the role of language in nation-building within the european union

Dialectical Anthropology 27: 249–268, 2003.© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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The Role of Language in Nation-Building within the EuropeanUnion

ALEXANDER CAVIEDESDepartment of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706, USA(E-mail: [email protected])

Abstract. Europe is home to a vast array of indigenous languages, not to mention numerousimmigrant languages. European Union (EU) acknowledgement of “national” languages asofficial languages results in a privileged status for these languages vis-à-vis the minoritylanguages with which they cohabit. This support prevents hegemony by a single languagesuch as English, yet the EU simultaneously undermines these national languages domesticallyby promoting their minority language competitors. This paradox can only be understood byexamining the developing model for European identity whereby identity is viewed as variableand multi-faceted, rooted in multilingual facility and the absence of a single, monolithic sourceof identity. If the project of creating a European identity is viewed as nation-building, it iscentral to consider how the issue of language diversity is addressed at the European level. Thepaper begins by discussing the concept of national identity and the central role that languageplays in its determination, as well as what modern conceptions of language planning bringto this process. After exploring the European language terrain, the paper considers whetherthe EU can even be said to have a language policy. The discussion focuses on multilingualeducation programs, the treatment of minority languages, and the issue of languages spokenby immigrant populations. Having presented these conceptual tools and policy surveys, ananalytical framework is introduced that situates the nation-building process in relation to thecreation of a common European identity.

I. Introduction

The European Union (EU) makes an interesting object for study thanks tothe duality of its nature. Is it merely a supranational organization that recon-figures the interests and economic paths of the member states along a singleguideline, or are we actually witnessing the slow yet deliberate progressiontoward an actual European state? While some students of European integra-tion postulate the creation of the latter, the truth is that the keys to the EUare still held in the hands of the member states to a large degree. Even inareas where the member states have ceded pockets of authority to the EU, theUnion carefully avoids diminishing the visibility and identity of the individualnations. Nevertheless, there are developments toward creating a Europeanidentity. This project is referred to by some as nation-forming, and if that istruly what is occurring, it is appropriate to ask how the question of language

250 ALEXANDER CAVIEDES

diversity is addressed at the EU level, since language generally plays a centralrole in determining the character of a national identity. This paper seeksto shed some light on the nature of this new European identity through anexamination of the language policy of the EU.

Part II discusses the concept of national identity and the central rolethat language plays in determining its nature, as well as what the modernconception of language planning brings to this process. After exploring thelanguage terrain within the EU in Part III, Part IV will answer the questionof whether the EU can even be said to have a language policy. In partic-ular, discussion focuses on multilingual education programs, the treatment ofminority languages, and the issue of languages spoken by immigrant popula-tions. With these conceptual tools and factual information in hand, Part Vconcludes by attempting to construct an analytical framework for concep-tualizing the nation-building process as it is taking place with regard to acommon European identity within the European Union.

II. Nation-building and the role of language

A. National identity

The concept of nation is a frequently debated one, but a good starting pointwould be to describe it as a human collectivity defining itself as historicallyconstituted or desired, where that notion makes some claim to autonomy.While many of the components of national identity, such as religion, languageand symbols, may be older than history, the notion of the nation emergedin the eighteenth century in Western Europe, where specifically ethnicallydefined communities developed around already existing kingdoms or culturesto form nation-states. As we are speaking about Europe, we will use thismodel, even though there are alternative paths leading to the formation ofnations that center around the contrasting colonial experience and its reactionto colonials or the home nations. Key to a conception of nation is the notionof identity as a source of symbols and legitimacy for mobilization towardthe task of nation-building. Whether one is predisposed to a primordial orconstructivist explanatory framework of identity formation, each approachshares the view that culture, language, and religion have historically been thecentral components of national identity.

B. Language and nation-building

The survival of a nation and the success of its drive towards nation-state statusare predicated upon the existence of a language that its people can speak,and more importantly, read and write. While it is important to be able to

THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE 251

communicate effectively within the modern nation-state, even more crucialto the manifestation of identity is the demarcation and boundary functionwhich language can play.1 While primordialists might focus upon the innateconfluence between the nature of a language and the character of the peoplewho speak it, constructivists are more wont to point out that identificationis taught and developed through the presence of a common language, and inEurope this unfolded once the vernacular was able to develop at a literarylevel.2 The font of these language-planning endeavors was the image ofthe noble and uncontaminated peasant who had managed to keep both thelanguage and national identity intact since the golden ages.3 This tensionbetween instrumental and primordial conceptions of the role of language innation-building has also been expressed as the difference between the enlight-enment and romanticist legacies. The enlightenment perceived a need for avernacular language as a lever for challenging the educational privilege of thenobility and clergy, while romanticism stressed the glorification of languageas a national treasure, rendering language cultivation a patriotic rather than asocial task.4

While these views either explicitly or implicitly suggest that the taskof nation-building must ground unification in one language, this is not thereigning perception among sociolinguists. De Witte has questioned whetherGellner’s insistence upon a single, uniform language to facilitate nation-building is perhaps only valid with respect to the social and economicevolution of the time, and that the simultaneous industrialization and nation-formation characteristic of the eighteenth century are no longer necessaryor sufficient configurations.5 Further criticism of unitary language theorycenters on the reality that in the wake of language rationalization and unifica-tion, there is usually not an emergence of a single pure language. Often,numerous dialects, patois, and minority languages may continue to exist withthe advent of national integration,6 even when the program is as rigid andhomogenizing as that found in France. These critiques recognize that it isnot multilingualism per se that engenders division, but the attitudes of thespeakers and the sentiments and symbolism attached to the language. If this isa valid comment, it should come as good news to those attempting to includean element of multicultural tolerance within their plans of nation-building.However, because many of the sociolinguists are dealing with cases in Africaor South-east Asia where both resources and alternatives are few, one mightspeculate whether these authors are merely selling prospective governmentson what they believe is the most just option.

