the reliability challenge

BOSTON CHICAGO DALLAS DENVER LOS ANGELES MENLO PARK MONTREAL NEW YORK SAN FRANCISCO WASHINGTON

The Reliability Challenge(aka, “resilience,” “fuel security”)

NEPOOL 2018 Summer MeetingPaul J. HibbardJuly 27, 2018

NEPOOL SUMMER MEETING 2018

Setting the stage for our two presentations

Key factors related to the fuel security challenge

Implications for competition, reliability, climate

Dr. Seth Climate change – science and regional implicationsDr. Yoshida Lessons from a similarly fuel-constrained energy sector in Japan,

following the Great Earthquake/Tsunami

Discussion following the presentations

Reminder: we are not in Westborough

No agenda items, no votes, no positions being taken

High-level consideration of risks underlying - and stemming from -the challenge

Overview of Discussion


Why are we here? For the better part of a decade…

The electric system operator has warned us of reliability challenges during winter conditions

Market incentives have largely worked, and may continue to

But the pace of change increases; the challenge is getting harder, not easier

What is FS/R/R generally, and in this NE context?

Keeping the lights on, getting them back on (nothing new, though added emphasis to resilience of system to storms and other events)

System security and resilience risk in NE: questionable resource availability under certain severe winter conditions (i.e., a system based primarily on variable resources and on-demand fuel transport, with little or no economic storage capability)

What options are available to the region?

Non-electric (i.e., gas) infrastructure investments

Market incentives for actions, investments, fuel contracts

Out of market payments for actions, investments, fuel contracts

Fuel Security/Resilience/Reliability…


Existing and recent past efforts

Forward capacity market pay-for-performance (not fully implemented for a few years)

Winter reliability program

Wide range of energy/ancillary services market changes

Job is not done - continued FS/R/R challenges

Little incremental gas supply infrastructure; uncertainty in seasonal delivery resources (i.e., oil, LNG)

Sustained, depressed energy market revenues pushing retirements

Continued susceptibility to severe winters (though demand in decline)

Lack of faith in PFP to address the challenge

New efforts

Market redesign focused on “fuel security” - TBD

New “fuel security” basis for reliability review of resource delists (i.e., notbased on transmission security) – stacking-order calculations given load, resource and fuel inventory assumptions

Current Context


Causes: Carbon Policy

Over the past 7-10 years, from “pilot” or marginal, to market significance

Energy efficiency, distributed solar accelerating due to regulatory policies on EE spending, net metering, solar RPS

Major increases in state RPS requirements

Successful renewable LTK procurements

Ongoing procurements in multiple states potentially netting an additional 1-2 GW

Overall potential market impact could approach a third to half of energy needs (generation and BPS load reduction) over next ten years, and more beyond

No let up - state carbon policies expanding rapidly

RGGI – continued reductions to 2030, 2/3 reduction from start of program

Multiple states setting goals, mandates to achieve near carbon-free generation over next couple decades (MA power plant regs – near phase out of fossil gen by 2050)

MA Senate bill – additional procurements, 100% renewables (others to follow?)

Infrastructure challenges

Pipeline siting not easy, to say the least – interstate/intrastate

Gas-fired power plants, oil firing capability face heightened review

Transmission to baseload hydro – recent setbacks

Part traditional local opposition, part campaign to end fossil fuel combustion


Causes: Markets Factors

Shale gas upends relative fuel pricing, creates sustained periods of low energy prices

Renewable procurements, EE, and distributed solar extend and amplify price suppression in energy markets, largely due to state policy, not market outcomes

Aging coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear assets: insufficient market revenues to remain operational

Growing reliance on and need for FCM revenues, and shift in market incentives towards capacity payments

Under any structure (including PFP), little sense for developers to reserve new interstate pipeline capacity

Retirement of units heavily relied on for winter reliability pending (Mystic, old oil, nuclear)


Where Are We Headed?

Carbon: one direction - external to (at least partly) internal

1980s: quantify in resource planning and procurement

1990s: restructuring – (modest) RPS, (modest) net metering

2000s: RGGI; beginning of policy expansion

2010+s: Massive policy expansionInfrastructure activism

Out of market procurements: returning?

1980s - 1990s: vertical integration; IRP

2000s: Markets & competition; RMRs gone by end of decade

2010s: State-funded procurements; net metering; utility built grid-connected solar; storage

2018: RMRs


Questions for the Region

Will the climate policy driver abate?

What does climate science point to? (Dr. Seth)

How much further (with mandates, procurements) are states likely to go? Is there a long-term solution (beyond CASPR) to the state policy-markets disconnect?

Would electrification help or exacerbate the fuel security challenge?

Is new gas infrastructure even a possibility? What would it take?

Can we manage the winter fuel delivery risk?

What does Japan’s experience with LNG tell us? (Dr. Yoshida)

Will anything but a blackout coalesce states around an infrastructure solution? (California experience)

Can a new market design put this to rest, once and for all? Given ISO’s proposed schedule, is there enough time to sort through the question?


