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The Russian conquest of the BukharanEmirate: military and diplomaticaspectsA.M. Malikova

a Independent researcher, Samarkand, UzbekistanPublished online: 27 May 2014.

To cite this article: A.M. Malikov (2014) The Russian conquest of the Bukharan Emirate: militaryand diplomatic aspects, Central Asian Survey, 33:2, 180-198, DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2014.916110

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2014.916110

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The Russian conquest of the Bukharan Emirate: military and diplomaticaspects

A.M. Malikov*

Independent researcher, Samarkand, Uzbekistan

This article examines the history of Russian conquest of Bukhara, with special reference tomilitary and diplomatic aspects. From the beginning of the Russian advance into the region,relations between Russia and Bukhara had several peculiarities, but were characterizedabove all by mutual incomprehension. In my view, the main obstacle to the development ofrelations lay in the different understandings the two sides had of the nature of a peaceagreement or treaty. In this paper I try to shed light on some questions arising from themilitary conflict between the Emirate of Bukhara and Russia in the interpretations ofRussian military historians and Bukharan chronicles of the period. The focus is on acomparative analysis of the military capabilities of the Bukharan Emirate and Russia, thedifferences in weapons technology between these two powers, the links between the Russianadvance in the region and the domestic and foreign policy of the Bukharan emir, Muzaffar,the situation in the emirate, and the use of Islamic ideology as a mobilizing force for thepopulation in opposition to Russian expansion.

Keywords: Bukharan Emirate; Russian Empire; Irjar; Chupan Ata; Samarkand; Zirabulak; war

Introduction

One of the most heavily debated problems in the study of the history of Central Asia is that of therelations of local polities with Russia in the period of the latter’s advance into the region. Manydifferent approaches can be taken to the analysis of this question, but one crucial factor is the dif-ferering perspectives provided by Russian and local sources, with the latter being very underusedin existing historiography. In this paper I try to shed light on some questions arising from the mili-tary conflict between the Emirate of Bukhara and Russia in the interpretations of Russian militaryhistorians and Bukharan chronicles of the period.

The history of the Russian conquest of the Emirate of Bukhara was analysed by someresearchers during the Soviet period (Simonov 1940; Abdullaev 1946; Saidkulov 1966;Carrère d’Encausse 1967; Mackenzie 1969), although the work of Soviet scholars sufferedfrom ideological constraints, and that of Western historians from a lack of access to primarysources. The years since Uzbekistan’s independence in 1991 have seen the publication of thework of H. Ziyoyev (1998) and other historians on the war between Bukhara and Russia (Uzbe-kistonning yangi tarikhi 2000) and on the military structures of the emirate (Shukurillaev 2006).In his monograph, Ziyoyev analysed various sources – mainly Russian, Khoqandi and Tashkentauthors – on the Russian conquest of Central Asia, including the Bukharan Emirate. However,there are still many questions requiring separate scrutiny. One of the reasons for the success ofthe Russian forces was military superiority, and in this article I focus on details of the differencesin military forces and tactics between the two sides. Unlike previous research, this article makesuse of both Bukharan chronicles and Russian archival sources, which allows a better

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*Email: azim_malikov@yahoo.com

Central Asian Survey, 2014Vol. 33, No. 2, 180–198, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2014.916110

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understanding of events from several different points of view. I pay particular attention to the pos-ition of local political and religious leaders, who followed their own interests in ways that oftenhelped to damage Russian–Bukharan relations.

In this paper the focus is on a comparative analysis of the military capabilities of the Bukharanemirate and Russia, the differences in weapons technology between these two powers, the linksbetween the Russian advance in the region and the domestic and foreign policy of the Bukharanamir, Muzaffar, the situation in the emirate, and the use of Islamic ideology as a mobilizing forcefor the population in opposition to Russian expansion.

In this article I also develop a new periodization of Russian–Bukharan conflict. I examine thefrequently changing and contradictory policy of the Bukharan government towards Russia, whichwas closely linked with the Russian advance and diplomacy in Central Asia. The first stage wasfrom June 1865 (conquest of Tashkent) to May 1866 (battle of Irjar); the second stage, from May1866 (fall of Khujand and Djizakh) to May 1868 (battle of Chupan Ata); and the third stage, May–June 1868 (conquest of Samarkand and uprising of the population; battle of Zerabulak; defeat ofBukharans and further local resistance).

The facts as presented by different sources often contradict each other when it comes to theinterpretation of events, or even chronology. Because of this, in some cases different versions ofthe same events arise, and a very complex and unclear picture emerges. Unfortunately, unlike theRussian sources, those written by Bukharan authors often fail to comment on important details ofsome events, although they do help us to understand the motivations of some of the leading andmost influential figures of the Bukharan elite in their dealings with the Russians (or at least theirsubjective opinions on this). For the history of the Russian conquest of Bukhara I have used thefollowing sources.

In the first category are the writings of Bukharan chroniclers, principally Ahmad-i Donish and‘Abd al-‘Azim Sami, and the reminiscences of Samarqandi and Bukharan eyewitnesses, as noteddown by the writers L.Kh. Khokhriakova (Simonova) and M.G. Bogdanov. These few sources areparticularly valuable because they complement each other, filling gaps in each other’s narratives,and because to some extent they illuminate internal events in the emirate during the Russian con-quest. Some have already been analysed by researchers (Epifanova 1959; Gross 1997). They canalso be fleshed out with facts drawn from the historians of the Khoqand Khanate and Tashkent,although this is something that requires further research. Unfortunately, no local archive of thegovernors (hakems or beks) of the Bukharan provinces of Djizakh and Samarkand seems tohave survived, or at any rate they have not yet been brought to light. Some later Bukharan histor-ians also attempted to briefly describe relationships between the Bukharan Emirate and Russia(Ayni 1975; Mirza Salimbek 2009).

The second category of sources is that of military history. These works are based on archivalsources, printed materials and the personal experiences of the authors in the regions under study.Amongst these works we find many written by officers who took part in the campaigns them-selves, such as A.N. Kuropatkin, L.F. Kostenko, M.A. Terent’ev, M.V. Lyko, K.S. Cherkasov,E. Voronets, A.K. Albedil and D. Ivanov. At times, their accounts contradict each other. Voro-nets’s memoirs are notable because he attempts to evaluate Bukharan military strength. Kuropat-kin’s unpublished memoirs, held in the Russian State Military-Historical Archive (RGVIA) inMoscow, are of particular interest. The most valuable sources are the comprehensive, three-volume history by Terent’ev, published in 1906 but begun in the 1870s, and the large collectionof documents published by A.G. Serebrennikov between 1908 and 1915. (Serebrennikov’s col-lection includes not just Russian materials but also letters from the amir of Bukhara.) For mostRussian participants and observers, then and later, a particularity of the conquest was that the ter-ritorial expansion of the Russian state into Central Asia could be justified through the imperialideology of Russia’s civilizing and enlightening mission. A whole series of Russian officers

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also invoked the competition between Russia and Britain in Asia as a key reason for the conquestof Central Asia, within the framework of the so-called Great Game.

The third category of sources are archival materials from the Central State Archive of theRepublic of Uzbekistan (TsGARUz), the scholarly archive of the State Museum of the Historyand Culture of Uzbekistan (GMIKUz), and RGVIA, which contain many valuable unpublisheddescriptions and eyewitness accounts. GMIKUz, for instance, contains notes on the army ofthe Bukharan Emirate, based on the testimony of former soldiers.

It is worth noting that in the Soviet period the term ‘uniting’ (prisoedinenie) – rather than‘conquest’ – was often used, as part of a generally very positive evaluation of the Russianadvance into the region. These works tend to emphasize the importance of Anglo–Russianrivalry, and the development of capitalism in Russia, leading to a growth of economic interestin the region (Simonov 1940; Khalfin 1965). They also note that Britain was interested in main-taining the Bukharan Emirate as a buffer state (Fioletov 1941, 74–75). Hopefully, this paper willdemonstrate instead the importance of a particular dynamic which grew out of Russian relationswith Central Asian peoples and states at the local level.

