is also linked to both a territorial and an individually

based ethnic criterion. The reindeer husbandry area is defined in the Reindeer Herding Act

and covers about 40 per cent of Norway’s land area.15 Although reindeer herding is the only

exclusively culture specific Sámi industry, the Sámediggi has no direct authority over it, a

significant and surprising restriction on its power, deriving from reluctance on the part of the

Sami organization of reindeer holders to permit it.

Multi-level governance

The extension of the Sámediggi’s sphere of operations since its establishment in 1989 is one

matter; the development of the Sámediggi’s role in government decisions that may affect the

Sámi is quite another. The big change in the Sámediggi’s role in this respect came in 2005,

with the signing of an agreement on procedures for consultation between the government

authorities and the Sámediggi, procedures that were also adopted by royal decree. The

establishment of the consultation scheme has given the Sámediggi significantly greater

influence and increased responsibility in negotiating laws and measures that are of

importance for the Sámi community. The consultation procedures set the ground rules for

how the Government authorities and the Sámediggi communicate and seek to reach

consensus on decisions that may directly affect the Sámi.16 They placed the Sámediggi in an

entirely new and more clearly defined position in relation to the state, with participation in

political decision making now formalised. Although such schemes do not always work as

intended (see next section) and the state at times may assert its authority, the Sámediggi is

no longer a body with only an advisory function, or an interest group, but a fully informed


15

formal participant in public decision-making processes. This has established a completely

new framework for the relationship between the state and the Sámediggi.

The formal purpose of the consultation procedures is to comply with obligations under

international law; in practice, it is to clarify the rules for how interests should be protected and

the role of the government and the Sámediggi in this. The consultations are intended to take

place in good faith with a view to achieving agreement or consent. This implies, among other

things, that mutual respect must be shown for other parties’ interests, values and needs. The

Sámediggi is therefore entitled to have a real opportunity to influence both the process and

the outcome of matters on which there is consultation.17 The obligation to consult applies to

matters that may directly affect the Sámi, entailing clarification of the probable impact of a

law or measure. It is largely up to the Sámediggi to decide what matters require such

consultation.18 Most forms of general cultural expression (including language) and material

interests (including land, resources, area planning and environment) fall within the scope of

the procedures. Consultations can be understood as a form of shared rule or multi-level

governance designed to achieve agreement between the Sámediggi and government

authorities before decisions that affect the Sámi are made. They also have a clear territorial

dimension, since many of the consultations involve questions about the territorial scope of

the various schemes. This applies to all resource legislation, but also to measures for

economic development, cultural institutions, language strengthening and training.

Sámi Authority and the Capacity to Resolve Ethnonat ional Tensions

For the Sámi, as for other indigenous peoples, territorial affiliation has a very prominent

cultural function, independently of established state borders. Indigenous people’s culture is

based on the use of land and resources, and rights in these areas have to varying extents

gradually been recognised by the states of which the indigenous peoples are part. This has

been linked to a strong degree of internationalisation of questions linked to indigenous

peoples’ rights. Modern ethnopolitical development relating to indigenous peoples is

therefore in large measure driven forward by developments in international law. Thus, when

one analyses the ways in which indigenous authority may be expressed, this must be set in

an international legal context that emphasises the principle of indigenous peoples’ right to

self-determination and the states obligation to consult indigenous peoples concerned.

Consultations should happen through the indigenous people’s representative institutions in

order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adoption and implementation of

legislative and administrative measures that may affect them.19


16

Territorial integrity, understood as the capacity for separate statehood, is not necessarily the

guiding premise of the international legal concept of a people. There is nevertheless little

doubt that states are wary of advocating self-determination for indigenous peoples precisely

because for many states this raises the spectre of secession. Norway and Sweden’s voting

statement in the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of

Indigenous Peoples in 2007 affirming the State’s territorial integrity must clearly be

understood in this context.20 The Government of Norway’s perception of self-determination

as a threat to the state’s territorial integrity provoked a strong reaction from the Sámediggi’s