The Climate Policy Driver: Dr. Anji Seth

Professor and Director of Applied Research, Connecticut Institute for Resilience & Climate Adaptation, Department of Geography, and Chair of the Atmospheric Sciences Group, University of Connecticut. We are not in Westborough

Climate change science; state of knowledge on impacts; implications

The Local Resource Limitation Dilemma: Dr. Phyllis Yoshida

Dr. Phyllis Yoshida, Senior Fellow for Energy and Technology, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA and former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia and the Americas, Office of International Affairs, U.S. Department of Energy

Impact of Fukushima on Japan’s energy systems; lessons for New England

Overview of Discussion


Paul J. HibbardAnalysis Group111 Huntington Avenue, 10th Floor Boston, MA [email protected]

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o Observed & Prolected Changes in Temperatures

o Observed & Pro¡ected Changes in Precipitation

o Tropical Cyclones, severe weatheç winter storms, drought

o Sea Level Rise

o Basis for Climate Policy

o Unknown unknowns: "Surprises"

o Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), Solar Radiation Management (SRM)

Weather Predictions v. Climate Projections

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Basis for Climate PolicyStabilizing global mean temperature to lessthan 3.6'F (2"C) above preindustrial levels ôrequires substantial reductions in net :íglobal COz emissions prior to 2040 Ërelative to present-day values and likely ¿requires net emissions to become zero or :possibly negative later in the century)

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Commitments that form the foundation of the ParisAgreement cover only approximately one third of the 60

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gap between the reductions needed and thenational pledges made in Paris is alarmingly high .

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multiple events occur simultaneously or in rapid sequence.

2. Self-reinforcing cycles, which can give rise to "tipping etemsubcomponents of the Earth system that can be stable in multiple different

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3. "Unknown unknowns" paleoclimate record also suggests possibilityof the emergence of new types of compound events not observed in the h calrecord or predicted by model simulations. E.9., Hurricane Sandy, where sea level rise,anomalously high ocean temperatures, and high tides combined to st both thestorm and the magnitude of the associated storm surge. At the same time, blockingridge over Greenland-a feature whose strength and frequency may be rel ed to bothGreenland surface melt and reduced summer sea ice in the Arctic-red the storm

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Summary

o For next few decades, warming is expected to continue (because the climate isadjusting to GHGs already emitted), and natural variability could amplify orsuppress the warming signal regionally.

o Expect more warm temperature extremes, and fewer [but not zero] coldtemperature extremes.

o Expect more heavy precipitation events.

o Possibly more intense (windspeed, precipitation) winter storms, more intensetropical cyclones.

o Continued greenhouse gas emissions near the current level >> accelerating andlarger, unprecedented changes in extremes, with potential for "surprises".

CDR and SRM

GHG forcing has the potential to push the climate farther into unprecedented states forhuman civilization and increase the likelihood of "surprises"

Limiting the global mean temperature increase through emissions reductions or adaptingto the impacts of a greater-than-3.6"F (2'C) warmer world have been acknowledged asseverely challenging tasks by the international science and policy communities.

Consequently, there is increased interest in exploring additional measures designed toreduce net radiative forcing through other, as yet untested actions, which are oftenreferred to as geoengineering, divided into two categories: carbon dioxide removal(CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM)

IPCC AR5

CDR and SRMcarbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM)

Require potential development of global and national governance and oversightprocedures, geopolitical relations, Iegal considerations, environmental, economic andsocietal impacts, ethical considerations, and the relationships to global climate policyand current GHG mitigation and adaptation actions.

CDR is technically possible, the prrmary challenge is achieving the required scale ofremoval in a cost-effective manner, which in part presumes a comparison to the costs ofother, more traditional GHG mitigation options, with additional ltmitation of longimplementation times.

SRM would not address damage to ocean ecosystems from increasing oceanacidification due to continued CO2 uptake. SRM could theoretically have a significantglobal impact even if implemented by a small number of nations. Even if the reduction inglobal average radiative forcing from SRM was exactly equal to the radiative forcing fromGHGs, the regional and temporal patterns of these forcings would have importantdifferences.

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Projected mid-century changesProjected Change in Number of Days Above 90"F

M¡d 21st Century Higher Scenario (RCP8.5)Projected Change in Number of Days Below 32"F

Mid 21st Century Higher Scenario (RCP8.5)

CSSR, 2017

Weighted Multi-Model Mean Weighted Multi-Model Mean

010203040506070 -74 -60 -50 -40 -30 -2A -10 0

About 20*30 more days per year with a maximum over 90"F (32'C) and 20-30 fewer days peryear with a minimum temperature below freezing in the Northeast.

