the revolution in intelligence affairs: the new role of intelligence in asymmetric conflict

8/6/2019 The Revolution in Intelligence Affairs: The New Role of Intelligence in Asymmetric Conflict

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The Revolution in Intelligence Affairs:

The New Role of Intelligence in Asymmetric Conflict

Corey Velgersdyk

International Security Politics

Prof. Chris Ritter

April 27, 2011


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Intelligence has been an important feature of war since before the time of Alexander the

Great. On his vast campaign that established his empire, Alexander relied on a strategy of divide

and conquer, which is dependent on regional intelligence that provides an accurate strategic

picture complete with the strengths and weaknesses of adversaries. The Roman Empire included

several categories of reconnaissance troops that provided valuable tactical intelligence while on

the campaign.1

Today the United States has satellites, radars, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at its

disposal to collect intelligence. Images and other data collected by these platforms are

transmitted to a communications satellite which is then sent, possibly via a relay satellite, to a

ground station, all practically in real time.2

Similarly impressive, Special Operations Forces

(SOF) that identify enemy combatants can communicate with the command center to request an

airstrike, provide specific coordinates to a B-52 bomber using Global Positioning System, and

within 20 minutes of locating enemy forces precision-guided munitions will fall from the sky on

their precise location.3

The advent of these capabilities is now referred to as the Revolution in Military Affairs

(RMA), although this is a bit of a misnomer as there have been several periods in military history

referred to with this or another similar moniker. Many of these revolutions have had

significant implications for intelligence whether it is new reconnaissance platforms like airplanes

during World War I (WWI) or advances in communications like the radio during World War II

(WWII).New capabilities allowed for better and faster intelligence collection, which was crucial

given the changing nature of warfare following these revolutions. WWI saw the end of cavalry as

1Keegan, John. Intelligence in War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. 7-9

2Ferris, John. "A New American Way of War? C4ISR, Intelligence and Information Operations in Operation Iraqi

Freedom: A Provisional Assessment." Intelligence and National Security18, no. 4 (2003): 155-174.3Chizek, Judy G. "Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance." Congressional Research

Service. 21


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machine guns easily repelled their charges; WWII refined the mechanized warfare introduced in

WWI and as a result trench warfare became virtually obsolete.4

Much like how previous revolutions in military affairs changed the nature of conflict, the

current revolution in military affairs has transformed how wars are fought. Modern militaries

now rely on advanced C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, information,

surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems to provide instantaneous information throughout the

battlespace as well as allow the complex coordination of various capabilities. The success of the

United States in this regard during the opening campaign Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrates

the potency of the new technologies.

5

However, the U.S. military does not operate in a vacuum;

the enemies of the United States have adapted to fighting against a technologically advanced

adversary by using asymmetric tactics. As a result, it seems that modern conflicts consist of

either modern militaries with advanced C4ISR networks fighting fast limited wars or asymmetric

conflicts in which the weaker side uses tactics designed to limit the effectiveness of the advanced

C4ISR networks.6

The relationship between revolutions in military affairs and the nature of conflict was

explored by Thomas Hammes in his bookThe Sling and the Stone. New developments in society

and technology led to new forms of conflict divided into what he called generations of warfare.

The fourth generation of warfare, the one that is currently ongoing, is concerned with the

necessity of operating on the political will of the adversary directly.7

4O'Hanlon, Michael. "Can High Technology Bring U. S. Troops Home?." Foreign Policy113 (1999): 72-86.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149234.5Ferris, John. "A New American Way of War? C4ISR, Intelligence and Information Operations in Operation Iraqi

Freedom: A Provisional Assessment." 165-76Pirnie, Bruce R., and Edward O'Connell. Counterinsurgency in Iraq (20032006). Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND

Corporation, 2008. 5-97Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone. 51-3


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This concept offers an explanation for why some modern conflicts are less

technologically-driven than wars during the middle of the 20th

century. Enemies of the United

States face an adversary that is highly advanced and capable of rapid power projection; facing

U.S. forces in a conventional manner, as Iraq tried to do during the First Gulf War, can spell

defeat in a manner of days or weeks. This leaves insufficient time for U.S. adversaries to operate

on the political will of the United States while exposing their own political bases to the United

States. An alternative is to resort to asymmetric tactics which drag out a conflict and present a

variety of new challenges for the United States to face, such as counterinsurgency (COIN),

nation-building, and regime maintenance.

