the semiotics of military terrain analysis and map reading

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The semiotics of military terrain analysis and map reading

By Ellis M. Madsen, MS, OD, LTC(R) US Army

ABSTRACT: The analysis of military terrain is as old as warfare itself. Military map making andmap reading may date back to the third century BC. Both of these endeavors constitute semioticsystems. They exhibit the sign relationship of signifier signified. Reading these texts can bedone only in the context of a given military situation. Terrain forms texts that can be read bycompetent practitioners. Indeed, the reading of terrain at a glance had a special name given it,coup doeil, as early as the eighteenth century. The texts can also be analyzed according to their paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes. The texts exist at all four levels of military engagement:individual, tactical, operational and strategic. Furthermore, terrain analysis takes a written form asmilitary map reading. As map texts become digitalized, this changes where, how and by whomthese texts are read. Finally, given that military terrain and military map reading are forms of expertise, one can extrapolate to consider any form of expertise as a semiotic system. If that isthe case then some semiotic systems as fields of expertise, can be automated, giving rise to aformal definition of machine semiosis.

Key Words:Military terrain analysisMap readingSemiotic systemExpertiseExpert systemMachine semiosis


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PART I: Terrain Analysis

Military terrain analysis is the study of land features in a specified area (the area of operations) that will contribute to or inhibit the operations of a military force. It includes the studyof obstacles that inhibit movement and observation, as well as terrain features that offer avenuesof movement and aids to observation. This analysis includes the two-dimensional land and seasurfaces as well as the airspace above the ground, space below ground such as tunnels and thevolume below the sea in the case of modern naval warfare. Terrain analysis also includes theweather and climate of an area including the ambient light available at different times of day.

The reading of maps and their preparation has, until very recently, been an integral part of terrain analysis. The science of cartography developed considerably in the Enlightenment andlater. Technological advances made maps essential for the full use of terrain by a commander.Very recently, digital electronic representation of the battlefield is overtaking the use of paper maps.

Terrain analysis and map reading are extra linguistic semiotic systems in the sense of Greimas and Courtes. . By natural semiotic systems we mean two vast signifying sets: on theone hand, natural languages and on the other extra-linguistic contexts that we consider assemiotics of the natural world. They are called natural because they impose themselves uponhuman beings rather than being constructed by them--. [Greimas & Courtes, 287.] As semioticsystems, terrain analysis and map reading can be analyzed paradigmatically and syntagmatically.These are not merely interesting examples of semiotic systems; rather the semiotic analyses of military terrain analysis and map reading lead to some insights in the semiotics and its history

Terrain as Sign and Text.

Basically, the features of terrain that one reads consist of terrain features that aid thecommander and hinder the enemy. Reading the terrain text is knowing what to look for in terrainand how to make use of these terrain features for military purposes. The terrain features includethe following:

*Terrain features that permit friendly movement and inhibits enemy movement, including,hills, mountains, valleys, passes, roads, paths, deserts, forests.

*Terrain features that permits friendly observation and inhibits enemy observation, includingthose named above.

*Natural obstacles such as rivers, streams, lakes, swamps, marshes.*Man-made obstacles such as trenches, ditches, moats, canals, forts, castles, minefields,

antitank obstacles such as Dragons Teeth, anti-cavalry obstacles such as calthrops.

The signs of a terrain text are those terrain features mentioned above. They are physicalobjects, natural or man-made, that occupy a volume above the earths surface (and, later, belowit) called the area of operations. This is volume that is significant to a commander and relevantto his mission. These signs exist in juxtaposition to one another, within that volume.

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Interpretations Underlying the Reading of a Terrain Text

The terrain is a text that the commander reads, but it is not the only thing that he uses toformulate his plan to accomplish his mission. He makes interpretations, consisting of the state of morale and physical health of his troops, the state of readiness of his equipment, the supplycapabilities of his organization, the quality of his intelligence, among others. For all of theinterpretations about his own troops, he makes corresponding interpretations about the enemytroops. He forms interpretations of each text and then integrates them with the interpretation hehas made from read from the terrain text to form his plan. These interpretations and integrationshappen continuously and rapidly. The integrations of the interpretations are processed in paralleleven though the information about each one is presented to the commander, typically in a staff briefing, serially. Most commanders let it be known to their staff the general nature of the missionbefore the staff presents their information. The plans are usually (and optimally) not finalized untilall the interpretations have been presented; the plans can (and optimally, should) change as newinformation is presented.

The interpretations of the signs read by a commander form the context of his reading of theterrain text. The contex t is the entire text which precedes and/or accompanies the syntagmaticunit under consideration and upon which the signification depends. It can also be implicit, in thiscase it is qualified as extra-linguistic or situational . [Greimas AJ, Courtes J. 1979 p58.]

The commander who reads terrain always interprets the terrain in the context of its militaryvalue, that is, in the context of its usefulness for attack/defense and/or advance/withdrawal,according to his assigned mission. Without this context, this interpretation, the terrain text has nomeaning; it is just bits of real estate, a hill, a valley, a road or a river. Furthermore, the signfunction is moveable and dependent on interpretations taking place in an underlying situationaldiscourse.

Changes in the situational discourse can be described as formal mathematicalcatastrophes. [Madsen E. 1978.] The situational discourse can change very rapidly, leading to arapid change of the interpretation of the sign in the terrain analysis. Thus, the ongoinginterpretation of the terrain text must be diachronic; only the later analysis of a battle or combat byan armchair general can be synchronic.

As an example of a terrain text, consider a dense forest. If you are a commander of agroup of defending infantry, this dense forest on either side of a clearing would channelize acavalry attack into a killing zone you have prepared with missile troops. This might describeHenry V at Agincourt. On the other had, if you are in command of a disciplined infantry thatmaneuvers and attacks in formation, a dense forest could break up your units physicalcohesiveness and leave them vulnerable to piecemeal attack by individual fighters. This is what adense forest meant to the Roman leader Varus when his force was annihilated by Germanictribesmen in the battle of the Teutoberger Wald, 9AD. [Perrett B, in Stephenson M ed. 2003, p94-98.]

There is a sectionalization of these extensive and complicated contexts that thecommander considers. The commander divides the labor of making these interpretations into

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areas for his (sometimes large) staff, to help him form his interpretations and analyze the contexts.In the modern US Army, the analysis of Terrain would fall under the S2 Intelligence section, theSituation would fall under the S3 Operations section, while the Morale would be a matter for theS1, Personnel section. Of course, there is considerable overlap in considering these areas. Ineach context/interpretation of the terrain, the commander must integrate all the elements of thecontext into his planning and management of the battle. He must further change his planning and

management as these contexts change.

Below is a small list of possible contexts that a commander can consider when he reads aterrain text.

OBJECTIVE; Attack Advance Break Contact Defendto contact (retrograde) in place

SITUATION: Turn their flank, Watch for sniper Retreat by unit Refuse the line

Break their center Form Square

(Naval) Rake their stern, Form Line of Battle

MORALE: Applicable to all of the above: win/lose, stand/run, freedom/capture, survive/die

The commander is also responsible for the training of his troops; that is for insuring thatsoldiers execute the concept of the underlying Situational and Morale discourses essential to thecompletion of the commanders operational plan. Maintenance of the acceptable discourses is thegoal of all training and moral initiatives. The acceptance by each individual soldier of thesituational discourse is the goal of military culture and training. (The exception is a sauve quipeut morale. This can come on very rapidly and no commander would plan for this or want this

eventuality. Keeping the Morale out of the sink of a sauve qui peut is clearly a huge job and it isone of the chief responsibilities of the NCOs, the noncommissioned officers, or sergeants, beforeand during battle.)