politicians, with Sámediggi president Egil Olli (2007-2013) alleging in 2010 that Norway’s

voting statement in respect of the UN declaration had the effect of impeding real discussion

with government authorities on the content of the right to self-determination.21

Both the experience of developing Sámi politics in Norway and corresponding international

legal norms in respect of the rights of indigenous peoples suggest that indigenous power

may have a content that does not necessarily entail a clear territorial dimension, but more of

a focus on political integration. Former Sámediggi president Sven-Roald Nystø (1997-2005)

commented in 2002 that ‘When the Sámediggi wants to negotiate with Government

authorities over future measures for the Sámi, we won’t negotiate ourselves out of Norway,

but on the contrary, into Norway. Into the country’s governance, so that we can take more

responsibility for our own future and future Sámi generations’.22

Two main dimensions, then, appear to be important in understanding the character of

indigenous power: the right to self-governance in matters relating to local or internal affairs,

and the right to political integration through negotiations or consultations that seek

consensus on decisions and measures between the state and the indigenous people (Falch

& Selle, 2015; Vars, 2009; Broderstad, 2008). Many will see these two dimensions as

extremes of a single dimension, so if there is more of one there will be less of the other.

Much of the international literature on the indigenous question is influenced by such a view

(Selle et al., 2015).

We believe, however, that it is indeed possible to distinguish two such dimensions. The

relationship between them is pivotal: the values of both variables may increase or decrease

simultaneously. The modalities of the exercise of self-determination are the outcome of

negotiations or consultations between the government and indigenous peoples, and need not

take the form only of territorial autonomy. This would confine self-governance to states, in the

form of federal governance systems, or to territorial areas where indigenous people are

predominant,23 and this is neither in line with a modern understanding of the concept of


17

ethnicity or in compliance with international legal developments with respect to the rights of

indigenous peoples (Falch & Selle, 2015).

The two dimensions of self-governance and political integration in the model for indigenous

authority that is presented here (see Figure 1) correspond broadly with the dimensions of

self-governance and multi-level governance upon which there is great emphasis in

international research on regionalisation (Zürn, Wälti & Enderlein, 2010). Unlike our model

for indigenous authority, these studies assume a pervasive defined territory which includes

all citizens (Hooghe & Marks, 2010; Hooghe, Marks & Schakel, 2010).24

Indigenous authority is of a peculiar character and is based on premises that are not part of

what we commonly understand by regionalisation. The model for indigenous authority that is

presented here does not have territoriality as an overarching premise, though it is fully

compatible with forms of authority that have clear territorial traits. The exercise of autonomy

may be linked to specific subject areas; it may, but need not, have a territorial scope; and this

may vary depending on the subject matter. Self-determination, as an international legal

standard for indigenous authority, does not assume territorial autonomy for the indigenous

peoples concerned; but it nevertheless entails that the territorial dimension for indigenous

people be respected and protected by states. By linking self-determination with the

dimensions of political integration (consultations or multi-level governance) and self-

governance, we derive a general model of indigenous authority where specific self-governed

administrative areas have varying territorial scope, with varying elements of individual-based

ethnic criteria and rights regimes. The autonomy tasks performed simultaneously connect to

relational political integration processes with government authorities in the form of

consultations or negotiations.

[Figure 1 about here]

The model for indigenous authority in Figure 1 presents four ideal-typical situations based on

cross-classifying the two dimensions discussed here. In reality, there will be gradual

transitions and empirically mixed forms both when looking at the total picture and within

various administrative and social areas, and there will be change over time. It will not

necessarily be the case that there must be self-governance within all areas in which there is

consultation for this to be seen as corresponding to the ‘self-determination’ ideal type. Here it

is reasonable to look at the overall picture, where the space for indigenous policies will be

different, but not necessarily more extensive, in a federal state than in a unitary state (Smith,

2010, Falch & Selle 2015). The four ideal types are as follows:


18

• Self-determination is the hallmark of a situation with a high degree of self-governance in

matters of great importance to the indigenous community, while there is simultaneously a

large degree of consultation with respect to laws, financial constraints and measures that

contribute to political integration.

