The Reluctant Spouse and the Illegitimate Slave

Marriage household formation and demographic behaviour

amongst Malian Twareg from the Niger Delta and the Gourma

Michael Winter

Department of Social Anthropology

University of Cambridge

England

Sara Randal]

Centre for Population Studies

London School of Hygiene and Tropial Medicine

Keppel Street

London S

England

January 1983

1

In a non-contracepting population differentials in the total

fertility rate are largely determined by different patterns of breastshy

feeding sterility sexual abstinence and marriage In rural Mali today

most women breast-feed for about 20 months and apart from the 40 days

there is little reported long term sexual abstinencedictated by Islam

except in cases of spousal separation Thus an examination of marriage

patterns should be a productive way of sccoun~ing for observed fertility

levels and differentials

In some populations it may only be married women who become exposed

to the risk of childbearing elsewhere extra-marital childbearing may be

acceptable However the relationship of the whole marriage process to

fertility is not simply a question of exposure Marriage is often the

prelude to the formation of a new household and this has economic and

social ramifications which are an integral part of the dynamics of the

whole social system Variations in marriage patterns have a multitude of

causes and implications all of which can be examined at different levels

the total population social class residential unit kinship unit

household or idividual In this paper we will look at two Malian

populations from the view poinlt of household formation and ceformation

the roles of children within marriage and the positions of both married

and unmarried women The whole discussion is stimulated by differences

in total fertility rates which largely disappear when we examine total

marital fertility rates

We will examine two populations of nomadic fwareg pastoralists one

from the Niger inland delta (Delta Twareg) and one from south of the

Niger bend in Mali (Gourma Twareg) As a comparison we will consider the

data from a population of Bambara millet farmers whose marriage pattern

2

is extremely different from that of the Twareg and consequently Bambara

have far higher total fertility These Bambara are a homogenous population

a series of social status classetswith no social divisions The Twareg have

which divide into two main groups illelan or free Twareg andliklar or

The three highest status classes imoshar inesleman and imrad

slaves

In the Gourma there is another (all free) will be referred to as nobles

group whom we will call low-status illelan Although free they have

than the nobles and more important for our analysis theylower status

In the Delta the nobles are predominantly ineslemenrarely own iklan

who include the Islamic religious specialists and in Lte Courma imrad

dominate Thus the categories are

Delta Gourma

nobles nobles (mainly ineslemen) (mainly imrad)

low-status illelan

iklaniklan

Attached to the nobles are dependant ik)a -r domestic slaves

owned inherited and conitrolled by their masteis In return for labour

the propertied nobles provide their iklan with their means of subsistence

In the past iklan dependence on nobles was near total but since the late

1950s a large number of iklan have left noble camps to form their own

independent carPs Many however still remain providing nobles with

a subordinate labour force

Nobles are in general wealthy fair-skinned and high-status

whereas iklan are generally poor negroid and low-status However they

3

share the same physical environment language and a dependence on pastoralism

In both samples the iklan population consists both of dependent iklan

who continue to work for their masters and independent iklan The

quantitative results do not distinguish between these two categories

but the qualitative analyses are drawn from our knowledge of iklan dependent

on nobles in mixed camps and who are continuing to live in the traditional

subordinate position Recently rapid change means that we no longer see

once ws and we must to a certain extent extrapolate fromslavery as it

Theinformants statements about the past and from current patterns

historical element also implies that any iklan demographic data are the

results of changing social practiccs something that should be taken

into account

Table 1 compares the total fertility rate for each population with

We see that the large differences inthe total marital fertility rate

fertility between the Twareg and the Bambara diminish considerably when

marriage is controlled for indicating the power of the marriage pattern

To take this further we must examine marriageas an intermediate variable

within the social context Age at first marriage frequency of divorce

and time to remarriage are all variables which can greatly reduce the

All exist within the contexts ofnumber of currently married women

the changes in or dissolutionshousehold formation and deformation (ie

of a household after a marriage ends) the roles of kin versus affines

residence patterns and the roles of children both economically and as

inheritors

Figure 1 shows the age-pyramids of adults by marital status for

Two points stand out Firstly the twoeach of the three populations

T- populations have similar profiles which differ significantly from

4

Secondlythat of the Bambara particularly regarding

female marriage

once they marry most Bambara remain in the married state for the rest

of their lives whereas at all ages a high proportion of [wareg women

widowed -In fertility analysis it is the are currently divorced or

to understand marriage pattern of women that is the primary factor but

the institution in the role of marriage within society we must

look at

its wider context which involves male marriage too

that all Bambara evert6ally marry whereas From figure 1 we see

Although Gourma Twareg some Twareg both male and female never

marry

Bambara men marry younger and more rapidly than either

Delta Twareg or

Bambara women men the major differences are in the female patterns

marry young over a small age range with few unmarried by ags 20 and none

first marriage with by 25 Twareg women have a wider range of age at

some women marrying well before puberty and others marrying for the first

time in their thirties arid there is a group of perpetual spinsters

At each age there is a sizeable proportion currently out of marriage either

This proportion increases with age indicatingby widowhood or divorce

large gaps before remarriage or even no remarriage The high proportion

young ages indicates a rapid breakdown of first

outside marriage at

marriages Figure 2 shows the percentage widowed and divorced by age for

each Twareg population The proportion divorced is quite constant though

for Delta Twareg and 15 for Gourma Twaregrising slightly around 10

Currently divorced Bambara women are rare

Polygyny and the practice of the levirate whereby a man inherits

his dead brothers wives lead both Bambara men and women to be almost

Bride wealth is paid by the mans lineage o always currently married

It can then be used by thefirst marrieshis wifes lineage when a women

5

womans lineage to secure themselves a bride The levirate practice

indicates that the lineage does not wish to lose its rights in the women

it is practised even withwhom it has brought in for her own sake as

On divorce the bridewealth should be women who are post-menopausal

returned As it has usually been redistributed this is very difficult

and a womens kin will actively discourage and even prohibit the divorce

The few divorces that do occur tend to be very early in the marriage

Amongst the monogamous noble Twareg on the other hand the

bridewealth becomes an indirect dowry (Goody and Tambiah) and often comes

with the woman into her marriage or is used to purchase what she needs

for marriage

It is the Twareg woman rather than the mdn who owns the tent

and the household goods and no woman of any statuscan marry without a

Sometimes a womans father will keep the bridewealth and even

tent

Ac the termination of a sell it but technically it belongs to her

marriage either by divorce or death the bridewealth remains with the

woman when she returns to her kin except in exceptional cases (Appendix

A case 1) Her ex-husbands kin have no claims on her only on her

children (for the patrilineal Delta Twareg for the matrilineal Gdurfba

Tware- they do not even have claims on the children) and in contrast

to the Bambara a Twareg womens own kin support her when she is widowed

Anything remaining from the bridewealth helps to support her

we see that for the Bambara the woman is an asset who is Thus

compensated for by bridewealth and is required for herself in her

affiral lineage and not only for the children that she produces as

The Twareg woman who is no economic or manifested by the levirate

labour asset in herself receives an indirect dowry to support herself

6

and at the end of a marriage returns to her kin who are obliged to bear

the costs of supporting her rather than her affines for whom she is an

expensive liability

Bambara women may get pregnant or even have a child before they

marry Often this is their future husbands child as a woman may go and

live and work with her husbands family for the rainy season prior to

She returns to her natal household until the marriage Newmarriage

formed at marriage which is patrilocal New wiveshouseholds are not

join the labour force of the husbands household and in this millet cultshy

ivating economy increased labour input is welcomed The pre-marital

lending system also accustoms the woman to her in-laws because it is

recognised that it is hard for her to leave her family and village to

go to live with strangers It also provides more time for the husband

and his family to accumulate the bridewealth and wedding costs without

having to wait any longer for the bride

For the Bambara children are a crucial component of marriage

They provide the lineage descendants for the man support in old age and

labour for the labour intensive agriculture Barren women or women with

no surviving children are pitied and also regarded with great suspicion

and may be considered as witches who can kill and maim other children

(Duncan Fulton personal communication) Polygyny means that a man with

take another wife but he rarely divorces the first one a barren wife can

There is always demand for adult women even when they are beyond childshy

bearing because of their skills and personal resources This with the

w-oen are either inherited on their husbands death levirate means that

have a scrier of suitorn who eventuilly pressurize them into remarriage

or

This demand for women as an economic and labour assetboth in herown right

7

and through the children she bears for the lineage contrasts strongly

with the Twareg situation

Noble Twareg women are exposed to the risk of pregnancy during

and only during periods of marriage There is no doubt that nobles

find extra- or pre-marital sex moral) abominable and moreover it seems

to be a moral norm that is traislated into actual practice The only

case of a Gourma imrad woman conceiving illegitimately is instructive shy

the woman concerned is said to have strangled her child to death out of

intense shame and dishonour It can be held then that periods within

marriage define the length of time that sexually mature noble women are

exposed to the risk of pregnancy The result is that long periods outside

marriage in sexually mature women imply a corresponding reduction in

fertility

Marriage results in the formation of a new household a unit that

is potentially reproductive For women first marriage can occur over a

wide age range - when very young aged about nine or ten or at the other

exLreme as late as forty years of age Although it is rare for women

never to marry it is by no means unheard of Many noble women do not marry

until several years after puberty - among the Ikuwalaten Kel Areris there

are several women of twenty plus who have never married (see Appendix A

case 1) Hence for women initial household formation can occur at a

variety of ages

Noble men marry later than women for both populations the median

age at first marriage for men is around 29 and in both samples at age 35

25 noble men were still celibate (see Appendix A case 3) This coupled

with the fact that men remarrying after the termination of a previous

marriage often marry celibate girls means that new households are often

8

made up of couples where the husband is considerably older than his wife

For example in 25 noble Gourma households the husband is more than 20

years older than his wife (see Figure 3)

Gourma imrad and their iklan are matrilineal in-contrast with the

patrilineal Delta and other Gourma Twareg and thus the allegiancies of

Both cases are considered below from which it can the children differ

be seen that although matrilinearity places additional strain on an already

weak marriage bond the other social principles beiind noble Twareg marriage

remain the same

The newly formed noole household can be terminated in two ways

Divorce - divorce is a relatively easy affair following Islamic (1)

are unable to initiate divorceprescription In theory vomen

proceedings themselves this being a male priviledge but in practice

Divorce can wives can bring pressure on their husbands for divorce

the result of a deterioratingfor any number of reasons and need not be occur

husband and wife relationship but the outcome of strained affinal relations

death of either spouse effectively results in household (2) Death shy

deformation

In both events a woman will return to her own kin (Gourma -

In the case of maternal kin in the Delta usually o her paternal

kin)

divorce the Gourma imrad woman retains the children of that marriage

whose principle allegiance is an any case to their mothers brother

Here a widowed husband never retains jural authority over his children

Delta women generally retain even if they continup to live with him

return to their father or his kin when they very young children who will

They do however maintain strong contact with their mother and

are older

9

The children of widowed Delta her kin and return on frequent visits

women will stay with her whilst young but when older they generally reLurn

to their fathers kin to whom they hold most allegiance

Following divorce remarriage is in principle possible the next day

Delta women must wait three months Followingfor men and Gourma women

the death of her husband all noble women mourn for five months during

which time they cannot and will not remarry Widowed men are under no

Such at any rate obligation to mourn and may marry as soon

as they wish

In practice noble women following divorce or widowhood

is the theory

- indeed they may never remarry may spend several years before they remarry

Since most hoble women (see Appendix B and Figure 4)

(Appendix A case 9)

marry at least twice this frequently long interval between marriages

are not exposed to the risk of pregnancy represents a period when they

The simple demography or late age at male marriage is contributory to this

pattern of household deformation - high adult mortality results in imrad

men dying while their younger widowed wives remain potentially reproductive

but outside marriage following their husbands death

marry until a relativelyAdded to the fact that women often do not

late age by African standards the considerable periods of time that they

spend in a non-reproductive status between successive marriages means

that noble women experience a socially controlled reduction in the period

In short a noble womans physiologicallyduring which they can reproduce

reproductive life is rarely coterminous with her socially reproductive life

stablishing why noble women can The question then becomes onb

spend such long periods in their physiologically reproductive lives in a

social state that effectively prohibits reproduction The answer is seen

10

to lie in the social domain a matter of examining the reasons for the

The argument put forward formation and deformation of household units

here is proposed for the matrilineal Gourma imrad It differs little

in that where imrad from that for other patrilineal noble Twareg save

their owe allegiance to their mothers brother Delta Twareg

turn to

Restraints on households dependence on fathers and patrilineal kin

iklan labour the power of kinship and reduced demand for woman as

reproducers are similar for both groups

A discussion of the factors and constraints involved in household

on for ever a drawn-out process of formation and deformation could go

Such is not our intention here and it is elimination and delimitation

preferable to describe the broad outlines of what seems to be a coherent

argument

for the imrad household formation is a Our argument is that

reluctantly accepted obligation and moreover a limited necessity

The constraints to household formation are not of a directly economic

nature - the arguments against a wealth-constrained pattern of household

Formation are given in Appendix C

First the issue of imrad household formation being a limited

nece3sity It seems appropriate to quote from Stennings influential

paper on Wodaabe household formation

Given this strict division of labour and a herd of a given size

a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its

responsibilities towards its herd and a compositiun which ensures

that these are efficiently carried out by appropriate members of

the family

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

1

In a non-contracepting population differentials in the total

fertility rate are largely determined by different patterns of breastshy

feeding sterility sexual abstinence and marriage In rural Mali today

most women breast-feed for about 20 months and apart from the 40 days

there is little reported long term sexual abstinencedictated by Islam

except in cases of spousal separation Thus an examination of marriage

patterns should be a productive way of sccoun~ing for observed fertility

levels and differentials

In some populations it may only be married women who become exposed

to the risk of childbearing elsewhere extra-marital childbearing may be

acceptable However the relationship of the whole marriage process to

fertility is not simply a question of exposure Marriage is often the

prelude to the formation of a new household and this has economic and

social ramifications which are an integral part of the dynamics of the

whole social system Variations in marriage patterns have a multitude of

causes and implications all of which can be examined at different levels

the total population social class residential unit kinship unit

household or idividual In this paper we will look at two Malian

populations from the view poinlt of household formation and ceformation

the roles of children within marriage and the positions of both married

and unmarried women The whole discussion is stimulated by differences

in total fertility rates which largely disappear when we examine total

marital fertility rates

We will examine two populations of nomadic fwareg pastoralists one

from the Niger inland delta (Delta Twareg) and one from south of the

Niger bend in Mali (Gourma Twareg) As a comparison we will consider the

data from a population of Bambara millet farmers whose marriage pattern

2

is extremely different from that of the Twareg and consequently Bambara

have far higher total fertility These Bambara are a homogenous population

a series of social status classetswith no social divisions The Twareg have

which divide into two main groups illelan or free Twareg andliklar or

The three highest status classes imoshar inesleman and imrad

slaves

In the Gourma there is another (all free) will be referred to as nobles

group whom we will call low-status illelan Although free they have

than the nobles and more important for our analysis theylower status

In the Delta the nobles are predominantly ineslemenrarely own iklan

who include the Islamic religious specialists and in Lte Courma imrad

dominate Thus the categories are

Delta Gourma

nobles nobles (mainly ineslemen) (mainly imrad)

