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  • 8/13/2019 The Politics of Poverty Measurement; The Chilean Case

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    ThePoliticsofPovertyMeasurement:

    TheChileanCase

    VladimirGlasinovic([email protected])

    Abstract

    Changingthepovertymeasurementmethodologyisatechnicalandpoliticaldecision.InChile,technicalconsiderationshavedominatedthediscussionsofar.InthispaperIargueforincreasedattentiontowardsthepoliticsofpovertymeasurementandpresentamodelto

    explaintheoutcomesofabargainingprocesstowardsmethodologyreform.Consequently,Itestthemodelwith5differentconfigurationsbasedonthecurrentalternativesbeingdiscussed.ThiswayIconcludethatthechancesofmethodologycontestationcanbeavariableaffectingthe

    outcomesofthepoliticalprocess.

    I. Introduction

    Povertymeasurementmethodologiesareontherise.Increasingdataavailability,larger

    interestamongpolicymakersandagrowingstockofinvestigatorsintheareaisexpandingthe

    availableliteratureatafastpace.Thisdiscussiontakesspecialrelevanceinaregionsuchas

    LatinAmericawhichhasdisplayedsustainedeconomicgrowthanddecreasinglevelsofpoverty

    andinequalityduringthepastdecadeleadingtotheexhaustionofsomepovertyindicators.In

    Chile,thediscussionabouttheadvantagesanddisadvantagesaboutdifferentmethodologiesis

    startingtotakeoff,withtheinvolvementofpoliticians,NGOs,thinktanksandresearchers.

    FromLarrain(2008)updatedabsolutepovertylinetoFUNASUPO(2009)guaranteedsocial

    thresholds,

    and

    from

    GPS

    (2010)

    multiple

    measurements

    recommendation

    to

    Sanhueza

    et

    al

    (2010)dichotomicapproach1whichsuggesteitheramultidimensionaloracombinedapproach

    dependingonthecontinuationofthecurrentmethodology,playersarevoicingtheiropinions

    andadvocatingtheirpreferredtechnicalsolutions.

    1Sanhuezaetal(2010)suggestsimplementingamultidimensionalapproachiftheobjectiveistocomplement

    currentmeasuresandtoimplementacombinedapproachiftheobjectiveistoreplaceit.

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    Nevertheless,discussionabouthowtoaddressthepoliticalprocessofadoptingoneor

    anothermethodologyhaslag.Glasinovic(2010)hasarguedthattheselectionofamethodology

    isnottheonlyrelevantdecisionandthatmoreattentionshouldbedrawntotheinstitutional

    processesusedtoselectit.Heshowsthattheinternationalexperiencedisplaysdiverselevelsof

    internalsupportforenactedmethodologiesandarguesthatalargerdegreeofsupportthata

    methodologyenjoys,thehigherthechancesofreachingconsensusoneffectivepoverty

    reductionstrategies.Thepurposeofthepaperistoinitiateadiscussionaboutthepolitical

    considerationssurroundingchangesinpovertymeasurementmethodologies,withaspecial

    focusontheChileancase.

    Thispaperisstructuredinfoursections.Inthesecondsectionafterthisone,Ipresenta

    briefliteraturereviewonthemostusedpovertymeasurementtechnologies,relyingmainlyin

    theGroupofRiodefinitions.Thiscomprehendsthepovertylineapproach,the

    multidimensionalpovertyapproachandthecombinedapproach.ThenIreviewthedegreeof

    internalsupport

    that

    different

    poverty

    methodologies

    enjoy

    across

    countries

    to

    stress

    the

    importancethatpoliticalprocesseshaveinthelevelofsupportachieved.Consequently,I

    elaborateasimplepoliticaleconomymodeltoexplainthebargaininglogicamongarulingparty

    anditsoppositionintheprocessofchangingthepovertymeasurementmethodology.

    Inthethirdsection,Ianalyzethepoliticalforcesthatemergefromapplying5different

    technologiestotheChileanscenarioandassessthechancesofseeingeachmethodology

    implementedasaresultofapoliticalbargaininggame.Thefirstcaseanalyzedrepresentsthe

    statusquo,meaningthattheoutcomeofthepoliticalprocessresultsinthecontinued

    implementation

    of

    the

    current

    technology.