The military strength of the Emirate of Bukhara and the Russian Empire in the 1860s

The conflict between Russia and Bukhara took place during the reign of Amir Muzaffar (1860–1885), of the Uzbek Manghit dynasty. His father, Nasrullah (1827–1860), for fear of beingdeposed, never allowed his son to play any part in either government or military campaigns(Galkin 1868, 233). This may have had a significant effect on Muzaffar’s character and styleof government; the sources characterize him as an indecisive ruler during the conflict withRussia (Ayni 1975, 278).

The emirate of Bukhara was not very economically developed. It had a mixed population ofapproximately 2.5 million (Khanykov 1843, 77–78), consisting of a sedentary and semi-nomadicpopulation of Uzbeks, whose tribal elites made up much of the governing class; in addition tosedentary (and largely urban-dwelling) Tajiks, Shi’i ‘Irani’, Jews, Arabs, religious elites claimingArab descent, and nomadic Turkmen and Kazakhs. Bukhara was, in theory at least, a monarchy,with the amir sitting at the apex of power and the single fount of authority. In reality, although theBukharan state had seen some centralizing measures under Nasrullah and his predecessors, muchof its nominal territory was barely controlled by the central power, which also saw a weakening inthe first years of Muzaffar’s reign. Shahrisabz, Hissar and Ura-Tepe were effectively independentunder local rulers, in the first case Baba-Bek and Jura-Bek, both of whom came from the Uzbektribe of the Kenagas. Another potentially separatist group were the Khitay-Qipchaq tribes ofMiankal in the Zarafshan Valley, who had rebelled against Amir Haydar in the 1820s. Bukharanhistorians are often highly critical of Amir Muzaffar’s bureaucratic policies, which, they argue,saw the sacking of most of the officials who had served his father and their replacement withincompetents (Donish 1960, 36). Nevertheless, by comparison with its neighbours, Khoqandand Khiva, Bukhara was the strongest of the Central Asian states.

Bukhara’s military was in many respects little changed from medieval times: heavily relianton irregular cavalry levies and with primitive matchlock firearms. In the 1830s Amir Nasrullahhad initiated a series of military reforms (Troitskaia 1953), which saw the introduction ofregular infantry (sarbaz) and artillery trained by soldiers from Russia and Iran; but this wasnever wholly completed, and the reliance on cavalry and irregular levies from the Uzbek tribesremained (Galkin 1868, 201–211, 214–217). Under Amir Muzaffar military expenditure wascut, by comparison to his father’s reign (Donish 1960, 37). Bukhara’s military thus remainedpartly medieval in structure, technology and training, with some elements borrowed from neigh-bouring states. The battalions of regular infantry were mainly armed with matchlocks, and with

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pistols of antiquated construction, and even these could normally be issued only to soldiers in thefront rank. The rear ranks would only have pistols and pikes (Lyko 1871, 30). The pistols wereusually of English manufacture, but owing to a lack of ammunition and an inability to maintainthem, they would quickly become unusable (‘L.’ 1868, 41).

Under Amir Muzaffar the sarbaz infantry were divided into dasta (battalions of 1000 men, eachwith an officer called a sarkarda at its head), each made up of 5 baydaq – platoons of 200 men, eachunder the command of a yuzbashi (literally a commander of 100). These were divided into units of50 men, which in turn had two sections. The artillerymen (tupchi) were divided into two baydaqs of250 men. There was also the irregular cavalry (el-naukar), recruited from Uzbek tribal groups suchas the Manghit, Naiman and Sarai and divided into nine dastas of 150 men.1 The regular Bukharanmilitary was formed and recruited partly by voluntary enlistment and partly by forced conscription.The wages of the sarbaz infantry were not high, and they were often paid irregularly, resulting infrequent desertions. In time of war, the army was augmented through a popular levy. In addition,Amir Muzaffar made use of a small force of Afghans and could also call upon a few thousandTurkmen (Lyko 1871, 32–33). The majority of the sarbaz were Persian captives.

The commander-in-chief of the sarbaz infantry in the 1850s was the experienced ShahrukhKhan.2 On Amir Muzaffar’s accession, he was removed from his post and imprisoned. The com-mander of the artillery, ‘Ibadullah, and others were killed (Donish 1960, 86). From 1865, the com-mander of the Bukharan forces was one ‘Usman, who was a former uriadnik (corporal) of the UralCossacks who had deserted to Khoqand in the 1860s. Taken prisoner from Khoqand by theBukharans, ‘Usman, a Russian converted to Islam, agreed to instruct the Bukharan forces inRussian drill. He had the full confidence of the amir, and was against making peace withRussia (Lyko 1871, 30–31), not least because he would have been punished as a deserter.

Russian deserters from the artillery were also responsible for training Bukharan artillerymen.The Bukharan army had a motley collection of cannon of different calibres. The field artillery wasmostly in brass, some in cast iron, but of poor quality. Not all cannon could be adjusted for height,meaning that it was impossible to raise or lower the barrel. Russian specialists noted the low levelof development of the Bukharan artillery, which some described as ‘medieval’ in appearance (‘L.’1868, 37). According to eyewitness accounts, the Bukharan artillery fired poorly and was unableto hit a target even at a range of 100–150 sazhens (200–300 metres) (Galkin 1868, 220). The poorquality of Bukharan artillery compared with that of the Russians was acknowledged by the emi-rate’s own officials (Tatarinov 1867, 79); however, this was barely reflected in the military pol-icies of the Bukharan state.

The range and accuracy of Russian weapons meant that Russian soldiers could remain perma-nently out of range of the Bukharan matchlocks, so Russian losses were remarkably light. Themaximum range of a Russian rifle for a line regiment was 800 paces, and for a rifle regiment,1200. To fire accurately, a range of 500–600 paces was sufficient. The Bukharans needed to beno more than 200–300 paces away for their firearms to be effective (Ivanov 1896, 833–834).The Russian rocket batteries, which the Bukharans did not have at all, participated in almostall military campaigns. These would fire explosive and incendiary rockets into fortresses, provok-ing fire and destruction. The most experienced Russian soldiers were chosen for the Central Asiancampaigns. Russian military specialists noted the considerable difference between the Russianand Bukharan forces with regard to discipline and armament. Unlike in Russia, there were nospecialist military schools providing training for qualified military cadres.

The battle of Irjar and its consequences

Russia’s advance into the Central Asian region was connected to a number of different factors –geopolitical, economic, and also the desire to restore prestige after the debacle of the Crimean

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War. Russo–Bukharan relations at the beginning of the Russian advance did not develop immedi-ately. The main obstacle to the development of relations lay in the different understandings thetwo sides had of the nature of a peace agreement or treaty. Bukharan historians noted thatBukharan diplomacy was exceptionally inconsistent and lacking in essential know-how(Donish 1960, 58–59; Ayni 1975, 278). Russia also generously rewarded those officers stationedon the frontier for their success in the campaigns of conquest in Central Asia. This was particu-larly true (at least initially) of the first governor of the Turkestan oblast’, colonel M.G. Cherniaev,who took Tashkent, Central Asia’s largest city, by storm on 17 June 1865, and was promoted tomajor-general. At that time, a pro-Bukharan political group predominated among the city’s mili-tary and clerical elite (Iuzhakov 1881, 4–6). Some Khoqandi historians believed that the amir ofBukhara had a secret agreement with the Russians concerning the fate of Tashkent (Babajanov2010, 279). Cherniaev had been given the task of separating Tashkent permanently fromKhoqand and of ensuring that the city did not fall under Bukharan influence (Leer 1889, 472).With the fall of Tashkent, the first stage of the conflict between Russia and Bukhara began.

