the reality bet: realism under postmodernity
TRANSCRIPT
The Reality Bet: Realism under Postmodernity
155
Christophe Den Tandt
Université Libre de Bruxelles (2015)
CHAPTER 6
The Reality Bet:
Realism under Postmodernity1
2.1.1 Virtualization and Dialogization
Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982), loosely based on Philip K. Dick’s
novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, depicts a world Emile
Zola, Theodore Dreiser, John Dos Passos, Fritz Lang, and Raymond
Chandler might have distantly recognized. The film opens with a
panoramic overhead view of an industrial megalopolis identified in
screen captions as 2019 Los Angeles. The next shot shows the urban
sprawl reflected in the pupil of an eye filling the screen in extreme
close-up. This observer, zooming over the city in an airborne vehicle,
1 This paper is the seventh instalment of a book-length study provisionally entitled
On Virtual Grounds: Blueprint for a Postmimetic, Dialogical Realism. Previous
instalments—entitled respectively “Toward a Dialogical and Postmimetic Realism,”
and “Classic Realism, the Nostalgic View,” “Modernist Antirealism: Existential
Alienation and the Solace of Form,” “The Thingless Sign: The Structuralist and
Poststructuralist Challenge against Referential Illusion,” “The Politics of Mimesis:
Realism as Discursive Repression,” and “Antirealism and the Visual Media”—are
also available on Academia.edu
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discovers a tangle of urban canyons, fire-spouting oil refineries, and
huge pyramid-shaped high-rises. Later shots reveal that, under the
hovering sky traffic, Los Angeles streets bathe in the glare of
ubiquitous advertising graphics—neon signs, giant screens on the face
of skyscrapers, floating dirigibles blaring out commercial messages.
The city’s crowds make up a multilingual mass exhibiting a confusing
plurality of ethnic or subcultural dress codes. Above all, the cityscape
proclaims through its procession of signs that it is a construct of
powerful corporations. In the tradition of hard-boiled detective fiction,
the film’s first scenes follow Deckard (Harrison Ford), a private
investigator, as he calls on some of the masters of this capitalist world.
Whereas in Dreiser’s or Chandler’s novels these figures would include
steel, oil or newspaper magnates, in Blade Runner they comprise
corrupt policemen, genetic engineers, and robotics tycoons.
While Blade Runner transposes the thematics of urban naturalism
and hard-boiled narratives to a dystopian future, thereby claiming a
realist genre affiliation, it also portrays a world afflicted with
contradictions and dissonances—features that depart from the rational
reading contracts both of science fiction and realism itself.2 On the
film’s release, critics were struck by the fact that Scott’s settings are
both futuristic and oddly antiquated (James 142). Up to the nineteen-
seventies, sf literature and films foreshadowed a future obeying the
logic of what Raymond Trousson, in a study of utopian literature, calls
“geometrical” utopias (21):3 they depicted machine-run urban hives,
whose design was extrapolated from the austere principles of
architectural modernism—an aesthetic still dominant in Ira Levin’s
novel This Perfect Day (1970) and George Lucas’s THX 1138 (1971).
The high-tech urban space of Blade Runner, on the contrary, is
crowded with the shapes of the past. Fussy neo-gothic ornamentation
reminiscent of turn-of-the-twentieth-century architecture mingles with
visual echoes of film classics—Lang’s Metropolis (1927) or Howard
Hawks’s The Big Sleep (1946). The city’s geographic anchorage is
similarly blurred: this ostensibly American urban space
accommodates advertisements featuring Japanese models in
traditional Geisha garb, robotics street vendors from Southern China
or the Middle-East, as well as gangs speaking dialects mingling
English, German, and Asian idioms. Other minor paradoxes seem so
2 For a discussion of the realist credentials of science fiction, see Suvin (26-27) 3 All quotations from non-English originals are in Christophe Den Tandt’s translation.
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puzzling they may be mistaken for involuntary breaches of
verisimilitude. Streets are steeped in a perpetual rainy gloom while the
summits of high-rises are inexplicably clouded in a luminous glow.
Also, while the panoramic views of urban space as well as specific
street scenes evoke an overpopulated world, the interiors of buildings
are enigmatically deserted and crammed with nostalgic artifacts.
The population of Blade Runner’s Los Angeles is affected by
similar paradoxes and indeterminacies: humans and animals in Scott’s
film are barely distinguishable from machines. Deckard, who
specializes in hunting down rogue androids, is given the delicate task
of gauging the biological status of a robotics tycoon’s secretary (Sean
Young). Only by the end of an excruciatingly lengthy personality test
is he able to ascertain that the young woman exhibits less-than-human
levels of empathy, and is therefore an engineered organism. In Philip
K. Dick’s source novel, Deckard’s own human make-up is explicitly
problematized—a matter only discreetly hinted at in Scott’s
adaptation. Similarly, Los Angeles pet snakes or fish are handcrafted
by artisans who brand the constructed animals’ genes with serial
numbers. The androids’ sense of a past self is constructed on the basis
of photographs obtained from their supposedly human designers, or
collected at random to make up the enigmatic record of a non-existent
childhood. In one of the film’s most intriguing moments, one of these
spurious photographic memories briefly turns into motion footage,
accompanied by a sound flash of children’s cries. The still image
thereby morphs into a live reminiscence, as if to further blur the
boundary between live mental processes and engineered fiction.
These contradictions are the more significant as Blade Runner
ranks as a pivotal text of cyberpunk sf—a genre cherished by fans for
its quasi-documentary function. The most popular cyberpunk works—
William Gibson’s novel Neuromancer (1984), Andy and Larry
Wachowski’s The Matrix (1998), Steven Spielberg’s Minority Report
(2002)—alerted readers and viewers to the social reconfiguration
induced by information technologies. In particular, they heralded the
development of what Gibson himself calls “cyberspace” (“Burningˮ
195; Neuromancer 4). One of Blade Runner’s memorable moments
shows how Deckard meticulously scans photographic evidence on his
voice-controlled computer, isolating after numerous image-processing
procedures the enhanced outline of a vital clue—a snake tattoo on the
side of an android’s face. This scene was the more impressive to early
1980s viewers as it depicted a technological advance that was both
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within credible reach yet also startlingly new: personal computers had
been marketed for a couple of years only, and featured few if any
graphic or video capabilities, let alone voice commands. Thus, as
viewers were given a glimpse of a new technological order of things,
they were also ushered into a world fraught with ontological
indeterminacy and epistemological ironies. It is not even clear, for
instance, whether the panoptic eye in the opening belongs to a human
observer. It might as well be the computerized pupil of an engineered
organism mystified by the forbidding spectacle of its own alienation.
Contrary to classic realist practice, the function both of this panoptic
moment and of the photograph-scanning scene resides less in asserting
the film’s ability to capture the totality of the social world than in
foregrounding the latter’s resistance to representation. In spite of the
impressive array of technologically enhanced modes of vision paraded
on screen, the social fabric Blade Runner makes visible is so protean
and contradictory that it verges on insubstantiality.
Concerns about the unreality of society and the world at large are
symptomatically rife not only in turn-of-the-twenty-first century
popular culture, but also in present-day realism scholarship, be it in
discussions of classic texts or of contemporary sources. In an
argument that, cultural chronology notwithstanding, proves
surprisingly relevant to Scott’s Blade Runner, Amy Kaplan contends
that late-nineteenth-century fiction of urban life expresses complaints
about the elusiveness of the social scene it otherwise seeks to portray
realistically. In William Dean Howells’s New York novel A Hazard of
New Fortunes (1890), Kaplan argues, “the ‘city’ often connotes ’the
unreal’” (44). Howells depicts the late-nineteenth-century century
metropolis as an object that is not immediately available to perception:
it is “that which has not yet been realized” (A. Kaplan 44), and it
therefore disturbs observers by “its potential, its threat, its promise”
(A. Kaplan 44). Catherine Belsey discerns similar anxieties in a
corpus that appeared roughly a century later than Kaplan’s
examples—turn-of-the-twenty-first century sf films (David
Cronenberg’s eXistenZ [1999]; John McTiernan’s The Last Action
Hero [1993]) as well as works in the tradition of postmodernist
metafiction (Woody Allen’s The Purple Rose of Cairo [1985]; Julian
Barnes’s novel England, England [1998]). These texts, Belsey
contends, are pervaded with “‘the anxiety of the real’” (Belsey 4):
their characters are caught up in narrative labyrinths weaving several
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levels of existence, none of which exhibiting the solidity and
authenticity of anything worth calling reality. The protagonists of
Cronenberg’s eXistenZ, for instance, struggle through a hyperrealistic
computer game ushering them into situations whose reality status
seems increasingly undecidable. Predictably, they hanker after a mode
of being more existentially fulfilling than these quasi-fictional
scenarios: Yet even when they believe the software has been “paused”
(Cronenberg), they end up wondering whether or not they are still in
the “game” (Cronenberg qtd. in Belsey 8).
As they evoke a tradition of epistemological and ontological
uncertainty stretching one century into the past, Kaplan and Belsey
throw light respectively on the prehistory and the contemporary
perpetuation of a familiar brand of pessimism whose most explicit
cultural manifestations appeared during the modernist decades.
Without disregarding the value of Kaplan’s findings, it makes sense to
point out that the concept of an existentially insubstantial urban world
is less less central to the concerns of late-nineteenth-century writers
than to early or mid-twentieth-century modernism: the phrase
“[u]nreal [c]ity,” used by Kaplan as chapter heading, is
symptomatically borrowed from T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922)
(A. Kaplan 44). Likewise, the “anxiety of the real” (Belsey 4)
identified by Belsey resembles a later avatar of the sense of
“emptiness of life” at the root of modernist anti-realism (Lukács,
“Narrate” 147). In this light, texts such as The Purple Rose of Cairo
and eXistenZ—or Peter Weir’s The Truman Show (1998), Spike
Jonze’s Being John Malkovich (1999), Christopher Nolan’s Inception
(2010), to add a few items to Belsey’s corpus—prolong the absurdist
tradition initiated by such classics of late-modernist metafiction as
Pirandello’s Six Characters in Search of an Author (1921) and Jorge
Luis Borges’s short prose works of the 1940s. Like these prestigious
antecedents, they rewrite the existential alienation of modernism
through a medium in which art questions its own strategies.