    The

    next

    4

    cases

    analyzed

    the

    implementation

    of

    differentsetsoftechnologies:i)anupdatedabsolutepovertylineii)arelativepovertylineiii)a

    multidimensionalpovertyindexandiv)acombinedapproachbetweenpovertylinesand

    multidimensionalpovertymeasurement.

    Inthefourthsection,Ipresentatablesummarizingtheresultsofthecasestudyanalysis

    andsomeconclusions.Ifinalizeelaboratingonpotentialareasoffurtherresearch.

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    II. Technologies,ExperiencesandPolitics

    InthissectionIreviewtheliteratureonthreespecificissues.FirstIdoageneral

    overviewofthepovertymeasurementtechnologies.Secondly,Ipresentthefindingsof

    Glasinovic

    (2010)

    about

    the

    international

    experience

    on

    poverty

    measurement.

    Finally,

    I

    elaborateapoliticaleconomymodeltoexplainthepoliticsofpovertymeasurement.

    PovertyMeasurementTechnologiesThisliteratureisfullofdifferentnotations.AcrossthispaperIusetheRioGroup(2006)

    notationofpovertymeasurementapproacheswhichdividestheminthreelargegroups:

    First,thepovertylineapproachwhichissubdividedinabsolutepovertylines,relative

    povertylinesandsubjectivepovertylines.Thisapproachreliesonthedefinitionofamonetary

    amountthatdividespeoplein2groups:poorandnonpoor.Theabsolutepovertylineis

    associatedtothecostofbuyinganessentialbasketofgoodswiththeminimumamountof

    caloriesneededtosustainlife.Chilecurrentlyusesanabsolutepovertylineapproachasits

    officialpovertymeasurementwhichiscalculatedbythePlanningMinistryMIDEPLAN(2010).

    Larrain(2008)hasproposedandupdatedpovertylinemethodologywhichisalsousedinthis

    paper.Therelativepovertylineiscalculatedusingacertainleveloflifeasareference.Inthis

    paperIuseEUROSTAT(2010)mostusedmeasureswhichare40%,50%and60%ofthemedian

    income.

    Second,themultidimensionalpovertyapproachwhichreliesonthedefinitionof

    deprivationindicators

    across

    different

    dimensions

    such

    as

    education,

    health

    or

    housing.

    A

    crucialaspectunderthisapproachistheaggregationcriteria.ThispaperusesmainlyAlkire&

    Foster(2011)dualcutoffmethodology:onewithineachdimensiontodeterminewhethera

    personisdeprivedinthatdimension,andasecondacrossdimensionsthatidentifiesthepoor

    bycountingthedimensionsinwhichapersonisdeprived.

    Third,thecombinedapproachwhichusesboth,thepovertylineapproachandthe

    multidimensionalpovertyapproachtodividethepopulationinfoursegments.Toachievethis,

    both,thepovertylineandthemultidimensionalpovertyapproachesareappliedtotheresearch

    subject.Ifthehousehold2ispoorunderbothmethodologies,itisclassifiedasmultidimensional

    poor.Ifitisnonpoorunderbothmethodologies,thesubjectisclearlynonpoor.Whenthe

    householdispoorunderthepovertylineapproach,butnonpoorunderthemultidimensional

    approachitisclassifiedasrising.Whenthehouseholdisnonpoorunderthepovertyline

    approach,butpoorunderthemultidimensionalapproachitisclassifiedasvulnerable.To

    2Thismethodologycanbeappliedoverhouseholdsorindividuals.Forsimplicity,Iwillrefertothesubjectin

    questionasahousehold.

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    calculatepovertyratesunderthisapproach,thispaperfollowsthemethodologyoftheMexican

    NationalCouncilofSocialDevelopmentPolicy CONEVAL(2010).

    InternationalexperiencesinpovertymeasurementAdopting

    any

    approach

    for

    poverty

    measurement

    is

    far

    from

    being

    just

    atechnical

    problem.Thepoliticalprocessthatisfollowedtoadoptacertainmethodologycanproduce

    differentoutcomesintermsofthelegitimacythatthepovertymeasurementwillhave.

    Glasinovic(2010)distinguishesthreegroupsofcountries,characterizingthedifferentlevelsof

    supportthatpovertymeasureshave.

