THE RELEVANCE OF PLATONIC JUSTICE Edith Watson Schipper University of Miami

Since the publication of David Sach’s “A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic”,’ his distinction between “Platonic justice” and “vulgar justice” has become well known to students of Plato. Mr. Sachs argues that there are two conceptions of justice in the Republic, a “Platonic” one, according to which each part of the soul of the just man performs its own function, only; and a “vulgar” one, which conceives justice in terms of acts commonly regarded as unjust, from which the just man will refrain, i.e., t o “embezzle, thieve, betray, behave sacrilegiously, fail t o keep oaths or agreements, commit adultery, neglect his parents or the service he owes to the gods”. Thrasymachus, backed by Glaucon, holds to the latter conception of justice, and questions whether advantage or happiness accrues to acts commonly regarded as just. Socrates’ answer, that happiness results from Platonic justice, is irrelevant to the question. For it to be relevant, Plato “must prove that the conduct of the just man also conforms to the ordinary or vulgar conception ofjustice”, and “that every man who is just according to the vulgar conception” exemplifies the Platonic conception. This, Plato does not do. Hence the entire argument about justice in the Republic rests on a fallacy of relevance.2

This brief paper argues for only two points: (1) that Thrasymachus and Socrates both refer their conceptions to the same kind of acts which are commonly (if only provisionally) reputed to be just; and (2) that those acts not only can be, but in some cases are, shown to be those of a “Platonically just” man, provided that he is conceived as also doing his own work within the state. Thus, however Plato’s conception of justice will be judged, and whatever the grounds of Socrates’ argument that justice is a good to its doer, that argument is at least relevant to Thrasymachus’ challenge.

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Is there a “vulgar conception” ofjustice in the Republic‘? There is the initial, conventional conception of justice of Polemarchus, followed by Thrasymachus’ conception of justice as obedience to laws the ruler makes in his own interest, and finally by the conceptions of both social and individual justice developed by Socrates under stipulations requested by Glaucon and Adeimantus. All of the parties to the discussion claim that their conceptions ofjustice will call just (or unjust) many of the main acts commonly reputed to be just (or unjust). Thus,

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the antithetical conceptions of justice of Thrasymachus and Socrates each call just (or unjust) many acts which they expect the assembled company will call so, at least after examination. Socrates’ list of acts ordinarily taken to be unjust (442d10-443b2) is only a random naming of same kinds of acts commonly reputed to be just to which his conception should apply: it is not a conception, even a “vulgar” one.

For when was there a popularly agreed upon conception of what acts were just or not? In Plato’s Athens, there could be as much disagreement about whether an act was just as there is now about whether it is just (or right) for a doctor t o perform a n abortion. There were only some acts which were roughly reputed to be just. Plato’s aim is to have Socrates develop a conception of justice which is a knoM’ledge of “naming” acts just o r unjust (443e444a2).’ Such a conception cannot be the varying and unexamined opinion as to what acts are just.

Nevertheless, though popular conceptions of justice are rule-of- thumb ways of labelling acts just or unjust, certain conspicuous kinds of acts are usually and conventionally called just. It is these acts to which both Plato and Thrasymachus relate their views, though Thrasymachus. no more than Plato, is bound by popular conceptions. Thrasymachus‘ legalistic conception names as unjust the acts of “temple robbers. kidnapers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves” (344bl-5). However, the common man is not always so legalistic in his concept ofjustice, tending to consider malicious but legal acts unjust. Even whenjustice is regarded as defined by the laws, the silent majority, which has usually tended to obey them, thinks they are somehow in the public good. Many would not go along with laws they considered only in the private interest of the ruler. Thrasymachus, though he refers to acts commonly called just o r unjust, states an uncommon conception.

Socrates, too, refers to acts which are roughly called just or not a s those to which his theory should apply. The problem of “what is justice” begins with Cephalus’ listing as acts conventionally called unjust, “not to cheat any man, even unintentionally, or play him false. not remaining in debt to a god or man for money” (331b). Yet Socrates rqiects Polemarchus’ conventional definition on grounds granted by the common man, who would not regard returning arms to a madman iust. He further argues against the conventional conception, which would call revenge just, by showing that it makes a man worse, and hence an act which the assembled company did not hold to bejust. And. ofcourse, in the passage (442d 10-443b2) which Mr. Sachs quotes as the basis for the “vulgar conception” of justice, Socrates brings up examples of man) kinds of acts usually thought unjust, which he asserts that hisjust man would not commit. However. this is not to say that the acts of the Platonically just man are equiLwlenr 10 the acts commonly called just, since the latter are roughly and provisionally called s o . Socrates merely claims that his conception will “name as just” many of the main acts which are commonly reputed to be just.

