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Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 406–416

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Electoral Studies

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/e lectstud

The price of personalizing politics: Political distrust and economicperformance in Latin America, 1996–2006

Ashley Ross, Maria Escobar-Lemmon*

Texas A&M University, 4348 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843, United States

Keywords:Political trustLatin AmericaEconomic conditionsElectoral lawsInterpersonal trustGovernment performance

* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ1 361 825 5781; faE-mail addresses: ashley.ross@tamucc.edu (A. R

tamu.edu (M. Escobar-Lemmon).

0261-3794/$ – see front matter � 2010 Elsevier Ltddoi:10.1016/j.electstud.2010.11.012

a b s t r a c t

While research has provided evidence that culture and institutional performance shapeindividual level trust in political institutions, scholars have neglected to adequately esti-mate the effect of political institutions and macroeconomic conditions on trust. Using datafrom the World Value Surveys for eleven Latin American cases, we test if countries with“partyizing” electoral systems - those with rules that encourage voters to hold the party,not individuals, accountable for government performance - experience lower levels ofdistrust in political parties and the legislature in times of poor economic conditions thanthose countries with “personalizing” electoral rules. Our analysis shows that the macropolitical and economic context largely conditions the impact of culture and institutionalperformance on political trust.

� 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Trust is central to the functioning of and deepening ofdemocracy. By serving as the foundation for the represen-tative relationship between citizens and politicians, trustfacilitates the workings of democracy. It provides thepolitical space for governments to maneuver throughpolicy decisions when regime actions are unpopular,uncertain, or unfavorable (Mishler and Rose, 1997). More-over, citizen trust in political institutions serves as a checkon government. A trusting society is not blind devotees butrather a vigilant and active citizenry with a healthy degreeof skepticismwilling to exercise control over government ifpoliticians have violated the rules of the game (Hardin,1999; Sztompka, 1999; Uslaner, 2001; Warren, 1999;Cleary and Stokes, 2006). Trust is also a critical compo-nent of deepening democracy. Booth and Seligson (2009)find that trust in political institutions as a piece of generalsystem legitimacy, strongly influences the “perceivedsupply of democracy”. More trusting individuals, they

x: þ1 361 825 3762.oss), escobar@polisci.

. All rights reserved.

assert, perceive their country as more democratic and aremore satisfied with their democracy.

Clearly, trust is important for democracy. But, trou-blingly low levels of political trust have been documentedglobally. As Dogan (2005a: 1) points out, “Very few coun-tries today are immune to political mistrust”. This isdemonstrated by data from theWorld Values Survey,1996–2006 where only 36% in Europe, 28% in Eastern Europe, 25%in Post-Communist States, 16% in Asia, 48% in SoutheastAsia, 24% in Latin America, 41% in Africa, and 31% in theUnited States say they have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” ofconfidence in the political institutions of the legislature andpolitical parties.

Scholarship to explain these levels of trust has generallyfallen into two theoretical campsdcultural and institutional(see Mishler and Rose, 2001). Cultural theorists argue polit-ical trust is exogenous, stemming from cultural norms andlife socialization. Low levels of trust in Latin America, forexample, havebeenattributed topolitical culture (ClearyandStokes, 2006) and “a common regional heritage of distrust”(Lagos, 2001: 142). Within this vein, political trust is alsotheorized to originate from interpersonal trust d an indi-vidual’s interactions with others in society affects whetherthey trust politicians and by extension political institutions.

A. Ross, M. Escobar-Lemmon / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 406–416 407

Ontheotherhand, institutionalists hypothesize that politicaltrust is endogenous and contend that government politicaland economic performance shapes political trust. Trust“stems from how people perceive political institutions towork, thus reflecting evaluations of regime performance inrelation to citizen demands” (Luhiste, 2006: 478).

While studies employing both theoretical traditionshave found support in various regions of the world d theUnited States (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Newton and Norris,2000), Canada (Newton and Norris, 2000), Europe(Newton and Norris, 2000; Dogan, 2005b), the Post-Communist nations (Luhiste, 2006), and Latin America(Gronke and Levitt, 2004; Booth and Seligson, 2009) d

they have not sufficiently examined how macro politicaland economic conditions affect political trust. Becausepolitical trust is “more dependent on formal sanctions inthe shape of rules and regulations about the conduct ofpoliticians” (Newton, 1999: 179), it is imperative to accountfor cross-national variance in political institutions in theexamination of political trust. Studies of trust in politicalinstitutions have treated regimes equally without concernfor differences in institutions and practices that maytemper the electoral connection between politicians andcitizens and, therefore, arguably have significant effects oncitizen evaluations of government. Moreover, even recentanalyses that demonstrate economic outcomes matter fortrust (McAllister, 1999; Miller and Listhaug, 1990; Mishlerand Rose, 2001) have ignored the cultural and institu-tional origins of trust as well as the political context inwhich citizens are situated.

We fill this void in the literature by exploring howpolitical institutions and economic performance conditionthe effect of cultural and institutional factors long known tobe associated with political trust. We contend that“personalizing” electoral rules - those that link votersdirectly to representatives rather than to parties - createa political environment where poor economic conditionsweaken the effect of both cultural and institutional effectsupon trust and may negatively affect confidence in insti-tutions. On the other hand, in regimes where electoral rulesare “partyizing” – that is encourage voters to hold partiesrather than individual legislators accountable - citizens willreact to poor economic conditions to a smaller degreeparticularly in systemswhere there are strong incentives toemphasize national policies, resulting in less change in theeffect of cultural and institutional variables when economicconditions sour than in personalizing electoral systems. Inpartyizing systems, voters hold parties responsible foroutcomes; in personalizing systems citizens hold indi-vidual representatives responsible. Because officeholdershave cultivated a vote that relies on personalistic politics(and patronage) in the latter system, it is harder for votersto separate individual and institutional performance, andpolitical institutions are more likely to suffer from a crisis ofconfidence when representatives fail in crucial policy areaslike economic management.