    First,thereisanimportantgroupofcountrieswheresocietyhasnotreachaconsensus

    inadefinitionofpoverty.Insomecases,thegovernmentdoesnothaveanexplicitdefinition,

    butregularstatisticsarepublishedthatareusuallyinterpretedbythemediaasthepoverty

    indicators.ThisisthecaseofCanadaforexample.Inothercases,thegovernmenthasanofficial

    definitionthat

    lacks

    social

    legitimacy

    and

    is

    contested

    by

    alternative

    measurements

    from

    independentthinktankssuchasinAustralia.

    Asecondgroupofcountriescomprehendsthecaseswherethedegreeofconsensusis

    partial.Insomecases,thisisbecausetheincomingadministrationimposesitsownpoverty

    definitionsettingitasitsframeworkandbenchmarkforassessingprogressonsocialand

    economicpolicies.AnexampleofthissituationistheUnitedKingdomwhereconservatives

    startedwithapovertylineapproachwhichwaschangedbyamultidimensionalpoverty

    approachwhenlabourismarrivedtopower.

    Athirdgroupofcountriesinvolvetheoneswherethedefinitionofpovertyissharedby

    mostoftheactorshavingalargedegreeoflegitimacy.Thisconsensuscanbereachedeitherby

    broadbaseagreementsinbothtechnicalandpoliticaltermsandmightbeinstitutionalizedbya

    billdefiningthekeyaspectssuchasdefinition,measurementmethodology,timeframeof

    measurementandorganismsinchargeofimplementingtheprocessinatransparentway.A

    goodexampleofthisisMexico,wheretheGeneralSocialDevelopmentBilldefinedthe

    CONEVALasapublicagencywithtechnicalindependencewiththemissionofregulatingand

    coordinatingtheevaluationofpublicpoliciesincludingthemeasurementofthepovertyrate.

    Insummary,

    it

    is

    not

    only

    relevant

    the

    chosen

    approach

    to

    measure

    poverty,

    but

    also

    theinstitutionalprocessfollowedtoadopttheapproachthatcanproducediverselevelsof

    support.Itappearstobeevidentthatthelargerthedegreeofconsensusandlegitimacythe

    selectedmethodologyenjoys,thelargerwouldbethelevelofsupportthatpovertyreduction

    strategiescouldachieve.

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    AmodeltoanalyzethepoliticsofpovertymeasurementToanalyzethepoliticsofchangingthepovertymeasurement,Iwillborrow(Drazen)useful

    distinctionamongtwokindsofinterestsheterogeneity.Exanteheterogeneityreferstothe

    differentpolicypreferencesthatpoliticalactorshaveastheyapproachtothepoliticalarena.In

    mymodel,

    there

    are

    two

    actors,

    acenter

    left

    coalition

    (Concertacin)

    who

    has

    apolicy

    preferenceforapproachesthatemphasizeredistributionandacenterrightcoalition(Alianza)

    whohasapolicypreferenceforapproachesthatemphasizetheimportanceofeconomic

    growth.Ididaneducatedguessabouttheexantepolicypreferencesthatispresentedinthe

    Figure1.ProximitytotheredistributionlabelrepresentsahigherpreferencebyConcertacin

    andproximitytotheeconomicgrowthlabelrepresentsahigherpreferencebyAlianza.

    Figure1:ExAntepolicypreferences

    Source:Authorscalculations

    Expostheterogeneityreferstothecostsandbenefitsassociatedwithimplementinga

    certainpolicythroughacollectivechoicemechanism.Inmytwoactormodel,wecanassumea

    EconomicGrowth

    Redistribution

    Updated

    Absolute

    Poverty

    Line

    Relative

    Poverty

    Line MultiDimensionalPovertyIndex

    CombinedApproach

    Current

    Absolute

    Poverty

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    zerosumscenario,wherebothactorshavetheincentivestomaximizetheirrelativegainsor

    minimizetheirrelativecosts.

    Formymodel,Iassumethatreportinganincreasinglevelofpovertyisarelativeexpost

    politicalcostforthecoalitioninpowerorarelativegainfortheoppositionandviceversawhen

    reportingdecreasing

    levels

    of

    poverty.

    Ialso

    assume

    that

    only

    the

    government

    coalition

    has

    the

    powertochangethepovertymethodologyandthatonlytheoppositioncoalitionhasthepower

    tocontestthelegitimacyofthemethodology.Fromthesocialplannerpointsofview,theonly

    relevantvariableisthelevelofsupportthatanimplementedmethodologyhas,wherethe

    higherthesupportofthepolicythemoreoptimalitis.