The revolution in military affairs that transformed intelligence into a component of the

integrated C4ISR network has now resulted in conflicts in which intelligence must play a vastly

different role. Satellite surveillance that provides target location information for precision-guided

munitions has little value in a COIN operation in the center of a city. Investigating the new role

of intelligence will benefit from briefly tracing the evolution of its role in the previous

generations of warfare; intelligence has generally become a more complicated endeavor over

time as intelligence requirements grew more complex with each subsequent generation of

warfare. Once the precise role of intelligence in the fourth generation of warfare is understood,

the missions necessary to fulfill this role can be examined and applied to the current conflict in

Iraq.

The First Three Generations of Warfare

The first generation of warfare was brought about by the advent of two key developments:

the invention of gunpowder, and reliable firearms to use it, and the creation of nation-states

capable of supporting massive conscripted armies. Both of these developments took hundreds of


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years to reach fruition. Gunpowder itself was not a new technology by the time of Napoleon, the

height of the first generation of warfare, but firearms capable of harnessing the power of

gunpowder consistently were fairly new. Nation-states required a host of developments including

the end of feudalism, increased wealth, and the advent of nationalism. Warfare of this generation

consisted of massing direct fire against the enemys forces in pitched battles.8

The role of intelligence in this generation was fairly simple. Commanders had two basic

intelligence requirements: the location of the enemy and the lie of the land. Scouts were the

primary means of fulfilling these requirements. Due to the constraints created by distance and the

lack of long range communication, little more could be expected of intelligence providers than

those two basic questions. Often times even these requirements were not met and golden

opportunities missed.9

Second generation warfare was brought about by the rapid industrialization of Europe

and North America. Industrialization led to an increase in wealth and the growth of industry

necessary to mass produce new weaponry, and the introduction of railways, telegraphs, and radio

that vastly improved the logistics capabilities of states. WWI epitomized second generation

warfare. Massive armies supplied by the industrial might of the states faced each other in the

trenches of Europe. Long range artillery, made possible by reconnaissance provided by aircraft

communicated through telegraphs, was massed against enemy positions instead of the direct fire

experienced in the previous generation of warfare.10

The role of intelligence expanded in this generation of warfare to include theater

awareness. It was no longer sufficient for commanders to know the location of enemy troops, in

fact, the cruel irony of trench warfare was knowing precisely where the enemy is without being

8Ibid. 16-8

9Keegan, John. Intelligence in War. 13-7

10Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone. 18-22


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able to do much about it. Likewise, the battlefield was often readily apparent to the commanders.

Now commanders needed to know where the enemys railways, telegraph lines, and supplies

were located as well as the plans of the enemy so reinforcements and artillery could be directed

as needed. Intelligence services began accomplishing this last requirement through their nascent

signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities, which basically consisted of eavesdropping and

cryptology.11

Advances in communications equipment, aviation, armor, artillery, and motor transport

and the fully-fledged industrial societies capable of producing those capabilities in large numbers

led to the third generation of warfare which was embodied in WWII. The blitzkrieg tactics of

Nazi Germany were only possible because of these advances; the same is true of the large-scale

naval battles of the Pacific Theater and the amphibious assaults on Sicily and Normandy. Battles

during WWII were far more complex in terms of capabilities due to the combined-arms tactics in

which ground, air, and maritime forces fought jointly. The focus of the war shifted again with the

new generation of war; the industrial might of the state was the chief enabler of combined-arms

operations and thus became the focus of enemy operations. Strategic bombing of industrial and

population centers became widespread practices as both sides sought to undercut the others

capability to continue the fight.12

Once again the role of intelligence expanded. The earlier missions still needed to be

fulfilled; theater awareness was still crucial to winning battles. The Battle of Midway, a narrow

but critically important victory, was won in part by the ability of the United States to intercept

and decode Japanese transmissions which revealed the plan to seize Midway as a staging area for

