the revival of classical political philosophy a reply to rothman

7/29/2019 The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy a Reply to Rothman

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The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy: A Reply to Rothman

Author(s): Joseph CropseySource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Jun., 1962), pp. 353-359Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1952371 .

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A REPLY TO ROTHMANJOSEPH CROPSEYThe Universityof Chicago

Readers of Stanley Rothman's article "TheRevival of Classical Political Philosophy: ACritique" will be aware that the title he haschosen does not indicate the full scope of hisendeavor.He has in fact attempted to state andcriticizethe grounds of classical political andnaturalphilosophy, nd to state and ina certainmeasure defend the grounds of modern socialand natural science. Exceptional resources ofscholarship and analytic power would beneeded to dispose ofthose tremendous hemes,which believe Rothman has not succeeded indoing. A prominent purpose of Rothman'spaper is to criticize he work of ProfessorLeoStraussand of some of his students,on the viewthat he, and after his instruction hey, are theanimators of the attemptedrevival ofclassicaldoctrines concerningnatural right. The at-tempt to revive natural right s presentedascomplementarywitha belief n theweaknessofsocial science as nowunderstoodby themajor-ity of academic and other professionals.Thepurposeofthepresentreflectionsn Rothman'sarticle is to see how far he has made a validcriticism f the classics and of the men he re-gards as theirattempted restorers; nd to con-sider thesoundness of his viewson thereceivedsciences.Rothman's essay consists of five main parts,organized about the distinction between Mr.Strauss's writingon contemporarysocial sci-ence and his writing on classical and earlymodernpolitical philosophy. n the former ivi-sion are two main parts: a summary (pages341-343) of Mr. Strauss's position on the ques-tion of contemporary social science; and acounter-statement pages 343-346) in defenseof social science, maintaining its consistencyand validityon what s best knownas theques-tion offactsand values, includingthe "values"of the social scientists. In the latter divisionthere is again an attempt to summarize (pp.346-348) a long developmentofMr. Strauss's,in this case on classical politicalphilosophy ndthe early modernposition that comprisedtherebellion against antiquity. Then there is acounter-statementpp. 348-351) arguing thesuperiorityof modern over ancient naturalscience, and inferringherefrom hesuperiorityof modern social science over the ancient.There is also an argument that iM:r. trauss atone time asserted and at a later time deniedthat classical political philosophy depended onclassical natural philosophy. Finally there s aconclusion of a miscellaneous character.

The thesisof Rothman's paper could be saidto be this: on the premiseof modernscientificmethod tcan be shown that therecan and mustbe clear a distinction etween"description" and"evaluation" in both social and natural sci-ence; and the denial or ignoranceof thisprop-osition is at the core both of classical phi-losophy and of the attempt to revive naturalright on the foundationof a discreditedteleo-logism. Unless this misrepresentsRothman'sposition, tfollows hat ifnatural rightdoes notsuppose, nor teleology mply, that descriptionand evaluation are "fused" in Rothman's senseofthe term, hen this criticism f natural rightwould prove invalid and Rothman's thesiswould have to be rejected. And ifMr. Straussdoes not argue, and if it should not be trueirrespectiveof Mr. Strauss's argument, thatnatural science determines political science,then not only would Rothman's statement ofMr. Strauss's self-contradictionprove incor-rect but the basis of Rothman's argumentingeneral would be falsified:for his paper as awhole standsor falls on the validity ofadoptingthepremises nd method of modernnatural sci-ence forvindicatingmodern social science andfor rejecting classical political philosophy aswell as natural philosophy.Also rejectedwouldbe the vindication of modern natural scienceby the premisesof modernnatural science.In taking up Rothman's argument, will notdiscuss thematicallyhis two summariesofMr.Strauss's statements in what I have describedas the first nd third divisions of his article).Rothman,in his second footnote,names Natu-ral Right nd History,Thoughts n Machiavelli,and IWhats Political Philosophy?as the mainsources of Mr. Strauss's views, adding "AnEpilogue" from Essays on the Scientific tudyof Politics, ed. H. J. Storing (incorrectly ited)in footnote . Rothman's references o What sPolitical Philosophy? are heavily concentratedin the first 7 pages, but extend to page 94 ofthat volume.His references o Natural Right ndHistory are extensive but not always precise(e.g., "pp. 88-164," "pp. 77-181"). Thoughts nMachiavelli, a difficult book of about 300pages, is referred o twice, once in footnote62("See TM") and again in footnote68 ("TM, p.13"). There is no evidence that Rothman'sargument is affected by Thoughts n Machia-velli, lthough his claim that therehas been ashift n Mr. Strauss's position would have torest upon a close reading of that book. HowthoroughlyRothman has studied his opponent