    III. Casestudyanalysis

    Inthissection,IanalyzedifferentpathsthatChilecouldtakewithregardstoitsofficial

    povertymeasurement

    methodology

    showing

    the

    trends

    in

    poverty

    rates

    that

    each

    would

    displayandelaboratingonthepoliticalimplicationsoftheresults.Idividethesedifferentpaths

    in5casesthatarebasedonthemainalternativesthatarebeingdiscussed.Case0,represents

    thestatusquo,assumingthatthecurrentabsolutepovertylinemethodologyiskeptunchanged.

    Case1,showsascenariowherethecurrentabsolutepovertylinemethodologyisupdated

    followingLarrain(2008)proposal,incorporatingrecentdataandmoredetailedconsideration

    onthecalculationoftheessentialbasketofgoodsbutkeepingingeneraltermstheframework

    proposedbyECLAC.Case2,reflectstheincorporationofrelativepovertylinesfollowingthe

    measuresthataremostusedbyEUROSTAT(2010).Case3,departsfromthecurrentpoverty

    lineapproach,

    incorporating

    multidimensional

    poverty

    measurements

    following

    Alkire

    &

    Foster

    (2011).Case4,elaboratesonacombinationofthepovertylineapproachandthe

    multidimensionalpovertyapproachfollowingthemethodologydefinedbyCONEVAL(2010).

    Case0:StatusquoThecurrentwayofmeasuringpovertyinChilefellsunderthepovertylineapproach,

    specifically,anabsolutepovertyline,andithasbeenkeptwithoutsignificantchangesduring

    thelast

    20

    years.

    It

    was

    implemented

    during

    the

    last

    years

    of

    the

    Pinochets

    dictatorship,

    and

    waskeptunchangedbytheConcertacionwhenittookpowerin1990.

    Thisabsolutepovertylineiscalculatedwithrespecttothecostsassociatedtobuyan

    essentialbasketofgoods.Asinmostplaces,twopovertylinesaredefined.Thefirstone,which

    iscalledtheextremepovertyline,isbasedonthecostofbuyingabasketoffoodgoodsthat

    containtheminimumamountofcaloriesthatthehumanbodyrequirestofunctioningood

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    conditions.Asecondpovertylineiscalculatedmultiplyingtheformeramountbyacoefficient

    totakeintoconsiderationtheconsumptionofothernonfoodrelatedgoodsthatare

    consideredessentialaswell. Figure2showstheofficialabsolutepovertymeasurementunder

    thecurrentmethodologyfrom1990to2009.

    Figure2: OfficalAbsolutePovertyinChile(1990 2009)

    Source:AuthorscalculationsusingCASENSeries

    Thetrends

    presented

    on

    Figure

    2show

    aconsistent

    decline

    in

    both,

    the

    total

    poverty

    rateaswellastheextremepovertyrate..Inalmost20years,from1990to2009,totalpoverty

    ratedeclinedfrom38.6%to15.1%andextremepovertyfrom13%to3.7%.Theslightincrease

    ofpovertyratesbetween2006and2009aremostlyassociatedtotheeconomiccrisisduring

    2008andisnotconsideredasachangeinthetrendformyanalysis.

    Becauseofitstransparentmethodologyandthepublicreleaseofdata,thecurrent

    povertymeasurementmethodologyiswellrespectedbytheacademiaandpolicymakersacross

    thepoliticalspectrum.Doubtsabouttheveracityofthedataortheprocessingofithavenot

    beenraised

    among

    serious

    actors.

    Nevertheless,

    some

    actors

    such

    as

    Larrain

    (2008)

    have

    arguedthatthemeasurementisbecomingobsoletesincethelowlevelsofpovertythatis

    currentlypresentingdoesnotprovideusefulinformationforpolicymakerslookingto

    understandandaddresstheproblemsofalargershareofthepopulation.

