The Role of Personality, Psychopathy, and PreviousExperience with Assessment in Intentions to Fakein Psychological Testing

Rachel Grieve

Published online: 10 November 2012# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

Abstract Much research has addressed the possible antecedents of faking behaviour,however these approaches tend to be theoretical rather than empirical in nature. Thisstudy empirically examined for the first time the role of personality and previousexperience with psychological testing in intentions to fake on psychological assess-ment. Participants (N=232 community members, n=175 females, n=58 males)completed the HEXACO-60 measure of personality, a measure of primary andsecondary psychopathy, provided information on whether they had experience inpsychological assessment, and rated their intentions to fake in future psychologicaltesting. Analysis via hierarchical multiple regression indicated lower levels of con-scientiousness, higher levels of psychopathy, and previous experience with psycho-logical testing significantly predicted intentions to engage in faking in futureassessment. In addition, lower levels of secondary psychopathy were also associatedwith intentions, however inspection of zero-order correlations suggested this influ-ence was via a suppressor effect. These results provide insight into the mechanismspredicting intentions to fake in psychological testing, which may subsequently informrecruiting or diagnostic practices.

Keywords Faking . Malingering . Honesty-humility . Psychopathy . Intention

It is well-established that individuals do not always respond honestly when under-taking psychological assessment, and may fake their responses. However, despite theimportance of decisions sometimes made on the basis of psychological testing (suchas offers of employment or compensation), the processes underlying faking are notclearly understood (Griffith and Peterson 2011). While a substantial body of researchhas examined the effects of faking on test scores, to date, very little research hasexamined the antecedents to faking, and those that have addressed this issue have

Curr Psychol (2012) 31:414–422DOI 10.1007/s12144-012-9158-x

R. Grieve (*)School of Psychology, Australian Catholic University, 1100 Nudgee Rd, Banyo, Brisbane, QLD 4014,Australiae-mail: rachel.grieve@acu.edu.au

tended to be theoretical, rather than empirical in nature (for example, Goffin andBoyd 2009; Levashina and Campion 2006; Snell et al. 1999). The aim of this researchwas to empirically test for the first time the role of personality, psychopathy, andprevious experience with psychological testing in determining intentions to fake inpsychological testing.

Faking or malingering can be defined as the strategic or dishonest presentation ofthe self when undergoing psychological testing (Grieve and Mahar 2010). Although anumber of potential factors have been identified that may influence whether or not apsychological assessment will be faked (for example, to obtain medication; greed;feelings of entitlement, etcetera; see Iverson 2007) extant research examining the roleindividual differences in intentions to fake in psychological testing is limited.

Given the paucity of research on faking intentions, Snell et al. (1999) examinedextant research in the fields of deception (for example academic cheating, employeetheft, and social deviance within organizations) and suggested dispositional factorsassociated with motivation to fake might include integrity and manipulativeness.Similarly to Snell et al. (1999), Levashina and Campion (2006) turned to generalliterature on deception in order to generate hypotheses regarding possiblepredictors of willingness to fake. Again, manipulativeness was identified ashaving potential validity in predicting faking intentions, given the construct’scalculating and self-serving nature. The authors also argued that individualshigh in agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability should be lesswilling to fake (presumably due to the anti-social nature of faking). Levashinaand Campion also suggested integrity levels would predict willingness to fake,as low scores on integrity tests have been shown to predict counterproductiveorganizational behaviours. Most recently, Goffin and Boyd (2009) suggestedmanipulativeness, integrity, conscientiousness, and emotional stability might predictwillingness to fake.

The Current Research

While previous research therefore suggests aspects of personality may be involved inintentions to fake in psychological testing, existing research has been comprised oftheoretical propositions rather than empirical examination of relevant constructs.However, there are two common themes evident within the research which appearto have predictive validity: integrity and manipulativeness. The aim of the currentresearch was to operationalize these individual differences within the context offaking, thus allowing the role of integrity and manipulativeness in intentions to faketo be empirically tested for the first time.

Ashton et al. (2004) identified and labeled a factor of personality tapping intocharacteristics of sincerity and reciprocal altruism: Honesty-Humility. Within theHEXACO model of personality, Honesty-Humility reflects a tendency to be straight-forward and fair in interpersonal relations (Ashton and Lee 2007). It follows that theassessment of Honesty-Humility may therefore allow the role of integrity in formingintentions to fake to be identified. Use of the HEXACO model also allows for thesimultaneous assessment of the additional relevant constructs of conscientiousnessand agreeableness.