I pointed out in Part I that Marxist theoreticians—Georg Lukács,
Theodor Adorno, Lucien Goldmann—interpret modernist or late
modernist alienation as an effect of reification: the pessimism of
twentieth-century art mirrors the process of “dehumanizationˮ by
which capitalist societies cease to be transparent and meaningful to
their own subjects (Lukács, Roman historique 218). Marx located the
origin of reification—or, as the German philosopher put it, “human
self-estrangement”—in the capitalist division of labor: the latter
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renders economic processes opaque and dehumanized (Economic 135;
see also Idéologie 365, 385). Later Marxists point out that the
evolution of capitalism into the late nineteenth and the twentieth
centuries exacerbated the alienating impact of reification (Lukács,
History 87). For Lukács, the failed revolutions of 1848 led the once
progressive middle classes to cut themselves off from the
revolutionary proletariat, and thereby to relinquish their ability to
understand the very social system they had brought into existence for
their own benefit (Roman historique 199; “Narrate” 118-19).
Goldmann, following Lukács, attributes the heightened
dehumanization and breakdown of sociological intelligibility of
twentieth-century society to the shift from entrepreneurial to
monopoly capitalism and to the concomitant development of colonial
empires (51). Postmodernist theoreticians, I indicate in more detail
below, corroborate these pessimistic evaluations: the late-twentieth-
century information society, they argue, is the culmination of the
corporate refashioning of the world: it creates a situation where “dead
human laborˮ has irreversibly displaced the lived contact with reality
(Jameson, Postmodernism 35).
Admittedly, tying turn-of-the-twenty-first realism to a historical
narrative whose keynote is “human self-estrangement” affords no
reassurance about its capacity to render accounts of social life. As the
above comments on Blade Runner suggest, contemporary works with
realist aspirations seem only able to draw up what Lukács might have
called “problematic” maps of the social field—fragmentary, self-
contradictory charts (Theory 78). In a Marxist perspective, inept
artistry is only minimally to blame for this apparent flaw: the latter is
caused instead by the texts’ anchorage in an inherently mystifying
historical environment (Lukács, Theory 78). Blade Runner or the films
and novels discussed by Belsey are in this logic the latest offshoots in
a line of works that yield social insights only after being subjected to
what French theoretician Louis Althusser calls a “symptomal
reading”—a corrective hermeneutics scrutinizing their gaps, fractures,
silences and contradictions (Althusser, Lire 1.31). This corpus of
indirectly or imperfectly referential art, Marxist critics suggest,
includes the 1950s French New Novel, American Pop Art, and late-
twentieth-century photorealism. The social world in these works
seems mute and forbidding, yet it is not inscrutable enough to prevent
some socially referential payload from filtering through. Goldmann’s
reading of the French New Novel shows that, if properly decrypted,
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the hermetic fiction of Nathalie Sarraute and Alain Robbe-Grillet
provides an effective mapping of advanced reification (51-51; 290-
91). Human agency is seemingly absent from these novels: it is
conferred to objects themselves, which make up an “autonomous
universe” (Goldmann 298). As such, French New Novels offer a
literal enactment of Marx’s diagnosis of capitalist self-estrangement:
they disguise social processes and subjects “into things” (Marx,
Idéologie 387). Likewise, Fredric Jameson has argued that the
ideological ambiguity of Pop Art and photorealism emblematizes the
reified politics of postmodernity. Though intensely concerned with the
iconography of consumerism, these graphic works exhibit towards
their object a cool indifference that illustrates the complicity of late
capitalist culture with market logic (Postmodernism 11). In the same
logic, the predominance of science fiction in critical discussions of
contemporary realism—in Belsey’s Culture and the Real or in
Jameson’s reflections on postmodernity—may be read as the symptom
of the alienating distance separating turn-of the-twenty-first-century
art from the social world of which it presumably renders account: the
defamiliarizing shift of temporal perspective inherent to sf
emblematizes these texts’ inability to represent social conditions
straightforwardly.
We may infer from the previous reflections that texts registering the
anxiety of the real are referentially insightful in so far as they reveal
new manifestations of reification in their own time (Roman 202;
Signification 152, 191). I believe that turn-of-the twentieth-century
works do carry out this referential agenda in spite of the
epistemological obstacles they otherwise so plainly foreground.
Specifically, they gesture toward two main causes to which the
epistemological othering of contemporary reality may be imputed—
one directly related to capitalist reification, the other indirectly. In the
first place, contemporary texts—cyberpunk science fiction and
electronic media such as music videos, particularly—are concerned
with what urban studies researchers call the “virtualization” of social
experience (Ghent Urban Studies Team 88)—the replacement of
spatially based forms of sociability by electronically supported
interfacing. Virtualization renders inscrutable the very coordinates of
everyday experience—space and, to a lesser extent, time. Subjects
living in a technologically generated field, cyberpunk sf indicates, see
their fabric of perception wrested from human control and
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understanding. Natural skies give way, as William Gibson puts it in
the opening line of Neuromancer, to a backcloth “the color of
television, tuned to a dead channel” (3). Existence, in Cronenberg’s
film, becomes entangled in “eXistenZ,” a new “game system”
engineered by “software capitalists” working for companies bearing
such names as “Cortical Systematics” and “PilgrImage” (Cronenberg,
eXistenZ). Secondly, turn-of-the-twenty-first-century works—
postcolonial literature, for obvious reasons, yet also contemporary
sf—register the impact of the process of hybridization caused by
large-scale migrations and media-supported cultural interchanges—a
phenomenon we may call, by reference to Mikhail Bakhtin, the
dialogization of social life. Dialogization has been analyzed notably
by theorists of what Diarmid Finnegan calls the “spatial turn”—
figures such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Homi Bhabha or Paul
Gilroy (Diarmid 369; see also Warf and Arias). It brings about the
coexistence of competing world views—rival codes for the
construction of reality. This multiplication of reality norms implies
that the global expanse of postmodernity amounts to a patchwork of
ill-fitting, even mutually exclusive human experiences.
Larry and Andy Wachowski’s The Matrix illustrates how the
former of these factors—virtualization—impinges on the subject’s
experience. Ostensibly, the film’s opening scene follows the
conventions of techno-thrillers. In the first shot, an enigmatic
telephone conversation is heard in voice-over against a background of
computer screens. The focus then shifts to a deceptively familiar film-
noir setting. Police units surround a suspect hiding in a derelict
hotel—an athletic woman clad in black vinyl, wearing narrow dark
shades. In order to fend off imminent arrest, this character, later
identified as guerilla fighter Trinity (Carrie Ann Moss), spurns any
customary means of physical resistance: she rises into the air with the
somber elegance of an airborne vampire, dashes from the hotel room
horizontally by using the walls as a race track, and leaps from roof to
roof across alleys and avenues until she reaches a telephone cabin
inside of which she vanishes into thin air. This memorable sf moment,
comparable to a modernist epiphany, has a metarealist value: it signals
that we are not in the old film-noir metropolis or even in any
recognizable city any longer: a techno-generated world renders
physical constraints so defamiliarizing and evanescent that the latter
seem to obey the rules of the gothic.
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The Matrix’s gothic-flavored sf highlights two interrelated features
of techno-virtualization: its capacity to produce a simulacrum of
phenomenal experience and its erosion of the basic stability required
to sustain inhabitable lifeworlds. The Matrix indeed echoes not only sf
films such as Blade Runner but also postmodernist theorists like Jean
Baudrillard in suggesting that the perceptible plane of contemporary
social life, which in the Wachowskis’ film is called “the Matrix”
itself, is a deceptive veil of encryption: the information economy,
beyond its surface of technological gadgetry, is a constellation of
barely decipherable corporate codes—a labyrinthine
“[c]ryptonomicon,” to use sf novelist Neal Stephenson’s term.
Conversely, the electronic encoding of social and economic bonds
drains traditional interactions in phenomenal space of their substance.
Beneath the layered techno-script making up the fabric of people’s
lives lurks what characters in The Matrix, quoting Baudrillard, call the
“desert of the real” (Baudrillard, Simulacres 10)—the residue of what
was once the mainspring of reality and authenticity. The Matrix
depicts this impoverished kernel of existence metaphorically, through
shots of a desolate rocky landscape graced with such incongruous
props as a late-nineteenth-century couch used by characters to
converse about their own alienation. Another scene evokes the
deliquescence of previous modes of reality through an admittedly
ponderous sf allegory: it shows thousands of human subjects
imprisoned in coffin-like pods—devices that capture their life energy
in order to sustain the Matrix’s techno-generated simulacrum of social
life. The negation of the lifeworld’s stability, on the other hand, is the
very object of Trinity’s metamorphosis from film-noir suspect to
techno-vampire: the scene suggests that the semiotically encoded
social world possesses an inherent fluidity. The Matrix renders this
plasticity visible not only through its initial genre-bending scene but
also through many subsequent shots in which protagonist Neo (Keanu
Reeves) learns to manipulate virtual urban landscapes molded by
digital special effects. The link between constant change and digital
encryption is evoked in an even subtler fashion in footage of computer
screens featuring an endless trickle of ciphers—the vision of codes
undergoing constant reconfiguration.
Dialogization, the latter axis of the contemporary othering of
reality, is depicted in multiculturalist and postcolonial narratives either
as a source of alienating strangeness or of grotesque contrasts.
Situations where characters inhabit the same social space yet endorse
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seemingly incompatible cognitive assumptions cause either a loss of
existential bearings or turn everyday life into local-color comedy.