    Politicalanalysis

    38.6

    32.8

    27.7

    23.221.6

    20.218.7

    13.7 15.1

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    25

    30

    35

    40

    45

    1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009

    TotalPoverty Poor(NotExtremelyPoor) ExtremePoverty

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    WhentryingtoexplainwhytheConcertacinmaintainedthestatusquoduringitstime

    ingovernment,themostimportantexplanationsliesintheexpostheterogeneity.Changingthe

    currentmethodologywouldhaveimpliedtogiveupthegainsofkeepingamethodologythat

    wasconsistentlyshowingdecreasingratesofpoverty.FromthepointofviewofAlianza,

    contestingthecurrentmethodologypresentedfewbenefitsfortworeasons.First:itwas

    implementedbyitspoliticalpredecessorsandcontestingitwouldbeanindirectcritictothem.

    Secondly,thecurrentmethodologywasuptoalargedegreeconsistentwithitspolicy

    preferencesreducingtheincentivestocriticizeit.

    OncetheAlianzatookofficein2010,exantepolicypreferencesfavoredachange

    towardsamoreprogrowthmethodology,butexpostpoliticalcostsofreportinghigherlevels

    ofpovertyfavoredthestatusquopredictinganambiguousoutcomeasaresultofthe

    bargainingprocess.Nevertheless,ItispossibletoargueAlianzas honeymooncondition

    couldhaveamelioratedthecoststoacertaindegreeincomparisontothecostthat

    Concertacioncould

    have

    faced.

    Case1:UpdatingtheAbsolutePovertyLineAnupdatedabsolutepovertyhasbeenproposedbyLarrain(2008)aneconomistfrom

    theAlianzawhoistheactingFinanceMinister.Hismethodologyfollowsingeneraltermsthe

    frameworkusedbyECLACincorporatingamongothersignificantvariationsthatit:

    Uses

    the

    V

    Household

    Budget

    Survey

    from

    1996

    1997

    as

    opposed

    to

    the

    IV

    Household

    BudgetSurveyfrom19871988.

    Uses2001FAOWHOUNnutritionalrecommendationsasopposedto1985

    recommendations.

    Usespricequintilization,incorporatinghowfoodpricesdifferaccordingtoitspointofsale.

    Usesautilizationfactortoacknowledgethatitisnoteffectivetoassumethata100%ofthe

    nutrientsandcaloriesconsideredintheessentialbasketofgoodsareconsumed,giventhat

    someportion(dependingonthefood)islostduringpreparationorcooking.

    Usesequivalenceofscale,attendingtodifferencesinconsumptionacrossagesandgender3.

    Domesticwork

    adjustment,

    to

    take

    into

    consideration

    that

    people

    that

    work

    on

    houses

    usuallygetstheirmealintheirplaceofwork.

    Theresultofincorporatingallthischangesproducesanabsolutepovertylinethatis51%

    higherthantheonecalculatedbyMIDEPLAN.Figure3showsthateventhoughbothmeasures

    3AcompleterevisionofequivalenceofscalesisprovidedbyECLAC(2001)

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    displayasimilardownwardtrend,Larrain(2008)measuresareapproximatelytwicethanthe

    measuresfromMIDEPLAN

    Figure3:ComparativeAbsolutePovertyRatesinChile(20002009)

    Source:AuthorscalculationsusingCASENSeries,MIDEPLAN(2010)andLarrain(2008)

    PoliticalanalysisWhentheConcertacinwasinoffice,twoforcespreventedtheimplementationofthis

    approach.

    Ex

    ante

    policy

    preferences

    opposed

    a

    change

    towards

    a

    more

    pro

    growth

    methodologyandgreatexpostpoliticalcostsalsoactedagainstthisdirectionofreformwhich

    altogethersuggeststhatthisisaveryunlikelydirectionofreform.

    OncetheAlianzatookoffice,exantepolicypreferencesrepresentedaforcesupporting

    changeinthisdirection,giventhatanupdatedabsolutepovertylinewouldseemtobetter

    reflectitspolicypreferences.Nevertheless,expostpoliticalcostsremainedequallyhigh.The

    chancesthatConcertacincontestedthisnewapproach,wherealsohigh,giventhatthispolicy

    isfartherawayfromitspolicypreferences.Hence,inthiscase,theresultofthispathis

    ambiguousgiventhatexanteandexpostforcesopposedeachother.

