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The Role of the United Nations in Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction

Report of the Twenty-Seventh United Nations Issues Conference

Sponsored by

The Stanley FoundationFebruary 23-25, 1996Convened at Arden House, Harriman, New York

Executive Summary

While the end of the Cold War greatly reduced some global threatsto security, enduring ethnic rivalries and regional tensions havecreated pressures on nations to continue to develop or expand theirarsenals of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, globalpolitical conditions are ripe for real progress in eliminating theseweapons. Traditionally, the United Nations has been engaged inarms control and disarmament through developing norms, negoti-ating treaties, and monitoring compliance. However, in light oftoday’s new challenges, it is time to ask whether the internationalcommunity is taking full advantage of the United Nations.

Participants reviewed the preconditions for the total elimination ofweapons of mass destruction, evaluated the current obstacles todisarmament, discussed the elements of an effective disarmamentregime, and suggested strategies and tactics to this end.

issues report 96 7/31/97 2:47 AM

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Preconditions: Security and a Global Commitment Participants agreed that a unique window of opportunity existsspringing from events occurring in the last few years: the Conven-tional Forces in Europe Treaty and START I have entered intoforce, START II was ratified by the United States and is awaitingaction by the Russian Duma, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treatywas extended indefinitely, some nations have renounced altogeth-er their nuclear weapons programs, and the Chemical WeaponsConvention is on the road to ratification. The international com-munity can build on this momentum to achieve even greaterreductions in the development and use of weapons of massdestruction.

Participants agreed, however, that real progress may be achievedonly after nations have reached an affirmative commitment, or“compact,” to the total elimination of weapons of mass destruc-tion. This would require nations to move beyond their sense ofinsecurity—a difficult task in that armament feeds insecurity andis fueled by insecurity. Ultimately, a sense of security will bedependent on trust. Reaching a global compact and carrying outnations’ commitments would be a very slow process that wouldinvolve repeated substantial security assurances and require great-ly reduced levels of conventional arms.

ObstaclesParticipants identified obstacles to the elimination of weapons ofmass destruction. The import and export of dual-usematerials—materials having civil and military uses—was seen as asignificant impediment. Opinions differed on the solution: whilesome advocated more controls at the national and internationallevels, others argued for a more flexible system where nationsexamine case by case the intent of importing nations. Technologicaladvances and the easy spread of knowledge hinder weapons con-trol as well, particularly with respect to chemical and biologicalweapons. Nuclear smuggling also threatens the international com-munity, but the first line of control would be within nations. Inter-national efforts should focus on more accurate record keeping,greater transparency in trade, and data-sharing among internation-al organizations. The most difficult obstacles to eliminatingweapons of mass destruction are the regional tensions within East


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Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East and inconsistent enforce-ment of treaty obligations by the Security Council.

Elements of an Effective Disarmament RegimeAn effective disarmament regime would require setting interna-tional norms, treaty negotiation, enforcement, verification andmonitoring, confidence-building measures, transparency, and fos-tering regional steps to disarmament. The United Nations’ perfor-mance in these areas is not consistent. While the United Nations issuccessful in norm-building and fostering treaty negotiation, itsSecurity Council-dominated enforcement system was character-ized by most participants as unreliable and overly politicized.Some participants supported the current system, arguing that alter-native enforcement arrangements are politically unrealistic. Therewas also disagreement on the United Nations’ record on verifica-tion, with some arguing for a stronger system and others caution-ing against interference with nations’ sovereign rights. Participantsgenerally agreed with the need to expand transparency and confi-dence-building measures and endorsed the growth of regionalnuclear-weapons-free zones.

Strategies and TacticsMost participants envisioned a greater role for the United Nationsin a strengthened disarmament regime, but only after certainreforms. The Secretariat lacks a professional staff of arms controlexperts and the Disarmament Commission could be used toexplore issues not addressed by the General Assembly or the Secu-rity Council. Most participants believed the Security Council’s vetopower most weakened treaty enforcement to the extent its use hasresulted in inconsistent responses to noncompliance. Participantsdiscussed the following reforms of the Security Council:

• Prohibit the use of the veto in cases of treaty noncompliance.• Limit application of the veto to nonmilitary enforcement deci-

sions.• Amend the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the chemical and bio-

logical weapons conventions to clarify the Security Council’sresponsibilities.

• Remove the Security Council’s enforcement powers and vestthem in the separate treaty regimes

• Assign some or all Security Council enforcement authority to


either a new or a transformed UN body.• Expand membership to enhance regional representation.• Create a special Security Council rapporteur for disarmament

or a permanent staff of disarmament experts serving the Secu-rity Council.

Participants explored the merits of other avenues to the total elimi-nation of weapons of mass destruction. Consolidating the nuclear,chemical, and biological weapons treaty regimes once they arefully operational, encouraging greater involvement by nongovern-mental organizations in the UN disarmament process, and increas-ing the number of regional nuclear-weapons-free zones wereamong the issues debated.

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Participants

ChairRichard H. Stanley, President, The Stanley Foundation

RapporteursBruno Pigott, Program Officer, The Stanley FoundationMary Theisen, Program Officer, The Stanley Foundation

ParticipantsBerhanykun Andemicael, Representative of the Director-General,International Atomic Energy Agency

Richard Butler, Permanent Representative of Australia to the Unit-ed Nations

John Despres, US Assistant Secretary of Commerce for ExportEnforcement

Rolf Ekéus, Executive Chairman, United Nations Special Commis-sion on Iraq

Nabil Elaraby, Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic ofEgypt to the United Nations

Ahmad Kamal, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the Unit-ed Nations

Sohrab Kheradi, Deputy Director, Centre for Disarmament Affairs,Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

James Leonard, Acting President, United Nations Association ofthe United States of America

Edward C. Luck, President Emeritus and Senior Policy Adviser,United Nations Association of the United States of America

Michael L. Moodie, President, Chemical and Biological Arms Con-trol Institute

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Qin Huasun, Permanent Representative of the People’s Republicof China to the United Nations

Ben Sanders, Executive Chairman, Programme for PromotingNuclear Non-proliferation

Edwin M. Smith, Leon Benwell Professor of Law and InternationalRelations, University of Southern California

Roland Timerbaev, President, Center for Policy Studies in Russia

Stanley Foundation StaffSusan Moore, Conference Management AssociateKeith Porter, Producer, Common Ground

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants attended as indi-viduals rather than as representatives of their governments or organizations.