353

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354 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWis by no means an unimportantmatter;but asfar as possible I wish to leave that questionopen to the udgmentofreaders,believingthatthose who take the trouble to compare theoriginalwiththerestatementwill be struckbythe disproportionbetween the solidity of theone and the looseness, fnot unintelligible b-breviation of the other. Because Rothman'spurpose s complex-not merely hecriticism fnatural rightproperbut thecriticism f t in itsrevived form,under the influence f a scholarwho has, as the ancients did not have, experi-ence of moderncircumstances-it will not bepossible entirely o ignorethe question of theaccuracy of Rothman's representation ofclassical thought s revived.Let us turn to Rothman's attack on naturalright n the form fa defenseofsocial science.Broadly, Rothman must refute this doctrine:that positivism and historicismare vitiated,positivismby its untenablepositionon values,and bothhistoricismnd positivismby the ap-plicationofeach to itself.The partofthe ques-tionthatpertains ohistoricism snotexaminedby Rothman. He does assert that "Strauss'analysis of the historicistmplicationsof posi-tivism as hedefinest) is not veryconvincing."(p. 6) This remark s supportedby a footnotewhichdoes not mention the issue, but whichcontains, among other things, the reference:"See, for example, Herbert Feigl and MayBrodbeck, Readings in thePhilosophyof Sci-ence....." The Feigl and Brodbeck volumeconsistsof52 essays and almost800 pages, andthere s no directmannerof knowing n whatwayRothmanconsiders t to bear on the ques-tion. Let us, withRothman,drop the problemof natural right and history and take up thequestion of whetherpositivisticsocial scienceis self-contradictory.The position that Rothman contestsmay betakento beginwith thissentence on page 21 ofWhat s Political Philosophy?:"It is impossibleto study social phenomena, i.e., all importantsocial phenomena,withoutmakingvalue judg-ments." (My italics) The argument of Mr.Strauss proceeds generally n this way: Socialscience which attempts to assimilate itselftonatural science denies that therecan be judg-mentsofgoodnessorexcellence, .e., of value,"exceedingbare preferences n cognitive stand-ing. To the extentto whichpositivisticsocialscience makes or implies such judgments, itcontradicts ts preceptby its practice. It mustcontradictitselfthus if it wishes to considerimportantquestions; but it can avoid contra-dictingitselfthus if it confines tself,forex-ample, to purely technical questions quatechnical, or to subordinate tasks of mere

enumeration, correlation, and so on. Theuntenability or the inutility of positivisticsocial science proceeds from ts premise thatjudgments of value are not as intelligibleorrational as are judgments of fact. Positivisticsocial science grants that men's preferences rvalues are themselves facts deducible frommen's behavior,and may as such be described,enumerated, nd so on; but it insists that thereis no way of verifying, .e., establishing thetruth of, a value judgment:only the existencebut not the truthof value judgments s matterof fact.Nothing n thischaracterizationofpositivis-tic social science can be takenas implying hatthereare no judgments as to factwhichare notalso judgmentsas to value. The pointis ratherthat judgments as to value are not to be ex-cluded from he class of judgmentsas to fact,and that such judgments as to value cannot beexcised from ocial sciencewithout terilizingtin more senses than the one intended. I am notnow trying o argue the truthof this doctrinebut only to establish what the position at issueis. The firstpart of the positioncan be statedthus, withbare brevity: values are factual,butnot all facts are values (e.g., "the cube root of64 is less thanhalf of 10" containsno elementofdiscretionor udgmentin the propersense).'

