THE RCAF IN THE CONGO, 1960 Among the Most Challenging Assignments Undertaken by

Canadian Forces in the Peace Keeping Role BACKGROUND TO TIIE UN CONGO OPERATION

U nti/ Somalia and Bosnia, in the 1990s, the UN opera­tion in the Congo (ONUC: Organization des Nations

Unies au Congo) was tbe most violent and by Jar the largest peacekeeping operation ever conducted by tbe UN. The Mission was authorized on 14 july 1960 and finally wrapped-up officially on 30 june 1964

The weaponry and firepower em­ployed by ONUC's military component included jet fighter aircraft , artillery, armored Personnel Carriers and tank . At its peak, the Force consisted of al­most 20,000 troops from 28 countries. Over its lifetime 93,000 troops served in the force. One hundred and twenty seven military personnel died in action and 133 were wounded, "along with scores of European expatriates and hundreds of Congolese."

0 C began as a conventional peacekeeping mi sion modeled on the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai. Like UNEF, ONUC was mandated initially only to use force in self-defense. This idea was considerably extended in due course as ; for example, the need arose to protect civilians at risk.

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Towards the end , i. e . 63 / 64 , by robustly asserting its freedom of movement in Katanga the UN Force was able to detain and expel foreign mercenaries and prevent civil war.

0 UC ceased to operate on 30 June 1964. UN expenditures amounted to $400,130,793. This figure represents only what is referred to as "incremental costs" (those costs billed by contrib­uting nations as being direct out-of­pocket expenses to them).

TIIE TASK TAKEN ON BY TIIE RCAF INONUC

The aim of this article is to tell the tale of RCAF involvement in the Congo peacekeeping operation in 1960, and to recall some of the thmgs that still stick in my memory 44 years later.

WHY WE BECAME INVOLVED AND HOW TIIE OPERATION GREW

The Congo , a country relatively unknown by Canadians until 1960, was subsequently shown to have been granted independence before it was able to assume the mantle of nationhood. For nearly 100 years it had been the private domain of the King of Belgium and later a totally dependent colony of Belgium. One

factor that sped the decision to grant independence in 1960, was the action by other colonial powers of recently granting self-government to no less than 17 former African colonies.

The first government of the Congo was formed on 24 June 1960, with Joseph Kasavubu as head of State and Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister. On 29 June, in Leopoldville they signed a Treaty of Friendship with Belgium and King Beaudoin proclaimed Congolese independence. Almost at once , a breakdown occurred in what had previously been a system of militarily imposed law and order.

The more than 200 tribes, speak­ing a myriad of languages , had never viewed Belgian colonization as a benefit , or a stabilizing influence on historic enmities. On the 5 July, parts of the 25 ,000 member native army/ police "Force Publique" muti­nied against their Belgian officers . This led to the wide-spread unrest. Belgium reacted by flying in troops to provide protection for its more than 100,000 nationals

Belgium was unable to add legiti­macy to this move by its fai lure to con­vince Lumumba to invoke the Treaty of Friendship and seek help from the

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now more than 10,000 Belgian soldiers in the country.

During the second week of July more trouble and violence arose as the mutiny spread. After evacuating all Belgian nationals from the area, Belgian soldiers and warships attacked the port city of Matadi with a consid­erable loss of life among the local population. Hyped-up reports of this action carried on the Congolese army radio network, sparked new rounds of violence even in areas that previously had been quiet. Far from stabilizing the situation, the appearance of Belgian paratroops at widely separated loca­tions resulted in even more unrest. Increasing numbers of attacks on the remaining Europeans followed.