An interesting example of the contexts of battle is the clash of opposing Greek infantryphalanxes in the Classical Age. This context confuses the concept of attack vs. defense. Theunderlying situational discourse could only be decided after some time after the clash of theopposing phalanges. As admirably demonstrated by VD Hanson, this time was typically short,usually not more than an hour. [Hanson VD, 2005.] Furthermore, the decision of the underlyingdiscourse could sometimes be decided before the clash of the phalanxes, especially when theenemy phalanx was Spartan. In this latter case the sight and sounds (pipes of the musicians

alone: Spartan traditionally approached the enemy in vocal silence) of the approaching of Spartanphalanx would cause a catastrophic change in the situational discourse of Spartas enemy.Sometimes the Spartans lost.

Reading terrain and the Coup dOeil

Terrain analysis is of such importance to military commanders, that the US Army hasincluded it in its operations order. This is a five-section template developed by US Army to aid itsmembers in issuing and understanding orders. It functions as a mission statement for a specifiedoperation and is used at all levels of organization. This mnemonic contains, among other things,

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the most important elements for a commander to use in reading terrain. They include, weather information and lighting data, locations of enemy and friendly forces, and how the operation is totake place on the terrain in the area of operations.[MIT Army ROTC.] The section on terrainincludes:

1. Observation and fields of fire

2. Cover and concealment3. Obstacles4. Key terrain5. Avenues of approach

In addition to the terrain data of the operations order, virtually every military force in the worldtrains at least its commanders in terrain analysis.

The terrain portion of the operations order is a tool to aid a commander in his terrainanalysis. It is especially for novices, designed to keep them from forgetting a key factor in their analysis, and to insure they communicate their ideas to subordinates. As such, it constitutes anexample of as studied, thorough and un-rushed reading of terrain.

A coup doeil, on the other hand, is an instantaneous analysis of military terrain by acommander. It is, in effect, an immediate reading of a terrain text without a studied, ponderousanalysis. It implies a rapid analysis or a brilliant stroke of insight into the military situation, andhow the terrain relates to that military situation and the commanders mission and objective. Thisstrange term is of interest because of its early use, predating many of the ideas of semiotics.

William Duggan offers a critical review of the concept of the coup doeil. Using recentresearch on how the brain works, he posits the view that there is really no difference between thestudied analysis of military problems and the coup doeil. Duggan suggests changing theprocedures used by military commanders to incorporate the intuitive aspects of battlefield problemsolving called coup doeil. Duggan also suggests that the coup doeil cannot be forced; it comeswhen it comes. This would suggest that a commander would do well to query many differentminds, people on his staff, on how to read terrain (and other command decisions, for that matter)to see if one of these struck a brilliant coup doeil. The commander, then, would not rely solely onhaving the right solution (which he himself might not be able to produce in time) but would rather function as a clearing-house and integrator of the coups doeil of his subordinates.[Duggan W 2005.]

Duggans thesis is supported by recent research in the workings of the brain and by thesuccessful planning techniques used in business. There is a long-standing connection betweenleadership in war and business, both academic and practical. Other research in how experts

arrive at decisions supports Duggans thesis. In a study of expertise, Phillip Ross, came to theconclusion that experts, especially chess masters, are made, through constant and long-standingpractice in their fields of expertise. This would suggest that the commanders should start earlyand practice often how to read terrain. [Ross, PE 2006.[ One is reminded of a number of episodes of Star Trek, The Next Generation where Captain Picard is conversing with higher echelon commanders, commanders who exceed his rank by three or four levels and who areabout his age or even younger. These commanders invariably tell Captain Picard, There is no-one better qualified to command the Starship Enterprise on this difficult mission. This is not justa superior recognizing the confidence he or she has in a subordinate, but rather that CaptainPicard REALLY IS the best qualified to command the Enterprise, because he has the most

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experience, because he is, along with his staff, most likely to come up with a coup doeil. Star Fleet has, after centuries of studying warfare, finally realized the value of experience in command,and not promoted Captain Picard to the higher rank of administrative and political levels. Theywant to benefit from his expertise, reading the texts of outer space.

Perhaps the best short description of coup doeil, one that serves for any age, comes from

the (fictional) mouth of Alexander the Great, as he tells the story of his life.As a boy I instinctively understood the ground, the march, the occasion, and the elements.

I comprehended the crossing of rivers and the exploitation of terrain; how many units of what composition may traverse such and such a distance, how swiftly, bearing how much kit, arriving inwhat condition to fight. The drawing up of troops came as second nature to me: I simply looked;and all showed itself clear. My father was the greatest soldier of his day, perhaps the greatest ever. Yet when I was ten I informed him that I would excel him. By twenty-three I had done so. [Pressfield 2004.]

John Churchill, the first Duke of Marlboro was another master at reading terrain and howthe placement of friendly and enemy troops on the terrain could be used to his advantage.

Both in his set-piece battles like Blenheim and Ramillies and in the encounter battle likeOudenarde, the Dukes [of Marlborol] masterly appreciation of the ground and his ability to read the enemy commanders mind enabled him so to deploy his forces that he always retained theinitiative, forcing the enemy to react to his moves. [Barthorp 1980.]

Historically, references to a coup doeil in the context of military terrain analysis occur asearly as the eighteenth century. Among his skills, the one by which the eighteenth century set of the greatest store was that of coup doeil, a facility which enabled a commander to grasp theessentials of a situation and make a speedy and appropriate decision. ]Pirscher, in Duffy 1987.]Duffy writes, the process of acquiring coup doeil began in peacetime, while the officer was outwalking, riding or hunting. The officer learned how to judge distances and to recognize key

terrain features as they relate to the different combat elements at the time, i.e. infantry, cavalryand artillery. Duffy again, Eventually it became possible to envisage the most peacefullandscape in military terms, and problems and their solutions crowded in upon the mind.

Von Clauswitz discussed coup doeil at length in the early nineteenth century. In hisconcept of coup doeil, it was meant to apply to all levels of battle as they have been presentedhere. Indeed, many of the examples of reading terrain already cited are in face coups doeil.[Caraccilo DJ, Pothin JL 2000.] Duffy again notes that, Whereas the combats of infantry againstinfantry had a attritional quality, the chance of success of horse against foot hung above all on thecoup doeil of the cavalry commander. [Duffy C. p228.]

As early as 1860, Viollet-le-Duc gave references to the coup doeil. The context of the firstof his references is the defense of a castle, which at the time would be considered tactical or operational (of which more, later) depending of the size and value of the castle and the size of theforce besieging the castle. It is certain that, even at the present day a place defended by acommander of ingenuity and skill, one whose coup doeil is rapid and accurate, may hold outmuch longer than one which is defended by a man of routine whose intelligence cannot furnishfresh resources at every phase of the attack. [Viollet-le-Duc EE. 1860 p69.]