low-status illelan

iklaniklan

Attached to the nobles are dependant ik)a -r domestic slaves

owned inherited and conitrolled by their masteis In return for labour

the propertied nobles provide their iklan with their means of subsistence

In the past iklan dependence on nobles was near total but since the late

1950s a large number of iklan have left noble camps to form their own

independent carPs Many however still remain providing nobles with

a subordinate labour force

Nobles are in general wealthy fair-skinned and high-status

whereas iklan are generally poor negroid and low-status However they

3

share the same physical environment language and a dependence on pastoralism

In both samples the iklan population consists both of dependent iklan

who continue to work for their masters and independent iklan The

quantitative results do not distinguish between these two categories

but the qualitative analyses are drawn from our knowledge of iklan dependent

on nobles in mixed camps and who are continuing to live in the traditional

subordinate position Recently rapid change means that we no longer see

once ws and we must to a certain extent extrapolate fromslavery as it

Theinformants statements about the past and from current patterns

historical element also implies that any iklan demographic data are the

results of changing social practiccs something that should be taken

into account

Table 1 compares the total fertility rate for each population with

We see that the large differences inthe total marital fertility rate

fertility between the Twareg and the Bambara diminish considerably when

marriage is controlled for indicating the power of the marriage pattern

To take this further we must examine marriageas an intermediate variable

within the social context Age at first marriage frequency of divorce

and time to remarriage are all variables which can greatly reduce the

All exist within the contexts ofnumber of currently married women

the changes in or dissolutionshousehold formation and deformation (ie

of a household after a marriage ends) the roles of kin versus affines

residence patterns and the roles of children both economically and as

inheritors

Figure 1 shows the age-pyramids of adults by marital status for

Two points stand out Firstly the twoeach of the three populations

T- populations have similar profiles which differ significantly from

4

Secondlythat of the Bambara particularly regarding

female marriage

once they marry most Bambara remain in the married state for the rest

of their lives whereas at all ages a high proportion of [wareg women

widowed -In fertility analysis it is the are currently divorced or

to understand marriage pattern of women that is the primary factor but

the institution in the role of marriage within society we must

look at

its wider context which involves male marriage too

that all Bambara evert6ally marry whereas From figure 1 we see

Although Gourma Twareg some Twareg both male and female never

marry

Bambara men marry younger and more rapidly than either

Delta Twareg or

Bambara women men the major differences are in the female patterns

marry young over a small age range with few unmarried by ags 20 and none

first marriage with by 25 Twareg women have a wider range of age at

some women marrying well before puberty and others marrying for the first

time in their thirties arid there is a group of perpetual spinsters

At each age there is a sizeable proportion currently out of marriage either

This proportion increases with age indicatingby widowhood or divorce

large gaps before remarriage or even no remarriage The high proportion

young ages indicates a rapid breakdown of first

outside marriage at

marriages Figure 2 shows the percentage widowed and divorced by age for

each Twareg population The proportion divorced is quite constant though

for Delta Twareg and 15 for Gourma Twaregrising slightly around 10

Currently divorced Bambara women are rare

Polygyny and the practice of the levirate whereby a man inherits

his dead brothers wives lead both Bambara men and women to be almost

Bride wealth is paid by the mans lineage o always currently married

It can then be used by thefirst marrieshis wifes lineage when a women

5

womans lineage to secure themselves a bride The levirate practice

indicates that the lineage does not wish to lose its rights in the women

it is practised even withwhom it has brought in for her own sake as

On divorce the bridewealth should be women who are post-menopausal

returned As it has usually been redistributed this is very difficult

and a womens kin will actively discourage and even prohibit the divorce

The few divorces that do occur tend to be very early in the marriage

Amongst the monogamous noble Twareg on the other hand the

bridewealth becomes an indirect dowry (Goody and Tambiah) and often comes

with the woman into her marriage or is used to purchase what she needs

for marriage

It is the Twareg woman rather than the mdn who owns the tent

and the household goods and no woman of any statuscan marry without a

Sometimes a womans father will keep the bridewealth and even

tent

Ac the termination of a sell it but technically it belongs to her

marriage either by divorce or death the bridewealth remains with the

woman when she returns to her kin except in exceptional cases (Appendix

A case 1) Her ex-husbands kin have no claims on her only on her

children (for the patrilineal Delta Twareg for the matrilineal Gdurfba

Tware- they do not even have claims on the children) and in contrast

to the Bambara a Twareg womens own kin support her when she is widowed

Anything remaining from the bridewealth helps to support her

we see that for the Bambara the woman is an asset who is Thus

compensated for by bridewealth and is required for herself in her

affiral lineage and not only for the children that she produces as

The Twareg woman who is no economic or manifested by the levirate

labour asset in herself receives an indirect dowry to support herself

6

and at the end of a marriage returns to her kin who are obliged to bear

the costs of supporting her rather than her affines for whom she is an

expensive liability

Bambara women may get pregnant or even have a child before they

marry Often this is their future husbands child as a woman may go and

live and work with her husbands family for the rainy season prior to

She returns to her natal household until the marriage Newmarriage

formed at marriage which is patrilocal New wiveshouseholds are not

join the labour force of the husbands household and in this millet cultshy

ivating economy increased labour input is welcomed The pre-marital

lending system also accustoms the woman to her in-laws because it is

recognised that it is hard for her to leave her family and village to

go to live with strangers It also provides more time for the husband

and his family to accumulate the bridewealth and wedding costs without

having to wait any longer for the bride

For the Bambara children are a crucial component of marriage

They provide the lineage descendants for the man support in old age and

labour for the labour intensive agriculture Barren women or women with

no surviving children are pitied and also regarded with great suspicion

and may be considered as witches who can kill and maim other children

(Duncan Fulton personal communication) Polygyny means that a man with

take another wife but he rarely divorces the first one a barren wife can

There is always demand for adult women even when they are beyond childshy

bearing because of their skills and personal resources This with the

w-oen are either inherited on their husbands death levirate means that

have a scrier of suitorn who eventuilly pressurize them into remarriage

or

This demand for women as an economic and labour assetboth in herown right

7

and through the children she bears for the lineage contrasts strongly

with the Twareg situation

Noble Twareg women are exposed to the risk of pregnancy during

and only during periods of marriage There is no doubt that nobles

find extra- or pre-marital sex moral) abominable and moreover it seems

to be a moral norm that is traislated into actual practice The only

case of a Gourma imrad woman conceiving illegitimately is instructive shy

the woman concerned is said to have strangled her child to death out of

intense shame and dishonour It can be held then that periods within

marriage define the length of time that sexually mature noble women are

exposed to the risk of pregnancy The result is that long periods outside

marriage in sexually mature women imply a corresponding reduction in

fertility

Marriage results in the formation of a new household a unit that

is potentially reproductive For women first marriage can occur over a

wide age range - when very young aged about nine or ten or at the other

exLreme as late as forty years of age Although it is rare for women

never to marry it is by no means unheard of Many noble women do not marry

until several years after puberty - among the Ikuwalaten Kel Areris there

are several women of twenty plus who have never married (see Appendix A

case 1) Hence for women initial household formation can occur at a

variety of ages

Noble men marry later than women for both populations the median

age at first marriage for men is around 29 and in both samples at age 35

25 noble men were still celibate (see Appendix A case 3) This coupled

with the fact that men remarrying after the termination of a previous

marriage often marry celibate girls means that new households are often

8

made up of couples where the husband is considerably older than his wife

For example in 25 noble Gourma households the husband is more than 20

years older than his wife (see Figure 3)

Gourma imrad and their iklan are matrilineal in-contrast with the

patrilineal Delta and other Gourma Twareg and thus the allegiancies of

Both cases are considered below from which it can the children differ

be seen that although matrilinearity places additional strain on an already

weak marriage bond the other social principles beiind noble Twareg marriage

remain the same

The newly formed noole household can be terminated in two ways

Divorce - divorce is a relatively easy affair following Islamic (1)

are unable to initiate divorceprescription In theory vomen

proceedings themselves this being a male priviledge but in practice

Divorce can wives can bring pressure on their husbands for divorce

the result of a deterioratingfor any number of reasons and need not be occur

husband and wife relationship but the outcome of strained affinal relations

death of either spouse effectively results in household (2) Death shy

deformation

In both events a woman will return to her own kin (Gourma -

In the case of maternal kin in the Delta usually o her paternal

kin)

divorce the Gourma imrad woman retains the children of that marriage

whose principle allegiance is an any case to their mothers brother

Here a widowed husband never retains jural authority over his children

Delta women generally retain even if they continup to live with him

return to their father or his kin when they very young children who will

They do however maintain strong contact with their mother and

are older

9

The children of widowed Delta her kin and return on frequent visits

women will stay with her whilst young but when older they generally reLurn

to their fathers kin to whom they hold most allegiance

Following divorce remarriage is in principle possible the next day

Delta women must wait three months Followingfor men and Gourma women

the death of her husband all noble women mourn for five months during

which time they cannot and will not remarry Widowed men are under no

Such at any rate obligation to mourn and may marry as soon

as they wish

In practice noble women following divorce or widowhood

is the theory

- indeed they may never remarry may spend several years before they remarry

Since most hoble women (see Appendix B and Figure 4)

(Appendix A case 9)

marry at least twice this frequently long interval between marriages

are not exposed to the risk of pregnancy represents a period when they

The simple demography or late age at male marriage is contributory to this

pattern of household deformation - high adult mortality results in imrad

men dying while their younger widowed wives remain potentially reproductive

but outside marriage following their husbands death

marry until a relativelyAdded to the fact that women often do not

late age by African standards the considerable periods of time that they

spend in a non-reproductive status between successive marriages means

that noble women experience a socially controlled reduction in the period

In short a noble womans physiologicallyduring which they can reproduce

reproductive life is rarely coterminous with her socially reproductive life

stablishing why noble women can The question then becomes onb

spend such long periods in their physiologically reproductive lives in a

social state that effectively prohibits reproduction The answer is seen

10

to lie in the social domain a matter of examining the reasons for the

The argument put forward formation and deformation of household units

here is proposed for the matrilineal Gourma imrad It differs little

in that where imrad from that for other patrilineal noble Twareg save

their owe allegiance to their mothers brother Delta Twareg

turn to

Restraints on households dependence on fathers and patrilineal kin

iklan labour the power of kinship and reduced demand for woman as

reproducers are similar for both groups

A discussion of the factors and constraints involved in household

on for ever a drawn-out process of formation and deformation could go

Such is not our intention here and it is elimination and delimitation

preferable to describe the broad outlines of what seems to be a coherent

argument

for the imrad household formation is a Our argument is that

reluctantly accepted obligation and moreover a limited necessity

The constraints to household formation are not of a directly economic

nature - the arguments against a wealth-constrained pattern of household

Formation are given in Appendix C

First the issue of imrad household formation being a limited

nece3sity It seems appropriate to quote from Stennings influential

paper on Wodaabe household formation

Given this strict division of labour and a herd of a given size

a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its

responsibilities towards its herd and a compositiun which ensures

that these are efficiently carried out by appropriate members of

the family

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

2

is extremely different from that of the Twareg and consequently Bambara

have far higher total fertility These Bambara are a homogenous population

a series of social status classetswith no social divisions The Twareg have

which divide into two main groups illelan or free Twareg andliklar or

The three highest status classes imoshar inesleman and imrad

slaves

In the Gourma there is another (all free) will be referred to as nobles

group whom we will call low-status illelan Although free they have

than the nobles and more important for our analysis theylower status

In the Delta the nobles are predominantly ineslemenrarely own iklan

who include the Islamic religious specialists and in Lte Courma imrad

dominate Thus the categories are

Delta Gourma

nobles nobles (mainly ineslemen) (mainly imrad)

