the site of the work of art

8/10/2019 The Site of the Work of Art

1/18

The Site of the Work of Art

Author(s): Sven-Olov WallensteinSource: MLN, Vol. 109, No. 3, German Issue (Apr., 1994), pp. 478-494Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2904657.

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2/18

The

Site of

the

Work

of

Art

Sven-Olov

Wallenstein

Die

Orte uchenden

nd

Ortebildenden

Charaktere

er

plastischen

erkorperung

blieben

unachst amenlos.

Martin

Heidegger,

Die

Kunstund der

Raum

I

What s a sitefor work f art?The questionhas several mplications,

both

on the

evel of

an institutional

heory

bout

the work

f artand

how thas been

displayed

during

various

historical

pochs,

but also as

what

concerns

the work

"itself"

n its relation

to

space

and time

as

general

philosophical

questions.

To a certain

extent

the critical

questioning

of the

concept

of

subjectivity

n

postwar

hought

runs

parallel

to the

questioning

of the modes

of

presenting

works

f

art,

and

although

one should avoid

establishing

oo

firm onnections

between

philosophical

reflections

nd

artistic

ractices,

t cannot

be

denied that he dissolution f the "white ube" as a neutral nd non-

historical

raming

or

the

work

of

art,

nd the

way

this

eemingly

a

prioric"

mode of

visuality

as

been reinscribed

nto

a historical

nd

discursive

ystem,

must

somehow be

connected to

the

analogous

reconsideration

f

subjectivity

s a

changing,

historically roduced

phenomenon.

To

a

pure,

phenomenologically

isclosed

subject

cor-

responds

something

uch as an

ideal,

optically

ure

situation,

where

subject

and

object

can

come

together,

where

they

an neutralize

or

reduce

their

respective

framing

onditions,"

nd establish

space

forwhatwerefer oas an "aesthetic xperience."Any hange in one

of

these

correlates

will

necessarily ring

bout a

change

in

the

other,

and here

will

ry

o

open

a

space

for

possible

dialogue

between

he

respective

pheres

of these two

theoretical raditions.

MLN,

109

(1994):

478-494

?

1994

by

The

Johns

Hopkins

University

ress

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/18

MLN

479

The idealized

optical

situation

was worked out within

he tradi-

tion

in

High

Modernism,

n relation to the visual

artsmost

notably

in thewritings f critics uch as ClementGreenbergand Michael

Fried.

A

central ssue

here is how

to

circumscribe

he

work

of

art,

how

to

separate

the inner from he

outer. The

purity

f

the

experi-

ence

of the artwork

orresponds

o the

purity

f the

encounter,

nd

their mutual

autonomy

thus

hinges

on

the

possibility

f

a correct

framing

whose

technical

realization then

becomes

assigned

to

the

physical

frame,

the

socle,

or

any

other

analogous

material device

carrying

he

symbolical

function of

separating

nner from

outer,

text

from

ontext,

ubstance

from

ccidence,

etc).

The

frame

lways

becomes a place forstruggle, orthe inscriptionof the aesthetic

ideology,

and

in a

different

lthough

related

sense for the

line

of

demarcationbetween the

art

object

as

object

of

interpretation

nd

as

commodity bject.1

This

strategy

f

framing

onstitutes

ne

of

the basic tenets

in

contemporary

ormalism,

ut ts nitialformulation

an

no

doubt

be

traced back to Kant

and the discussions bout

the

possible

autono-

my

of aesthetic

experience

in

the

third

Critique.

Greenberg's

al-

most

retrospective

manifesto Modernist

Painting"

1961),

written

at

precisely

hemomentwhen thissystem egan to crumble, ooks

back to such a Kantian

coup

d'envoi:

I

identify

Modernismwiththe

intensification,

lmost

the

exacerbation

of this elf-critical

endency

that

began

with

the

philosopher

Kant.

Because he

was the first o

criticize

he means

itself f

criticism,

conceive

of

Kant

as the first

real

Modernist.The essence

of Modernism

ies,

as

I

see

it,

n

the use

of the characteristic

methods

of a

discipline

to criticizethe disci-

pline

itself-not

in

order

to subvert

t,

but to

entrench

it more

firmly

n

its

area

of

competence."2

The

specificity

f

the modern

work

of

art

consists n its

tendency

o

purify

ts own

genre,

to elimi-

nate

anything

hat

might

be derived

from nother

formof

expres-

sion,

and the two

final

results

f

this

process

will of course be

sculp-

ture

immersing

tself

completely

n

three-dimensional

resence,

and

painting

fulfilling

tself

n its "inevitableflatness"

and

thus

1

The

extent

to which these remarks

emain

ndebted

to

Jacques

Derrida's

read-

ing

of the

Kantian notion of

framing

s

obvious;

cf.

"Parergon,"

La veriten

peinture

(Paris:Flammarion,1974). The frame s the ocus ofa separationbetweenthespace

of

interpretation

nd that of the

commodity

as been discussed

in severalcontexts

by

Andrew

Benjamin,

most

pregnantly

n

Art,

Mimesis nd the

Avant-garde

London:

Routledge,

1991).

2

Art

&

Literature,

pring

1961.



4/18

480 SVEN-OLOV

WALLENSTEIN

constituting

omething

f a Modernist

ounterpart

o the

systeme

es

beaux

rtsn

the

classical

sense).

In

this

perspective,

he

radicality

f

Greenberg's pproach consists essin itsvarious "material" ypothe-

ses about the

workof art than

in

the fact that

t

pushes

this

ogic f

framing

o its

imit: ach art

will,

s autonomous

art,

have to

define

its own

form,

ts own site

of

being

and

of

apprehension,

and

in this

process

it will

constitute,

r

require,

a

subject

situatedon the

same

level

of

idealization.