In the midst of all this turmoil,

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Tsombe. the provincial gm ernor of mineral-rich Katanga province an­nounced its secession . Lumumba flew to Elizabethville, the provincial capital, to seek conciliation, but his aircraft was prevented from landing. The in­cident led to a further breakdown of relations with the Belgian government, which supported Tsombe for financial reasons, from behind the scenes,

Confronted with <.1 situation be­yond his control. Lumumba asked the United nations for help on 12 July. The Security Council gave unanimous ap­proval for a security force to be sent to the Congo. A Swedish General, Carlson Von Horne, then Chief of Staff of the U Truce Supervisory Organization in the Middle East, was appointed to command the force, and he arrived

Opposite: RCAF NS 17 517, one of the lost North Stars to fly to the Congo, is marshalled into position at N'Diili Airport, Leopoldville, 28 August 1962. DND Pll40337 VIAL MOTIUK. Above: W /(McClure, acting CO of RCAF Uplands, wished G/C (orr "Bon Voyage" prior to his trip to the Congo. With him are, L-R, W/C Kerr, S/L Morrison, S/L Henderson, W/C Allison, W/C Dicks and W /C Borden. VIA THE AUTHOR. Left: Sgt R.E. Ralph and Cpl Peter Gray (RCAF Telecommunications Technicians) serving with ONUC, hove identities checked by guards at N'Ojili Airport. Pll46103 VIAL MOTIUK

on the scene on 18 July. The build-up of troops \\aS rapid and within a month, more than1'±,000 military personnel were located throughout the country. They had been delivered directly to their final destinations within

the Congo, mainly by CS and RCAF aircraft

CANADA'S KEY ROLE Because of its already well-earned

reputation in L"\ Peace Keeping, and ha\ ing played a key role in every U:'-J Peace mission to date, Canada became involved at the outset in the planning for the Congo operation. Specifically. the Secretary General asked Canada to take on the job of running all air operations throughout the Congo and, in addition, also to provide a long­range radio network for the UN Forces '' hich would be located at key centres. Canada agreed.

The Air Officer Commanding RCAF Air Transport Command. A C Fred Carpenter. accompanied by W C Jack

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Maitland, the CO of <±26 Squadron, the long-range orth Star Transport Squadron, were dispatched immedi­ately to survey the needs and make recommendations as to how they could be satisfied. Carpenter's recommenda­tions were approved and, within days , a small air staff to implement the de­cisions was assembled and sent on its way to Leopoldville.

Canada also agreed to establish and operate the ll Forces' radio network as requested by the Secretary General and. coincidently, took on the task of reactivating and operating the civilian systems which had collapsed with the departure of the Belgians.

\X' hile this was happening, my fam­ily and I were holidaying at a lake west of Ottawa. I was the \Yl/ C CO of the RCAF's '±12 VIP Squadron. E<trly one morning in late July, the Bonnechere airport manager drove up in his pick­up and told me I was wanted on the phone by ··some big-shot" in Trenton! I went to the phone and spoke to my boss, A/ C Carpenter. His -;vords were. ·'You're to go to the Congo tomorrow.·· .:-\aturally, I politely asked why, and for hO'.\' long. "You 're to set up and run an air transport operation for the UN operations in the Congo,'' he replied. "You 're to jump on a 'plane and head for New York, where someone from U.t\ Headquarters will meet you and brief you in more detail. From there you will head for Brussels where you'll get a detailed briefing on the situation in the Congo, and then you 'll head by Sabena Airlines to Leopoldville. You should be away for a few weeks and, by the way, you're promoted to G/ C as of today.

I did as I was told, and arrived in

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New York - where no one met me. I phoned UNHQ and spoke to Dr Bunch's SA , Brian Urquhart , (Later Sir Bryan) whom I had met before, and .went on to Brussels by commercial air. There, the RCAF air attache met me, gave me a bottle of scotch and wished me luck, having informed me he had no idea what was going on. The Belgians were too busy to brief me. The next morning I arrived in Leopold,·ille and was met by Jack Maitland whom the A/ C had left be­hind to help out until the small air staff gr up from Trenton and I arrived on the scene.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AIR TRANSPORT FORCES (UNATF) IN ONUC

The press release from UN IIQ used

the phrase that I was "to command all UN air forces in the Congo." Obviously, this was a further endorsement of Canada 's reputation and had little to do , I suspected , with my particular talents. ·