11Kahn, David. "The Rise of Intelligence." Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006): 125-134.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032075.12

Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone. 23-8


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attacks on Hawaii.13Nevertheless, the role of intelligence expanded to now include the

responsibility of locating strategic targets like factories, refineries, and even the site of

Germanys V-1 and V-2 program.14

The Fourth Generation of Warfare Political Terrain Mapping

The biggest transformation that led to the fourth generation of warfare was the

advancement of information technology. Information can be transmitted around the globe

virtually instantaneously. This has allowed a growth of the number of international actors besides

states as organizations can have their voices heard on a variety of media. Information is now

widely accessible, even to citizens of developing countries albeit less so than for citizens of

developed countries.15

One other factor has played a crucial role in the formulation of the fourth generation of

warfare: nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have effectively prevented developed countries

from fighting total wars like WWI and WWII because the potential costs are too high. As a result,

wars between developed countries have been of a much smaller scale and the focus is no longer

on destroying an adversarys industrial capacity.16 Rather these conflicts are fought to influence

the political willpower of the people. Hammes argues that it was this realization by Mao Zedong,

and the strategy that he developed following that realization, that led Mao and Chinese

Communist Party to victory during the Chinese Civil War.17

Simply put, conflict in the fourth

generation of warfare is about the imposition of political will on others, which heralds back to


14Ibid. 275-85





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Karl von Clausewitzs argument that war is used to achieve political ends.18

Ultimately, whether

these political ends are achieved through winning hearts and minds or by imposing a cost

deemed too high to resist, conflict in the fourth generation is focused on the political will of the

people.

This leads to the biggest evolution of the role of intelligence in warfare. In the previous

generations of warfare, intelligence was responsible for enabling operations that achieve the

objectives of the conflict. During the first generation this meant simply providing the location of

the enemy whereas the third generation required providing information about strategic targets

like industrial sites. If conflict in the fourth generation of warfare is concerned with the political

landscape of the people, then intelligence will need to map the political terrain of the conflict.

This is a fundamentally different mission than those seen in previous generations of warfare.

Moreover, the previous missions are still important requirements that need to be met. There are

several ways for intelligence to fulfill this new mission that will be considered here: intelligence

preparation of the battlespace (IPB), community intelligence, and human intelligence (HUMINT).

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

IPB is an analytical framework for assessing the various important factors, such as terrain,

threat, area of operations (AO), and associated areas of interest (AOI). Although it is currently

limited by assumptions regarding the types of threats and likely AOs U.S. forces will encounter,

this analytical tool could be valuable when considering the political aspects of the battlespace.

IPB has four steps: define the battlespace, describe the battlespaces effects, evaluate the threat,

18von Clausewitz, Carl. What Is War? In On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret 75-89. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1976.


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and develop enemy courses of action (COAs). Each of these steps is valuable for mapping the

political terrain of a conflict.19

The first step of IPB is defining the battlespace. This may sound like a simple task, but

actually can rapidly become a complicated endeavor. The point of this step is to identify specific

aspects of the AO that will influence the COAs available to commanders. Including politically

important features, such as infrastructure, religious centers, etc., as areas of interest to ensure that

they receive due consideration could prevent insensitivity and mitigate backlash against

operations.20

Describing the battlespaces effects, the second step of IPB, deals with features of the

battlespace that may influence the success of operations. In the typical understanding, this would

include information about the weather and terrain of the battlespace. While these are of course

important features of the battlespace to consider, operations in fourth generation conflicts should

also include population analysis. Basic statistical data as well as cultural intelligence and any

other aspects of the population that may influence success need to be considered. One

particularly beneficial inclusion to make would be perception analysis. Perception analysis

examines how actions will likely be interpreted by the local population, an important

consideration when trying to influence the populations political will.21

A dilemma does arise

from this consideration: the time-sensitivity of intelligence about enemy location and plans

encourages a fast and often overwhelming response, but this is likely to upset local populations

that have to endure these responses and bear the cost of collateral damage.