low-status illelan

iklaniklan

Attached to the nobles are dependant ik)a -r domestic slaves

owned inherited and conitrolled by their masteis In return for labour

the propertied nobles provide their iklan with their means of subsistence

In the past iklan dependence on nobles was near total but since the late

1950s a large number of iklan have left noble camps to form their own

independent carPs Many however still remain providing nobles with

a subordinate labour force

Nobles are in general wealthy fair-skinned and high-status

whereas iklan are generally poor negroid and low-status However they

3

share the same physical environment language and a dependence on pastoralism

In both samples the iklan population consists both of dependent iklan

who continue to work for their masters and independent iklan The

quantitative results do not distinguish between these two categories

but the qualitative analyses are drawn from our knowledge of iklan dependent

on nobles in mixed camps and who are continuing to live in the traditional

subordinate position Recently rapid change means that we no longer see

once ws and we must to a certain extent extrapolate fromslavery as it

Theinformants statements about the past and from current patterns

historical element also implies that any iklan demographic data are the

results of changing social practiccs something that should be taken

into account

Table 1 compares the total fertility rate for each population with

We see that the large differences inthe total marital fertility rate

fertility between the Twareg and the Bambara diminish considerably when

marriage is controlled for indicating the power of the marriage pattern

To take this further we must examine marriageas an intermediate variable

within the social context Age at first marriage frequency of divorce

and time to remarriage are all variables which can greatly reduce the

All exist within the contexts ofnumber of currently married women

the changes in or dissolutionshousehold formation and deformation (ie

of a household after a marriage ends) the roles of kin versus affines

residence patterns and the roles of children both economically and as

inheritors

Figure 1 shows the age-pyramids of adults by marital status for

Two points stand out Firstly the twoeach of the three populations

T- populations have similar profiles which differ significantly from

4

Secondlythat of the Bambara particularly regarding

female marriage

once they marry most Bambara remain in the married state for the rest

of their lives whereas at all ages a high proportion of [wareg women

widowed -In fertility analysis it is the are currently divorced or

to understand marriage pattern of women that is the primary factor but

the institution in the role of marriage within society we must

look at

its wider context which involves male marriage too

that all Bambara evert6ally marry whereas From figure 1 we see

Although Gourma Twareg some Twareg both male and female never

marry

Bambara men marry younger and more rapidly than either

Delta Twareg or

Bambara women men the major differences are in the female patterns

marry young over a small age range with few unmarried by ags 20 and none

first marriage with by 25 Twareg women have a wider range of age at

some women marrying well before puberty and others marrying for the first

time in their thirties arid there is a group of perpetual spinsters

At each age there is a sizeable proportion currently out of marriage either

This proportion increases with age indicatingby widowhood or divorce

large gaps before remarriage or even no remarriage The high proportion

young ages indicates a rapid breakdown of first

outside marriage at

marriages Figure 2 shows the percentage widowed and divorced by age for

each Twareg population The proportion divorced is quite constant though

for Delta Twareg and 15 for Gourma Twaregrising slightly around 10

Currently divorced Bambara women are rare

Polygyny and the practice of the levirate whereby a man inherits

his dead brothers wives lead both Bambara men and women to be almost

Bride wealth is paid by the mans lineage o always currently married

It can then be used by thefirst marrieshis wifes lineage when a women

5

womans lineage to secure themselves a bride The levirate practice

indicates that the lineage does not wish to lose its rights in the women

it is practised even withwhom it has brought in for her own sake as

On divorce the bridewealth should be women who are post-menopausal

returned As it has usually been redistributed this is very difficult

and a womens kin will actively discourage and even prohibit the divorce

The few divorces that do occur tend to be very early in the marriage

Amongst the monogamous noble Twareg on the other hand the

bridewealth becomes an indirect dowry (Goody and Tambiah) and often comes

with the woman into her marriage or is used to purchase what she needs

for marriage

It is the Twareg woman rather than the mdn who owns the tent

and the household goods and no woman of any statuscan marry without a

Sometimes a womans father will keep the bridewealth and even

tent

Ac the termination of a sell it but technically it belongs to her

marriage either by divorce or death the bridewealth remains with the

woman when she returns to her kin except in exceptional cases (Appendix

A case 1) Her ex-husbands kin have no claims on her only on her

children (for the patrilineal Delta Twareg for the matrilineal Gdurfba

Tware- they do not even have claims on the children) and in contrast

to the Bambara a Twareg womens own kin support her when she is widowed

Anything remaining from the bridewealth helps to support her

we see that for the Bambara the woman is an asset who is Thus

compensated for by bridewealth and is required for herself in her

affiral lineage and not only for the children that she produces as

The Twareg woman who is no economic or manifested by the levirate

labour asset in herself receives an indirect dowry to support herself

6

and at the end of a marriage returns to her kin who are obliged to bear

the costs of supporting her rather than her affines for whom she is an

expensive liability

Bambara women may get pregnant or even have a child before they

marry Often this is their future husbands child as a woman may go and

live and work with her husbands family for the rainy season prior to

She returns to her natal household until the marriage Newmarriage

formed at marriage which is patrilocal New wiveshouseholds are not

join the labour force of the husbands household and in this millet cultshy

ivating economy increased labour input is welcomed The pre-marital

lending system also accustoms the woman to her in-laws because it is

recognised that it is hard for her to leave her family and village to

go to live with strangers It also provides more time for the husband

and his family to accumulate the bridewealth and wedding costs without

having to wait any longer for the bride

For the Bambara children are a crucial component of marriage

They provide the lineage descendants for the man support in old age and

labour for the labour intensive agriculture Barren women or women with

no surviving children are pitied and also regarded with great suspicion

and may be considered as witches who can kill and maim other children

(Duncan Fulton personal communication) Polygyny means that a man with

take another wife but he rarely divorces the first one a barren wife can

There is always demand for adult women even when they are beyond childshy

bearing because of their skills and personal resources This with the

w-oen are either inherited on their husbands death levirate means that

have a scrier of suitorn who eventuilly pressurize them into remarriage

or

This demand for women as an economic and labour assetboth in herown right

7

and through the children she bears for the lineage contrasts strongly

with the Twareg situation

Noble Twareg women are exposed to the risk of pregnancy during

and only during periods of marriage There is no doubt that nobles

find extra- or pre-marital sex moral) abominable and moreover it seems

to be a moral norm that is traislated into actual practice The only

case of a Gourma imrad woman conceiving illegitimately is instructive shy

the woman concerned is said to have strangled her child to death out of

intense shame and dishonour It can be held then that periods within

marriage define the length of time that sexually mature noble women are

exposed to the risk of pregnancy The result is that long periods outside

marriage in sexually mature women imply a corresponding reduction in

fertility

Marriage results in the formation of a new household a unit that

is potentially reproductive For women first marriage can occur over a

wide age range - when very young aged about nine or ten or at the other

exLreme as late as forty years of age Although it is rare for women

never to marry it is by no means unheard of Many noble women do not marry

until several years after puberty - among the Ikuwalaten Kel Areris there

are several women of twenty plus who have never married (see Appendix A

case 1) Hence for women initial household formation can occur at a

variety of ages

Noble men marry later than women for both populations the median

age at first marriage for men is around 29 and in both samples at age 35

25 noble men were still celibate (see Appendix A case 3) This coupled

with the fact that men remarrying after the termination of a previous

marriage often marry celibate girls means that new households are often

8

made up of couples where the husband is considerably older than his wife

For example in 25 noble Gourma households the husband is more than 20

years older than his wife (see Figure 3)

Gourma imrad and their iklan are matrilineal in-contrast with the

patrilineal Delta and other Gourma Twareg and thus the allegiancies of

Both cases are considered below from which it can the children differ

be seen that although matrilinearity places additional strain on an already

weak marriage bond the other social principles beiind noble Twareg marriage

remain the same

The newly formed noole household can be terminated in two ways

Divorce - divorce is a relatively easy affair following Islamic (1)

are unable to initiate divorceprescription In theory vomen

proceedings themselves this being a male priviledge but in practice

Divorce can wives can bring pressure on their husbands for divorce

the result of a deterioratingfor any number of reasons and need not be occur

husband and wife relationship but the outcome of strained affinal relations

death of either spouse effectively results in household (2) Death shy

deformation

In both events a woman will return to her own kin (Gourma -

In the case of maternal kin in the Delta usually o her paternal

kin)

divorce the Gourma imrad woman retains the children of that marriage

whose principle allegiance is an any case to their mothers brother

Here a widowed husband never retains jural authority over his children

Delta women generally retain even if they continup to live with him

return to their father or his kin when they very young children who will

They do however maintain strong contact with their mother and

are older

9

The children of widowed Delta her kin and return on frequent visits

women will stay with her whilst young but when older they generally reLurn

to their fathers kin to whom they hold most allegiance

Following divorce remarriage is in principle possible the next day

Delta women must wait three months Followingfor men and Gourma women

the death of her husband all noble women mourn for five months during

which time they cannot and will not remarry Widowed men are under no

Such at any rate obligation to mourn and may marry as soon

as they wish

In practice noble women following divorce or widowhood

is the theory

- indeed they may never remarry may spend several years before they remarry

Since most hoble women (see Appendix B and Figure 4)

(Appendix A case 9)