• Territorial autonomy occurs when indigenous people have a relatively high degree of self-

governance and a rather low degree of political integration by means of consultations,

even if there must be interaction and meetings with the state in many areas. This is the

ideal type that lies nearest to the conservative understanding of the right to self-

determination, and is linked to decolonisation situations or ‘islands’ clearly distinct from

the governing power, such as we see, for example, in Greenland’s self-governing

authority. This is also the category that most states fear in the debate on self-

determination for indigenous peoples.

• Corporatism is the outcome where there is a low degree of self-governance and a high

degree of political integration by means of interest participation. This type of situation

largely resembles a corporative structure, where NGOs are actors for input to public

authorities and to some degree for implementation of public policy. This is a governance

structure that has been prevalent in the Nordic countries.

• Cooptation is characterised by a high degree of state domination and control, at the

expense of social movements and interest organisations. State delegation of public

authority is modified by strong oversight and control, combined with an absence of

interaction processes in respect of overall decisions, quickly amounting to cooptation.

In all these ideal-typical categories, one can see the schemes involving indigenous peoples

as more or less having a territorial scope; the question is the extent to which indigenous

people themselves participate in designing and operating these schemes. To the extent that

the Sámediggi is directly elected and chooses the executive body—the Sámediggi Council—

it has a high degree of formal independence from state authorities. It is still unclear to what

extent the Sámediggi is independent of the government in practice, since the tasks that have

been transferred to it entail varying degrees of formal government involvement. The law does

not prescribe the Sámediggi as independent of the Government, or as a legal entity separate

from the state.25

The Sámediggi is drawn from among Sámi throughout the country who have registered in the

electoral roll according to an objective and a subjective criterion. Thus, it is a non-territorial


19

authority and by means of consultations with government authorities participates in a form of

multi-level governance without necessarily exercising authority itself in all areas in which it is

consulted. At the same time, the consultations also have a territorial character both in that

the geographical efficacy of laws and measures govern whether it shall be consulted, and in

that consultations often comprise geographically-oriented measures. The Sámediggi has in

recent years participated in and gained influence over a number of political processes

relating to legislation and administration (Falch & Selle 2015). The consultation procedures

are still not enshrined in law, and a proposal to do so from the Committee on Sámi Rights in

2007 has not yet been implemented. In addition to the consultation procedures, regular

meetings were established between the Sámediggi and various sectoral ministers.

The pattern of Sámi politics in Norway seems to have evolved with little overall discussion of

how territoriality and ethnicity are handled and balanced. Solutions and schemes seem

largely to have developed in an ad-hoc way (Selle, 2011). Today there are five different

territorial areas of operation. The area with the largest spread is in the field of reindeer

management, and consultations on matters relating to material cultural foundations, heritage

sites and authority in land-use planning (it covers 40 per cent of Norway’s land area). The

second territorial area is related to business subsidy schemes (30 municipalities). The third

relates to decisions under fisheries legislation about the right to fish in respect of the smallest

vessels (Finnmark, and the Sámediggi’s area for business subsidies outside Finnmark). The

fourth area relates to land and resource rights and decisions relating to considerations in

minerals legislation (96% of the land area in Finnmark). The fifth and smallest area relates to

language, kindergarten, educational and training rights and schemes (10 municipalities). This

layered territorial approach to the Sámi exercise of authority is further modified by the fact

that at some levels there is also an individual-based ethnic approach (such as the right to

own reindeer, and the right to use the Sámi language in kindergarten).

The Sámediggi’s decision-making authority in some fields of importance for Sámi culture and

society can be understood as forms of self-governance (autonomy), but these exercises of

executive authority have largely accrued to the Sámediggi in the period before the

consultation agreement was signed. For several of these schemes, the Sámediggi is not the

formal final decision-maker, since the decisions may be appealed to government authorities

(Plan and Building Act, Cultural Heritage Act), or the Sámediggi is only an authority which

makes recommendations (cultural heritage, Education Act). In addition, there are central

Sámi areas of interest, such as reindeer herding and supervision of compliance with

language rules, which lie outside the Sámediggi’s decision making jurisdiction.