19Medby, Jamison J., and Russell W. Glenn. Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation for the Battlefield for Urban

Operation. Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, 2002. xvii - xix20

Ibid. 40-121

Ibid. 51-5


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The third step of IPB is to evaluate the threat. The normal analytical approach is to

examine known adversaries based on the assumption that its doctrine and tactics are known. This

can cause two problems. First, this approach engenders assumptions about the behavior of the

enemy because it forces categorization based on supposed doctrine and tactics, a dangerous habit

in any conflict but particularly treacherous when fighting in an asymmetric conflict. Second, in

asymmetric conflicts there is a good chance that enemies will remain unknown; evaluating only

the threats that doctrinal and tactical information can be provided for does little to help locate the

unknown threats of a region. Defining threats based instead on interests and capabilities not only

provides a means to try to find unknown enemies, but it also reinforces the concept of fourth

generation conflicts being fought to achieve political ends.22

The final step of the IPB is to develop enemy COAs. The reasoning behind this concept

is that creating a list of potential COAs and then proceeding to use collected intelligence to

disprove possible COAs is analytically more rigorous and less likely to succumb to the

confirmation bias of the analyst. An analyst that considers a single COA at a time will

subconsciously try to fit evidence to confirm that his hypothesis is accurate while disregarding

any evidence that contradicts the hypothesis. The practice of disproving hypotheses was

developed by Richards Heuer and is known as the analysis of competing hypotheses. The better

the analysis of enemy COAs, the better prepared U.S. forces will be to defend against the

potential threats.23

Community Intelligence

In the United Kingdom, authorities faced a severe lack of operable intelligence for

counter-terrorism. Highlighting the shortage of intelligence was the fact that many of the

22Ibid. 89-94

23Ibid. 123-6


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counter-terrorism cases it was pursuing were originating from neighborhoods that were not at all

expected of harboring terrorists; the lack of intelligence was not just at the tactical level

(individual cases) but permeated to a strategic level (sources of possible terrorists).24

A study of the issue made two conclusions about why counter-terrorism intelligence was

in such a poor state. First, police agencies efforts were not widespread enough to acquire a

complete picture of the situation that was being faced. Part of the cause of this behavior is that

police agencies are adept at using known intelligence sources, but are far less skilled at searching

out new sources of intelligence. Second, police agencies are over-reliant on professional (i.e.

criminally-connected) police informants. Like the first conclusion, this is partially due to the

expertise police agencies have in using known intelligence sources. There is also the association

of professional informants with higher credibility and better quality intelligence.25

The study proposed the solution of community intelligence. Community intelligence is a

strategy of engagement with local communities to utilize the groups or communities found in

the cities as information networks. These networks are inherently widespread and are much more

attuned to the nuances of the various communities in their local area, a skill that the police forces

lack. The police agencies seek out community leaders to make these connections. Two results

ideally occur. First, the entire computer becomes an intelligence network that feeds information,

not just about terrorism, to the police agency via the relationship developed with the community

leader. Second, information can be spread to the community from the police to counteract rumors

and misinformation.26

24Innes, Martin. "Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic

Policing."Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 605 (2006): 222-241.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097806.25

Ibid. 23026

Ibid. 232


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Community intelligence is not limited to just counter-terrorism, but would have

applications in COIN and development missions as well. The nuanced intelligence that

communities could provide would potentially be incredibly valuable for three reasons. First, U.S.

forces do not have the intimate knowledge of the local area or the people and as a result

insurgents hiding within neighborhoods could for all pragmatic reasons be invisible to U.S.

forces. The community, assuming it does not wish to directly support the insurgents, will be far

more likely to notice strangers and strange behavior.