An embassy which had been sent to the tsar under Najmaddin Khwaja3 (who was chosenbecause under Amir Nasrullah he had successfully led an embassy to Alexander II in 1859) atthe end of July 1865 was detained at Kazalinsk. To this attempt by the amir to establish directrelations with the tsar, the governor-general of Orenburg responded that all negotiations withBukhara would be conducted through him (Pavlov 1910, 124). In October 1865 Cherniaev des-patched a Russian embassy to Bukhara, led by A. Glukhovskii and A. Tatarinov, with the task ofnegotiating a permanent peace settlement with the amir. However, the embassy was detained,according to Russian sources, because the amir was annoyed at the detention of his ownembassy, at the arrest of several Bukharan merchants, and at the proximity of Russian forcesto his territory. Bukharan sources have a different emphasis: according to Mirza ‘Abd al-‘AzimSami, after Cherniaev took Tashkent, a Russian envoy was sent to Bukhara from Tashkent, buthe was then detained. A portion of the ‘ulama (Muslim religious scholars) of the city thenbegan to urge the amir and the general population to launch a holy war ( jihad) against theRussian unbelievers (Sami 1962, 67b–68a). Cherniaev demanded that the Russian embassy beset free unconditionally. To secure this, and notwithstanding the protests of the amir, inJanuary 1866 he led a force of Russian troops towards Djizakh. Amir Muzaffar had already des-patched the Russian envoys to Samarkand on 7 February, and undertook to send them on toTashkent, on condition that he could sign a treaty with the tsar directly. Apparently, Muzaffarbelieved that a treaty signed by the tsar personally would be legal and stable. However, after Cher-niaev’s assault on Djizakh failed, the Russian envoys were once again imprisoned at Samarkand(Tatarinov 1867, 65, 74).

After these events, Cherniaev was recalled to Saint Petersburg, and in March 1866 he wasreplaced by general D.I. Romanovskii, a veteran of the Caucasus War. Cherniaev’s retreat fromDjizakh was interpreted as a disastrous defeat in Bukhara, and the amir once again demandeddirect negotiations with the tsar, proposing to establish the frontier along the Syr Darya (Sereb-rennikov 1915, 65–66, 105–106). The amir also authorized his local governors (beks) in the pro-vinces bordering Russian territory to engage in diplomatic exchanges with the Russian governorin Tashkent.

According to Russian sources, from the beginning of Cherniaev’s attack on Djizakh, there wasa renewal of military clashes with Bukhara in the form of attacks on Russian soldiers and com-munications along the frontier, which continued throughout winter and spring. Drawing on hisCaucasian experience, Romanovskii (1868, 52–53) considered that alongside an invitation topeace talks it was necessary to prepare for a decisive armed clash; anything else would betaken by the Bukharans as a sign of weakness. There is no doubt that Romanovskii did all hecould to weaken the position of Bukhara and strengthen Russian influence (Becker 1968, 32).

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In March–April 1866 Amir Muzaffar began to move his troops towards the Syr Darya. TheBukharans stationed themselves here in fortified positions, and according to Russian sources,began to stir up the population of Tashkent Province to holy war (Romanovskii 1868, 58). TheRussians believed that the Bukharans were probably preparing an attack on Russian territory.Talks with the Bukharan emissaries continued until the end of April but ended without result.At that time Romanovskii received reinforcements from western Siberia and the Syr Darya,and at the beginning of May his forces advanced against the fortified positions of the Bukharanarmy. The 8th of May 1866 saw a clash between the Russians and Bukharans at the Irjardepression near the Syr Darya. In the Bukharan chronicles it is known as the battle of Maidayul-gun (Sami 1962, 68b), after a local lake. The Bukharan forces were not under a single command:each bekwas with his own forces, and in some cases units were formed according to ethnic group:Uzbek, Turkmen or Persian. The beks of Shahrisabz stood apart from the battle and did not par-ticipate (Tatarinov 1867, 98). The commander of the Bukharans was the Irani Shir ‘Ali Inaq, whowas the brother of one of Amir Muzaffar’s wives and the bek of Samarkand.4 At Irjar theBukharan army suffered a crushing defeat, with heavy losses, in stark contrast to the Russianforces. The amir and the wounded Shir ‘Ali themselves ran from the field of battle, and Shir‘Ali was dismissed from his positions as commander-in-chief and bek of Samarkand (Tatarinov1867, 98, 99, 114) – though he would later be reinstated. The supporters of the war withRussia at Muzaffar’s court were punished by his order, and some of those, accused of collusionwith the Russians, were executed. There were also some supporters of peace with Russia at theamir’s court, notably a Tatar from Saratov, ‘Ali Muhammad Qarataev.5

The battle of Irjar marked the end of the first phase of Russo–Bukharan relations. As a resultof the victory at Irjar, Russian influence spread west of the Syr Darya. The attacks by Bukharanforces on Russian territory diminished, and the amir’s prestige suffered a significant blow. In thesenew circumstances, Romanovskii did not wait for instructions from Saint Petersburg (for whichhe would have had to wait 2–3 months) but directed his forces towards Khujand, which stood atthe crossroads of important routes linking Bukhara and Khoqand, at the mouth of the FerghanaValley. On 24 May 1866, after fierce resistance, Khujand was taken, despite the protests of theBukharan envoy, who insisted that because the Russian envoys had now been released therewere no further grounds for war (Pashino 1868, 117). In this way the Bukharan Emirate lostall the territory which connected it to the Khoqand Khanate, which prevented a coordinated resist-ance to the Russian advance.6 On 2 June 1866 an envoy from the amir reached Tashkent, togetherwith the members of the detained Russian embassy (Glukhovskii, Tatarinov, et al.) (Lobysevich1900, 177). Romanovskii presented the amir with preliminary conditions for peace: Bukhara’srecognition of the territorial annexations already made by Russia in Central Asia; a guaranteeof safe conduct and the right to trade for Russian merchants in Bukhara; and payment of a militaryindemnity (Romanovskii 1868, 75–76). In August 1866 further military reinforcements arrived inTashkent, together with the governor-general of Orenburg, Kryzhanovskii, who had been a criticof Cherniaev’s actions and an opponent of further Russian advance but who as soon as he arrivedin the region became an advocate of further decisive action against Bukhara (possibly because hesaw the possibility of personal glory). He demanded further reparations of 100,000 gold tillas(450,000 roubles) from the amir, to be paid within 10 days (an unrealistic condition, almost cer-tainly intended as an excuse for the resumption of hostilities). The head of the Bukharan ‘ulama,who was leading the Bukharan embassy, asked for a reduction, but this was refused. At the expira-tion of the stipulated period, in September 1866, Kryzhanovskii led a force to attack the nearbycity of Ura-Tepe,7 which was taken by storm on 2 October (Romanovskii 1868, 98).

On 18 October 1866, after a five-day siege, the city of Djizakh was also taken, though the gar-rison there had had time to prepare themselves for the Russian attack, and the amir had placed someof his best troops here, including a group of Afghans who, according to both Bukharan and Russian

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sources, fought particularly bravely (Maev 1873, 275; Sami 2010, 187, 192–193). The Bukharanartillery was more accurate and better-managed than at Irjar, but the experienced Russian artillery-men silenced it with accurate return fire (Grebner 1897, 17–18).

In October–November 1866 Russian forces carried out reconnaissance along the road fromDjizakh towards Samarkand, which disturbed the amir, who had by now realized from experiencethat the military initiative on the Russian side was coming not from the government in SaintPetersburg but from officers on the spot (Terent’ev 1906, I, 390). The amir stationed his forcesalong the Shiraz Canal (in the east of the modern-day Samarkand Province), fearing furtherattacks by the Russians. Apart from this, Muzaffar faced a domestic rebellion from a group oftribes known as the Khitay-Qipchaqs, which necessitated sending another force out fromBukhara. The leader of one of these tribes entered into negotiations with the Russians and togetherwith some of his relations resettled in the Djizakh region and became a Russian subject (Anon.1868, 205).

Amir Muzaffar decided to seek external support, and in November 1866 sent out ambassadorsto the Turks, the British, the Afghans and the Turkmen (Saray 2003, 25).