Just

as

in

Kant,

this

subject

will not

be

the

knowing,

desiring

or

acting

subject,

but the

subject

of

"feeling,"

immersed

n a

floating,pre-conceptual

sensuscommunis.

nd this

feeling

will

not be of a

general,

"emotional"

kind,

but a

specific

affectivityositioned withinthe space of con-templatio,nside the

confinesof a

templum

llowing

esthetic

experience

to

appear

in

its

purity

the

subject

as

castrated,

ndowed with

pleasure

that

has to

be held

back,

interrupted

nd interiorized

..).

The modern

gal-

lery pace

is the

latestdescendant

of thisritualistic

nd

theological

trope,

and the

workof art turns

nto a

quasi-divinepresence

await-

ing

us

in

thisblank

space,

this

"espace

dereel",

to use an

expression

from

Jean-Francois

yotard.

In

his

groundbreaking ssay

from1976.

"Inside the

White

Cube,"3

Brian

O'Doherty

comments

upon

the connections between the

white,

sacralized

gallery space

and

a

certain

notion of aesthetic

experience,

where the

guiding

principle

is

the

"transposition

f

perception

from

ife to formal

values."

Eventually,

he

author

ob-

serves

ronically,

hiswill turn ven

an

ashtray

eposited

somewhere

in

a corner nto

a

sacred

object

of veneration.

The ideal observer s

no

longer

the

Spectator

moving

round,

but the disembodied

Eye

relating

to the visual world

as an a

prioric

imit

condition.

This situationwillchange fundamentally henworks f art enter

into our

own

space,

when the

sculptures

descend from heir

ocles,

and the

paintings egin

to take

on

sculptural

nd

objectal

values.

n

a

famous

statement,

onald

Judd

once claimed

that the most

im-

portant contemporary

works

were situated between he different

genres,

since

they ctively

efied

the earlier

system

f

genres.

This

new situation

was

acknowledged

by

several

critics,

mong

them

Mi-

chael

Fried,

who

in

his now canonical

essay

from

1967,

"Art nd

Objecthood,"

coined

the

expression

"theatricality."

ried

is,

how-

ever, trongly egative gainstthistendency,which he (indeed cor-

rectly)

believes

to

signify

he

very

negation

and

the

possible

demise

3

Artforum,

arch and

April

1976.



5/18

MLN

481

of the achievements

of

High

Modernist

art: "Art

degenerates

s it

approaches

he

ondition

f

heatre

..

The

conceptf uality

nd value-

and tothe xtent hat hesere centraloart, he onceptf rt tself-are

meaningful,

r

wholly

meaningful,

nly

within he

ndividual

rts. What

lies between

he

rts s

theatre."4

he

object

in

situation,

nvolving

he

spectator

s

body,

nd as

temporally

ocated

(and

thus

no

longer

as

a

pure Eye,

but

endowed with

movement nd

duration),

s forFried

the element

in

which

art

dies,

or

at

least becomes transformed

beyond

recognition.

The

spatio-temporal

ituatedness

of the work

in

fact testifiesto

a

"preoccupation

with

time ... as

though

theatre

confronts

he

beholder,

and

thereby

solates

him,

with

the

endless-

ness

notjust

of

objecthood

but of

time;

r as

though

the sense

which,

at

bottom,

heatre

ddresses

s

a

sense

of

temporality,

f time

both

passing

and to

come,

simultaneouslypproaching

nd

receeding,

s

if

apprehended

in

an infinite

perspective,"

whereas the Modernist

work s

"wholly

manifest

t

every

moment,"

n a

"perpetual

creation

of

itself,

hat one

experiences

as a kind of

instantaneousness;"

nd this

presence

transfigures

he

"literalism"

f

everyday

ife,

suspends

its

"objecthood"

and leads to the

aesthetic

conversion

concluding

the

text: Weare literalistsmostof all of our lives.Presentnesssgrace."5

Fried's

formalist

redo has been

the

starting oint

for

many

rtists

and art

theorists,

ut

mostly

n the sense that

they imply

end

to

inverthis claims.

The

phenomenological

theater

opened

by

the

disappearance

of the

socle,

the

frame,

nd the institutional

rame-

work

positioning

the

eye

and

its

object,

is indeed what

has been

called the

"expanded

field,"

he

site of

contemporary

rt

n

both a

physical

and a

conceptual

sense,

where the

limitsbetween

object

and

image,

scenography

nd

installation,

have

been

effaced,

nd

where thenotion of"support" r "substrate" avebecome moreof a

functional

han

a

substantial

notion.6

And the

preoccupation

with

time,

so central

today

n

performance

rts,

transforms he

action

and its

objects

nto

a series of

perspectival

hadings,

nd

attempts

o

bring

about an active

displacement

of

the

aura of

presentness.

This is in a sense a

complete story,

nfolding

on

the

level

of art

criticism

nd art

theory, eading

us into the

contemporary

and-

4

"Art nd

Objecthood,"

in

Gregory

attcock,

d. Minimal

Art:

A

Critical

nthology.

(NewYork:Dutton,1968), p. 141f.Fried's italics.

5

Ibid,

p.

145-47. Fried's

italics.

6

Cf.

on these

points

Rosalind

Krauss,

"Sculpure

in

the

Expanded

Field,"

The

Originality

f

theAvant-Garde

nd Other

Modernist

Myths

Cambridge,

Mass.:

MIT,

1985).



6/18

482

SVEN-OLOV

WALLENSTEIN

scape

of

nstallations,

ite-specific

orks nd

actions

no

longer

read-

able

within

the discourse

of

high

modernism.7

But the idealized

subjectthatwas itspreconditionor correlate lso has a historyf ts

own,

notably

within he

phenomenological

tradition,

which

has oc-

cupied

a

highly

mbivalent

lace

in these

discussions.