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Opening Remarks

by Richard H. Stanley, President, TheStanley Foundation

Welcome to the twenty-seventh UnitedNations Issues Conference. Our topic,“The Role of the United Nations in Elim-inating Weapons of Mass Destruction” isboth timely and challenging. Althoughthe Cold War is over and superpowertensions have diminished greatly, thethreat posed by weapons of massdestruction has not disappeared. In fact,the enduring presence of nuclear, chemi-

cal, and biological weapons continues to threaten global security.As long as such weapons exist, a secure peace with freedom andjustice will be at risk.

Why is now a good time to talk seriously about eliminatingweapons of mass destruction? Let me suggest several reasons.First, while the end of superpower rivalry minimized some globalsecurity threats, many remain. A mushrooming of ethnic rivalriesand enduring regional tensions have created pressures on nationsto expand or develop these massively destructive weapons. In theMiddle East, the world had a wake-up call when Iraq’s possessionof chemical and biological weapons stockpiles and nascent nuclearcapabilities were fully discovered. In East Asia, North Korea’s defi-ance of established nonproliferation norms threatened the viabilityof the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While these crises have been avert-ed, there is no guarantee that the international community willeffectively deal with similar events in the future.

Globally, nuclear weapons problems persist. Testing continues.Smuggling of nuclear materials by terrorists presents grave securi-ty risks. And, while vertical disarmament should be promising inthis post-Cold War era, the pace is disturbingly slow. We arealarmed by reports of development of chemical weapons in vari-ous countries, and of their use—even against domestic popula-tions. Growing stockpiles of unsafe and inadequately protected

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chemical weapons not only present security threats but environ-mental and health hazards as well. The list goes on, and I am sureit will be more than adequately discussed in the days ahead. Thepoint is that all of these problems and developments clearlydemonstrate the need to stop the spread of weapons of massdestruction and to work seriously toward their elimination.

Second, opportunities exist to push for complete disarmament, butwe will not be able to build momentum unless we take advantageof them. We have made progress. Last year the five nuclearweapons states pledged to complete negotiations on a Comprehen-sive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by September 1996. START II was rati-fied last month by the US Senate in a near-unanimous vote. TheRussian Duma may take action on the treaty this summer. Success-ful completion of both the test ban and START II would provide atremendous boost to nuclear arms control and could lead the wayto nuclear disarmament. The Chemical Weapons Convention, com-pleted in 1993, continues to gain international support. Althoughforty-two states have ratified the convention, sixty-five are neededbefore it may enter into force. It is encouraging, however, that one-hundred fifty-nine countries have now signed the convention. Withrespect to biological weapons, negotiations are well underway tocreate a legally binding instrument that will provide the means ofverification that was previously lacking in the biological weaponscontrol regime. A special United Nations’ committee is working toincorporate further confidence-building and transparency mea-sures into the biological weapons regime and is crafting a programfor international cooperation in biotechnology for peaceful purpos-es. The next biological weapons convention review conference willbe held late this year.

Finally, and perhaps most important, changes in the global politicalenvironment should permit real advances in the elimination ofweapons of mass destruction. Today security is no longer definedsolely by military strength; rather, it includes several dimensions,including political stability, a healthy economy and environment,and respect for human rights. There is a growing realizationamong experts and observers that neither status in the global com-munity nor solutions to complex problems can be found throughnuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Ethnic conflicts such asthe world has seen in Bosnia, devastating humanitarian disasters,

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intractable civil wars, and far-reaching economic crises call formore innovative solutions. In this environment, weapons of massdestruction—indeed, even the use of force—have been renderedfar less relevant. Consistent with this new outlook, various stateshave renounced the use and production of nuclear weapons—mostnotably, Ukraine, South Africa, Japan, and Germany. Their renunci-ation has bolstered world security. Moreover, growing economicinterdependence and technological change, particularly in commu-nications, have altered traditional notions of sovereignty and haveushered in an era where countries increasingly share commoninterests and objectives. As Barry Blechman and Cathleen Fisherhave so aptly stated in a recent Foreign Policy article, “[t]he use offorce, once accepted as an unfortunate but necessary consequenceof a world in which states remain sovereign, is losing its legitimacyexcept as a multinational instrument to enforce common values.”Perhaps for the first time since the Second World War, a window ofopportunity exists to eliminate, once and for all, weapons of massdestruction.

Why should we think about the United Nations’ role in disarma-ment? What should its contribution be at this critical juncture? TheUnited Nations has served a significant role in developing theworld’s weapons control regime and is in the best position to forgethe remaining work that needs to be done. The Non-ProliferationTreaty as well as the chemical and biological weapons conventionswere negotiated under UN auspices. The Comprehensive Test BanTreaty is nearing completion in the Disarmament Commission.Last June, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extendedby the General Assembly—a political breakthrough that seemedelusive only one year before. In the wake of the gulf war, the Secu-rity Council established a special commission on Iraq to renderharmless Iraq’s biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons—thefirst time the United Nations has involved itself in the dismantlingof a nation’s entire weapons system.

The United Nations is the only institution capable of serving theneeds and interests of a broad range of countries each having mul-tifaceted disarmament goals. For nonnuclear member states, theUnited Nations provides an opportunity for individual and region-al concerns to be brought before the world community. For nuclearstates, the United Nations has provided a forum for addressing the


need to halt weapons proliferation while at the same time servingto impose on them certain international responsibilities, includingprogress toward disarmament. I think my own country needs to bereminded of the important role the United Nations has had in tak-ing actions that are consistent with serving US security interests.For example, the work of various groups—such as the Internation-al Atomic Energy Agency in nuclear nonproliferation, the SpecialCommission in neutralizing Iraq’s weapons program, and the Dis-armament Commission in negotiating the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty—has served US security goals as well as those of othernations. Clearly, for the United States and the rest of the world, theUnited Nations is the only place where all nations can work togeth-er on disarmament.