marry at least twice this frequently long interval between marriages

are not exposed to the risk of pregnancy represents a period when they

The simple demography or late age at male marriage is contributory to this

pattern of household deformation - high adult mortality results in imrad

men dying while their younger widowed wives remain potentially reproductive

but outside marriage following their husbands death

marry until a relativelyAdded to the fact that women often do not

late age by African standards the considerable periods of time that they

spend in a non-reproductive status between successive marriages means

that noble women experience a socially controlled reduction in the period

In short a noble womans physiologicallyduring which they can reproduce

reproductive life is rarely coterminous with her socially reproductive life

stablishing why noble women can The question then becomes onb

spend such long periods in their physiologically reproductive lives in a

social state that effectively prohibits reproduction The answer is seen

10

to lie in the social domain a matter of examining the reasons for the

The argument put forward formation and deformation of household units

here is proposed for the matrilineal Gourma imrad It differs little

in that where imrad from that for other patrilineal noble Twareg save

their owe allegiance to their mothers brother Delta Twareg

turn to

Restraints on households dependence on fathers and patrilineal kin

iklan labour the power of kinship and reduced demand for woman as

reproducers are similar for both groups

A discussion of the factors and constraints involved in household

on for ever a drawn-out process of formation and deformation could go

Such is not our intention here and it is elimination and delimitation

preferable to describe the broad outlines of what seems to be a coherent

argument

for the imrad household formation is a Our argument is that

reluctantly accepted obligation and moreover a limited necessity

The constraints to household formation are not of a directly economic

nature - the arguments against a wealth-constrained pattern of household

Formation are given in Appendix C

First the issue of imrad household formation being a limited

nece3sity It seems appropriate to quote from Stennings influential

paper on Wodaabe household formation

Given this strict division of labour and a herd of a given size

a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its

responsibilities towards its herd and a compositiun which ensures

that these are efficiently carried out by appropriate members of

the family

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

3

share the same physical environment language and a dependence on pastoralism

In both samples the iklan population consists both of dependent iklan

who continue to work for their masters and independent iklan The

quantitative results do not distinguish between these two categories

but the qualitative analyses are drawn from our knowledge of iklan dependent

on nobles in mixed camps and who are continuing to live in the traditional

subordinate position Recently rapid change means that we no longer see

once ws and we must to a certain extent extrapolate fromslavery as it

Theinformants statements about the past and from current patterns

historical element also implies that any iklan demographic data are the

results of changing social practiccs something that should be taken

into account

Table 1 compares the total fertility rate for each population with

We see that the large differences inthe total marital fertility rate

fertility between the Twareg and the Bambara diminish considerably when

marriage is controlled for indicating the power of the marriage pattern

To take this further we must examine marriageas an intermediate variable

within the social context Age at first marriage frequency of divorce

and time to remarriage are all variables which can greatly reduce the

All exist within the contexts ofnumber of currently married women

the changes in or dissolutionshousehold formation and deformation (ie

of a household after a marriage ends) the roles of kin versus affines

residence patterns and the roles of children both economically and as

inheritors

Figure 1 shows the age-pyramids of adults by marital status for

Two points stand out Firstly the twoeach of the three populations

T- populations have similar profiles which differ significantly from

4

Secondlythat of the Bambara particularly regarding

female marriage

once they marry most Bambara remain in the married state for the rest

of their lives whereas at all ages a high proportion of [wareg women

widowed -In fertility analysis it is the are currently divorced or

to understand marriage pattern of women that is the primary factor but

the institution in the role of marriage within society we must

look at

its wider context which involves male marriage too

that all Bambara evert6ally marry whereas From figure 1 we see

Although Gourma Twareg some Twareg both male and female never

marry

Bambara men marry younger and more rapidly than either

Delta Twareg or

Bambara women men the major differences are in the female patterns

marry young over a small age range with few unmarried by ags 20 and none

first marriage with by 25 Twareg women have a wider range of age at

some women marrying well before puberty and others marrying for the first

time in their thirties arid there is a group of perpetual spinsters

At each age there is a sizeable proportion currently out of marriage either

This proportion increases with age indicatingby widowhood or divorce

large gaps before remarriage or even no remarriage The high proportion

young ages indicates a rapid breakdown of first

outside marriage at

marriages Figure 2 shows the percentage widowed and divorced by age for

each Twareg population The proportion divorced is quite constant though

for Delta Twareg and 15 for Gourma Twaregrising slightly around 10

Currently divorced Bambara women are rare

Polygyny and the practice of the levirate whereby a man inherits

his dead brothers wives lead both Bambara men and women to be almost

Bride wealth is paid by the mans lineage o always currently married

It can then be used by thefirst marrieshis wifes lineage when a women

5

womans lineage to secure themselves a bride The levirate practice

indicates that the lineage does not wish to lose its rights in the women

it is practised even withwhom it has brought in for her own sake as

On divorce the bridewealth should be women who are post-menopausal

returned As it has usually been redistributed this is very difficult

and a womens kin will actively discourage and even prohibit the divorce

The few divorces that do occur tend to be very early in the marriage

Amongst the monogamous noble Twareg on the other hand the

bridewealth becomes an indirect dowry (Goody and Tambiah) and often comes

with the woman into her marriage or is used to purchase what she needs

for marriage

It is the Twareg woman rather than the mdn who owns the tent

and the household goods and no woman of any statuscan marry without a

Sometimes a womans father will keep the bridewealth and even

tent

Ac the termination of a sell it but technically it belongs to her

marriage either by divorce or death the bridewealth remains with the

woman when she returns to her kin except in exceptional cases (Appendix

A case 1) Her ex-husbands kin have no claims on her only on her

children (for the patrilineal Delta Twareg for the matrilineal Gdurfba

Tware- they do not even have claims on the children) and in contrast

to the Bambara a Twareg womens own kin support her when she is widowed

Anything remaining from the bridewealth helps to support her

we see that for the Bambara the woman is an asset who is Thus

compensated for by bridewealth and is required for herself in her

affiral lineage and not only for the children that she produces as

The Twareg woman who is no economic or manifested by the levirate

labour asset in herself receives an indirect dowry to support herself

6

and at the end of a marriage returns to her kin who are obliged to bear

the costs of supporting her rather than her affines for whom she is an

expensive liability

Bambara women may get pregnant or even have a child before they

marry Often this is their future husbands child as a woman may go and

live and work with her husbands family for the rainy season prior to

She returns to her natal household until the marriage Newmarriage

formed at marriage which is patrilocal New wiveshouseholds are not

join the labour force of the husbands household and in this millet cultshy

ivating economy increased labour input is welcomed The pre-marital

lending system also accustoms the woman to her in-laws because it is

recognised that it is hard for her to leave her family and village to

go to live with strangers It also provides more time for the husband

and his family to accumulate the bridewealth and wedding costs without

having to wait any longer for the bride

For the Bambara children are a crucial component of marriage

They provide the lineage descendants for the man support in old age and

labour for the labour intensive agriculture Barren women or women with

no surviving children are pitied and also regarded with great suspicion

and may be considered as witches who can kill and maim other children

(Duncan Fulton personal communication) Polygyny means that a man with

take another wife but he rarely divorces the first one a barren wife can

There is always demand for adult women even when they are beyond childshy

bearing because of their skills and personal resources This with the

w-oen are either inherited on their husbands death levirate means that

have a scrier of suitorn who eventuilly pressurize them into remarriage

or

This demand for women as an economic and labour assetboth in herown right

7

and through the children she bears for the lineage contrasts strongly

with the Twareg situation

Noble Twareg women are exposed to the risk of pregnancy during

and only during periods of marriage There is no doubt that nobles

find extra- or pre-marital sex moral) abominable and moreover it seems

to be a moral norm that is traislated into actual practice The only

case of a Gourma imrad woman conceiving illegitimately is instructive shy

the woman concerned is said to have strangled her child to death out of

intense shame and dishonour It can be held then that periods within

marriage define the length of time that sexually mature noble women are

exposed to the risk of pregnancy The result is that long periods outside

marriage in sexually mature women imply a corresponding reduction in

fertility

Marriage results in the formation of a new household a unit that

is potentially reproductive For women first marriage can occur over a

wide age range - when very young aged about nine or ten or at the other

exLreme as late as forty years of age Although it is rare for women

never to marry it is by no means unheard of Many noble women do not marry

until several years after puberty - among the Ikuwalaten Kel Areris there

are several women of twenty plus who have never married (see Appendix A

case 1) Hence for women initial household formation can occur at a

variety of ages

Noble men marry later than women for both populations the median

age at first marriage for men is around 29 and in both samples at age 35

25 noble men were still celibate (see Appendix A case 3) This coupled

with the fact that men remarrying after the termination of a previous

marriage often marry celibate girls means that new households are often

8

made up of couples where the husband is considerably older than his wife

For example in 25 noble Gourma households the husband is more than 20

years older than his wife (see Figure 3)

Gourma imrad and their iklan are matrilineal in-contrast with the

patrilineal Delta and other Gourma Twareg and thus the allegiancies of

Both cases are considered below from which it can the children differ

be seen that although matrilinearity places additional strain on an already

weak marriage bond the other social principles beiind noble Twareg marriage

remain the same

The newly formed noole household can be terminated in two ways

Divorce - divorce is a relatively easy affair following Islamic (1)

are unable to initiate divorceprescription In theory vomen

proceedings themselves this being a male priviledge but in practice

Divorce can wives can bring pressure on their husbands for divorce

the result of a deterioratingfor any number of reasons and need not be occur

husband and wife relationship but the outcome of strained affinal relations

death of either spouse effectively results in household (2) Death shy

deformation

In both events a woman will return to her own kin (Gourma -

In the case of maternal kin in the Delta usually o her paternal

kin)

divorce the Gourma imrad woman retains the children of that marriage

whose principle allegiance is an any case to their mothers brother

Here a widowed husband never retains jural authority over his children

Delta women generally retain even if they continup to live with him

return to their father or his kin when they very young children who will

They do however maintain strong contact with their mother and

are older

9

The children of widowed Delta her kin and return on frequent visits

women will stay with her whilst young but when older they generally reLurn

to their fathers kin to whom they hold most allegiance

Following divorce remarriage is in principle possible the next day

Delta women must wait three months Followingfor men and Gourma women

the death of her husband all noble women mourn for five months during

which time they cannot and will not remarry Widowed men are under no

Such at any rate obligation to mourn and may marry as soon

as they wish

In practice noble women following divorce or widowhood

is the theory

- indeed they may never remarry may spend several years before they remarry

Since most hoble women (see Appendix B and Figure 4)

(Appendix A case 9)

marry at least twice this frequently long interval between marriages

are not exposed to the risk of pregnancy represents a period when they

The simple demography or late age at male marriage is contributory to this

pattern of household deformation - high adult mortality results in imrad

men dying while their younger widowed wives remain potentially reproductive

but outside marriage following their husbands death

marry until a relativelyAdded to the fact that women often do not

late age by African standards the considerable periods of time that they

spend in a non-reproductive status between successive marriages means

that noble women experience a socially controlled reduction in the period

In short a noble womans physiologicallyduring which they can reproduce

reproductive life is rarely coterminous with her socially reproductive life

stablishing why noble women can The question then becomes onb

spend such long periods in their physiologically reproductive lives in a

social state that effectively prohibits reproduction The answer is seen

10

to lie in the social domain a matter of examining the reasons for the

The argument put forward formation and deformation of household units

here is proposed for the matrilineal Gourma imrad It differs little

in that where imrad from that for other patrilineal noble Twareg save

their owe allegiance to their mothers brother Delta Twareg

turn to

Restraints on households dependence on fathers and patrilineal kin

iklan labour the power of kinship and reduced demand for woman as

reproducers are similar for both groups

A discussion of the factors and constraints involved in household

on for ever a drawn-out process of formation and deformation could go

Such is not our intention here and it is elimination and delimitation

preferable to describe the broad outlines of what seems to be a coherent

argument

for the imrad household formation is a Our argument is that

reluctantly accepted obligation and moreover a limited necessity

The constraints to household formation are not of a directly economic

nature - the arguments against a wealth-constrained pattern of household

Formation are given in Appendix C

First the issue of imrad household formation being a limited

nece3sity It seems appropriate to quote from Stennings influential

paper on Wodaabe household formation

Given this strict division of labour and a herd of a given size

a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its

responsibilities towards its herd and a compositiun which ensures

that these are efficiently carried out by appropriate members of

the family

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

4

Secondlythat of the Bambara particularly regarding

female marriage

once they marry most Bambara remain in the married state for the rest

of their lives whereas at all ages a high proportion of [wareg women

widowed -In fertility analysis it is the are currently divorced or

to understand marriage pattern of women that is the primary factor but

the institution in the role of marriage within society we must

look at

its wider context which involves male marriage too

that all Bambara evert6ally marry whereas From figure 1 we see

Although Gourma Twareg some Twareg both male and female never

marry

Bambara men marry younger and more rapidly than either

Delta Twareg or

Bambara women men the major differences are in the female patterns

marry young over a small age range with few unmarried by ags 20 and none

first marriage with by 25 Twareg women have a wider range of age at

some women marrying well before puberty and others marrying for the first

time in their thirties arid there is a group of perpetual spinsters

At each age there is a sizeable proportion currently out of marriage either

This proportion increases with age indicatingby widowhood or divorce

large gaps before remarriage or even no remarriage The high proportion

young ages indicates a rapid breakdown of first

outside marriage at

marriages Figure 2 shows the percentage widowed and divorced by age for

each Twareg population The proportion divorced is quite constant though

for Delta Twareg and 15 for Gourma Twaregrising slightly around 10

Currently divorced Bambara women are rare

Polygyny and the practice of the levirate whereby a man inherits

his dead brothers wives lead both Bambara men and women to be almost

Bride wealth is paid by the mans lineage o always currently married

It can then be used by thefirst marrieshis wifes lineage when a women

5

womans lineage to secure themselves a bride The levirate practice

indicates that the lineage does not wish to lose its rights in the women

it is practised even withwhom it has brought in for her own sake as

On divorce the bridewealth should be women who are post-menopausal

returned As it has usually been redistributed this is very difficult

and a womens kin will actively discourage and even prohibit the divorce

The few divorces that do occur tend to be very early in the marriage

Amongst the monogamous noble Twareg on the other hand the

bridewealth becomes an indirect dowry (Goody and Tambiah) and often comes

with the woman into her marriage or is used to purchase what she needs

for marriage

It is the Twareg woman rather than the mdn who owns the tent

and the household goods and no woman of any statuscan marry without a

Sometimes a womans father will keep the bridewealth and even

tent

Ac the termination of a sell it but technically it belongs to her

marriage either by divorce or death the bridewealth remains with the

woman when she returns to her kin except in exceptional cases (Appendix

A case 1) Her ex-husbands kin have no claims on her only on her

children (for the patrilineal Delta Twareg for the matrilineal Gdurfba

Tware- they do not even have claims on the children) and in contrast

to the Bambara a Twareg womens own kin support her when she is widowed

Anything remaining from the bridewealth helps to support her

we see that for the Bambara the woman is an asset who is Thus

compensated for by bridewealth and is required for herself in her

affiral lineage and not only for the children that she produces as

The Twareg woman who is no economic or manifested by the levirate

labour asset in herself receives an indirect dowry to support herself

6

and at the end of a marriage returns to her kin who are obliged to bear

the costs of supporting her rather than her affines for whom she is an

expensive liability

Bambara women may get pregnant or even have a child before they

marry Often this is their future husbands child as a woman may go and

live and work with her husbands family for the rainy season prior to

She returns to her natal household until the marriage Newmarriage

formed at marriage which is patrilocal New wiveshouseholds are not

join the labour force of the husbands household and in this millet cultshy

ivating economy increased labour input is welcomed The pre-marital

lending system also accustoms the woman to her in-laws because it is

recognised that it is hard for her to leave her family and village to

go to live with strangers It also provides more time for the husband

and his family to accumulate the bridewealth and wedding costs without

having to wait any longer for the bride

For the Bambara children are a crucial component of marriage

They provide the lineage descendants for the man support in old age and

labour for the labour intensive agriculture Barren women or women with

no surviving children are pitied and also regarded with great suspicion

and may be considered as witches who can kill and maim other children

(Duncan Fulton personal communication) Polygyny means that a man with

take another wife but he rarely divorces the first one a barren wife can

There is always demand for adult women even when they are beyond childshy

bearing because of their skills and personal resources This with the

w-oen are either inherited on their husbands death levirate means that

have a scrier of suitorn who eventuilly pressurize them into remarriage

or

This demand for women as an economic and labour assetboth in herown right

7

and through the children she bears for the lineage contrasts strongly

with the Twareg situation

Noble Twareg women are exposed to the risk of pregnancy during

and only during periods of marriage There is no doubt that nobles

find extra- or pre-marital sex moral) abominable and moreover it seems

to be a moral norm that is traislated into actual practice The only

case of a Gourma imrad woman conceiving illegitimately is instructive shy

the woman concerned is said to have strangled her child to death out of

intense shame and dishonour It can be held then that periods within

marriage define the length of time that sexually mature noble women are

exposed to the risk of pregnancy The result is that long periods outside

marriage in sexually mature women imply a corresponding reduction in

fertility

Marriage results in the formation of a new household a unit that

is potentially reproductive For women first marriage can occur over a

wide age range - when very young aged about nine or ten or at the other

exLreme as late as forty years of age Although it is rare for women

never to marry it is by no means unheard of Many noble women do not marry

until several years after puberty - among the Ikuwalaten Kel Areris there

are several women of twenty plus who have never married (see Appendix A

case 1) Hence for women initial household formation can occur at a

variety of ages

Noble men marry later than women for both populations the median

age at first marriage for men is around 29 and in both samples at age 35

25 noble men were still celibate (see Appendix A case 3) This coupled

with the fact that men remarrying after the termination of a previous

marriage often marry celibate girls means that new households are often

8

made up of couples where the husband is considerably older than his wife

For example in 25 noble Gourma households the husband is more than 20

years older than his wife (see Figure 3)

Gourma imrad and their iklan are matrilineal in-contrast with the

patrilineal Delta and other Gourma Twareg and thus the allegiancies of

Both cases are considered below from which it can the children differ

be seen that although matrilinearity places additional strain on an already

weak marriage bond the other social principles beiind noble Twareg marriage

remain the same

The newly formed noole household can be terminated in two ways

Divorce - divorce is a relatively easy affair following Islamic (1)

are unable to initiate divorceprescription In theory vomen

proceedings themselves this being a male priviledge but in practice

Divorce can wives can bring pressure on their husbands for divorce

the result of a deterioratingfor any number of reasons and need not be occur

husband and wife relationship but the outcome of strained affinal relations

death of either spouse effectively results in household (2) Death shy

deformation

In both events a woman will return to her own kin (Gourma -

In the case of maternal kin in the Delta usually o her paternal

kin)

divorce the Gourma imrad woman retains the children of that marriage

whose principle allegiance is an any case to their mothers brother

Here a widowed husband never retains jural authority over his children

Delta women generally retain even if they continup to live with him

return to their father or his kin when they very young children who will

They do however maintain strong contact with their mother and

are older

9

The children of widowed Delta her kin and return on frequent visits

women will stay with her whilst young but when older they generally reLurn

to their fathers kin to whom they hold most allegiance

Following divorce remarriage is in principle possible the next day

Delta women must wait three months Followingfor men and Gourma women

the death of her husband all noble women mourn for five months during

which time they cannot and will not remarry Widowed men are under no

Such at any rate obligation to mourn and may marry as soon

as they wish

In practice noble women following divorce or widowhood

is the theory

- indeed they may never remarry may spend several years before they remarry

Since most hoble women (see Appendix B and Figure 4)