Maxine Hong Kingston’s autobiographical The Woman Warrior:
Memoir of a Girlhood Among Ghosts (1977) dwells on the former,
disruptive dimension. The text focuses on Chinese immigrants who
have gone through successive historical changes. The memoir’s
central figure—Kingston’s mother Brave Orchid—witnessed the fall
of the Chinese imperial system and the emergence of Sun Yat Sen’s
republic. During her youth, Chinese families had to face the cultural
uprooting of emigration to the United States. Once in America, Brave
Orchid finds her new surroundings unreal. Chinese immigrants, driven
by hope and desperation, had imagined their host country in the
features of a “Gold Mountain” (3). When faced with its reality, they
call it instead “the land of ghosts” (178). Not only is it unfamiliar but,
to people hailing from a tightly structured traditionalistic society, its
culture seems inferior. Accordingly, Chinese American children live
in a world made up of mismatched planes. Kingston narrates that, as a
child, she communicated through the front-door mailbox slot with a
creature she had been taught to view as the “Garbage Ghost”—in fact
a white American dustman (115). Unlike proper ghosts, the latter
displays the enigmatic, though eventually reassuring ability to “cop[y]
human language”: he mimics the children’s Chinese (115). In order to
bridge the gap that rents their world, Brave Orchid and her daughter
Maxine must rely on a life-long ethos of pragmatic dedication and on
the imaginative ability to identify with legendary figures of
empowerment such as Princess Mulan—the eponymous “[w]oman
[w]arrior.”
Zadie Smith’s White Teeth (2000), by comparison, highlights the
uncanny yet comic dissonances of multicultural conviviality. Smith,
with considerable talent for reproducing the postcolonial British
vernacular, pictures the interaction of a broad cast of Londoners of
various origins—England, the Caribbean, and Bengal. Two of these
characters, Millat and Magid Iqbal, the twin sons of Bengali-born
parents, emblematize what we might call, by reference to Gabriel
Garcia Márquez, the “impossible realit[ies]” of interethnic Britain
(Márquez 13). The former proudly displays the attractive looks of a
Bollywood star, and seems destined to become a British-identified
ladies man. Yet he chooses to join a fundamentalist Islamic group
awkwardly named “KEVIN” (the “Keepers of the Eternal and
Victorious Islamic Nation”) (295). The latter was sent by his father to
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live among his relatives in Bengal for fear of assimilation into British
culture. Ironically, he comes back from Asia a clean-shaven, white-
clad, scholarly atheist, unconsciously affecting the accents of “a right
fuckin’ Olivier” (449), as one of his father’s cockney friends puts it.
Magid, in his gentle tones, creates an intercultural stir—indeed a
dialogical crisis—when he convinces the barman of his father’s
favorite halal pub to serve him “a juicy, yet well-done, tomato
ketchup-ed bacon sandwich” (450). Smith’s fiction has been
derogatorily labeled “hysterical realism” because it supposedly
restricts itself to such intercultural comedy (Woods 42). Still, her
multicultural local color aptly expresses the de-realizing impact of
dialogization: her characters are tragic precisely in so far as they are
imprisoned in the comic interplay of conflicting definitions of identity.
In cyberpunk, dialogization is pictured not as a consequence of
population shifts but as a technologically generated feature of
information societies—indeed an offshoot of virtualization. On the
one hand, the semiotic weave of cyberspace or the Matrix is of
necessity heterogeneous: if it boasted the monochromatic texture of
the future worlds of classical-sf, it could not act as a credible
substitute for proverbially polymorphous and untidy reality. On the
other hand, the codes of its ostensibly polyphonic fabric are
consubstantial in so far as they share the basic semiotic mechanisms
that sustain all languages, whether natural or technological.
Accordingly, seemingly separate planes of the cyberpunk world—
technology, organic life, culture—are interlinked by virtue of their
shared anchorage in encoding procedures. This allows cyberpunk
sociability, as the street scenes of Blade Runner and Gibson’s
Neuromancer attest, to accommodate not only distinct ethnic or
techno-generated subcultures but also the liminal beings
postmodernist feminist Donna Haraway calls “cyborgs” (149). In
Haraway’s definition, the latter are “creatures simultaneously animal
and machine, who populate worlds ambiguously natural and crafted”
(149). Gibson depicts several varieties of these techno-biological
crossbreeds: his fiction features human subjects flaunting animal or
technological grafts—claw-like “scalpel blades” (Neuromancer 25),
“fangs” (“Johnny” 28), perfectly oval-shaped skulls, or “Zeiss Icon
eyes” (“Burningˮ 211). Cronenberg’s eXistenZ brilliantly satirizes
cyberdialogization by having its characters use gaming software made
up of sexually connoted, grotesquely organic matter: protagonists
connect to eXistenZ through an umbilical cord implanted into the
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spine by oddly inappropriate industrial means—a jackhammer jab, for
instance. Likewise, game-console circuitry is made up of mutant
animals cooked in a Chinese-style cafeteria.
Virtualization and dialogization have in most cases been analyzed as
manifestations of postmodernity: as academic issues, they belong in
the theoretical and cultural constellation surveyed, among others, by
Jameson, Baudrillard, Jean-François Lyotard, Homi Bhabha, and
Cornel West. Virtualization itself has been a key concern for
postmodernist theoreticians with Marxist credentials—Jameson and
Baudrillard, in particular. The latter blame the “unreality” of late-
twentieth-century society on the development of the technologically
mediated social sphere (Jameson, “Reification” 17). Accordingly, they
interpret virtualization as the final victory of reification: it brings
about a decisive breakdown in social intelligibility. In a Marxist
perspective, postmodernist subjects entertain a paradoxically euphoric
relation to their technologically reconfigured environment: they
welcome a situation in which the capitalist technostructure has
become parasitically alluring precisely because it constitutes, as
Jameson puts it, an “impossible totality”—a ghostly, forbidding yet
fascinating reified field (Postmodernism 38). On first inspection, this
social change has easily identifiable material determinants: Jameson
argues that postmodernity’s lingering elusiveness is due to the shift
towards an economy based on “machines of reproduction rather than
of production” (Postmodernism 37); it is the social offshoot of
information systems, digitization, and computer networks, indeed the
very tools engineering the virtualization process described above. On
the other hand, the very notion of reification implies that the
metamorphosis of the visible technosphere is only the outward
expression of a broader reconfiguration of the mode of production,
which affects in turn the perception of the world. The task of late-
twentieth-century criticism, Jameson therefore contends, consists in
developing the “cartographyˮ of an “as yet unimaginable” economy of
information-based social relations (Postmodernism 54).
The economic/epistemological shift Jameson associates with
postmodernity has, in its various stages of development, been the
object of Theodor Adorno’s reflections on the culture industry, Walter
Benjamin’s comments on mechanical reproduction, Guy Debord’s
analysis of the “Society of the Spectacle,” and Baudrillard’s
semiotically based analysis of consumerism (Debord 5; Jameson,
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“Reification” 11, 14; Postmodernism 17-18; Marxism and Form 60-
82). Baudrillard is of particular importance in this tradition. His theory
of the simulacrum, by its merger of Marxism and semiology,
highlights the specifically postmodernist variant of reification: it
suggests how the economics of postmodernity may be apprehended as
the advent of a power apparatus engineered by new signifying
processes. According to Baudrillard, late capitalism cannot be
understood by reference to what is commonly called the real
economy: it does not obey such familiar norms as use value and
industrial production. In its new system, the real economy is entirely
overwritten by speculative exchange and by the mystique of
consumerism (Mirror 22; Pour une critique 164-68). In a gesture
Jameson considers decisive for postmodernist theory (Postmodernism
395), Baudrillard suggests that exchange value, when it achieves such
“absolute pre-eminence,” obeys the relational logic of signs systems
defined by Saussure (Pour une critique 164; see also Echange 17).
Items in the parade of commodities mimic the behavior of signs in so
far as they derive their function not from any anchorage in external
reality (in this case, in use value) but rather from a shifting game of
interactions among all other elements of the market system in which
they circulate (Pour une critique 182-190). With tragic resignation,
Baudrillard concludes that this process annihilates “referential value”
in all human fields (Echange 20). Postmodern objects, subjects, or
cultural representations are deprived of all claims to authenticity: they
are only “simulacra” (Echange 77)—copies without originals, brought
into existence by mechanisms mingling immotivated semiotic value,
commodification, and media reproduction. Conversely, the realms of
experience that previously stood as bedrocks of reality have been
turned into the vacant sites of the “desert of the real” (Simulacra 2;
Simulacres 10) so vividly allegorized in The Matrix. Ironically,
reification is so deeply ingrained in this postmodern waste land that its
capacity to induce self-estrangement is seemingly suspended:
commodification has become immune from any confrontation with an
adversary principle able to unmask it (Simulacres 65; Transparence
12). Surprisingly, then, postmodernity is not a realm of visible
alienation: it is suffused with inauthentic “positivity” (Baudrillard,
Transparence 51). In Jameson’s eloquent formula, it gleams with
“hallucinatory splendor” (Jameson, Postmodernism 32-33).
Compared to the gloom of Marxist diagnoses of the information
society, discussions of postmodernist dialogization seem positively
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solar. In this field too, a new social situation has become interwoven
with a theoretical corpus that initially developed in partial
independence from it. Poststructuralist models, which at first
addressed linguistic and existential issues, are invoked in order to
account for what Homi Bhabha calls “the new internationalism”
(Location 6)—the geographically based power shifts induced by
decolonization, the political struggles of dominated groups, the
dissemination of “cultural and political diasporas,” and “the major
displacements of peasant and aboriginal communities” (Bhabha,
Location 7). The early stages of the cultural assertion of postcolonial
minorities, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin contend,
were characterized by the primacy of essentialist paradigms: ethnic
identity served as stable referent for the definition of authentic human
experience (21). The literatures of négritude or the African American
Black Arts movement, for instance, superseded the derogatory ethnic
stereotypes imposed by colonizers with positively connoted
counterstereotypes, often simply portraying as desirable the very
features that previously served as marks of inferiority (xx). Still,
cultural agendas endorsing essentialist minority identities, though they
may have suited the needs of a specific historical moment, fall short of
the libertarian spirit of late-twentieth-century postmodern culture.