    Case2:IncorporatingRelativePovertyLinesRelativepovertylinesfallinthepovertylineapproach.Inthiscase,themonetary

    amountthatdefineswhoisornotpoorisdefinedinrelationtocertainstandardoflife.The

    0

    5

    10

    15

    20

    25

    30

    35

    40

    2000 2003 2006 2009

    Larrain(2008)PovertyLine MIDEPLAN(2010)PovertyLine

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    relativepovertylinesmostusedbyEUROSTAT(2010)aredefinedas40%,50%or60%ofthe

    medianincome.Medianincomeisusedasopposedtoaverageincomegiventhattheformer

    tendstobemorestableandlessdependentonthefluctuationsonhigherincomes.

    Figure4showstheobservedtrendofrelativepovertyinChile.Whenincorporating

    thesemeasures,

    it

    is

    possible

    to

    observe

    that

    relative

    poverty

    in

    Chile

    would

    have

    increased

    slightlybetween1992and1998anddecreasedinthesamewaylatelybetween1998and2006

    toreturntolevelssimilartotheonesof1992.Year2009representsthefirsttimethatrelative

    povertyratesarebelowthemeasuresobservedin1992.

    Figure4:RelativePovertyRatesinChile(19922009)

    Source:AuthorscalculationsusingCASENSeries

    Ingeneral,itispossibletoobservethatthedifferentmeasuresofrelativepovertytend

    tobeconsistentamongthem.Thisis,whenonemeasuremovesinacertaindirection

    (downwardorupwardtrend)mostoftheothermeasuresmoveinthesamedirection.Whatis

    notconsistentarethetrendsdisplayedamongabsoluteandrelativepovertylines.Theformer,

    displayacontinued

    decrease

    in

    poverty

    in

    Chile

    since

    the

    90s,

    while

    the

    latter

    show

    that

    povertyrateshaveonlystartedtodeclinerecently.

    PoliticalanalysisWhentheConcertacinwasinoffice,exantepoliticalpreferencesfavoredchangein

    thisdirectionbutexpostpoliticalcostsactedagainstbecauseitwouldhaveimpliedgivingup

    0%

    5%

    10%

    15%

    20%

    25%

    30%

    1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009

    Porcentage(%)

    ao

    med60

    med50

    med40

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    thecurrentmethodologywhichwasdisplayingconsistentexpostpoliticalbenefitsintheform

    ofsteadydeclineinpovertymeasurements.Theconflictingdirectionsoftheforcessuggestthat

    thisisnotalikelyoutcome.Furthermore,thepossibilitythatAlianzacontestedthispathof

    reformcanalsobeincludedinthebalanceofforces.

    Oncethe

    Alianza

    took

    office,

    ex

    ante

    political

    preferences

    opposed

    change

    in

    this

    directionandinthesamewaythatexpostpoliticalcost,configuringaveryunlikelypathof

    evolution.

    Case3:IntroducingMultidimensionalPovertyIndexAmultidimensionalpovertymeasurementreliesontheaggregationofdeprivation

    indicators.Thismethodmeasuresdifferentdimensionsofthehousehold(health,education,

    nutrition,etc)

    and

    contrasts

    them

    again

    apredefined

    set

    of

    thresholds

    for

    each

    of

    these

    dimensionstoassesifthehouseholdisornotdeprivedineachdimension.Themaindifference

    withthepovertylineapproachliesinthemultidimensionalityoftheassessment.Whileunder

    thepovertylineapproachasubjectisalwayseitherpoorornonpoor,themultidimensional

    approachallowsfordifferentlevelsofdeprivationdependingonthenumberofdimensionsin

    whichthehouseholdispoorornot.

    TheintroductionofaMultidimensionalPovertyindex,requiresthedefinitionofthe

    dimensions,thethresholdsandtheaggregationcriteria.Sanhueza(2010)doesthisforthe

    Chileancontext

    considering

    5dimensions:

    i)Education

    4

    ,ii)

    Health

    5

    ,iii)

    Housing

    6

    ,iv)

    Work

    7

    and

    v)

    Income.

    Fortheincomedimension,3differentthresholdsareconsidered.i)Thecurrentabsolute

    povertylineusedbyMIDEPLAN(2010),ii)theupdatedabsolutepovertylineproposedby

    Larrain(2008)andiii)arelativepovertylinedefinedas50%ofthemedianincome.