The events of 1867–April 1868

According to Sadriddin Ayni (1975, 292–293), after the battle of Irjar the ‘ulama played a signifi-cant role in the struggle against the Russian forces, attempting to use religion as a consolidatingfactor in resistance. Here we need to distinguish two aspects of this question. On the one hand the‘ulama attempted to mobilize the local population without reference to religious affiliation andfaith and independently of their political sympathies; on the other, knowing that the Russianforces included some Muslim soldiers, the Bukharans attempted to use religious propaganda tobring them over to their side. The agitators were dervishes, mullas and leaders of the local Sufibrotherhoods. From the beginning of 1867 proselytizers from Bukhara began to appear inDjizakh and Ura-Tepe, agitating against Russian rule amongst both the local population andMuslim Russian soldiers, who made up a significant proportion of the local garrison, judgingfrom the fact that they constituted 12.5% (143 men) of the 4th Turkestan Line Battalion(Zaitsev 1882, 116–117). This propaganda had some success. In the middle of April 1867some Muslim soldiers of the Djizakh garrison began to desert to the enemy (Terent’ev 1906, I,389–390). However, many Muslim soldiers remained loyal through the various battles withBukhara, and many of them were decorated for it.8 It is also very possible that the desertionsamongst Russian Muslim soldiers had nothing to do with Bukharan agitation; it had beencommon for the previous decade (Kostenko 1880, III, 266).

After Romanovskii’s departure in December 1866, the acting governor-general of Turkestanwas N.M. Manteufel. In January–February 1867 the Russians believed that the activities ofBukharan agents stirring up anti-Russian sentiment in the Djizakh and Ura-Tepe regions hadintensified. In spring 1867 Amir Muzaffar chose a new ambassador, Musa Bek, to resume nego-tiations with Russian forces for a permanent peace and the return of Ura-Tepe and Djizakh.However, on Manteufel’s initiative, and on the pretext of suppressing banditry and introducinga more regularized system for collecting land tax from the local population, Russian forcesseized the fortress of Yangi-Qurghan, near Djizakh on the road to Samarkand (Terent’ev 1906,I, 391). This strained Russo–Bukharan relations still further. From 26 May until July 1867 aseries of Bukharan attacks tried unsuccessfully to liberate the fortress (Lyko 1871, 4).

The military activities of Russian forces, and their movement towards Samarkand even whilstpeace talks were taking place in Orenburg, led Amir Muzaffar into confusion (Terent’ev 1906, I,394). Having lost their lands, the former beks of Djizakh and Ura-Tepe and their relatives werealso interested in restoring their power. The regions along the notional Russian frontier saw

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repeated raids from groups the Russians described as shaiki (armed bands), or Bukharan partisans.Fearing an attack on Samarkand, in September 1867 the amir stationed 12,000 sarbaz infantrythere, mostly newly recruited Persians and 6000 Turkmen.9 Amir Muzaffar also continued tosearch for external help against the Russian power.

Russian attempts to consolidate and organize their power in the region culminated in the cre-ation of theTurkestan governor-generalship in July 1867. InNovember 1867 adjutant-general Kon-stantin Petrovich vonKaufman arrived in Tashkent, having been chosen by thewarminister, DmitriMiliutin, to be Turkestan’s governor-general. He had much greater plenipotentiary powers than hispredecessors, and was authorized to engage in diplomatic negotiations with the neighbouringpowers (Bregel 2009, 408). Arriving in Yangi-Qurghan on 23 November, he was presented witha letter from the amir by Musa Bek which stated that Muzaffar agreed to all the peace conditionsstipulated by the Russians and was willing to sign a treaty. However, von Kaufman was not pre-pared to accept the border with Bukhara which had been agreed upon by Kryzhanovskii. Herewrote the treaty and sent it to the amir once again (Maev 1873, 261). Negotiations were thus pro-longed into April 1868 without leading to any mutual understanding or agreement.

Military action and the need to maintain an army almost permanently in the field made heavydemands on the weak economy and fiscal system of the emirate. Amir Muzaffar imposed heavyadditional taxes on the mercantile estate and on other portions of the population. He also engagedin remonetization, recalling tangas to be reminted with a lower content of silver. These attempts torefill the treasury aroused considerable opposition.10 The Bukharan merchants who were suffer-ing from the conflict demanded one of two alternatives: either a decisive battle, or the conclusionof peace. The ‘ulama continued to call for holy war. On 10 March the amir called an assembly todecide whether to conclude a final peace with Russia or renew the war.11 Those who took part inthe assembly, who included most of the beks of the emirate, the ‘ulama and the richer merchants,were in favour of war. The ‘ulama issued a rivayat,12 according to which anyone who did notswiftly take up arms to fight the Russians and free Muslims from their rule would be consideredan outcast. In view of Amir Muzaffar’s indecisiveness, his military defeats, the increase of taxesand expenditure on war and the dissatisfaction of the people, some of the ‘ulama began to demandthe selection of a new amir, wanting to see him replaced by his elder son, ‘Abd al-Malik Tura, or anephew (Lyko 1871, 20–21). Refugees from Yangi-Qurghan, Ukhum and Nur Ata also demandedwar with the Russians.13

In 1867 the former commander of the Bukharan forces that were so badly defeated at Irjar,Shir ‘Ali Inaq, was appointed governor of Samarkand. The reason for this rehabilitation is notexplained in the sources. According to Bukharan and Khoqandi sources, the inhabitants of Samar-kand suffered under Shir ‘Ali Inaq’s oppression (zulm) and wanted him replaced (Ayni 1975,275). Despite this, amir Muzaffar left him in charge of Samarkand, placing his son, ‘Abd al-Malik, in the garrison, together with some influential nobles, and he himself left for Karmina(160 km west of Samarkand). After the amir’s departure, Shir ‘Ali Inaq severely punishedsome Samarqandis for their petitions against him. He also accused ‘Abd al-Malik of riot andrebellion, and with the amir’s agreement sent him away from Samarkand to Ghuzar (Sami1962, 72a–72b).

In March 1868, after the festival of Qurban Bayram, a council of chosen representatives andreligious figures, supporters of ghazavat (holy war), gathered in the Tilla-Kari madrasa in Samar-kand. They demanded more decisive measures to defend the city (Simonova 1904, 846). Therewas a conflict between supporters of Shir ‘Ali Inaq and the mullas at the madrasa, as a resultof which Shir ‘Ali Inaq ordered a force of sarbaz soldiers to punish them. During this clashwith the mullas, many students and teachers were killed or injured (Sami 1962, 73a, 73b, 74a).According to local eyewitnesses, Shir ‘Ali Inaq prevented the organization of a local militia tooppose the Russians (Simonova 1904, 846, 859).

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Throughout March von Kaufman and the amir continued their negotiations to define theboundary between the two powers (Lyko 1871, 15–16). According to Sadriddin Ayni (1975,277), two close friends of Amir Muzaffar, the Bukharan officials Yaqub Qushbegi and Utkurbiy,belonged to party of war and had a strong influence on the amir’s decisions. Unexpectedly for theRussians, at the beginning of April Muzaffar returned from Karmina, and under the influence ofthe ‘ulama declared ghazavat, or holy war. After rumours spread of an advance of the Bukharansinto Russian territory, von Kaufman resolved on a war of aggression to finally establish Russianpower and significance in the eyes of the local population.