We test this theory using World Values Survey data(1996–2006) from eight Latin American countries for theyears 1996–2006. We focus on Latin America because richvariation in electoral rules and often sharp fluctuations ineconomic conditions make it an excellent starting point in

which to test our theory. This period allows us to reflect ontheway institutions condition trust across the entire cycle ofcrisis and recovery. Comparedwith global GDP growth ratesof 3.18, 4.13,1.5, and 1.89 for 1999 to 2002 (and rates of 3.19,3.74,1.19, and 1.41 in high incomeOECD countries), the LatinAmerican & Caribbean region barely grew or contractedduring that period with average regional growth rates of0.18, 3.9, 0.29, �0.45 (World Bank: World DevelopmentIndicators and Global Development Finance statistics). [Aneven more negative story can be told with per capita GDPgrowth which was negative for three of these four years.]Thus, because our data allow us the opportunity to considerboth the onset of crisis aswell as recovery,we are able to useit to drawuseful lessons thatmayapply to the present globaleconomic downturn. Specifically, because similar variationin electoral rules exists in countries most severely affectedby the present crisis, we expect our theory to apply to thesecases aswell. However, since theworld has not yet emergedfrom the downturn of 2008, a reflection on Latin America’spast may shed light on the future.

To test our theory, we model the effects of cultural andinstitutional factors on trust in political parties and thelegislature separately for each country to examine how thecombination of “partyizing” and “personalizing” electoralrules moderates political trust in good and bad economicenvironments. This approach allows us to comprehensivelyexplore the origins of political trust by testing for competingcultural and institutional explanations, adequately inte-grating both macro political and economic conditions, andsampling across a large time period. Moreover, keeping thedimensions of trust in the legislature and in political partiesseparate recognizes that citizens distinguish among insti-tutions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995), thereby permit-ting us to capture how electoral rules and economicperformance influences the responsibility citizens assign tothese institutions that, in part, function to formulate andexecute economic policy, but do so in different ways.

The remainderof thepaperproceedsas follows. In thefirstsectionwe discuss the two competing explanations -culturaland institutional performance - for political trust, present ouroriginal theory of how electoral rules and economic perfor-mance condition political trust, and outline the testablepredictions generated byeach theory. Second,wepresentourmodel, variables and data. The third section offers ourstatistical results and discusses the findings, beginning firstwith an empirical test of the institutional and culturalexplanations of political trust then moving to analyses of thedifferences between baseline trust in partyizing andpersonalizing systems and of the effect of electoral laws invarying economic conditions in two cases, Venezuela andColombia. We conclude by exploring the implications of ourstudy.

2. Explanations for political trust

Political trust, as defined by Miller and Listhaug (1990:358), is:

Evaluations of whether or not political authorities andinstitutions areperforming inaccordancewithnormativeexpectationsheldby thepublic.Anexpressionof trust in

1 A complete review of the literature on personal vote seeking isbeyond the scope of this paper. Some noteworthy studies include: Ames(1995a, 1995b), Crisp and Ingall (2002), Desposato (2006), Taylor (1992).

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government (or synonymously political confidence andsupport) is a summary judgment that the system isresponsiveandwill dowhat is righteven in theabsenceofconstant scrutiny.

The cultural and institutional theoretical traditions offerdistinct explanations for the origins of political trust.Political trust is thought to be exogenous, stemming fromsocial capital, by scholars of the cultural tradition (Gary andVerba, 1963; Inglehart, 1988; Putnam, 1995). Social capitalfor Putnam (1993: 167) is “features of social organizationsuch as trust, norms and networks that can improve theefficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action”. It issocial capital that mediates the relationship betweeninterpersonal trust and political trust. A society of indi-viduals possessing high levels of trust in others andparticipating actively in the community creates a coopera-tive environment conducive to confidence in politicalinstitutions (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Damico et al.,2000). Many scholars have found evidence that socialcapital, specifically interpersonal trust, is positively asso-ciated with confidence in political institutions (Finkel et al.,2000; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Booth and Seligson, 2009).The logic is as Lagos (2001: 144) argues, “Interpersonaltrust lies at the heart of attitudes toward institutions.People who do not trust their peers will have difficultytrusting the leaders and institutions that represent them”.Drawing on extant research and theory, we expect indi-viduals who are more trusting of one another to be moretrusting of their political institutions.

Hypothesis 1. Trust in others is positively associated withtrust in political institutions.

In contrast to cultural theory, institutional explanationsfor political trust focus on citizen evaluations of the gov-erning regime. As Cejudo (2007: 590) puts it, “Trust ininstitutions is a product not only of institutional design butalso of institutional performance”. Confidence in politicalinstitutions, from this perspective, is contingent on theefficiency and effectiveness of government policy. Mishlerand Rose (2001) offer support for this contention in theiranalysis of post-Communist regimes, finding a significantrelationship between evaluations of the governing regime(i.e. satisfaction with the current government) and politicaltrust. Similarly, Cleary and Stokes (2006) examinedperceptions of government performance as part of citizens’trust in political institutions in Mexico and Argentina. Theyfound that citizens in regions with good governmentperformance - responsible behavior on fiscal matters, lowlevels of political violence, and competitive elections - havegreater institutional trust. Following institutional theoryand past analyses, we expect good government evaluationsto build political trust.

Hypothesis 2. Positive evaluation of the governing regime’sperformance is positively associated with political trust.

While past research has linked political trust to bothsocial capital and institutional performance, we contendthat the way in which they determine individual level trustin political institutions is conditioned by macro institu-tional and economic factors. In other words, the political

and economic environments in which citizens find them-selves help to determine their evaluations of politicalinstitutions. Thus, while we know that economic condi-tions have some independent effect upon political trust(McAllister, 1999; Miller and Listhaug, 1990; Mishler andRose, 2001), we also argue that electoral rules willmoderate the effect that trust and institutional perfor-mance have on trust in political institutions.

Electoral rules can give voters or party leaders theopportunity to select among candidates, thus encouragingcandidates to cultivate a personal vote and determining towhom those elected are ultimately loyal (Siavelis andMorgenstern, 2008). Whether rules create personal voteseeking incentives (what we call personalizing rules) or not(partyizing rules) is determined by whether party leaderscontrol access to the ballot, the extent to which votepooling takes place, the level/number of votes citizens cast,and district magnitude. (See Carey and Shugart, 1995 fora complete discussion of how these interact and can beordered). In systems where the electoral rules are person-alizing, legislators are encouraged to build a personalreputation and engage in behaviors that distinguish themfrom co-partisans such as bill sponsorship, committeework, and casework. On the other hand, in partyizingsystems, the electoral laws create incentives for thoseholding (or wishing to hold) office to follow the directivesof party leaders and act in ways that benefit the nation asa whole for which the party can then claim credit (Crispet al., 2004).1

Consequently, partyizing electoral rules encourageindividuals to hold the party, rather than individual poli-ticians responsible for policy outcomes and thereforeshould produce both lower overall levels of politicaldistrust and less change in the level of political trust intimes of poor economic performance. In contrast, person-alizing electoral systems, which offer incentives for indi-vidualistic political behavior, should lead to higher levels ofdistrust as elected representatives cultivate a direct linkwith citizens. Therefore, we expect, voters to bemore apt toexpress distrust as a result of economic downturn insystems where individuals rather than institutions areperceived as responsible.