C. Language planning

Language planning has been defined as a “government authorized, longterm sustained and conscious effort to alter a language itself or to change


a language’s functions in a society for the purpose of solving communicationproblems”.7 Though the endeavor usually accompanies processes of nation-state building and consolidation, the primary purpose, as mentioned above, isto facilitate communication within the state. This may sound like an apolit-ical aspiration, but it carries with it several consequences that are likely tobring about conflict. The rationalization process usually involves territorialspecification of a common language for the purpose of efficient administra-tion and rule and often results in a condition of linguistic hegemony where thelanguage of the center replaces local languages not only for official purposes,but for normal interchange.8 Language planning begins with corpus plan-ning, or the creation of new forms, modification of old ones, or the selectionof alternative forms of language, which is the technical side of the enter-prise. More importantly, language planners must also consider the potentialeffects of status planning, or the allocation of languages to certain functions.9

Certain choices may effectively disallow some groups from learning or usinga language, or they may require certain languages as prerequisites for accessto employment, licensing, court access, etc. As such, language can becomeeither an instrument of participation, access or deprivation, in that it canalter existing relationships of power between different groups within thepolity. Language policy cannot be blind to this fact, and the debate overhow language planning is best effectuated usually alternates around issuesof corpus planning and administration on one side, and the political effectsof status planning on the other. It is also this second dimension which mostpertinent for addressing the deprivations to culture and identity that can inad-vertently or consciously be brought about through a language policy thatvalues efficiency over democracy, equality and self-determination.

III. The European Union’s language terrain

A. Approaching babel?

Though it is home to around 58 autochthonous languages,10 there are onlyeleven officially recognized languages within the EU: Danish, Dutch, Eng-lish, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, andSwedish. This means that all EU legislation must be published in all themember states’ official languages, because it is in effect also national law.To prevent member states from adopting their own translations that mightdiverge and deprive EU citizens from equal protection, it becomes neces-sary for the EU itself to become the final arbiter of what a law means.This also allows member states and individuals to draft their correspondenceto European institutions in any of these eleven official languages with theassurance that the reply will be written in the same language.11


This policy results from a Council of Ministers regulation from 1958,stipulating that Dutch, French, German and Italian were the official andworking languages of the European Economic Community (EC) institutions.Accompanying successive Community and Union enlargements, the regula-tion has been amended to include the current eleven languages. Since theyall have the same status – in that translating and interpreting from eachshould be occurring into the other ten – there are at present 110 languagepairs, or dyads, existing within the EU. What is truly staggering is that thecontemplated first round of Eastern expansion (which will happen once theCzech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Sloveniaare accorded membership) would treble the number of dyads, up to 342!12

While this is a large number, the cost currently associated with the adminis-tration of translation and interpretation services comes to only 5% of the EUbudget.13 More daunting than the financial costs are the mere logistics behindsuch an undertaking – housing such a large number of language professionalswould require new buildings with assembly halls the size of football stadiums.Given the pretensions of the EU to continue expansion in the new millennium– perhaps until it encompasses all of continental Europe – new debates havesprung up addressing whether the EU should reconsider its language policybefore the situation becomes unmanageable.

B. De facto official languages

French was the original working language within the institutions of the EU.This is only natural given that Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg all lie inFrench-speaking territory. However, since the UK and Ireland joined the ECin 1973, English has also become a working language within the institutions.A recent study of language use within the European Commission showedthat English was used in 47% of oral communication within the Commission,while French was used only 38% of the time. For written communica-tion within the Commission English outdistanced French 49 to 45%, whileexternal communications were 54% English and only 35% French.14 Thisconfirms the effect that still derives through location, as the greatest differ-ence is found where the receiving parties communicating were not necessarilylocated in a French-speaking locale. Though French and English are thedominant languages, German also comes in a poor third, used occasionallywithin informal committee discussions (depending on the particular constel-lation of its membership), even though translators of all the official languagesare present.15

Even francophones recognize the inroads made by English, so policy initi-atives emanating from France are more concerned with retaining co-equalstatus with English than actually elevating French back into primacy. There-fore, France has forwarded proposals on the European level that solicit aid for