Phenomenol-

ogy

has been

able

to function

both

s a

legitimation

f the

optically

ideal

situation

with

he

subject

situated t

the imit

f the world

and

as

a means of access

to a discussion

centered

around

the

body

and

its

trajectories

within

n

irreducibly

actical

pace-time.

his

history,

fromHusserl

and

Heidegger

to

Merleau-Ponty

nd

Derrida,

might

thus

shed

a

light, lthough

a

somewhat

oblique

one,

overthe

con-

troversies bout the workof art and its "site."Here we will limit

ourselves

to

a discussion

of the

themes

of

space

and site as

they

emerge

in

Heidegger's

writings,

ut

they

can no

doubt

have

an

examplary

unction

within he

kind

of

encounter

between

art

and

philosophy

we

are

trying

o

stage

here.8

The

discovery

f the irre-

ducibility

f

space

and

bodily

ncarnation

n

phenomenology

also

entails

the

recognition

of the

inescapability

of

language

and

di-

acriticity,

s forms

of

dispersion

more radical

than

the

temporal

horizons,and on the basis of these acknowledgements, henome-

7

Although

t should

of course

be

acknowledged

that

many

of the

contemporary

strategies equire

High

Modernism

s a

background

n

order

to be understood.

The

pioneering

installatory

works of

an artist

ike Guillaume

Bijl,

where the relation

between

reality

nd

"dereality"

re

reversed,

nd social institutions

nter into

the

gallery

r museum

space

in

life-size

cale,

function

precisely

y

virtue f their

nver-

sion

of

a

previous

ituation.

This condition

s indeed

valid formuch

art of

today,

nd

it

would

be

naive to

conclude

that the

logic

of aesthetic

framing

s

simply

no

longer

at work-it

has

only

been

transformed,

nd

today

t functions

n

a meta-level

n

the

sense

that

t

actively

reats

he

history

nd discursive

rchive

of

framing. ontempo-

rary rt,based on information, ocumentationand processesrelatingto technical

communication

systems,

annot be

analyzed according

to the formal

schemes of

High

Modernism,

which does

not

imply

hat t does

not

give

rise

to other

types

f

frames,

socles"

and

aestheticizing

mechanisms,

which

yet

remain

to be charted

n

an

appropriate

way.

We

have not

moved fromenclosure

o

freedom

which

s the

very

way

that

Modernism

defines

tself),

but

towards

finer

modulation,

more

granular

inscription

f

the laws of

representation.

8

It

might

be

objected

that

these remarks

fall

prey

to Fried's

anathema

against

minimalism,

ince

they attempt

to institute

similar

kind

of

in-between,

now

in

relation

to art

and

philosophy,

a

"theoretical

theatricality"

here these

different

discursive

modes can

come

together,

with

he risk hat he

specificity

f

both

will

get

lost

n

the

process

of

"staging."

here

is of

course

no

straightforward

nswer

to this

allegation, apart fromthe fact thatthe "expanded field" of contemporaryrt also

requires

an

expanded

theoretical

field,

or

that,

to

use

a

Heideggerian expression,

the

Zwiegesprdch

etween

art

and

philosophy

needs to be

rethought

within he con-

temporary

ituation,

which,

needless

to

say,

s

highly

ifferent han the

one

Heideg-

ger

was

facing.



7/18

MLN

483

nology mightprovide

us with

mportant

ools

for

dismantling

he

aesthetic

deology

which

t

itself

helped

to set

up.

II

In

his meditations n the site

of

the workof

art,

nd more

generally

on the

significance

f a site

n

general, Heidegger

attempts

o move

beyond

the limitations

mposed

on

thought by objectivist

natural

science,

originating

n

the Cartesian

analysis

of the res xtensa

s a

mathematizeable nd indifferent

pace,

and

a

subjectivist henome-

nology, aking

ts ead fromHusserl's

attempts

o

understand

pace

as

a projection manating rom heego as thezero-point forientation,

the

Nullkorper,

s it is called

in

the Cartesianische

editationen.he

objectivist

nclination

s

oblivious,

Heidegger

claims,

o the

phenom-

enon

of

"world," .e.,

the

totality

f

significance

making

up

the

basic

structure

f

Dasein's

being-in-the-world,

hereasthe

subjectivist

en-

dency

s unable to

explain

the transcendence

f

the

world

n

relation

to

intentionality,

ts ultimate

facticity

nd resistance

to

all sense-

bestowing

ctivities.

he reduction f thesetwomotiveswill hus

have

to

be carriedout with he

full wareness hatneither

f them

may

be

groundedin theother, nd thattheir relativeustification"a con-

stantly ecurring

xpression

n

Seinund

Zeit)

willhave

to be

respected.

The

move

back "zu den Sachen

selbst,"

nitiated

y

Husserl,

but never

brought

to

its fullconclusion

by

him

since

he

erroneously

elieved

transcendental

ubjectivity

o be the ultimate

bedrock of

being,

will

have to

constitute

"grundfreilegende

nalyse,"

aying

are a neutral

ground starting

romwhichall the various

types

f

traditional

xpli-

cations

of

worldhood

and

spatiality

an be understood

as so

many

one-sided

ttempts

o elucidate the

proper

meaning

oftheworld.

t s

only

after

having

reached the fundamentumhat we can

proceed

backwards

nd

analyze

the

oppositions

within he

system

f

meta-

physics

s

derivative,

nd

thus

to a certainextent

ustifiable

odes

of

comprehension

of

being-in-the-world.

In

an extended and

careful

nalysis,

idier

Franckhas

shownhow

Heidegger attempts

o

derive

patiality

rom

emporality

n

a

variety

of

ways,

nd the extent

to which this train

of

thought produces

serious

cracks

n

the

entire architectonic

f Sein und Zeit.9

he

spa-

tial incarnation of

Dasein is

always

a

moment

in

its

being-in-the-

9

Didier

Franck,

Heidegger

t e

probleme

e

'espace

Paris:

Minuit,

1986).