Rothman, however, makes it clear that hetakes the natural right position to imply the"fusion" of facts and values. On page 491 ofThe Structure fScience,2 Ernest Nagel, discus-sing a passage by Mr. Strauss, denies that"fact and value are fusedbeyond the possibil-ity of distinguishing hem." Rothman has evi-dentlytaken up the understandingof naturalright implicit in that denial, and made itfundamental o his ownview. In thepartofhisarticle dealing thematicallywith social science,he builds up to the assertion p. 345) that "onecan describe without at the same timeevaluat-ing." (My italics) In the subsequentpart of hisarticle which could be said to have naturalscience as the theme,he asserts that "In theclassical view all descriptionsare evaluationsand all evaluations are moral evaluations." (p.348)No evidence broughtby Rothman supportsthe view that, accordingto Mr. Strauss or toanyone, all descriptionis evaluation and allevaluation is moral evaluation. The StatisticalAbstract ftheUnitedStates could be regarded

I The reader should consult Walter Berns' Com-munication in this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (September,1958), entitled "On Robert Dahl's 'ImportantQuestions.' "2 See Rothman's footnote26.

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REPLY TO ROTHMAN 355as a kind ofdescription f thiscountry,withoutmoral udgements of any sort being expressedin its pages. No one could deny the mportanceof some or many of the undoubted facts con-tained in it. Also, buildings may be approvedfortheir durability,horses for their swiftness,women for heirbeauty and men for heir ntel-ligencewithout any trace of moral evaluationentering.There is assuredly a difference e-tweena broken-winded ag of great age and avigorous plow horse n theprime of ife, nd asa difference hich s essential to the nature ofthe horse t couldbe said to rest upon a normof"natural right;" but what does that differencehave to do withmorality? Why should a manbe said to make a moral evaluation when hejudges a hound to have a good nose?Rothman'smisrepresentation f the view he attempts tocriticizemust emanate from failureto reflecton thedifference etween"right" and "moral."The classical doctrineis that each thingisexcellent n the degreeto which it can do thethings for which its species is naturallyequipped. Later on, in footnote 46, Rothmanwillask, why s the natural good? The answeris that there s neither way nor a reason to pre-ventourselvesfrom istinguishingetweenuse-less and serviceable beasts, forexample, andthat the most empirical and also obvious, aswell as rational standard of theserviceable, orthe limit of the thing's activity, is set by itsnature. We do not judge elephants to be goodbecause they are natural; or because nature ismorallygood-whatever that wouldmean. Wejudge a particularelephant to be good by thelight of what elephant nature makes it possibleforelephants to do and to be. As long as wecontinue to base our judgments of beings ontheirnatures,wewill be preserved, or xample,from xpecting ll men to become philosophersat the same time that we are preservedfrombeing unable to distinguishgood citizensfromparasitesand criminals.The common notionofnatural right s that it is not empirical.Roth-man distinguishesthe men of the empiricaltraditionfromthose he criticizes.Like all un-derstanding, hat provided by the lightofna-ture is of course not simply empirical. But itshould be clear that greater scope can hardlybe given to observationthan to allow it to bethe basis for our recognitionof the species ofthings nd theirfaculties.Whether eleologyorsome otherprinciple ies behind thephenomenais a question that can be deferred ora while.For thepresent t suffices hat Rothman'smainargument n his rejoinderto the natural rightargument against positivisticsocial science ismade against a point that his opponent doesnot make.