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari argue that minorities should not
rally around closed “regionalis[t]” or “ghetto” identities (Mille
Plateaux 134); they should instead pursue a dynamic of “becoming
minoritarian” (Mille Plateaux 134), eschewing the pursuit of
dominance through a practice of “continuous variation” (Mille
Plateaux 134). In geopolitical terms too, the postcolonial context
renders essentialist cultural politics impractical: the postcolonial
condition offers no field in which specific groups might, as Lyotard
puts it, treasure their own “world of invariable names” (Différend
219). Homi Bhabha points out that a global field where population
groups share the same space or are aware of one another’s cultures
through media interchange “prevents identities […] from settling into
primordial polarities” (5). Accordingly, turn-of-the-twenty-first-
century polities require a dialogical model: they need a paradigm of
identity and power that acknowledges the explicit and implicit
interactions among cultural sub-systems and prevents each of them
from gaining hegemonic status over others.
Poststructuralism and postmodernism offer the appropriate
conceptual tools for this dialogical agenda: the critique of
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logocentrism, the celebration of textual hybridity, and above all the
poststructuralist appropriation of Bakhtinian dialogism combine to
fashion a vision of postmodernity where, to borrow Lyotard’s words,
the “infinity of heterogeneous finalities” prevails over the cultures of
closed identities (“Sign of History” 409; emphasis in original).
Bhabha’s writings best articulate this fusion of postcolonial and
poststructuralist paradigms. Bhabha conceptualizes dialogization
through keywords such as the “necessity of heterogeneity” (Location
39), “hybridity” (37), “the Third Space of enunciation” (53), and the
“liberatory” potential of the “enunciatory present” (255). In his view,
dialogization—or hybridization—is part of a process that refashions
identities not only through social interaction but also through the
“contingent” emergence of temporality (Location 264). In other
words, dialogization/hybridity develops along two simultaneous axes,
corresponding respectively to Bakhtinian dialogism and Derridean
différance. It arises in the first place through the mechanism by which
a subject, in the dynamics of dialogical exchange, must provisionally
adopt “the mental position of the antagonist” (35)—literally othering
him or herself, and thereby becoming hybrid or “ambivalent” (35).
Secondly, the subject becomes hybrid at a different level as it is
affected by the passage of time—a process Bhabha views as a
performative dynamics enacted in the indeterminate present of
enunciation (264). Hybridity/dialogization is accordingly not to be
resisted: subjects quixotically seeking to eschew interethnic dialogical
encounters would still be othered by ineluctable “temporality”
(Bhabha 38). Symptomatically, Bhabha adopts a resolutely optimistic
view of this dialogical refashioning. While others might lament the
loss of integrity caused by hybridity, he contends that “contestatory
subjectivities are empowered” as they are unraveled and rewritten
within an energizing performative process (256). They accede thereby
to the “Third Space of enunciation” (53)—the field of creative
interaction generated by “dialogical discursive exchange” and by the
constant emergence of an ever more complex global field (Location
34).
2.1.2 Wagering on Reality: Shall I Project a World?
The greatest aesthetic challenge called forth by the virtualized and
dialogized field of postmodernity, the previous comments suggest, is
primarily the search for artistic practices that might render justice to
its elusive environment. Philip K. Dick’s 1956 novel The World Jones
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Made addresses this issue with remarkable prescience. Dick describes
a turn-of-the-twenty-first-century society where distrust of absolutes
has become a state-sponsored doctrine. In order to forestall political
and religious fanaticism, the Federal World Government has
promulgated the “multiple-value system” (86-87), a dialogical code of
conduct laid out in a new gospel, “Hoff’s Primer of Relativism” (22).
Even government officials acknowledge that strict adherence to the
relativistic primer is difficult. Citizens befuddled by Hoff’s system of
(un)belief may, however, take their cue from the art of their era. The
cultural life of Dick’s twenty-first century indeed features such
didactic works as ballet performances meant to act out the
indeterminate fluidity of existence: dancers morph from one gender
into the other in front of live audiences, thereby allegorizing their
society’s refusal of stable referents (80). Like Dick’s custodians of
relativism, actual postmodernist theoreticians contend that late-
twentieth-century art should refrain from reducing the world to
determinate patterns, or even assume that any sum of experience is
liable to cohere into a world at all. Brian McHale, in his discussion of
postmodernist fiction, argues that literature seeking to be relevant to
postmodernity must “foregroun[d] ontological issues” and subject
them to skeptical scrutiny (McHale 10). Similarly, advocates of magic
realism suggest that the late-twentieth-century context requires
aesthetic practices registering the experience of a pluralist, not a
monologic culture (Saldivar 526-32; McHale 17). The same authors
take it for granted that the classic realist aesthetic is not up to this task,
or even actively hinders it: realism is concerned with truthful
representation and cannot as such render account of a world deprived
of ontological anchorage. Accordingly, the objections to mimesis set
forth in Part I, which in principle apply to all stages of cultural history,
have been invoked in the field of postmodernist criticism as evidence
of realism’s specific inability to address the climate of skeptical
pluralism and indeterminism of the post-WWII context.
Postmodernist objections to realism echo the earlier Marxist
concerns about the inability of reified societies to produce
sociologically insightful art. However, unlike orthodox Marxists,
postmodernist theoreticians argue that neither art nor philosophy
should aim entirely to dispel the sense of unreality suffusing the
contemporary scene. Doing so amounts to a quixotically naive—even
politically repressive—hankering after ontological certainty,
authenticity, and monologic closure. Jean-François Lyotard eloquently
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indicates to what extent these postmodernist principles disqualify the
realist aesthetics. In comments that echo Breton, Adorno, and Sartre,
he contends that the purpose of mimesis in the twentieth-century has
consisted in “preserving consciousness against doubt” (“Réponse”
19). Under postmodernity, however, the imitation of phenomenal
appearance has become artistically counterproductive because it has
been overwhelmed by capitalism’s capacity to “de-realize everyday
objects, the roles of social life, and [its] institutions” (“Réponse” 18).
Reluctant to confront this destabilizing dynamics, realists have merely
played the “therapeutic” part of “cheerleaders of what exists” (
“Réponse” 19). High modernism and mass-culture-oriented populist
postmodernism fare little better in the French philosopher’s typology:
he suspects the former, in spite of its devotion to aesthetic
experimentalism, to harbor the “nostalgia of presence” (“Réponse”
28). The latter merely trivializes the legacy of the avant-garde by
reducing it to consumerist eclecticism. Genuinely postmodernist art as
Lyotard defines it, must on the contrary earnestly address the
epistemological challenge of its era. To this effect, it should take heed
of of Kant’s discussion of the sublime. The Kantian sublime, in
Lyotard’s reading, signals the breakdown of the subject’s capacities of
representation: it designates the suffering experienced by the subject
when it witnesses its inability to “present an object” that exceeds the
imagination, but can nevertheless be conceived by reason (“Réponse”
31). Whereas previously God, nature, and the industrial metropolis
were singled out as objects of the sublime, under postmodernity
reality itself triggers this crisis of perception.4 Thus, art accepts the
challenge of postmodernity precisely in so far as it sets itself the task
of alerting its audience to the fact that postmodern society has no
stable reality concept: it signals that the social world is constantly
disturbed by “the unpresentable” (31). Rather than surrendering to the
“fantasy of embracing reality” (32) and the “consolation of beautiful
forms” (31), postmodern art keeps “inventing allusions to what cannot
be presented” (Le postmodernisme, “Réponse” 32).
There are two dimensions to these serious objections—one
concerning the tenor of realist discourse, the other the nature of
postmodernity. I address the former in later chapters, arguing that the
concept of mimesis as existential therapy, which Lyotard borrows
4 For the discussion of the various objects of the rhetoric of the sublime, see Den
Tandt, (“Masses” 127-28) and Jameson (Postmodernism 32-35).
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from the tradition of modernist antirealism, is not borne out by the
actual make-up of the realist corpus. We have already noted in
Chapter 4 that classic realism is more complex than the one-
dimensional profile foisted upon it by champions of modernism: it is
in fact a dialogized practice. The contemporary realist corpus, I
indicate in more detail below, is even more remote from this
antirealist caricature. What interests us at the present stage of our
argument is, however, the latter aspect of Lyotard’s analysis—the
very soundness of his portrayal of contemporary conditions.
Establishing the legitimacy of realism within a virtualized, dialogized
scene requires indeed opening up the possibility that the
postmodernist characterization of turn-of-the-twentieth-century
culture as the field of the unpresentable might be one-sided. In other
words we must show that postmodernist theory blocks off other
legitimate perspectives on contemporary conditions, one among which
being realism itself.
If we follow the most sanguine opponents of postmodernism,
refuting the arguments of late-twentieth-century prophets of unreality
seems a fairly simple task. Christopher Norris argues, for instance,
that postmodernist “dogmatic relativism” is dismissible on purely
logical grounds (285). Like all similar doctrines, it stumbles on the
“self-disabling” contradiction (Norris 198) of the liar paradox. In the
Introduction to the present essay, I have pointed out how Epimenides’
vexing syllogism affects the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. For Norris, this
logical impasse jeopardizes postmodernist theory altogether: as
postmodernist discourse affirms the impossibility of absolute
knowledge, it is against all logic compelled to maintain unshakeable
trust in its own skepticism. Government officials in Dick’s The World
Jones Made fall victim to this trap: in their efforts to enforce the
principles of the Primer of Relativism, they naively pride themselves
on learning the textbook’s skeptical doxa “by heart” (22). Still, jeering
at theoreticians caught up in Epimenides’ logical snares does not
amount to a full-fledged refutation of their claims: all discourses,
whether in favor of skepticism or cognitive trust, have to wrestle with
obstacles of this kind. Symptomatically, the liar paradox has not
eluded Lyotard’s attention. He analyzes it in detail in reflections on
sophist philosopher Protagoras (Différend 19-22). Lyotard’s argument
in this matter suggests that, contrary to what opponents of
postmodernism may hope, exposing the logical contradiction of
philosophical skepticism does not suffice to establish the possibility of
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knowledge. Stating that uncertainty must remain uncertain falls short
of a solid validation of procedures of cognition. Only a provisional,
contingent grasp of the world can be developed on this basis, and this
frail edifice may at any moment be challenged by the indeterminacy of
the unfolding of human experience in time (Lyotard, Différend 21).