Like it or not, the United Nations is the only game in town. It is theonly organization available to deal with these issues. For instance,in this post-Cold War era where the influence of superpowers hasgreatly diminished, multilateral action to prevent the spread ofnuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is essential. The UnitedNations is the only place to deal with both vertical and horizontalproliferation. And the United Nations is the only internationalbody that can perform the range of tasks necessary to reign inweapons proliferation, from the creation of norms and standards tothe enforcement of international commitments.

But if everything were perfect, we would not be here. While thechallenges before the United Nations are many, the organization’scapacity to deal with them is very limited. Currently, the UnitedNations and national governments move from crisis to crisis,developing ad hoc measures along the way. Member states’ finan-cial support of the United Nations is unpredictable. The UnitedNations and its related organizations have weak enforcementmechanisms, and their intelligence and monitoring activities relyon member states’ good will. Solutions to these and other problemsmust necessarily accompany any revitalized role of the UnitedNations in eliminating weapons of mass destruction.

Now is the time for member states to strengthen their resolve andcreate the political will to disarm. Nations need to assess both theadequacy of today’s global arms control regime and the UnitedNations’ institutional capabilities. The United Nations has much to

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offer. It is time the international community took full advantage ofit. What is more, by methodically assessing and strengthening itsrole in eliminating weapons of mass destruction, the UnitedNations will not only make this a safer world, but would, in theprocess, enhance its own viability as an international organizationthat makes a difference.

I want to stress to all of you the urgency in our task. At thismoment the political environment is conducive to progress towardthe total elimination of weapons of mass destruction. If that is trulyour goal, then we must act now before this window of opportunitycloses. For who knows how long this moment will last? In theseturbulent times, who knows what political changes will take placeover the next twelve months? Who knows what technologicaladvance may be the next weapon of mass destruction, triggeringanother arms buildup? Who knows what spark will cause a politi-cal flash point to ignite, resulting in the use of some weapon ofmass destruction? After crossing such a threshold in the use ofchemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, do we want to look backon this time and regret our inaction?

Unless we work now, we will continue to find ourselves runningdangerously and haphazardly from crisis to crisis. We cannot allowthe opportunity to eliminate these weapons pass. Working togethertoday could result in real progress. Improving the United Nations’capability will both strengthen the United Nations just when it isunder fire and help achieve our common goal. Tackling theseissues will not be simple. It will mean that institutions and nationswill have to shed outdated ideas. Your presence here indicates yourwillingness to take on the challenge. I look forward to our discus-sions.

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Conference Report

The Role of the United Nations in EliminatingWeapons of Mass Destruction

For more than forty years, the United Nations has been workingquietly, effectively, and almost without notice on an issue that hashung heavily over the world: curbing the horizontal and verticalproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yet, only now maythe United Nations be uniquely positioned to facilitate their elimi-nation. While the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Prolifer-ation Treaty (NPT) received most of the attention last year, therehave been other less prominent but equally important develop-ments. The UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) has identi-fied, monitored, and verified the destruction of Iraq’s nuclearweapons capacity. The United Nations is working to strengthencompliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). TheConference on Disarmament successfully completed negotiationson the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and is now negotiat-ing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The United Nations has thepotential to play a central role in ridding the world of weapons ofmass destruction, but is the world community ready to embracethe goal by taking advantage of the United Nations’ strengths andimproving its capabilities?

The Stanley Foundation convened its twenty-seventh UnitedNations Issues Conference with three broad aims. The first was toexplore whether the goal of eliminating weapons of mass destruc-tion is indeed feasible. The second was to examine the UnitedNations’ past record and current role in dealing with proliferation.The third objective was to identify concrete, short- and long-termstrategies for improving the United Nations’ performance in thisarea.

Issues Relating to Elimination: Feasibility and Precon-ditions Although participants agreed that the total elimination of theweapons of mass destruction was desirable, some doubted its fea-sibility. The post-Cold War world is an uncertain, unstable place.

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Rapporteurs Mary Theisen and Bruno Pigott

Although old ideological enmities have faded,old alliances have become strained, internal con-flicts have escalated, and countries’ reactions tointernational crises are less predictable. As aresult, some argued the climate for eliminatingweapons of mass destruction is not good. Theycited several examples. The prohibition on theuse of chemical and biological weapons is still nota universally accepted norm; only forty-twonations have ratified the CWC, still short of the sixty-five neededfor the convention to enter into force. More states have crossed thenuclear threshold and others seem to be on the verge. Many statesalready possess the capability to produce biological and chemicalweapons and delivery systems. Although the United States hastalked about eliminating weapons of mass destruction, it has notcommitted to any timetable. Some questioned whether internation-al institutions are, in fact, capable of addressing these issues.

However, most participants saw in today’s global environment aunique window of opportunity. They cited the end of the Cold War,which has brought unprecedented progress in bilateral agreementssuch as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, START I, andSTART II. The NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995. Nations

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The rapporteurs prepared this report following the conference. It containstheir interpretation of the proceedings and is not merely a descriptive,chronological account. Participants neither reviewed nor approved thereport. Therefore, it should not be assumed that every participant sub-scribes to all recommendations, observations, and conclusions.

Mostparticipantssaw...a uniquewindow ofopportunity.

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such as South Africa and Brazil have renounced their nuclearweapons programs. And nuclear powers have pledged, as part ofthe extension of the NPT, to complete a Comprehensive Test BanTreaty in 1996 and to make systematic efforts to reduce nuclearstockpiles with the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclearweapons. Moreover, the signing of the CWC brings the total elimi-nation of these weapons within reach, and negotiations continue toput teeth into the BWC.

Both the hopeful and the doubtful acknowledged that progresstoward complete disarmament would need to be undertaken stepby step and accompanied by new security assurances and a greatlyreduced level of conventional armaments. Given political unpre-dictability, the opportunity to agree upon and implement the elimi-nation of weapons of mass destruction may be short-lived. Unlessnew steps are taken, the present situation could deteriorate andnew weapons technology, smuggling, and proliferation among non-state actors could lead to a new arms race. Acting now is important.Participants discussed what should be done to move toward thegoal of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. They agreed thata new global security compact or commitment was a preconditionfor the total elimination of these weapons.

Security Elimination of weapons of mass destruction cannot be divorcedfrom the issue of security. The two are intertwined in a Gordianknot. Acquisition of weapons is spurred by a sense of insecurity.