languages “used in their particular area”.16 As egalitarian as this might sound,it is aimed primarily at preventing English language hegemony. Regardless,outside the EC institutions, English is even more prevalent, especially insecond language education, as well as in the media, trade, technology andscience. For example, Estonia, where the ruling class spoke German for over amillennium, and continued to do so under Soviet rule, now recognizes Englishas the most important language for foreign business contacts, even when themajority of these contacts are still with Germans.17 The Germans themselves,with the largest group of native speakers within the EC and its most powerfuleconomy, have been far more subdued in their language demands. There havebeen initiatives trying to establish German as one of only three real workinglanguages, but the timbre of these demands, as evidenced in the followingcomments of the German Ambassador in the UK, belies luke-warm inten-tions: “We feel that languages that are spoken by a great number of peoplein Europe should also be considered in this context, but we are in no waypressing for this”.18 By quietly opting for English they not only sublimatetheir own position, but also erode the previous linguistic primacy of theirFrench rivals.19 The most bitter irony to the French must be that the Britishdo not even actively promote English within the EU. Part of the appeal behindthe use of English is its pluricentric character, which gives it a de-ethnicizedand culturally-unbounded quality that allows speakers to use it without auto-matically identifying with one nation.20 This is true to a large extent becausethe media and commercial power of the United States plays a huge part inenhancing the popularity of the English language, and this is not a functionof any British linguistic imperialism within the EU. This failure to pursuelinguistic hegemony does not alter the fact the language repertoire of over75% of multilingual speakers in Western Europe includes English.21

The opinion of one commentator reflects the multilingual mentality of theEU with regard to official languages: viewed holistically, the EU is comprisedof cultural and linguistic minorities, so there is no one national (or pan-national) people, culture or language, and there can never be one.22 Evenartificial languages like Esperanto cannot claim to be universally conceptu-alized or organic, and cannot fill the role of unitary language,23 though theidea is frequently raised.24 The trend toward monolingualism will continueunless measures are put into place that provide for multilingual administrationwith a “manageable” number of working languages.25 For this reason, thereis frequent advocacy for a minimum number of working languages, but evensuch opinions do not stray from the central caveat that all languages shouldstill remain usable.26 Such views buy into the idea that form is more importantthan substance since in reality English becomes ever more hegemonic, evenin the face of laws and policies aimed at preserving equality. What does it


mean to keep all languages usable if only a small core of working languagesremain? Either one is prepared to communicate in all languages, or the desig-nation of a few working languages will result in the exclusion of all others.To better understand why the EU continues to hold up this multilingual frontin the face of a reality that seems to contradict it, it will first be necessary toreview its policy and subsequently, the nature of the ideology behind it.

IV. European Union language policy

A. Is there a language policy?

While some EU policy addresses linguistic matters, in keeping with thegeneral pattern of European integration, there is no clearly discernableuniform policy. Policy develops in an ad hoc manner that allows for anincremental progression that attempts to stave off conflict before a situationbecomes too intransigent. Within EU institutions the previously mentionedRegulation no.1 makes all the official languages of the member states theofficial languages of the EU. Even if all the other states were willing to limitthe official working language to English, the French have made it abund-antly clear that they would block any attempts to unseat French within theinstitutions.27 This type of attitude only elicits similar blocking maneuversby the other governments who are not about to allow a special dispensationfor the French. Not only is there a spirit of intransigence on behalf of themember states, but even within some of the institutions, most notably theEuropean Parliament (EP), have repeatedly come out in favor of preservingmultilingualism. This should not be surprising as the EP is supposedly thedemocratic forum that exists to represent the interests of the people and notonly the member states.

Multicultural or pluralist language policies seek recognized participationof minority languages. One scheme for arranging this would be along regionallines such as those found in consociationalism, where non-discriminationis achieved through territorial subdivision, federalism or multilevel arrange-ments of political representation.28 However, the Union has adopted a socio-cultural variant that encourages the creation of parallel institutions that aregranted equal status in the public sphere. To ensure that communication doesnot suffer through such a program, the EU has focused extensively on thepromotion of bilingualism or multilingualism in education, culture and themedia.29

Language policy in the EU can be separated into three fronts: the previ-ously discussed institutional rules, its various education and cultural policies,and the stance towards minority languages. Within the EU as a whole,


Article 290 of the Treaty offers protection by prohibiting discrimination basedupon language. This law is regarded as being fairly firmly in place, as it canonly be amended through unanimous decision,30 and, as mentioned above,there is at least one nation that will always wield its veto in protection of itsmother tongue. Therefore, this staunch pledge of support for multiple officiallanguages, when viewed along with the other two policy areas, yields a fairlyaccurate picture of the complex and at times contradictory image that theEuropean Union is trying to project and develop with regard to a “European”identity. Examining the policies individually, we will attempt to uncover whatmanner of European nationalism is being created and whether it can even betermed as such.

B. Language and cultural policy

Though our primary focus is on language, it is also necessary to appreciatethat because language is the major component of what is commonly iden-tified as culture, many provisions couched in terms of cultural policy havea largely or predominantly linguistic nature. The EU has recognized thatcultural measures are required to make people more aware of their Europeanidentity.31 Beyond the creation of various European Union cultural awards,there has been even greater emphasis on broadening commonality throughthe education process. If one is intent on creating a common identity, keyrequisites are common education programs and the utilization of languageas the prime integrator.32 The LINGUA program pursues the diversificationof foreign languages offered in training and educational programs ratherthan promoting one or two priority languages.33 Erasmus is an internationalexchange program between universities meant to foster international under-standing as well as multilingualism. At the moment the program is stillsubject to criticism as only 1.5% of all university students participate.34

However, the EU has responded to other charges that the program is elitistsince it only works at the level of a certain social and academic strata, throughthe introduction of further programs such as Socrates and Leonardo da Vinci,which are targeted at vocational trainees and high school students.35 This isan attempt to ensure that foreign language proficiency is not reserved for anelite or those who acquire it on account of their geographic mobility.