    Asfortheaggregationcriteria,Sanhueza(2010)calculatestheresultsfortheunion

    criteria(deprivedin1ormoredimension),intersectioncriteria(deprivedin5dimensions),and

    4i)Childrenbetween4and5thatdonotassisttoschoolbecauseoflackofaccess,childrenbetween6and16that

    donot

    assist

    school

    that

    do

    not

    assist

    to

    school

    or

    havent

    achieved

    the

    12

    years

    compulsory

    education.

    ii)

    People

    requiringspecialeducationthatisnotassistingtoschoolordontknowhowtoreadandwrite.Iii)People

    economicallyactivewhichhaventreach12yearsofcompulsoryeducation.iv)Seniorswithoutminimumlevelof

    schoolingandthatdontknowhowtowrite.5i)Peoplewithouthealthcoverage.ii)=PeoplethatconsultedwithregardsAUGEsicknessduringlast12yearsand

    peoplewithhealthproblemsinthelast30days,exceptthosethatdidnotconsultbecauseitdidntseem

    necessary.6i)Housinglackingtoiletteorii)sufferingfromovercrowding.

    7i)Unemployedorinactivebyinvoluntaryreasonsorii)Workingunderinformalconditions

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  • 8/13/2019 The Politics of Poverty Measurement; The Chilean Case

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    reformb

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  • 8/13/2019 The Politics of Poverty Measurement; The Chilean Case

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    Page|14

    Vulnerablegrouparehouseholdswithlowincomebutnodeprivation:Thisgroupisnot

    currentlypoor,butiftheirincomeremainslowtheywillbecomepoor:theyarecurrently

    sinkingintopoverty.Thissituationoftenariseswhenincomefallrapidly(e.g.duetojobloss),

    butpeoplemanagetomaintaintheirlifestyle,atleastforafewmonth,bydrawingintheir

    savingsandusingassetsaccumulatedwhenincomewashigher.

    Risinggrouparehouseholdswithahighincomebutwith1ormoredeprivations.Thisgroupis

    currentlynotpoor,andiftheirincomeremainshightheirstandardoflivingwillriseescaping

    outofpoverty.Thisgroupisintheoppositesituationofthepreviousgroup.Thiscanoccur

    whentheincomeofsomeonewhoispoorsuddenlyincreases(e.gduetogettingajob),butit

    takestimebeforetheyareabletobuythethingsthattheyneedtoincreasetheirstandardof

    living.

    TheapplicationofCONEVAL(2010)totheChileancontextisdisplayedonFigure7and

    present

    a

    more

    complex

    description

    of

    poverty,

    especially

    because

    it

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    the

    large

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    ofarisinggroup8.Thesizeofthisgrouprangefrom45%to57%ofthepopulation,and

    encompasshouseholdsthathaveanincomeabovethedefinedthresholdbutsimultaneously

    presentdeprivationin1ormoreofthedimensions.Thedeprivationsthatrisinggroupsuffers

    rangefrominadequateeducationtolackofhealthcoverageorseriousillnessinthepast30

    days,tolackoftoiletteorovercrowdedhomesandtoinvoluntaryunemploymentorworking

    informallywithoutcontact.

    8ThesizeoftheVulnerablegroupfortheChileancontextissmallrangingfrom1%to%5.Itispossibletoargue

    thatthisgroupcouldrepresenttoalargeextenthouseholdsthatarenonpoorbutareexperiencinganormaland

    averageperiodofnoincomeduetounemploymentrelatedtoashiftfromonejobtoanother.Thepercentageof

    householdswithoutworkrelatedincomeinthisgroupcouldsuggestifthisisareasonablestatement.

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    PoliticalGive

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  • 8/13/2019 The Politics of Poverty Measurement; The Chilean Case

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    Page|16

    expostforcespointinthedirectionofreform,suggestingthatthisoutcomeislikely.Onthe

    contrary,theuseofarelativepovertylineoranupdatedpovertylinepresentsmoderateex

    postpoliticalcosts,representinganambiguouscasewherepoliticalincentivespointinopposed

    directionwiththeresultofanambiguousoutcome.

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    Page|17

    IV. ConclusionsandFutureResearch

    Adoptingapovertymeasurementapproachisatechnicalandapoliticaldecision.

    Differenttechnicalconsiderationswillimplydifferentlevelsofpovertyandwillemphasize

    certain

    problems

    of

    the

    population.