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Psychopathy is characterized by self-serving, deceptive, and remorseless behaviors(Hare 1996). Individuals with psychopathic tendencies are skilled at manipulationand have little regard for social norms. It was deemed possible that by includingpsychopathy as a variable of interest, the influence of manipulativeness on intentionsto fake in psychological assessment could be readily assessed.

Thus, it was hypothesized that lower levels of honesty-humility, lower levels ofconscientiousness, and higher levels of the manipulative construct of psychopathywould predict intentions to fake in psychological assessment. Previous experiencewith psychological assessment was also included as a predictor for completeness.

Method

Participants

Participants (N=232) were recruited from the Australian community. The majority ofthe sample were female (n=175), and were aged between 18 and 45 (63.4 %). Almostall participants identified as being European/White Australian (88.8 %), with a smallproportion identifying as Asian (4.7 %), Indigenous Australian (2.6 %), MiddleEastern (.4 %), or Other (1.7 %). 43.9 % of the sample reported completing apsychological test for personality assessment purposes before. There were no selec-tion criteria.

Design

A cross-sectional, correlational design was used, with analysis conducted via hierar-chical multiple regression. In the first step, the predictor variables were Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, andOpenness to experience. In the second step, the additional predictors of primaryand secondary psychopathy were added. In the third step, the final predictor wasprevious experience with psychological assessment. The outcome variable was in-tention to fake in future psychological tests. As a control measure, the items assessingintentions to fake in future assessment were presented last to avoid the possibility thatasking about faking might influence individuals’ genuine responses to the personalityand psychopathy measures.

Materials

Intention to Fake Intention to fake in future psychological tests was measured usingfour items: I intend to fake on future psychological tests; If I could see a benefit, Iwould fake responses on a psychological test; I would never fake on a psychologicaltest (reverse scored); and I expect to fake on future psychological tests. Participantsrespond using a five-point Likert style scale, with the anchors 1=strongly disagreeand 5=strongly agree. Responses were summed, with higher scores reflecting astronger intention to fake. Internal reliability was very good in the current sample(Cronbach’s α=.84).

416 Curr Psychol (2012) 31:414–422

Personality Personality was assessed using Ashton and Lee’s (2009) HEXACO-60.This scale provides subscale scores for Honesty-Humility (a sample item is I wouldnever accept a bribe, even if it were very large), Emotionality (I sometimes can’t helpworrying about little things), Extraversion (The first thing that I always do in a newplace is to make friends), Agreeableness (Most people tend to get angry more quicklythan I do), Conscientiousness (I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scramblingat the last minute), and Openness to experience (I like people who have unconven-tional views). A Likert-style response scale is used (1=strongly disagree, 5=stronglyagree). Internal reliability for the measure is good, with Cronbach’s αs between .74and .80 in a community sample (Ashton and Lee 2009).

Psychopathy Psychopathy was measured using Levenson et al. (1995) primarypsychopathy (16 items) and secondary psychopathy (10 items) scale. A sampleprimary psychopathy item is For me, what’s right is whatever I can get away with.A sample secondary psychopathy item is I quickly lose interest in tasks I start.Participants respond on a four-point Likert style scale, where 1=disagree stronglyand 4=agree strongly. Internal reliability for the primary psychopathy subscale isgood (α=.82) and for the secondary psychopathy subscale is adequate (α=.63)(Levenson et al. 1995).

Previous Experience with Psychological Assessment Participants were given oneitem in a forced choice format asking whether they had ever completed a personalitytest for psychological assessment before.

Procedure

Ethical approval was obtained from the University Human Research EthicsCommittee. To avoid recruitment bias, participants were invited to participatein a study investigating individual differences influencing psychological assess-ment, and completed the study either using an online link or paper copies ofthe questionnaires.

Results

Regression diagnostics revealed one influential case. This case was removed foranalyses and consequently all relevant assumptions were met. There was a smallamount of missing data: cases with missing datum points were excluded listwise.Together, these changes resulted in a usable data set from 228 participants.

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, and were generally in line with thosereported in previous research (Ashton and Lee 2009; Levenson et al. 1995). However,participants in the current study showed slightly higher endorsement of the Honesty-Humility items, and slightly lower levels of primary psychopathy. Bivariate correla-tions are presented in Table 2.

In step 1 of the hierarchical multiple regression, the combination of Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness andOpenness together significantly predicted intentions to fake in future psychological

Curr Psychol (2012) 31:414–422 417

testing, R=.32, R2=.10 (Adj R2=.08), explaining 10.2 % of intentions to fake, F(6,221)=4.17, p=.001. Within the model, lower reported levels of Honesty-Humilitysignificantly predicted intentions to fake in future psychological testing. No otherpersonality variables contributed significantly to the model.