Hypothesis 3a. Partyizing electoral systems are charac-terized by higher levels of political trust than personalizingelectoral systems.

Hypothesis 3b. Poor economic performance decreasestrust in personalizing electoral systems, but not inpartyizing.

3. Modeling political institutional trust: descriptionof variables and model

We use the World Values Survey (1996–2006) to testhow economic crisis conditions the impact of cultural andinstitutional factors on political trust across eight countries

A. Ross, M. Escobar-Lemmon / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 406–416 409

in Latin America for the years 1996–2006. Specifically, wetest how interpersonal trust and evaluations of governmentperformance affect trust in political parties and the legis-lature differently in countries with “partyizing” and“personalizing” electoral rules, under good and badeconomic conditions.

The World Values Surveys (1996–2006) allows us toanalyze comparable data from different Latin Americancountries at different points in time as the same questionswere asked in each country. These countries also provideinteresting variation in terms of wealth, size, economicperformance, and experience with democracy. Our datasetincludes surveys conducted in Argentina (1999), Brazil(2006), Chile (1996), Colombia (1998 and 2005), Mexico(1996 and2005), Peru (2001), Uruguay (1996) andVenezuela(1996and2000).2 Toselect casesasexamplesof goodandbadeconomic conditions we plotted gross national income percapita over time to identify years when a survey was con-ducted that correspond to clear points of positive or negativeeconomic growth. In addition to variation in economicconditions, the data provide reasonable variation in electoralrules. We treat Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, andVenezuela as having partyizing rules and Brazil, Colombia,and Peru as having personalizing electoral laws.3

Surveys carried out as part of the World Values Surveyqueried citizens as to whether they had (1) “a great deal ofconfidence”, (2) “quitea lotofconfidence”, (3) “notverymuchconfidence”, (4) or “none at all” in parliaments and politicalparties. Given that our dependent variable is ordered cate-gories, theanalysis that followsusesordered logitwithrobuststandard errors. We model confidence in parliaments andparties separately because citizens should evaluate eachinstitution separately.We estimate a separatemodel for eachcountry rather thanpooling the data to alloweach coefficientin the model to vary by country. This is similar to imple-menting a hierarchicalmodelwherewe allow intercepts andslopes to vary across countries, but given the relatively smallnumber of countries/years this approach is preferable.

To test our cultural hypothesis, we include a dichotomousmeasure of interpersonal trust that records whether the

2 These are eight of the 11 Latin American countries covered by theWorld Values Survey. Cases were selected to maximize variation ineconomic performance and electoral laws. Relatively few countries in theregion have personalizing electoral laws, thus we are limited in thenumber of possible cases and further constrained by the countriessampled by the World Values Survey explaining why only four of our 11cases have personalizing electoral laws.

3 Carey and Shugart (1995) offer a ranked list of electoral system’sincentives to cultivate a personal vote where "a" is the least and "m” isthe most. Uruguay and Chile are listed as examples of "e" rank placingthem on the partyizing side; Colombia is an example of rank "l" and Brazilis an example of rank "i" making them personalizing. Argentina usesclosed-list proportional representation. Thus, despite a somewhatdecentralized nomination process (De Luca et al., 2002), it falls in thepartyizing category. When the survey was conducted, Mexico andVenezuela both elected lower chamber members using a combination ofclosed-lists and single member districts. We have treated Mexico as anexample of a partyizing system because of the strong control partyleaders held over nominations even as late as 2005. Similarly, Venezuelain both 2000 and 1996 had fairly centralized nomination proceduresleading us to classify it as partyizing (Crisp and Rey, 2001). We classifyPeru in 2001 as personalizing because of the use of open-list proportionalrepresentation for the 2001 elections (Schmidt, 2003).

respondentbelieves that "mostpeoplecanbetrusted" (coded1) or "you can’t be too careful" (coded 0). We test our insti-tutional hypothesis by modeling the effect of evaluations ofthe governing regime on political trust. Respondents evalu-ated government performance on a four-point scale rangingfrom “very satisfied” (1) to “very dissatisfied” (4)with peoplein national office. We collapsed those who said they were"very satisfied" or "fairly satisfied" into a satisfied category(coded 1) and those who were "fairly dissatisfied" or "verydissatisfied" intoadissatisfiedcategory (coded0) foranalysis.Unfortunately, this questionwasnot asked in all years forcingus to consider an alternativemeasure for Brazil 2006,Mexico2005, and Colombia 2005. Using a question that was notasked in prior years – for which party would an individualnever vote – we constructed a measure of satisfaction withofficeholders. Respondents who said theywould "never votefor" thepresident’spartyoraparty thatwas in themajority incongress were coded as being dissatisfied, respondents whogave any other answer were coded as satisfied.4 We use thisquestion instead of one asking respondents who their firstchoice was because there is a difference between whethersomeone is satisfiedwith officeholders andwhether they areone’s first choice to govern.

In addition to these variables, we include a series ofcontrol variables to account for any effect a respondent’spolitical orientation and socio-demographic characteristicshave upon his or her level of political trust. Thus, we includemeasures of the respondent’s age, gender, education level,income level, whether they are employed or unemployed,and a self-placement on a left-right scale – all of whichscholars have found to affect trust in other parts of theworld(Mishler andRose,1997, 2001; Luhiste, 2006;Newton,2001;Dogan, 2005b).5 Also, consistentwithpast research (Mishlerand Rose, 1997, 2001; Newton, 2001; Espinal et al., 2006;Luhiste, 2006), we include a measure of satisfaction withthe household’s financial situation (reported on a 10-pointscale with increasing values indicating higher levels ofsatisfaction) andpolitical interest (coded as being interested

4 In Brazil we code respondents as dissatisfied if they said they wouldnever vote for any of the 7 parties (PT, PMDB, PPB, PL, PCdoB) thatendorsed president Lula. One of the coalition members, the PT, hada plurality in the legislature in 2006 when the survey was conducted. InMexico, the survey was conducted in 2005, the year before presidentialand legislative elections. In 2005, the PAN controlled the presidency andthe PRI had a plurality of seats in the legislature. Thus, we coded a persondissatisfied with officeholders if they said they would never vote foreither the PRI or the PAN. The Colombian election preceding the 2005survey was the 2002 presidential and congressional elections thatbrought to power Alvaro Uribe who ran on his own party label, but hadpreviously been associated with the Liberal Party. Because the LiberalParty controlled a plurality of seats in the legislature, we code a Colom-bian respondent as dissatisfied with officeholders if they said they wouldnever vote for either the Liberals or Uribe’s party.