Yet, the weapons themselves breed insecurity thatinevitably leads to further proliferation. The keyto halting the spiraling proliferation of theseweapons is to build a sense of global security.

But how can security be created when both theelimination and proliferation of these weaponscan create imbalances which give rise to a senseof insecurity? Two rationales exist. One beginswith the perception that insecurity is the cause ofarmament. Nations arm when they perceive secu-rity threats. Absent regional or strategic alliancesassuring security, nations will arm themselves.The first step, according to this approach, is to

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Elimination ofweapons

of massdestruction

cannot bedivorced from

the issue ofsecurity.


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bolster the current collective security mechanism—the UnitedNations—or develop a new one.

A second rationale is based on the premise that arms create inse-curity. Weapons of mass destruction, by their nature, create aninsecure environment and promote proliferation. It is important,therefore, to first gain general acceptance of the idea that securityis enhanced by disarmament, then take steps to disarm.

Most participants agreed that these rationales are not mutuallyexclusive. Both should be addressed simultaneously. Additionally,different regions will require different kinds of security assuranceswhich range from nuanced promises to formal alliances. Perhapsmost important to proceed, trust must be developed betweennations.

A Global CompactSome called for a “global compact” by which countries wouldestablish a fundamental political agreement, a common under-standing that weapons of mass destruction are wrong and that theworld is committed to their elimination. Only through a globalcompact will serious disarmament begin. Many participants notedthat trust is often lacking, especially between nuclear weaponstates (NWSs) and nonnuclear weapon states (NNWSs). TheNNWSs believe that while they have complied with the NPT, theNWSs have generally ignored their Article 6 obligation to negoti-ate in good faith a complete disarmament treaty. The NWSs, onthe other hand, are concerned that certain NNWSs may attempt toobtain nuclear weapons production capability. They view therefusal of some nations to sign the NPT as a proliferation danger.This atmosphere builds distrust.

What options are available to break through the feelings of dis-trust? Participants pointed to several possibilities, including elimi-nating large weapons stockpiles, putting conventions into force,renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons, disarming small andlarge NWSs simultaneously, and establishing confidence-buildingmeasures.


Obstacles to the Elimination of WeaponsIn a broad sense, increasing security and creating a global under-standing are preconditions to the elimination of weapons of massdestruction. Participants also examined more specific, concretehurdles to making progress. Those hurdles include import/exportissues, technology transfers, smuggling, regional flash points, andan ineffective approach to enforcement issues.

Import/Export Issues Participants agreed that dual-use materials—materials that areused for economic development and could either directly or indi-rectly be used to produce weapons of mass destruction—are signif-icant impediments to eliminating weapons of mass destruction.Some participants advocated developing controls at national andinternational levels. Other participants argued that placing strictcontrols on exports would damage some countries’ economicgrowth and would not stop the transfer of sensitive technologies.They argued that nations should examine the intent of eachimporting nation on a case-by-case basis. Many other participantssought a middle ground advocating a “grand bargain” in whichexporting nations would agree to trade and importing countrieswould agree to establish transparency procedures which wouldassure that sensitive materials were used for peaceful purposes.

Technological IssuesThe advance of technology and the spread of knowledge are signif-icant obstacles to controlling weapons of mass destruction. This isparticularly true in the chemical and biological arms fields, whereknowledge needed to produce these weapons is widespread, asdemonstrated by the use of sarin nerve agent in a Tokyo commutertrain by the Aum cult in 1995. Participants noted that methods ofpreventing the spread of this knowledge—prohibiting high-tech-nology companies from hiring foreign nationals or preventing for-eign nationals from attending Western universities—would beundesirable and ineffective.

Smuggling The demise of the Soviet Union, increasing intrastate conflicts, andthe large number of nonstate actors have increased fears about thesecurity of nuclear stockpiles. In fact, smuggling incidents doubled

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from around sixty in 1993 to one-hundred twen-ty-four in 1994. Participants argued that the firstline of control is within nations. Each must main-tain more accurate recordkeeping of nuclearmaterials and permit greater transparency intrade. International organizations must developgreater data sharing.

Regional Flash Points Regional tensions and instances of noncompli-ance with treaty obligations present serious chal-lenges to the total elimination of weapons of massdestruction. For example, tensions are particular-ly high between India and Pakistan, two pre-sumptive nuclear powers who have gone to warthree times. Israel, generally recognized as having nuclearweapons in its arsenal, has not signed the NPT. Iran, a signatory ofthe NPT, is widely suspected of having embarked on a nuclearweapons program and may have received smuggled nuclear tech-nology from several sources. North Korea, also a member of theNPT, was actively developing a nuclear weapons program and hadthreatened to withdraw from the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) safeguards regime until agreement was reached inlate 1994 diverting the crisis. While progress has been made by thecreation of nuclear-weapons-free zones, the growth of post-ColdWar regional tensions coupled with the increasing availability ofnuclear and nonnuclear weapons materials and technologies mayfurther exacerbate regional tensions for the foreseeable future.

Inadequate Enforcement MechanismMany participants observed that reliance on the UN SecurityCouncil for enforcement of arms control regimes is problematic.They worried that the veto—particularly when five nuclear pow-ers are permanent members of the council—could result in selec-tive enforcement of treaty violations. For example, when NorthKorea did not allow certain inspections, the threat of a Chineseveto prevented the Security Council from placing sanctions.

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...reliance onthe UNSecurityCouncil forenforcementof armscontrolregimes isproblematic.


Participants meeting at Arden House discuss, informal and informal settings, the effort to elimi-nate weapons of mass destruction.


PHOTOS BY KEITH PORTER


Necessary Functions in an Effective DisarmamentRegimeIf the elimination of weapons of mass destruction is, as many par-ticipants argued, feasible, despite significant hurdles, it is importantto identify the necessary components of an effective disarmamentregime. Participants identified several components.

Norm-Setting and Treaty NegotiationThe UN system has been particularly effective in developing normsand facilitating the negotiation of treaties. More must be done tobolster enforcement provisions in the BWC, to reach a Comprehen-sive Test Ban Treaty, and to seek the commencement and conclusionof a convention banning the production of fissile materials forweapons production.