The newest and most illuminating policy trajectory emanating from theCommission is a tacit recognition of the dominant position of English withinEurope. Even when people are encouraged to diversify their language reper-toires, the odds are that the second language they choose to learn will beEnglish.36 To prevent this tendency from stifling those initiatives that promotethe learning of other languages and cultures, the Commission has identifiedthe need for European citizens to be conversant in three languages. In a 1997


White Book from DG XXII, it announced the intention to launch educationinitiatives within the member states that contemplate the instruction of onelanguage at the beginning of high school, followed by one more after a coupleof years.37 Since it is already part of the Common Foreign Policy of the EUto encourage speaking the languages of third countries when dealing withthem directly,38 this principle is merely being turned inwards by encouragingcommunication with native speakers within the EU in their native tongueswhen present upon their soil. It has already been suggested by one of theforemost commentators that English only be taught as the second foreignlanguage to prevent students and schools from neglecting the remaininglanguages once the instrumental task of acquiring English language skills hasbeen completed.39 While the Commission is still soliciting input as to howthis policy will be carried out, the ambitions of the plan throw light onto theEU conception of what it means to wield a European identity.

C. Minority languages

1. What is a minority language?Perhaps the best illustration of the schizophrenic nature of EU policytowards language is in the area of minority and regional languages. Minoritylanguages are not those “small languages” within the EU, such as Finnish,which have a limited number of speakers, native or otherwise, and aretherefore marginal. Minority languages are those existing as mother tonguesamong a sizeable population within the member states, but which are not theofficial languages of those particular member states. Frisian, Basque, Welshand Catalan are among the more prominent languages falling under thisrubric. The EU has realized that by failing to acknowledge and cultivate theselanguages the EU contributes to their continued marginalization. By dealingwith member states solely through the official languages of the EU, the EUin effect props up that official language to the exclusion of the minoritylanguage. The curious effect of this commitment to multilingualism, whenmultiplied throughout all the EU, is to propagate monolingualism in eachindividual country by focusing on a national language.40

While there is no suggestion that all these minority and regional languagesshould be made official, there is a recognition that steps must be taken topreserve and strengthen these cultural and linguistic traditions. While the EUhad already devoted a part of its resources towards promoting the develop-ment of official languages as vessels of domestic culture, this money funnelsto the national governments. It is dubious whether they would take stepsto support minority languages that effectively undermine the authority ofthe national languages, especially if they find it necessary to build up thenational language vis-à-vis fellow EU national language competitors. France


does not even acknowledge the presence of any minority languages withinthe country because this would go against Article 2 of the Constitution thatprohibits differentiation between citizens on the grounds of their origin, raceor religion.41 What may not exist does not exist, so France does not containany identifiable, self-contained minorities to whom any recognition couldflow on the basis of their linguistic identity.

What is required in response to such national policies as these are mea-sures that circumvent the arbitrary policy inclinations of the member statesby dealing directly with language minorities at the regional level. Of course,such a policy itself can be faulted for being an arbitrary policy. Why is it thatFinnish, a language with less than 5 million speakers, is considered an officiallanguage while Catalan, with 5–7 million speakers, will still be relegatedto minority language status?42 The rubric of minority language is meant todelineate a relational status in which the language in question is a minorityvis-à-vis a majority language within the state.43 However, if the EU is creatingan entity within which all citizens are equal, why should national statusmatter? If limitations on the designation of official language rest upon consid-erations of efficiency, Occitan with its 9.5–12 million speakers44 should rankahead of some of the smaller national languages.

2. The European Charter for Regional LanguagesA major initiative in this direction is the European Charter for RegionalLanguages of 1992, which creates a system of relationships betweensignatory countries and their constituent linguistic minorities. It stipulatesrights of access to education, judicial/administrative authorities and publicservices, media, economic and social life, and cultural activities and facilitiesfor speakers of such languages. Parties are required to submit written reportsdocumenting their efforts, which are then reviewed by a committee of expertsappointed by the Council. However, the Charter expressly does not specifywhich European languages correspond to the concept of regional or minoritylanguages. While the explanatory report puts this down to the inability toconclusively decide at what level a language officially should be treated asregional or minority, it is probably also because, to entertain any hope ofbeing signed, there would have to be a tacit silence which preserves the powerto decide when measures may be appropriate in the hands of the memberstates. Even worded as it is, France refused to sign.45 At least this was basedupon French honesty that, because they would not acknowledge the presenceof minority languages, the point would be moot. It also highlights that thedegree of protection the Charter provides is limited to the good graces ofthe member states in its application. For this reason it is difficult to attributemore than a symbolic effect to the document, especially since it is only anintergovernmental agreement and not actual Community law.