(Appendix A case 9)

marry at least twice this frequently long interval between marriages

are not exposed to the risk of pregnancy represents a period when they

The simple demography or late age at male marriage is contributory to this

pattern of household deformation - high adult mortality results in imrad

men dying while their younger widowed wives remain potentially reproductive

but outside marriage following their husbands death

marry until a relativelyAdded to the fact that women often do not

late age by African standards the considerable periods of time that they

spend in a non-reproductive status between successive marriages means

that noble women experience a socially controlled reduction in the period

In short a noble womans physiologicallyduring which they can reproduce

reproductive life is rarely coterminous with her socially reproductive life

stablishing why noble women can The question then becomes onb

spend such long periods in their physiologically reproductive lives in a

social state that effectively prohibits reproduction The answer is seen

10

to lie in the social domain a matter of examining the reasons for the

The argument put forward formation and deformation of household units

here is proposed for the matrilineal Gourma imrad It differs little

in that where imrad from that for other patrilineal noble Twareg save

their owe allegiance to their mothers brother Delta Twareg

turn to

Restraints on households dependence on fathers and patrilineal kin

iklan labour the power of kinship and reduced demand for woman as

reproducers are similar for both groups

A discussion of the factors and constraints involved in household

on for ever a drawn-out process of formation and deformation could go

Such is not our intention here and it is elimination and delimitation

preferable to describe the broad outlines of what seems to be a coherent

argument

for the imrad household formation is a Our argument is that

reluctantly accepted obligation and moreover a limited necessity

The constraints to household formation are not of a directly economic

nature - the arguments against a wealth-constrained pattern of household

Formation are given in Appendix C

First the issue of imrad household formation being a limited

nece3sity It seems appropriate to quote from Stennings influential

paper on Wodaabe household formation

Given this strict division of labour and a herd of a given size

a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its

responsibilities towards its herd and a compositiun which ensures

that these are efficiently carried out by appropriate members of

the family

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

5

womans lineage to secure themselves a bride The levirate practice

indicates that the lineage does not wish to lose its rights in the women

it is practised even withwhom it has brought in for her own sake as

On divorce the bridewealth should be women who are post-menopausal

returned As it has usually been redistributed this is very difficult

and a womens kin will actively discourage and even prohibit the divorce

The few divorces that do occur tend to be very early in the marriage

Amongst the monogamous noble Twareg on the other hand the

bridewealth becomes an indirect dowry (Goody and Tambiah) and often comes

with the woman into her marriage or is used to purchase what she needs

for marriage

It is the Twareg woman rather than the mdn who owns the tent

and the household goods and no woman of any statuscan marry without a

Sometimes a womans father will keep the bridewealth and even

tent

Ac the termination of a sell it but technically it belongs to her

marriage either by divorce or death the bridewealth remains with the

woman when she returns to her kin except in exceptional cases (Appendix

A case 1) Her ex-husbands kin have no claims on her only on her

children (for the patrilineal Delta Twareg for the matrilineal Gdurfba

Tware- they do not even have claims on the children) and in contrast

to the Bambara a Twareg womens own kin support her when she is widowed

Anything remaining from the bridewealth helps to support her

we see that for the Bambara the woman is an asset who is Thus

compensated for by bridewealth and is required for herself in her

affiral lineage and not only for the children that she produces as

The Twareg woman who is no economic or manifested by the levirate

labour asset in herself receives an indirect dowry to support herself

6

and at the end of a marriage returns to her kin who are obliged to bear

the costs of supporting her rather than her affines for whom she is an

expensive liability

Bambara women may get pregnant or even have a child before they

marry Often this is their future husbands child as a woman may go and

live and work with her husbands family for the rainy season prior to

She returns to her natal household until the marriage Newmarriage

formed at marriage which is patrilocal New wiveshouseholds are not

join the labour force of the husbands household and in this millet cultshy

ivating economy increased labour input is welcomed The pre-marital

lending system also accustoms the woman to her in-laws because it is

recognised that it is hard for her to leave her family and village to

go to live with strangers It also provides more time for the husband

and his family to accumulate the bridewealth and wedding costs without

having to wait any longer for the bride

For the Bambara children are a crucial component of marriage

They provide the lineage descendants for the man support in old age and

labour for the labour intensive agriculture Barren women or women with

no surviving children are pitied and also regarded with great suspicion

and may be considered as witches who can kill and maim other children

(Duncan Fulton personal communication) Polygyny means that a man with

take another wife but he rarely divorces the first one a barren wife can

There is always demand for adult women even when they are beyond childshy

bearing because of their skills and personal resources This with the

w-oen are either inherited on their husbands death levirate means that

have a scrier of suitorn who eventuilly pressurize them into remarriage

or

This demand for women as an economic and labour assetboth in herown right

7

and through the children she bears for the lineage contrasts strongly

with the Twareg situation

Noble Twareg women are exposed to the risk of pregnancy during

and only during periods of marriage There is no doubt that nobles

find extra- or pre-marital sex moral) abominable and moreover it seems

to be a moral norm that is traislated into actual practice The only

case of a Gourma imrad woman conceiving illegitimately is instructive shy

the woman concerned is said to have strangled her child to death out of

intense shame and dishonour It can be held then that periods within

marriage define the length of time that sexually mature noble women are

exposed to the risk of pregnancy The result is that long periods outside

marriage in sexually mature women imply a corresponding reduction in

fertility

Marriage results in the formation of a new household a unit that

is potentially reproductive For women first marriage can occur over a

wide age range - when very young aged about nine or ten or at the other

exLreme as late as forty years of age Although it is rare for women

never to marry it is by no means unheard of Many noble women do not marry

until several years after puberty - among the Ikuwalaten Kel Areris there

are several women of twenty plus who have never married (see Appendix A

case 1) Hence for women initial household formation can occur at a

variety of ages

Noble men marry later than women for both populations the median

age at first marriage for men is around 29 and in both samples at age 35

25 noble men were still celibate (see Appendix A case 3) This coupled

with the fact that men remarrying after the termination of a previous

marriage often marry celibate girls means that new households are often

8

made up of couples where the husband is considerably older than his wife

For example in 25 noble Gourma households the husband is more than 20

years older than his wife (see Figure 3)

Gourma imrad and their iklan are matrilineal in-contrast with the

patrilineal Delta and other Gourma Twareg and thus the allegiancies of

Both cases are considered below from which it can the children differ

be seen that although matrilinearity places additional strain on an already

weak marriage bond the other social principles beiind noble Twareg marriage

remain the same

The newly formed noole household can be terminated in two ways

Divorce - divorce is a relatively easy affair following Islamic (1)

are unable to initiate divorceprescription In theory vomen

proceedings themselves this being a male priviledge but in practice

Divorce can wives can bring pressure on their husbands for divorce

the result of a deterioratingfor any number of reasons and need not be occur

husband and wife relationship but the outcome of strained affinal relations

death of either spouse effectively results in household (2) Death shy

deformation

In both events a woman will return to her own kin (Gourma -

In the case of maternal kin in the Delta usually o her paternal

kin)

divorce the Gourma imrad woman retains the children of that marriage

whose principle allegiance is an any case to their mothers brother

Here a widowed husband never retains jural authority over his children

Delta women generally retain even if they continup to live with him

return to their father or his kin when they very young children who will

They do however maintain strong contact with their mother and

are older

9

The children of widowed Delta her kin and return on frequent visits

women will stay with her whilst young but when older they generally reLurn

to their fathers kin to whom they hold most allegiance

Following divorce remarriage is in principle possible the next day

Delta women must wait three months Followingfor men and Gourma women

the death of her husband all noble women mourn for five months during

which time they cannot and will not remarry Widowed men are under no

Such at any rate obligation to mourn and may marry as soon

as they wish

In practice noble women following divorce or widowhood

is the theory

- indeed they may never remarry may spend several years before they remarry

Since most hoble women (see Appendix B and Figure 4)

(Appendix A case 9)

marry at least twice this frequently long interval between marriages

are not exposed to the risk of pregnancy represents a period when they

The simple demography or late age at male marriage is contributory to this

pattern of household deformation - high adult mortality results in imrad

men dying while their younger widowed wives remain potentially reproductive

but outside marriage following their husbands death

marry until a relativelyAdded to the fact that women often do not

late age by African standards the considerable periods of time that they

spend in a non-reproductive status between successive marriages means

that noble women experience a socially controlled reduction in the period

In short a noble womans physiologicallyduring which they can reproduce

reproductive life is rarely coterminous with her socially reproductive life

stablishing why noble women can The question then becomes onb

spend such long periods in their physiologically reproductive lives in a

social state that effectively prohibits reproduction The answer is seen

10

to lie in the social domain a matter of examining the reasons for the

The argument put forward formation and deformation of household units

here is proposed for the matrilineal Gourma imrad It differs little

in that where imrad from that for other patrilineal noble Twareg save

their owe allegiance to their mothers brother Delta Twareg

turn to

Restraints on households dependence on fathers and patrilineal kin

iklan labour the power of kinship and reduced demand for woman as

reproducers are similar for both groups

A discussion of the factors and constraints involved in household

on for ever a drawn-out process of formation and deformation could go

Such is not our intention here and it is elimination and delimitation

preferable to describe the broad outlines of what seems to be a coherent

argument

for the imrad household formation is a Our argument is that

reluctantly accepted obligation and moreover a limited necessity

The constraints to household formation are not of a directly economic

nature - the arguments against a wealth-constrained pattern of household

Formation are given in Appendix C

First the issue of imrad household formation being a limited

nece3sity It seems appropriate to quote from Stennings influential

paper on Wodaabe household formation

Given this strict division of labour and a herd of a given size

a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its

responsibilities towards its herd and a compositiun which ensures

that these are efficiently carried out by appropriate members of

the family

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

6

and at the end of a marriage returns to her kin who are obliged to bear

the costs of supporting her rather than her affines for whom she is an

expensive liability

Bambara women may get pregnant or even have a child before they

marry Often this is their future husbands child as a woman may go and

live and work with her husbands family for the rainy season prior to

She returns to her natal household until the marriage Newmarriage

formed at marriage which is patrilocal New wiveshouseholds are not

join the labour force of the husbands household and in this millet cultshy

ivating economy increased labour input is welcomed The pre-marital

lending system also accustoms the woman to her in-laws because it is

recognised that it is hard for her to leave her family and village to

go to live with strangers It also provides more time for the husband

and his family to accumulate the bridewealth and wedding costs without

having to wait any longer for the bride

For the Bambara children are a crucial component of marriage

They provide the lineage descendants for the man support in old age and

labour for the labour intensive agriculture Barren women or women with

no surviving children are pitied and also regarded with great suspicion

and may be considered as witches who can kill and maim other children

(Duncan Fulton personal communication) Polygyny means that a man with

take another wife but he rarely divorces the first one a barren wife can

There is always demand for adult women even when they are beyond childshy

bearing because of their skills and personal resources This with the

w-oen are either inherited on their husbands death levirate means that

have a scrier of suitorn who eventuilly pressurize them into remarriage

or

This demand for women as an economic and labour assetboth in herown right

7

and through the children she bears for the lineage contrasts strongly

with the Twareg situation

Noble Twareg women are exposed to the risk of pregnancy during

and only during periods of marriage There is no doubt that nobles

find extra- or pre-marital sex moral) abominable and moreover it seems

to be a moral norm that is traislated into actual practice The only

case of a Gourma imrad woman conceiving illegitimately is instructive shy

the woman concerned is said to have strangled her child to death out of

intense shame and dishonour It can be held then that periods within

marriage define the length of time that sexually mature noble women are

exposed to the risk of pregnancy The result is that long periods outside

marriage in sexually mature women imply a corresponding reduction in

fertility

Marriage results in the formation of a new household a unit that

is potentially reproductive For women first marriage can occur over a

wide age range - when very young aged about nine or ten or at the other

exLreme as late as forty years of age Although it is rare for women

never to marry it is by no means unheard of Many noble women do not marry

until several years after puberty - among the Ikuwalaten Kel Areris there

are several women of twenty plus who have never married (see Appendix A

case 1) Hence for women initial household formation can occur at a

variety of ages

Noble men marry later than women for both populations the median

age at first marriage for men is around 29 and in both samples at age 35

25 noble men were still celibate (see Appendix A case 3) This coupled

with the fact that men remarrying after the termination of a previous

marriage often marry celibate girls means that new households are often

8

made up of couples where the husband is considerably older than his wife

For example in 25 noble Gourma households the husband is more than 20

years older than his wife (see Figure 3)

Gourma imrad and their iklan are matrilineal in-contrast with the

patrilineal Delta and other Gourma Twareg and thus the allegiancies of

Both cases are considered below from which it can the children differ

be seen that although matrilinearity places additional strain on an already

weak marriage bond the other social principles beiind noble Twareg marriage

remain the same

The newly formed noole household can be terminated in two ways

Divorce - divorce is a relatively easy affair following Islamic (1)

are unable to initiate divorceprescription In theory vomen

proceedings themselves this being a male priviledge but in practice

Divorce can wives can bring pressure on their husbands for divorce

the result of a deterioratingfor any number of reasons and need not be occur

husband and wife relationship but the outcome of strained affinal relations

death of either spouse effectively results in household (2) Death shy

deformation

In both events a woman will return to her own kin (Gourma -

In the case of maternal kin in the Delta usually o her paternal

kin)

divorce the Gourma imrad woman retains the children of that marriage

whose principle allegiance is an any case to their mothers brother

Here a widowed husband never retains jural authority over his children

Delta women generally retain even if they continup to live with him

return to their father or his kin when they very young children who will

They do however maintain strong contact with their mother and

are older

9

The children of widowed Delta her kin and return on frequent visits

women will stay with her whilst young but when older they generally reLurn

to their fathers kin to whom they hold most allegiance

Following divorce remarriage is in principle possible the next day

Delta women must wait three months Followingfor men and Gourma women

the death of her husband all noble women mourn for five months during

which time they cannot and will not remarry Widowed men are under no

Such at any rate obligation to mourn and may marry as soon

as they wish

In practice noble women following divorce or widowhood

is the theory

- indeed they may never remarry may spend several years before they remarry

Since most hoble women (see Appendix B and Figure 4)