Enforcement One participant noted that “without enforcement provisions, con-ventions are nothing more than paper regimes.” Currently, theresponse to noncompliance is to turn the issue into one that must bedealt with at a political level. Some participants were satisfied withthe current system, arguing that other enforcement provisions arepolitically unrealistic, would lack teeth if implemented, and wouldonly harden the stance of treaty violators if they had teeth. Theseparticipants argued that the world already deals effectively withpotential violations of regimes such as the NPT and cited NorthKorea as an example. Most participants disagreed. They contendthat the political sensitivity of enforcement mechanisms arguedagainst the current ad hoc approach to enforcement and in favor of

devising an effective collective security mecha-nism to deal with enforcement in an evenhandedmanner.

VerificationVerification provisions, according to one partici-pant, are essential to political acceptance and aneffective regime. They should be designed to col-lect data or provide firsthand access to confirmor verify a state’s compliance with a treaty oragreement. The BWC third review conference,for instance, established a group of experts to

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Verificationprovisions...are

essential topolitical accep-

tance and aneffectiveregime.


examine possible verification measures. Critics ofthe CWC in the US Congress argue that its verifi-cation procedures do not provide, among otherthings, methods of detecting clandestine produc-tion facilities, diversion of precursors, and thetransfer of weapons technology. Many partici-pants agreed that some verification proceduresneed strengthening. Others believed that currentverification procedures are appropriate andshould not interfere with the sovereign rights ofnations.

Confidence-Building Measures and TransparencyConfidence-building measures and transparency work to elimi-nate the elements of secrecy in military activity. They help statesdistinguish between real and unfounded fears about threats frompotential adversaries. They include increased communication, dis-tribution and collection of technical data, scientific and technicalexchanges in the chemical and biological weapons fields, securityassurances, prenotification of weapons testing, as well as financialassistance.

Creation of Regional LinksParticipants endorsed regional disarmament approaches that sup-plement global efforts. Currently, there are four treaties establish-ing regional nuclear-weapons-free zones, all in the SouthernHemisphere: the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty(for Latin America and Caribbean states), the 1986 RarotongaTreaty (covering the South Pacific), and the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty(for all African states). In addition, in December 1995 the Associa-tion of Southeast Asian Nations formally endorsed a new nuclear-weapons-free zone that would abut the South Pacific zone. Theseregional agreements reflect the unique characteristics of differentregions and build transparency, confidence, and security.

The United Nations’ Advantages and Weaknesses Most participants agreed that the United Nations has had a dis-tinct comparative advantage in establishing international norms ofbehavior and in negotiating international agreements to controlthe spread of weapons of mass destruction. The complex techno-

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Weaponsproliferation isinherently aglobal politicalproblem whichneeds a globalsolution.


logical and political challenges of eliminating the threat ofweapons of mass destruction will not be met by any single state orset of states. Instead, weapons proliferation is inherently a globalpolitical problem which needs a global solution. The UnitedNations is the only international body to which nations have giventhe explicit authority for collective security and is the best—per-haps only—forum to negotiate multilateral commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament.

Helpful as norm-building and treaty making are, they are only twoaspects of disarmament. The United Nations and its subsidiaryorgans have not had similar success in confidence-building mea-sures, verification, monitoring of compliance, or enforcement.While participants considered such functions essential to an effec-tive arms control regime, the extent to which the United Nationscan or should enhance its activities and programs in these areaswas a matter of extended debate.

The primary issue was whether the United Nations should in factbe more involved in these other aspects of arms control. Oneminority view held that the United Nations was created primarilyto provide a forum to address global issues on a multilateral basisand, as such, cannot be expected to perform functions beyondbuilding international norms and negotiating treaties. The UnitedNations is not a treaty implementation organization per se or a for-mal institution which could be assigned the task of directly control-ling weapons of mass destruction. Given these limitations, thefunctional aspects of nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponscontrol, including enforcement, should be handled within the insti-tutions created to regulate them. The IAEA, it was noted, already

has a functioning comprehensive safeguard sys-tem and the CWC will have one once the conven-tion enters into force.

Other participants envisioned a more involvedrole for the United Nations in eliminatingweapons of mass destruction. However, they rec-ognized problems rooted in both the structureand operation of the United Nations that wouldneed to be solved before it could take the lead.Since the UN Charter was “preatomic,” it was

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The UnitedNations is

not a treatyimplementa-

tion organiza-tion per se...


neither created nor equipped to deal with theproliferation of nuclear weapons. The SecurityCouncil was also seen as anachronistic—“a 1945tool dealing with century problems.” In its pre-sent configuration, the United Nations is not anideal foundation upon which to craft a system ofinternational collective security. Nevertheless,most participants agreed that it is the best vehicleavailable to the international community.

Improving the United Nations’ Effectiveness Participants assessed the United Nations’ presentability to facilitate eliminating weapons of massdestruction and proposed various reforms both toits structure and operation. Any enhanced UNrole in controlling weapons proliferation mustalso be accompanied by reform of those UN bodies responsible fornonproliferation and disarmament. How to improve the disarma-ment structure and whether such restructuring should involverevising the UN Charter were issues that generated substantialdebate. Discussion centered on reforming the Security Council, theSecretariat, and the Disarmament Commission. Participants alsoassessed the role of regional nuclear-weapons-free zones and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in disarmament.

Security CouncilUnder the UN Charter, the Security Council holds “primaryresponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secu-rity” and has the authority to “decide what measures shall betaken...to maintain or restore international peace and security.”Consistent with this mandate, the disarmament regimes negotiatedunder UN auspices give a special enforcement role to the SecurityCouncil in implementation. For example, the IAEA statute requiresviolations of its safeguards system, which the agency implementsunder the NPT, to be referred to the Security Council. In 1993 theIAEA referred a case—concerning North Korean compliance—forthe first time. The CWC calls on the Security Council to considerquestions of enforcement and withdrawal, as does the BWC. Mostparticipants questioned the reliability of the Security Council infulfilling these institutional duties, especially with respect toenforcement. They explored whether and to what extent the Securi-ty Council’s veto power should be revised; whether the Security

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...the disarma-ment regimesnegotiatedunder UNauspices givea specialenforcementrole to theSecurityCouncil...