Second, community intelligence provides a mechanism for communities to convey their

needs to U.S. forces. Meeting these needs would be an important reciprocal action to build up

trust with the community, which is necessary for strategic relationships to work, and would also

help win minds and hearts. As the strategic relationship deepens, the members of the

community will likely be more and more inclined share information and become invested in the

U.S. mission.

Third, it provides a way for U.S. forces to share information to community members

through the trusted channel of community leaders. This is beneficial because it can help

counteract the propaganda of the terrorist and insurgent groups. Preventing propaganda victories

for an insurgency or terrorist cell is just as critical as victories on the battlefield when the focus

of conflict is the political will of the people.27

Of course, for the community intelligence

arrangement to work, mutual trust must be established.28

Human Intelligence

27Jackson, Brian A. "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a 'Long War': The British Experience in Northern

Ireland."Military Review(2007): 74-85.28

Innes, Martin. "Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic

Policing." 232-4


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HUMINT is nothing new to warfare; in fact, its the oldest form of intelligence there is

and has been around as long as there has been war and conflict.29Nevertheless, given the nature

of asymmetric conflicts, HUMINT offers the best potential of acquiring detailed intelligence

about the location and plans of the adversaries of the United States. Enemies are not operating

from base camps but rather from within the local population, severely reducing the effectiveness

of U.S. IMIGINT capabilities. Insurgents and terrorists quickly learned good signals tradecraft to

counter U.S. SIGINT or were captured.30

This does not play to the strengths of U.S. intelligence capabilities. U.S. intelligence for

most of the second half of the 20

th

century was designed to collect intelligence about the Soviet

Union. The difficulty of running HUMINT operations behind the Iron Curtain led the United

States to rely on its other intelligence arms, in particular SIGINT and IMIGINT. Moreover, what

HUMINT capabilities the United States does have were also focused on the Soviet Union;

HUMINT operators with expertise on the Middle East are a limited commodity.31

Currently the United States is taking steps to bolster its HUMINT capabilities. Military

units with intelligence training are being deployed with front-line troops and SOF have been

used to a great extent for reconnaissance and tactical intelligence collection. Once collected, this

intelligence is exploited, analyzed, and shared. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is

developing a HUMINT database to facilitate access to valuable HUMINT.32

Iraq

Before delving into the specifics of the asymmetric conflict taking place between the

United States and various insurgency groups, it is important to point out an analytical lapse that

29Keegan, John. Intelligence in War. 7

30Jones, Seth G. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, 2008. 99-100

31Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009. 90-103

32Chizek, Judy G. "Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance." 24-5


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appears to be plaguing much of the discussion about COIN, namely that COIN operations are on

the whole treated as being the same problem regardless of differences in population, conditions

before the insurgency, and the challenges that must be overcome. Overlooking differences like

these leads to false conclusions about what strategies and tactics will and will not work in COIN

operations. This is not to say that there are no important lessons to be learned from Vietnam that

can be applied to Iraq or Afghanistan, but it is analytically lazy to lump all three conflicts

together just because they involved fighting insurgencies.

A complete discussion of the role of intelligence in the COIN in Iraq goes far beyond the

scope of this paper, but two important aspects must be covered by intelligence when mapping the

political terrain of Iraq that would be a key enabler of successful COIN operations: population

groups by interests and the conditions before Operation: Iraqi Freedom began, namely repressive

state that brutally stomped out dissension. Lastly, how community intelligence can be a valuable

tool in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people will be discussed.

Combatants

It is easy to simplify the conflict in Iraq by dividing combatants into two broad groups:

U.S. and allied forces and the insurgency. Doing so misses the complexity of the several

different groups that have different goals and interests that they pursue. If the fourth generation

of warfare is about acting on the political will of the adversary, then the United States

intelligence system needs to provide an accurate picture of the political motivations of all

combatant groups. This follows the model of IPB that has been expanded to include interest-

based threat evaluations based on population information.