(Appendix A case 9)

marry at least twice this frequently long interval between marriages

are not exposed to the risk of pregnancy represents a period when they

The simple demography or late age at male marriage is contributory to this

pattern of household deformation - high adult mortality results in imrad

men dying while their younger widowed wives remain potentially reproductive

but outside marriage following their husbands death

marry until a relativelyAdded to the fact that women often do not

late age by African standards the considerable periods of time that they

spend in a non-reproductive status between successive marriages means

that noble women experience a socially controlled reduction in the period

In short a noble womans physiologicallyduring which they can reproduce

reproductive life is rarely coterminous with her socially reproductive life

stablishing why noble women can The question then becomes onb

spend such long periods in their physiologically reproductive lives in a

social state that effectively prohibits reproduction The answer is seen

10

to lie in the social domain a matter of examining the reasons for the

The argument put forward formation and deformation of household units

here is proposed for the matrilineal Gourma imrad It differs little

in that where imrad from that for other patrilineal noble Twareg save

their owe allegiance to their mothers brother Delta Twareg

turn to

Restraints on households dependence on fathers and patrilineal kin

iklan labour the power of kinship and reduced demand for woman as

reproducers are similar for both groups

A discussion of the factors and constraints involved in household

on for ever a drawn-out process of formation and deformation could go

Such is not our intention here and it is elimination and delimitation

preferable to describe the broad outlines of what seems to be a coherent

argument

for the imrad household formation is a Our argument is that

reluctantly accepted obligation and moreover a limited necessity

The constraints to household formation are not of a directly economic

nature - the arguments against a wealth-constrained pattern of household

Formation are given in Appendix C

First the issue of imrad household formation being a limited

nece3sity It seems appropriate to quote from Stennings influential

paper on Wodaabe household formation

Given this strict division of labour and a herd of a given size

a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its

responsibilities towards its herd and a compositiun which ensures

that these are efficiently carried out by appropriate members of

the family

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

7

and through the children she bears for the lineage contrasts strongly

with the Twareg situation

Noble Twareg women are exposed to the risk of pregnancy during

and only during periods of marriage There is no doubt that nobles

find extra- or pre-marital sex moral) abominable and moreover it seems

to be a moral norm that is traislated into actual practice The only

case of a Gourma imrad woman conceiving illegitimately is instructive shy

the woman concerned is said to have strangled her child to death out of

intense shame and dishonour It can be held then that periods within

marriage define the length of time that sexually mature noble women are

exposed to the risk of pregnancy The result is that long periods outside

marriage in sexually mature women imply a corresponding reduction in

fertility

Marriage results in the formation of a new household a unit that

is potentially reproductive For women first marriage can occur over a

wide age range - when very young aged about nine or ten or at the other

exLreme as late as forty years of age Although it is rare for women

never to marry it is by no means unheard of Many noble women do not marry

until several years after puberty - among the Ikuwalaten Kel Areris there

are several women of twenty plus who have never married (see Appendix A

case 1) Hence for women initial household formation can occur at a

variety of ages

Noble men marry later than women for both populations the median

age at first marriage for men is around 29 and in both samples at age 35

25 noble men were still celibate (see Appendix A case 3) This coupled

with the fact that men remarrying after the termination of a previous

marriage often marry celibate girls means that new households are often

8

made up of couples where the husband is considerably older than his wife

For example in 25 noble Gourma households the husband is more than 20

years older than his wife (see Figure 3)

Gourma imrad and their iklan are matrilineal in-contrast with the

patrilineal Delta and other Gourma Twareg and thus the allegiancies of

Both cases are considered below from which it can the children differ

be seen that although matrilinearity places additional strain on an already

weak marriage bond the other social principles beiind noble Twareg marriage

remain the same

The newly formed noole household can be terminated in two ways

Divorce - divorce is a relatively easy affair following Islamic (1)

are unable to initiate divorceprescription In theory vomen

proceedings themselves this being a male priviledge but in practice

Divorce can wives can bring pressure on their husbands for divorce

the result of a deterioratingfor any number of reasons and need not be occur

husband and wife relationship but the outcome of strained affinal relations

death of either spouse effectively results in household (2) Death shy

deformation

In both events a woman will return to her own kin (Gourma -

In the case of maternal kin in the Delta usually o her paternal

kin)

divorce the Gourma imrad woman retains the children of that marriage

whose principle allegiance is an any case to their mothers brother

Here a widowed husband never retains jural authority over his children

Delta women generally retain even if they continup to live with him

return to their father or his kin when they very young children who will

They do however maintain strong contact with their mother and

are older

9

The children of widowed Delta her kin and return on frequent visits

women will stay with her whilst young but when older they generally reLurn

to their fathers kin to whom they hold most allegiance

Following divorce remarriage is in principle possible the next day

Delta women must wait three months Followingfor men and Gourma women

the death of her husband all noble women mourn for five months during

which time they cannot and will not remarry Widowed men are under no

Such at any rate obligation to mourn and may marry as soon

as they wish

In practice noble women following divorce or widowhood

is the theory

- indeed they may never remarry may spend several years before they remarry

Since most hoble women (see Appendix B and Figure 4)

(Appendix A case 9)

marry at least twice this frequently long interval between marriages

are not exposed to the risk of pregnancy represents a period when they

The simple demography or late age at male marriage is contributory to this

pattern of household deformation - high adult mortality results in imrad

men dying while their younger widowed wives remain potentially reproductive

but outside marriage following their husbands death

marry until a relativelyAdded to the fact that women often do not

late age by African standards the considerable periods of time that they

spend in a non-reproductive status between successive marriages means

that noble women experience a socially controlled reduction in the period

In short a noble womans physiologicallyduring which they can reproduce

reproductive life is rarely coterminous with her socially reproductive life

stablishing why noble women can The question then becomes onb

spend such long periods in their physiologically reproductive lives in a

social state that effectively prohibits reproduction The answer is seen

10

to lie in the social domain a matter of examining the reasons for the

The argument put forward formation and deformation of household units

here is proposed for the matrilineal Gourma imrad It differs little

in that where imrad from that for other patrilineal noble Twareg save

their owe allegiance to their mothers brother Delta Twareg

turn to

Restraints on households dependence on fathers and patrilineal kin

iklan labour the power of kinship and reduced demand for woman as

reproducers are similar for both groups

A discussion of the factors and constraints involved in household

on for ever a drawn-out process of formation and deformation could go

Such is not our intention here and it is elimination and delimitation

preferable to describe the broad outlines of what seems to be a coherent

argument

for the imrad household formation is a Our argument is that

reluctantly accepted obligation and moreover a limited necessity

The constraints to household formation are not of a directly economic

nature - the arguments against a wealth-constrained pattern of household

Formation are given in Appendix C

First the issue of imrad household formation being a limited

nece3sity It seems appropriate to quote from Stennings influential

paper on Wodaabe household formation

Given this strict division of labour and a herd of a given size

a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its

responsibilities towards its herd and a compositiun which ensures

that these are efficiently carried out by appropriate members of

the family

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

8

made up of couples where the husband is considerably older than his wife

For example in 25 noble Gourma households the husband is more than 20

years older than his wife (see Figure 3)

Gourma imrad and their iklan are matrilineal in-contrast with the

patrilineal Delta and other Gourma Twareg and thus the allegiancies of

Both cases are considered below from which it can the children differ

be seen that although matrilinearity places additional strain on an already

weak marriage bond the other social principles beiind noble Twareg marriage

remain the same

The newly formed noole household can be terminated in two ways

Divorce - divorce is a relatively easy affair following Islamic (1)

are unable to initiate divorceprescription In theory vomen

proceedings themselves this being a male priviledge but in practice

Divorce can wives can bring pressure on their husbands for divorce

the result of a deterioratingfor any number of reasons and need not be occur

husband and wife relationship but the outcome of strained affinal relations

death of either spouse effectively results in household (2) Death shy

deformation

In both events a woman will return to her own kin (Gourma -

In the case of maternal kin in the Delta usually o her paternal

kin)

divorce the Gourma imrad woman retains the children of that marriage

whose principle allegiance is an any case to their mothers brother

Here a widowed husband never retains jural authority over his children

Delta women generally retain even if they continup to live with him

return to their father or his kin when they very young children who will

They do however maintain strong contact with their mother and

are older

9

The children of widowed Delta her kin and return on frequent visits

women will stay with her whilst young but when older they generally reLurn

to their fathers kin to whom they hold most allegiance

Following divorce remarriage is in principle possible the next day

Delta women must wait three months Followingfor men and Gourma women

the death of her husband all noble women mourn for five months during

which time they cannot and will not remarry Widowed men are under no

Such at any rate obligation to mourn and may marry as soon

as they wish

In practice noble women following divorce or widowhood

is the theory

- indeed they may never remarry may spend several years before they remarry

Since most hoble women (see Appendix B and Figure 4)

(Appendix A case 9)

marry at least twice this frequently long interval between marriages

are not exposed to the risk of pregnancy represents a period when they

The simple demography or late age at male marriage is contributory to this

pattern of household deformation - high adult mortality results in imrad

men dying while their younger widowed wives remain potentially reproductive

but outside marriage following their husbands death

marry until a relativelyAdded to the fact that women often do not

late age by African standards the considerable periods of time that they

spend in a non-reproductive status between successive marriages means

that noble women experience a socially controlled reduction in the period

In short a noble womans physiologicallyduring which they can reproduce

reproductive life is rarely coterminous with her socially reproductive life

stablishing why noble women can The question then becomes onb

spend such long periods in their physiologically reproductive lives in a

social state that effectively prohibits reproduction The answer is seen

10

to lie in the social domain a matter of examining the reasons for the

The argument put forward formation and deformation of household units

here is proposed for the matrilineal Gourma imrad It differs little

in that where imrad from that for other patrilineal noble Twareg save

their owe allegiance to their mothers brother Delta Twareg

turn to

Restraints on households dependence on fathers and patrilineal kin

iklan labour the power of kinship and reduced demand for woman as

reproducers are similar for both groups

A discussion of the factors and constraints involved in household

on for ever a drawn-out process of formation and deformation could go

Such is not our intention here and it is elimination and delimitation

preferable to describe the broad outlines of what seems to be a coherent

argument

for the imrad household formation is a Our argument is that

reluctantly accepted obligation and moreover a limited necessity

The constraints to household formation are not of a directly economic

nature - the arguments against a wealth-constrained pattern of household

Formation are given in Appendix C

First the issue of imrad household formation being a limited

nece3sity It seems appropriate to quote from Stennings influential

paper on Wodaabe household formation

Given this strict division of labour and a herd of a given size

a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its

responsibilities towards its herd and a compositiun which ensures

that these are efficiently carried out by appropriate members of

the family

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

9

The children of widowed Delta her kin and return on frequent visits

women will stay with her whilst young but when older they generally reLurn

to their fathers kin to whom they hold most allegiance

Following divorce remarriage is in principle possible the next day

Delta women must wait three months Followingfor men and Gourma women

the death of her husband all noble women mourn for five months during

which time they cannot and will not remarry Widowed men are under no

Such at any rate obligation to mourn and may marry as soon

as they wish

In practice noble women following divorce or widowhood

is the theory

- indeed they may never remarry may spend several years before they remarry

Since most hoble women (see Appendix B and Figure 4)

(Appendix A case 9)

marry at least twice this frequently long interval between marriages

are not exposed to the risk of pregnancy represents a period when they

The simple demography or late age at male marriage is contributory to this

pattern of household deformation - high adult mortality results in imrad

men dying while their younger widowed wives remain potentially reproductive

but outside marriage following their husbands death

marry until a relativelyAdded to the fact that women often do not

late age by African standards the considerable periods of time that they

spend in a non-reproductive status between successive marriages means

that noble women experience a socially controlled reduction in the period

In short a noble womans physiologicallyduring which they can reproduce

reproductive life is rarely coterminous with her socially reproductive life

stablishing why noble women can The question then becomes onb

spend such long periods in their physiologically reproductive lives in a

social state that effectively prohibits reproduction The answer is seen

10

to lie in the social domain a matter of examining the reasons for the

The argument put forward formation and deformation of household units

here is proposed for the matrilineal Gourma imrad It differs little

in that where imrad from that for other patrilineal noble Twareg save

their owe allegiance to their mothers brother Delta Twareg

turn to

Restraints on households dependence on fathers and patrilineal kin

iklan labour the power of kinship and reduced demand for woman as

reproducers are similar for both groups

A discussion of the factors and constraints involved in household

on for ever a drawn-out process of formation and deformation could go

Such is not our intention here and it is elimination and delimitation

preferable to describe the broad outlines of what seems to be a coherent

argument

for the imrad household formation is a Our argument is that

reluctantly accepted obligation and moreover a limited necessity

The constraints to household formation are not of a directly economic

nature - the arguments against a wealth-constrained pattern of household

Formation are given in Appendix C

First the issue of imrad household formation being a limited

nece3sity It seems appropriate to quote from Stennings influential

paper on Wodaabe household formation

Given this strict division of labour and a herd of a given size

a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its

responsibilities towards its herd and a compositiun which ensures

that these are efficiently carried out by appropriate members of

the family

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

10

to lie in the social domain a matter of examining the reasons for the

The argument put forward formation and deformation of household units

here is proposed for the matrilineal Gourma imrad It differs little

in that where imrad from that for other patrilineal noble Twareg save

their owe allegiance to their mothers brother Delta Twareg

turn to

Restraints on households dependence on fathers and patrilineal kin

iklan labour the power of kinship and reduced demand for woman as

reproducers are similar for both groups

A discussion of the factors and constraints involved in household

on for ever a drawn-out process of formation and deformation could go

Such is not our intention here and it is elimination and delimitation

preferable to describe the broad outlines of what seems to be a coherent

argument

for the imrad household formation is a Our argument is that

reluctantly accepted obligation and moreover a limited necessity

The constraints to household formation are not of a directly economic

nature - the arguments against a wealth-constrained pattern of household

Formation are given in Appendix C

First the issue of imrad household formation being a limited

nece3sity It seems appropriate to quote from Stennings influential

paper on Wodaabe household formation

Given this strict division of labour and a herd of a given size

a family must attain a certain size commensurate with its

responsibilities towards its herd and a compositiun which ensures

that these are efficiently carried out by appropriate members of

the family

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

When the size and increase of the herd is adequate for the subsistence

of the family and the size and composition of the family are

suitable for the control and deployment of the herd then family

a whole and herd may be said to be in equilibrium

and the unit as

is viable (Stenning in Goody 1958)