Viollet-le-Duc refers to a coup doeil in the context of the placement of the castle. In thiscase, he makes the certain case that the placement of the castle is of strategic importance to the

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defense of a whole region. With the sure coup doeil which belongs to men of genius, he(Richard the Lion Heart) chose the site of the fortress intended to cover the Norman capital, andhaving once decided upon his plans, he followed out their execution with a tenacity and force of will which bore down every obstacle opposed to his undertaking; so that, in one year not only wasthe fortress built, but a complete system, likewise, of defensive works was thrown up, with ratetalent, along the banks of the Seine, to the point at which the river covers Rouen. [Viollet-le-Duc

EE. 1860 p 81.]

Errors in reading terrain

Umbero Eco has famously remarked, A sign is anything that can be used as a lie. [EcoU. 1979.] If that is so, then terrain features certainly qualify as signs, given the numerousexamples of commanders misreading terrain because of deceits and feints of the enemy. Thesedeceptions usually consist of making the enemy think an attack is going to take place where itisnt. This allows the attacker to mass his forces elsewhere, at a more advantageous place. Suchdeception is an example of surprise, a principal of war.

John Churchill, Duke of Marlboro, was a master of deceitful attack. In the battles of theearly Eighteenth Century, Marlboro had occasion to attack dug-in French positions. He wouldvigorously attack one flack of the French line, causing the French commander to think that flankwas the main attack. Marlboro would then with overwhelming force at a different flank. Having selected the most advantageous sector of the battlefield for his decisive thrust, he would maintain

pressure at other points, thus inducing the enemy commander to weaken that part of his front,while at the same time building up a massive concentration of force for the ultimate breakthrough.[Barthorp M. 1980 p17.]

In the film The Seven Samurai, [Kurasawa A. 1954.] the leader of the seven purposelyleaves a path into the village apparently unguarded, while actually fortifying it with hidden troops.By creating this opening in his defenses, he canalizes the attackers, so that he can split up theenemy forces and counterattack them at a place of his choosing and at advantageous odds. Inmodern terms, he applied the principle of mass and the offensive by deceiving the banditcommander about the villages defenses. The leader counts on his enemy the misreading theterrain, that is, the defenses of the village he has prepared.

One of the best examples of deception is that of the Mongols. A few Mongols would attackan enemy line and then turn, feigning retreat. The enemy would break ranks and give chase tothe fleeing Mongols. The Mongols would ride over a small hill, when they would spring the trap.The pursuing enemy would be attacked on both flanks by the previously unseen main part of theMongol forces. If anything is noteworthy about this simple deception, it is that it succeeded sooften throughout history and by different armies. [Nicolle D. 1996.]

Well before D-day, General George Patton was stationed in the north of England. Seeingthe apparently tremendous troop concentrations on their aerial photographs, the Germans weremade to believe that the main invasion that they knew to be immanent would occur across theChannel at the narrowest point at the Pas-de-Calais. In fact, what the Germans were seeing intheir aerial photographs were empty tents, dummy oil storage takes, dummy parked aircraft andinflatable dummy tanks, all of which looked quite real from the air. The deception also includedsomething rather new to warfare, the use of extensive and deceptive radio traffic by elements of

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Pattons phantom army. [fas.org. 1996.]

Visualization

Beyond just the presence of these key terrain features, a commander must be able tovisualize, that is, to read the text as it might play out in a future battle. This visualization is theunfolding in the commanders minds eye of the unfolding of the conflict over time (one dimension)in the volume of operations (three dimensions). The ability to visualize this is a key element of terrain analysis at all four levels. For instance, in the movie, The Last Samurai, four assassinsconfront Tom Cruises character. [Zwirk E. 2003] The film visually demonstrates the movementshis character will use to engage and defeat the assassins. At first confusing to the viewer, uponreflection, it provides a startlingly vivid demonstration, for which a cinematographic presentation isparticularly apt, of this visualization process.

In a literary example, Alexander the Great tells a pupil:You ask, How long did it take to fashion the battle plan for Gaugamela? I have known it since I was seven. It has played before my eyes a thousand times. I have

seen this plain in my drams; I have imagined Dariuss order. This battle I have fought inimagination all my life. Nothing remains but to live it out in flesh. [Pressfield S. 2004. p 210.]

This visualization is a playing out of the possible battle in the minds eye of the commander.When resources (meaning, mostly, time) permit, the commander can game the battle withmembers of his staff. War gaming is now an accepted part of training for commanders andtroops. [Duggan W. 2005.] The serialized movie, Band of Brothers, admirably demonstrates thetraining in terrain analysis that went into the preparations of the airborne troops drops before D-day. [Frankel D, Hanks T dir.2001.] They used a sand board or terrain board, which was a three-dimensional topographic scale model of their landing area and its surroundings.

More recently, visualization has been discussed in relation to tank warfare. The difficultyfaced by tankers buttoned up in a tank is visualizing the battlefield outside the tank. Originallythe visualization required a tank commander to mentally picture a two dimensional plane outsidehis tank that might include mine planted in his path, infantry in the area, including antitank gunnersbut principally the positions of enemy tanks. Recently, however, this visualization must includethe airspace above the area of operations, which might contain enemy tactical aircraft such asground attack airplanes and attack helicopters. [Madsen E, Lewis H. 1994.]

Syntagmatic and Paradigmatic Analysis

If terrain analysis is reading a text, the text must consist of some language. This languagedoes indeed exist, consisting of paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes.[Greimas AJ, Courtes J. 1979. Chandler D. 2002 p79-92.]

Syntagmatic Axis

For traditional military terrain, the syntagmatic axis consists of the three dimensionalvolume surrounding the set of planes tangent to the surface of the earth. This volume usuallytakes the form of a rectangular solid consisting of: the area of operations defining the twodimensions parallel to the surface tangents and the third dimension defined by the lowest

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elevation of the deepest depression and the greatest elevation of the highest elevation in the areaof operations. This volume has nevertheless traditionally been depicted on a two dimensionalpaper sheet called a map. Variations in the third dimension, that is, in the depression-elevationaxis, has been depicted on the two-dimensional as sheet as isometric lines on the map depictingdepressions and elevations. More recently, since the advent of airpower, the syntagmatic axishas changed to a full-fledged three-dimensional volume, containing the airspace above the area of

operations. This can only be reasonably depicted by computer representations of the area of operations, of which more, later.

Naval operations have had a two dimensional syntagmatic axis for some time. However,the axis changed gradually from planar surfaces essentially next to coastlines to curved twodimensional manifolds representing the surfaces of the oceans and seas. With the advent of thesubmarine, the naval syntagmatic axis changed to a true three-dimensional volumes, the topsurface of which was the surface of the oceans and seas. The volume of the syntagmatic axisextended below the two-dimensional manifold of the traditional syntagmatic axis. With the later advent of marine airpower, the three dimensional volume was extended above the traditional twodimensional manifold

Paradigmatic Axis

There are multiple elements in the paradigmatic axis. The first element of the paradigmaticaxis consists of terrain features. It is the all those features that occur within the polygon of thearea of operations. Any of the features from the sets listed under What a terrain text consists ofabove can be on the first paradigmatic axis. This axis should be thought of as the buildingblocks of the terrain that, when assembled, form the terrain in the area of operations. For example, it might contain three hills situated just so, a stream running between the first two hillsthat forms a valley, and a plane north of the hill. Note that the example occupies a volume sincethe hills have elevation and the stream has depth. This first paradigmatic axis does not contain

any enemy troops, not yet, anyway, but it may contain things such as the minefield for example,that the enemy may have put there to inhibit movement.