A further rgument thoughtby Rothman tobe necessaryfor his case against natural rightand for ocial science s this: it is not legitimateto object against social science that "the ob-jects of nvestigation nd even the veryformu-lation of the problems are shaped by personalinterestsor commitments...... "(p. 344) I donot know (but will in a moment attempt toguess) what point of classical doctrine Roth-man is attempting to refutewith this argu-ment, but its bearing can be determined n ageneral way. In his footnote 6, he draws atten-tion to pages 485-502 of Ernest Nagel's TheStructure f Science. Those pages comprise asection of a chapter on Methodological Prob-lemsof theSocial Sciences. The section n ques-tion is entitled "The Value-Oriented Bias ofSocial Inquiry." In it, Professor Nagel takesup, under four headings, "the alleged role ofvalue judgments," i.e., of the social scientists'value judgments, n influencinghe workof thesocial scientists.His first eading s, theallegedrole of value judgments in the selection ofproblems.The position he bringsundercriticalreview is this: the possible field of interestofsocial scientists s determinedby theircultureand values, and therefore strictly objectiveor scientificsocial science is impossible. Wemay note that he rejects theconclusion, rguingthat investigation of value-indicated objectscan still be perfectly cientific.Of nterest o usis the fact that the writerwho advanced theview that Nagel rejects is Max Weber. Thesituation is as follows. Weber is a powerfuladvocate ofvalue-free ocial science,and is de-fendedas such by Rothman against the criti-cismsof Mr. Strauss (pp. 345-346). But Weberbelieves that the possibilityof value-free ocialscience is unavoidably limited by the value-directedness of the social scientists' choice ofsubjects. Mr. Strauss denies both the possibil-ity and the desirabilityof value-free ocial sci-ence and would certainlydeny that an intel-ligent man's investigationsare determinedbyhis cultural values. Rothman here takes upNagel's rebuttal against Weber, but mistakesthe arguments against Weber for argumentsagainst Mr. Strauss. This is especially damag-ing to Rothmanfor he reasonthat there s per-haps one pointon whichMr. Strauss's positionis more congenial to the claim of social sciencethan is Max Weber's: Weber affirms nd Mr.Strauss denies that the scientist s in principleculture-boundn the choice of topics. It is pre-ciselyon thispoint that Rothman imaginestherefutationof Weber to be a refutationof Mr.Strauss; and, as it happens, he presents t as arefutationof an argumentwhich Mr. Straussdid not make (namely, that there are no im-



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356 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWportant value-free acts) and to whichthe sup-posed refutation would in any case be unre-lated, as is evident.The obscurity fRothman'sposition s increasedby the factthat the posi-tion of Weber, to which he takes unwittingexception, is Rothman's own position ex-pressed in other words. Rothman argues theimpossibility freducing nterest nd commit-ment to anythingelse: they simply are whatthey are. Weber, as Mr. Strauss remarks onpage 46 of Natural Rightand History, dmitsthis and even gives it a respectabilitywhichRothman does not try to do: "Excellence nowmeans devotion to a cause, be it good or evil,and baseness means indifferenceo all causes."If we tryto reconstructRothman's reasonforincludinghis passage on "commitments,"(p. 344) wemay conjecture he does not say it)that this s his argument gainst Mr. Strauss'sview that positivistic social science is self-depreciatory o the point of being self-contra-dictory. In other words, value-freesocial sci-encedenies theobjectivity r truth f thevalue-judgment that pronouncesscience itselfto bemoreworthy han otherpursuits. The highestwisdom about value judgments includes thejudgmentthat there s no objective superiorityin the pursuitofthat highestwisdom,withoutwhichmen would errconcerning udgment it-self. If Rothman's passage on page 344 is in-tended to be the rejoinder to this part of thenaturalrightposition, hen tmustbe said thatthe rejoinderis a confirmation f the view itseeks to refute:he tells us that men's interestsand commitments imply are what they are.That is to say, he admits preciselywhat hewould have to refute n orderto meet theargu-mentagainst which he is contending. f Roth-man's passage is not intended as I have sup-posed it, then t mustbe regardedas not to thepoint. The reader's attentionshould be drawnin passing to Rothman's use of "interests" inconjunctionwith"commitments.""Interests"is an ambiguous word; and it becomes clearlater in his article that Rothman must be heldto mean that investigators are directed notonly by theirinterests n the sense of "whatexcitescuriosity" but also by their nterests sthe wordappears in the phrase "interested orselfishmotives." The purification f science isinseparable from the incrimination of thescientists. t is an open questionwhether ocialscientists,of whatever opinion, will find thisdoctrinemorecontradictory handerogatory rvice versa. n any case, it is not an effective ef-utation of the charge that positivistic socialscience infects its own being with a funda-mentalweakness.Rothman proceeds with a reference o Mr.