    These

    diverse

    outcomes

    will

    imply

    different

    incentives

    for

    politicalactorsinthebargainingprocess.Thispaperusedapoliticaleconomymodeltoanalyze

    analyzedthelikelihoodof5differentscenarios.Theconstructionofthisscenariosreliedonthe

    differentpovertymethodologiesthathasenteredthediscussioninChile.Asummaryofthe

    resultsispresentedinTable1.Agreencolorrepresentsaforcetowardschangewhileared

    colorrepresentsaforceagainstchange.Theyellowcolorreflectsambiguouscaseswherethe

    conditionsdoesnotallowtosuggestthelikelihoodorunlikelihoodofreform.

    Table1:

    Summary

    of

    Results

    from

    Case

    Studies

    ExAnte

    Preferecences

    (1=first,7=last)

    ExPost

    Preferences

    (1=first,7=last)

    Reform

    Chances

    Contestation

    Expectations

    Case0Concertacin 6 2 Ambiguous NoContestation

    Alianza 6 2 Ambiguous NoContestation

    Case1Concertacin 7 7 Unlikely NoContestation

    Alianza 1 7 Ambiguous Contestation

    Case2Concertacin 1 6 Ambiguous Contestation

    Alianza

    7

    6

    Unlikely

    NoContestation

    Case3Concertacin 2 5 Ambiguous Ambiguous

    Alianza 2 5 Ambiguous Ambiguous

    Case4with

    CurrentPoverty

    Line

    Concertacin 4 1 Likely Ambiguous

    Alianza 4 1 Likely Ambiguous

    Case4withLarrain

    PovertyLine

    Concertacin 5 3 Ambiguous Ambiguous

    Alianza 3 3 Ambiguous Ambiguous

    Case4with

    RelativePoverty

    Line

    Concertacin 3 4 Ambiguous Ambiguous

    Alianza

    5

    4

    Ambiguous

    Ambiguous

    Source:Authorscalculations

    FromtheanalysisofTable1,itispossibletoconcludethatcases1and2arethemost

    unlikelytohappen.Incase1(updatingthepovertyline)politicalcostsareeitherunbalanced

    withpositivepolicypreferencesorthereisanevidentriskofcontestation.Case2

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    (incorporatingrelativepovertylines)representstheparallelsituationfromCase1butinverting

    thesituationofConcertacionandAlianza.

    Case3(introducingamultidimensionalpovertyindex)presentsambiguousresults

    withoutthepossibilityofsuggestingthatthisiseitheralikelyorunlikelyoutcome.Forboth

    actors,ex

    ante

    policy

    preferences

    are

    positives

    but

    balanced

    agains

    by

    negative

    ex

    post

    politicalcosts.

    Case4(introducingacombinedapproachtopovertymeasurement)presentdiverse

    chancesdependingonthepovertylinemethodthatisusedtocombinewiththe

    multidimensionalapproach.Whenusingtheupdatedandtherelativepovertylines,the

    outcomeisambiguousasexpostpoliticalcostsbalanceagainstthepositiveexantepolicy

    preferences.

    Nevertheless,whenusingthecurrentpovertyline,theoutcomeislikelydueto

    favorableex

    ante

    policy

    preferences

    and

    positive

    ex

    post

    political

    gains

    associated

    to

    reporting

    alowerlevelofpoverty.Accordingtothismodel,thisoutcomeisevenmorelikelythanthe

    Case0(statusquo)risingthequestionaboutwhythispathwasnotfollowedbyConcertacionor

    haventbeenpursuedbyAlianza.Onepossibleexplanationcouldbethattheexpectationof

    ambiguouscontestationinthiscasebalancesagainstitslikelihoodmeanwhiletheexpectation

    ofnocontestationinCase0balancesinfavorofthiscase.Thisresultsuggeststhatthe

    expectationsofcontestationscanplayaroleindeterminingthebargainingprocessandthat

    increasedattentiontothepoliticsofpovertymeasurementshouldbeundertakentofurther

    understanditsdynamics.

    Futureresearchshouldtestiftheassumptionthatpovertymeasurements

    methodologiesthatenjoyhigherlevelsofsupporthavehigherchancesofproducingsuccessful

    povertyreductionstrategies.Itisalsoimportanttofurtherunderstandthemaindeterminants

    ofsuccessfulprocessesofreforminthesensethatfinaloutcomesenjoyhighlevelsofsupport.

    AbetterunderstandingofthepoliticalprocessinMexicoleadingtotheadoptionofCONEVAL

    (2010)shouldbeofgreathelpinthissense.

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