20

Concurrency in institutional autonomy, decision-making authority in some areas of society

and consultations on legislation and administrative measures can be offered as evidence that

the Sámi authority falls into the ‘self-determination’ ideal type. This is supported by the fact

that there are few clear indications of a direct cooptation of the Sámediggi in Norway in the

national political system, differentiating the Norwegian experience sharply from the Swedish

(Falch & Selle, 2015; Lawrence & Mörkenstam, 2016).

There are nonetheless several problems with categorising Sámi authority in Norway as ‘self-

determination’. Political integration in the form of consultations about the economic basis of

Sámi politics is virtually non-existent, and it seems to be difficult for the Norwegian political

system accepting specific interests being part of general budgeting processes. Neither has

the Sámediggi any form of tax-varying power, so that in many areas it has less economic

freedom of action than the municipalities (Borge, 2010). Here we see the Sámediggi system

colliding with expectations of what is possible within a unitary state. Varying degrees of fiscal

autonomy are no rarity in federal systems with territorially defined autonomous schemes for

indigenous peoples, but in these systems there may be other mechanisms that restrict

indigenous influence (Selle et al., 2015; Smith, 2010).

Consultation processes that are characterised by the government authorities’ understanding

of the Sámediggi as an advisory body point in the direction of the Sámediggi as a corporative

institution. The Sámediggi has on occasion claimed that consultations have taken the form of

suggestions and views on the implementation of government positions that have already

been formed, and so have more the character of briefings and explanations than meaningful

discussion on choice of solutions.26 In the Storting’s consideration of a major constitutional

revision in 2014, where there was a proposal to amend constitutional provisions relating to

the Sámi, for example, the Sámediggi was not consulted. Given that much of the authority

that the Sámediggi exercises was transferred before consultation procedures were

established and may be subject to state management and control, the relationship between

the state and the Sámediggi clearly also has corporatist elements.

Today, the Sámediggi operates in a state of tension between self-determination and

corporatism. For both the state and the Sámediggi, a situation that favours corporatism in the

short term may be convenient. For the state, it is more legitimate within a corporate structure

not to achieve consensus through consultation, or to transfer decision-making authority to the

Sámediggi, while for the Sámediggi it is easier not to take responsibility for controversial

decisions or make lukewarm compromises vis-à-vis the Sámi community. The transition from

corporatism towards cooptation is, however, fluid, placing the Sámediggi in constant danger


21

of losing its representative legitimacy. A Sámediggi without legitimacy within the Sámi

community will again weaken the state’s ethnopolitical governing efficacy. The development

of Sámi policy therefore entails a constant search for balance between state management

capacity and Sámi governance legitimacy and participative efficacy (Dahl & Tufte, 1973),

where an attempt is made to handle the territorial dimension without individual discrimination

on an ethnic basis. This makes Norwegian Sámi policy very demanding and complex, not

least because the Sámi are also full-fledged Norwegian citizens, having the same rights and

obligations as other Norwegian citizens, while at the same time they are strongly integrated

in Norwegian society and do not appear to be marginalised and segregated as is the

experience of many other indigenous peoples (Selle et al., 2015).

Conclusion

A development of indigenous authority without territorial considerations is not in compliance

with international legal developments, nor is it in accord with the developments that have

taken place in Sámi policy in Norway. The Sámi policy is on one side built around the

development of a Sámi parliament, which is not territorially based, but on the other side a

series of laws, measures and self-governance and cooperation schemes have been

developed that to varying extents have a territorial aspect, in some cases in combination with

individual-based ethnic criteria.