The second element of the paradigmatic axis consists of enemy and friendly troopsandnowadays, civilians and journalistsin their particular units, with their particular weapons. Thiselement of the paradigmatic axis includes the added dimension is time. It is this military interpretation of the terrain that gives the terrain features their meaning. As noted above, theterrain features have no meaning in a semiotic system independent of the interpretation.

This is what a commander and his staff do when they look at terrain with from a militarypoint of view. They consider the type of operation they have in mind: attack, defend, where and

when, advance to contact, withdrawal from contact, when and in what direction. They conceive of where their troops might be or move on the terrain and where the enemy troops might be or moveon the terrain. The utilization of the second element of the paradigmatic axis of the terrainanalysis consists of examples of playing out the battle over time; how the various types of troopunits will move, where the bottlenecks would be, where the possible ambushes might occur,where are the lines of supply and evacuation, and where the critical areas, the Schwerpunckte(concentration points) are and how they will be attacked. A good commander and staff can runthrough these like videos playing. They play until a problem occurs, then they back up and play adifferent version to see what its outcome will be.

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Of course, these all play out in the commanders mind and those of his staff. By talkingthese movements out before the battle (they usually use maps to demonstrate their ideas, or morerecently, computerized graphic systems, of which more later) the commander can deal withproblems during the battle, at least those he can foresee. Once the battle commences for real,the commander and his staff have only limited knowledge of how the objects in the secondelement of the paradigmatic axis move. It is something like a director of a theatrical production;

indeed, an interesting comparison could be made between the military commander and thedirector of a play. Recently, with the concepts of so-called Net-centric warfare, commandershave a much sought-after ability to intimately know what is happening in the second element of the paradigmatic axis. Of course, this will go hand in hand with their ability to meddle in theconduct and actions of their subordinates, the soldiers actually doing the fighting.

This interpretation is critically dependent on the technology, and resources that thecommander has available to him. He must consider if his transport is sufficient for the movementhe envisions. For example, Napoleon and his staff conceived of crossing Germany verydifferently than did Patton in WWII. Or can the commanders engineers breach the obstacles inthe time allowed? Napoleon had to plan for and execute his crossing of the Neiman during his

retreat out of Russia in dramatically different ways than the US and British engineers planned andexecuted crossing rivers in WWII using the prefabricated Bailey bridge. Terrain features that mighthave been considered barriers in ancient times are no long such impregnable obstacles for modern forces, such as those with the vertical assault capabilities of airborne or helibornetroops. Warfare in urban areas and its particular terrain analysis has recently come into the foreas has terrain considerations of political importance. Modern terrain analysis also entertainsmedical aspects of the terrain, such as indigenous disease vectors, average temperature, etc.

The interpretation a commander makes also has considerations that are independent of thetechnology available to him, and have therefore remained the same throughout the ages. Theseare the considerations of training and morale, both of his own and allied forces and those of his

enemy. While these intangibles are difficult to measure and impossible to see in and of themselves, they exert a profound influence of the course of any battle. A good commander willknow how his troops fare in these regards and will factor this into any reading he does of theterrain.

Reading the old classics

Some literary works are called classics. They get read over and over again. Their popularity continues for ages. Examples are the Bible and Euclids Elements. So to, somepieces of terrain qualify as classics because they have been read, that is analyzed and foughtover for centuries. The premier example of such a piece of terrain is the Jezreel valley in the

middle east. One of the first recorded accounts of terrain analysis occurs in the description of theBattle of Megiddo, the Armageddon of the Bible. In fact, it probably wasnt the first battle at thatplace, but it was one of the first to be recorded in the Bible and elsewhere. A famous modernbattle there occurred in WWI, when the British, Australians and Arab irregulars under Allenbydefeated the Turks. Apparently, Allenby knew the particular pass that Pharaoh Thutmose III usedto defeat the Canaanites three and a half millennia earlier. This operational battle culminated inthe fall of the Turkish Empire in that area. The most recent battles in the area were during theArab-Israeli wars. This area, then, has seen over thirty battles, where the soldiers used weaponsranging from bronze axes, archery, large cavalry charges to modern tanks. [Cline EH. 2000 p19-30.]

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Another classic in terrain analysis is the cockpit of Europe. [Brewers Dictionalry.] Thisdubious distinction has be bestowed upon Belgium since it has been the site of so many battlesfrom the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. It has seen the marching and countermarching of Spanish Tercios, the cavalry of Louis XIII and Louis XIV, Marlboro and later on the attacks of Germans in both world wars. One other area should be mentioned as a classic piece of terrain,

Kawanakajima in Japan. In this small valley and surrounding area, two Samurai warlords foughtno less that five battles, although some were not large battles, in less than eleven years between,1553 and 1564. [Turnbull S. 2003.]

Four Levels of Size

Four levels or hierarchies of warfare are considered in this essay. These four levelscorrespond roughly to the size of the conflict in terms of number of men involved, roughly to thesize of the area of operations, and again, very roughly to the duration of the battles involved.These are the contexts of reading the texts of military terrain. They are: individual, tactical,operational and strategic. They are present below, with some examples taken from military

literature and military cinema.

Individual

At the individual level, the terrain analysis includes the terrain features listed above, but italso includes aspects of martial arts. To that extent, the context includes a diachronic analysis of the opponents past performance. Individual contests may last from seconds to a couple of hours

One of the best examples of individual terrain analysis is a scene in The Seven Samurai.The scene shows a prospective recruit approaching the open doorway of an inn. Kurasawa,1954. The leader of the group, seated inside an inn, has positioned an assistant out of sight of the

recruit, who is to ambush the recruit as he enters. One recruit enters and instantly disarms theassistant. Another recruit, having spotted something amiss, stops short before entering thedoorway, saying simply, No jokes, please! In both instances, the individual combatant effectivelyanalyzed the terrain by executing a coup doeil. Another instance in the same movie occurs whenthe leader is watching a match between a prospective recruit, a true master of the sword as itturns out, and a samurai who has challenged the master swordsman to a duel. After only a littleposturing of the two duelists, merely some shifting of stance, the leader exclaims to hiscompanion, Its so obvious! The leader has read the capabilities of the two duelists by viewingonly a few of there movements.

Numerous martial arts movies demonstrate individual terrain analysis, which is almost

exclusively an analysis of the opponent. The examples are legion. The Kung Fu Flick revels inacrobatic displays to demonstrate the mastery of the heros ability to read the terrain and hisopponent, at an unbelievable level. As a personal note, I can relate that training for competition inmartial arts involves learning to read the opponent and find his/her weaknesses and how theytelegraph their attacks. As a simple example, a competitor who keeps his guard low might bevulnerable to an ax kick coming from above, an area that is often poorly guarded and difficult tosee. Another example is the maxim that one should circle and move to the right if the opponenthas a strong weapon on his right side. This moves one away from the opponents strength.