The role of the UNATF was to op ­erate and control aircraft, air traffic and the facilities needed to support the ONUC commander in the effec­tive execution of his mandate. Our arrival within days of the receipt of the request by Ottawa , saw our crew

Below: l·R, Col Bernie Guimond, General Von Horne of Sweden, Col Bert Mendelson, and an Ethiopian B Genera·! (Chief of Stoff). VIA THE AUTHOR. Bottom: 426 Squadron North Stars on the flight line at RCAf Trenton, 27 December 1960. L. MILBERRY VIAL. MOTIUK.

Opposite: Sgt W. Wiser supervises Air Congo workers fuelling o North Star at N'Ojili Airport, leopoldville, 26 may 1961. ONO

PL 124720 VIAL. MOTIUK.

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of ten Canadian airmen underLake an operation which had no precedent in UN peace-keeping history.

On arrival, I had met with General Von Horne, the supreme commander, and came away with a vague under­standing of what the ONUC would need by way of air support. My first job was to write my Terms of Reference and define our role as pre­cisely as could be clone. The General immediately approved what I put in front of him.

The air transport job would include the control of the External Airlift and the operation and control of Internal Airlift. The External Airlift involved the movement of military units and equipm nt, and ingoing logistic sup­port from overseas to the Congo. The Intenial Air Transport would include the movement of UN military and civil-

(in this confused atmosphere) we soon discovered that we had pilots who had

never flown the types of aircraft we had

inherited . . . ))

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ian personnel and materiel throughout the Congo. In addition it was to pro­vide the resources to be able to deploy by air, a battalion Group of infantry to trouble spots as might be required, to help the local UN commander reestab­lish stability in his regions.

We soon discovered that this in­volved not only operating nut"l;)bers of different kinds of aircraft over a very wide area, but it would also require rhe operation of an air traffic cbntrol system and the airfields which would be used. To cap it all, the air naviga­tion and communication systems, as modern as any in Europe, had been abandoned by the Belgians and no lo­cal Congolese had been trained to the level necessary to put them back in op­eration. In some cases the equipment had been sabotaged while in others it had been vandalized.

With more than 15,000 UN troops already on location at many widely spread points, we obviously could not wait to produce a nice neat plan to put the whole project together. The troops had to be fed and supported. The lim­ited road and rail and very expensive river transponation systems used by the Belgians were no longer in opera­tion. Simultaneously, we would have many activities on the go. All of these, hopefully, would lead eventually to the neat (and very expensive) package we could see down the road, but had nei­

.ther the time nor the information to create in the rush. Inundated with de­mands on their talents and time never

before experienced, our ten intrepid members managed it with aplomb -and perhaps many shortcuts. We did have help from a Pakistani Army mo­tor-transport company in assembling loads and dispatching aircraft. And we increasingly commandeered people and equipment from the HQs, and on the road, to get the job done.

EVOLUTION OF THE UN AIR TRANSPORT FORCE

With the Security Council's decision, Hammarskjold's staff had immediately appealed to selected member nations for the resources they believed to be necessary to meet the mandate. With total confidence i"n their infallibility, and some limited advice from an eclec­tic array of ex-military UN employees, infantry units and air force personnel and aeroplanes were requested from different sources. In the army case it worked out well, as some expertise was evident in the staff and useful of­fers were made and accepted. In the air force case, however, no such know­how seemed to be on hand when the non-specific requests for airmen and aeroplanes went out. And, unbeliev­ably, before the requirement could be defined in detail, numbers of each ap-peared on the scene. .