This

book

continues

a

discussion

begun

already

n

the earlier

work on

Husserl,

Chair t

corps,

sur

a

phdnomenologie

e Husserl

Paris:

Minuit,

1981).



8/18

484 SVEN-OLOVWALLENSTEIN

world,

nd the ultimate ense

of this atterwill

lways

e its

temporal

horizon.

Space

can

only

be understood

as a

derivative

mode of

time,

and thetemporal nalyticn this ense constitutes "metontologyf

spatiality,"

s

Heidegger

claims

in

a lecture

cycle

from

1926.10

Franck directs his initial critical

questions

to the fundamental

notions

of

Vorhandenheit

nd

Zuhandenheit,

nd claims

that

they

m-

plicitly

osition

Dasein as

incarnated, and,

more

precisely,

s en-

dowed

with

hands

nd unthinkable

without

reference o a moment

of

prehension, ouching

nd

grasping.11

he twobasic modes

of

the

thing

s Vorhandenheitnd Zuhandenheitill

byHeidegger

himself e

led back to

modes of

temporalization,

ut the

question

is whether

this

nterpretation

oes not reduce the facticityfDasein, since it

conceives

of all

spatial significations especially

as

they appear

in

the

sphere

of

language)

as

in

some

sense

"fallen,"

derivative" nd

"inauthentic."

n

Sein und Zeit

and other

writings

rom the same

period, Heidegger

oftendiscussesthe

spatial "sundering"

Streuung)

of

Dasein,

and the

correlative

undering

of

space

itself nto

places,

sites nd

locations,

nd the

general

drift f the

argument

s

always

o

subjugate spatial

multiplicity

o a

tendency

towardsunification

n

terms f the

projection

of

sense,

which s

always emporal.

The Aus-

einander f

spaces

and sites is

always

projected against

the back-

ground

of a horizon whichholds them

together,

ince

space

itself s

10

Metaphysische

nfangsgriinde

er

Logik

m

Ausgang

von

Leibniz,

Gesamtausgabe

d.

26,

p.

174.

11

Heidegger occasionally

returns

o the

question

of

prehension

and the

hand,

for

instance

in

Was heisst enken?

Pfullingen:

Niemeyer,

1954),

where he states that

"Die Hand ist von allen

Greiforganern:

atzen, Krallen,

Fangen,

unendlich,

d.h.

durch

einen

Abgrund

des Wesens verschieden.

Nur

ein

Wesen,

das

spricht,

d.h.

denkt,

kann die Hand

haben und

in

der

Handhabung

Werke der Hand voll-

bringen,"and continues to ascribe a more fundamental tatusto the hand than

merely

mediating

between inner and outer:

'Jede Bewegung

der

Hand

in

jedem

ihrerWerke

tragt

ich

durch

das

Element,

gebardet

sich im Element des

Denkens.

Alles Werkder Hand

beruht

m Denken

(p.

51).

The

gestures

Gebdrden)

f the hand

permeate

all of

language,

and are not to be conceived of as mere

physical

ndica-

tions. Here

Heidegger

in

fact

opens

a

discussion

with

Husserl

of a

highly omplex

nature:

first,

he

ssue

is to free

gesturality

s

such

from he

sphere

of

"indication,"

o

which it was

assigned by

Husserl

in

the

Logische

Untersuchungen;

ut

secondly,

Heidegger

also

opens

the

problem

of

incarnation,

which was

pressing

for

Husserl,

given

the

highly problematic parallelism

between the transcendental

and

the

psycho-physical.

his

Heideggerian choreography

f

thought

has,

in

its kinaesthetic

dimension,

close affinities o some of Husserl's

analyses

of the

body

and

its

connec-

tion to theworldas Leib, or nstance n thefifth artesianMeditation, lthoughthe

factthatthe

parallelism

n

Heidegger's

case is

situatedbetween

anguage

and

body,

and

not between transcendental

ubjectivity

nd

body,

hifts he

optic

to

a consider-

able extent.On these and related

passages, especially

n

the ecture

cycle

on Parme-

nides

(1942-43),

cf.

Franck,

op.

cit.,

chap.

9,

"L'entrecroisee des mains."



9/18

MLN

485

thought

f as

in

some sense

incomplete, acking

capacity

or

"being-

together."12

Primarilywe are not faced withthings n the sense of objects

of theoretical

ontemplation

or

perception,Heidegger

claims,

but

tools

(Zeuge),

belonging

to

a

complex

of references nd

indications,

as

pragmata

or

a

possible praxis.

The

totality

as

to be

disclosed

if

the

single

tool is to

appear

in

its "as

such," .e.,

in

its "for-the-sake-

of. .

."

(Um-zu).

Consequently

here

can be no such

thing

s

a

"sin-

gle"

tool,

but

only

what

Heidegger

calls

a

Zeugganzheit.

f

we

follow

this

complex

of references nd

implications

we will

finally

rrive t

the

phenomenon

"world" s

such,

although

t

s

normally

oncealed

because we are

dispersed

nto the

circumspection

f

everydayness.

And the

final

for-the-sake-of,

o which

all references

point

and

where

they

find

their

ultimate

anchoring

point,

which

gives

sense

and direction

to the

totality,

ill be Dasein

itself,

he

final end

in

itself,

onceived on the

basis

of

the

temporal

horizon

of the

future.

This futural imension

of Dasein unifies

ime as the sense

and

sig-

nificance

f the

project

of fundamental

ntology

tself,

t

least

f

we

stick o the text

of Sein und Zeit

n

its

published

form nd leave

the

question relatingto its unfinished tateaside for thepresent.

In

another

context,

acques

Derrida

has

pointed

out this

general

tendency

n

the

metaphysical

radition,

where the move

towards

originary

ime constitutes

reduction

of

space

conceived

as a

form

of

exteriority,

n

contradistinction o

time as the

formof interi-

ority.13

his is obvious

n Kantian

philosophy,

ut

Derrida

attempts

to

show that

this s the

case,

at least to

a

certain

extent,

lready

n

Aristotle's

Physics

V,

and that

this reductive motive

continues

to

dominate

philosophy

up

until the

present

day,

and

is

especially

predominant n Heidegger's projectfora destruction f thevulgar

concept

of time.