Instead of complacently deconstructing the paradoxes of
relativism, the present vindication of realism requires an approach
acknowledging the legitimacy of postmodernist skepticism, without
however conferring to the latter the intellectual hegemony it has
enjoyed in the last decades. The chief theoretical foundation for an
argument of this nature is Kant’s comments on the limits of
metaphysical thought. I contend indeed that postmodernism’s key
principles, as well as its mapping of turn-of-the-twenty-first-century
society, cannot aspire to be more than metaphysical hypotheses—
inspiring to some extent, yet beyond proof. Thus, using Kant against
Lyotard, I suggest that postmodernism has elaborated what the
German philosopher calls a set of “world-concepts” (Critique of Pure
Reason 460). In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant uses the latter term
to designate transcendental ideas pertaining to the “absolute totality of
experience in the synthesis of appearances” (Critique of Pure Reason
460). Such totalizing propositions—the (non)existence of God, the
reality of freedom or of determinism, the finitude or the infinity of the
cosmos—may in Kant’s view “neither hope for confirmation in
experience nor fear refutation by it” (467): they are locked in the
“antinomy of pure reasonˮ (259). World-concepts are no “arbitrary
question[s],” however (467); they are rather “natural and unavoidable
illusion[s]” that “every human reason must necessarily come up
against in the course of its progress” (467). Yet a sound “skeptical
method” (468; emphasis deleted), which Kant distinguishes from
radical skepticism, relinquishes any hope of submitting them to a final
cognitive judgment. With unwitting relevance to late-twentieth-
century controversies, Kant adds that arguments over world-concepts
open up a “dialectical battlefield” (468) where supposedly decisive
victories can, for lack of final proof, be gained “merely because the
champion of the good cause h[o]ld[s] the field alone, his opponent
having been forbidden to take up his weapons again” (468).
Viewed in this Kantian perspective, postmodernism has elaborated
a metaphysical synthesis of contemporary society whose
indeterminism fits its historical context so tightly that it has in many
cases discouraged scrutiny of its underlying assumptions. All major
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formulations of poststructuralist skepticism are in this light Kantian
world concepts, be it Lyotard’s contention that contemporary society
is irremediably disturbed by the unpresentable, Lacan’s
characterization of the subject as haunted by desire and lack, or
Derrida’s theory of the temporal deployment of signifiers under
différance. Each of these propositions can be validated only from an
external totalizing perspective. That human experience is essentially
indeterminate and lacunar can be ascertained only by a gaze
presumably unaffected by lack, différance, or the unpresentable itself.
In short, demonstrating that postmodernity is under the sway of
unreality can only be done from a standpoint where reality is
paradoxically available. For lack of this touchstone of (un)reality,
postmodernist arguments have the same epistemological value as the
metaphysical hypotheses that serve as skeptical poles of Kant’s
antinomies of pure reason: they are late-twentieth-century variants of
the ungrounded claims stating that “[t]here is no absolutely necessary
being existing anywhere” (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 491), that
“nowhere in [the world] does there exist anything simpleˮ (477), and
that “[t]he world has no beginning and no bounds in space” (471). In
the same logic, on the basis of a philosophical source older than Kant,
one may argue that postmodernist indeterminism covertly appeals to a
paradoxically inverted version of René Descartes’s proof of the
existence of God. The French philosopher contends that God must
exist because in its absence, a “finite being” like the human subject
could never of itself conceive of “any substance that were genuinely
infinite” (117). Conversely, postmodernist indeterminism can be
proved true only if contemporary subjects—even though they are
presumably caught up in an environment of unreality, heterogeneity,
and change—manage to locate within this very field a philosophical
principle that could against all odds serve as final guarantee of the
world’s indeterminacy, but would disclaim for itself any privileged
metaphysical status.
In the most compelling formulations of postmodernist theory—in
Derrida and Lyotard, notably—, temporal experience has served
precisely as this metaphysical case clincher. Postmodernism has
managed to shield itself against Kantian allegations of metaphysical
undecidability by anchoring its indeterminism in phenomenological
reflections on time that seem unchallengeable on empirical grounds.
We have seen in Chapter 3 that the destabilizing momentum of
différance originates from the temporal dissemination of stimuli (i.e.
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of signs) within the structure of perception: consecutive stimuli
rewrite the meaning of the present and past ad infinitum, pursuing no
determinate goal. Likewise, Lyotard’s theory of the différend specifies
that the subject is produced by the occurrence of heterogeneous
“phrases” whose unpredictable and ineluctable chaining makes up the
texture of “time” itself (Différend 10). Still, as counterintuitive as this
may sound, the poststructuralist notion of a Heraclitean flow of time-
bound perception constitutes an undecidable world-concept. Derrida’s
portrayal of the temporality of différance or Lyotard’s evocation of
speech acts “arising out of nothingness” (Différend 102) are, in a
Kantian perspective, twentieth-century variants of the branch of the
antinomy of pure reason arguing in favor of the infinity of the world
in time and space (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 470). They are as
such beyond proof. Admittedly, the phenomenologically based
postmodernist view of temporality is more complex than what
Derrida, quoting Heidegger, dismissively calls “a vulgar concept of
time”—a merely linear sequence (Grammatologie 105). Yet by
picturing temporal experience as aimless (non-teleological) and
propelled by an irreversible dynamics, postmodernists endorse a
paradigm no less dogmatic than the overtly metaphysical philosophies
of history—Hegel’s, notably—they so assiduously deconstruct.
Admittedly, the postmodernist case is rhetorically cogent because, in
a century shattered by “signs of history” such as the Shoah,
Hiroshima, and Stalinist totalitarianism (Lyotard, “Discussions” 383),
indeterminate temporality seems more intuitively compelling than a
Hegelian “narrative of legitimization” driven forward by ineluctable
progress and headed for the end of history (Lyotard, Condition 54).
Still, empirical improbability cannot pass for philosophical refutation,
so that the postmodernist perspective on these matters cannot fully
discredit opposing viewpoints, however marginalized they have been
in recent decades.
When postmodernist arguments are reframed in the light of Kant’s
antinomy of pure reason, virtualization and dialogization, the two
pillars of postmodern unreality, lose some of their seemingly
irresistible momentum. In this new light, Baudrillard’s nightmarish
vision of a virtualized future remains unappetizing, yet not
ineluctable. Full-fledged virtualization—the victory of simulacra with
the concomitant erasure of nature—is indeed a world-concept
subjected to the same paradoxes as all other totalizing ideas. If the
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technologically generated posthuman/postnatural environment
possessing “neither origin nor reality” did come to pass (Baudrillard,
Simulacres 10), its anti-natural character could be established only by
comparison with absolute reality—from the perspective of unsullied
nature, for instance. Were this touchstone of reality available,
virtualization would, however, remain paradoxically incomplete.
Thus, a world of rootless technological clones is literally unthinkable
or, more appropriately, it can be envisaged only if we accept that the
resulting universe would manifest itself as a full-fledged second
nature with all the prerogatives of the old one, including its hierarchies
of (un)reality and (in)authenticity—hence its capacity to appeal to
non-alienated truth. Symptomatically, Gibson’s cyberpunk novels,
even as they evoke the threat of a world dominated by the “space that
[isn’t] a space” of virtual interconnections, explore this universe
through the perspective of protagonists propelled by aspirations to
truth and fulfillment transcending the values of their virtualized world
(Gibson, Count 62). Similarly, if Philip K. Dick’s/Ridley Scott’s
Deckard turned out to be a cyborg, he would still exhibit moral
qualms, existential anxiety, and concerns for the truth of his social
environment. Thus, no degree of virtualization may entirely
delegitimize the realist agenda, however daunting the obstacles this
technological process may lay in the way of realist investigation.
The same shift of perspective suggests that dialogization, however
prominent a feature of the present social and political context, cannot
be viewed as a flight into limitless diversity: it still requires principles,
ethical or referential, framing its supposedly endless dynamism and
should make allowances for the possibility of common ground beyond
cultural diversity. Ironically, a large segment of multiculturalist
literature and art has no qualms endorsing such guiding norms: in
Hong Kingston’s memoir, Chinese characters back up their political
demands by pointing to an ascertainable history of oppression;
similarly, the characters of Smith’s contemporary London rely on the
inalienable values of a bill of rights. Postmodernist proponents of
dialogism—Bakhtin, Bhabha, Butler, Rorty and occasionally Lyotard
and Foucault—are less easily convinced by this covert universalism,
however. They assume that cultural and social interchanges are
infinitely open-ended—that they will never encounter a truth-based
referent able to bring their discursive movement to a close. Yet, by
invoking an infinite regression of discursive exchanges, dialogical
theories renounce the possibility of proof. They revert to the status of
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world-concepts for the same reason as Derrida’s différance and
Lyotard’s différend do. I do not suggest, of course, that in a
conceivable future, cultural controversies are likely to be rendered
irrelevant by the rise of absolute truth—however intriguing such an
event might be. I argue instead that dialogical arguments tend to
obscure the problems caused by their anti-referential commitment by
cloaking the potentially conflictual dynamics of speech acts—the
liberatory potential of the enunciatory present—in angelic optimism.