Council’s powers to determine the existence of violations andundertake enforcement measures should be removed and vestedinstead in the respective nuclear, chemical, and biological treatyorganizations; whether the composition of the Security Counciladequately reflects today’s global power structure; and whetheradditional resources should be provided to the Security Council toexpand its expertise in arms control issues.

Enforcement and the Veto Power. Participants had varying opin-ions regarding reform of the veto power of the permanent fivemembers of the Security Council. For some, the veto power wasthe most significant obstacle to more effective treaty enforcement.The council’s inability to act because of a lack of consensus has ledto inconsistent and unpredictable responses to noncompliance. Theunpredictability, in turn, has undermined deterrence and has effec-tively ceded to one or two countries the task of upholdinginternational proliferation norms. A few participants suggestedprohibiting the use of the veto when the council makes decisionsrelated to noncompliance and enforcement. This would requireeither revising the Security Council’s rules of procedure (which arestill provisional due to this issue) or amending the Charter. The lat-ter, of course, would present more formidable political obstacles.One participant cautioned that, given the decidedly anti-UN moodof the US Congress, tampering with the Security Council’s vetopower could be explosive. Also, pressure on the Security Councilto alter its rules of procedures would require strong Security Coun-cil support, not just “grudging consent.” One participant suggestedlimiting the scope of the veto with respect to nonmilitary measures,such as economic sanctions authorized in Article 41, as a first stepto gauge the viability of the proposal.

As an alternative to amending the Charter or the Security Council’srules of procedure, some participants proposed that member statesensure greater uniformity in the council’s enforcement decisions byclarifying the council’s responsibilities. There is a “gray area”between the enforcement role the treaty regimes assign to the Secu-rity Council and the fundamental mandate of the Security Council.These participants suggested amending the NPT, CWC, and BWCto establish a definitive set of responses available to the council.More explicit instructions written into the treaties might injectmore predictability into Security Council responses.

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Remove Noncompliance and Enforcement Decisions From theSecurity Council. A few participants suggested reassigning thepresent role of the Security Council in identifying noncomplianceand carrying out enforcement. They argued that the inconsistencyof the Security Council’s decisions regardingenforcement of the NPT has produced resentmentand accusations of double standards. This hasworked to undermine the regime’s legitimacy. Toameliorate this, one participant proposed remov-ing the Security Council’s enforcement powersand vesting those powers in the separate institu-tions created by the nuclear, chemical, and biolog-ical weapons treaty regimes, such as the IAEA orthe Organization for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons. Another proposal was to assign someor all Security Council enforcement authority to anew UN body or to a transformed UN Trustee-ship Council. The administrative cost of convert-ing the Trusteeship Council into a disarmamentenforcement authority would be minimized since the body alreadyexists, but member states would need to define the new TrusteeshipCouncil’s relationship with the Security Council.

Participants also discussed who should determine the existence oftreaty violations—an issue fraught with political tensions on allsides. The CWC, for example, was originally intended to placeevery member state in an equal position with respect to identifyinginstances of noncompliance. This would have been accomplishedby granting the executive council of the CWC, not the SecurityCouncil, authority to identify chemical weapons violations. Duringnegotiations, the prerogative of identifying violations was grantedto the Security Council. One participant criticized this as an unnec-essary enhancement of Security Council powers at the expense of afully capable executive council. Those who supported the currentCWC structure responded that the objective of preserving SecurityCouncil control was not to deprive the executive council of thepower for the sake of protecting the Security Council’s domain.Instead, one participant asserted, if the executive council hadauthority to identify violations of the CWC, it might not recognizeobvious violations for political reasons. Additionally, an executive

Theinconsistencyof the SecurityCouncil’sdecisionsregarding theNPT hasproducedresentment...


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council pronouncement that a violation had occurred would forcethe Security Council to take punitive enforcement actions, depriv-ing it of alternative ways to ensure compliance. It is not clear, how-ever, how the Security Council would be less political in identifyingCWC violations.

Change the Security Council Composition. Some participantsclaimed the Security Council’s composition must be changed if it isto become more effective in disarmament. The current membershipis small; it does not include several states which have recentlycrossed the nuclear threshold, nor does it include important eco-nomic and regional powers. Participants acknowledged the varietyof proposals to expand the council: adding permanent members;creating a “tenured” membership category where members wouldsit for longer than the current two years; adding regional represen-tation; or simply expanding the current size of the council throughthe addition of more rotating members. Others were skeptical andcautioned against building security structures within the UnitedNations that do not reflect the power balances of the internationalsystem. In the long run, they argued, imposing a structure thatignores global realities will hinder the United Nations’ ability torespond to future security threats and would harm considerablythe organization’s credibility.

Increase Security Council Expertise on Disarmament Issues. TheSecurity Council lacks the institutional expertise to monitor andanalyze proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although the

permanent five do have adequate sources of infor-mation, the temporary members do not; instead,they must rely on the permanent members. Thisdeficiency has contributed to the council’s ad hocapproach to confronting proliferation threats. Ithas also denied the council the opportunity todevelop early warning mechanisms, to engage inpreventive diplomacy, or to make well-informeddecisions on proliferation issues.

Some participants supported the creation, underthe authority of Article 29, of either a special Secu-rity Council rapporteur for disarmament or a per-manent professional staff of experts serving the

...the SecurityCouncil’s com-

position mustbe changed

if it is tobecome more

effective indisarmament.


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Security Council exclusively. The staff would pro-vide information, analysis, and advice and wouldassist the council in examining and responding tothe secretary-general’s reports on disarmament.Reliance on one resource would foster consensusamong the permanent five, allow the SecurityCouncil to be more active in disarmament issues,and encourage the sharing of information betweeninstitutions and governments. Most important, theSecurity Council’s discussion and decisions onproliferation threats would be based on a deeperawareness of the political and technical issuesinvolved. On the other hand, some participantsexpressed reservations about the wisdom ofexpanding the resources of a Security Council thatis unrepresentative, operates in a shroud of secre-cy, and has of late been too active in passing rela-tively unimportant resolutions.