The battle of Chupan Ata and its consequences

Von Kaufman (2003, 6) justified the advance of Russian forces to Samarkand in terms of thenecessity of concluding a permanent peace treaty and of preventing further attacks on Russianterritory. The conquest of the city of Samarkand – sacred to Muslims and the capital of Timur– would have great significance as a demonstration of the might of Russia to Central Asianrulers. It would also bring the headwaters of the Zarafshan River under Russian control. On 14April von Kaufman ordered 12 platoons from Tashkent, Chinaz and other posts to advance toDjizakh as reinforcements. On the night of 14–15 April a group of Bukharans carried out anunsuccessful attack on the Russian camp near Djizakh, which provided another reason to ordera further advance. On 16 April a force of 286 Afghans, led by Iskander Khan, a grandson ofAmir Dost Muhammad Khan of Kabul, who had been in Bukharan service since 1864, desertedto the Russian side; they were subsequently reinforced by Iranian deserters from the Bukharanranks (Terent’ev 1906, I, 407, 411).14

On 22 April von Kaufman sent a letter to the inhabitants of Samarkand and Bukhara fromDjizakh, in which he noted that the aim of the Russians was not conquest but the conclusionof peace.15 On 23–26 April envoys came from the Samarkand bek, assuring von Kaufman thatthe amir only desired peace, and asking him not to renew hostilities. The Russians assumedthat the Bukharans were simply playing for time, with the aim of joining with forces from Shah-risabz and bringing greater numbers to bear (Lyko 1871, 45–51). If we are to believe the accountof one former Bukharan soldier, Amir Muzaffar did not expect such a rapid beginning of hosti-lities, and learnt with surprise, from a letter sent by a Samarqandi official, that Russian forces hadalready appeared at Yangi-Qurghan. Bukharan forces were gathered and stationed to repel theenemy and defend Samarkand (Bogdanov 1873, 428). On 30 April 1868, a Russian force of3500 men set out from Yangi-Qurghan towards Samarkand. The column was led by vonKaufman himself, assisted by two of his most trusted staff officers, N.N. Golovachev and A.K.Geins. The soldiers of the column had been carefully selected; many were veterans of the warsin the Caucasus and the Crimea.

On 30 April a Bukharan embassy led by Mirza Shamsuddin approached the Russian lines,promising a speedy conclusion of peace and asking von Kaufman to return to Yangi-Qurghan.However, von Kaufman stated that until he received a firm treaty, his forces would continue toadvance. On the morning of 1 May the force set off once again. After Mirza Shamsuddin’sdeparture, Najmaddin Khwaja reappeared once again as the amir’s emissary. According tosome sources, he brought with him a peace treaty which had been partly revised by the amir.To be precise, in the original version of the document Muzaffar was supposed to sign apeace treaty with von Kaufman (in his capacity as governor-general of Turkestan), and in thenew Bukharan version it was written that Muzaffar was signing a treaty with Alexander II(Lobysevich 1900, 192). The Russians once again chose to interpret this as an attempt by theamir to string out negotiations to buy time, allowing the Bukharans to strengthen their positionon the Samarkand heights and to unite their forces with those coming from Shahrisabz

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(Lyko 1871, 56–57). This may have been so, but it is equally probable that the amir was simplyinsisting that as a sovereign ruler he had the right to sign a treaty with his nominal equal, thetsar, rather than with one of his subordinates, something which would have been perceived as adeliberate humiliation.

According to local eyewitnesses, the day before the Russians arrived, Shir ‘Ali Inaq fledSamarkand, while the Bukharan forces which were camped around the city were joined by alevy from its inhabitants (Simonova 1904, 847). According to another version, Shir ‘Ali tookpart in the subsequent battle, was wounded and then escaped from Samarkand (Sami 1962,78b). In a third version, he was killed while preparations were being made to resist the Russians(Mirza Salimbek 2009, 38). The Bukharan military commanders were both Russian deserters,‘Usman and Bogdanov. The former was placed in charge of the infantry, the latter of the artillery.Around 20 cannon were placed along the line of the Zarafshan (Simonova 1904, 845–846).According to Russian sources, the Bukharans had 40 cannon.16

As they approached Samarkand on the Chupan Ata heights, the Russians were attacked by amass of Bukharan cavalry, which they beat off. According to Russian military eyewitnesses, theBukharans were capable of fierce resistance when defending themselves from behind fortifica-tions, but here they tried to secure victory through artillery fire. As the Russians approached,the Bukharans opened fire with their cannon, but they were poorly served and loaded; the shotdid not reach the Russians, and most of the shells failed to explode.17 According to Ahmad-iDonish, when the Russians reached the bank of the Zarafshan, ‘two or three cannon fired, butthe powder failed to ignite’ (Donish 1960, 58).

When the Russian artillery ceased firing, the infantry began to cross the river, and dealt theBukharans the first blow, on the front and both flanks simultaneously. The popular levy, the4000 sarbaz infantry of Hajji Rumi,18 and the force led by ‘Usman, composed of Arabs andUzbeks, all entered the fray but were beaten off (Sami 1962, 77a, 77b). Bogdanov, the artillerycommander, was captured by the Russians at Chupan Ata. He subsequently gave valuableservice to the Russian forces during the insurrection and siege of Samarkand; he was pardonedfor his desertion and even decorated (Simonova 1904, 850).

Russian losses were insignificant – according to the official report, just 3 NCOs and 28 privatesoldiers were wounded, and 2 soldiers killed, whilst the Afghan force also suffered some casual-ties (the number is unrecorded). Bukharan sources suggest that many of those in the forces led by‘Usman and Hajji Rumi perished (Sami 1962, 78a). That the losses among the popular levy werealso heavy can be judged from the reminiscences of Samarqandis who took part, and also from the6000 or so cartridges fired by the Russians during the battle.19 The heavy Bukharan defeat atChupan Ata marked the end of the second and the beginning of the third and final phase ofRusso–Bukharan relations.

The Russian commanders were certain that the Bukharans would rally once again for a finaldefence of the city of Samarkand, and in view of the exhaustion of their troops decided to putoff the assault on the city to 2 May. Meanwhile, the city authorities and a portion of the ‘ulamahad fled Samarkand to the amir at Karmina, with the exception of just a few individuals. Atdawn on 2 May, a group of representatives of the ‘ulama and city administration, led by amufti (Islamic jurist), Mulla Kamaladdin Kuz-Falak, and six of the city’s aqsaqals (elders orheadmen, lit. white-beards), approached von Kaufman with a request to take the city underhis protection. According to Sami, the ‘ulama made reference to the Qur’an, referring to thetraditionally close relationship between Christians and Muslims (Sami 1962, 79b–80a). In theopinion of the Russian military leaders, the city was given up because neither its walls norits citadel were fit for defence, because they had not been repaired for a considerable time; mili-tary action might also have led to the destruction of many of the city’s historic monuments(Cherkasov 1870, 33).

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The Russian forces entered the city and citadel. On 4 May further reinforcements arrivedfrom Tashkent in the form of an artillery train under the protection of two platoons of riflemen(Terent’ev 1906, I, 426). Von Kaufman appointed Mulla Kamaladdin the chief qazi (Islamicjudge) of the city of Samarkand, and it is probable that, as a means of winning over the local popu-lation to the Russian side, he freed the Samarkand region from taxes (Sami 1962, 79b). It is wellknown that the Russians announced the abolition of slavery and the introduction of equality ofrights among the local population without regard to ethnic origin or religious affiliation,helping to explain why their advent seems to have been welcomed by the Shi’i Irani, the Jewsand some other groups in Samarkand (Mirza Salimbek 2009, 38).

Von Kaufman sent a letter to the amir, in which he offered Bukhara peace on thesame terms as before, but with an additional demands for the territory of the Samarkandbekstvo (province), payment of the military costs of the expedition, and recognition of allRussian annexations of Bukharan territory since 1865. Amir Muzaffar was at Karmina, fromwhere he sent another force to defend the town of Katta-Qurghan (70 km west of Samarkand).Simultaneously, another force of levies, together with 4000 fresh sarbaz infantry, led byHajji Rumi and ‘Usman, took up a defensive position along the nearby Zirabulak heights(Sami 1962, 81a).

At the same time, the Russians were forcing those towns of the Middle Zarafshan Valleywhich had not sent peace delegations to submit to Russian rule. On 17 May the Russians tookKatta-Qurghan, and on 23 May concluded a peace agreement with the amir of Bukhara. VonKaufman proposed two conditions: either to pay an indemnity of 4,600,000 roubles over eightyears, with the amir retaining control of the territory between Yangi-Qurghan and Katta-Qurghan, or else to pay just 120,000 roubles, but recognize the Russian annexation of all the ter-ritory they had occupied up to Katta-Qurghan. The Bukharans asked for 10 days to collect themoney for the second of these terms (Terent’ev 1906, I, 430).

