the rise of détente and ‘triangular diplomacy’, 1963-72 young & kent: international...
TRANSCRIPT
The Rise of Détente and ‘Triangular Diplomacy’, 1963-72
Young & Kent: International Relations since 1945
1963: in the wake of Cuba
• Signs of Détente?– Kennedy’s American University
speech– ‘Hot line’ agreement – Partial Test Ban Treaty
• Cold War goes on– Berlin tension– Multilateral Nuclear Force
Pressures for Détente in Europe
• Mutual fear of war• Western Europe
– fragmentation: de Gaulle– Harmel Report– Brandt and Ostpolitik
• Eastern bloc– fragmentation: China, Romania– desire for trade/technology– fall of Khrushchev
Nuclear Balance• Dawn of ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’• ‘Triad’ of weapons:
– Aircraft– Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)– Submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs)• Threats to the balance:
– Anti-Ballistic Missile– Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle
Détente Delayed, 1964-68
• Limited East-West agreement– Glassboro’ mini-summit– Non-Proliferation Treaty– Proposed Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks
• Barriers to progress– Vietnam– Czechoslovakia: ‘Prague Spring’– No Johnson-Brezhnev summit
Nixon’s Approach
• Inaugural speech: ‘an era of negotiations’
• End Vietnam war: Nixon Doctrine• But détente only on conditions:
– Concrete agreements not just a change in atmosphere
– Soviets to show restraint– ‘Linkage’
‘Linkage’ in practice
• US view: if Soviets want strategic arms talks and trade, they must not exploit conflicts in the Third World
• Series of crises in 1970-71:– Chile: election of Allende– Cienfuegos– Jordanian civil war– Indo-Pakistan War
‘Triangular Diplomacy’
• Sino-Soviet ‘split’• Chinese fear USSR more than US
– Border clashes of 1969
• Nixon ready for ‘opening’ to China– Trade barriers relaxed– ‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’– China enters UN
• US plays off China and USSR
1972: two summits
• Beijing Summit, February 1972– Nixon and Mao– Shanghai Communique
• Moscow Summit, May 1972– Nixon and Brezhnev– went ahead despite crisis in Vietnam– several agreements: trade, space, etc.– ‘Basic Principles’
SALT I: highpoint of Moscow
• Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty– Two ABM ‘fields’ and 200 missiles
each
• ‘Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles’– ICBMs: 1054 US, 1618 Soviet– SLBMs: 656 US, 740 Soviet– Bombers: 455 US, 140 Soviet– To last five years: SALT II to follow
Moscow: success or failure?
• The successes:– Well-choreographed– Numerous agreements– SALT a significant nuclear arms deal
• The limits:– Soviets never accepted ‘linkage’– Unclear what ‘basic principles’ meant– SALT failed to control MIRVs– ‘unequal ceilings’ in SALT