Derrida claims

that

Heidegger

in

fact

restoreshe

metaphysicalproject

in

its initial

purity,

irst

y

insisting

on the

reduction

of all

spatial

signification

o

temporal

horizons,

and

secondlyby trying

o reduce

"vulgar"

ime

(conceived

on the

basis

on the Aristotelian

ramme

athematike,

nd

thus

on a

spatial

model)

in

order to disclose

an

originary

mode of

temporalization

s the

12

At

the end of

?

23

Heidegger

writes: Der bloBe Raum

ist

noch

verhfillt.

er

Raum ist n Platzeaufgesplittert"p. 104), butthenadds in a handwrittenmarginal

note:

"Nein,

gerade

eine

eigentiimliche

nd

ungesplitterte

inheit

der

Platze "

(An-

hang, p.

442).

13

Cf. "Ousia

et

gramm--note

sur une

note de Sein und

Zeit,"

Marges

de la

philosophie

Paris:

Minuit,

1972).



10/18

486

SVEN-OLOV

WALLENSTEIN

origin

nd

condition

of

possibility

f all

"fallen"

nd

"worldly"

meta-

phors.

Ifwe

accept

Derrida'sargument,t becomes clear thatHeidegger,

his

sharp

criticism

gainst

Husserl's

subjectivism

otwithstanding,

in fact

maintains

the

phenomenological

structure

f

subjectivity

as

pure

auto-affection

n

time,

as time

emporalizing

tself

nd

thus

remains

within

the

confines

of

subjectivism.14

he

phenomenon

"world"

s

basically

temporal

phenomenon,

and

as such

it

does

not

give

spatiality

n

independent,

autonomous

character,

nd it

does

not

allow

for

ny

developed

reflections

n

notions

such

as the

body,

incarnation

or

sexual

difference,

whose

mode

of

being

cannot

be

reduced

to

modes

of time.l5

Heidegger's

unusually

harp

self-criticism

n the

ecture

"Zeit

und

Sein"

more than

three

decades

later identifies

his

problem

in

an

unusually

traightforward

nd-acute

way.

The

title

of

this

ecture

s

in factthe

same

as

the title

of

the

section

n Sein und

Zeit

which

was

held

back,

and where

the whole

project

came

to a

halt,

butit

would

be erroneous

to

search

for direct

clues

in this

later

text

to

why

fundamental

ntology

was

abandoned.

Heidegger's

thinking

as

at

this aterstatetraversed long path, eadingfrom hetranscenden-

tally

riented

project

of

fundamental

ntology,

hrough

he

reflec-

tions

on the

history

f

metaphysics

nd

the

thinking

f

being

as

"sending"

(Geschick),

p

to

the

final

phase

where the

history

f

metaphysics,

nd

even

being

itself,

re reconsidered

n

light

of the

notion

of

Appropriation

Ereignis)

s

something

xceeding

history,

and

preparing

the

way

for a new

thought

utside

ofthe

metaphysi-

cal

tradition.

But even

though

this

ecture

does

not

directly

ddress

the

failure

of Sein

undZeit

n

a

general

level,

tnevertheless

eturns

to it on a specificpoint: this last phase will in factreopen the

question

of

space,

recisely

n relation

to

its derivation

rom ime

n

14

This becomes

evident

when

Heidegger

in

Kant

und das

Problem

er

Metaphysik

attempts

to

free the

notion

of auto-affection

e

finds

delineated

in Kant's

first

Critique

rom

ts architectionical

raming,

nd

interprets

t as

a

passageway

owards

the transcendence

of

Dasein,

barred

by

Kant's

"shunning

back"

from

the

proper

sense

of

his owndiscoveries.

n

fact,

Heidegger's

critique

of the

various

notions

of

the

subject

tends

to

leave

what

one could

call the

position

f

subjectivity

s

the

zero-

point

ofprojection

ntact.

On these

and

related

issues,

cf.

my

"FromFundamental

Ontology

o

the

History

f

Being:

The

Question

of

Heidegger's

Turning,"

Proceedings

from heResearch roject henomenologynd Critique fModernity/1991, Stockholm

University.

15 These

questions

are

all discussed

by

Franck,

and

also

in

a somewhat

different

optic

by

Derrida

in his "Geschlecht.

ifference

exuelle,

difference

ntologique,"

in

Michel

Haar

(ed.):

Heidegger

Paris:

Cahiers

de

l'Herne,

1983).



11/18

M LN 487

Sein und Zeit.

Heidegger

writes:

InsofernZeit sowohl wie Sein als

Gaben

des

Ereignens

nur

aus diesem her zu denken

sind,

muB

entsprechendauch das Verhaltnis des Raumes zum Ereignisbe-

dacht

werden.

Dies kann freilich rst

gliicken,

wenn

wir zuvor

die

Herkunftdes

Raumes aus dem

zureichend

gedachten

Eigentfim-

lichen des Ortes

eingesehen

haben ... Das

Versuch

n 'Sein nd Zeit'

? 70,

dieRdumlichkeitesDaseins

auf

dieZeitlichkeit

uriickzufiihren,afit

sich

nicht

alten,"16

iven the fact that

Heidegger

often

engages

in

self-interpretations

f a

highly

dventurous

sort,

with the obvious

intention o smooth the breaks between earlier and later

phases

in

his

development,

his

andid retractation

s

highly urprising,

nd it

is not an unlikelyhypothesis hat t pointsto a fundamentalprob-

lem

leftunresolved

n

the earlier works.