Despite the formal conclusion of peace, 27 May saw a clash between colonel A.K. Abramovand a force from Shahrisabz at Qara-Tepe, to the south of Samarkand, in the foothills of the Zar-afshan range, as a result of which the Shahrisabzis retreated. On the same day, a force of Bukharancavalry attacked General Golovachev’s force near Katta-Qurghan, but was also beaten off. Theseevents led von Kaufman to march the main Russian force out of Katta-Qurghan.

The Samarkand uprising and the battle of Zirabulak

The Russians would subsequently believe that Bukharan supporters of a continued war withRussia had already devised a plan to destroy the Russian forces in May. By the beginning ofJune, Terent’ev concluded (1906, I, 439), the Bukharans were plotting an assault on the Russiansat three points: from the direction of Katta-Qurghan, from Qara-Tepe, and from Chelek towardsYangi-Qurghan. Kuropatkin believed that the plan was for the Bukharans to draw the mainRussian forces further away from Samarkand, at the same time as the Shahrisabz forces underJura-Bek, together with the Samarqandi population and other allies, seized the city, whichwould be a signal for a general revolt in the region.20 According to yet another Russian theory,a plan for a joint assault was put together by representatives from Shahrisabz and the amir. Itwas suggested that in order to recapture Samarkand, the best means was to join forces andattack the Russian force near Katta-Qurghan, threatening Russian communications with Tashkent.Thus, the recapture of Samarkand was considered the main aim of the rebellion (Voronets 1872,28–29). All of these Russian theories of deep-laid plans and sinister conspiracies were unlikely,not least because the rulers of Shahrisabz did not acknowledge the authority of the amir; insteadthey had allied themselves with his eldest son, ‘Abd al-Malik Tura, who was now in open rebel-lion against his father.

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In fact, the attacks against the Russians were planned by several different individuals, largelyindependently of each other. The most important figures were ‘Umar Khwaja of Dahbid (14 kmnorth-west of Samarkand), a descendant of the famous Sufi leader Ahmad Kasani Makhdum-iA’zam (1461–1542), the beks of Shahrisabz and Kitab (Jura-Bek and Baba-Bek), and theformer bek of Chelek, ‘Umar Bek (Simonova 1904, 851–852). ‘Umar Khwaja himself was oneof the most influential Sufi leaders in the region, said to have over 10,000 murids (followers)(Shkapskii 1909, 99). Amongst the leaders of the rebellion against the Russians in Samarkand,the sources name the leader of the Khitay-Qipchaq tribe, Adil Dadkhwah, and ‘Abd al-GhafarBek, the former ruler of Ura-Tepe and brother of the mentioned ‘Umar Bek (Schuyler 1876, I,241). The coalition to resist the Russians included Samarqandis, Urgutis, Panjikandis, Qaraqal-paqs, and the Uzbek tribes of Naiman, Tuyakli, Qirq-yuz and others (Albedil 1907, 9, 14). AtGhuzar, the amir’s son ‘Abd al-Malik had also collected troops and a popular levy to free Samar-kand.21 The leaders of the Manghit, Qungrat and Sarai Uzbek tribes also joined him, with some oftheir followers.

When setting out for Katta-Qurghan from Samarkand, von Kaufman had left a very small gar-rison of just five platoons behind, under the command of Major Baron Shtempel. Apart from thisthere were approximately two battalions’ worth of non-combatant and sick or wounded soldiers.In all, the Russian force consisted of 658 men, with two cannon and two mortars. According toanother Russian eyewitness, there were approximately 800 officers and men left in the Samarkandcitadel (Ivanov 1896, 833–834).

At the end of May, ‘Abd al-Malik’s forces set out from Ghuzar for Samarkand via Shahrisabzwith the aim of destroying the Russian garrison. At Shahrisabz, Jura-Bek and Baba-Bek came outto meet ‘Abd al-Malik, joining forces with him for the war and ghazavat. In Samarkand,‘Umar Khwaja and other religious leaders called on the population to revolt. On 1 June someShahrisabzis under the command of Baba-Bek began to enter Samarkand from the south,whilst the rest of the force approached from the direction of Chelek, to the north of the city.Their place of assembly was the Chupan Ata heights. At that time, a large force led by ‘UmarKhwaja Makhdum-i A’zam joined with ‘Abd al-Malik Tura’s forces and advanced on the city.Groups of Khitay-Qipchaqs, Qaraqalpaqs and Samarqandi Tajiks also joined in the attack (Simo-nova 1904, 852–854).

The Russian garrison retreated into the citadel of the city, which became the object of a fierceassault, beginning on the morning of 2 June. The commander of the citadel, Major Shtempel, andLieutenant Colonel Nazarov mobilized all soldiers capable of carrying arms. The Russians hadsupplies and ammunition to withstand a long siege, but the walls of the citadel were in poorrepair, and they had barely enough men to cover them. Repeated attempts to seize the citadelfailed, though Russian losses were quite heavy (Vereshchagin 1898; Terent’ev 1906, I, 462).

On 31 May, von Kaufman had arrived in Katta-Qurghan, and after a day’s rest, once the timeallowed the Bukharans to gather the money for the indemnity and sign the treaty had expired, onthe night of 2 June 1868 he advanced with 18 platoons of infantry, 6 sotnias (companies) ofcavalry, a platoon of Afghans, 14 guns and 6 rocket batteries towards the Bukharan positionon the Zirabulak heights, 16 km from Katta-Qurghan. On the night of the 1st-2nd of June vonKaufman’s force attacked the amir’s forces and the popular levies spread out along the heights.The Bukharans had 6000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry and 14 guns, and were further assisted by afigure the Russians called Syzdyk Sultan. This was Sadyk Kenesarin, a son of the Kazakhsultan Kenesary Kasymov (who had led a rebellion against the Russians in the steppe in the1830s and 1840s), with a force of Kazakh cavalry (Bogdanov 1873, 432). The Russian forces suc-cessfully used the additional range of their weapons. Despite the stoicism of the sarbaz infantryand the activity of the cavalry, the Bukharans were routed once again. According to one Russiansource, only 1000 of the amir’s troops remained at the end of the battle (‘Zerabulakskie… ’ 1912,

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518). The route to Bukhara for the Russian forces lay open; however, events in Samarkandcaused von Kaufman to turn back.

According to Voronets (1872, 27–28), between 1866 and 1868 there had been some progressin the military organization of the Bukharan Emirate. While at the battle of Irjar the Bukharanforces had been lacking in order and discipline, at Zirabulak they were formed up inregular lines and ranks, fired in volleys, and stood firm under fire almost until they were inhand-to-hand combat: they even withstood two or three volleys of grape-shot. Nevertheless,the overall military-technical backwardness of the emirate led to its defeat. In Bukharathere were further outbreaks of popular unrest, stimulated by the defeat at Zirabulak, and onlythe intervention of Najmaddin Khwaja succeeded in pacifying this potential revolt (Bogdanov1873, 432).