The uncritical celebration of dialogical contests amounts in this
perspective to ungrounded political utopianism—a glamorization of
sheer energy and change deprived of proper philosophical foundations
or political scrutiny.
This point can be made by underscoring the pragmatist dimension
of postmodern dialogism—the fact that it shares key principles with
Charles Sanders Peirce’s and William James’s philosophy, including
the latter’s conceptual paradoxes. Since postmodernist dialogism
rejects truth values and lays its trust in the efficacy of speech acts, it
qualifies indeed as a discursively based, performative variant of
pragmatism. In his critique of late-twentieth-century thought,
Christopher Norris, pertinently points out that pragmatists old and new
(James and Rorty, say), as they abandon truth claims “renounce all
warrant for criticizing false and deluded beliefs” (Truth 293) and
thereby lose any capacity to clarify their own political goals. James
famously claims that philosophy should pursue “‘what is good in the
way of belief” (qtd in Norris, Truth 297). Yet, Norris argues, one
hardly sees how any evolution from what is good to what is better in
the way of belief could be legitimated, let alone identified, merely on
the basis of such criteria as efficacy and usefulness (Truth 291). A
belief that is performatively efficacious may not be useful; if useful, it
may not be desirable; and, above all, it might not be true.
By the same token, the postmodernist hope that speech acts contest
will function as crucibles of resistance rings hollow as long as
postmodernism deprives itself of the possibility to gauge whether any
social progress is scored in specific discursive tussles. Such forced
confidence amounts to believing in what we might call performative
magic—the mysterious capacity of speech acts, as they engender the
world from one moment to the other, to yield political benefits that
remain paradoxically beyond any determinate evaluation. In the logic
of performative magic, the sheer dynamism of discourse—its
illocutionary force—serves as substitute for truth or ethics.
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Accordingly, arguments championing dialogism—Bhabha’s paeans to
the enunciatory present, for instance—disguise the precarious
groundings of such optimism by means of a discursive strategy that
plays off one world-concept against another. Performative dialogism
ostensibly endorses the world-concept of infinite time and space. Yet
as it declines to measure political achievement by means of
determinate standards or even to envisage the possibility of political
setbacks, it discreetly set its hopes on the antithetical, equally
undecidable metaphysical claim: it covertly banks on the availability
of automatic progress, reconciliation, and closure. In the present
defense of realism, it would admittedly be ironical to take issue with
the latter aspirations: they signal the continued relevance of useful
principles repressed by postmodernist orthodoxy. The problem lies,
however, in the fact that performative dialogism relegates these values
to the status of a hidden, somewhat shameful agenda
Contemporary realism seems only modestly empowered by an
argument that follows the precepts of as Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason and therefore dismisses all metaphysical claims back to back.
The previous remarks imply indeed that realism is no less, yet no
more legitimate than the skeptical theories that deconstruct it. Its
possibility depends on a gesture similar to French seventeenth-century
moralist Blaise Pascal’s famous bet on the existence of God and the
afterlife. In his Pensées, Pascal argues that unbelievers have little to
lose and much to gain by endorsing the otherwise unverifiable dogmas
of Christianity (550). In an intellectual context dominated by
antirealism, reality can be made the object of a similar wager: between
the postmodernist belief in unreality and, on the other hand, the
referential trust in the possibility of an ascertainable lifeworld, “one
must,” as Pascal puts it in his own religious context, “place one’s bet”
(Pascal 550). Even though this gesture carries the negative
connotation of a gambling, it constitutes the foundation of what Ihab
Hasan, in a re-evaluation of realims, calls “cognitive trust”
((“Beyond” 206)).
The contrasted subject positions enabled by the reality bet sketched
out above are illustrated in two major works of American late-
twentieth-century fiction—Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49
and Don DeLillo’s Underworld. Pynchon’s and DeLillo’s novels deal
with the same social environment at different stages of its evolution.
Oedipa Maas in The Crying of Lot 49 must decipher the suburban
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spread of San Narciso—a newly minted California community
fashioned by information technologies. This techno-suburb, the novel
suggests, embodies the state of America in the mid-1960s. Only the
actions of mysterious subcultures vying against one another for
political and informational control confer a semblance of structure to
its mute, elusive fabric. DeLillo’s protagonist Nick Shay travels
through an arguably less allegorically enigmatic, yet equally
alienating variant of the postmodern waste land. The post-Cold-War
society he inhabits is spiritually thin, economically iniquitous, still
haunted by the fear of nuclear annihilation, and confronted with the
fear of AIDS and ecological disaster. Both Pynchon’s and DeLillo’s
characters perceive that the key question raised by this environment is
whether it possesses sufficient substantiality to resolve itself into a
lifeworld. Oedipa candidly voices this concern when, struggling with
bewildering clues as to the nature of San Narciso, she asks: “Shall I
project a world?” (56/82; emphasis in original). This question
implicitly acknowledges that the evidence available about the
structure of the social environment does not cohere into a lifeworld
out of its own dynamics: the lifeworld’s emergence is conditioned by
each observer’s commitment to the possibility of securing a consistent
framework of experience. In Pynchon, the answer to Oedipa’s
question about the worldness of postmodernity is deferred. The Crying
of Lot 49 famously leads to an open ending whereby the heroine
expects the arrival of still another subculture messenger bearing
potentially decisive revelations about San Narciso’s power games.
DeLillo’s Nick Shay, by comparison, resolutely commits himself to
the reality bet: he chooses to “liv[e] responsibly in the real” (82).
Accordingly, he cannot endorse the facile skepticism of some of his
acquaintances, who claim that “life” is “a fiction” and that “things
[have] become unreal” (82). Instead, he “he[ws] to the texture of
collected knowledge,” and “[takes] faith from the solid and availing
stuff of (…) experience” (82).
It is fitting that in the sprawling narrative fabric of Underworld,
Nick’s commitment to reality should be dialogized with the stance of
less epistemologically confident protagonists: his voice is only one
strand, albeit a prominent one, in a large ensemble cast. What matters
in the present context is, as DeLillo’s novel attests, not the absence of
a consensus about the knowledge of of reality, but rather the assurance
that the reality wager embodied in Nick’s attitude can find at least a de
jure validation. There are several reasons not to go beyond this
Christophe Den Tandt On Virtual Grounds
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minimalist gesture at this stage of our argument. In the first place, the
concept of the reality bet fits the existential tenor of the contemporary
realist corpus. We have seen in the Introduction to the present essay
that turn-of-the-twenty-first century realist works are problematic
texts, reflecting the mood of what French New Novelist Nathalie
Sarraute evocatively calls the “era of suspicion” (57). As such, they
partly incorporate the postmodernist distrust of ontological certainties,
and cannot profit from a reading grid that takes certainty for granted.
Secondly, even the limited validation of referential practice sketched
out above may serve as foundation for a felicitous change in heuristic
perspective. Philosophical assumptions, both for postmodernism and
realism, act as enabling supports for heuristic frameworks.
Postmodernist art and theory, on the basis of their indeterminist
metaphysics, excel in digging up evidence testifying to the othering of
everyday experience. Likewise, if realism endorses the reasonable yet
not uncontestable principles of cognitive trust, it is apt to bring out
those aspects of the contemporary scene that justify a representation of
postmodernity from the perspective of truth. The resulting realist
practice, to misappropriate a term Bakhtin coins disparagingly,
resembles a “centripetal” dialogism (Dialogic 272)—a cautious,
pluralist, experimental appraisal of a social scene that, contrary to
indeterminist beliefs, need not reshape itself ad infinitum.
2.1.4 The Realist Underground
The various cultural practices that fulfil the terms of the reality bet do
not add up to a clearly demarcated cultural movement. I pointed out in
the Introduction to this essay that the corpus of contemporary realism
is a scattered, discreet constellation. Symptomatically, several texts
mentioned in the present chapter even challenge the notion that
cognitive trust—tentative optimism mixed with skepticism—may
yield a viable subject position. Cronenberg’s eXistenZ features
Luddites of the computer age who call themselves the “realist
underground.” Dressed in Che Guevara-style military fatigues, these
self-proclaimed “true and trustworthy realist[s]” struggle against the
“deformations of reality” caused by commodification and
virtualization. On first inspection, Cronenberg’s concept of a realist
underground could serve as a fitting template for the realist praxis
outlined in the present pages. Yet eXistenZ handles this prospect with
dismissive irony. When the realist guerillas decree the “victory of
realism,” they can only point at a barren landscape devastated by their
The Reality Bet: Realism under Postmodernity
181
own raids. Above all, one hardly sees how characters in a computer
simulation might act as custodians of reality. Dick’s The World Jones
Made pictures the realist underground in even grimmer terms. Its
eponymous character Floyd Jones possesses paranormal skills
enabling him to see with full accuracy one year into the future. With
these cognitive privileges, Jones cannot accept the state-sanctioned
view of a dialogized reality amenable to multiple interpretations. He
therefore creates a fascistic party that overturns government-enforced
relativism and restores, for better or worse, the perception of the world
advocated by his band of fanatical followers. Intriguingly, The World
Jones Made fails to make clear where readers’ sympathies should lie
in this debate over the philosophical paradoxes of truth-seeking. For
all his dictatorial flaws, Jones is credited with rekindling life-
enhancing projects the relativistic government had smothered.