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The tactical level of battle extends from the squad to battalion level, which correspondsroughly from five to 500 combatants. This is the area of expertise of the company grade officersand NCOs. The areas of terrain involved are usually not more that a few square miles and often

just a few hundred square yards. Occasionally these areas can extend to many miles, such as inan air battle. Indeed, the context of an air battle is best thought of as a volume, since altitude canbe a key factor in such a contest. The temporal context of tactical conflicts may be a few minutes,

such as the clash of two Hoplite phalanxes in the Peloponnesian Wars to some hours or days,such as the company-sized battles that took place in the Battle of the Bulge. [Hanson V D. 2005.Frankel D, Hanks T dirs. 2001.]

One of the best examples of reading a tactical defensive terrain text is offered in the movie,the Seven Samurai . Here, the leader makes a reconnaissance of the village he plans to defendand makes a rough schematic map of the area and its surroundings showing avenues of enemyapproach and natural and man-made obstacles. He determines what weaknesses he has andhow to fix them by building obstacles. He assigns areas of responsibility for different parts of theterrain, and makes sure his lieutenants and men know their areas.

During the Napoleonic Wars, experienced battalion officers became adept at reading theterrain in the no-mans-land between two opposing armies. Typically, both sides would send outskirmishers, soldiers sent out in pairs in front of the lined-up battalions in an attempt to break upthe opposing line of soldiers. Brent Nosworthy cites de Bracks Cavalry Outpost Duties, By theheight of the Napoleonic Wars, veteran officers confronted with enemy skirmishers in front of their defensive lines would sometimes drive away these skirmishers simply to observe their retreat and use this same method to evaluate the terrain behind the skirmishers initial position. [NosworthyB. 1996.] Reading the subtleties of the terrain between the two opposing lines of soldiers thatcould hide or break up the attacking line as it approached the defending one was of vitalimportance in the deadly game played by Eighteenth Century infantry commanders.

A superb example of reading terrain in an offensive is presented in the serialized movie,Band of Brothers. [Frankel D, Hanks T dirs. 2001.] In the second episode, CPT Winter attacksa battery of German howitzers, firing on the D-day beachhead. He quickly reads the terrain, formshis operational plan and executes it in what was to become literally a textbook operation.

Operational

The operational level involves units of divisional and corps level. This can include from10000 to 100000 combatants and perhaps hundreds of square miles. Such conflicts can lastfrom hours to many days, as in the case of the maneuver warfare of Marlboro and Eugene in theearly Eighteenth Century. The name operational art is a recent one; even as late as Napoleonic

times it was called Grand Tactics. [Nosworthy B. 1996.]

Difference between operational and strategic is somewhat nebulous. The sizes consideredare not rigidly fixed. For instance, a battle of the late Middle Ages, such as Bosworth Field couldinvolve some 15000 men on each side. At that time, the battle had strategic significance. Amodern battle involving a similar number of men, say, a mechanized battle in WWII, would only beconsidered as an operational battle, yet it could involve a much larger area of operations. Itseven more complicated than that. For example, considered by size of units involved, the racebetween Bluechers Prussians and Grouchys French to the main battlefield of Waterloo was anoperational one. [Grouchy disregarded an old maxim of the time in not marching to the sound of

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the guns that were blazing away in the distance at Waterloo. In effect, he misread the acousticsigns of the battle.] A quote attributed to Wellington at the time, Night or the Prussians willcome. The Prussians did come; Bluecher won the operational race to give Wellington thestrategic victory. [Wikipedia: Waterloo. Wikiquote: Wellington.]

At the battle of Jena-Auerstaedt, Napoleon split his force, keeping his larger force at Jena

to engage what he considers to be the major Prussian force under Hohenlohe, leaving MarshallDavout at Auerstaedt to simply hold off a smaller Prussian force under Brunswick. As is turnedout, Napoleon routed the smaller force. But Davout, outnumbered over two to one, held hisposition, and with the arrival of troops under Bernadotte, finally repulsed the Prussians. This is arare example of Napoleon misreading of the terrain text, that is, where the greater enemy forcewas, due to faulty reconnaissance. Fortunately for Napoleon, Davout, the Iron Marshal, was inhis usual form. [Hathornthwaite PJ. 1990 p27-32.]

Perhaps one of the finest and most significant readings of terrain occurred in the AmericanCivil war. At Gettysburg, the Kentuckian BG Buford was a Union cavalry commander making areconnaissance of the area. He correctly realizes the value of high ground commanding the area

of operations. John Barratt writes of Buford, He immediately appreciated the significance of thehigh ground to the north, west and south of the town, This is as good a description of anoperational coup doeil as ever was given. [Barratt J. 2001.] In the manner of the Union cavalry atthat time, his troopers dismounted, deployed as infantry and seized the critical terrain. In themovie Gettysburg, Bufords commander congratulates him on his initiative. This is good ground,very good ground. Maxwell RF. 1993. BG Buford was justifiably pleased with his good reading of the terrain. This is also an illustration of the difficulty in distinguishing the operational level fromthe strategic level of battle. Had the Confederate forces won the battle and seized Washington,the battle would have proved to be a strategic Confederate victory. As it was, the Confederacywent on to fight for two more years after losing the battle of Gettysburg.

Strategic Strategic battles involve the highest levels of military commitments in manpower, logistics,

areas and time. The context here is one of Armies and Theaters of war. They involve hundredsof thousands of men, in significant portions of entire continents and may last for months. Whilehigh-ranking military commanders retain responsibilities for the conduct of operations in strategicbattles, leaders of countries are involved in the planning and coordination of these battles. Entirestaffs of planners read the terrain of strategic battles.

The land and see feature of terrain reading for strategic battles is generally straightforward,being well known in most cases. What needs to be learned by commanders are the dispositionsof the enemy, the future weather, which is hard to predict, and the medically relevant conditions in

the area of area of operations. Water obstacles almost always play a part in reading the terrain of strategic battles, so the commander must usually plan for amphibious or riverine operations.Politics plays a major role in strategic battles, both the support given commanders by their countries and allies and the cohesiveness of the enemy and his allies. Commanders of strategicforces must learn to read the minds, psyches and political will of their superiors and allies everybit as much as they read the terrain held by the enemy.

Examples of strategic battles are numerous. The Allied invasion of Europe in WWII is aprime example. The soviet Russians wanted the opening of a second front in Europe proper inorder to relieve pressure on them in the east. The western allied political leaders had to weigh

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that with the fact that such an operation would allow large areas of Eastern Europe to fall under Soviets hegemony. Having agreed to such an invasion and with Herculean preparations doneweeks beforehand, the actual point of decision came when Eisenhower had to decide if theweather would be acceptable for the operation. He read the weather, decided to take the risk andinvade Europe on 6 June 1944. [Encyclopedia Britannica Online: D-day.] Another strategic battlewas the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans attacked in the west, hoping to gain ground and time to

force the western allies into negotiations. Such a strategy was probably invalid from the start. Inthe event, the German leaders misread the political will and military power of America. [Wikipedia:Battle of the Bulge.]

Since strategic battles almost always occurred for significant durations of time, certainaspects of terrain attain higher significance for the strategic operations than for the lower levels of conflict. For instance, logistical considerations for strategic battles are considerably morecomplicated that they are for, say, tactical operations. One aspect that is often overlooked,especially by some of the earlier military writers, is the medical aspect of the terrain involved.Until the last century or so, strategic operations have involved larger numbers of casualties fromdisease than from enemy action. Historically, the greatest advances in maintaining fighting

efficiency of combatants in the longer terms of strategic battles have been the advances madeand implemented in field hygiene. As an example, Napoleon lost more troops to typhus in hisinvasion of Russia than he did to Russian combat activity. Nowadays, commanders know themedical environment in their area of operations, including temperature maxima and minima,endemic diseases and their vectors, any preexisting areas of toxic substances and the like.[Personal communication and training,1986.]