Non-territorial autonomy for minorities in independent states requires ethnic identification on

an individual basis, which in itself can be problematic and challenging.27 Territorial autonomy

for indigenous peoples requires clear regional majority areas of a certain size not to be found

in Norway. Using the experience of Norway, we have argued that it is quite possible to

develop self-determination schemes that are neither territorial nor non-territorial, but that rest

on a distinctive combination of autonomy and political integration. Our model of indigenous

authority implies that there is a representative body for the indigenous people, and that this

has an individual-based ethnic dimension. The schemes and measures for indigenous

peoples need on the contrary not to be individual based and ethnic oriented, but may have

varying territorial ambit.

In the long run, we believe that it will be difficult to develop a rights framework for the Sámi,

as a people, that primarily emphasizes individual rights. First, this approach, which we can

trace in the Sámediggi’s own policy paper on the Sámi language from 2012,28 will over time

detach the Sámi from traditional land and resource areas that have always been the defining

cultural element and a central characteristic of Sámi ethnicity, and where language, culture

and industry have been closely tied together. Second, major demographic change and


22

urbanisation are likely to undermine the sense of community of the Sámi, broadening the gap

between culture and industry and reinforcing a trend in which the Sámi may move from the

category of being understood as a ‘people’ to becoming a ‘minority’, implying an entirely

different role and influence in society. Third, Sámi autonomy and authority is dependent on

an active and vigilant Sámi civil society, but this is not very strong nor particularly

differentiated and more and more of the activity is concentrated in and around the Samediggi

itself (Selle & Strømsnes, 2015).

Without a clear territorial dimension in Sámi ethnic policy, then, it is our opinion that it will be

almost impossible to develop an active and strong Sámi civil society. This may well result in

disintegration of the legitimacy and standing that the Sámediggi has in the political system in

Norway. The possibility that the state will incorporate and co-opt the Sámi will be significantly

greater in the context of these underlying changes.

Notes

1 In Norway there are four official Sámi languages, of which three are actively used. The different

languages are to a varying degrees under pressure.. All together there are ten different Sámi

languages in the four countries with a Sámi population (Todal, 2015).

2 ILO Convention No.169 is a legally binding international instrument, which deals specifically

with the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples. Today, it has been ratified by 20

countries. Norway was the first country which ratified the convention in 1990.

3. Kveeni are immigrants from areas which currently are part of Finland or lie in the border zones

between Sweden and Finland. They are defined by Norway as a national minority according to

the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and

Minority Language Charter.

4. In Norway and Sweden, reindeer husbandry may only be practised by Sámi, while in Finland

there is no such rule. As a result of Protocol 3 in the Affiliation Agreement with the EU, Finland

assumed the responsibility of strengthening Sámi reindeer husbandry.

5. See Recommendation no. 79 (1986-1987) to the Odelsting (The Sámi Act) and

Recommendation no. 147 (1987-1988) from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs

concerning recommendation for a new Section 82 in the Constitution, alternatively an

amendment of Section 98 or a new Section 110a (Sámi rights). In amendments to the


23

Constitution carried out in 2014, the ‘Sámi paragraph’ was moved to Section 108

(Recommendation no. 187 (2013-2014) to the Storting).

6. The watershed is also one of the main rivers for the North Atlantic wild salmon, which meant an

alliance between the Sámi and conservationists who helped to provide extra support in the

conflict.

7 NOU 1984:18 Om samenes rettsstilling.

8 NOU 1984:18 Om samenes rettsstilling, p.18.

9. Sámi Act (1987), subsection 2-6, first paragraph.

10. Turnout for Sámediggi elections has declined in all three Scandinavian countries. At the first

election in Norway in 1989, the turnout rate was 77.8 per cent. In Sweden, the turnout has

declined from 71.7 per cent in 1993 to only 54.4 per cent in 2013. Since the census numbers

have increased in both countries, the number of votes cast has nonetheless increased in

successive elections. In Finland, the turnout was only 49.6 per cent at the last election in 2011,

and here it is also true that the number of votes cast has declined. These numbers suggest that

Sámi parliaments in all three countries are struggling with legitimacy challenges—greatest in

Finland and least in Norway (Berg-Nordlie, 2015; Josefsen, Mörkenstam & Saglie, 2015).