5 To standardize income we create three categories. Respondents in thefirst, second, or third step were defined as low income; those in theseventh, eighth, ninth or upper steps were coded as high income. Tostandardize education we created three categories from the variablereporting highest level of educational attainment. Low educationrespondents had no formal education, complete or incomplete primaryeducation, or incomplete secondary education; high education respon-dents had some or complete university education. Employed respondentsare those who said they worked full time, part-time or were self-employed.

A. Ross, M. Escobar-Lemmon / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 406–416410

(1) for those respondents whose self-reported level ofinterest in politics was "very interested" or "somewhatinterested" and coded as uninterested (0) for thosewho saidthey were "not very interested" or "not at all interested").

4. The determinants of political trust

Tables 1 and 2 present the results of our models testingthe effect of institutional performance and culture upontrust in the congress and political parties, respectively.Recall thatwe estimate amodel for each country separately,and, thus, each table reports 11 separate models. The coef-ficients for each model should be interpreted as the effectthat a variable has given a country’s electoral law andeconomic condition. An initial examination of the tablesreveals that both culture -measured as interpersonal trust -and institutional performance - measured as satisfactionwith officeholders and willingness to vote for incumbents-are significant and generally positive predictors of an indi-vidual’s confidence in both legislatures and political parties.

4.1. Cultural and institutional predictors of political trust

Based on cultural explanations we expect to find thatinterpersonal trustpositivelyaffects confidence in legislaturesand parties. Themodels reported in Table 1 reveal that in fiveof the 11 cases, trusting other people increases the chances anindividual trusts the congress. In eight of the 11 cases inter-personal trust increases confidence inpolitical parties, shownin Table 2, however in Brazil (2006) respondents who saidmost people could be trusted were significantly less likely tohave confidence in parties. Thus, while interpersonal trustincreased confidence in parties in most cases, it actuallyweakened confidence in political parties in one case and hadno impact on trust in congress in a majority of cases.

Consistent with the literature on institutional perfor-mance, we predicted that individuals who were satisfiedwith officeholders would express higher levels of confi-dence in institutions. We find relatively strong support forthis hypothesis regardless of whether it is measured usingthe satisfaction with officeholders question or the votingquestion. In nine of 11 cases satisfaction with officeholdersincreases trust in congress (Table 1), and in 10 of 11 cases itpositively predicted confidence in political parties (Table 2).The only exceptions are Brazil (2006) where satisfactionactually decreased confidence in parties and congress andColombia (2005) where the effect is positive but not statis-tically significant. Substantively the effect of satisfactionwith officeholders is fairly large as the average individual6 inVenezuela (2000) who is satisfied with officeholders hasa 29.7% probability of having quite a lot and a 24.4% proba-bility of not having confidence in congress compared with15.1% and 48.6% for the same individual if she is dissatisfied.Overall, we take the fact that positive perceptions of

6 Our "average respondent" in this case is a composite of the averageand modal categories for each of our variables. That is an employedfemale with middle-level income and education whose left-right ideo-logical self-placement is 6.1, with a financial satisfaction score of 6.5,uninterested in politics, dissatisfied with officeholders, and has nointerpersonal trust.

performance increase confidence in both parties and legis-latures as fairly strong support for the hypothesis thatwheninstitutions work citizens trust themmore.

4.2. Individual predictors of political trust

Ouranalysis includes avarietyof control variables shownto affect confidence in political institutions. The resultssubstantially vary across countries. Increasing levels ofsatisfaction with the household’s financial situation predicthigher levels of confidence in the legislature in three cases(Mexico, 1996, 2000, and Venezuela, 1996); howeverhousehold satisfaction is not a predictor of confidence inpolitical parties in any cases. Additionally, individuals whoare interested in politics have higher odds of trustingcongress in 10 of the 11 cases (all except Chile, 1996) andparties in all cases than do individuals who are not inter-ested. And as respondentsmovemore toward the right, theyare more likely to express confidence in political parties inseven of the 11 cases and legislatures in six of the 11 cases.

The other control variables are largely inconsistent intheir effect. Age and gender are not consistent predictors ofindividual trust in political institutions. The effects ofsocioeconomic variables are also fairly weak and inconsis-tent across countries. It is a most consistent determinant oftrust in the legislature in Venezuela 1996 where high andloweducation and low income individuals weremore likelyto trust legislatures. Socioeconomic status also seems tomatter more for confidence in the legislature in Chile 1996where high education individuals had higher confidence,but employed individuals had less. With regard to politicalparties, socioeconomic status predicted trust inpartiesmostin Venezuela 1996 (high and low education increased),Mexico 1996 (high income decreased but employmentincreased), Peru 2001 (high and low income increased,employmentdecreased), andColombia1998 (loweducationincreased, but low income decreased).

4.3. Electoral rules and economic performance

While it is clear that culture, institutional performance,and some individual characteristics significantly affectpolitical trust, we are also interested in determining howeconomic performance and electoral lawsmay interactwiththese factors to affect confidence in political institutions.First, we are interested in testing the differences in baselinetrust between partyizing and personalizing systems. Weexpect partyizing electoral systems to experience higherlevels of trust in political institutions than personalizingelectoral systems. Second, we expect that in addition toelectoral rules explaining baseline trust (H3a) the effect ofinstitutional performance and culture would vary such thatwhen economic conditions worsened [improved] in coun-tries with personalizing electoral laws we would see lower[higher] levels of trust driven by either a weaker [stronger]effect of institutional performance or culture, but that incountries with partyizing electoral laws, changed economicconditions would not result in detectable differences in theeffect of either institutional performance or culture (H3b).

We begin by exploring the differences between baselinetrust inpartyizing andpersonalizing systems.A comparisonof

Table 1The effect of trust and institutional performance upon confidence in legislatures.