The addition of primary and secondary psychopathy to the model significantlyimproved the prediction of intentions to fake in future psychological testing,R2change=.09, Fchange (2,219)=12.58, p<.001, explaining an additional 9.3 % ofvariance. With psychopathy added, the model explained 19.4 % of variance inintentions to fake, R=.44, AdjR2=.17, F(8,219)=6.60, p<.001. With psychopathyincluded in the model, Honesty-humility was no longer a significant individualpredictor. Both primary psychopathy and secondary psychopathy were significantindividual predictors in the model. As predicted, higher levels of primarypsychopathic traits were significantly associated with intentions to fake infuture psychological testing. Unexpectedly, lower levels of secondary psychop-athy were significantly associated with intentions to fake. However, as the zero-order correlation between secondary psychopathy and intention to fake was low(r=.07), this suggests that rather than secondary psychopathy directly predictingintentions to fake, it instead contributes to the model by acting as a suppressorvariable.

Previous experience in psychological testing was added in the final step, andaccounted for a small but significant amount of additional variance in intentions tofake, with an extra 1.9 % of variance explained, R2change=.02, Fchange (1,218)=5.316, p=.02. The final model of personality, psychopathy, and previous experiencein psychological testing significantly predicted intentions to fake in futurepsychological testing, R=.46, AdjR2=.18, F(9,218)=6.58, p<.001, with 21.3 % ofvariance explained. Within the model, conscientiousness, primary psychopathy,secondary psychopathy, and previous experience with psychological testing weresignificant individual predictors. Lower levels of conscientiousness, higher levelsof primary psychopathy, and having previously completed a psychological testwere all significantly associated with intentions to fake in psychological testingin the future. Inspection of zero-order correlations confirmed secondary psy-chopathy again contributed significantly to the model through the suppressionof extraneous variance. Full details of all stages of the regression are presentedin Table 3.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics andscale reliabilities for measures

Mean SD Cronbach’s α

Intention to fake 8.33 3.31 .84

Honesty-humility 36.21 5.73 .72

Emotionality 32.31 6.00 .77

Extraversion 33.67 5.83 .78

Agreeableness 32.28 5.61 .75

Conscientiousness 36.01 5.41 .74

Openness to experience 35.97 5.76 .75

Primary psychopathy 29.10. 7.61 .88

Secondary psychopathy 19.55 4.40 .71

418 Curr Psychol (2012) 31:414–422

Tab

le2

Bivariate

correlations

betweenmeasures

Intentionto

fake

Honesty-hum

ility

Emotionality

Extraversion

Agreeableness

Conscientiousness

Opennessto

experience

Primary

psycho

pathy

Secon

dary

psycho

pathy

Intentionto

fake

−.29

***

−.03

.01

−.15

*−.11*

.02

.39*

**.07

Honesty-hum

ility

−.13

*.00

.35*

**.06

.01

−.53

***

−.25

***

Emotionality

−.26

***

−.15

*−.09

−.11*

.02

.23*

*

Extraversion

.10

.29***

.28***

−.05

−.39

***

Agreeableness

−.02

.12*

−.24

***

−.26

***

Conscientiousness

.06

−.18

**−.51

***

Openn

essto

experience

−.13

*−.18

**

Primarypsycho

pathy

.42*

**

Secon

dary

psycho

pathy

*p<.05,

**p<.01,

***p

<.001

Curr Psychol (2012) 31:414–422 419

Discussion

The aim of this research was to examine the role of personality, psychopathy, andprevious experience with psychological testing in the prediction of intentions to fakein future psychological assessment. As hypothesised, in the first step of the hierar-chical multiple regression, lower levels of honesty-humility were significantly relatedto intentions to fake in psychological testing. In contrast to predictions, conscien-tiousness was not a significant contributor to the model. When psychopathy wasadded to the model, the role of honesty-humility was no longer significant. Asanticipated, higher levels of primary psychopathy were associated with willingnessto fake in future psychological testing. However, unexpectedly, lower levels ofsecondary psychopathy also contributed significantly to the model, with inspectionof zero-order correlations revealing secondary psychopathy contributed to intentionsto fake through the suppression of extraneous variance. In the final step of the model,while honesty-humility did not act as a significant individual predictor, in line with

Table 3 Hierarchical multiple re-gression showing predictors offaking intention

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

B Std.E Beta t

1 Constant 18.14 3.02 6.00

Honesty-humility −.15 .04 −.27 −3.86***Emotionality −.04 .04 −.08 −1.14Extraversion .02 .04 .03 .42