What Stenning is indicating here is that what Wodaabe households

do

a socially defined economic unit such that labour matches

is provide

The relevence to our argument livestock consumption matches

production

function in the same way is that thi noble Twareg household

does not

The imradare principally dependent particularly with regard to labour

Beyond that it is also often on iklan to provide the necessary

labour

the case that an imrd household does not correspond to a discrete

production unit and will invariably cooperate with other households

The

rely on a family of key point however is that a man

does not have to

his mothers brothers iklan - his or imrad to provide him with labour

Hence late age of will do the necessary work (See

Appendix A case 4)

male marriage can in part be seen as the outcome of a limited

need

for household formation- Equally one can view at the individual level

such a system as resulting in a markedly reduced pressure on female

marriage

a reduced demand for imrad women as reproducers resulting in a

later

(The contrast is implicit with labour thirsty

age at first marriage

cultivating societies such as the Bambara where a womans reproductive

powers are critical and explain in part the greater degree of

pressure

The same thesis applies to women on sexually mature women to marry)

The restrictions remaining single for long periods

in between marriages

on women marrying are enhanced by the social norm which prohibits

either

a woman or her kin from making any movements towards finding

herself a

From the womans viewpointshe must be totally passive until

husband

selected out by a man or his kin

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

12

Household formation can also be seen as a limited necessity in

For imrad women there is the enduring guarantee that they

another way

will be supported by their matrilateral kin - a woman is most at ease

with her uterine siblings and mothers brother who will always provide

Women are rarely identified as being the wives of imrad but as

for her

the overwhelming emphasis and the daughters and nieces of imrad -

With preponderant responsibility are on

blood kin and not on husbands

a lack of emphasis on reproduction and an emphasis on blood kin women

are

a non-reproductive position Women by no means compromised by remaining

in

- it is no coincidence that they then feel very little pressurc to marry

exercise their own consent with regard to marriage and that their kin

case of minors exert little pressure on them to marry

except in the

So much for limited necessity what of marriage and household

formation being reluctantly accepted obligations An obligation because

it is socially necessary to biologically reproduce reluctantly accepted

because as we shall see Twareg kinship is powerfully overrated and

because households bring on a series of responsibilities that are avoided

for a long time

smatrilineallyconstituted but beyond that it is

In particular imrad siblings (of any sex) imrad kir6 ip

extraordinarily powerful

demonstrate a fundamental solidarity that contrasts strongly with the

tensinn and weakness of marriage and affinal relations When imrad

discuss marriage it is nearly always in terms of the marriage going sour

The of the marriage ending in divorce

and acrimonous affinal disputes

practice of azali which are cattle that arrive with a married women

but

which remain under control of her maternal kin and not in the hands of

Azai cattle her husband leads to a whole host

of potential tensions

do not go towards making up a joint fund of household wealth and a husband

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

is oily allowed access to the azali herds milk to dispose of as he wishes

(and even then he must send every year a large quantity of butter processed

from the milk to his wifes kin his affines) As a womans maternal

kin start to eat into her azali herd diminishing its size or as the

husband himself starts to exceed his limited rights in the azali herd

disputes arise and the possibility of divorce increases (see Appendix A

case 6) Marriage is thus an extremely tense institution one that is not

entered into disarmingly and which is easily terminated largely because

blood kinship is so strong an institution

More than that marriage for a woman represents a residential

separation from her home from her maternal kin a separation that women

do not find pleasurable or a good alternative to being with their caring

blood kin Women must be seen as losing a great deal with marriage

This is somewhat mediated by the high rates of endogamy Most people can

trace the kinship link between themselves and their spouse and frequently

a couple are first or second cousins In a Dalta camp only 5 of marriages

were to non-kin and in 70 of marriages the kinship link could be traced

through less than 3 generations It is frequently said that 6nes cousin

already has a great deal of affection for one and that his or her solidarity

and care is guaranteed by kinship Non-kin may not have such profound

affection for their spouses and there is no expectation that marriage will

necessarily generate such affection The problem with close kin marriage

is that if the marriage goes wrong its effects ramify beyond the bounds

of the estranged spouses and affinal tensions will be placed on top of the

usually powerful and binding kin bonds From this arise two schools of

thought one which maintains that close kin marriage is best because it

brings close affective bonds into often tense marital situations and

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

14

another which views non-kin marriage as Preferable because the predictedaffinal anid marital tensions hill not be transformed into tensions between close blood kin Women tend io express preference for close kin spouseswhich fits coherently with a desii-e to avoid being separated from their

kin after marriage

For men in economic terms first marriage and household formationbring little gain aod on the contrary imply a- increased pressure ontheir wealth and indeopndance Noble women do nct work and in the pastat least neither did their children while thd azali herds that the wife brings are largely subordinate tc the needs of her matrilateral kin andnot to those of her husband The result is that a noble man faces the prospect of an increased take-off from his herds (because he has to supportmore people) and a reduction in his own personal expenditure and independenceThe young Twareg noble enjoys a great deal of freedom from responsibility a freedom to live lavishly that he will lose upon marriage and at theformation of his ovn household Marriage for the noble man is a reluctantlyaccepted obligation Often a man finally marries because his kin havefound him a wife and arranged the marriage for him In the Delta if hisfather does this filial respect demands that he obey his fathers wishesKin may arrange marriages for their young men to force them to settle down live less lavishly and become stable members of society (see Appendix A case 7

The result of this limited necessity for and reluctantly acceptedobligation of tarriage is that there is a relative lack of pressure oniomen to marry or to remarry Partly the woman is allowed to exercise choice because it does not matter to her kin partly it is because imrad men are in no hurry to marry and thus exert little pressure on the stock

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

What it is not is an ideology of sexual egalitarianismof unmarried women

as she wishes but a social and economic systemwhereby a woman does exactly

that generates no overwhelming need for reproduction and which has transshy

formed marriage and household formation into an institution with very few

functions Given such considerations one can begin to make more sense of

the large amount of time that noble women spend out of marriage

Iklan

We concentrate here on iklan who live and work in noble camps

There are quite considerable differences in iklan marital behaviour between

the two zones and it is possible that this is because Delta iklan are more

ineslemen the Twar g rel2ious Llpsislamicised because their masters are

They also have more contact with non-Twareg for whom many of the iklan

However in terms of households and iklanshywork in the harvest season

First we willnoble interdependence the two areas are very similar

discuss Gourma iklan and then turn to differences in the Delta

The first and most striking contrast between Courma iklan and nobles

is fundamental noble extra-marital conception is negligeable while iklan

For iklan periodsillegitimacy rates are considerable (see Appendix D)

of m-iage are not the only times when sexual reproduction can occur

ire not theleading one to the conclusion that household formation et

single social determinants of overall fertility in iklan populations

an altogether more problematic issueWhy this should be so is

The issue of morality is perplexing for while few readily admit

to being illegitimate it seems to be a widely accepted fact that they are

For the imrad of course iklanand that many other iklan will be

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

16

illegitimacy is conclusive proof of iklan social inferiority and

yet

sc lowly regarded illegitimacy amongst them seems

because the iklan are

The iklan themselves particularly to be devoid of moral abhorrence

as immr)ral but those of illegitimate birth

do comment on illegitimacy

accept it without any difficulty

to consider the iklan in relation to

A more fruitful approach is

Both illegitimate and legitimate their traditional masters

the imrad

their mothers master so birth stetus has no confusing

effects

iklan belong to

It will be the imrad master who is responsible for the upkeep of the

children who will feed them and ultimately appropriate

their labour

case 8) the iklan mother of course has some

power (see Appendix A

responsibility but by far the largest share of the burden will fall on

then the iklan du not have the same problem as

a sensethe imrad In

Stenning~s Wodaabe simply because considerations of

subsistence are for

The iklan woman does not rely on

and not for the iklanthe imrad

legitimate household formation or marriage to provide a

subsistence base

terms of

so that extra-marital or pre-marital conception mean

little in

The connection resources constituted out

of marriage having to be met by the

one between dependent poverty and a corresponding limited

necessity

then is

for household formation as a nredicate for reproduction

Whatever my be

the exolanation for higher rates of illegitimacy among

th ikian it does

imply a reduction in the importance of marriage as

a controller of fertility

Age at first marriage is less We now turn to household

formation

variable than for the imrad (though still much more variable

than for the

Few iklan women marry before puberty and fewer get married at

Bambara)

Iklan men marry much earlier than their noble

later ages (Figure 5)

This in contrast with

counterparts generally before age 30 (Figure 6)

the imrad results in on average a smallcr age discrepancy between

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

iklan husbands and wives with a possible reduction in female widowhood

(Figure 4) Household deformation results from either divorce or death

remarry for many yearsDivorces or widowed iklan women often do not

despite the fact that remarriage is possible In the event of either

return from her husbands camp todeath or divorce the iklan woman will

that of her owner who may himself have put pressure on her not to leave

in the first place (see Appendix A case 8)

Again there is little point in going into laborious detail on

iklan household formation etc The key to understanding domestic development

among the iklan lies precisely in a recognition of their status and

position viz b viz their masters The iklan are more or less domestic

slaves and this is what conditions virtually all the salient features of

household formation among them

In the Gourma iklan marriage is largely controlled by the imrad to

womans kin and her owner are involved inthe extent that both the ikl

owner who pays the bridewealthgiving consent and that it is the iklan mans

etc and receives the bridewealthand the womans owner who provides her tent

repaid and the originalpayment At divorce the bridewealth payment is not

todonor effectively loses his investment a prospect that he may be averse

of an iklan man will often exert pressure on himConsequently the owner

not to initiate divorce proceedings and counsel continued marriage In

extreme cases he might forbid divorce altogether (see Appendix A case 9)

Moreover as propertyHence iklan themselves might find it hard to divQrce

transfers between affinal iklao are not involved there may be less iklan

affinal tension than between the propertied imrad

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

18

However for the slave owner there is a dilemma Because iklon childri

of their mother her ownrr is motivated to encouragebelong to the owrwer

iklan fertility On the other hand virilocal iklan marriage means that

a noble loses his female lklan labuur to her husbands camp Some nobles

they retain both spouses (see Appendix Atry to manipulate the system so that

case 10) On divorce or widowhood iklan women return to their masters

female iklan owners interests to encouragecamp Thus it is in the

illegitimacy because in that vay he retains his adult female labour as

The owner of the ikian male getswell as increasing his labour force

return for thc bridewealth and no potentialtemporary female labour in

It seems that these factors which encourageincrease in his labour force

iklan women to spend long periods between marriages working for their

own masters in fact lead to equivalent proportions of iklan and noble women

to be outside marriage

In the Delta it was only in the past that iklan owners paid the

bridewealth and provided the slave woman with her tent and chattels

nowadays this burden falls on the iklan themselves and their kin In

the bridewealth still goesaccordance with past tradition however half

to the iklan womans master presumably to compensate for the labour that

he is losing Otherwise virilocal marriage and iklan ownership do not

differ from the Gourma practices Again the female iklan and noble

marriage patterns are remarkably similar Thus we have a situation whereby

noble women are not constrained to marry and bear many children partly

because iklan labour is available similarly iklan women do not have to marry

a labour and support system that is not dependentbecause they are part of

on their own household formation

In both samples iklan men marry much earlier than noble men (see

As ikan children belong to the womans owner reproduction -sfigure 6)

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

19

unlikely to be the key incentive for male iklan marriage Two factors

We said that for noble men marriage is ashould be taken into account

reluctantly accepted obligation because of its restrictions on previous

freedom and increased expenditure The unmarried iklan has neither freedom

his maternal nor wealth Before marriage he lives either with his master or

kin and marriage will make him head of his own household with a limited

Also at least in the Gourma marriageincrease in power and independence

costs him little because his owner pays the bridewealth and his wife

arrives with the tent and chattels

An obvious control group for all these hypotheses is the low-status

illelan Unfortunately we have littel detailed qualitative knowledge on

thembut there is quantitative data Thus the discussion below is somewhat

conjectural but founded on observations and discussion during the collection

of the demographic data

These low-status illelan do not generclly have slaves but they are

not slaves themselves Hence their households are closer to Stennings

Wodaabe household where labour ideally matches livestock and consumption

matches production Without iklan both men and women have to work and

their support system is their own household as created by a married

couple Within this household the labour is divided up Motivation for

rapid household formation is high and one expects an earlier age at marriage

for both men and women Young men donot have the liberty of noble men

but they do own their own herds and by marrying they obtain a certain

independence and possibilities of increased labour with the creation of

a new household Certainly for inhaden and probaily for low-status

of the bridewealth isillelan economic constraints dictate that most

immediately invested in the womans prerequisites for marriage Thus if

the marriage breaks up there is no remaining surplus to automatically

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

20

Figure 6 shos that to age 35

support her when she returns to her kin

the proportion of currently married low-status illelan

women consistantly

There is more incentive both to create and

exceeds that for nobles

maintain their socially homogenous households where both spouse

work and

The percentage of for someone else to their own ends rather than

evermarried women who are currently divorced is much lower in this

group

(Figure 8)