Strauss's position on Weber's thesis concerningthe rise of capitalism. If what has been saidabove is correct,Rothman's remarks re not tothe point, forhe is still arguing that, accordingto the natural right position, "purely descrip-tive propositions are not merely wrong butrather . . they are meaningless." (p. 345) Inany case, the reader mightwishto knowthat afuller statement on the Weber thesis can befound in Church History, March, 1961: "TheWeber Thesis Reexamined (W. S. Hudson)with Comment by Leo Strauss," against whichRothman's remarkscan be checked.Rothman prepares to bring his sectionof hisarticle to a close by asserting "that Straussseems to have shifted his position aftercom-pletingNatural Right nd History."This is oneof the points we shall have to consider, as weturnto the part of his paper that Rothman de-scribesas dealing withMr. Strauss's "restate-ment of the implications of classical thoughtand the modern break with that thought,"(p. 346), but which in effectcontains Roth-man's treatmentof the problem of natural sci-ence.The primary ubject in partII of Rothman'spaperis natural science and its relationto socialscience. The argumentfalls nto divisions whichare determined by the fact that Rothman iscontending partly against classical philosophyand partly against the revival of classicalphilosophy. The difference etween the two isproduced by the intervention f modern natu-ral science. Rothman's method is to adopt ashis premisethe decisive supersessionof ancientphysicsby modernphysics nd then to argue (1)that both ancient and revived natural right,which depend upon the teleological view of na-ture, are invalid as ancient physics is becauseancient physics depends upon the teleologicalview of nature; and (2) that Mr. Strauss in hisearlier writings onceded the victoryof modernnatural science and with t, n effect, he victoryof modern social science; but in his later writ-ings denies that the victory of the formerm-plies the victory f the atter. shall try o showthat there is no merit in the argument thatnatural rightfalls with ancient physics becauseboth are teleological; and that Mr. Strauss didnot assert what Rothman alleges him to haveasserted,and thereforehat the changeofviewwhich Rothman speaks of never occurred.Themajority of Rothman's detailed points I shallhave to leave to each reader's scrutiny,withthe suggestion that theybe tested by the rule,are they comprehensible fread very literally?The point numbered (1) above would bevalid if it were true not only that modernnatural science has simply superseded ancient



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REPLY TO ROTHMAN 357naturalscience, but also that in the decisivere-spect, i.e., on the groundof that supersession,natural rightwas simultaneously overthrown.What is thegroundon which that supersessionis thought,or is specifically houghtby Roth-man,to rest?It is that modernnatural scienceis, whereas classical natural science is not,guided or dominated by the verification rin-ciple.3What is the verification rinciple?Roth-man givesone form f t: "that all propositionsbe statedin such form s to be capable ofbeingvalidated by empirical procedures, and thatpropositionswhichform part of a system notcontradict ach other." (p. 360) As to the attercondition, t is clear that the need to avoid self-contradictions as muchan element ofancientas ofmodernmethod, nd consciously o.

The novelty of theground of modern cienceis the condition, pparently, that propositionsmust be capable of empirical verification norderto be regarded as meaningful.As is wellknown, he acceptance of the empiricaltest forverification ests upon this belief:that the evi-dence ofthe senses is themostfundamentalormost genuine evidence accessible to man; andthat in turn s truebecause what is, is sensibleand what s sensible, s. I do notwishto empha-size what is commonknowledge,namely, thatthere s no empiricalbasis for hemetaphysicaldoctrinethat to be is to be sensible. I meanonly to point out that thismetaphysical prin-ciple does not overthrow for t does not meet)themetaphysicalprinciple to be is to be intel-ligible"; it merely draws men's minds in adifferentirection.Ruling out certainquestionsas meaningless because not empirically verifi-able, does no more than any abstention froman inquirycan do: it leaves the question open,in the mindsof those who do not mistake thenegativeofa blankfor negationbyrefutation.It mightbe true that the order ofnature, andthenecessary ulmination fthatorder n someprinciplethat originatesmotionwithout tselfbeing in motion,cannot be made a matter ofempiricaldemonstration if that expression snot a self-contradiction). ut it might also betrue,for nything he verification rinciple anadduce to the contrary, hat an infinite egressof sources of motionin the universe is a con-tradictionof the profoundest ort; and that,therefore,o insistupon empiricalverificationand consistency f thesystem s meaningless.am far fromwishingto maintain that ancientphysics is superior to modern physics. I wishonly to suggestthat the case against teleologyis notmade out by Rothman.What ofthecollapse of natural rightbecause

3Pp. 348, 349, 350 forexample.