Bad economic conditionspartyizing electoral laws

Good economic conditionspartyizing electoral laws

Good economic conditionspersonalizing electoral laws

Bad economic conditionspersonalizing electoral laws

Argentina 1999 Venezuela 1996 Mexico 1996 Chile 1996 Uruguay 1996 Venezuela 2000 Mexico 2005 Brazil 2006 Colombia 2005 Colombia 1998 Peru 2001

Interpersonal trust:say others canbe trusted

0.032 (0.195) 0.349* (0.187) 0.478*** (0.110) 0.636*** (0.173) 0.674*** (0.171) �0.116 (0.189) 0.220 (0.157) 0.190 (0.177) 0.322** (0.131) 0.100 (0.113) �0.068(0.185)

Institutionalperformance:satisfiedwith officeholders

1.057*** (0.171) 0.751*** (0.188) 0.482*** (0.108) 0.710*** (0.147) 0.921*** (0.159) 1.087*** (0.141) 0.698*** (0.084) 0.670***(0.128)

Institutionalperformance:vote for incumbentparties

0.331*** (0.114) �0.061 (0.126) 0.137 (0.106)

Financial satisfaction 0.039 (0.030) 0.083*** (0.024) 0.065*** (0.023) 0.010 (0.037) �0.022 (0.030) 0.047 (0.026) 0.045* (0.023) 0.036 (0.023) 0.021 (0.019) �0.013(0.024)

Interested in politics 0.764*** (0.176) 0.315** (0.148) 0.774*** (0.098) 0.202 (0.165) 1.056*** (0.146) 0.850*** (0.148) 0.422*** (0.114) 0.774*** (0.107) 0.722*** (0.108) 0.943*** (0.083) 0.268**(0.119)

Age �0.001 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) �0.004 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005) 0.010** (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) �0.008** (0.004) �0.003 (0.003) 0.001 (0.092) �0.004 (0.004) 0.004(0.004)

Female �0.156 (0.148) �0.032 (0.144) 0.069 (0.102) �0.240 (0.151) 0.233* (0.136) �0.180 (0.144) �0.311** (0.126) 0.259** (0.109) 0.126 (0.092) �0.096 (0.078) �0.082(0.124)

High education �0.012 (0.254) 0.461** (0.197) 0.004 (0.127) 0.064 (0.185) 0.291 (0.198) �0.263 (0.170) �0.041 (0.148) �0.132 (0.168) 0.375*** (0.122) 0.057 (0.096) 0.104(0.145)

Low education �0.103 (0.163) 0.503*** (0.168) �0.130 (0.123) 0.161 (0.169) 0.066 (0.162) 0.021 (0.175) �0.074 (0.146) 0.223* (0.128) 0.142 (0.112) �0.179 (0.110) 0.088(0.124)

High income 0.0004 (0.179) �0.044 (0.353) �0.268* (0.146) 0.593*** (0.190) 0.001 (0.166) �0.127 (0.159) 0.092 (0.148) �0.095 (0.155) �0.251 (0.165) �0.149 (0.121) 0.255(0.232)

Low income �0.079 (0.189) 0.353** (0.153) 0.054 (0.108) 0.250 (0.164) 0.018 (0.169) �0.219 (0.179) 0.203 (0.131) 0.015 (0.122) �0.164 (0.116) �0.308*** (0.108) 0.182(0.137)

Employed 0.033 (0.154) �0.062 (0.143) 0.124 (0.106) �0.262* (0.149) �0.077 (0.141) �0.006 (0.141) �0.105 (0.126) 0.139 (0.110) 0.041 (0.095) �0.022 (0.084) �0.125(0.123)

Left-rightself placement

0.052 (0.034) 0.032 (0.025) 0.112*** (0.022) �0.045 (0.037) 0.110*** (0.036) 0.008 (0.027) 0.039** (0.020) 0.066*** (0.023) 0.099*** (0.018) 0.105*** (0.017) �0.018(0.028)

Cut 1 0.398 (0.356) 1.187 (0.341) 0.333 (0.259) �0.537 (0.037) 0.348 (0.371) 0.154 (0.342) �.159 (.289) .616 (.295) 0.408 (0.220) 0.860 (0.220) �0.594(0.301)

Cut 2 2.840 (0.369) 2.605 (0.355) 1.815 (0.261) 1.199 (0.435) 2.294 (0.381) 1.652 (0.348) 1.542 (.294) 2.240 (.302) 2.187 (0.225) 2.580 (0.225) 2.706(0.312)

Cut 3 4.537 (0.412) 3.687 (0.370) 3.746 (0.270) 3.497 (0.451) 5.024 (0.406) 3.354 (0.356) 3.856 (.321) 4.832 (0.321) 4.376 (0.243) 5.056 (.258) 3.869(0.336)

N 773 781 1530 729 825 816 1172 1297 1777 2650 1257Wald chi-2 74.0 54.88 192.96 68.45 150.50 121.0 48.14 73.51 101.74 297.83 41.21Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Pseudo R2 0.050 0.032 .047 0.036 0.077 .059 0.018 0.026 0.027 0.054 0.018

*P > .01, ** P > .05 *P > .01Ordered Logit with robust standard errors

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Table 2The effect of trust and institutional performance upon confidence in parties.

Good economic conditionspartyizing electoral laws

Bad economic conditionspartyizing electoral laws

Good economic conditionspersonalizing electoral laws

Bad economic conditionspersonalizing electoral laws

Chile 1996 Mexico 2005 Venezuela 2000 Uruguay 1996 Argentina 1999 Venezuela 1996 Mexico 1996 Brazil 2006 Colombia 2005 Peru 2001 Colombia 1998

Interpersonal trust:say others canbe trusted

0.690*** (0.178) 0.474*** (0.155) 0.116 (0.183) 0.796*** (0.173) 0.309* (0.189) 0.428** (0.203) 0.321*** (0.102) �0.359*(0.187)

0.300** (0.139) �0.106(0.196)

0.337*** (0.123)

Institutionalperformance:satisfied withofficeholders

0.367** (0.146) 0.552*** (0.153) 0.721*** (0.164) 0.993*** (0.169) 0.523*** (0.195) 0.744*** (0.108) 0.523***(0.128)

0.628*** (0.088)

Institutionalperformance:would vote forincumbent parties

0.440*** (0.115) �0.109(0.127)

0.234** (0.107)

Financial satisfaction �0.019 (0.036) 0.055** (0.023) 0.035 (0.026) �0.038 (0.030) 0.047 (0.031) 0.037 (0.023) 0.017 (0.021) 0.014(0.023)

0.005(0.025)

�0.010 (0.021)