3. The Bureau for Lesser Used LanguagesA more effective measure for protecting minority languages is the Bureau forLesser Used Languages within the European Community itself. Establishedin Dublin in 1982, the Bureau is primarily a distributor of funds to “worthy”cultural and educational projects that promote the development and retentionof minority and regional languages. The Bureau is also responsible for studyand research into the status of minority languages within the member states,and has adopted something of an ombudsman role for itself on behalf ofthese languages. At the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996, in Brussels,the Secretary General of the Bureau, Donall ‘O Riagain, proposed severaladditions to the Maastricht Treaty to recognize and expand the rights ofcitizens of the Union in all their diversity and rich linguistic and culturalheritage. Moreover, he made a plea for a new Commission Green Paperdiscussing a European language policy. The effectiveness of the Bureau islimited by its modest budget, and the fact that though roughly 10% of all EUcitizens speak regional or minority languages, they still receive substantiallyless financial support, proportionally, than those fortunate enough to speak anofficial language, who can take advantage of a plethora of programs.46

A further interesting role for the Bureau has been suggested. A point offriction between the EU and multiple languages is the principle of free move-ment, that has led to the development of laws and policies to prevent memberstates from framing measures having the same effect as quantitative restric-tions as provisions in which the state has a national interest. Health provisionssuch as the Bavarian Reinheitsgebot have been struck down for being littlemore than disguised import restrictions. At what point can language-basedregulation and restrictions be challenged? Until now, the European Court ofJustice has been careful to side with national laws, cautious of tamperingwith the linguistic and cultural integrity of the member states, even whenthese provisions appear to constitute restraints of trade.47 To ensure that theEU continues to give preference to the defense of its cultural and linguisticheritage, the Bureau could well be employed as an advisory body to the EUin the formulation and control of language policy vis-à-vis the interest ofpreserving the common market.48

4. Dissenting voicesNot all EU commentators are convinced that the lesser languages even requireprotection. Is the lack of integrated EU language policy “supporting evidencefor a view which questions the idea of language planning on the grounds thatlanguages look after themselves?”49 Forcing speakers of minority languagesto communicate in a foreign language places them at a disadvantage vis-à-vissomeone operating in their native tongue, but they also gain a bargaining edgeby having made the concession to work in that language. This is very much


a classical economics adage that “if you are buying, you do so in your ownlanguage, but if you are selling you will switch to the customer’s language”.50

However, this view does not take into account the psychological advantagegained by forcing someone to submit to the power of one’s language, nordoes it appreciate that some markets may be so minor that it will not be worthlearning their language to reach such a limited clientele.

Another view – albeit one that envisions an active role for language plan-ning – which fails to predict further deterioration of minority languages withthe development of a single lingua franca is Laitin’s 2∀1, which he origin-ally developed in Language Repertoires. He feels that Europeans will needto be able to speak their national language and the lingua franca (English),as well as possibly a local vernacular if it is distinct from the nationallanguage. English speakers can get by with only their mother tongue. Heholds that minority languages will be strengthened through their dealingswith the EU and its eurocrats. National bureaucrats seek to preserve theirnational languages’ official status in the face of English hegemony, but suchsupport will only be forthcoming if the governments also promise to promoteand protect vernaculars.51 Laitin utilizes rational choice theory to supportthe stability of the 2∀1 structure, so one should note that this is a furthercommentator basing his argument upon liberal economic theory. Whetherthe market place truly can protect minorities as well as they believe isquestionable.

5. Warning for the futureThe potential for minority languages problems is highlighted in the casesof Gaelic and Welsh. While Gaelic was important for Irish national feelingbefore independence, its role in society and politics has declined. Meanwhile,the revival of Welsh since the 1960s may be due to the fact that Wales is notpolitically independent. If this is a valid correlation, it warns that the languageissue will have to be treated with great care in a Europe where the memberstates are incrementally giving up larger chunks of their sovereignty.52 Thecontinued recognition of national language privileges on the one hand, andsupport and cultivation of regional languages on the other hand, puts the EUin the dangerous and volatile position of not only taking away sovereigntyfrom above, but facilitating the regions to slice it away from below. One canonly hope that by allowing these two contrary policies to build up momentum,the Union is not setting the stage for domestic confrontations that it would beprovoking itself.

D. Immigrant language issues

One of the relevant groups that have nevertheless been left out of the debatewith regard to minority languages are immigrants from non-union third


countries. It is ironic that population influxes from former colonies andlabor migration have produced colorful and multilingual societies in thevery countries where the idea of the linguistically homogenous nation stateoriginated.53 While EU law prohibits discrimination on the basis of language,and many educational initiatives are undertaken to promote national andminority languages, there is no mention of those immigrants whose mothertongue derives from outside of the EU. In the same way that there are morespeakers of some minority languages than some official EC languages, thereare 4 million Turkish speakers in Germany alone, and even greater numbersof Arabic speakers within the EU,54 but the language rights of these groupsremains un-addressed by the policies and initiatives of the Union. Not onlyare these immigrants often relegated to the lower socioeconomic classes, butwithout proper language skills, immigrant children are often trapped in thiscycle, with reduced opportunities for social mobility via higher education,which contributes to high rates of delinquency.55

The failure to properly address this problem has been aided by schol-arly attention toward indigenous minority languages to the detriment ofimmigrant languages. Though some commentators point to the difficulty inproperly assessing the situation, as the language groups are not localized inone location,56 the real problem lies in the academic focus itself. In appre-hension of the loss of smaller EU languages if a lingua franca is chosen,commentators argue an inherent, equal value of all languages which is best bepreserved through strong bilingual education programs. However, languagessuch as Turkish do not enter into the equation since Turkey is not an EUmember.57 Immigrant languages are not afforded access to the educationaland cultural resources set aside for minority languages, nor are they protectedfrom discriminatory practices under the Treaty. If the language policy of theEU is to retain a practical dimension beyond the mere ideological function itserves in promoting equality, future research should concentrate on the possi-bility of spreading out the social net so that it also covers those marginalizedby the extra-EU origins of their language.