of its association with teleological physics? Inorderto considerthis question, willmergetheremainder of point (1) with point (2) as theywere numbered above. How closelyare physicsand moralphilosophyinked? Rothman believesthat they are inseparable. He writes, . . . un-less Strauss can demonstrate he superiority fclassical over modern and contemporarysci-ence, his whole case collapses ... " (p. 349)Why should this be so? Rothmandoes not say,but he gives the impression hat if the Heisen-berg uncertaintyprinciple not both the veloc-ity and the position of the small quanta aredeterminate) and the second law ofthermody-namics (on the irreversibility f energy trans-fers n the universe as a whole) are somehowtrue,then thereare consequences for the pos-sibilitythat man's end is relatedto his nature.But Heisenberg's uncertainty rinciplehas pre-cisely as much to do withthe goodnessof man'srational activity, for example, as the law ofgravityhas to do with the question,ought youtoknockdownan old lady inorderto geta seatonthe subway-neither morenor ess. The prin-ciples of physics re relevant to theproblemsofhuman lifeto the extentthathuman lifecan bereduced to the motion of matter.This is trueaccordingto the self-understandingf modernscience, at any rate, which, so faras it adoptsthe verification principle, adopts simple em-piricism nd with t materialism.On this score,Rothman's argument onsistsexclusivelyofhisunsupported assertions.But he claims that on this issue of the rela-tionbetween natural science and natural right,it is Mr. Strauss who is inconsistent,havingchanged his views fundamentally.Rothman,summarizing Mr. Strauss's position, says,... the separation of man and nature, andthe attempt to apply differentmodes of analy-sis to each, was inconceivable to classicalpolitical philosophy, and is a product of thebreak withthat philosophy." p. 346) We leavealtogetherout oftheaccount Spinoza's famousremark gainst the writers by whichhe meantthe traditional writers) who "conceive man tobe situated in nature as a kingdom within akingdom."4 Let us turn to the presentation ofthecase inNatural Right nd History, cceptingit as at the same time a statement of theclassical and revived natural rightposition:Socrateswasforced o raise he question s to whatthe humanthings s such are, or what the ratiorerum umanarums. But it is impossible o graspthe distinctiveharacter fhumanthings s suchwithoutgrasping he essentialdifferenceetween

I Ethics, III, introduction.



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358 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWhuman thingsand the thingswhichare not human,i.e., the divine or natural things....Contrary to appearances, Socrates' turn to thestudy of human thingswas based, not upon disre-gard of the divine or natural things, but upon anew approach to the understanding of all things.That approach was indeed ofsuch a character thatit permitted, and favored, the study of humanthingsas such, i.e., ofthe human things n so far asthey are not reducible to the divine or naturalthings.Socrates deviated fromhis predecessors byidentifying he science of the whole, or of every-thingthat is, withtheunderstandingof "what eachof the beings is." For "to be" means "to be some-thing" and hence to be differentromthingswhichare "something else"; "to be" means therefore tobe a part." Hence the whole cannot "be" in thesame sense in which everything that is "some-thing" "is"; the whole must be "beyond being."5

It simply is not true that the classics com-promised their teaching concerning humanthings with a teaching concerning the non-human things-saying nothing further aboutthe possible merit of that latter teaching. Whatthen is the basis of Rothman's allegation thatMr. Strauss has shifted his position in an im-possible way? It is this: early in Natural Rightand History (pp. 7-8), Mr. Strauss refers to a"dilemma" that confronts modern men as a re-sult of the great successes (i.e., technologicalsuccesses) of non-teleological science. Mlenbelieve either that they must accept non-teleological moral doctrine because of the suc-cess of non-teleological physical science; orthat they can escape by arguing that the hu-man things are intelligible teleologically andthe non-human things non-teleologically. Theformer are positivists (and would includeRothman), the latter are Thomists and otherswho have broken with Aristotle, i.e., with theclassical tradition of natural right. Since it isperfectly obvious that Mr. Strauss is not in thecourse of associating himself with either party,it is equally clear that he means literally whathe says toward the end of the Introduction toNatural Right and History: the book "will haveto be limited to that aspect of the problem ofnatural right which can be clarified within theconfines of the social sciences." Rothman's mis-interpretation consists in this: he believed Mr.Strauss, or the natural right position (in factboth) to be themselves confined to the twohorns of the dilemma. He did not realize thatwhat follows, both in Natural Right and His-toryand in the later works, is a statement thatrefuses the dilemma because what follows does