On our arrival, we discovered 17 C-47s (Military DC-3s) had arrived, along with five C-119s. These bad apparently been dug out of the NATO war reserve in Europe and, until their delivery, some had not flown for upwards of 15

years. A mixed bag of helicopters and several Beaver and Otter fixed­wing aircraft as well, had been generously shucked off from Middle East UN missions. While this raised our eyebrows, it was nothing compared to the surprise we got when we discovered that we had, or would shortly have on hand, aircrew and ground crew in uncoordinated lots from 11 different na­tions! The one encour­aging offer of assistance was an Indian Air Force C- 119 Squadron which would come as a formed unit. It was followed a short while later by an Italian Air Force C-119 Squadron.

In this confused atmosphere, we soon

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disco\·ered we had pilots who had neYer flown the types of aircraft we had inherited and mechanics who were not qualified to fix them. To make mat­ters even more difficult, there was the Yugosla\' contingent of mechanics, real experts on their Russian version of the DC-3, but who had no facility in ei­ther of the languages our Brazilian and Argentinian pilots spoke. The pilots spoke good English but the Yugoslavs spoke only Serho-Croatian, with their Sergeant able to speak some French. Initially, this too, created a problem. but the expertise of the Yugoslav mechanics soon com·inced our South American pilots that these foreigners were as good or better than any they had \VOrked ·with at home.

The U_ Air Transport Force, with a fleet of obsolescent aircraft, many aircrew unqualified to fly them, and mechanics of questionable skills and know-ho"'· was not off to a very impressive start - from the outset it would be expected to logistically support a field force of upwards of 20,000 troops widely dispersed over an area of nearly 1,000,000 square miles. However, with the unqualified dedication and ability of a few key members, we were soon running con­version courses to qualify personnel, and were routinely doing pilot check rides on all our pilots. whether they liked it or not. Flight Safety, if nothing else, required it. We were responsible for the safe results of our efforts and had to make sure an acceptable stan­dard could be met.

Flight checks were done using RCAF check standards. There was no sitting in the office and having someone else do it. After the initial run-through we were able to recruit others to accept some of the responsibility. Obviously the Indian Air Force and Italian Air Force Squadrons maintained their own air force standards, even though the first time I flew with an Italian C-119 crew, I was a bit surprised to see a wicker-covered bottle of Italian vino in an especially fitted holder between the two pilot seats. (The explanation that potable water simply was not available in the Congo, and seldom in Italy, left me a bit uncomfortable, despite its purported logic!)

PROGRESS By the end of Augu t, the du."t

had begun to settle. We were run­ning regular flights to main UN troop locations, and had a better sense of safety regarding the situation on the ground at the airfields we were us-

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ing. Thanks to the generosity of the Canadian Government, the RCAF had been allowed to provide a few bilin­gual air traffic control tradesmen, and ICAO roo, through its European office, provided further help. At the outset we had asked much of the aircraft crews in having them operate into insecure and uncontrolled airfields where the local political situation was uncertain. The Canadian Army Signallers at most of these sites were of inestimable help, and our crews ''''ent out of their way to make sure that the needs of the signal detachments and our tradesmen took priority Much innovation was in­volved, in acquiring vehicles, accom­modation and such amenities as we could locate. The UN support system was imply not geared for this kind of operation. However, their ignorance was our bliss!

By mid-September we had aircrew of 11 nationalities flying 78 aircraft of 13 different types. Despite the lan­guage barriers, inadequate training and lack of supplies, we were getting results. We still required the backup of Air Congo (A politically less offensive name invented for Sabena) charter C-54s as well as in the maintenance and repair of our aircraft.

Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, our incomparable Chief of The Air Staff, was well known for keeping his ear close to the ground on all matters af­fecting his RCAF members and what they were doing. He called one clay from Ottawa, via our SSB long-range radio, and asked how things were go-

ing and whether there was anything we needed. I briefed him on some of our aircraft serviceability and aircrew proficiency problems and mentioned that we !1ad a very large backlog of ve­hicles and equipment that was urgently needed in the field. lie asked whether a couple of C-119s on temporary duty (with crews) would help. I, of course,

((Tbe Russians openly supported Lumumba) even after he had been

fired by Kasavubu. ))

said 'yes' and within three days they were in Leopoldvi lle! (I wonder if toclay's brass could react so quickly and completely.)