V. Nation-building around the European Union

A. Citizenship

With the advent of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1996, the EU made clear itsintention to expand the conception of the Union from one based upon anagreement between sovereign nations to one centered about the citizenshipof individuals. Article 17 declares that every national of a member statealso becomes a citizen of the Union. While the practical effect of this islimited to those rights conferred by the Treaty (i.e., freedom of movement


and the passive and active rights of voting in European Parliament elections),symbolically it signifies another step toward political union.58 Nationalsof parties to international agreements or countries that are members of aninternational organization do not accrue citizenship rights. By invoking thelanguage of citizenship, the EU is tipping its hand, exposing an intention toachieve a status that approximates actual statehood. However, constructing aEuropean community as opposed to a mere common market requires a farmore concerted attempt at changing people’s image of themselves, includingtheir identity as nationals rather than European citizens. Another reason forcreating a European citizenry is to make use of a common identity to over-come the problem of the EU’s democratic deficit.59 The hope is that thiswould enable people in the member states to identify more with the EU and itsinstitutions, which might assuage the Union’s self-perceived lack of authorityand prestige.60 While this trend should not come as a great surprise to thosewho follow the development of the EU, it does open up the question whetherthe philosophy of the language policy currently pursued is appropriate to theformation of a state.

B. Common European identity

In its incremental advance toward statehood, the EU has engaged in behaviorthat has consciously paralleled the nation-building process in a number ofrespects. There has been a concerted effort toward cultivating a sense ofEuropean-ness or European identity among EU citizenry. The most overtvehicle for creating a common identity has been the drive toward draftingand enforcing pan-European standards in disparate fields from environmentalprovisions to workers rights. While the impetus behind such measures hasbeen the desire to enhance efficiency by facilitating the freedom of movementfor goods, people, services, and capital, it also has the effect of creating agreater feeling of commonality. The European Monetary Union is a goodexample of this dynamic. The purpose behind economic union is to be able toreduce transaction costs and allow for a greater control of fiscal policy withinthe EU, but it will certainly have the side effect of creating one more bond ofcollective identification. While this may not cut deeply into the identities ofsmaller nations who operate with multiple foreign currencies, it will be feltacutely by a country such as Germany that draws part of its post-war identityfrom its strong identification with the Deutschmark. While introduction ofthe Euro has not yet had this effect, once the individual national currenciesare phased out and replaced by a single common currency, there is likely tobe a substantial shift in conscious as well as subconscious identification fromnation to supranational entity.

Few visitors to Brussels can leave without feeling slightly nauseated atthe number of umbrellas, bumper stickers, pins, t-shirts, etc. that are being


peddled with the twelve star logo of the EU boldly emblazoned upon them.While the EU works to solidify and subsidize the process of discrete nation-making,61 the aforementioned activities can hardly be termed as discrete.Subsidization of “European” contests and programs in the arts is a furtherovert attempt to foster a European image. However, it has been rejectedthat one can form new ideas about one’s identity through artificial methodswith artificial time and content parameters. Language development, thoughmanipulable, is highly organic, especially when there is a degree of freedomof decision on behalf of the public, as language planners in Africa frequentlydiscover to their chagrin.62 Even with its highly coercive program, the cent-ralized projection of the Russian language on the Soviet republics did nothave the desired effect of replacing the national languages.63 Similarly, theEU lacks the hundreds of years within which European nation-states wereconsolidated. In addition, it is attempting to create identifications at a timewhen the epic form of belonging, so popular before the devastation of thetwo great wars of the century, has become dubious as a viable politicalproject.64 Therefore, what the EU needs to create is a European level ofidentity and authority functioning as a type of ‘organizational vessel’ thatcan contain nationalist sentiments while at the same time allowing for theenhanced expression regional identity.65

C. What is different about this European identity

Instead of using the traditional nationalist or ethnic model of identity form-ation, the EU employs a civic one. This means that when people becomeEuropeans, that identity no longer revolves around categories of religion,folk, or national defense. In the new Europe, the defining values are to centeraround exchange, difference and value.66 Crucial among these three valueswith respect to language policy, is difference, as it brings the element ofdiversity to the fore. In the last two centuries, linguistic minorities and ethnicgroups in Europe have affirmed their particular identity and claimed theirrecognition in the political sphere in reaction to the dynamics of modernnation-building.67 In the process of nation-building, language becomes asymbol of national belonging and a historical treasure that establishes it asa common denominator of its citizenry. The EU recognizes that since legit-imacy remains tied to the robustness of their languages, the member states areengaged in a permanent competition for linguistic dominance or survival.68

Following in the steps of the sociolinguists, there is confidence that it isnot multilingualism but the attitudes of the speakers that determines whetherdivisions are created. Eager to avoid conflicts that emerge among linguisticgroups in response to the new creation of the European citizen, the languagepolicy pursued by the EU is built upon multiculturalism and multilingualism,thereby deviating in essential ways from the nation-state political form.