5 P. 122.

not concedethat the issue between ancient andmodernnatural science s simplydisposedof byarguing from the premises of modernnaturalscience. Rothman's argument thus does notbear weight.I deeply deplore the need to notice the con-cluding section of Rothman's paper. In it hecontinues n the tone he sets very early whenhe refers to Mr. Strauss's students as "dis-ciples," a term of gratuitous offense hat in-sinuates a combination of self-satisfied ec-tarianism and hypnotic nfluence. n the con-clusionhe permitshimself o speculate on thebasis ofthat influence, nd easily satisfieshim-self that it is foundedupon a susceptibility o"simple keys," and a lust forpower. He doeshimself ittle credit by describing s simple the

oldest and deepest philosophic raditionknownto man, one whichhe shows no sign of havinggrasped. And as forthe desire to seize power,whatmoredoes that half-serious llegationrestupon than a mixture of levity and the near-malevolenceof hostilebroodingupon motives?That same conjunctionof evityand ill-tempercould as well impute to Rothman an appetiteto be known s climbingJack nsearchof giantsto slay; but theman who wouldwrite o ofhimwould deserve the censure of scholars,forthechargewould be mere speculation, and irrele-vant to every genuine ssue.Rothman writes hatMr. Strauss "has madea fetish f theesotericcontentof thewritings fpolitical philosophers." Mr. Strauss has notmade a fetish f anything.He has done no morethan to act on the principle that, when onereads the writings f great men, one should aslong as possible abstain from concluding thatwhat appears obscureor contradictory,.e., un-intelligible, s reallyso. Any other approach tothe great literature is sheerly presumptuous.Rothman does not refer o Persecution nd theArtofWriting.Readers mightbe interested nconsulting that statementof the issue by Mr.Strauss, n orderto ascertainwhether here areany tracesoffetishismnit.Rothman makes a particularlyoffensive ndunjust insinuation when he depreciates thesincerityof the adherence of Mr. Strauss andhis students to the principles f democracyandof theUnited States. The quality ofRothman'smethodofscholarship, nd the wholesomenessof his intention an best be exposed by quotingthe passage fromWhat s Political Philosophy?that he alludes to as he distorts t (see his foot-note65):To speak first fthe classics'attitude owardsdemocracy,hepremises: the classicsare good,"and "democracys good" do notvalidate thecon-

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8/8

REPLY TO ROTHMAN 359elusion "hence the classics were good democrats."It would be silly to deny that the classics rejecteddemocracy as an inferior ind ofregime.They werenot blind to its advantages. The severest indict-ment ofdemocracy that ever was writtenoccurs inthe eighth book of Plato's Republic. But eventhere,and preciselythere, Plato makes it clear-bycoordinating his arrangement of regimes withHesiod's arrangement of the ages of the world-that democracy is, in a very important respect,equal to the best regime, which corresponds toHesiod's golden age: since the principle of democ-racy is freedom, all human types can developfreely n a democracy, and hence in particular thebest human type. ...

Rothman hints at a sinisterpurpose under-lying Mr. Strauss's "contradictory" attribu-tion of American political institutions to"Machiavellian" and "anti-Machiavellian"sources. Rothman does not appear to realize

that the tradition of modern political phil-osophy is not a seamless web, but a compli-cated structure onsisting f parts which are tosome extent antagonistic. He might be ex-pected to knowthat this s, at least, the view ofMr. Strauss, for the sixth chapter of NaturalRight and History is called "The Crisis ofModern Natural Right," and begins with theremark that "The first risis of modernityoc-curred in the thought of Jean-Jacques Rous-seau." (AMytalics) Readers may conclude forthemselveswhetherRothman's presentation fthe case was fairorwell-informed.The contestbetween ancientsand moderns sbound to continue. It draws our attentiontothe deepest and grandestquestions, nthepres-ence of whichthere s no proper frameof mindbutmodesty nd concentration pon the ssues.To proceedin any other spirit s to show disre-spect for cholarship nd for hesovereign ues-tions, and is altogetherdeplorable.

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the revival of classical political philosophy a reply to rothman

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