In the two months we really needed them, these two borrowed aircraft and crews moved 386,000 pounds of freight backlog and hundreds of passengers. Also, during the ONUC operation at this time, the RCAF's 426 Squadron North Stars, in 392 flights , had airlifted more than 2,000 tons of freight and 11,476 UN passengers into and within the Congo.

To further give body to the UN Air Transport Force, Canada had purchased four de Havilland Caribou aircraft and offered them to the U

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for internal airlift. It was busily train­ing the aircrews and ground crews to ferry them · to the Congo and operate them as part of the UNATF when the Secretar.y General, bowing to Russian pressure, refused the offer. This was a blow to our hopes. The Russian pressure was reportedly because of Canada's strong position in NATO as well .as its membership in the Commonwealth which had a history in African affairs not necessa.rily covered with glory. The Russians openly sup­ported Lumumba, even after he had been fired by Kasavubu.

The records show that, by the middle of October, our 'mixed bag' UNATF had actually moved more than

10,000 tons of freight and hundreds of passengers in its military aircraft! We had also met the U 's voracious need for paper work by having is­sued Organization Orders, Air Staff Instructions, Supply Demand forms. Job Descriptions, and other 'useful' documents. (They were all actually modified RCAF Forms printed locally with ONUC letterhead.) The world wondered how such a small and busy bunch of airmen could produce this stuff and still run an air operation.) I still marvel at it!

An interesting political situation existed during this period when, for a while, no one knew who the govern­ment was. Lumumba claimed the PM job, because he had been appointed into it, even though Kasavubu, with outside encouragement, had fired him, and Joseph Mobutu, a recent

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sergeant in the Belgian-officered Force Publique/ ANC, promoted himself and had led a coupe d'etat. Dr Bunche, the Se retary General's Representative on the spot recognized Mobutu as the point man to deal with. The Russians objected strongly, but the Sec Gen sup­ported this position. Russian support for Lumumba was strong, even .. before Congolese independence had evolved. They saw him as the means to get re­estabJ.ished in Africa, having lost their footholds in Egypt and Tanzania.

The Russians tried to pressure the UN into allowing them to participate in the provision of aid and, despite the denial of over- flight clearances by NATO nations as a result of a

Opposite: the last 426 Squadron flight into Leopoldville, cap­tained by F /L Danny Mahoney (at bottom of stairs) in North Star NS17821, 8 September 1962. E. EMPEY VIAL MOTIUK. Above: North Star, NS 17817, being serviced at ldris (near Tripoli) Libya, en route to the Congo autumn, 1960. DND Pll456104 VIAL MOTIUK.

timely Canadian recommendation, the Russians did try. At one stage a dozen IL-12 aircraft loaded with 'equipment' for Lumumba arrived in Stanlyville, via a very circuitous route, intending to proceed further to Leopold ville. The Ethiopian commander at the airport called on the radio and told me the aircraft were loaded with arms and ammunition. General Von Horne agreed that we should try to prevent this from being delivered. Since we airmen controlled the airfields, we ordered the UN detachments at the useable ones to block their runways by parking vehicles or 45-gallon gas

barrels on them as soon as we gave them word that the Russians were airborne. Our UN commanders did as requested, and the IL -12 pilots, on learning there was no Congolese destination open, had no alternative but to return to Khartoum.

In retr0spect, it is amazing how easy it was to get things done when one judiciously avoided being trapped by the UN bureaucratic network. A few times I was chastised for not seeking authority ahead of time. But, when the results looked good and all could take a bow, shorting the system was over­looked! The fact was, we were far too busy to waste time on details, when the course of action was obvious.

Again, their ignorance was our bliss!