Here

we

will

follow he transformationsf the notions of site and

space

in

connection with the transformation f the

notion of the

work f

art,

ince

it s our

working ypothesis

hat hese

changes

are

intimately

elated,

at

least

if

we

choose

to

read

Heidegger

in

a

retrospective

ight,

.e.,

from

he

point

of

view

of the formulations

n

his

astworks.But beforewe

approach

the ater

texts,

we

will

have

to

make

a briefdetour

through

he first

ppearance

of the workof

art

on a grandscale in Heidegger's oeuvre,namely n DerUrsprunges

Kunstwerkes

1936),

and

attempt

o

analyze

how thistexttransforms

the

site of the work f

art,

r rather or he first ime

opens

his

ite

by

implicitly ecasting

the

structural

hierarchy

between

temporality

and

spatiality

n

fundamental

notology.

It

is

evident that the

work of

art

has no

specificposition

within

Sein und

Zeit,

nor

in

the

adjacent

works

r

lecture

cycles.

The

status

accorded to

language gives

evidence

to this:

anguage

is a moment

within the

totality

f

tools,

it is

indeed characterized

by

Bedeut-

samkeit,

ut it is not

essentially

ifferent rom other tools used

by

Dasein

in

everyday ircumspection. anguage

has no

privileged

e-

lation to truth s fundamental

disclosure,

s

aletheia,

which will

be

the case

later on

after

he

dismantling

f the

project

n

Seinund Zeit.

The

step

back fromtranscendental

hilosophy,

ttempted

but not

brought

to its

conclusion

in

the

earlier

works,

will let

language

appear

as the

very

lement of the

disclosureof truth nd

being,

and

it

can

no

longer

be

thought

f as

a

tool

among

others:

Man

does not

use Language, Language uses Man or speaks throughhim,in the

16

"Zeit

und

Sein,"

Zur

Sache desDenkens

Pfullingen:Niemeyer,

1976),

p.

24.

My

italics.



12/18

488 SVEN-OLOV

WALLENSTEIN

inversion

of the zoon

ogon

chon

f

metaphysical

humanism to the

logos

oonechon aried

n

an infinite

mount of

ways

n

Heidegger's

later works.

This

process

is

only

hinted at in

Der

Ursprung

es

Kunstwerkes,

where the

more decisive

restructurings

ill relate to the

notion of

"world."

Heidegger

situates

the

work

of art

at the

intersection

e-

tween

world,

s the

open

and

disclosed,

and

earth,

s the closed and

self-contained. ome

commentators ave tried

to see this as a con-

tinuation of themes

of

Verbergung

nd

Entbergung

n

Sein und

Zeit,

i.e.,

Dasein as

belonging

to

both the

spheres

of truth

openness,

aletheia)

nd untruth

closure,

lethe),

ut the new twist

iven

to this

opposition is so violent that t more or less "twists" reefromthe

former

onceptuality.

oth Dasein's

capacity

for

falling

nd for re-

verting

o authentic

xistencewould

in

the later textbe

analyzed

as

possibilities

within

he

world,

which,

via

negativa,

ndicates

the ex-

tentto which the notion

of

earth

ere transcends he

possibilities

f

being-in-the-world,

nd

points

n

the directionof an

altogether

dif-

ferentdimensions.

The earth cannot

be conceived of as an

"un-

truth"

nscribedwithinDasein's

existential

apacity

to

fall,

since it

denotes the

concealed as

such,

something

which could never be

thematized s a

"possibility"

fDasein, or as a

projection

of sense,

but rather the unthematizable

s such. The earth

is not

something

situated

t the outer

edge

of our intentionalities nd

projections,

t

is no

longer

any

kind

of "horizon"or Kantian dea

("the

horizon of

all

horizons,"

as

Husserl

describes the

world),

but

something

that

radicallyprecedes

all reflection

nd

projection.

Heidegger

directs

his

attention

to the

way

n

which an ancient

Greek

temple gathers

world

around

itself,

nd then sets thisworld

back to itsearthly oundation,

nd

in

this

way

creates a site

for

the

work of art

in

the "chasm"

(Rifi)

between

earth and world. "Er

[Der Bauwerk]

steht einfach da inmittendes

zerkliifteten

elsen-

tales....

Dastehend ruhtdas Bauwerk uf dem

Felsgrund....

Das

Tempelwerk

r6ffnet astehend eine Welt

und stelltdiese

zugleich

zurfick uf die

Erde,

die

dergestalt

elbst

erst als der heimatliche

Grund herauskommt....

Der

Tempel gibt

n

seinem Dastehen

den

Dingen

erst ihr Gesicht und den Menschen erst die

Aussicht auf

sich selbst."17

he work tands

there,

n

an irreducible

Da-and this

Da can no longerbe understood as theDa in SeinundZeit, .e., the

"there" s the factical

rigo

of an ecstatical

emporality

elonging

to

17

Holzwege, esamtausgabe

d.

5,

p.

27ff.



13/18

MLN

489

Da-sein,

but it is the

There,

he

siteof a world

becoming

world,

or

"worlding,"

n

a

spatial

sense

no

longer

reducible

to a

projective

temporality.The Dastehen,Heidegger adds a page furtheron,

should be

conceived as the

"erecting"

f a world:

"Werksein

heiBt:

eine Welt

aufstellen");

he

Stellen

hould, however,

ot be

conceived

as a

positioning

n terms f the

Setzung

erived

from he

metaphysics

of

subjectivity

n

German

Idealism

(and,

we

might

dd,

from

Hus-

serl,

who uses

the same

terminology),

ut

as a

letting-presence

n

the sense

of the Greek thesis.

his

thesis

ets

the world

emerge

from

the

earth,

nd then relates t back

to the

earth,

hus

etting

he

earth

remainearth.

"Indem das Werk

ine Welt

aufstellt,

tellt s

die Erde

her. Das Herstellen sthier im strengenSinne des Worteszu den-

ken. Das Werk ruckt

und halt die

Erde selbst

n

das Offene einer

Welt.