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I1 Even when so weakened, Plato’s claim that his concept will call just

many of the acts which are commonly called so would be challenged by Mr. Sachs. Plato, he says, not only does not, but cannot, show that his just man would refrain from acts commonly called just. For Plato’s conception of the just man is of one each part of whose soul is so ordered that it does its own work, only. This ordering, Mr. Sachs says, might account for the virtues of intelligence, courage, and self-control, but is “prima acie compatible with a variety of vulgar injustices and evil- doing”. Hence, the Platonically just man cannot be shown to refrain from them.

Other Platonic scholars have held that individual justice as Plato conceived it is not the justice which we say is exemplified in man’s relations to others in society. Raphael Demos, in his reply to Mr. Sachs, agrees that “the proper ordering of one’s life” is not the “doing of good to others” which is usually called just.5 Can Plato’s conception of justice apply to a man’s relations to others and to society, as should any conception of justice which deserves the name?

But is Platonic justice, conceived merely as what Plato called the justice of the individual, the proper ordering of the parts of the soul, conceived too narrowly? For Plato previously developed his conception of justice in a state, where each group (and the individuals within it) d o their own work in the state (434~7-10). T o this justice in a state, the virtue of justice in the individual is analogous. Yet, this social justice includes more than the justice of a state; it is also the justice of the individual so far as he is related to the state. When the concept is introduced, it is first defined as an act of the individual, as the doing of his own business (ta haurou prattein), most in accordance with his nature, within the state (433a1-5). When the citizens (and the classes to which they belong) all d o their own work, contributing to the state, it too, is just. A just individual then, must do his own work in the social whole. It is not enough that he be internally so ordered that each part of his soul performs its own function, only.

Yet, for Plato, a man who is individually just will also d o his own work within the state. Socrates says that “each of us also in whom the several parts within him perform their own task-he will be a just man and minds his own affairs” (441el-2). In other words, a man who is “Platonically just” will also d o his own work toward the state. If, as Plato has said in 353d3-e2, a man’s excellence o r virtue enables him to perform his proper function, then the right ordering of the parts of the soul would be the virtue which enabled him to perform his function, his work within the state. Thus, the concept of social justice could not be rnerelv a quality of the state to which justice in the individual is analogous. It would include the justice of the individual in so far as he was related to society.

The conception of doing his own work according to his nature within

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the state brings in the individual’s relation to it, and through it to other individuals. A person’s own work, for Plato, must contribute toward or at least be compatible with the purposes and laws of society. Without the social conception of justice, Plato could not say, as he does in 420b4-c5 and in 5 19e 1-520a4, that it is not merely the exceptional happiness of the guardians (who are just) that is to be considered, but the happiness of the whole state in which they do their own work of ruling. The just individual cannot live for himself, alone. His inward ordering enables him to contribute effectively to society and to its members.

Surely, the two conceptions of justice, that in the state to which the individual is related, and that of the individual, must supplement each other. Bosanquet says that the two concepts are the “outer” and the “inner” aspects of morality, which “should not be severed”.6 Justice in the state must also include part of thejustice of the individual, his actual doing of his own work within society. It thus completes the conception of the inward ordering of the individual. Plato does not explicitly say this, as Mr. Sachs would point out. But do not the passages cited above demand it?

I t remains true that Plato does not establish in detail that many acts commonly and roughly regarded as just or not are also those a Platonically just man would or would not commit. Yet, he does show this, for at least one group of acts, when the concept of doing one’s work in society is added to the concept of the Platonically just man. For Plato says that the decisions of the law courts base justice on the ordinary principle that “no one shall have what belongs to others”, so that “the having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to oneself would admittedly be justice” (433e3-434a2). He does not carry out his demonstration in detail to many samples of acts. But it is by no means obvious that he cannot do so.

In conclusion, since both Socrates and Thrasymachus relate their conceptions to many experienced acts commonly called just or unjust, Plato’s answer is relevant to Thrasymachus’ challenge. For that relevance, it is neither necessary nor possible to deduce from acts of the Platonically just man, even conceived as also socially just, all of the various acts roughly and commonly called just. What is necessary is that both men show that their conceptions would call just or not many acts commonly so-called. Both men partially do this. Hence, would there be a fallacy of relevance in Plato’s Republic?

NOTES

’ The Philowphical Review, 7 2 (1963), pp. 141-158.

‘ Shorey’s translation in the Loeb Classical Library is used throughout.

’ “A Fallacy in Plato’s Republic?” The Philosophica 1 Review, 73 (1964). pp. 395-399.

Ibid.. pp. 152-156.

Op. Cir., pp. 154-155.

A Companion ro Plaro’s Republic, (N.Y., 1895). p. 162.

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