HOW TO GROUND A RUSSIAN TU-lo4

Late one afternoon in October, a Russian TU-104 military trans­port jet landed in Leopoldville. General Von Horne informed me that its likely purpose was to lift Lumumba out of the country, and this was not what the UN wanted to happen. He wondered if we airmen could quietly arrange to delay his departure for a few hours. I met with two of our intrep­id, innovating airmen, stated the problem and was reminded that a high performance jet

couldn't taxi or takeoff, with flat tires. Since we controlled the airport , and our good buddies the A C guards were now very friendly with us, (be­cause we had arranged that they be paid their overdue wages), in the clark of night the deed was clone.

The Russians were most upset when, late the following morning, they explained to us why they needed to borrow our air compressor. They de­parted Leopoldville that afternoon and Lumumba was not on board. Dr Bunche did mention later how lucky ONUC had been that the Russians aircraft had had a problem and Lumumba was unab1e to get away as he had planned. We choose not to enlighten the UN staff on what happened. With hindsight, had we sought CYA authority, it would never have been granted and Lumumba would not have been stymied.

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OFFICIAL GUESTS' DINNER LIST While Lumumba was still in the

chair, he hosted a 'black-tie ' dinner to which some UN staff members \Vere invited. L Col "'johnnie·· Berthiaume, an incredibly able R22eR officer, who \vas acting Chief of Staff to General Von Horne, and I were seated at the head ­table. At the appropriate time our host decided to speak to his guests, which included the US representative , and up-date them. His speech soon devel ­oped · into an anti -\'if estern harangue, where Canada in particular was viii ­fied. Col Berthiaume and I listened for a while and with Lumumba still in full flow decided simultaneously, I think, to depart the gathering in protest. We were featured in the local press the fol­lowing day. While we felt some politi­cal upsets might follow our actions , I personally was more worried that one of Lumumba· - AK"±7-armed and highly visible guards might shoot me in the back as we left.

THE UN SUPPLY SYSTEM In ONUC , the UN civilian staff

handled logistics and this included ac­commodation and ground trans porta­tion. There were Official Forms for ev­erything including the bits and pieces \Ye needed to repair our aircraft. To say it >vas a slow process is being gen­erous. Our supply NCO working with his buddies back in Trenton, somehow got around this by etting up a process whereby we ordered stuff through the RCAF supply system and billed U

ew York after the fact. The UN ci­vilian staff was more than pleased and soon became very cooperative in things Canadian originated by our guys and the Army signalers.

A case in point, concerns the lack of vehicles for getting our crews from their accommodation to the airport and for other administrative purposes. No civilian transportation systems were operating either locally, on the few highways and rail spurs, or on the river system. Early on, this shortage hamstrung our efforts, so having had, no response from the U system, one of our can-do RCAF Flight Lieutenants conned his UN civilian supply friends into giving him the forms to requisi­tion the vehicles we needed. He did, and four years later, I received a query from UN New York, asking the where­abouts of a dozen or so vehicles I had signed for in August I960!

OTHER TALES, OTHER TIMES The cultural and political sensitivi­

ties of contingents from 28 different

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national sources created many head­aches for staffs. For example, bivouack­ing 'flip-flop'-shod Guinean troops along side American Infantry- booted Liberian troops caused the Guineans to demand that they be kittecl just as well as their neighbours. The UN complied and , in passing, had real trouble rounding up boots big enough to fit previously un-shod feet. A similar problem arose over UN service allow­ances. Egyptian soldiers claimed $6.00 per clay, Canadians $0.30 per clay!

An example of po litics enter­ing clay-to-clay affairs was the case

(~ round trip for a North Star crew from Trenton to the Congo was

approximately 70 flight hours. ))

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of the Israeli-packed and -labeled canned-pork products doled out to the Egyptian contingent by the l '\1 quartermaster. A political crisis en sued. with the Egyptians accusing all and ~undry of a deliberate attempt to emharra~~ them. While members of a United Nations force, they were still enemies at home!