However the power of Twareg kinship is still maintained

and low-status

illelan women currently married can still depend on their

kin for protection

of the similarity between the

It should be noted that some and support

demographic profiles for the low-status illelan and that

of the iklan is

due to the fact that only about half of the iklan sample is made up of

The rest who are independent dependent iklan living in noble camps

iklan have a life style similar to that of the low-status

illelan

The low-status illelan illegitimacy rate is low the nobles

However unlike the other Twareg sub-groups

values holding sway

examination of the total marital fertility rate is low at 75

and marriage

With low

alone does not seem to explain overall low total fertility

marital fertility we must look to other intermediate fertility variables

We would hypothesise that in this poorer group with

no

for exolanation

an increased level of spousal separation because of labour

iklan there is

We know that during the drought in 1973-4 many low-status

demands

illelan and iklan men went to Niger and Nigeria to find work and remained

This migration continues but has little effect

away for several years

Iklan fertility where spousal separation does not imply

the celibacy

on I Thus in this group protracted

spousal which it does for the illelan

separation could reduce marital fertility to below that for the other

two grous

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

21

Conclusions

In this brief attempt to try and understand some

of the processes

determining low Twareg fertility as compared with high Bambara

fertility we

Marriage is a social the most important factor

identified marriage as

ecological variable and hence Twareg demographic

rather than a biological or

behaviour is to be judged within the social and economic

system

Our thesis is that nobles and iklan despite their many real

and

perceived differences are part of a composite

social and economic system

or the iklan reference

and in description and study of either the nobles

It is only for a fuller understanding

to emerge

must be made to the other

iklan and noble households together that

by considering the dynamics of

the sum total of the two corresponds to what Stenning

describes for the

It thus follows that demographic analysis must not

Wodarhe household

alyse data separately for the social classes but

should consider

ju

As a contrast the low-status illelan household

their joint dynamics

more readily approaches Stennings Wodaabe unit

iklan labourwith no

although even here the ubiquitous power of Twareg

kinship and its influence

on household formation and deformation should

not be ignored

we have implicitly drawn a

In discussing household forrrjiion

distinction between a households reproductive

and other functions and

it is these latter which at a social level may be critically

important

For the nobles we have seen that

in determining the overall pattern

In the iklan

because of the iklan households are of limited

necessity

case households have more complex functions

devoid of resource constitution

two ways by a reproductive function both of which

are

and shaped in

inciting high fertility thus increasing the

onedictated by the nobles

the other constraining against continued marriage

nobles slave resources

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

22

ueeause the owner loses his adult female labour for the duration of the

All this is partly mediated by a high level of iklan illegitimacymarriage

and noble manipulation of iklan marriage

That low-status illlelan fertility is little higher than that of

nobles and little lower than that of iklan and that all are much lower

than the Bambara indicates that it is not only the complementarity of

iklan and noble hcjseholds and the reluctance to accept household responshy

sibilities that is reducing fertility More fertility reduction comes

from periods spent outside marriage than from slow female entry into

marriage It is suggested that the powerful kinship systemwhich provides

support for women which is preferred to the affinal support provided by

marriage is an important factor

The most important feature to emerge from this discussion is the

role that social institutions such as marriage play in what is often

It is important notconsidered to be the biological field of fertility

to reduce these social institutions solely to economic parameters but

to luok at the dynamics of society the values held and the interactions

Fertility and household formation and developmentof groups and individuals

are inextricably entwined and influenced by s whole spectrum of cultural

econamic and environmental factors

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

Appendix A Case Studies

Case 1 Fatima was married to her patrilateral parallel cousin Moussa

when she was very young She was always against the marriage and

left her husband after 3 months Her parents spent 3 years trying

to save the marriage but finally gave up and the couple were

divorced Fatima returned the 20 head of cattle bridewealth

to indicate that she really meant that the marriage was over

and she wanted no more pretensions to dependence on her ex-husbano

Case 2 Atanerit is about 32 years old and has never been married At

present she lives in the same tent as Ashanhat her widowed MZD

and Mostafi her MZS According to Atanerit she has never been

asked to marry something that does not seem to over-worry her

She enjoys a relaxed relationship with all the men in the camp

Fana is about 24 years old and lives in her own tent along with

her two younger sisters and mothers brother She has never been

married and like Atanerit Has never been asked to marry

Case 3 Both Neti and Romar are in their mid-thirties both have never

been married In Netis case he has never wanted to marry in

Romars case it is said that he has proposed twice and been

refused on both occasions

had oneCase 4 Azerdehat a woman of about 50 first married in 1961

son (who subsequently died) and was divorced 3 years later in

1964 since then she has not remarried and has always lived in

her own tent in the camp of her mothers brothers

when she was 29 yearsFatimatas first husband died in 1975

old She has not remarried and is unlikely to do so

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

Case 5 Neti of case 3 is also a wealthy young man - in 1981 he paid

for his pilgrimage to Mecca - whose cattle herd is managed

Romarby his mothers brothers contract herders and iklan

also of case 3 is a wealthy cattle owner possibly one or the

His cattle are herded by his motherswealthier of the imrad

Neither Romar nor Netibrothers contract herders and Iklan

have any need of a household to provide them with labour for herding

etc

Case 6 Elakudas marriage to Atama 4 years ago has always been rather

The problem is that Elakuda has not paid sufficienttense

respect to hiswifes father and has consistently neglected to

send butter to his father-in-law The tension reached a high

point in the dry season of 1982 when Atama left Elakuda returning

to her fathers camp The separation ended fairly quickly

Elakuda immediately promising to become a more respectful

son-in-law Atama returned with a depleted azali herd her father

Thisrefusing to allow Elakuda any more cattle than he had to

annoyed Elakuda and affinal tension continues nobody feels that

their marriage can last much longer

Mahmed now about 28 is a somewhat mentally disturbed youngCase 7

man with a tendency towards wild actions and very extravagant

When he was about 22 his father arranged for himbehaviour

to marry Fatima who later died in childbirth Within 3 months

of her death he married Mariana and people say that he is more

sane and rational since he was forced to marry and accept

responsibilities

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

Case 8 Makeltu brought 2 ikan women with her as part of her dowry

The first and eldest Ijaharher have birth to an illegitimate

daughter (Tezehut now 24 years old) and died 4 days after

giving birth Makeltu raised Tezehut as a child and the latter

remained akeltus household slave until 3 years ago when she

married - Makeltu arranged for Tezehuts tent and domestic

equipment Makeltus other iklan woman Silerhat gave birth

to an illegitimate daughter Tahushal 12 years ago and both

Silerhat and Tahushal lived with Makeltu until 3 years ago

when Silerhat married for the first time (Makeltu again making

up the dowry) Tahushal however has remained with Makeltu

for whom she continues to work Toreplace Tezehut and Silerhat

Makeltu received another iklan woman Wardiseden from her mothers

Since then Wardiseden has given birth to 2 illegitimatebrother

children who together with her first illegitimate daughter

all live in Makeltus tent along with their mother and Tahushal

Wahar was divorced in 1974 and has remained unmarried since then

Case 9

imrad woman who supportsToday she works for Towaylilt art

Wahar and her 3 children (two of whom are illegitimate)

lives in her own tentTaskeut was divorced 4 years ago and now

but works for and is supported by Fati (Taskeuts imrad mistress)

and Rakebu Fatis husband Both Wakar and Taskeut are assured

of subsistence by their respective imradowners

During the wet season of 1982 both Wanamrulset and his wifeCase 10

Tild wanted to be divorced Loqqin Wanamrulsets imrad

master who had made up the best part of the twently goat

bridewealth payment to Tilds parents two years ago was very

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

against divorce and ultimately prohibited it saying that

the couple should sort out their differences without recourse

The two Bella remain married and Tild is now pregnantto divorce

Case 11 Mahmad wanted to marry Mariama and went to her camp to discuss

the matter with her father Mariamas father had a 16 year old

iklan woman called Tinazoum and Mariama was obviously going

to need a female servant It was obvious however that Tinazoum

would also get married in the near future and Mariama would then

have to find another iklan woman probably younger and less

capable of hard work Mahmads father had an iklan man called

Boubakar in his early twenties who also did some work for Mahmad

himself So Mahmad on arriving home proposed to Boubakar that

the camp with Marianahe marry Tinazoum thus bringing her to

Mahmad also contributed something towards the bridewealth

Appendix B Summary analysis of imrad womens marital histories

The following data pertain to the Ikawalaten Kel Areris - Gourma imrad

Women age 15-54 = 48

of whom 11 have never been married

37 have ever been married - of these 37 only 26 are currently married

thus the 0 of sexually mature women currently in a socially reproductive state

546 of all sexually mature women

All women who have ever married - 42

for whom there have been a total of 70 marriages

Of the marriage Lerminations

divorce accounts for 13

and widowhood for 30

currently married 27

70 total marriages

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

fIormation Apendix CWe~alth

andhou~sehold

a high bridewealth payment might be viewed

Marital transactions1

as a constraint to household formation

inhibiting marriage until

the imrad have accumulated sufficient cattle to pay the taat

In fact the imrad taalt is set relatively

low

or bridewealth

at batween four and eight cattle well

within the capacity of most

Beyond this men proposing to marry

can undertake

young imrad men

a tir]t a procedure whereby they appeal

to a variety of kin and

friends for contributions to the tagalt

again it would be reasonable to assume

Household resources2

that an imrad man must have sufficiert

livestock to support a new

household and that therefore the imrad

must await relatively large

herds before they can marry the problem here

however is that

in general wealthy (men carl usually support

houseshy

the imrad are

holds before they actually do so) and that wives usually

come

with often substantial azali herds which

can make a major contribution

Moreover in the few cases of poor

to supporting the household

imrad poverty does not seem to have

hindered household formation

illegitimacy p i DGourma iklan

Loqqins c~mp has a total of 43 resident

Bella (men women and children)

giving an illegitimacy

15 were conceived illegitimately

Of these 43

Naturally this rate cannot be extended

but it does give

rate of 35 among

indication of just huw prevalent non-marital

conception is

some

the Bella and what its implications

for reproduction are

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

Figure 1 Age-sex pyramids by marital

age

(a) Delta Twareg

male

status

female

200 100 00 260 360 406

(b) Cz--r Tareg

2bo ldo 15-119 i~ -

(c) anbara

Scelibate marred divorcedwidowed

1o 0 100 300 500500 300

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

Figure 2 Percentage of ever-married women widowed and divorced by age

60 (a) Delta Twareg

50

4o

30

20

10 -shy

80 (b)Gouxma Twareg

70

60

50 widowed

- 0 -divorcedL~0

30

20 - - - shy

10 -

15 2 3J 45 55 65 ae

Table ii Total fertility and total marital fertility for Bambara and Twareg (household data)

TFR TMFR

Ban - 90-a1 Deit3Ts~reg 65 bull89 Gou=--_ wa-reg 53 79

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

Figure 3 Spousal ag differences for currently married couples living in the same tent

cumulated perce tage of coupes

90

(a) Delta Twaxeg 80

70

- nle6obull

50

40

30 nobles iklan + inhaden20

10 30 40 number of years-10 0 20 husband older than wife

100

90

(b) Courma Twareg

70

60

50

40 shy

- nobles30 3- a Ilow-status illelan iklan20i

10 +

30 40 number of years-1o 0 10 20 husband older than wife

-2

Figure 4 Mean number of marriages for all ever-marri-d Twtreg women

2(a) Delta (b) Gourma 2

-nobles

low-status illel iklan

15 2 35 45 55 15 25 35 45 55 ae

r-zure 53 Proportion of women celibate by age and social class

9 (a) Delta Twareg

-_ nobles

--- low status illelan

iklan

2

I obull 3Uo 4oU age

(b) Courma Twareg

6

15shy

4

3

10 20 30 40 50 60 age

2

ioure 6 Percentage of 7wareq men celibate by age and social class

(a) Delta 100

S

90

7D

5n

41

2) 30 40 50 6O 70 age

5-- 4 r- 100

90sooshy

80 bull

70

0_ - nobles

low-status illelan

-0 iklan

20

20

30 40 50 60 76 age20

Figure 7 Proportion of Courma Twareg women currently married by age

9

8

3 nobles

low-status illelan2 Mkan

50 age35 4 20 25 36

figure Proportion of Gourma women currently divorced by age

-- nobles1 ----- low-status illelan 41

I -

2

I -23 35----shy

References Goody JS Tambiah SJ Bridevealth and Dowry 1973 Cambridge University

Press

Stenning D Household viability among the Pastoral Fulani in J Goody ed The Dev lopmenal qycle of Domestic Croups 1958 Cambridge University Press

ioure 6 Percentage of 7wareq men celibate by age and social class

(a) Delta 100

S

90

7D

5n

41

2) 30 40 50 6O 70 age

5-- 4 r- 100

90sooshy

80 bull

70

0_ - nobles

low-status illelan

-0 iklan

20

20

30 40 50 60 76 age20

Figure 7 Proportion of Courma Twareg women currently married by age

9

8

3 nobles

low-status illelan2 Mkan

50 age35 4 20 25 36

figure Proportion of Gourma women currently divorced by age

-- nobles1 ----- low-status illelan 41

I -

2

I -23 35----shy

References Goody JS Tambiah SJ Bridevealth and Dowry 1973 Cambridge University

Press

Stenning D Household viability among the Pastoral Fulani in J Goody ed The Dev lopmenal qycle of Domestic Croups 1958 Cambridge University Press

Figure 7 Proportion of Courma Twareg women currently married by age

9

8

3 nobles

low-status illelan2 Mkan

50 age35 4 20 25 36

figure Proportion of Gourma women currently divorced by age

-- nobles1 ----- low-status illelan 41

I -

2

I -23 35----shy

References Goody JS Tambiah SJ Bridevealth and Dowry 1973 Cambridge University

Press

Stenning D Household viability among the Pastoral Fulani in J Goody ed The Dev lopmenal qycle of Domestic Croups 1958 Cambridge University Press

References Goody JS Tambiah SJ Bridevealth and Dowry 1973 Cambridge University

Press

Stenning D Household viability among the Pastoral Fulani in J Goody ed The Dev lopmenal qycle of Domestic Croups 1958 Cambridge University Press