Interested in politics 0.819*** (0.166) 0.578*** (0.116) 1.131*** (0.150) 1.313*** (0.146) 1.123*** (0.178) 0.921*** (0.159) 0.640*** (0.099) 0.972***(0.111)

0.887*** (0.105) 0.464***(0.121)

1.221*** (0.087)

Age 0.007 (0.005) �0.007 (0.004) �0.003 (0.006) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) �0.009 (0.006) 0.009** (0.004) 0.001(0.003)

0.001 (0.004) 0.006(0.005)

�0.003 (0.004)

Female �0.071 (0.154) �0.121 (0.128) �0.088 (0.151) �0.014 (0.133) 0.138 (0.153) 0.115 (0.153) 0.230** (0.104) 0.174(0.113)

0.131 (0.096) �0.160(0.127)

�0.117 (0.083)

High education 0.143 (0.154) �0.253* (0.148) �0.572*** (0.183) 0.247 (0.201) 0.172 (0.250) 0.345* (0.198) �0.078 (0.113) �0.068(0.166)

�0.008 (0.122) 0.059(0.147)

0.031 (0.100)

Low education �0.081 (0.174) �0.094 (0.143) 0.034 (0.179) 0.024 (0.164) 0.030 (0.168) 0.302* (0.171) 0.020 (0.130) 0.195(0.136)

0.062 (0.114) 0.132(0.165)

0.211* (0.117)

High income 0.291 (0.192) 0.119 (0.151) 0.064 (0.172) �0.059 (0.166) �0.124 (0.178) 0.122 (0.352) �0.361** (0.156) 0.037(0.151)

�0.345** (0.169) 0.443*(0.236)

�0.034 (0.123)

Low income 0.472*** (0.177) 0.149 (0.133) �0.091 (0.179) �0.018 (0.167) �0.150 (0.196) 0.187 (0.161) �0.020 (0.104) 0.058(0.125)

�0.159 (0.117) 0.349**(0.145)

�0.265** (0.113)

Employed �0.112 (0.155) �0.180 (0.128) 0.015 (0.146) �0.033 (0.138) 0.165 (0.156) 0.035 (0.159) 0.390*** (0.108) �0.050(0.113)

0.013 (0.101) �0.294**(0.145)

�0.044 (0.091)

Left-right selfplacement

�0.058 (0.035) 0.043** (0.020) 0.035 (0.027) 0.099** (0.034) 0.018 (0.035) 0.084*** (0.025) 0.100*** (0.021) 0.072***(0.024)

0.093*** (0.178) 0.012(0.028)

0.122*** (0.018)

Cut 1 0.035 (0.436) .267 (.294) 0.955 (0.351) 0.440 (0.376) 1.083 (0.377) 1.461 (0.368) 0.869 (0.272) 0.938(0.299)

0.717 (0.231) �0.266(0.315)

1.302 (0.239)

Cut 2 1.867 (0.444) 1.969 (0.300) 2.342 (0.355) 2.428 (0.383) 3.794 (0.400) 2.985 (0.383) 2.617 (0.279) 2.493(0.306)

2.488 (0.238) 3.250(0.335)

3.277 (0.246)

Cut 3 4.014 (0.487) 4.254 (0.320) 4.061 (0.362) 4.928 (0.411) 5.528 (0.456) 4.257 (0.410) 4.875 (0.300) 5.301(0.344)

4.571 (0.258) 4.401(0.377)

5.752 (0.283)

N 728 1175 824 825 796 790 1551 1301 1797 1261 2658Wald chi-2 70.16 74.56 96.84 186.98 92.50 72.91 198.96 96.82 114.52 45.92 348.92Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000Pseudo R2 0.041 0.028 0.053 0.088 0.068 0.043 0.049 0.036 0.031 0.021 0.074

*P > .01, ** P > .05 *P > .01Ordered Logit with robust standard errors

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Fig. 1. A: Confidence in the legislature, by country, B: Confidence in political parties, by country.

A. Ross, M. Escobar-Lemmon / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 406–416 413

the percentage of respondents in each of the 11 caseswhohadconfidence (either "a great deal" or "quite a lot") versus thosewho did not ("not very much" or "none at all"), is shown inFig. 1A and B, demonstrating that confidence in both politicalparties and legislatures is lower in the countries withpersonalizing electoral laws (the four rightmost columns). Inpersonalizing systems, on average 22% of respondents trust

congress compared to 32% in partyizing systems; 16% trustparties comparedwith 24%. In both cases a test of the equalityofmeansfindsthedifferencetobesignificant (p¼ .000).Whenwe control for economic conditions and compare personal-izing and partyizing systems under good economic perfor-mancewe find average trust in parties is 20% in personalizingand 24% in partyizing (p ¼ .000); average levels of trust in

A. Ross, M. Escobar-Lemmon / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 406–416414

legislatures are 25% and 32% (p ¼ .000) in personalizing andpartyizing respectively. When economic conditions sour wefind that overall trust is a little lower – average trust in partiesis11% inpersonalizingand26%inpartyizing (p¼ .000); trust inlegislatures is 17% in personalizing and 31% in partyizing(p ¼ .000). This supports our expectation that personalizingelectoral systems start off with lower levels of trust in politicalinstitutions, with the exception of Argentina (1999).

Recall that our argument, however, was not only aboutbaseline levels, but also about the changes that took placewithin a given type of system when economic conditionschanged. Looking at our dataset as a whole – in countrieswith personalizing electoral laws, 25% trusted congresswhen the economy was good, but only 17% when it wasbad, which is a significant decline (p ¼ .000). Trust inparties also dropped significantly with poor economicperformance from 20% to 11% (p ¼ .000). Under partyizingelectoral laws, however, we do not observe similar changes.Trust in parties changed from 24% to 22% as economicconditions worsened (p ¼ .01). But, trust in congressremained statistically unchanged from 32% when condi-tions were good to 31% when they were bad (p ¼ .10).

To further illustrate how economic conditions inconjunction with electoral laws affect an individual’s levelof trust, we select two countries where electoral laws donot vary significantly over time, but economic conditionsdo: Venezuela (partyizing) and Colombia (personalizing).7

In both cases, the earlier survey corresponds to a periodof poor economic performance while the more recent oneto a period of economic growth.