Das

Werk

afit

ieErde ine

rde ein."18What

s

important

ere is

that

he work of

art,

although

it

opens

a

specific

world,

does

not

overcome the lethe

f the

earth,

but lets the earth

remain

earth,

as

the obverse

side of

phenomenality

nd of the

clearing

(Lichtung)

takingplace,

and that t

allows this

"letting"

o

presence

in

the

form

of a

Streit

hich s

not

something

rojected

r

brought

bout

y

Dasein,

but

something

which situates

ach Dasein within

historical

world.

Much could be said about these

passages,

especially

n relationto

the activistic

erminology

hat here

has become

transferred

rom

the

sphere

of

subjectivity

o

the workof art tself

something

which

will sever the connection

between

art

and the

faculty

f

imagina-

tion,

s

Heidegger

himself

emarks).

Here we

will confineourselves

to the

remark that the

derivation of

space

from time

no

longer

seems

possible

in

the

context

of Der

Ursprung

es Kunstwerkes.

he

site,

the Da of the

work

of

art,

annot be

thought

within

n ecstatic-

horizonal

temporalityelonging

to

Dasein,

but

only

s the

Streit,

he

Riff

nd the

Gegeneinander

f

earth

and

world.

n its nsistentmate-

riality,

he

work of

art

does

not allow

for the reductions

operative

within

ein und Zeit.

These themes will

resurface

gain

and

again during

the

rest of

Heidegger's

development.

We

will here devote

our attention

o

two

specific

exts,

ecause

they xpress

this

turning

way

from

he

per-

spective

of Sein und Zeit

n

its final

and most

complete

form,

nd

recast the interrelation

between

the

site,

the

work of

art

and

thought s thevery ssueforthought, s thefundamentalSachedes

Denkens,

amely

Bauen

Wohnen

enken

1951)

and Die Kunst

und der

18

Ibid,

p.

32.

Heidegger's

italics.



14/18

490

SVEN-OLOV

WALLENSTEIN

Raum

(1969).

Both

of

themaddress

the

question

of the

relation

between

thinking

nd

habitation,

whether

here

s such

a

thing

s

a

site Ort)ofthought, nd inwhat ense art can allowus toapproach

this

site

n

a

more

profound

way.

The notion

of

an Ort

belonging

to

thought

has several

ayers

n

Heidegger's

later

thinking,

ften

connected

to

what he

calls a "to-

pology"

or

"topic"

of

being.

In

this

ater

phase,

the nsistence

n

the

rereading

of the

history

f

philosophy

will recede

into

the back-

ground,

s the

notion

of

Ereignis,

s the

happening

of

being

situated

outside

of

the

epochs

of

metaphysics

nd

theirconcatenation

as

a

progressive

blivion

of the

truth,

ecomes

central.

n one

sense,

it

could be said that

Heidegger

once moreattempts ogo back to the

things

hemselves,

ince

he now

realizes

that

the "issue

for

thought"

cannot

be

understood

through

history,

ince

history

ill

always

on-

demn

us to an

infinite

nterpretation,

nd thus

will obscure

the

element

of

presencing,

the

clearing

(Lichtung)

of

being

which

"gives"

he

impetus

to

thought.

We

must

cease

all

overcoming"

s

a

claim

often

repeated

in

these

ate

texts,

which

ttempt

he

step

back

from he

tradition

n a more

complete

sense. But

where

does such

a

step

lead us?

In

the

transcription

f the seminar

following

n

the

lecture

"Zeit und

Sein,"

Heidegger

writes: Das DaB des Ortes des

'Wohin'

steht

fest,

ber dem Wissen

st

noch

verborgen,

wie

dieser

Ort

st,

und

es muB

unentschieden

bleiben,

ob das

Wie,

die

Seinsart

des

Ortes,

schon

feststeht

aber

noch

nicht

wiBbar

st),

oder ob

es

sich erst

selbst

in dem

Vollzug

des

Schrittes,

n dem

genannten

Entwachen

in das

Ereignis

ergibt."19

The notion

of a site

for

thought

remains

obscure,

and

perhaps

one should

view

these later

texts as

a series

of efforts o

allow

something

to

happen

through

language, to let this"site"speak through anguage withoutpaying

attention

o

whether

hiswill be

acceptable

within

he

language

of

the

tradition

r not.

The site

appears

to be both

a

position

of

being

(or

rather

Ereignis),

t the

limit

of

metaphysics:

Das

Ende der

Phi-

losophie

ist

der

Ort,

dasjenige,

worin ich

das Ganze

ihrerGeschich-

te

in seine

auBerste

Moglichkeit

versammelt,"20

nd

a more

con-

crete site

in

the

sense of

a connection

to an

earthly

habitation,

sense

of

"rootedness,"

which

will become

obvious

as

we turnto

the

relation between

habitation,

dwelling

and

thinking.

s there

an

oblique, enigmaticpassagebetweenthese two ensesof thesite,or is

19

Zur Sache

des

Denkens,

.

33.

20

Ibid,

p.

63.



15/18

MLN

491

thisdemand

fora

systematic

rticulation

f

concepts

still oo classi-

cal,

too

metaphysical,

o

open

an

access to these

writings?

Anotherquestion related to thefirst, hich needs to be asked, s

whether

Heidegger

is here still

pursuing

phenomenology.

We

could

perhaps

tentativelyay: yes,

to the

extent that he

is

following

he

spiralling

movement

back to the

things

hemselves,

nd

attempting

to let them

appear

as

theypresent

hemselves; o,

to the

extent hat

we conceive of

phenomenology

s more than

a

possibility

f

thought,

i.e.,

as

something

which

has

to

fulfill series

of

systematic romises

lodged

within

the

tradition,

s a

"philosophy"

n

the traditional

sense

of the word.