The chasm between officers and other ranks in some contingents were eye-openers also. For example, we had one group whose Wing Commander complained that their officers were expected to ride on the same bus as their mechanics, and this was unac­ceptable. He wanted separate buses. I suggested to him, that , if his govern­ment would indicate its wi llingness to buy ::m additional crew-bus and supply a driver, we would have no objection. But, in the mean time, perhaps they could arrange to share the bus , \\itb some sitting up front and the others at the back. I heard no more from that source.

African military personnel. espe­cially from former colonies, seemed prone to respect the authority of us foreigners more than they did that of other Africans. I could cite many ex­amples of tribal attitudes being basic behavior drivers - but one sticks out. The Force Publique A C detested the Ghanaian officers who bossed them in the provision of airport security. When one group of French-speaking Canadian troops arrived and were mis­taken for Belgians, it was the interjec­tion by an on-site RCAF officer that stopped the mayhem, with absolutely no move to help by the Ghanaian

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officers who stood b} and watched. These officers claimed the Congolese soldiers paid no attention to the orders given them.

Compared \\ ith the Commander-in­Chief's job of keeping his troops from 28 nations fed and happy, our job to help, while critical to his courses of action, had few of the political and so­ciological factors to distract us. We had untrained personnel , but they v\ere being trained, and our multi-national Air Force was making good progress. Safety of our crews and passengers was paramount and, for the most part. luckily, we were ~uccessful.

THE RCAF NORTH STAR LIFELINE During the deployment phase of

the 0 C operation, 426 Squadron's 13 North Stars were flown at the - until then - unequalled rate of 180 hours per month each, for a total monthly flying rate of 2,3<t0 hours. The unit played a critical role in terms of support to the whole U"-' Congo build-up.

Being u npressurized, the aircraft usually operated below 10,000 feet, especially with passengers on board. There was no passenger oxygen in­stalled. Consequently, and unlike today's high-performance passenger jets, the North Star crews spent much of their time flying on instrument fly­ing rules (IFR) rather than above the weather. It was hard, tiring work and poorly paid, but a challenge these professionals accepted and relished as their duty.

A round trip for a North Star crew from Trenton to the Congo was ap-

Opposite, top: celebrating Canadian Thanksgiving at the leopoldville Tennis Club in 1960. Seated fifth from left, on the for side of the table, is Von Horne, with Mendelson to his left and then the outhor (in light suit). On the other side of the toble, Guimond looks over his shoulder toward the camera. VIA THE AUTHOR. Opposite, bot­tom: 4 26 Squadron Maintenance Personnel change on engine on o North Star at Kana, Nigeria on 21 December 1960. D. SMITH VIA t. MOTIUK. Left: 4 2 6 Squadron North Stars at N'Ojili Airport, leopoldville, in July 1960. L MILBERRY COt VIAL MQTIUK.

proximately 70 flight hours. Through the use of en route ·sJ ip­crews' the aircraft could he hack in Trenton in a little less

than four days. The crews, however. limited to 12-hour duty days, could be on the route for eight days or more.

The initial Canadian deployment route \\as from Trenton via The Azores to Dakar, thence to Accra and on to Leopoldville. After these deploy­ments were finished, with the North Stars having helped on the interna­tional ones as well. a twice-weekly scheduled flight via the European Pisa terminal. normally used for the RCAF Middle east shuttles, was in­stituted at the request of the nited "\ations. These flights continued until the wind-up of ONUC in 196"1. (From late 1960 omvards they were carried out by the Yukon, the new and much more operationally-capable orth Star replacement.)

THE UN AIR STAFF Our airmen from 11 nations. speak­

ing six languages were nothing short of amazing in what they \vere able to do. They needed little supervision or direction. and regardless of nationality, seemed to be blessed with the know­how and understanding which led to the on the spot innovation and action that produced the results needed, and \vhich normally would not have been seen to be possible, even from person­nel of much higher rank and experi­ence. Biased, I may be. but in retro­spect, the glue in the whole operation provided by the small group of highly motivated, dedicated and loyal RCAF officers, was the key to the amazing success which was achieved in the

RCAF IN TilE CONGO CONTINUED ON P. 31

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