Cronenberg’s and Dick’s dystopian farces stand in contrast with
the numerous contemporary realist works where the commitment to
reality is the object of earnest and sympathetic reflections. William
Gibson’s cyberpunk narratives, for instance, introduce a variant of the
realist underground peopled with characters acting with remarkable
dedication as “[c]ognitive [d]issidents” of the information society of
the near future (Virtual 131). These referential questers enter informal
brotherhoods committed to reclaiming an intelligible life-world
against social and epistemological odds. The primary function of
Gibson’s realist underground is, predictably, of a cognitive nature: it
features protagonists whose exceptional skills of perception make
them comparable to Dick’s Floyd Jones. Colin Laney in Idoru and All
Tomorrow’s Parties is able to discern patterns within apparently
formless social and informational configurations: he identifies “nodal
points” in data streams (Idoru 37); Cayce Pollard in Pattern
Recognition and Zero History responds to fashion designs as to
allergens, thereby intuitively grasping information vital to corporate
strategies. Such icons of truth seeking are the sf counterparts of
investigators in contemporary crime narratives. They are equivalent,
for instance, to Nicholas Branch, the CIA analyst of Don DeLillo’s
Libra, who seeks to retrieve the “secret history” (15) of JFK’s
assassination from the “six point nine seconds of heat and light” (15)
of the Zapruder film—the grainy 8mm movie offering the best
available visual record of the president’s shooting. Branch himself is
comparable to the ubiquitous experts of TV fictions—characters in
CSI, Without a Trace, or Cold Case—whose scientific investigations
Christophe Den Tandt On Virtual Grounds
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of crime contribute to a fictional sociology of contemporary life. As
they foreground these icons of cognitive investigation, contemporary
works perpetuate the classic realist tradition of introducing within
fictional narratives observers embodying Emile Zola’s ideal of the
scientifically trained artist mindful of social reform (Hamon 132).
In Gibson’s technothrillers as in all other realist texts discussed in
the present chapter, the subject position supported by cognitive
dissidence is never restricted to mere fact finding. Instead, the realist
underground sustains a multidimensional praxis comprehending
modes of behavior such as pragmatic commitment, the ability to
inhabit an unstable environment, and aesthetic experimentation. The
pragmatic, activist axis of cognitive dissidence informs the behavior
of protagonists as ostensibly different as Brave Orchid, the mother of
Chinese American writer Maxine Hong Kingston, and turn-of-the-
twenty-first-century documentary film makers Michael Moore and
Morgan Spurlock: these figures are dedicated to the retrieval of
knowledge in challenging circumstances. Brave Orchid, whose
itinerary from China to the US is chronicled in Kingston’s memoir
The Woman Warrior (1977), responds to the metamorphosis of mid-
twentieth-century China by dedication to hard work and scientific
education. Obliged to support her family in the home country before
her husband can afford to let them join him in the US, she obtains a
medical degree. Already in her forties, she starts working as a doctor,
a midwife, and, as Kingston puts it, a “shaman” coping with the
complexities of a dialogized world (65): she fights both the battle of
western medicine against germs and disease and the Chinese struggle
against spirits and ghosts. With some degree of metaphorical
transposition, Brave Orchid’s struggle against disease and ghosts
matches the complex strategies of Moore and Spurlock in their efforts
to expose the strategies of corporate leaders, politicians, and
ideologues: information in the turn-of-the-twenty-first century context
is no object that can merely be harvested: it has to be teased out,
obtained by cunning, and advertised with some degree of performative
showmanship.
The implicit aim of the cognitive praxis sketched out above is the
staking out of a shared, sustainable life space. Realist investigators
therefore also act as existential settlers. Pam Morris points out that
realism has always nurtured a concern for community: the sharing of
knowledge both presupposes and generates a social bond (155). The
connection between realism and the yearning for human interaction is
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183
particularly noticeable under postmodernity: Joseph Dewey contends
that late-twentieth century novelists such as Joyce Carol Oates, Ann
Tyler, or John Irving develop a new variant of realism in so far as they
depict protagonists eager to weave networks of relationships at the
local level. Their efforts, Dewey argues, amount to a gesture of
resistance against capitalist dehumanization, in particular, against the
fantasy version of the real constructed by the technologies of
information (14-15). Dewey’s insight may be transposed to a broad
corpus in various media. It applies, for instance, to Thomas Pynchon’s
ostensibly postmodernist novel Vineland. The America depicted in
this work is threatened by government conspiracies and overlaid with
mass-culture kitsch. Yet the novel’s protagonists, instead of giving in
to despondency, deploy a manic inventiveness in carving a niche for
themselves in their unpromising environment. Ex surf-band musician
Zoyd Wheeler maintains his status as a certified mental patient
eligible for disability allowances by carrying out a media-covered life-
threatening routine every year. Zoyd’s daughter Prairie, less eccentric
than her father, displays remarkable authority and skill when asked to
run the dysfunctional kitchen of a Zen retreat for female Ninja fighters
(107). Isaiah Two Four, Prairie’s heavy-metal rocker boyfriend plans
to develop a franchise of amusement parks for martial-arts enthusiasts,
thereby turning anti-social behavior into entrepreneurial pursuit (19).
Don DeLillo’s novel Underworld follows a comparable logic,
arguably in less cartoonish fashion. The novel is peopled with such
courageous figures as Sister Grace Fahey, Sister Alma Edgar, and
graffiti writer Ismael Muñoz. Against extraordinary odds of poverty,
racism and medical plagues, these characters attempt to maintain a
livable space within neighborhoods whose “surreal” state of
dereliction has become a feature of the society of the spectacle,
attracting chartered buses packed with foreign tourists (Underworld
47). Similarly, in turn-of-the-twenty-first-century independent films
such as Wayne Wang's and Paul Auster’s Smoke (1995), Jim
Jarmusch’s Ghost Dog (1999), and Lisa Cholodenko’s High Art
(1998), local communities or sub-cultural brotherhoods are contrasted
with a larger, dysfunctional megalopolitan context. Smoke introduces
a cluster of characters inhabiting an island of conviviality in the
middle of 1990s Brooklyn. The anchoring point of their relationships
is a cigar store run by Auggie Wren (Harvey Keitel). Ghost Dog is set
in the waste land of a nameless industrial New York suburb (in fact,
Jersey City). In this unpromising locale, Jarmusch’s eponymous
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character—a lone African American contract killer working for
mobsters—is able to build his small circle of friendship: he bonds
with a young girl named Pearline, who shares his interest for Japanese
Samurai lore, and with a Haitian ice-cream vendor, who intriguingly
thrives in an environment whose language he does not master.
Aesthetic experimentation has a share in the practice of realist
investigators because the struggle waged by these characters pursues
goals that outstrip self-interest. The link between realist practice and
art is underscored in Toni Morrison’s A Mercy (2008)—a narrative set
in seventeenth-century colonial America, but whose thematics
resonates with twenty-first-century issues. Morrison’s colonists
confront an environment so challenging that it makes “animosity”
among the socially unequal settlers “utterly useless” (51). Though
divided by race, gender, and above all by their status as free persons,
indentured servants, or slaves, these characters must combine their
efforts to maintain their uncertain dwelling. This pursuit, Morrison
indicates, amounts to an art form, and it can be accomplished with
various degrees of success. A few protagonists misguidedly associate
settling with the urge to leave a mark of their triumphant selfhood on
the landscape. White colonist Jacob Vaark dreams of possessing a
gentleman’s mansion comparable to the estates of the aristocratic
landowners with whom he trades. As part of this project, he hires an
African American blacksmith able to create a splendid wrought-iron
gate. Symptomatically, both Jacob and the blacksmith die shortly after
the completion of this real-estate fantasy: the unmanageable manor
remains deserted. The proper art of dwelling, Morrison suggests,
consists instead in shoring up a common life space—an effort pursued
tentatively by Jacob’s wife and servants. Similarly, DeLillo’s
Underworld is crowded with characters for whom inhabiting is an art
form. Conceptual sculptor Klara Sax has chosen to reside on a former
air base in the Southwestern desert. Surrounded by a cheerful crowd
of art students, she refits B-52 bombers into huge painted sculptures.
In the novel, her gesture is attributed to the nostalgic urge to exorcise
the ghosts of the Cold War. In a Baudrillardian perspective, it also
reads as an attempt to reclaim the technological waste land of
postmodernity and to refashion it into an artistically glamorized
dwelling space. Likewise, Ismael Muñoz domesticates his
environment both in the fashion of an aesthetic and a political activist:
there is only a slight shift of emphasis between his adventurous years
as a graffitero spray-painting subway trains and his later efforts as a
The Reality Bet: Realism under Postmodernity
185
charity worker. Graffiti writing is carefully planned, illegal and
glamorous. It allows dispossessed urban dwellers to redraw the city in
their own image. Social work only prolongs this endeavor, albeit with
a sharper insight into the community’s needs. Outside the realm of
fiction, aesthetically minded existential settling is practiced by
performance artists such as the Parkour acrobats of the French
banlieues. Parkour runners chart their way across housing projects by
means of hazardous climbs, leaps, and jumps (Zeitoun). In so doing,
they explore and reclaim their life world through a careful appraisal of
what is physically and imaginatively possible. Their practice, which I
discuss in more detail in a later section, ranks therefore as a variety of
realist inhabiting similar in status to Ismael’s graffiti raids, Klara’s
conceptual art, and the survival gestures of Morrison’s protagonists.
As the realist underground both explores and inhabits the
contemporary lifeworld, it develops a praxis comparable to a
cognitively focused existentialism. It may seem odd to link the
philosophy popularized by Jean-Paul Sartre in the 1940s and ’50s to
contemporary realism. From the perspective of present-day academia,
existentialism resembles a ghost from the cultural past. According to a
historical sequence more often taken for granted than critically
examined, the thematics of existentialism—the absurd, authentic
selfhood, freedom—have been eclipsed from academic discourse as of
the 1970s, and superseded by the postmodernist concerns for the
linguistic construction of experience and multicultural diversity. Yet a
cultural shift of this magnitude can neither be abrupt nor irrevocable.