Agreeableness −.04 .04 −.07 −1.05Conscientiousness −.07 .04 −.11 −1.67Openness to experience .01 .04 .02 .27

2 Constant 13.18 4.23 3.12

Honesty-humility −.06 .04 −.10 −1.27Emotionality −.02 .04 −.03 −.43Extraversion −.01 .04 −.02 −.21Agreeableness −.05 .04 −.08 −1.23Conscientiousness −.09 .04 −.14 −1.91Openness to experience .03 .04 .05 .78

Primary psychopathy .17 .03 .39 5.00***

Secondary psychopathy −.15 .06 −.20 −2.33*3 Constant 13.21 4.19 3.16

Honesty-humility −.06 .04 −.10 −1.35Emotionality −.00 .04 −.00 −.04Extraversion −.01 .04 −.02 −.24Agreeableness −.05 .04 −.08 −1.17Conscientiousness −.09 .04 −.14 −2.00*Openness to experience −.03 .04 .05 .89

Primary psychopathy .17 .03 .39 5.07***

Secondary psychopathy −.14 .06 −.18 −2.22*Previous experience −.95 .41 −.14 −2.31*

420 Curr Psychol (2012) 31:414–422

predictions, lower levels of conscientiousness and higher levels of primary psychop-athy were associated with increased intentions. Further, having previously completeda psychological assessment was also significantly related to intentions to fake inpsychological testing. Again, in contrast to predictions, lower levels of secondarypsychopathy were associated with stronger intentions to fake, with secondary psy-chopathy acting as a suppressor.

Even within the relatively simple exploratory framework used here, it can be seenthat the interplay between variables is complex and multifaceted. As proposed byLevashina and Campion (2006), conscientiousness significantly predicted intentionto fake. However, this influence was not evident when personality was evaluated byitself. In contrast, the role of honesty-humility was significant and in line with Snell etal.’s (1999) and Goffin and Boyd’s (2009) perspective on the role of integrity, whenpersonality alone was in the model. Primary psychopathy was a strong predictor ofintentions to fake: this is in line with conceptions of psychopathy as a trait charac-terized by callous, manipulative, and self-serving actions (Levenson et al. 1995). Thecurrent findings highlight the importance of a multivariate approach when assessingthe role of individual differences in intentions to fake.

An interesting finding was that formerly completing a psychological test forassessment purposes was significantly associated with stronger intentions to fake.A number of possible mechanisms may be responsible for this relationship. Perhapsprevious experience with psychological testing increases an individual’s self-efficacyfor matters involving psychological testing. Another possible explanation is thatindividuals who have previously completed psychological assessment may havean increased awareness of the high stakes sometimes involved with psycholog-ical testing, and this awareness may impact on their willingness to engage infuture faking behaviors. Given the current findings, examining potential mod-erating effects of variables such as anger, frustration, or misattribution (asidentified by Iverson 2007) in the previous experience-faking intention nexus maybe useful.

Additional Considerations

It should be noted that the current research did not include a behavioral fakingoutcome measure. Future research might benefit from using a prospective design toassess the prediction of faking more closely. However, given the bases rates forfaking and malingering (Rees and Metcalfe 2003; Sullivan et al. 2005), and asindividuals rarely admit malingering (Hall et al. 2007; Morel and Marshman 2008),a prospective methodology may be difficult to operationalize. Still, intention toengage in a behavior is considered to precede the behavior (Ajzen 1991), and so,particularly given the low likelihood individuals will endorse a behavioral fakingoutcome measure, the use of an intention-only paradigm is supported.

Considering there was a substantial proportion of variance in intentions to fakeunexplained by the constructs investigated here, it would be prudent to extendexamination of possible predictors of faking intention to other constructs (for exam-ple morality). It is also possible a more fine-grained approach to operationalizing theconstructs assessed here may also prove fruitful. For example, although primarypsychopathy was a significant predictor within the current model, perhaps a purer

Curr Psychol (2012) 31:414–422 421

measure of manipulativeness (such as Machiavellianism or emotional manipulation)may provide additional insight.

Conclusion

Broadly, these findings align with previous research suggesting empirical examinationof individual differences in the prediction of intentions to fake in psychological testing isindicated. Specifically, this research has empirically tested for the first time the theoret-ical paradigms suggested by Goffin and Boyd (2009), Levashina and Campion (2006),and Snell et al. (1999). Identification of the characteristics likely to be associated withfaking intentions may inform selection or diagnostic methods (for example by addingspecific items to structured interviews implicitly assessing relevant traits), and mayassist psychologists in their recruiting or diagnostic practices.

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