As an alternative to creating a subsidiary staff orrapporteur, the Security Council might consider reviving the his-torically neglected Military Staff Committee to provide it with dis-armament expertise. This committee was originally intended, asstated in Article 47 of the UN Charter, to “advise and assist theSecurity Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’smilitary requirements for the maintenance of international peaceand security, the employment and command of forces placed at itsdisposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarma-ment.” Since the committee already exists to serve the SecurityCouncil, the administrative and political problems associated withbreathing life into the Military Staff Committee would be limited.Participants stressed that member states would need to define therelationship of the Military Staff Committee to the Security Coun-cil.

Secretariat The resources the Secretariat commits to disarmament were seenas inadequate. To help the Security Council have an informedunderstanding of complexities involved in any disarmamentissue, the Secretariat would need personnel that could give sub-stantive input. A small office within the Secretariat staffed by arms

Someparticipantssupported thecreation...ofeither a specialSecurityCouncilrapporteur fordisarmamentor a perma-nent profes-sional staff ofexperts....


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control experts could be appointed to provide substantive supportfor the periodic weapons review conferences and to assist the sec-retary-general in drafting his Article 99 reports on disarmament tothe Security Council.

Disarmament Commission Participants differed on their assessment of the Disarmament Com-mission’s contribution to the United Nations’ arms control efforts.Some maintained the commission makes valuable contributions to

the policy process. For example, the commissionprovides a forum where diplomats identify areasfor norm-setting and discuss the feasibility ofacademic ideas and NGO recommendations onarms control—where the “world of politics anddiplomacy visits theory.” Nevertheless, support-ers contend that the Disarmament Commissionis underutilized. It could be more effective if itwere required to explore disarmament issuesthat do not lend themselves to General Assemblyor Security Council consideration, such as

whether, or how, to close the gaps in the UN disarmament regime;the desirability of strengthening the relationship between or out-right consolidation of the nuclear, chemical, and biologicalweapons control regimes; whether NGOs should be grantedgreater access to UN processes, including formal access to the com-mission itself; and the sensitive issue of timing of a fourth GeneralAssembly Special Session on Disarmament.

Other participants viewed the Disarmament Commission lessfavorably and suggested that UN funds could be better spent.When assessing the United Nations’ effectiveness in global disar-mament, one participant suggested that the Disarmament Commis-sion was “as useless as the Indian Ocean Committee” and urgedthe United Nations to be “ruthless” in its analysis of which institu-tions work and which do not.

Strengthening the Role of Treaty Regimes, RegionalNuclear-Weapons-Free Zones, and NGOs Although reforming the structure and operation of UN entitiesdirectly responsible for disarmament is crucial for the greater con-trol and eventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction, par-

The resourcesthe Secretariat

commits todisarmamentwere seen asinadequate.


ticipants explored other avenues as well. Partici-pants concentrated their analysis on consolidat-ing the nuclear, chemical, and biologicalweapons treaty regimes (once all become opera-tional) into one weapons control agency;expanding the number and interconnectednessof regional nuclear-weapons-free zones; andassessing the most effective role for NGOs in thedisarmament process.

Treaty RegimesThere was a sharp division among participantsregarding the merits of consolidating the nucle-ar, chemical, and biological weapons controlregimes into one weapons control agency. Mostparticipants were generally supportive of theproposal. The IAEA, clearly the most developedweapons control regime, has institution-building and technicalexpertise which could be readily shared with a revitalized biologi-cal weapons regime and with a future chemical weapons regime.At a minimum, ideas for implementing the CWC and BWC couldbe gleaned from the IAEA’s experience. Proponents of some formof consolidation maintain that the successful UNSCOM is a poten-tial model for regime consolidation given its structure of mutuallycomplimentary activities. UNSCOM’s nuclear disarmament

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There wasdivisionregarding themerits ofconsolidatingthe nuclear,chemical, andbiologicalweaponscontrolregimes....

In an unprecedented opera-tion, the United NationsSpecial Commission(UNSCOM) has overseenthe destruction of most ofIraq’s weapons of massdestruction. Here filters ata ballistic missile site areburned.

UN PHOTO


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responsibilities are performed with the close cooperation of theIAEA, but it has sole discretion over chemical and biologicalweapons aspects of the operation. UNSCOM represents a uniqueapproach to linking chemical and biological weapons controls.

Others viewed any integration of the treaty regimes as misguided.There is no overarching principle within the three regimes thatsuggests they operate in tandem. The problems associated withmonitoring and verifying compliance with chemical and biologicalweapons controls differ from nuclear weapons controls. Variousscientific and technological distinctions make the wholesale liftingof one compliance regime onto another unworkable. Furthermore,opponents noted, the international community should be cautiousabout the suitability of UNSCOM as an integrative model.UNSCOM’s strength is based on a binding Security Council resolu-tion and, more important, the unwavering commitment of thecouncil’s five permanent members to the elimination of Iraq’sweapons of mass destruction. UNSCOM was created under specialcircumstances and, as such, is not readily adaptable to other situa-tions.

Regional Nuclear-Weapons-Free ZonesIncreasing the number of regional nuclear-weapons-free zones wasseen as a complementary path toward building a world free ofweapons of mass destruction. More than one hundred countriesacross Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia currently adhere

to regional nuclear-weapons-free zones, and cer-tain Central Asian countries within the formerSoviet Union are moving in that direction. Sincemost conflicts involving weapons of massdestruction emerge at the regional level, thisapproach to disarmament and nonproliferationis promising. To aid these regional efforts, partic-ipant suggested that the nuclear, chemical, andbiological weapons control regimes expand theirconnections to the regional zones and encouragetheir momentum. At a minimum, they have sym-bolic value and may help nations visualize aworld without such weapons.

Should theUnited Nations

encouragemore extensiveinvolvement by

NGOs in thedisarmament

process...?


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Nongovernmental Organizations Should the United Nations encourage moreextensive involvement by NGOs in the disarma-ment process or is their present level of accesssufficient? Opinions varied. Some argued thatNGOs are not truly “representative” organiza-tions (many in fact do not run their own organi-zations democratically) and cannot realisticallyclaim to reflect the views of their respective coun-tries’ citizenry. Moreover, NGOs do not necessari-ly have influence with their own national govern-ments. Each has its own agenda, complicating theUnited Nations’ task of choosing which NGOs would be allowedgreater access should the United Nations decide to expand the NGOpresence. It would be rare for any NGO to be accepted by all mem-ber states. In light of these enduring problems, some participantsbelieved NGOs should not be given greater access to the UN disar-mament process.