Existentialist concerns are still traceable in novels such as Joseph
Heller’s Catch-22 (1961) or Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.’s Slaughterhouse-Five
(1969), which are otherwise regarded as classic instances of
metafiction and postmodernist “black humor.” John Yossarian in
Heller and Billy Pilgrim in Vonnegut qualify as existentialist
protagonists in so far as they are alienated subjects—“problematic”
heroes, to take up Georg Lukács’s term (Theory 78)—responding to a
world whose values have receded into invisibility. They therefore
prolong the struggle against the absurd previously waged by anti-
heroes in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s, Joseph Conrad’s. Ernest
Hemingway’s, Richard Wright’s, and, of course, Sartre’s and Albert
Camus’s fiction. American films of the late 1960s and 1970s—Mike
Nichols’s The Graduate (1967), Dennis Hopper’s Easy Rider (1979),
Bob Rafelson’s Five Easy Pieces (1970), Monte Hellman’s Two-Lane
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Blacktop (1971)—lend themselves to a similar analysis: their
countercultural appeal draws on existential angst and self-assertion.
Beyond the 1970s, I argue below, existentialism did survive, albeit at
the cost of a shift in thematics. A continuous tradition of existential art
up to the present may be traced out if we accept that the central focus
of existentialism was redefined in a fashion that effected a partial
merger of existential and realist concerns.
The metamorphosis of existentialism under postmodernity can
hardly be attributed to renewed confidence in the meaningfulness of
the world. Fiction from the 1970s onward either perpetuates the
classic existentialist thematics of alienation, or it formulates a
postmodernistic representation of the subject’s relation to society
whose tenor is hardly less pessimistic than in the previous literature of
fear and trembling. DeLillo’s Underworld, published even beyond the
cresting point of postmodernist fiction, illustrates the first branch of
this evolution in cultural thematics. In this angst-ridden narrative,
pragmatic dedication unfolds against a background of philosophical
doubt and political terror. These grim affects are embodied in
psychologically tortured figures such as FBI director Jay Edgar
Hoover and Sister Alma Edgar, a conservative catholic nun doing
charity work in the Bronx. Hoover is obsessed with “Dietrologia,”—
the “science of dark forces” (Underworld 280); he discerns
manifestations of these powers in the USA’s nuclear contest with the
Soviet Union—a political development that makes the postwar scene
comparable to the world of Pieter Bruegel’s The Triumph of Death
(Underworld 50). Sister Alma Edgar sees enduring evil throughout the
urban scene, indeed in the very neighborhoods where she otherwise
helps derelicts cope with urban blight. The second variant of the
thematics of alienation gives voice to the unease caused by a world
constructed entirely of recycled cultural material—indeed by the field
of Baudrillardian simulacra spawned by the information society. It
constitutes as such the specifically postmodernist expression of
existential absurdity. The imaginative rendering of disoriented
subjects in a media-generated universe is the core concern of
Pynchon’s novels. His Crying of Lot 49 (1966), whose protagonist
Oedipa Maas is overwhelmed by the bewildering information flow
generated by the high-tech expanses of Southern California, has
served as template for the tradition that culminates in the corpus of
1990s and 2000s metafictional films resonating with the “anxiety of
the real.” Among the latter, Jarmusch’s Ghost Dog provides one of the
The Reality Bet: Realism under Postmodernity
187
most eloquent evocations of the uncanny affects of a world reduced to
intertextual echoes. The Jersey City waste land in which Ghost Dog
lives is overwritten with pastiche. Its grotesque villains are bumbling,
chronically broke gangsters resembling extras from mafia epics such
as Francis Ford Coppola’s The Godfather (1972) or Martin Scorsese’s
Goodfellas (1990). Similarly, Ghost Dog’s lifestyle as an ascetic loner
is patched together from a toolkit of popular-culture references—film
noir, hip-hop, and the philosophy of martial arts derived from Akira
Kurosawa’s samurai films.
Classic theoreticians of postmodernism—Lyotard, Baudrillard,
Jameson—suggest that the intertextual life-world of postmodernity
neutralizes existential angst and extinguishes the very problematic of
the subject. Existentialist texts foreground their protagonists’ selfhood
because these subjects, however alienated, are passionate in their
anguish and indignation. The postmodern field of cultural simulacra,
on the contrary, seems to remove the foundation of this type of
subjectivity: if consciousness is reduced to a patchwork of cultural
scripts, it should no longer be able to measure its alienation by
reference to an ideal of authenticity validating existential rebellion.
Autonomous selfhood may therefore be thought to perish. Jameson,
building upon Baudrillard’s analyses, points out accordingly that one
of the most emblematic subject positions made possible by
postmodernity is the “waning of affect” (Postmodernism 10)—the
cool fascination for the reified store of images and codes generated by
contemporary culture, utterly disregarding the fact that this
environment brings about “an unparalleled quantum leap in the
alienation of daily life”(Postmodernism 33). Under postmodernity,
Vincent Van Gogh’s or Edvard’s Munch’s vibrant outcries over the
human condition are superseded by Andy Warhol’s replicas of
consumerist images or Richard Estes’s distanced photorealist
cityscapes (Jameson, Postmodernism 32). At the opposite end of the
postmodern spectrum, late-twentieth-century society has generated a
second subject position, equally incompatible with the pathos of
existential alienation: the unconditional acceptance of what Bhabha
calls “hybridity” (37) and Lyotard the “infinity of heterogeneous
finalities” (“Sign of History” 409; emphasis). The latter stance, central
to magic realism and the fiction of multiculturalism, amounts to
reveling in the metamorphoses of one’s fragmented subject in the
multifaceted flow of experience: the subject welcomes its othering in
the supposedly empowering sphere Bhabha calls the “Third Space of
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enunciation” (53). As Zadie Smith’s White Teeth indicates, alienation
is not the keynote in this case, but rather fascinated curiosity triggered
by multiple, unforeseen cultural interfacing.
The possibility for an existential subject position is reopened,
however, if, as suggested above, the diagnosis of postmodernist
theoreticians about the insubstantiality or infinity plurality of
contemporary experience is counteracted by what I call above the
reality bet. Protagonists and performers who take a wager on reality
implicitly regain the capacity to position themselves with regard to the
totality of their lifeworld not only through existential angst but also
through cognitive appraisal and pragmatic intervention. Still, the
existentialism of the realist underground differs in several respects
from mid-twentieth-century precedents. It is, in the first place,
practical-minded and subdued in tone—the feature that indeed renders
its proponents comparable to the members of a clandestine operation.
Protagonists in classic existential narratives—Antoine Roquentin in
Jean-Paul Sartre’s Nausea, for instance—experience alienation as an
underserved trauma—a surprising deprivation of certainties that were
previously taken for granted. To the protagonists of Smoke or
Underworld, on the contrary, indeterminacy is a fact of life that has to
be managed from day to day. Secondly, contemporary texts differ
from their antecedents in that they less often portray existentialism as
the complaint of isolated individuals pitted against the universe. I
indicated above that the very project of inhabiting contemporary
social space leads characters seemingly cut off from human interaction
to join local communities: in the same way as Jarmusch’s Ghost Dog
bonds with young Pearline, teenager Thomas Cole in Wang’s and
Auster’s Smoke (Harold Perrineau) renews contacts with his remarried
father, laying the foundation for a recomposed family (Forest
Whitaker). In this, contemporary texts are less reminiscent of Sartre’s
Nausea [La nausée] (1938) or Albert Camus’s The Stranger (1942)
than of Camus’s The Plague (1947), where the struggle against
alienation is viewed as a collective endeavor.
Above all, contemporary texts redefine the very source of
existential concern. Classic existentialism portrays the loss of
authenticity—the withering away of values deplored by Lukács—
mostly as an eclipse of ethical standards and moral authority. In
Camus’s short novel The Fall [La chute] (1956), this plight is
emblematized by the theft from Ghent Cathedral of early-Renaissance
artist Jan van Eyck’s painted panel The Just Judges (136). In Sartre’s
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189
Nausea it transpires through the tricks used by the powerful—indeed
by the hypocrites Sartre elsewhere calls “the bastards”
(Existentialisme 85)—in order to maintain their unwarranted authority
(Nausea 133). In turn-of-the-twenty-first-century works, on the
contrary, the emphasis on moral values is superseded by questions
about the integrity of worldness itself. Because of the pressure of
virtualization and ontological relativism, the texture of the time-space
continuum as a physical environment sustaining human communities
has become the problematic object eliciting existential doubt. Brian
McHale’s periodization of twentieth-century fiction from modernism
to postmodernism implicitly acknowledges this shifting tenor of
existential concerns. Modernist fiction, McHale contends, has an
epistemological dominant: without denying the existence of a
common ground of experience, it assumes that the phenomenal world
is not spontaneously amenable to knowledge and is therefore
approached through diverging interpretations. Modernism, in short,
raises questions about modes of perception: “How can I interpret this
world of which I am part? And what am I in it?” (9). Postmodernism,
on the other hand, is haunted by ontological uncertainty: it suggests
that experience unfolds across a multiplicity of worlds that do not
necessarily intersect. It therefore elicits queries fitting Lyotard’s and
Bhabha’s concepts of plurality and heterogeneity: “Which world is
this? What is to be done in it? Which of my selves is to do it?” (10).
The realist underground, by comparison, partly endorses McHale’s
diagnosis of ontological uncertainty, yet it also avoids its ostensible
skepticism. In the face of the “non-space” of postmodernity,
contemporary realism opts for a positive answer to Oedipa Maas’s
question whether a world should be projected in the face of confusion.
Its purpose consists precisely in enquiring to what extent the
supposedly inauthentic or fragmented contemporary field may
nevertheless yield a texture that sustains conditions of existence
sufficiently predictable for knowledge and human interaction. These
are the terms in which contemporary art formulates the “reasonable”
question that, according to Lukács, realism is bound to ask of the
world (Signification 134; Meaning 69). In accordance with the limits
imposed by the reality bet, contemporary realism utters this query in a
mood that is both hopeful and conscious of the determinate scope of
its action: its object consists in defining a horizon of knowledge and
practice, evaluating which areas of postmodernity may lend
themselves to realist investigation.
Christophe Den Tandt On Virtual Grounds
190
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