It is hard to say whether the news of the defeat of the amir had reached the besiegers at Samar-kand by 2 June. It is known that on the morning of 3 June the attempted storming of the citadelwas renewed, and that the besiegers had somewhat altered their tactics. Having inflicted heavylosses on the Russian forces, the besiegers were close to victory, when the Shahrisabzis, whomade up the bulk of the military force, unexpectedly abandoned Samarkand. There are varyingaccounts of why this happened, but according to one of the more plausible ones, on 2 June theShahrisabzis had indeed heard of the amir’s defeat at Zirabulak, and realized that the Russianswould soon be bringing overwhelming force to lift the siege. The 3rd of June saw their thirdand final attempt to storm the citadel, and after it failed they then left for Shahrisabz (Voronets1872, 49–50). According to one Samarqandi eyewitness, there was a conflict between ‘UmarKhwaja and Jura-Bek, which led to the latter’s departure on 3 June; after this, ‘Umar Khwajatook over as the leader of the siege (Simonova 1904, 856–857). He was later obliged to flee toBukhara, where he died in 1877 (Kattaev 1994, 68). According to Sami, at the time of theclash at Samarkand, Amir Muzaffar, fearing that a victory for the Shahrisabzis might threatenhis own power and allow his son to take the throne, ordered his people to write a series offalse letters stating that the amir had concluded peace with the Russians, and that in order toweaken ‘Abd al-Malik and the Kenagas the amir had sent his commander ‘Usman, with aforce of sarbaz, accompanied by Russians, to capture Shahrisabz. These false letters fellinto the hands of the Shahrisabzi leaders, who, fearing for their own families, lifted the siegeof Samarkand and set off back to Shahrisabz. Because ‘Abd al-Malik could not prove that theletters were false, a large proportion of the troops from Qarshi and Ghuzar also abandoned thesiege.22 Once in Shahrisabz they realized that the letters were false, but by then it was too late(Sami 1962, 87b–88b). It is hard to say which (if any) of these is the most accurate account,although Sami’s tale seems to be motivated by the anti-Manghit sentiments that figure so promi-nently throughout his history. It is however quite possible that Amir Muzaffar saw the best hopefor preserving his power in concluding a speedy peace with Russia, and was therefore anxious tosee the military clash at Samarkand fail.

After the departure of the Shahrisabzis, the morale of the besiegers weakened, and the char-acter of the Russian defence changed. They no longer had to man every point along the defensivewall, and from the evening of 3 June they began to carry out offensive sorties against the besiegers(Voronets 1872, 50–51). Commander Shtempel despatched 20 runners to von Kaufman for assist-ance; just one made it through the enemy lines. According to Kuropatkin, von Kaufman receivednews of the siege on the evening of 6 June, and his force set off for Samarkand immediately.23

Back in Samarkand, 4–7 June saw daily repeated attacks on the gates and the breaches in thewalls (Saidkulov 1970, 80).

Meanwhile, von Kaufman’s forces hastened to relieve the besieged garrison. By the eveningof 7 June they were already close to Samarkand, and on the morning of 8 June, Russian columnsentered the city. Von Kaufman’s forces and the garrison in the citadel stormed the city

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simultaneously. The main opposition they encountered came from students and teachers of themadrasas of the Registan; they were easily beaten off (Cherkasov 1870, 58).

A range of sources and secondary works suggest that the uprising in Samarkand helped topreserve one of the most famous spiritual and political centres of the Muslim world – Bukharaitself – from being seized by Russian forces (Carrère d’Encausse 1967, 142; Ayni, 1975, 288).On 10 June an envoy from the emperor, Musa Bek, arrived in Samarkand for further parley. On23 June a peace treaty was signed, in which Bukhara agreed to recognize all Russia’s conquestssince 1865 and promised to pay an indemnity of 500,000 roubles and to allow Russian mer-chants to trade freely in the emirate. The territory annexed during the 1868 campaign wasformed into the Zarafshan military okrug (Morrison 2008, 21–28). With the assistance ofRussian forces, Amir Muzaffar managed to defeat the rebellious local beks and return Shahrisabzto Bukharan rule, whilst also consolidating his power within the emirate. The desire for thereturn of Samarkand came up in negotiations between the Russians and the Bukharans overthe succeeding years (Pashino 1884, 140–143). Von Kaufman himself stated that he hadnever intended the destruction of Bukhara as a state (Terent’ev 1906, I, 474), and the Russianspreserved it as a protectorate. At the beginning of the twentieth century, D.I. Logofet led a cam-paign to have the emirate abolished on grounds of misgovernance. He attributed the originaldecision to preserve it to the distance of the region from Russia and its poor communications,the small size of the Russian forces, and (erroneously) to British intrigues (Logofet 2011, 13).However, the Manghit dynasty survived until 1920, when the emirate was overrun by Bolshevikforces; and in the guise of the Bukharan People’s Republic the Bukharan state remained semi-autonomous until 1924.

Conclusion

In attempting to establish criteria for the periodization of the war between Russia and Bukhara, itseems clear that the starting-point has to be those events which led to a switch from diplomatic tomilitary tactics on each side. In my view, the initial relations between Russia and Bukhara after theaccession of Amir Muzaffar were peaceful, even as Russian forces waged war against theKhoqand Khanate and advanced steadily into Central Asia.

The first stage in the military clash between the powers came only in June 1865, when Russianforces seized the largest city in Central Asia: Tashkent. It was only after this that Amir Muzaffarentered into direct conflict with Russia because of his own claims to the city, and under the influ-ence of the ‘ulama. From the beginning of the Russian advance into the region, relations betweenRussia and Bukhara had several peculiarities, but were characterized above all by mutual incom-prehension. Amir Muzaffar was forced to negotiate, not with the tsar, as he felt his status as afellow sovereign demanded, but with governors and generals on the spot. This reflected the gen-erally low standing the Russians accorded Bukhara as a state, even compared with other ‘Asiatic’governments such as Persia or the Ottoman Empire. Russian governors had almost completefreedom in conducting negotiations with the amir and setting terms for peace. The actions ofone governor might be contradicted by his successor (as happened with Cherniaev and Roma-novskii). A further obstacle to the establishment of peaceful relations was the different under-standings of peace and peace treaties on either side. Diplomatic negotiations and petty violentclashes culminated in the battle of Irjar in May 1866, in which the Bukharans were routed.From the military point of view Bukhara was a long way behind Russia, which mobilized experi-enced veterans of the Caucasus and Crimean Wars for the war with Bukhara, and had technologi-cally superior firearms and artillery. The economic resources of the two states were alsoincommensurable. Insufficient understanding of the extent and strength of Russia’s military

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resources led the Bukharans to a prolongation of a war they could not win, and ultimately todefeat.24

With this, the initial stage of the war ended. The second began when Romanovskii and Kryz-hanovskii, realizing how weak Bukhara was, and claiming to fear an alliance between theBukharan Emirate and the Khoqand Khanate, overran the key cities of Ura-Tepe, Khujand andDjizakh. During this period Amir Muzaffar may have attempted to use guerrilla warfareagainst the Russian outposts, although the repeated raids the Russians complained of alongtheir frontiers may equally well have been the results of local initiative, symptoms of collapsingManghit authority in a region which had long been contested between Bukhara and Khoqand. Theamir certainly had not given up hope of recovering Djizakh, but this attempt (if such it was)between Irjar and the battle of Chupan Ata to force a Russian withdrawal using the forcesraised by local beks was a failure. Amir Muzaffar’s attempts to find allies from other countries(the Ottoman empire, British India, Afghanistan) were equally unsuccessful. At this point theRussians decided to take the initiative once again, using Bukharan raids along the frontier as ajustification for a further advance towards Samarkand. As in 1866, on the Bukharan side thisled to an attempt by the ‘ulama, together with some members of Khwaja lineages and localbeks, to use religion to rally popular resistance in a war for Islam against the unbeliever.Amongst the most active were the students and teachers of the Samarkand madrasas. Islamcould potentially serve to unite an emirate deeply divided by political conflicts, notably thatbetween Amir Muzaffar and his son ‘Abd al-Malik Tura. The Russians believed that Samarkandhad been chosen as a rallying-point because of its status as a holy city, although its symbolic statusas the capital of Timur may have been equally important (Viatkin 1899). However, the rapidadvance of the Russian forces led to a premature battle at Chupan Ata, which prevented Bukharanforces from gathering as planned. According to Bukharan historians, this army had been gatheredpurely for the defence of Samarkand, rather than for any offensive operations. The second stageended with the battle at Chupan Ata and the fall of Samarkand to Russian forces.