In a Europe buttressed upon individualism and freedom, there is a desirethat citizens not be forced to abandon individuality in exchange for a newand homogenous internationality.69 This does not mean that there will not bea new international identity for the European of the future, but merely thatit cannot be a homogenous one based upon a single hegemonic language orculture. In particular, such language conformity would send a bad signal tothe former east bloc nations, intent on joining the EU and putting the oppres-sion of the Soviet years behind them. Having spent half of a century underpolitical and cultural tyranny, the last thing they are prepared to accept isthe continuation of this type of arrangement. The transnational developmenttoward Europe as a single economic unit faces a fundamentally differenthistoric situation than the old national language unification processes of thepast.70 To actively participate in and benefit from the European Union, thenew European identity is one that requires adequate command of multiplelanguages.

Given that the role of the citizen has only been institutionalized at the levelof the nation-state,71 what the Union is attempting is a radically different re-conception of identity. What this will require is an ability to adopt differentidentities and roles that do not compromise the others. As our understandingof identity-formation becomes more dynamic, there is room for discussion ofmultiple sources of identity that need not be seen as competing within a zero-sum game. This coexistence is possible as long as the space these loyaltiesand identity occupy is not identical and exclusive. For instance, Andersonbelieves the concept of the nation only had the necessary room to developonce the previously existing universal allegiance of the individual to the spir-itual realm had been eroded. With religion no longer capable of controllingevery day life to the degree that it had throughout the middle ages, there wasa vacuum in which national identities were able to gestate.72 The trick behindcarrying out a successful program of European identification, or a successfullanguage policy that facilitates communication without paying the price ofstrangling the smaller languages, will lie in making sure that identities andculture are not always viewed as being in competition with one another.

Switzerland is often cited as an example of peaceful linguistic coexist-ence within Europe, but a more appropriate case of identity surviving absentcultivation of a single language is the case of Luxembourg – an actual EUmember state. Here, the members of the community place a high value onmaintenance of the minority vernacular as an element of group identity, butare also able to communicate in the more prevalent languages. French remainsthe most common spoken language, and most written works are in German,but Luxembourgish is not threatened in its existence by the fact that it islimited to certain spheres of life.73 This may be the model upon which the


new Europe is based. If Luxembourg expresses a confluence of languagesand business also found within the common market, it should also be notedthat here, national identity is hardly a source of aggressive nationalism. Thisshould also be encouraging for the development of language policy withinthe EU as it attempts to foster the creation of an identity that is common, inthat every member is European, but variable, in that individual members willhave different cultural heritages and varying language repertoires.

VI. Conclusion

In the process of national identity creation, language has played as central arole in determining its nature as any other component. Language is the mostvisible aspect of culture, and as such language planning has an importantpolitical dimension, for it often determines who will be the haves and have-nots within a society. The EU is home to a vast array of indigenous languages,not to mention numerous immigrant languages. It has been the policy of theEU to acknowledge certain national languages as official languages, but thishas resulted in a privileged status for these languages vis-à-vis the minoritylanguages with which they cohabit. The EU has walked a policy tightropewhere it has simultaneously supported national languages to prevent the hege-mony of a single language such as English, while it has also undermined thoselanguages domestically by promoting their competitors within those countries– minority languages. This policy can only be understood when one examinesthe new model for European identity in which identity should be variableand multi-faceted, rooted in the ability to shift between languages both viamultilingual facility as well as psychologically by not relying on a monolithicsource of identity. What will hopefully emerge are new and tolerant Unioncitizens, capable of finding unity within their common diversities.74 Whetherthis will be a successful endeavor depends upon the skill of EU policy-makersin navigating the minefield between efficiency demands, member state insec-urities and the desire to protect speakers of minority languages. All this willhave to be achieved without repeating the errors of past nationalisms thatallowed “Others” to develop within the polity that are not part of the politicaland social process (i.e., immigrants). Let us hope that the EU’s optimism canalso translate into success.

Notes

1. Ernest Gellner, “On Nationalism,” in Nationalism, eds. Anthony Smith and JohnHutchinson (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 57–62.


2. Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1997), 21.

3. Joshua Fishman, Language and Nationalism (Rowley, MA: Newbury House Publishers,1972), 69.

4. Florian Coulmas, “European Integration and the Idea of the National Language,” in ALanguage Policy for the European Community: Prospects and Quandaries, ed. FlorianCoulmas (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 18.

5. Bruno De Witte, “The Impact of European Community Rules on Linguistic Policies ofthe Member States,” in A Language Policy for the European Community: Prospects andQuandaries, ed. Florian Coulmas (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 163.

6. Ayo Bambgbose, Language and the Nation: The Language Question in Sub-SaharanAfrica (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), 14.

7. Brian Weinstein, The Civic Tongue (NY: Longman, 1983), 37.8. David Laitin, Language Repertoires (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 15.9. Robert L. Cooper, Language Planning and Social Change (NY: Cambridge University

Press, 1989), 31–32.10. Eric Dacheux, Les strategies de communication persuasive dans l’Union europeene

(Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 1994), 70.11. Thierry Fontenelle, “English and Multilingualism in the European Union,” ZAA 47 (1999),

121.12. Konrad Schröder, “Dreisprachigkeit der Unionsbürger – ein europäischer Traum?” ZAA

47 (1999), 155.13. Wilmya Zimmerman, “Die Zukunft der Sprachen in Europa: Zur Sprachenpolitik in der

EU,” ZAA 47 (1999), 167.14. Carsten Quell, “Language Choice in Multilingual Institutions: A Case Study at the

European Commission with Particular Reference to the Role of English, French, andGerman as Working Languages,” Multilingua 16 (1997), 63.