Recall that the earlier survey for both cases was con-ducted during a period of economic decline while the laterduring a period of improved economic conditions. Table 3presents the simulated probabilities with 90% confidenceintervals that an individual has confidence in parties orcongress for different combinations of interpersonal trustand satisfaction with officeholders. Cases where changedeconomic conditions, holding everything else constant,produce a significantly different probability that an indi-vidual has "a great deal", "a lot", "not much" confidence or"none at all" appear in boldface type. We expected changedeconomic conditions to exert a greater effect on confidence

7 Mexico is also a possible case to which test the effect of economicconditions and electoral rules given that there is a survey conductedduring poor economic conditions in 1996 and good economic perfor-mance in 2005. However, considering the political changes that tookplace during this period of time, we chose not to utilize Mexico in our testof hypothesis 3B, expecting that the profound party system changes thatoccurred would muddle the results. In 1996 the hegemonic PartidoRevolucionario Institucional (PRI) controlled the presidency and anabsolute majority in both house of congress as they had for decades,however indications of change were on the horizon as in 1997 the PRI lostits majority in the lower chamber for the first time. In 2000 the PRIsuffered a historic defeat in the presidential race losing control to thePAN. When the survey was conducted in 2005 Mexicans were looking ata hotly contested presidential election between the PAN and PRD withmany likely having grown frustrated that five years of "oppositiongovernance" had not brought the major systemic changes they hadexpected with the PRI’s defeat. Thus, lower levels of confidence might bea result of the weakening of overall system confidence due to disap-pointment with the PAN and thus might reflect results peculiar to insti-tutional change in Mexico rather than a generalizable phenomenon.

in institutions in personalizing – Colombia - than partyizing– Venezuela - electoral systems. An initial and cursoryinspection of Table 3 suggests that our initial expectationsare borne out in Venezuela, as there are almost noinstances where changing only economic conditions altersthe probability of trusting institutions. In Colombia, espe-cially with regard to political parties, changed economicconditions do affect the probability of trusting institutionsunder a variety of different conditions.

As we expected, in Venezuela, a country with partyizingrules, economic conditions appear to produce a signifi-cantly higher probability an individual has “quite a lot ofconfidence” and “not very much confidence” in the legis-lature only if they lack interpersonal trust and are dissat-isfied with officeholders. Under that one scenario animproved economy increases the probability they have"quite a lot" of confidence from 7.5% to 15%. In all othercases – that is if an individual trust others or is satisfiedwith government (or both) –economic improvement (ordecline) does not alter their confidence in the legislature.With regard to political parties, the improvement ineconomic conditions that took place between 1996 and2000 only affected the probability of trusting parties underone specific circumstance. Someone who trusted othersand was satisfied with officeholders had a 12.7% chance ofhaving "quite a lot of confidence" in the legislature wheneconomic conditions were bad versus a 16% chance whenthey improved. These results support our theory – thatchanged economic conditions will not alter political trust inpartyizing systems. In only three of the 32 pairedcomparisons we examined in Venezuela did changedeconomic conditions affect the chances of trusting partiesor congress. This provides evidence that while the presenceor absence of interpersonal trust and satisfaction withofficeholders (good institutional performance) does affectthe level of trust in institutions, that relationship is notconditioned by economic circumstances.

In Colombia, a countrywithhighly personalizingelectorallaws, changes ineconomicconditionsmatter. Foragiven levelof trust and satisfaction with officeholders, changedeconomic conditions produce significantly different pre-dicted chances of confidence in political parties in 14 of 16cases and 8 of 16 cases for congress. An individual whodoesn’t trust others and is dissatisfied with officeholders hasabout a 1% chance of having "a great deal" of confidence anda 56% chance of having "none at all" in congress wheneconomic conditions are bad. When conditions improve, anindividual’s chance of having "a great deal" of confidencerises to 3% and having "none at all" falls to 38.5%.While thesegains seemmodest, there is no overlap in the 90% confidenceintervals in either case. For almost all combinations of inter-personal trust and satisfaction with officeholders, economicconditions shift trust in political parties. The only exceptionsare that those who are trusting of others and satisfied withofficeholders do not have a different probability of sayingthey have "not very much" confidence or "none at all" inpolitical parties when economic conditions change. Thisconfirms our expectation that economic conditions influenceinstitutional trust to a higher degree when voters hold indi-viduals – rather than parties – responsible. In the case of thelegislature, however, we notice that only in cases where the

Table 3How interpersonal trust and institutional performance affect institutional trust in Colombia and Venezuela.

A great deal Quite a lot not very much none at all A great deal Quite a lot not very much none at all

No interpersonal trustDissatisfied with officeholders

Poor Economic Conditions

0.044[.030 - .063]

0.075[.054 - .099]

0.237[.189 - .280]

0.644[.565 - .720]

0.012[.009 - .015]

0.112[.095 - .129]

0.316[.293 - .340]

0.561[.522 - .597]

Good Economic Conditions

0.042[.030 - .057]

0.151[.115 - .192]

0.321[.280 - .360]

0.486[.410 - .562]

0.03[.022 - .039]

0.184[.150 - .221]

0.401[.375 - .425]

0.385[.327 - .444]

Trust othersDissatisfied with officeholders

Poor Economic Conditions

0.061[.054 - .099]

0.100[.069 - .138]

0.277[.226 - .325]

0.562[.462 - .661]

0.013[.009 - .018]

0.123[.098 - .149]

0.330[.297 - .362]

0.535[.475 - .592]

Good Economic Conditions

0.038[.024 - .058]

0.139[.095 - .192]

0.308[.257 - .356]

0.514[.403 - .618]

0.041[.029 - .056]

0.232[.183 - .286]

0.413[.392 - .434]

0.313[.249 - .385]

No interpersonal trustSatisfied with officeholders

Poor Economic Conditions

0.090[.054 - .132]

0.133[.091 - .180]

0.313[.265 - .357]

0.464[.351 - .580]

0.023[.017 - .030]

0.197[.168 - .227]

0.390[.370 - .409]

0.390[.347 - .434]

Good Economic Conditions

0.115[.082 - .153]

0.297[.245 - .348]

0.344[.309 - .378]

0.244[.185 - .310]

0.034[.025 - .043]

0.203[.171 - .237]

0.409[.386 - .431]

0.354[.305 - .405]

Trust othersSatisfied with officeholders

Poor Economic Conditions

0.123[.071 - .191]

0.166[.115 - .220]

0.330[.289 - .365]

0.382[.262 - .518]

0.026[.018 - .035]

0.213[.172 - .255]

0.395[.374 - .416]

0.365[.309 - .428]

Good Economic Conditions

0.105[.067 - .154]