PART II Map reading

A map is a two-dimensional, scale representation of the three dimensions near the surfaceof the earth. The edges of the map and the map sheet itself form the syntagmatic axis of theterrain to be read. The terrain features, both natural and man-made, form the first paradigmaticaxis written on the map. This latter includes the contours of equal elevation with notations of their altitude, water features, road, railways, cities etc. The second paradigmatic axis of the mapconsists of the symbols designating enemy and friendly forces.

The symbols of both elements of paradigmatic axis are iconic. [Chandler D. 2002.] In thecase of both examples, the map symbols are chosen in such a way as to be mnemonics of theterrain feature or military object they represent. Modern military maps use a standardized color coding for objects: water is blue, roads and paths are black, iso-elevation lines are green andother man-made objects such as towers and buildings are black.

The second paradigmatic axis is usually depicted on the military map as a map overlay.This is a clear acetate sheet literally laid on top of the map on which friendly and enemy forces aredrawn with a grease pencil. Friendly forces are shown in blue or black while enemy forces areshown typically in red. The overlay allows easy erasure with a cloth of units while preserving thepaper map underneath it. This is necessary as the units move from one position to another, but italso allows the staff to plot update knowledge, intelligence, as it becomes known. If the type of aunit is not well-known, the units symbol is depicted dashed borders. The overall movement of aunit is shown with a big arrow; this can be the known movements of enemy or friendly units, or itcan be the anticipated movement of a unit as in a planned attack.

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Sometimes, the military map consists of an aerial photograph. In this case, theparadigmatic axes are photographic in nature. These are very useful because they give the exactrelative positions of objects on the ground and thus the distances between them, and they can bethe most up-to-date information about the positions of friendly and enemy forces. Their bigdrawback is that they are difficult to read and require a great deal of experience to do so.

The map is the written analogue of the conceptual terrain analysis. The map holds thesame relation to terrain analysis as writing does to speech.

map : terrain analysis :: writing : speech

The diachronic history of the two pairs is similar, although the history of terrain analysis/mapreading occurred much later than did speech/writing. Written language occurred long after speechand in a variety of different ways. So too, map reading occurred much later than terrain analysis.

Maps exhibit different forms of semiotic modes. Chandler notes that,

A map is indexical in pointing to the locations of things, iconic in representing the directional relations and distances between landmarks and symbolic in using conventional symbols thesignificance of which must be learned. [Chandler, 2002 p43.]

Different kinds of maps exhibit different degrees of these modes. For example, a threedimensional topographical map is indexical to a greater degree than a sheet map. A sand boxmilitary map in more indexical than a military map. In certain instances the indexical nature of themilitary map reaches startling levels. In the movie, Uncommon Valor, Gene Hackmans character constructs a full-scale model of the Vietnamese prison compound for his soldiers to practice their upcoming rescue mission of POWs. [Kotcheff T. 1983.] In this case, the terrain map and the realtarget of the mission differed only in exact the placement of the people, both friend and enemy,

within the two prison compounds.

Military maps are iconic to a higher degree than ordinary maps. [FM 21-26, 1966.] Militarymaps generally make use of the standard symbols used in the wider world of cartography.However, they differ from those civilian maps in that they contain the second paradigmatic axisof military specific symbols. These symbols are also iconic in that they are derived from variouspieces of military equipment that are used or at least were used historically, by the various typesof military unit the symbols depict. The basic symbol for any military unit is a long-base rectangle.The different type of unit is depicted by what is inside the rectangle. For instance, an infantry unitis depicted by a large X connecting the diagonals of the rectangle. This is reminiscent of thecrossed belts used by the infantrymen of the Enlightenment and Napoleonic periods. A cavalry

unit has one diagonal, symbolizing the baldric used by cavalrymen to suspend their swordscabbard. An artillery unit has a large filled in dot in the center of the rectangle symbolizing acannon ball. And when a new type of unit appears, iconic mode is preserved. For instance, ananti-aircraft artillery unit symbol is a filled in black ball under a circular arc, the latter representingthe umbrella of protection afforded by the unit from the enemy above. [Mouat T.] So militarysymbols are iconic to a much greater degree than written language.

(It is not true that ALL written languages are purely symbolic. That is, there is a written languagewhere the written signs used in the language are not completely arbitrary relative to the sounds of the language. The story goes thus. [Personal communication. 1990.] In order to increase the

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literacy of his kingdom, the late fifteenth-century king Sejong of Korea convened a committee of notable scholars. Thinking that the difficult ideographic Chinese characters were an impedimentto this goal, they decided to study other scripts. They hit upon the novel idea, traditionally after much drinking of so-ju, a powerful rice wine, of forming the characters of the syllabic script theywere developing to mimic the shape the mouth and the tongue take, when the speaker vocalizesthe sound of the character. Some other letters depict the shape of the mouth when the speaker is

viewed head-on. They ended up with essentially a syllabic script. This physical mnemonic isremarkably useful in teaching the written language to illiterates. While some of these must belearned, this mnemonic precludes the written Korean language Han-gul from being purelysymbolic.)

Some standard symbols used on military maps are depicted below.

Infantry Cavalry Artillery Antiaircraft Artillery

XX X ||| ||

The symbol for infantry is supposed to be reminiscent of the crossed baldrics sworn by XVIIIcentury infantry, one suspending the bayonet and scabbard and the other suspending thecartridge case. One diagonal depicts the single bandoleer of the cavalry. The black spot of theartillery represents a cannon ball, or the mouth of the cannon, and when artillery was latterly usedagainst aircraft, the umbrella was added to symbolize the protection offered by anti-aircraftartillery. The size of each unit is designated by the symbol above the units rectangle: XX =division, X = brigade, ||| = regiment, || = company. The mnemonic here is that certain

representations of the rank of a commander of the unit being depicted is similar to the size symbolof that unit. For instance, a division commander (XX for the division size symbol) wears two starsas his rank, while a Brigade commander, X for the brigade size symbol, wears one star as hisrank.

Military maps certainly have symbolic elements that must be learned. Despite thenumerous instances of the use of the iconic mode to facilitate learning, much of military mapreading requires learning the conventions. In fact, among military trainees of all type, classes inmap reading are anticipated with a certain dread. Good teaching methods help alleviate thisdread. The first element of the paradigmatic axis includes symbols for different types of man-made objects, different terrain features representing different elevations and natural objects,

symbols for proper directional orientation, etc. The second element of the paradigmatic axiscontains symbols for different types, sizes and positioning of friendly and enemy units, symbols for the immediately past movement of the units and other symbol. All of these symbols must belearned.