W

Global Mean Temperature Change(b)

2.5

CSSR, 2017(a)

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Temperatures have been increasing globally, with 95% probability due toanthropogenic forcing (i.e., burning fossil fuels,)

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- NOAA Observed

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Decade the 5-year Event Becomes a 0.2-year Event

under the lntermediate Scenario(d)

Water Level Height (feet) Decade

0 1 2 3 4 >5 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 210a <22AA

The extent and depth of minor-to-major coastal flooding during high-water events will continue toincrease in the future as local RSL rises. a median B-fold increase (range of 1.1- to 430-fold increase)is expected by 2050 in the annual number of floods exceeding the elevation of the current 1O0-yearflood event (measured with respect to a 1991-2009 baseline sea level). Under the same forcing, thefrequency of minor tidal flooding (with contemporary recurrence intervals generally <1 year )willincrease even more so in the coming decades , and eventually occur on a daily basis (Figure 12.5b)

i n Da i ry, 20-;"::"#ii:13i3¡rreci pitati on

Winter

Summer

Spring

Fall

The 2}-year return value of theseasonal maximum 1-dayprec¡pitation totals over the per¡od1948-2015. A mix of increasesand decreases is shown.

Change (inches)

WIII

+0.22

+0.0

<0.0 0.0-0.10 0.11-0.20 0.21-0.30 0.31-0.40 >0.40

Projected Changein Daily, 2}-year Extreme Precipitation

Changes in the Z}-year return periodamount for daily precipitation showlarge percentage increases for boththe middle and late 2'l st century. Noregion in either scenario shows adecline in heavy precipitation. Theincreases in extreme precipitationtend to increase with return level, suchthat increases for the 1OO-year returnlevel are about 30% by the end of thecentury under a higher scenario.

Mid-century

Mid-century

Lower Emissions

Higher Ëmissions

Late-century

Late-century

Change (%)

14

+13+12

+10

+13

+10

+11

+12

+13

+13

+10

+12

+11

3

+21

+20

+16

+19

+20

+20

04 5-9 10-14 15+

Observed precipitation extremes

Observed large increases in measures of heavyprecipitation in the Northeast U.S.

For the continental United States there is high confidencein the detection of extreme precipitation increases, whilethere is low confidence in attributing the exiremeprecipitation changes purely to anthropogenic forcing.There is stronger evidence for a human contribution(medium confidence) when taking into account process-based understanding (increased water vapor in awarmer atmosphere), evidence from weather and climatemodels, and trends in other parts of the world.

99th Percentile Precipitation(1e58-2016)

Number of 5-yr, 2 Dary Events(1958-2016)

Change (%)

TIIffiII I<0 0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40+

PRo¿ecrons o¡ SuRrnce TeupeRnruRes

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Tem pe ratu re Proj ecti o n sLarge dependence on emissions choices by end of century.

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2020-2029

New England Power Pool

Summer MeetingJune 27, 2018

Dr. Phyllis Genther Yoshida

“Energy Conundrum”

How to provide an affordable and environmentally friendly energy supply resilient to the unexpected-- with insufficient domestic

resources.

The Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

217 Square Miles Flooded,16,000 Dead, $199 Billion in Direct Damage

“The Quadlemma”

Decreased energy self-sufficiency

A deteriorating trade balance

High electricity tariffs

Increased CO2 emissions

LNG

Played an Immediate Strategic Role

Necessitated an Activist International Policy

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

196

5

67

69

71

73

75

77

79

81

83

85

87

89

91

93

95

97

99

01

03

05

07

09

11

13

15

City Gas

Power Industry

（1,000 tonne）

Trends in Japan’s LNG Consumption

Source: IEEJ/EDMC, “Handbook of Japan’s and World Energy

and Economic Statistics”

Coal Return of Coal for Power Generation

HELE Power Plant Exports

Isogo Thermal Power Plant

Coking coal import expenditure

Thermal coal import expenditure

Coal’s import expenditure share in total

import expenditure (right axis)

Coal Import Expenditures and their Shares in the Total Import Expenditures

Source: METI Energy White Paper 2017

Deregulation

Source: Koichiro Ito, Energy Policy Institute, University of Chicago

Trends in Renewable Energy Installed Capacity

Renewables

Feed in Tariff

Nuclear Rebuilding Social Trust

Transition to Next Generation Nuclear

GE-HitachiPRISM

Recommendations1. Policymakers must ensure electricity and natural gas

market deregulation and reform is transparent, increases competition, and creates opportunities for new actors, and for new technologies and practices.

2. Japan must reverse its underinvestment in and underutilization of renewables as a major source of domestic supply to enhance energy security and environmental sustainability.

3. Japan must give special attention to mass transportation in smart-urban and -suburban environments, vehicle electrification, hydrogen-fuel vehicles, and autonomous-drive technologies to mitigate oil consumption.

Recommendations4. Japan must actively explore the next generation of

advanced nuclear reactors to determine how they can play a role in Japan’s energy future and energy security.

5. Adequate system flexibility, especially the expansion of transmission interconnections, must play a role in lowering energy demand and achieving Japan’s goal of cutting greenhouse gas emissions from 2013 levels by 80 percent by 2050.

6. Japan must limit investment in the fossil fuel power plants to generators with the highest operational efficiency to support environmental and climate goals for security, health, and resiliency.

the reliability challenge

Documents