15. J.A. Laponce, Languages and Their Territories (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press,1987), 168.

16. Marcel Machill, “Background to French Language Policy and Its Impact on the Media,”European Journal of Communication 12 (1997), 499.

17. David Laitin, “The Cultural Identities of a European State,” Politics & Society 25 (1997),288.

18. Quell, 61,72.19. Abram De Swann, “The Evolving European Language System: A Theory of Communi-

cation Potential and Language Competition,” International Political Science Review 14(1993), 246.

20. Quell, 71.21. John Borneman and Nick Fowler, “Europeanization,” Annual Review of Anthropology 26

(1997), 499.22. Schröder, 156.23. R.B. Le Page, The National Language Question (New York: Oxford University Press,

1964), 9.24. Paul P. Gubbins, “Sense and Pense: An Alternative Language Policy for Europe,” in

Language, Culture and Communication in Contemporary Europe, ed. Charlotte Hoffman(Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1996), 124.

25. Quell, 72.


26. Miquel Reniu i Tresserras, “A Language Policy for Europe,” in Watching One’s Tongue:Issues in Language Planning, ed. Mairead Nic Craith (Liverpool: Liverpool UniversityPress, 1996), 64.

27. Dennis Ager, Language, Community and the State (Exeter: Intellect Books, 1997), 81.28. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).29. Matthias Koenig, “Cultural Diversity and Language Policy,” International Social Science

Journal 51 (1999), 405.30. Zimmerman, 165.31. Cris Shore, “Inventing the ‘People’s Europe’: Critical Approaches to European

Community ‘Cultural Policy’,” Man (N.S.) 28 (1993), 787.32. Ernest Gellner, “On Nationalism,” in Nationalism, eds. Anthony Smith and John

Hutchinson (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 56.33. Coulmas, 13.34. Gubbins, 126.35. Fontenelle, 123.36. Laitin 1997, 288–289.37. Schröder, 159.38. Joint Interpreting & Conference Service, “Multilingualism: The Key to Success,” SCIC

multilingualism home page Online. December 1999.39. Coulmas, 16.40. Coulmas, 14.41. Machill, 496.42. Gubbins, 126.43. Hartmut Haberland, “Reflections about Minority Languages in the European

Community,” in A Language Policy for the European Community: Prospects andQuandaries, ed. Florian Coulmas (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 182.

44. Giulio Lepschy, “Le lingue degli europei,” in Storia d’Europa: Volume primo – L’EuropaOggi, eds. Anderson, Perry et al. (Turin, Italy: Giulio Einaudi, 1993), 893.

45. Machill, 495.46. De Witte, 175.47. Laitin 1997, 289.48. Reniu i Tresserras, 65.49. Thomas Herbst, “11 + x = 1?” ZAA 47 (1999), IX.50. Nick Roche, “Multilingualism in European Community Meetings – a Pragmatic

Approach,” in A Language Policy for the European Community: Prospects andQuandaries, ed. Florian Coulmas (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 145.

51. Laitin 1997, 298.52. Herbst VIII.53. Coulmas, 27.54. Schröder, 156.55. John Edwards, Language and Disadvantage, 2nd ed. (London: Whurr Publishers Ltd.,

1989), 126–127.56. Schröder, 156.57. Eric Beck, “Language Rights and Turkish Children in Germany,” Patterns of Prejudice

(April 1999), 11.58. Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 4th ed. (Durham:

Duke University Press, 1999), 71.59. Shore, 786.


60. Michael J. Baun, An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics ofEuropean Integration (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 145–146.

61. Borneman and Fowler, 489.62. Cooper, 59–62.63. Harald Haarmann, “Language Politics and the European Identity,” in A Language Policy

for the European Community: Prospects and Quandaries, ed. Florian Coulmas (NewYork: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 108.

64. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (NY: TheNoonday Press, 1993), 245.

65. Shore, 784.66. Borneman and Fowler, 492.67. Koenig, 402.68. Borneman and Fowler, 499.69. Zimmerman, 165.70. Konrad Ehlich, “Linguistic ‘Integration’ and ‘Identity’ – the Situation of Migrant Workers

in the EC as a Challenge and Opportunity,” in A Language Policy for the EuropeanCommunity: Prospects and Quandaries, ed. Florian Coulmas (New York: Mouton deGruyter, 1991), 196.

71. Habermas Jürgen, “Citizenship and National Identity,” in The Nationalism Reader, eds.Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities PressInternational, 1995), 337.

72. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism (New York: Verso, 1983), 23.

73. Stephen Barbour, “Language and National Identity in Europe; Theoretical and Prac-tical Problems,” in Language, Culture and Communication in Contemporary Europe, ed.Charlotte Hoffman (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1996), 40.

74. Paul James, Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community (London: SagePublications, 1996), 145.

Biographical note

Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.Spring 2003, will begin dissertation field research at the Freie Universität,Berlin. Received J.D. from the University of Florida (1993) and LL.M.eurfrom Universität of the Saarland (1996). Practiced immigration law from1997–99. Dissertation deals with comparative W. European labor immig-ration policy (Germany and the UK). Interests include Western Europeanpolitical economy and European Union politics generally, with particularconcentration on labor immigration policies.

the role of language in nation-building within the european union

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