The Kurds are primarily motivated by a desire for autonomy. Their loyalty belongs to

Kurdistan, a geo-cultural area with territory that spans Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and not to


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Iraq. This has not prevented them from taking positions in the Iraqi government, although it

appears that this is motivated out of a desire to protect the autonomy they currently enjoy and out

of a politically astute decision that it is wise to be involved with the big game in town.

Nevertheless, the Kurds, or at least a subset of them, continue to participate in separatist

activities in Turkey meant to further the realization of their ultimate goal of the formation of

Kurdistan.33

Sunni Arab insurgents are fighting to oust the United States from Iraq and remove the

Iraqi government. The interests that motivate this desire vary and in some cases are difficult to

determine as there is no clear leadership or overarching organization for the Sunni insurgents.

Some insurgents have negotiated with the United States and Iraqi government and have disarmed

following fulfillment of some political demands, such as the dissolution of Shiite militias. Other

insurgents seem highly unlikely to ever negotiate or cease fighting. Important to note is that not

all Sunni Arabs support the insurgents and political participation has risen dramatically among

Sunni Arabs.34

Violent extremists only represent approximately 10% of the active fighters in Iraq, but

the scale of violence in their attacks gives them disproportionate influence and attention. Most

extremists appear to be motivated by sectarian discord and anti-West sentiments. Unlike the

Sunni Arab insurgents, the extremists do not appear to desire any kind of control or political

power in Iraq, not surprising given that large portions of these extremists are foreign fighters.

Using terrorist tactics such as suicide bombs, they attack crowded Shiite gatherings like

33Pirnie, Bruce R., and Edward O'Connell. Counterinsurgency in Iraq (20032006). 24-5

34Ibid. 25-8


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weddings, markets, and even mosques. Like the more intransigent insurgents, it is highly

unlikely that individuals in this group will negotiate or agree to cease fighting.35

There are two primary Shiite militia groups: the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution

in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Mahdi Army. Smaller Shiite militias also exist; these groups are formed

out of security concerns caused by Sunni insurgents and extremists. SCIRI and the Mahdi Army

maintain an uneasy truce as both seek to further their own ends. SCIRI has become the chief

political party for Shiite Arabs and supports the Iraqi government. The Mahdi Army is Islamic

and opposed to the U.S. presence in Iraq and wants U.S. forces to withdraw although it too has a

presence in the government which provides funding and jobs for members of the Mahdi Army.

Small militias would likely be willing to disband if convinced of their safety. SCIRI works with

the United States. The Mahdi Armys interests place it in a position where negotiation and

cooperation are unlikely.36

The last groups to be discussed are the criminal organizations responsible for drugs,

smuggling, arms sales, and basically any illegal venture that bears a profit. These groups are

interested solely in making a profit. The ongoing conflict provides them with a variety of money-

making endeavors so it is in their best interest to continue to enable the various groups

mentioned above to continue fighting.37

If U.S. forces evaluate the threats represented by these various groups by doctrine and

tactics, most of these groups will be lumped together under the term insurgents. Doing so

would be a grave mistake. Some of these groups will be intractable and violent conflict will be

inevitable and continuous. Some of these groups, however, can be approached by appealing to

their interests and conflict can be avoided. The United States has already done this to an extent;

35Ibid. 28-30

36Ibid. 31-32

37Ibid. 32


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for example, the Kurds enjoyed a great deal of autonomy during the invasion of Iraq as their

militia, the PeshMerga, was recognized as a legitimate militia and the United States gained an

ally.38

Conditions Before Operation: Iraqi Freedom

Saddam Hussein imposed a Sunni Arab-dominated dictatorship that controlled every

aspect of society. His regime viciously stamped out revolts by both the Kurds and the Shiites.

He also embroiled Iraq into disastrous wars with Iran and NATO forces following an invasion of

Kuwait. Infrastructure suffered and the economy was distorted by massive subsidies for basic

essentials under his corrupt government. His regime was toppled following a rapid campaign by

the United States and its allies in which only sporadic resistance was offered.39

On the face of it, it seems reasonable of the United States and its allies to expect a warm

welcome, and for a brief window that was the case. Very quickly the situation deteriorated with

looting and riots although the insurgency did not begin in earnest until the fall of 2003.40

The

United States suffered a rude awakening about the situation of Iraq that was caused by missing

important aspects of Iraq that political terrain mapping might have avoided. Better intelligence

leads to better informed decision-making and a more realistic understanding of what to expect

during a conflict.