Bauen Wohnenenken ollows hemovement lreadybegun in Sein

und Zeit:

n

order

for us to

get

access to the

originary

ense of

the

world,

we have to

reduce both

objectivist

cience and

subjectivism.

This will ead

us

to

a

primary

onstellation

f

inhabiting,uildingand

thinking,

ince

thinking lways

means to be

situated,

to

dwell

in

a

certain

place.

Already

t the outset

we can see

how this transforms

certain

notions

fromboth Sein

and Zeit nd

fromDer

Ursprung

es

Kunstwerkes:

he themes

of

facticity

nd Sein-zum-Todere

reworked

in

the

light

of the

site,

of the

belonging

to a determined

place;

and

the themes of earth and world are recast,in the sense that the

heroic,

world-formative

owers

evoked

in

the

Ursprung

re trans-

formed nto

a

"letting-be,"

more

profoundpassivity

hich

no

long-

er retains

anything

romthe

lexicon of

subjectivist

ctivism.

This can be

seen

in

the stress

ut

on

the

notion of the

world,

nd

its

"worlding."

n another

related

text,

Das

Ding

(1950),

Heidegger

expounds

an

enigmatic,

although

consequent duplication:

"Welt

west,

ndem sie weltet.

Dies

sagt:

das

Welten

von Welt

ist

weder

durch anderes erklarbar

noch

aus

anderem

ergrundbar.

Dies

un-

mogliche liegt

nicht

daran,

daB unser menschlichesDasein zu sol-

chem

Erklaren

und

Begrfindenunfaihig

st. Vielmehr beruht

das

Unerklarbare

nd

Unbegrundbare

des Weltensvon

Welt

darin,

daB

so etwas

wie Ursachen

und Griinde

dem

Welten

von

Welt

ungemaiB

bleiben."21

This

doubling

of

words,

lreadypresent

n Der

Ursprung,

showsthe extentto

which the

world cannot

be understood

as some-

thingproduced,

constituted,

rought

bout,

etc.,

but instead has to

be

thought

f

presencing

n

itself.

Heidegger's

linguistic aroxysms

should indeed not preventus from eeing thatwhat is at stakein

these verbal

duplications

is the

possibility

f

expressing

the

"step

21

Vortrdge

nd

Aufsdtze

I

(Pfullingen:

Neske,

1957),

p.

52.



16/18


17/18

MLN

493

vealed

in

the workof

art,

nd not

in

scientific

alculation,

and

thus

the work

f arthas a

privileged osition

n

relation

o truth.

t is

only

in the passage throughthework of art that we can get access to a

kind of truthwhich

thought

will

register

nd formulate

fterwards.

Art s the

organon

f

thought,

s

Schelling

could have

said,

and it

opens

a

truth,

r a

site,

n

which

thought

might

nstall tself.

Art

s

in

a certain

ense the

"embodiment"

f

the

process

through

which

space

unfolds,

or

"spaces"

itself,

n

what

Heideger

calls

"das

Raumen."

This

spacing

should

however not be

understood

as the

result f an

activity,

ut as

an

originary appening

which

llows sites

to

appear

and various

"directions" o

shine

forth,

nd

in

this

ense it

is a "letting" nalogous to what takesplace in theworkof art."Die

Plastikwaire

die

Verk6rperung

on

Orten, die,

eine

Gegend

er6ff-

nend und sie

verwahrend,

in Freies

um sich versammelt

aben,

das

ein

Verweilen

gewaihrt enjeweiligen

Dingen

und ein Wohnen

dem

Menschen

inmitten

er

Dinge."23

Art s the

fundamental

nalogy

o

the

spacing

of

space

and the

worlding

of

world,

but the conse-

quence

of this

s thatart

n

a certain

sense

escapes

naming;

f

art s

situated

on this ide

of all traditional

notionsof

spatiality

nd

sites,

it cannot

be thematized

from

within he

world of

already

formed

spaces, but perhaps onlymimed from positionwithindiscourse,

where the

ssue willbe

to

give

analogies

to the

kind

of

truth

appen-

ing

in

art.

f

plastic

rt s "die

Verk6rperung

er Wahrheit

des

Seins

in ihrem Orte

stiftenden

Werk"24,

hen

this

embodiment

will

only

take

place

in

thought

fterwards,

fter he

event,

nd

thought

will

have to accommodate

itself

n

the site

opened

by

the

work of

art.

From fundamental

ntology,

where

spatiality

nd the

Streuung

f

sites

were

conceived

against

the

horizon

of

their

ynthesis

ithin

he

projective

emporality

f

Dasein,

we moved to

the site

of the

work f

art as the "chasm" betweenearthand world,betweenclosure and

disclosure,

nd

then to the

final

position

of the

work of

art as the

fundamental

nalogy

to

the

happening

of truth

tself,

elonging

to

the

sphere

of the

spacing

of

space

and the

worlding

f

world,

lways

anterior

to its thematization

within

discourse.

This

itinerary

s one

possible

among

the

texts f

Heidegger,

but

n

a monadical

sense it

reflectshis

entire

development,

nd

also the

fate of

phenomenology

tself,

tarting

ff s

a transcendental

roj-

ect,and then immersing

tself

more and

more

in

that

which

effec-

23

Ibid,

p.

208.

24

Ibid, p.

210.



18/18

494

SVEN-OLOV

WALLENSTEIN

tively

esists

hematization,

ince it is

alwaysalready presupposed

within

very

ct,

every

word and

everygaze trying

o

position

the

worldas a stableobject of theoreticaldomination.The Zwiegesprdch

between

art and

philosophy,

egun

in

the

30s,

finally

ead

Heideg-

ger

to a

position

where

philosophical

discoursehas

lost all tradition-

al

securities,

nd

finds ts

onlypossibility

n the radical

namelessness

of the

workof art.

Universityf

Stockholm

the site of the work of art

Documents