Other participants argued that NGOs have contributed to disarma-ment and should continue to do so. That NGOs may not be repre-sentative organizations does not detract from their ability to makespecial contributions to disarmament issues. For example, NGOsprovide a convenient channel through which academia and armscontrol experts can interact with the United Nations to define theintellectual terrain and help create and shape policy options. Theyare constructively involved in confidence-building measures and intransparency programs enabling states to better ascertain the intentof parties acquiring certain products and materials. They are adeptat identifying issues before they escalate into crises. Ultimately,NGOs “keep diplomats honest” by striving to hold the UnitedNations and its member states to their commitments. Even thosewho criticized NGOs conceded that they have a role to play.

One participant maintained that NGOs are most effective when theyare “working the corridors.” Any other arrangements, such asallowing certain NGOs to address member states on the floor of theGeneral Assembly during official meetings, were less meaningfulsince the delegations pay little, if any, attention to them. Most partic-ipants agreed, however, that NGOs could contribute more to the dis-armament process by expanding their activities to other aspects of

Even thosewho criticizedNGOsconcededthat theyhave a roleto play.


arms control, such as developing practical approaches to rational-ize conventional weapons control regimes with regulation ofweapons of mass destruction. Eventually, NGOs could be involvedin providing transparency to ensure that no nation rebuildsweapons of mass destruction once they have been truly eliminated.

Short- and Long-Term Strategies for Improving theUN RoleThroughout the conference participants identified concrete stepsand strategies which, if embraced and implemented, could pavethe way toward global elimination of weapons of mass destruction.Although there clearly are no quick fixes, participants agreed thatsome progress is better than none. The following is a list of specificrecommendations. Not all participants agreed with the feasibilityor desirability of any one recommendation. Each proposal, howev-er, elicited substantial discussion and support.

Short-Term Strategies: • Convene a special Security Council meeting to discuss the

broad issue of the role of nuclear weapons in the post-ColdWar era.

• Complete the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Stopping thequalitative development of nuclear weapons would pave theway for quantitative ceilings and transparency in fissile materi-al sales.

• Commit to a no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons.• Convene a fourth Special Session on Disarmament to discuss

the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction. • Create a UN register for weapons of mass destruction to

increase transparency.• Create a staff of arms control experts and/or a rapporteur on

proliferation as an Article 29 “subsidiary organ” of the SecurityCouncil.

• Enhance conventional weapons control by adding more typesof conventional weapons to the UN Register of ConventionalArms.

• Hold discussion within the General Assembly regarding therole of NGOs in the UN disarmament structure and processes.

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Long-Term Strategies:• Strengthen regional approaches to disarmament.• Pursue both disarmament and nonproliferation and establish a

timetable for total elimination of weapons of mass destruction.• Explore the use of the Security Council veto as it relates to dis-

armament issues and the composition of the council. • Define clearly the role of the Disarmament Commission. • Form an interparliamentary union to encourage consensus on

disarmament among the national governments.• Explore the feasibility of unifying the nuclear, chemical, and

biological weapons control regimes.• Expand the Security Council’s access to arms control expertise

through the creation of Security Council subsidiary bodies orby enhancing Secretariat support.

ConclusionA universal commitment to eliminate weapons of mass destructionis a necessary first step before any international organization cansuccessfully work toward that goal. When the political will isfound, the United Nations, more than any other international orga-nization, is well-positioned to orchestrate disarmament. However,the United Nations’ abilities to foster such a global commitmentand to conduct the actual disarmament once the commitment ismade are hampered by enduring structural and operational prob-lems. The international community must work to address theseproblems. It must build consensus on how to compel compliancewith the treaty regimes and on the proper role of the UnitedNations and the Security Council.

Today’s window of opportunity must be used to maximum advan-tage. For the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age more thanfifty years ago, the political environment is favorable to forge aglobal commitment to eliminate weapons of mass destruction.Unless nations act now, the world may find itself confrontingfuture dangers far worse than present ones.

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Chairman’s Observations

Arden House discussions confirmed that, for the first time sincethe Second World War, there is a credible opportunity to eliminateweapons of mass destruction. However, desirable as this objectiveis, progress will be neither easy nor immediate. It will be achievedstep by step.

Delegitimizing the use of weapons of mass destruction is the firststep toward elimination. Nations need to reach a fundamentalagreement that the development, deployment, and use of weaponsof mass destruction is wrong and must commit to their elimina-tion. This “global compact” should be coupled with a continuingseries of confidence-building measures such as commitments to ano-first-use policy, completion of the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, strength-ening of the Biological Weapons Convention verification regime,creation of a register of weapons of mass destruction, and othersimilar actions.

A second essential element is greater transparency in all mattersrelating to weapons of mass destruction including transfers of sen-sitive technologies. In the past certain nations denied technologytransfers to others as a means of preventing the spread of suchweapons. Strategies of denial are less and less effective. In theinterconnected, knowledge-based societies of today and the future,it is increasingly difficult to control information and technology.Strategies of transparency are needed. We need open mechanismsto monitor the extent and intended use of technology transfers.Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—whether representingindustry, technical, or other interest groups—should continue tobring questionable uses to the attention of appropriate institutionsand enforcement authorities.

Third, we need effective institutions to enforce treaty obligationsand encourage adherence to international norms. The UnitedNations is the best starting place for this. As we consider how bestto use the United Nations, we should look to successes, such as theInternational Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Special Commis-sion on Iraq, as models. Regional organizations and nuclear-


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weapons-free zones are also important to the elimination processand should be encouraged. Similarly, NGOs and civil society havemuch to contribute through information gathering, lobbying, con-ceptualization, and advocacy.

Ultimately, we will need to link elimination of weapons of massdestruction with reductions in conventional weapons and to breathnew life into the old concept of general and complete disarma-ment.

We must rise to the challenge of this unprecedented opportunity tomove toward total elimination of weapons of mass destruction.The prospective benefits call for political will and commitmentfrom all concerned. Let us not miss this opportunity.


the role of the united nations in eliminating weapons of ... · sohrab kheradi, deputy director,...

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