Military maps, as they are used in the field, contain diachronic elements of usage thatcivilian maps do not have. These are the movements and projected movements of both friendlyand enemy units. The normal usage was to have a map of the area of operations posted verticallyin the tactical Operations Center. Clear acetate overlays were lain over the map and tacticalsymbols drawn on them in grease pencil corresponding to the places where the units were

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thought to be positioned. Doubtful positions were drawn with broken lines, and even the time of posting, name of unit, size of unit were also drawn. Enemy units were drawn in red and friendlyunits in blue or black. As the units moved, their symbols on the acetate overlay were erased andredrawn in the their new position. Planned advances or withdrawals were depicted with largearrows in red or blue. I have seen planning sessions of regimental sized mock battles of theOPFOR at the National Training center at Fort Irwin, California. These planning sessions took

place around the map and overlay and were presided over by the commander and his chief of operations. The commander and his staff became experts in reading the terrain shown on themaps and planning their operations around them.

Below is a fictitious example of a planned attack on a small town in German during theNapoleonic Wars, rendered using modern military map symbols. The main operation is a cavalryattack by the two squadrons of French cavalry, charging between the river Oder and the townObergerode, designated by the dark arrow and cutting off a battalion of Prussian infantry.

17

River Oder

|||

Obergerode

O

||

|||

|||

|||

|||

|||

2 Lancier

17 Uhlan

|||

12 Cuir

|||

||

|||

15 Landeswehr Lande

15 Landewehr Landeswehr

9 pounder pounder

12 pounder

55 Ligne

55 Ligne

55 Ligne

|||

|||

|||

15 L

55 Ligne

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The non-military equivalent to the military use of maps is the use of maps by civil engineersin planning bridges, highways, train routes, air ports and the like. As might be expected, civilengineers have their own symbols. But there is and always has been, much overlap with themilitary map usage, since from the earliest times civil engineers have been employed as militaryengineers. Indeed, the first curriculum of the US military academy at West Point included the

training of officers for the army as civil engineers. Some of the earliest civil engineers to achievepersonal fame were military ones. The outstanding example of such is the celebrated Frenchmilitary engineer Vauban. [Faucherre N. 1991.] Graphic artists, painters and sculptors, who alsoearned some of their live making architectural drawings of military fortifications, include Da Vinciand Albrecht Duerer. [Hutchison JC. 1990.]

History of Military Cartography

The dating of the earliest maps in existence is a problematic exercise. Some researchersconsider that the earliest map dates from the seventh millennium BC. Maps certainly date from atleast Classical times. The uses of these maps were probably for commerce, navigation and law

enforcement. Specifically military uses of maps are somewhat more difficult to document. In thosetime past, however, the differences between trade and military enterprises may have been lessdistinct than they are today. [Wikipedia: Maps, Cartography, Military Cartography]

Cartography has probably been associated with its military uses since its invention. Not just as aids in exploration but also as aids in military planning, maps and map collections havebeen a part of military planners collection of tools for centuries. In a fictional work, StevenPressfield attributes the first use of maps for specifically military planning to Memnon of Rhodes, amercenary Greek commander under Darius III and later Alexander the Great. According to him,Memnon used maps to their fullest extent in the third century BC, every bit as much as a moderncommander would.

Memnon was the first field commander to use maps. In those days no one had heard of such a thing. To survey the ground was considered a debasement of the art of war. A general was supposed to know the field from his own reconnaissance or from reports of trusted officers,guides, or locals. To map it was cheating.

But Memnon went beyond surveying fields. He charted specific battlegrounds, not only those upon which armies had clashed in the past but also sites unknown to war, which might

prove hospitable at some subsequent time. He kept books of roads and streams, passes and heights and defiles; he plotted the length and breadth of Asia Minor down to footpaths and mountain tracks known only to goatherds. He surveyed sites suitable for camps, then studied theways by which each might be approached, supplied, or turned. Nor did he anticipate only victory.

For each camp he discovered how many columns could withdraw how quickly over which road or track; he even charted sites for ambuscades to cover the retreat he planned for. He recorded dates for the turning of the seasons and the risings and settings of the sun and moon. He know the days and nights length at any field across all Asia west of the Halys. He knew the day and date of the barley harvest in Phrygia, Lydia, Cilicia, and the site of every garner, with the names of the brokers who held them. Which rivers were in spate at what season? Could they be forded? Where? When he had completed a battles exercise from his own point of view, he ran it from thefoes. How could his brilliant dispositions be countered? What weaknesses had he left exposed? [Pressfield, 2004 p94-5.]

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There are large maps dating from the sixteenth century painted of the walls and ceilings insome buildings of the Vatican. The Vatican library also holds numerous maps dating from thattime and earlier. Louis XIV was known to have had a large map commissioned for his use and for that of his ministers. These maps were used for political and military purposes. Thecartographical wonder of the age was the map, twenty-four feet in diameter, which Giovanni Cassini and his aides drew in ink on the floor of the Paris observatory (c.1690), showing in precise

location, in latitude and longitude, of all the important places on the earth. [Durant W, Durant A.1963 p508.] As early as 1713, under Louis XIV, a corps engineers was established in France.Hubert Gautier wrote the first formal treatises in Europe (Traite des chemins, Traite de laconstruction des ponts) about roads and bridges, including maps of the roads. An excellent,detailed and modern-looking map exists of the road from Paris to Caen, dating from 1766.[Mesqui 1994.]

Modern warfare has seen an extensive development. During the Ancien Regime, theFrench Army instituted a corps of ingenieurs geographs in 1777. This corps was disbanded in1791 but was reconstituted by Napoleon in 1809. These officers surveyed terrain and producedmaps. [ Haythornthwaite 1988.] The Ordnance Surveys of Great Britain provided Victorian Great

Britain nearly complete representations of terrain that were used for defence planning in WWII.By the end of the twentieth century, the US Army maintained sophisticated capabilities to mapterrain using traditional surveys and satellite photographs. [Personal communication 1984-8.]

Beyond map reading: the electronic digital representation of the battlefield

The development of the map was completely transformed by the introduction of digitalrepresentations of terrain. The first implementation of digital technology for military terrainanalysis was probably the installation at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin California in thelate 1970s. In this state-of-the art military training system, each combat vehicle and some squadsof infantry are fitted with radio frequency transponders that can be used to place the transponder on a map of the area on a digital map in a facility called the Star Wars Building. As the vehiclesmove the transponders positions changes as they are triangulated by receivers sited on nearbymountain tops. These digital video displays can have alpha-numeric notations superimposed onthe views of the battlefield to represent friendly and enemy units. Commanders from the batallionlevel down, and trainers view the plots of their units movements in the area of operations.

This technology is currently used in battlefield simulation for training purposes. It is used intank simulators, both for training the tank commander, gunner and driver and in helicopter andaircraft (fixed wing and rotor) simulators for training pilots and gunners. The Army has developedvideo games designed to train new recruits and soldiers in their jobs as individual war-fighters.This is an inexpensive way of giving these soldiers experience in reading all axes of terrain and in

acquainting them with command and moral decisions they might have to make on the nextbattlefield.

More recently, this kind of technology has been considered for use in combat. The aim of the to provide seamless integration between the digital systems the soldiers and commanders usein training with those they use in combat. This integration will include integration of all necessaryinformation about the battlefield including position and status of enemy troops, vehicles andfortification, information about the nuclear, biological and chemical status of the terrain, weather conditions, etc. [Ashley J. 2006.] The ultimate capabilities of this technology were depicted in thescience fiction film Aliens. Each combat soldier had individual biological sensors and digital

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video feed back to the command center, where the squads officer was stationed. [Cameron J dir.1986.]