0.281[.214 - .348]

0.347[.309 - .380]

0.267[.185 - .358]

0.046[.009 - .062]

0.254[.205 - .308]

0.415[.393 - .436]

0.285[.229 - .348]

A great deal Quite a lot not very much none at all A great deal Quite a lot not very much none at all

No interpersonal trustDissatisfied with officeholders

Poor Economic Conditions

0.025[.016 - .036]

0.058[.040 - .078]

0.209[.164 - .259]

0.709[.633 - .775]

0.005[.004 - .007]

0.051[.042 - .060]

0.241[.215 - .268]

0.704[.668 - .736]

Good Economic Conditions

0.023[.015 - .034]

0.092[.064 - .125]

0.225[.182 - .270]

0.660[.583 - .735]

0.023[.017 - .031]

0.137[.108 - .167]

0.366[.331 - .399]

0.474[.409 - .538]

Trust othersDissatisfied with officeholders

Poor Economic Conditions

0.038[.022 - .059]

0.084[.056 - .117]

0.264[.205 - .324]

0.613[.504 - .707]

0.007[.005 - .010]

0.070[.054 - .089]

0.297[.254 - .340]

0.626[.565 - .685]

Good Economic Conditions

0.026[.015 - .039]

0.103[.065 - .146]

0.239[.182 - .292]

0.632[.531 - .734]

0.031[.021 - .044]

0.173[.131 - .217]

0.393[.359 - .424]

0.402[.328 - .482]

No interpersonal trustSatisfied with officeholders

Poor Economic Conditions

0.042[.024 - .067]

0.090[.059 - .131]

0.275[.213 - .337]

0.593[.478 - .697]

0.009[.007 - .013]

0.090[.073 - .107]

0.341[.309 - .372]

0.560[.513 - .607]

Good Economic Conditions

0.039[.025 - .057]

0.146[.106 - .194]

0.289[.247 - .330]

0.526[.434 - .611]

0.029[.029 - .038]

0.165[.134 - .198]

0.390[.361 - .416]

0.416[.360 - .473]

Trust othersSatisfied with officeholders

Poor Economic Conditions

0.064[.034 - .104]

0.127[.079 - .104]

0.321[.255 - .376]

0.489[.354 - .626]

0.013[.009 - .018]

0.122[.093 - .152]

0.391[.349 - .429]

0.474[.406 - .544]

Good Economic Conditions

0.044[.027 - .067]

0.160[.109 - .220]

0.298[.252 - .342]

0.497[.391 - .606]

0.039[.027 - .055]

0.206[.162 - .255]

0.408[.382 - .431]

0.347[.278 - .418]

Confidence in the Legislature

Confidence in Political Parties

Venezuela (1996 v. 2000) Colombia (1998 v 2005)

Venezuela (1996 v. 2000) Colombia (1998 v 2005)

A. Ross, M. Escobar-Lemmon / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 406–416 415

respondent is dissatisfiedwithofficeholders does a change ineconomic conditions shift confidence. This provides some ofthe most compelling evidence for our theory. Regardless ofwhether they trust their fellow citizens, it appears that theirunhappiness with the people running government isbleeding over into their evaluations of the institution as thehigh degree of personalism in the system has meshed insti-tutional and individual evaluations.

5. The price of personalizing politics: concludingthoughts on political trust

This analysis has filled a void in the extant scholarshipby exploring how economic conditions and electoral lawscondition the effect of cultural and institutional factorsupon political trust. Consistent with past research, wefound that both culture (measured as interpersonal trust)and institutional performance (measured as satisfactionwith officeholders and willingness to vote for the incum-bent) increased confidence in political parties and legisla-tures for a sample of 11 Latin American cases. But, electoralrules in conjunction with economic conditions also affectlevels of political trust. Personalizing electoral systemsexperience greater fluctuations in political trust as a result

of variable economic performance than do partyizingsystems as shown with the cases of Colombia andVenezuela, respectively. When voters have a connection toa party rather than an individual, they are they are morelikely to retain a consistent level of confidence in institu-tions when economic performance worsens.

Our study shows that macro economic conditions andelectoral rules influence the effects of culture and institu-tional performance on political trust, making their directinfluence on trust weaker and more difficult in times ofmacroeconomic decline especially if a country has adoptedan electoral law that encourages personal vote seeking. Inthis sense institutional designers confront a serious choice.When writing electoral laws they must pick between onethat generates direct linkages between representatives andcitizens, encouraging legislators to pay attention toconstituent concerns or they must chose one that insteadencourages legislators to follow the party line, apportionsignificant responsibility to party leaders, and focus onnational policy. The later approach, while more common inLatin America, has fallen into problems in some cases as"partyocracy" was assumed to be bad, generating discon-tent among voters who felt congress didn’t care aboutthem. In this context countries like Venezuela moved away

A. Ross, M. Escobar-Lemmon / Electoral Studies 30 (2011) 406–416416

from purely closed-list proportional representation toa mixed member system in an effort to try to establish thelinkages between parties and voters found in morepersonalizing systems (Crisp and Rey, 2001). Our findingsshow, however, that this kind of decision comes witha price. By adopting personalizing electoral laws, countriesmay encourage a higher degree of the parochial politicsthat makes citizen’s feel their concerns as constituents arebeing respected, but it may also increase the stakes of goodeconomic management. Personalizing systems do notgenerate the kind of institutional trust that partyizingsystems do from the start. Moreover, they are more likely tosee trust deteriorate when economic conditions sour. Inthis case, the price of attentiveness to constituent concernsmay be lower levels of overall confidence in institutions.

In Latin America, the biggest swings in trust in institu-tionswere found incountrieswithpersonalizing rather thanpartyizing laws. As the economy improved, trust in politicalinstitutions was restored – in part as a function of theperceived improvement in the way institutions worked.Meanwhile in cases where electoral laws were partyizing,economic conditions did not matter as much. While trustdid not decline, policymakerswho shepherded the recoveryalso were not rewarded with increased trust in institutions.Our research suggests that in countriesmost profoundlyanddeeply affected by the economic downturn of 2008, thosewhichhave adoptedpersonalizingelectoral laws aremost atrisk of having trust in institutions erode.While it is unlikelythat this would threaten democracy in well-establisheddemocracies like the United States, the picturemight not beso rosy where democracy is new and developing. Countrieswith partyizing electoral laws are certainly not immunefrom declining institutional trust and its consequences, butthey may be better able to weather the storm.

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