11. Sámediggi’s working plan. Ground rules last revised on 31 December 2009, Section 1:

‘Sámediggi’s highest body is the Sámediggi’s plenary. The Sámediggi chooses from and among

Sámediggi’s representatives a Sámediggi Council and plenary leadership. The Sámediggi

determines any other organisation in its business agenda.’

12. Planning and Building Act (2008), Subsections 5-4 and 8-4.

13. Odelsting proposition no. 43 (2008-2009) relating to the acquisition and extraction of mineral

resources (the Mineral Act).

14. Odelsting proposition no. 72 (2004-2005), Annotation to Section 8; Kindergarten Act (2005),

Sections 2, fourth paragraph and 8, third paragraph.

15. The Reindeer Herding Act (2007), Section 4, first paragraph states that ‘The Sámi population

has the right, based on immemorial usage, to practise reindeer husbandry within those parts of

the counties of Finnmark, Troms, Nordland, North-Trøndelag, South-Trøndelag and Hedmark

where Sámi reindeer herders of old have practised reindeer herding (the Sámi reindeer herding

district)’. According to Section 9 of the Act, only persons of Sámi ancestry with the right to brand


24

reindeer have the right to own reindeer, while according to Section 32 only persons of Sámi

ancestry have the right to brand reindeer.

16. The basis of the established consultation procedures was prepared by an administrative

working group with three members from the ministry of local government and regional

development and two members from Sámediggi who submitted a report with assessments and

proposals for procedures in April 2005.

17. NOU 2007:13 Den nye sameretten. Utredning fra samerettsutvalget. See subsection 17.5.8.2.

18. Sámi Act (1989), Subsection 2-1, first paragraph, states that ‘The business of the Sámediggi is

any matter that in the view of the parliament particularly affects the Sámi people’.

19. See Falch & Selle, 2015, for a broader explanation and discussion of indigenous political rights

according to international law.

20. Norway’s voting statement says: ‘Norway considers that this declaration is to be understood

within the framework of the UN Declaration on principles of International Law concerning

Friendly Relations and cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United

Nations’. Sweden’s voting statement is even more to the point : ‘The right to self-determination

in Article 3 should not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which dismember

or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent

States’.

21. The Sámediggi president Egil Olli (2007-2013) emphasized this in his lecture ‘Law and

Justice—development of the Sámi community’ at the Norwegian Association of Lawyers

conference on Security under the law on 9 December 2010.

22. Sámediggi President Sven-Roald Nystø (1997-2005) said this about the right to self-

determination in the lecture ‘Sámediggi, democracy and governance’ held at the conference

‘Politics: Aspects of Power and Democracy’ in Tromsø on 3-5 October 2002.

23. The challenge of defining a territory that is inclusive, homogeneous and compact (see Coakley,

2016) is particularly great in the case of the Norwegian Sámi.

24. Regional studies by Hooghe, Marks & Schakel (2010) have sought to measure self-governance

and multi-level governance, providing a relevant basis for comparison among different periods

and different political systems. The indicators used in the regionalisation studies can be

adjusted to facilitate equivalent comparative studies of indigenous authority.

25. Report of the working group of the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, the Ministry of

Justice and the Sámediggi, delivered 27 April 2007.


25

26. The Sámediggi’s report on ILO Case 056/2013, and its report to ILO for the period from 1 June

2008 to 31 May 2013. See in particular subsection 4-11. See also Falch & Selle (2015) and

Broderstad, Hernes & Jenssen (2015) for a discussion of the extent to which the consultation

scheme has worked as intended.

27. See Coakley’s discussion in the introductory section about challenges related to the extent of

being inclusive, homogeneous and compact.

28. Report to the Sámediggi on the Sámi language (2012). See also Åhrén (2008).

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Level of political integration (consultations)

High Low

Level of High Self-determination Territorial autonomy

self-governance Low Corporatism Cooptation

Figure 1. A model of indigenous authority

the sÁmi parliament: territorial vs. non-territorial ... · panel 346: sami parliaments:...

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