These systems depict the area of operations, complete with symbols for friendly and enemyunits on monitors in high resolution. These systems integrate intelligence from a number of sources, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, digital video feed from ground

vehicles and even individual soldiers and unattended ground sensors. The commanders at anumber of different levels can view this information and interact via video teleconferencing witheach other. Clearly, this has an impact, not necessarily all good, on the relationships betweenthese commanders of different levels. The availability of this information at so many levels willcertainly allow higher level commanders to micromanagement his subordinate commanders. Ageneral who can read the same computer-graphical terrain text as a lieutenant colonelcommander of a maneuver battalion will have to exercise self restraint and let the battalioncommander run his own battle. [Army Magazine Green Book 2006-2007 p328-32.]

Implications for Expertise as Semiotic Systems

If the message of this essay can be so painted with a very broad brush, it is that a militarycommander, as an expert, is capable of reading terrain and map texts. This broadly statedconcept can be extrapolated to any of the equivalent hypotheses:

*Any field of expertise forms a semiotic system.*In any field of endeavor that contains an expert or master also contains semiotic symbolrepresentation.*To be an expert is to be able to read a specialized semiotic text

The expertise considered as a semiotic system, could be natural or unnatural by thedefinition given above. [Greimas AJ, Courtes J. P287.]

An expert is a person who is very skillful or highly trained and informed in some specialfield. [Websters New world Dictionary. 1974.] So by this definition, the following is a list of experts:

*Martial artist*18 th Century Sailing Master *phone based credit authorizer *the blast furnace operator god in Japan*Refractionist, someone who determines a spectacle prescription*reading a visual field to detect changes indicative of Glaucoma

In each case in the above list, the expert reads a text, and the text is not the usual text of verbalization or written script. In each case, the text is different to any of the others, and theexpert gains his expertise in reading the text through specific, extensive training and experience.The expert does this text reading better than an arbitrary person off the street, so the function isindeed an expertise. Each area of expertise listed above begs a proving essay, similar to this oneabout military terrain analysis and map reading, to formally demonstrate that each caseconstitutes a semiotic systems.

This connection of expertise with semiotic system leads to a formulation of machine20


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semiosis via the semiotic systems used by experts. This linkage takes the following form:

Theorem of Machine Semiosis

IF: A certain semiotic system forms an expertise

AND: Said expertise can be automated into an expert system, using, perhaps an expertsystem shell, knowledge engineer and a domain expert. [Madsen et al. 1991; p116-

21.]

THEN: The semiotic system has a representation, or model in the formal mathematicalsense, as an expert system. The machine running the expert system is using asemiotic system

As a demonstration of the possibility of machine semiosis, consider the list above of areasof expertise. Which of them can be implemented as an expert system? The martial artist iscertainly an expert, but his expertise cannot readily be implemented, at least with the current state

of robotics, into an expert system. A training system might help in his training, but the immediacyof his expertise is not amenable to expert systems, because coding an opponents signs is not fastenough to be valuable in an actual contest.

It is slightly different in the case of the 18 th century sailing master. The signs of wind andwater used to sail, say a three-mast frigate like the constitution, could indeed be coded by atechnician into such an expert system, and rapidly enough to be useful. However, the need for such expertise is now so low that development of such a system is not likely.

When a person uses a credit card, a system is queried that grossly checks to see if theinformation on the card is valid; is there really such an account, is it open, does the name match

the number and so on. In fact such expertise has been automated to an expert system, and is inuse by the American Express company. It is called the Authorizers Assistant, and can handle 25-30 percent of American Express credit advisor traffic.[ Feigenbaum E, et al. 1988 p105-114.]

The Nippon-Kokan Ironworks in Japan employed ah human expert to operate a giant blast

furnace. He read such signs as size of the furnaces load, temperature and color of the moltenmetal, pressure of the air/oxygen blast, etc. But a problem arose when their expert, referred to asgod was about to retire. To preserve the expertise of god the company developed an expertsystem that had an initial reliability of 85%, which was later raise to 93%. [Feigenbaum E et al.1988 p158-161.]

A refractionist is someone who determines a patients spectacle prescription. In the UnitedStates, a refractionist must be either an optometrist or ophthalmologist. These are experts of adoctorate level. The expertise consists of a set of numbers determined by the expert usingvarious ophthalmic tests and of other data, such as the patients goals, medical and familialhistories, etc. In a demonstration of the usefulness of expert systems, this expertise has beshown capable of being captured by an expert system.[Madsen et al.1991 p621-9.]

In the ophthalmic disease glaucoma, there changes in a patients ability to perceive theperiphery of vision. The expert reads the visual field that is printed on paper, as a pattern of the

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patients loss of her normal field of vision. While the diagnosis of glaucoma is a complex process,there are certain visual field changes that are characteristic of glaucoma. (Alas, the other directionof the implication doesnt hold; that is, there are glaucomas that can cause uncharacteristicchanges of the visual fields.) A demonstration expert system was constructed that was able todetect characteristic glaucomatous visual field changes. This expert system could detectcharacteristic visual field changes and reject non-glaucomatous visual field changes. Within the

domain established in this study, the investigators showed that at least part of the glaucomadiagnosis process can be automated. [Madsen EM, Yolton RL. 1994 p553-6.]

John Deely posits the possibilities of zoosemiotics and anthroposemiotics. [Deely J. 1990.]As a further extension of the realm of semiosis, one can ask: are machines capable of semiosis?If the Theorem of Machine Semiosis is correct, then machines, at least those machines withsoftware capable of running expert systems, are capable of semiosis. For example, some chessgame playing software, notable Big Blue, function as true experts of the game. Within the contextof chess expertise, this machine/software would be capable of semiosis.

One concern of the of the well foundedness of the definition presents itself in the case of

some machine semiosis. The Theorem of Machine Semiosis might be true only if one assumesthat the machine is able to derive meaning from the sign relationship. This may force a restrictionon the very definition of machine semiosis: that definition of machine semiosis is only definedwhere there is an end user of the expert system, a human, available to interpret the meaning of the results given by the expert system. A corollary of the theorem would be that the knowledgeengineers making these expert systems are, in fact, working semioticians.

Summary

Using a wide variety of media, including books, movies, internet articles, personalexperiences and conversations, I have demonstrated that military terrain analysis and military mapreading form a semiotic system consisting of sets of signifiers and signifieds. The semiotic systemoccurs at all four levels of military engagement and demonstrates the classical features of semiotic systems, including paradigm and syntagm, and deception and errors of text reading. Thevisual terrain analysis has a written script in the form of map reading.

Military terrain analysis and map reading are done by experts. An extension of this fact isthat ANY field of expertise forms a semiotic system, that is, a set of specialized texts, read by theexperts of that field. Secondly, some expertise (though not necessarily these two) can beautomated in the form of computerized expert systems. Extrapolating these ideas, one can askthe general question, within the context of meaning for a machine as an expert system being usedby a human: is a semiotic system of a field of expertise capable of being modeled as an expert

system, a form of machine semiosis? In some cases the answer is yes.

References

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Greimas AJ, Courtes J. Semiotics and Language, An Analytical Dictionary 1979. The Universityof Indian Press, Bloomington. p287.

Greimas AJ, Courtes J. 1979 p58.

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Pressfield S. The Virtues of War 2004; Doubleday, New York.

Barthorp, Michael. Marlboros Army 1702-11 1980. Osprey Publishing, London; p17.

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