First, following the First Gulf War, Shiites in southern Iraq revolted with the

encouragement of the United States. Hussein ruthlessly put down the revolt, even going so far as

to cause an ecological disaster by draining the marshes between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.

The United States did nothing to prevent the brutal suppression of the revolt, and as a result

38Ibid. 22-25

39Ibid. 2-6

40Ibid. 9


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Shiite Arabs came to distrust the United States.41

This distrust now undermines U.S. efforts in

COIN and nation-building in Iraq. Analysis of the political interests of Shiite Arabs and

previous interaction with this group would likely have drawn attention to the mistrust Shiites

had for the United States.

Second, it seems that the United States greatly underestimated the difficulty of forming a

government that would be acceptable to Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, and Kurds. It is possible that

part of this underestimation is the result of Husseins effective albeit brutal repression of

sectarian violence. Another possible cause is that the Kurds had relative autonomy in the

northwest Iraq and this dampened their efforts to revolt against Husseins regime. In any case, an

evaluation of the various actors in Iraq as determined by interests would have quickly indicated

that conflict between the groups was not only likely but would be difficult to resolve.

Community Intelligence in Iraq

In an article examining the British experience in Northern Ireland, Brian A. Jackson

extrapolates several lessons for COIN in Iraq. Two of these recommendations are joined under

the header of low-grade intelligence, that is intelligence that when aggregated provides an

accurate picture of the insurgency. The first is that every soldier should be a collector of

intelligence and the second is that U.S. forces should think people first, basically that the local

population can be an excellent source of intelligence. This approach makes troops more effective

as they gain familiarity with an area. It also allows locals the opportunity to become familiar

with the troops, which led to the realization by the troops,that the way a battalion behaved made

a big difference to its overall success. Toughness was acceptable; roughness was not. Asthe

41Ibid. 4


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relationship between the two developed over time, locals would provide intelligence that the

soldiers never would have had access to otherwise.42

Community intelligence mirrors this approach. As soldiers develop strategic relationships

with community leaders, they also become familiar with the community. Repeated exposure to a

community creates a baseline of experience that can foster similar realizations about the value of

respectable behavior like those British troops had in Northern Ireland. Moreover, it can result in

intelligence being collected that U.S. forces would never have had access to otherwise. Locals

know what is and what is not normal for the community. Likewise, they know who and who is

not from around the area; that can be significant intelligence considering most violent extremists

are foreign fighters.43

Community intelligence provides a source of intelligence that helps protect

not only U.S. troops but also the people of Iraq. Protecting Iraqi citizens from suicide bombers

and developing actual relationships will go far in winning hearts and minds.

Conclusion

The Revolution in Military Affairs has brought about the fourth generation of warfare in

which conflict is focused on the political will of the combatants. U.S. intelligence services have

always had to evolve with the new generations of warfare and the latest was no exception. In

order for U.S. intelligence services to enable U.S. forces to effectively fight its adversaries, they

must provide political terrain mapping that reveals the interests that the adversaries of the United

States. The COIN operation in Iraq demonstrates that failures to fully understand why

combatants are fighting can lead to wasted effort and costly mistakes. Intelligence preparation of

the battlespace, community intelligence, and a renewed HUMINT program are the new mission

42Jackson, Brian A. "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a 'Long War': The British Experience in Northern Ireland." 77-

943

Innes, Martin. "Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic 229-34

and Pirnie, Bruce R., and Edward O'Connell. Counterinsurgency in Iraq (20032006).28


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of U.S. intelligence services meeting the intelligence requirements of a U.S. military involved in

fourth generation conflicts.


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the revolution in intelligence affairs: the new role of intelligence in asymmetric conflict

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