The third stage, fromMay to June 1868, saw the last attempts at resistance to Russia, in whichthe role of the Manghit dynasty and the Bukharan state was overtaken by local forces, notably thepopulation of Samarkand and the surrounding region, and the beks of Shahrisabz and Kitab, whothe Russians later believed were acting in concert with the Khoqandis and Tashkandis to bringabout a general anti-Russian uprising. During this stage Samarkand had the greatest significance,symbolizing for the local population Islamic sacredness and the former greatness of the regionwhen it had been the capital of Timur. For the Russians, control of the upper and middlecourses of the Zarafshan would give them the possibility of establishing a permanent strangle-hold on Bukhara’s water supply, forcing the emirate into a relationship of dependence onRussia. The Russians suspected a coordinated conspiracy for a simultaneous blow to be struckby the amir’s troops at Katta-Qurghan, the uprising at Samarkand, and the destruction of theircommunications with Djizakh, which would threaten Russian control not just over the emiratebut also over Tashkent. For this purpose (they also believed), there had been secret talks withKhudoyar Khan of Khoqand and the elites of Tashkent; there is a high probability that thesestories were products of Russian paranoia, but they certainly added to the distrust that character-ized Russo–Bukharan relations, and ensured that Russian terms for peace became ever moreonerous. If such a conspiracy ever existed, the defeat at Zirabulak, the conflict between SayyidMuzaffar and his son ‘Abd al-Malik, and the premature departure of the Shahrisabzis at thesiege of Samarkand ensured that it came to nothing. In the final analysis, the reasons for thedefeat of the emirate lay in its economic and military backwardness when compared to Russia.The reasons the war began in the first place were more complex. The lack of any thought-through foreign policy on the Bukharan side was compounded by ignorance and inconsistency,and the ambition of individual Russian officers (and of von Kaufman himself) almost certainly

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also played a part. The political manoeuvring between different political forces in Bukhara, andAmir Muzaffar’s constant wavering between peace and war, together with his steadily decliningauthority, also had negative effects. The third stage of conflict ended only with the defeat of theanti-Russian uprising in Samarkand in June 1868, and with the peace treaty between Russia andBukhara, which, whilst it made the emirate a vassal of Russia, would also have the effect of con-solidating Amir Muzaffar’s authority within the emirate and preserving the Manghit dynasty,which could now rely upon Russian military force to suppress its internal enemies.

Translated by Alexander Morrison

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Alexander Morrison, Sergey Abashin and Wolf-gang Holzwarth for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Archives and abbreviations

NAGMIKUz Nauchnyi Arkhiv Gosudarstvennogo Muzeia Istorii Kul’tury Uzbekistana –

Scientific Archive of the State Museum of the History and Culture of Uzbeki-stan, Samarkand

RGVIA Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv – Russian State Mili-tary-Historical Archive, Moscow

Fond (F.) 165 ‘Lichnyi fond A.N. Kuropatkina’ (Personal fond of A.N. Kuropatkin)F.483 ‘Voennye Deistviia v Srednei Azii’ (Military Actions in Central Asia)F.1392 ‘Pokhodnaia Kantseliaria komanduiushchego voiskami Turkestanskogo voen-

nogo okruga’ (Expeditionary Chancellery of the Commander of the Forces ofthe Turkestan Military District)

F.1393 ‘Polevoi Pokhodnyi Shtab Turkestanskogo voennogo okruga’ (Field Staff of theTurkestan Military District)

TsGARUz Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan – Central StateArchive of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Tashkent

F.I-715 A. G. Serebrennikov (Materials collected by A.G. Serebrennikov)

Notes

1. M.S. Yusupov, ‘Armiia Bukharskogo Emirata v kontse XIX i nachala XX veka’ NAGMIKUz D.814ll.1–3, 13.

2. Shahrukh was a relative of the Persian Qajar Shah Nasruddin, and after the latter attained the throne in1848 he fled to Amir Nasrullah in Bukhara and was appointed commander-in-chief of the army, becausehe had considerable experience of war.

3. Najmaddin Khwaja was a sayyid by descent, and occupied the position of ra’is (leader) of the sayyids ofBukhara. This was not his first or his last embassy: he had been to Saint Petersburg in 1859, and morerecently to Orenburg and Kazalinsk. He would be given the thankless task of negotiating with the Rus-sians before Samarkand in May 1868 (see below).

4. Amir Muzaffar had continued the policy of his ancestor Muhammad Rahim Khan (1756–1758), whohad shown distinct preference for exiles and former slaves from Iran when it came to distributingcivil and military posts (Abduraimov 1966, 182). This policy was intended to reduce the dependenceof the amir on the Uzbek tribal nobility and strengthen central power (Holzwarth 2006, 100).

5. ‘Ali Muhammad Qarataev had arrived in Bukhara in 1854, where he worked for a Bukharan merchant,Rahim Bai. After the latter’s death he wished to return to his homeland, but Amir Nasrullah forbade hisdeparture. In the 1870s he worked as an interpreter for the Russians and was much respected (Stremou-khov 1875).

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6. In justifying his actions to Saint Petersburg, Romanovskii invoked the possibility of a military unionbetween the Bukharan Emirate and the Khoqand Khanate against Russia.

7. Called Istaravshan since 2000.8. ‘Nagradnye spiski ofitserov i soldat, otlichivshikhsia pri zashchite tsitadeli goroda Samarkanda’ 08/06/

1868 RGVIA F.1392 Op.1 D.13 l.28.9. ‘Chastnye svedeniia iz Bukhari, 1867’ RGVIA F.483 Op.1 D.103 ll.1ob, 2ob.

10. ‘Materialy dlia istorii zavoevaniia Turkestanskogo kraia’ TsGARUz F.I-715 Op.1 D.36 l.266.11. Ibid., l.239.12. A rivayat is a document, drawn up in accordance with the shari’a, explaining the proper course of action

in a given situation. A rivayat bearing the seals of the ‘ulama had the force of law.13. ‘Materialy dlia istorii zavoevaniia Turkestanskogo kraia’ TsGARUz F.I-715 Op.1 D.36 l.239.14. ‘Perepiska s komanduyushim voiskami Sir-Dariinskoy oblasti o vziatii russkimi voiskami Bukhari i

Samarkanda’ RGVIA F.1392 Op.1 D.2 l.4.15. ‘Materialy dlia istorii zavoevaniia Turkestanskogo kraia’ TsGARUz F.I-715 Op.1 D.36 l.239.16. ‘Sem’desiat let moei zhizni’ Memoirs of A.N. Kuropatkin, Vol. I, Part 2. RGVIA F.165 Op.1 D.1742

l.23.17. Ibid., ll.21–22.18. Hajji Rumi may have been an Ottoman military specialist (Mirza Salimbek 2009, 38).19. ‘Raport o Chupanatinskom srazhenii’ RGVIA F.1393 Op.1 D.2 l.7a.20. ‘Sem’desiat let moei zhizni’ Memoirs of A.N. Kuropatkin, Vol. I, Part 2. RGVIA F.165 Op.1 D.1742

l.50.21. The conflict between Amir Muzaffar and his son may have arisen when Amir Nasrullah was making his

choice of heir, and hesitated between his son and his grandson (Donish 1960, 33–34).22. ‘Abd al-Malik continued to fight against the Russians, and against his father, but suffered defeat and fled

to Peshawar in British India, where he was awarded a pension. He died in 1908.23. ‘Sem’desiat let moei zhizni’ Memoirs of A.N. Kuropatkin, Vol. I, Part 2. RGVIA F.165 Op.1 D.1742

l.54.24. There is a suggestive passage in Ahmad-i Donish’s Risala to this effect, stating that Amir Muzaffar

decided to open hostilities in 1866 ‘because he was convinced that the Russian government – waslike the rulers of Mawara’ al-nahr, and as he had enjoyed victory over them, so he reasoned that hewould have victory over the Russians as well.…As for the amir, being by nature stupid and narrow-minded, he was unable to comprehend the difference between governments’ (Donish 1960, 40–41).Allowances must be made for Donish’s strong anti-Manghit agenda.

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